ML20148C628
| ML20148C628 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1980 |
| From: | Nichols D AIR FORCE, DEPT. OF |
| To: | Kantor F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148C627 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8009040269 | |
| Download: ML20148C628 (7) | |
Text
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([7 11, i G JAN 1980 br. Palh Kantor Divinion of Gite Saf ety and Pnvironenntal ;\\nniv ti',
United Utates !!ucionr no julatory Conninsjon lianhington, P,C 20555 Door fir, Kantor Peference your converard ion on 4 Peer'ser 1979 with bt Col Dtoddard of thin Directorato.
The following ranpon9s to your ret;uest for nn updated analynis of th: ric':n nanociated with An accident betu?cn an aircraf t en the I!!
k UOD/601 (Daynhore) lou level training t: cute, end him nig noci:
Point Duc) oar Power Plant.
!!Q USAP han nerfornica the analynic be.ced on cmtrwit.. w.t i j a b l e dr ta and a piore concorvativo trnatnent of the cwonnent -
a pro'.mbil i t ies.
The hoy f actc which cmacgo f rc:a thic nnalvn.$.
arca (a)~ The probability of a crash in a 3 nanti&1 u.ile equare caclosing the power plant is lecc than one la a humhed t.1111 ion per year,.and i i (b)
L'ven thouuh the npdated er.timate in bauc;I on a nores contor/ativo nothodology, the data thc.nelves do not maggo9t any appreciable change in the rich to the power p?c.nt.
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potuithstanding the above, nort.croua actions hevo been tahon to assure the 5 Jely 1979 inadvertent overflight cf the pouer plant does not reoccur.
An 13 Ju3 y 197') Str*tegic Air Command r.cnnngo requiren thene npocific inctructiona and b
antions be tuken by aircreun and radar ho;ab ocoring nite y
ber:,onnel:
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.s' q1 (a)
Scoringcitokiernonnelwillurovideradarustning
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'to aircrows if the aircrist t <Ioviaten 3 milen tron conterlino, f
l arid 4..
(b)
Aircrews dill ta;.o panttive actions to return to i.
conterline.
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,i 5l THIS D00UMENTLC0rh AINS 1 <
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s Thin nonnage further requiron aircrew mianion planning I
cinphanic to innure that all aircrew pornonnel are auare of l
, potential proulom areas while 'the aircraft is operating near the nucicar facility.
The above meccago vith added information-was copplied to Mr. Richard Silver, Division of operating Beactors, Muclear Regulatory Conainsion with our j
'30 July 79 letter.
i Fe hope the above information will be of assictance to yon, i
and will help natisfy any requirenents that have developed in this regard.
l Sincerely Slenedi DAVID L. NICHOLS, Col, USAF 1 Atch Deputy Director for Operations Risk Analysis, 2 Jan 80
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and Training l
Directorate of Operations and i
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PCP1.Y TO
- W.d*I,o SAS M. JAN 1980 c.t it.
~
Risk Analysis of a Catantrophic Event at Bayshore Strategic sva n e
Training Bange (STR)
AF/XOOT
- l.. As you requested, we have exaulned the rit>k of SAC aircraf t "unhing into the Big Rock Huclear power plant while conducting lov altitude training at th+ nearby (5.7 NM offset chown in Atch 1) Baychore Strategic Training Esnce/ Instrument Route (STR/IR 600/601).
Our calculations (cummary in Atch 2) are baced on an adur*.ation of a.
the methodology of the original 1971 AF/0A study, but we utilized more recent data where appropriate and available.
b.
This approach estimates the probability of a crsch near Big Rock
. (i.e., in a.3 !!M by 3 NM equare enclocing the plant) to be icca than one in a hundred million per year.
L c.
Even the introduction of ct'ill more concervatirin into the cctinate, to reficct the imprecice and judcmental nature of such a risk analysis, vouJd not alter the basic result that the chance of'a crash in extremely n::?ll.
e 2.
The methodology in baned on the observation thatin crash into the power plant area can occur only by 'the combination of an ov'erflight and a crash during a,cmall segment of the total flight. This observatic,n may be elaborated as follows:
An overfli ht (of the 3 NM by 3 HM equare) can occur only. if the a:
C bomber in badly off course and fai]c to correct.
b.
In the event of such a gross navigationn1 error, a corrective mecnage in sent from the Bayahore cite unless there in communication failure /
commercial power. outage.
i l c.' Given an uncorrected overflight, damage to 'he power plant would t
require crash in a three NM cecment of a 160 !M route.
f.
. Data vert available as follova:
3.
