ML20147E309

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Application for Certificate of Compliance 9220 for Model 884 Type B.Sar Encl.Fee Paid
ML20147E309
Person / Time
Site: 07109220
Issue date: 09/02/1987
From: Roughan C
AMERSHAM CORP.
To: Macdonald C
NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
Shared Package
ML20147E313 List:
References
28747, NUDOCS 8801210075
Download: ML20147E309 (71)
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Text

{{#Wiki_filter:- -- An.r h.m corporation RETURN TO 396-SS 40 North Avenue Burlington, Massachusetts 01803 Telephone (617) 272 2000 1 September 2, 1987 'g RECEIVED ? 'I \\ Mr. Charles MacDonald Chief NOV 91987 7 L-4 3.hucme mpr ' Transportation Certification Branch ",.Wc 'yss:g p Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety 'N s U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 9, Washington, DC 20555 4 i

Dear Mr. MacDonald:

A We request issuance of a USNRC Certificate of Compliance of Radioactive Materials Package for Amersham Corporation Model 884 Type B package. We are enclosing eight copies of the Safety Analysis Report for the Model 884 for your review. In accor-dance with 10 CFR 170.31 (10)(D), we are enclosing a check for $150.00 as the application fee for this review. We are applying to the U.S. Department of Transportation for an Internationa.' Atomic Energy Agency Certificate of Comcatent Authority for Type B(U) packaging under the 1973 Revised Edition of IAEA Safety Series No. 6. We ask that this package be reviewed for conformance to these re.quirements also. We trust that this application satisfies your requirements for issuance of the certificate. If we can provide any additional information, please contact. us. Sincerely, 01 $0 kg Cathleen M. Roughan Radiation Safety Officer p N,( postnD U;MC Yi CMR:aep .E', t40V 91987 ) L-h g q m uum j; m ~.. tK o ;T U tfM /1 lv-yyyy s pyg' ..: 8 1 e co, 1 e Hyv I /fd ~ by /ithy l I It w O Ad't?! j 2 7Y7 9801210075 870902 8 " ^" ck o

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O 1.0 General Information 1.1 Introduction The Amersham Model 884 is designed for use a a gama ray projector and shipping container for M e B quantities of radioactive material in special form. The Model 884 is. imilar to Amersham Model 858 (USA /9154/B(U)) and Amersham Model 676 (USA /9029/B(U)). 1.2 Package Description 1.2.1 Packaging The Model 884 is 17. Sin (440m) high,19.5 inches (500mm) long and 22 inches (560mm) wide. The gross weight of the package is 925 pounds (420kg). The radioactive source assembly is stored in a titanium "S" tube in the geometric center of the package. The "S" tube is cast inside a depleted uranium shield assembly. Tae weight of the uranium shield is 470 pounds (213kg). The shield is enclosed in a shell fabricated of A inch (6.35mm) thick hot rolled steel. The shield is fixed in position within the shell by the retaining bar assembly and the collimator positioning tube. The void space between the shield and the shell is filled with a castable rigid poly-urethane foam. Steel-uranium interfaces are separated with 0.010 inch (0.254mm) thick copper separators. h Attached to the sides of the container are 1.0 inch (25.4mm) thick hot V rolled steel side frames which are welded to the shell using a 1 inch fillet weld. Mounted at each end of the "S" tube are positioning devices. The source assembly is locked in position by means of the control cable connector and additionally secured by means of a shipping plug. A protective shipping plate (1 inch thick steel) is mounted over the control cable connector assembly. Tamperproof seals are provided during shipment of these sources. Assembly joints which are not leak-tight and two one inch diameter pour holes provide passageways for the escape of any gas generated from decomposition of the potting foam in the event the projector is involved in a fire accident. The outer packaging is designed to avoid the collection and retention of water. The package is painted and finished to provide for easy decontamination. The radioactive material is sealed inside a source capsule, which is the containment vessel of the package. The Model 884 is similar to the Model 676 which has been approved for use as a Type B package under USNRC Certificate of Compliance No. 9029 and is also similar to the Model 858 which has been previously approved for use as a Type B package under USNRC Certificate of Compliance No. 9154. (N 1.1 REVISION 0 4 August 1987

b i 1.2.2 Operational Features The source assembly'is secured in the proper position by the control cable connector and lock assembly. This assembly requires a key for operation. and this provides positive closure. A 1 inch (6.35 sun) thick steel shipping plate is used to protect the assembly during shipment. Additionally, the source assembly is secured by means of a shipping plus inserted in the opposite end of the "S" tube. 1.2.3 Contents of Packanina The Model 884 is designed for a capacity of up to 330 curies of cobalt-60 as Amersham Source Assembly A424-13. The source assembly is in specisi i form as prescribed in 10CTR71 and IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973. 4 ]

