ML20147E357
| ML20147E357 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1997 |
| From: | Woolley R UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| References | |
| FRN-61FR60057, RULE-PRM-97-7 61FR60057-00003, 61FR60057-3, NUDOCS 9702180336 | |
| Download: ML20147E357 (7) | |
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Secretary SERIAL: GDP 97-005 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP)
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS)
Docket Nos. 70-7001 and 70-7002 PRM-70-7, NEl's l'etition for Rulemaking on 10 CFR Part 70
Dear Sir:
On behalfof the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), I am pleased to provide comments on NEI's " Petition for Rulemaking on 10 CFR Part 70" as noticed in the Federal Register on November 26,1996. Although the gaseous diffusion plants managed by USEC are certified under 10 CFR Part 76 and, therefore, not subject to the proposed revisions to Part 70, USEC offers these comments 1)in the interest of the USEC AVLIS facility which is docketed under Part 70,2) to share USEC's experience assessing the integrated safety of the gaseous diffusion plants, and 3) to provide as much consistency as is appropriate between Part 70, Part 76, and other NRC guidance and regulations.
As noted in the enclosed comments, USEC endorses NEl's petition and is providing certain suggested changes to further the objectives of the petition. USEC believes that the language of the proposed rulemaking should be revised to explicitly clarify the intended use of the perfomiance criteria; namely that the purpose of the criteria is to guide the Commission and licensee in their evaluation of the suitability of(1) the events chosen for evaluation (i c., those with consequences of concern) and (2) the identification determination as to the safety significance of Structures, Systems and Ccmponents (SSCs).
The revisions proposed by USEC are intended to ensure that the primary intent of the rule is to provide reasonable assurance of public health and safety rather than that specific performance criteria are not exceeded Revisions are also suggested to the criteria themselves.
Finally, USEC suggests revising the proposed language of Q70.40 to clarify that the backfit provision applies to the results of the ISAs.
9702180336 970210 PDR PRM 97-7 PDR Offices in Pa 1ucah. Kentucky Portsmouth, Ohio Washington, DC
4 Docketing and Service Branch February 10,1996 GDP 97-005 Page 2 We would be pleased to discuss these comments with you. Please contact me at (301) 564-341 Ms. Lisamarie Jarriel at (301) 564-3247.
Sincerely, f
,/
Robert L. Woolley Nuclear Regulatory Assurance and Policy Manager Enclosure ec:
M. Fertel, NEI 1
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UNITED STATES ENRICIIMENT CORPORATION Comments on NEI's Petition for Rulemaking on 10 CFR Part 70, PRM-70-7 Introduction USEC has been engaged with the NRC since 1993 in rulemaking and certification of the two gaseous ditTusion plants under 10 CFR Part 76, which bears a very close relationship to Part 70. Indeed, in the Part 76 Statements of Consideration, the Commission wrote:
"In developing Part 76, the stafT took into account the ongoing effort to revise Part 70, which applies to licensing of other fuel cycle facilities. The staff believes that Part 76 will be compatible with anticipated future changes to Pan 70. Ilowever, if the final revisions to Pan 70 (in 1996) call for a revision to Part 76, appropriate revisions will be considered and the backfit rule would apply."
USEC clearly has an interest in the content of Part 70 due to its relationship to Part 76. Based on our experience, we believe that formalization, by rulemaking, of criteria for determining areas of concern and the importance of SSCs for furl cycle facilities is essential.
There is little stored energy at the fuel cycle facilities nor are there large concentrations of radioactivity that would pose a significans public safety concern offsite except in the most extreme and unusual scenarios. Ilowever criticality, exposure to chemical hazards from radioactive materials of either the public or workers, and materia', diversion are areas of concern. To date, the NRC has not established clearly identified safety criteria or goals for these hazards. Explicit goals against which these plants can be evaluated should be established clearly and unambiguously as part of this rulemaking.
Key policy issues that should be considered by the Commission as part of the rulemaking include:
- Worker Safety Prevention of Accidental Criticalities Operptslity Assurance of Systems, Structures and Components These fundamental policy issues were integral to the GDP certification experience, are embedded in this rulemaking and, USEC beheves, are best addressed through the rulemaking process. The following comments address each of these issues and how they relate to our clarifying comments on NEPs Petition.
