ML20148G363
| ML20148G363 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1988 |
| From: | Fisher W, Terc N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148G338 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-88-07, 50-458-88-7, NUDOCS 8803290121 | |
| Download: ML20148G363 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1988007
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION-IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-458/88-07
-License:
Docket:
50-458
Licensee: Gulf States Utilities'(GSU)
P.O. Box 220.
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St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
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Facility Name:
River Bend Station (RBS)
Inspection At:
RBS, St. Francisville,' Louisiana
Inspection Conducted:
February 22-25, 1988
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Inspector:
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N. M. Terc, Emergency Preparedness,i Specialist _
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Accompanying
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Personnel:
R. E. Farrell, Senior-Resident Inspbetor,
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Fort St. Vrain, Region IV, NRC
J. B. Baird, Technical Assistant, Region IV,
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NRC
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C. A. Hackney, Emergency Preparedness
Specialist, Region IV, NRC
G. Bryan, Nuclear Engineer, Comex Corporation
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Approved:
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W. L. Fisher, Chief, Nuclear Materials and
Date
Emergency Preparedness Branch
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted February 22-25, 1988 (Report 50-458/88-07)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's annual
emergency preparedness exercise.
Results: Within the areas inspected, two deficiencie's were identified
(paragraphs 5 and 6).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
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GSU
- J. Deddens, Senior Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group
- J. Cadwallader, Supervisor, Emergency Planning
- T. Plunkett, Plant Manager
- E. Grant, Director, Licensing
- K. Suhrke, Maneger, Project Management
- P. Graham, Assistant Plant Manager
- D. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Training
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- J. Booker, Manager, River Bend Oversight
- W. Odell, Manager, Administration
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NRC
- D. D. Chamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector
- L. J. Callan, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
- W. Paulson, NRC Project Manager, NRR
'* Denotes those present during the exit interview.
2.
Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
(Closed) Deficiency 458/8706-04:
Notification was delayed - The NRC
inspector noted that the licensee had developed and implemented a new
notification system based on a computer network connecting River Bend
emergency response facilities with those of offsite authorities.
This
eliminated the need to read the notification' form to the offsite agencics
over the state and local telephone hotline, resulting in a more rapid
method of notification and transmission of protective action
recommendations.
Licensee communicators had been trained and drilled in
using the system.
However, written procedures had not been finalized and
approved pending testing of the system during the exercise.
A problem
observed in the use of this system during the exercise is reported in
paragraph 5 below.
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3.
Control Room (82301-1.0)
The NRC inspector observed licensee activities in the Control Room (CR)
during the exercise, including CR emergency response organization staffing,
radiation protection, recordkeeping, communications and information flow
with other Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), turnover of
responsibilities, detection and classification of emergency events,
formulation of action recommendations, notifications, interface with
offsite officials ar.d the NRC, and the general conduct of the licensee's
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response to the simulated emergency.
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Communications and information flow from the CR to ERFs were good.
Procedures were followed and the staff was efficient as a team.
Classifications and notifications were timely, and recordkeeping was
adequate.
No violation or deviations were identified in this area.
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4.
Technical Support Center (82310-2.0)
The NRC inspector observed licensee activities in the Technical Support
Center (TSC) during the exercise, including TSC emergency response
organization staffing, radiation protection, recordkeeping, communications
and information flow with other ERFs, turnover of responsibilities,
technical assistance and support to the control room and TSC, detection and
classification of emergency events, formulation of action recommendations,
communications and information flow with other ERFs, notifications,
interface with offsite officials and the NRC, and the general conduct of
the licensee's response to the simulated emergency.
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The NRC inspector noted that staffing, activation, technical assistance
and support to the control room, classifications, and notifications were
adequate and timely. Occasional scenario problems were noted; e.g., the
erroneous assumption that Site Area Emergency conditions were present due
to loss of the capability to depressurize the reactor vessel.
In addition,
the inspector noted that responsibility for classification was not trans-
ferred to the Recovery Manager at the E0F.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Emergency Operations Facility (82301-3.0)
The NRC inspector observed licensee activities in the Emergency Operations
Facility (EOF) during the exercise, including E0F emergency response
organization staffing, facility activation, offsite dose assessment,
formulation of offsite protective action recommendations, notifications,
interface with offsite officials and the NRC, and the general conduct of
the licensee's response to the simulated emergency.
The NRC inspector observed that the EOF was staffed and activated in
approximately 52 minutes after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency, in
accordance with the emergency plan goal of 60 minutes.
Shortly after the
declaration of General Emergency by the Emergency Director in the TSC at
10:09 a.m., responsibilities for offsite agency notifications of accident
classification and protective action recommendations were transferred to-
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the Recovery Manager in G e EOF.
The inspector noted that the initial
notification to the state and parish officials was formulated, approved,
and transmission initiated at 10:24 a.m. by means of the computerized
notification system.