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.( y'~') 2.0 Structural Evaluation 2.1 Structural Design 2.1.1 Discussion Structurally the Model 884 consists of six components: a source capsule, shield assembly, outer shell, side frames lead collar, land lock assembly. The source capsule is the primary containment vessel. It meets the requirements for special form radioactive material as outlined in 10CFR71 (see Section 2.8). The shield is 470 pounds (213kg) of depleted uranium. The shield assembly fulfills two functions: it provides shielding for the radiosctive material and, together with the positioning mechanisms insures proper positioning of the source. The shield assembly is supported on one end with retaining bars which are forced together by means of hex nuts threaded on adjusting screws. The adjusting screws and retaining bars are secured with jam nuts. The shield is supported on the opposite end by the collimator positioning tube. The entire shield assembly is potted in a castable rigid polyurethane foam and encased in a i inch (6.35mm) thick hot rolled steel shell. Steel-uranium interfaces are separated with copper. Attached to the shell are side frames made of 1.0 inch (25.4mm) thick steel which are welded to the shell. Circling the device is a collar made of a steel tube filled with lead, to reduce radiation levels when the device is in operation (as the source assembly is moved from to stored to exposed 7-~s position). The key operated lock assembly and control cable connector () secure the source in the shielded position. A i inch (6.35mm) thick steel shipping cover plate is installed to protect the lock from damage. Positive proof of source position is evidenced by the use of a seal wired shipping plug. 2.1.2 Design Criteria The Model 884 is designed to comply with the requirements of 10CFR71 and IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973. The device is simple in design, such that there are no design criteria which cannot be evaluated by straight-forward application of the appropriate section of 10CFR71 or IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973. 2.2 Weights and Centers of Gravity l The Model 8R4 projector weighs 925 pounds (420kg). The shield assembly l contains 470 pounds (213kg) of depletad uranium. The center of gravity is l located approximately at the geometric center of the package. l l 2.3 Mechanical Properties of Materials The Model 884 gamma ray ptajector shell is made of hot rolled steel. This material has a yield strength of 40,000 pounds per square inch (276MN/m ), 2 (

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook, 20th Edition, 1976, p. 452). l l O ~s l l l REVISION 0 2.1 4 August 1987 3

9 (m) 2.4 General Standards for All Packages 2.4.1 Chemical and Galvanic Reactions The materials used in the construction of the Model 884 gamma ray projector are uranium metal, steel, stainless steel, copper, lead, and titanium. There will be no significant chemical er galvanic action between any of these components. The possibility of the formation of the eutectic alloy of iron uranium at temperatures below the melting tc1peratures of the individual metale was considared. The iron uranium eeteatic alloy temperature is approximately 1337'F (725'). However, vacuum conditions and extreme cleanliness of the surfaces are necessary to produce the alloy at this low temperature. Due to the conditions under which the shields are mounted, sufficient contact for this effect does not exist. In support of this conclusion, the following test results are presented. A thermal test of sample of bare depleted uranium metal was performed by Nucletr Metals, Inc. The test indicated that the uranium sample oxidized such that the radial dimension was reduced by 1/32 inch. A subsequent test was performed in which a sample of bare, depleted uranium metal was placed on a steel plate and subjected to the thermal test conditions. The test showed no alloying or melting characteristics in the sample, and the degree of oxidation was the same as evidenced in the first test. A copy of the test report appears in Section 2.10. fg l Although the likelihood of the formation of an iron-uranium eutectic alloy is remote, c;pper separators are used at steel-uranium interfaces. 2.4.2 Positive Closure The Model 884 source cannot be exposed without opening a key-operated lock. Access to the lock requires the removal of the shipping cover plate. Additionally, this shipping cover plate is seal wired and provided with a tamperproof seal. 2.4.3 Lifting Devices The Model 884 is designed to be lifted by the side frames and by 2 eyebolts located at the top front of these side frames. l The eyebolts are attached to the side frames by their 1/2-13 threaded shanks. Each eyebolt has a tensil load rating of 2600 pounds. As used in the normal lifting proceedure, the eyebolts and the side frames support the load. The root area of a 1/2-13 thread is.126 in and the cross-sectional area of the side frame opening is 1 in. The total area supporting the 2 load will be 2.25 in. The stress due to shear while lifting the Model 884 2 is computed from: S =_E A 3 l REVISION 0 2.2 4 August 1987