Enclosure to GDP 97-005 USEC's Corrunents on PRM-70-7 Page 2 of 5 Comments on NEI's Proposed Revisions to Part 70 USEC fully supports the concept, and many of the details, of the NEI proposed revisions to Part 70.
In particular, we support the requirement that similar integrated safety analyses be performed for the existing fuel cycle facilities; that standards be established to determine the areas of concern to be analyzed, and that a backfit provision be included to assure that costs, as well as benefits, are considered for changes to the facilities. Incorporating the backfit provision into the rulemaking will allow for reasoned evaluation of the need for changes to these facilities and the most cost effective means of obtaining those changes.
NEI's proposed revisior,s would require these analyses to be completed before the NRC imposes changes in programs or procedures which might not prove necessary after the results of the analyses are evaluated.
USEC recommends certain modifications to NEI's proposal as follows:
Reasonable Assurance of Public IIcalth and Safety The language of the proposed rulemaking should be revised to explicitly clarify the intended use of the performance criteria; namely that the purpose of the criteria is to guide the Commission and the licensee in their evaluation of the suitability of(1) the events chosen for evaluation (i.e., those with consequences of concern) and (2) the determination as to the safety significance of SSCs. Numerical limits can not represent the :orrelation of all factors significant to the question of reasonable assurance of public health and safety. Factors that go to the credibility of the event such as, probability of occurrence, existing administrative controls, existing physical and engineering controls, and the detectable nature of these hazards (i e., visible and noxious) need to be appropriately considered before making a finding that " reasonable assurance" has not been provided. The current language of the proposed miemaking might be interpreted to suggest that the performance criteria are absolute limits, exceedance of which implies that the public health and safety cannot be reasonably assured. Rather, the criteria should be used to identify the events of concern to be considered in the IS A and SSCs of imponance. The regulation should provide a mechanism for determining whether there is reasonable assurance of public health and safety and not reasonable assurance that the criteria are not exceeded.
USEC has proposed a modification to the NEl wording to strengthen this concept.
Worker Safety A key challenge in certifying the gaseous diffusion plants has been addressing the NRC stafTs appropriate concern for the protection of onsite workers under accident conditions. Besides NRC's oversight, the fuel cycle facilities are also regulated in this area by OSHA and, under these regulations, perform Process Safety Management and Hazard Analyses.10 CFR 76 does not explicitly address chemical toxicity from radioactive materials for workers. However, many of the systems that have been identified for additional quality controls at the gaseous diffusion plants and many of the restrictions in the Technical Safety Requirements were established specifically in response to worker safety considerations under accident conditions. Imposition on requirements without a clear basis against which to demonstrate adequate safety is not an appropriate way to establish regulatory requirements. Because worker safety appears to be a key underlying motive behind the NRC staffs interest in revising 10 CFR 70 and imposing new requirements on fuel cycle facilities, it is essential that this issue be explicitly recognized and considered in this rulemaking proceeding.
NEI's proposal in this regard suggests that the requirements of 10 CFR 20 be satisfied We believe that NEl's intention was to make it clear that the IS A be used to demonstrate compliance with to CFR 20.
Fuel cycle facilities are currently required to comply with 10 CFR 20. First, USEC believes that
Enclosure to GDP 97 005 USEC's Comments on PRM-70-7 Page 3 of 5 analysis is not required to comply with 10 CFR 20. Compliance with this requirement has been j
achieved to date through the implementation of Radiation Safety Programs and without specific analysis requirements. Second, this would be a new use of analysis to demonstrate compliance with this 10 CFR 20 requirement. The analytical methods to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 20 are not demonstrated and, without further guidance on how to demonstrate compliance using analysis, the requirements to do so remain unclear. Therefore, USEC has proposed to delete reference to 10 CFR 20 in NEI's rule language.