Shortly after this transmission, the Recovery
Manager noted that the recommendation to shelter Sections 1, 3, and 9 was
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in error, in that the notification should have stated to shelter Sections 1,
3, and 8.
At 10:26 a.m. the Recovery Manager directen the communicator to
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contact the offsite agencies via the telephone hotline to notify them of
this correction.
The communicator determined that East Feliciana parish
had not received the initial transmission, and read the notification form
to the parish communicator at approximately 10:29 a.m.
Subsequently, the
licensee communicator determined that Pointe Coupee and West Feliciana
parishes had not received the initial transmission, and gave them the
notification verbally.
Both East Feliciana and West Feliciana parishes
were in the pathway of the simulated release of radioactivity.
Therefore,
more than 20 minutes elapsed from declaration of General Emergency to the
initial notification of all offsite agencies responsible for implementing
protective actions for the public.
The inspector noted that notification
times exceeded the 15 minutes required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.D.3.
This constitutes an exercise deficiency (458/8807-01).
The NRC inspector noted that this deficiency was identified during the
licensee's postexercise critique and noted that the computer transmission
problem was reported as probably due to operator error and the
configuration of the software which contributed to the operator error.
The NRC inspector observed that a corrected notification form was
transmitted from the EOF by computer at 10:36 a.m.
During confirmation of
receipt of these notifications it was again determined that two parishes
(Pointe Coupee and West Feliciana) had not received these notifications,
and the TSC was requested to transmit the notification form.
The parishes
subsequently were contacted by telephone at 10:55 a.m. by the Recovery
Manager, who verified that they received the notification between 10:38
and 10:42 a.m.
The time elapsed from the declaration of General Emergency
to initial transmission of the corrected notification form was
approximately 27 minutes and the time to receive the notification form in
the two parishes identified above was about 30 minutes.
The inspector
noted that the parishes simulated sounding the public warning sirens at
11 a.m. and broadcasting a notification to the public over the Emergency
Broadcast System (EBS).
Thus, the public warning did not occur until about
51 minutes after the declaration of General Emergency.
The NRC inspector noted that good command and control was exercised by the
Recovery Manager throughout the exercise.
Information flow from outside
and within the EOF appeared to be good.
Status boards were maintained
current, except that the Notification Information board was not updated
between approximately 9:49 and 10:45 a.m. even though a General Emergency
had been declared at 10:09 a.m. and the initial notification to the offsite
agencies had been transmitted at 10:24 a.m.
The NRC inspector observed timely calculations of offsite doses and
measurement of radiological levels offsite by the field monitoring teams.
However, the inspector noted that the licensee's radiological assessment
staff had difficulty in resolving apparent differences between calculated
radiation projections and field data.
These discrepancies did not result
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in a nonconservative assessment of the offsite radiological assessment.
In
addition, the problem was identified and properly characterized by the
licensee's postexercise critique.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
6.
Operational Support Center (82301-4.0)
The NRC inspector observed licensee activities in the Operations Support
Center (OSC) during the exercise, including OSC emergency response
organization staffing, facility activation, team briefings, equipment and
instrumentation, status board upkeep, information flow with other ERFs,
radiological controls, logistics and support of inplant teams, and the
general conduct of the licensee's response to the simulated emergency.
The NRC inspector noted that the OSC was activated promptly after the Alert
was declared.
Although plant and accident status briefings were made
through the plant intercom system, the second OSC coordinator gave no
briefings after 9 a.m.
Onsite monitoring results were not posted, and the
status boards did not provide adequate space for maintaining information
required for keeping track of the various inplant teams.
Communications
and information flow, as well as general coordination and support of
inplant activities required by the operations staff, was adequate.
The
inspector noted that the supply of anticontamination clothing available in
the OSC was insufficient to support OSC activities throughout the exercise.
The inspector noted that the OSC coordinator failed to send a radiation
protection technician to the E0F, as required by Procedure EIP-2-017,
"Operations Support Center - Support Functions." This, together with the
failure to complete Attachment 3 of EIP-2-009, "Medical Emergencies," (see
paragraph 7 below) constitutes a deficiency (458/8807-02).
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
7.
Medical Team (82301-10.0)
The NRC inspector observed licensee activities during the "injured,
contaminated man" supplemental scenario.
In particular, the preparation
and implementation of first aid, and anticontamination assistance during
the exercise, and the general conduct of the licensee's response to the
simulated emergency were observed.
The NRC inspector determined that the radiation technicians and first aid
responders arrived promptly at the accident scene.
First aid and
decontamination techniques were found to be adequate.
The team kept the
control room informed of injuries and contamination levels.
The inspector
noted that Attachment 3 of EIP-2-009, "Medical Emergencies," was not
completed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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8.
Exit Interview
The NRC inspectors met with the NRC resident inspector and licensee
representatives identified in paragraph 1 on February 25, 1988, and
summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this
report.