.! ' a.' Col]ection of route'navigat' ion information vac limited to activity 1
l
' conducted from the period of 7 Oct to 30 Nov 79 Croso n.avigational error
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1The only source of data,are plot sheets from the cite which are not retained for more than 6-9 veeks.
The average position error and average deviation left and 'icht of track of the power plant on the planned track vac measured for 3% lov altitude bomb runs frca tlie available plot chectc.
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information, in excess of four nautical miles either side of the planned
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. track, was available covering the period 1 Nov 78 to 30 Oct 79.' ' Total D
numerical lov altitude activif,y was'also available since 1971.
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. b.
The site has t,vo UHF radios and has never experienced a complete 4
communications outage due to radio failure; however, loss of communications has occured during commercial power outcges (20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> in 3120 hours0.0361 days <br />0.867 hours <br />0.00516 weeks <br />0.00119 months <br /> of operation).
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Crash data are bated on total similar lov level. training flightc
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since 1971.2
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Using the data referenced in paragraph three to estimate the probabili-f ties of the events specified in para 5reph 2, and multiplying the probabili-
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ties together, one arrives at a probability of 9 156 10-9 for the probability of a crash at the Big Rock Nuclear plant area,'given 2986 trcining i
flights at Bayshore. As noted in par 1 graph 1 b,'this is less than one chance f
in 100 million.
5 The current estimate quoted above is somewhat larger than the value
'of 1.h7 10-10 given in the original AF/0A study.
The difference is
.rgely
'the result of a more conservative treatment of component probabilities in k
the' current estimate. A very conservative treatment of gross navigational i
ej errors introduces a factor of ten, and the inclusion of power outages L
introduces a factor of.three over the previous estimate of communication failure, which included only radic failures ;' a combination of other conserva-i tive changes introduce another factor of two.
6.
One could be more conservative still.
Instead of postulating statistical independence of the. component events, which is the basis for multiplying probabilities, one couH examine the consequences of a certain amount of dependence.
Even if such censideracion's introduced a furth2r factor of a 1
hundred, however, cne vould still be dealing vim an extre:pely lov overall probability.
7 Despite the somewhat more conservative treatment of the present apprcach, the data themselves do not suggest any appreciable change in the risk to the l
Big Rock plant.' That risk, even without more precise calculations, has been
'seen to be very lov.
It could, however, be made lover still by movin, the e
training route further from the Big Rock plant,?ar.d it is' cur understandin6
-that'.this possibility is now under examina' tion.
8.
It should be poted, however, that 'the impact of such a route change on the.overall risk depends on the total context of operations near Big Rock.
In the past year, for exampic, there were.76,993 flight operations at the
".' L six civilian airfields located within 25 NM of Big Rock (see'Atch 1).
Evaluh-tion of their risk, and the risks.of nuclear terrorism, etc., vould be M
, ',c j
n, a
N 2Accident information was restricted to L.52 'and FB-111 aircraft in flyin6 lov altitude bombing routes. There were three incidents, 'two FB-111s and
.. <W s B-520.
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Should any questic,nc arice concerning this analycic please feel free to contact Maj Ectourne, AF/SASB extension 53561.
g 2 Atch j
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Probability Calculationc v
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- 5. f, * ' t PROBADILITY CALCULATIONS r.y -
l.
Radio failure--dominated by power outages of long duration.,
Outages are assumed to occur during five bomb r'uns.
There were 2986 low altitude bomb runs at Bayshore this past year.
l s
8 P
=
RF 5 / 2986 = 0.0016745,
)
l839 2.
Gross error--defined as excceding the 4 NM corridor either
- side of. planned track.
These are identified by the scoring
- site as 3 K ABORTS.
There-were 60 events this past year.
All i
gross _ errors are assumed to the right (west) for conservatism.
P, = 60 / 2986 = 0.0200938 g
l.bD -
3.
Overflight - assumes radio failure and gross error must occur.
The aircrew is not warned by the site to return to track.
i.
-5 P
=P XP
= 3.36 X 10 O
RF GE 4.
i k-Crash - considers all B-52 and FB-lll crashes during all low altitude activity.
The're were 229,390 low altitude runs
)
during the time period of the crashes.-
P
= 3 / 229,390.= 0.00001308 C
5.
Crash at specific point - assumes the crash will take place during one point on the 430 NM low altitude route.
P X 3 / 430,= 9.1256 X'10-8 CP C
6.
Crash at Bi'g Rock -
l
-1~9 PCBR = 3.0662 X 10 -
7.
Crash at Big Rock during a year's activity.,
j l P
~9 CBR., = P'CBR X 2986 = 9.1557 X10 A
IAccuracy to 10+1 -
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