Accidental Criticalities Fuel cycle facilities are already required to detect accidental criticalities under 10 CFR 70.24. This regulation does not, however, specifically address prevention of accidental criticalities. Currently, the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program requires analyses of the potential for accidental criticalities during operations. Criticality has long been a risk at fuel cycle facilities that has been considered acceptable if compliance with the double contingency principle is demonstrated. The double contingency principle as stated in ANSI /ANS-8.1-1984, Section 4.2.2 is as follows: " Process designs should, in general, incorporate sufTicient factors of safety to require at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions before a criticality accident is possible." USEC has proposed a modification to 70.24 to clarify that licensees be required to demonstrate that adequate controls and protective measures are in place to provide reasonable assurance that accidental criticalities are prevented and that compliance with this requirement may be achieved through satisfaction of the double contingency principle.
i Assurance The last sentence of NEI's proposed 70.40(a) indicates that SSCs be classified on the basis of safety significance and commensurate controls applied. USEC understands this to allow for the imposition of controls to assure operability based on the importance to safety of SSCs and the risk to the facility their inoperability poses. The determination of the safety significance of SSCs and commensurate controls to assure operability has been a challenging issue for certification of the gaseous diffusion plants. Indeed, no clear criteria or standards were adopted as part of the certification process to classify SSCs Lacking a clear method of determining the safety significance of SSCs and appropriate quality controls, we believe a larger number of SSCs were selected as safety significant than if consistent classification criteria had been utilized in the process. Significantly, SSC's that are relied on to demoristrate compliance with the double contingency principle for criticality prevention were included in the quality program. This may or may not have ir, mpropriate. USEC believes the ISA should provide the basis for determining the importance (
'.SCs and that operability assurance should then be applied commensurate with risk. USEC u oposed a modification to the NEI wording to strengthen this concept.
Hackfit Provision USEC especially supports the inclusion of the backfit provision ( 70.76) as a sound basis for determining if modifications or additions to systems, structures or components of a plant, or to the procedures or organization required to operate the plant arejustified by considering both their benefits and associated costs. The existing facdities that will be subject to this proposed rule, like our gaseous diffusion plants, have been operated safely for many years. While safety can almost always be improved, the icey question for existing facilities is what improvements to safety, if any, are necessary to achieve an acceptable level of safety, and, beyond that, what changes are clearly beneficial given
Enclosure to GDP 97-005 USEC's Comments on PRM-70-7 Page 4 of 5 fair consideration of associated costs. The backfit proposal provides for these determinations to be made in an open, public process. To assure that there is no ambiguity about the timing of the applicability of the proposed backfit provision, USEC suggests an addition to the proposed language of 70.40. This addition wou:d make it clear that plant or procedure changes proposed by the NRC as a result ofits consideration of the results of the ISAs for existing facilities would be subject to the backfit rule. This is consistent with NEI's intent as reflected on page 8 ofits petition, but it should be made clear in the mie text itself implementine Guidance Establishment of the requirement is only the first step. Guidance should be promulgated on the required format and content of the analysis required. This guidance would logically follow imposition of the requirement by rule, but, as discussed in reference to 10 CFR 20, it should be clear before rulemaking that guidance is indeed available. The AIChE " Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Second Edition with Worked Examples," 1992 is representative of the types of analysis that should be required.
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Enclosure to GDP 97-005 USEC's Conunents on PIGA-70-7 l
Page 5 of 5 l
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USEC's Modifications to NEI's PrarM Rule I aneumme i
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I USEC's moddications to the NEI proposed 10 CFR 70 language reflect the recommendations discussed above. USEC recommends that the NRC approve the NEI petition, as modified by below:
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alternatiw integratedqpproach to safety, to determine the Seucares, Systems)nidC#%.:.((SSCs) arulprograms that will be used by the licensee to protect public health arut safety and, on the basis of the results of the ISA, implement changes to SSCs or associatedlicensee programs isthisorsserfto that l
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(b) The ISA willidentify and emluate those ha:ards that could result in not meeting any of thi followingperformance criteria amiwilldetermine whether adequate controls andprotective measures are inplace toprovide reasonable assurance ofpkblishealdisis(i&frti thet:
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