/^ V) Where S = Stress in psi F = Force in lbs.(3 times weight of device, 2,775 lbs. (1259kg). A = Stressed area in square inches, 2.25 ina (14.5cm ), 2 Therefore, the stress is equal to 1233 psi (8.50 MN/m ). Assuming the 2 material has a minimum yield strength of 40,000 psi (276 MN/m ), the 2 lifting devices are capable of supporting more than 32 times the weight of the package. The weld joining the side frames to the shell of the Model 884 is a 1/4 inch fillet veld. The American Welding Society "Code for Arc and Gas Welding in Building Construction" permits the stress on a fillet weld to be 13,600 psi (89.6MN/m ). As the shear stress or the throat of 2 the fillet weld is the limiting factor, the allowable stress on a 1/4 inch fillet weld (throat dimension.177 inch, 4.49 mm) is calculated to be 2,400 lbs. per linear inch. The perimeter of the veld on each side frame is 52 inches. Therefore, the allowable load is 124,800 lbs. (555,110N). Hence, the allowable load is far greater than 3 times the package weight. Therefore, the lifting devices are capable of supporting more than 3 times the weight of the package as prescribed in 10CFR71.45 (a). O l l l l l ll0 l REVISION O 2.3 4 August 1987 i

[n) 2.4.4 Tiedown Devices N_ - The tiedown devices on the Model 884 are the eyebolts and side plates. As shown in the above analysis these eyebolts can withstand the load combination of 10CFR71.45(b) without exceeding the yield strength of the material. 2.5 Standards for Type B and Large Quantity' Packages 2.5.1 Load Resistance The Mcdel 884 is supported by a front and rear foot which consists of rectangular steel tubing 4 inches wide by 3 inches high by 1/8 inch wall thickness. The front foot is 22 inches long and filled with lead for shielding purposes. The rear foot is 16 inches long and is not filled. If we consider that only the rear foot supports the entire load, we can treat the support as a short column restraining an evenly distributed load of 5 times the weight of the packe39, 4,625 lbs. (2102kg). We can consider the support as a short column because it has a "slenderness ratio" (1/k), which is the ratio of its length (1) to the least radius of gyration (k) of its cross-section, of less than 100 for a steel column. The maximum compressive strength of this column can be computed by the following formula: [ 'T Se=F 1+ 12 go V K W 1FnE Where: Se = Compressive stress in psi F = Load in 1bs. (4,625 lbs.) A = Cross-sectional area in square inches (4.9 in )2 1 = Slenderness ratio (2.46) k Se = Elastic limit of material (30,000 psi) n = Condition of ends of column (one end fixed, n = 0.25) E = Modulus of elasticity of material (30,000,000 p31) From the above formula, we calculate the stress in the wall of our support to be 944 psi (6.5N/m ), far below the yield strength of 40,000 psi 2 (276N/m ), 2 Reference "Machine Design" Maleen & Hartman, Third Edition, Page 33 l i

O I

l l l REVISION 0 l 2.4 4 August 1987 i

. () 2.5.2 External Pressure The Model 884 is open to the atmosphere; thus, there will be no differen-tial pressure acting on it. The collapsing pressure of the source capsules can be found: P = 86,670 t - 1386 D where: P: collapsing pressure in pounds per square inch t t: vall thickness in inches (.016 inch) D: outside diameter in inches (0.35 inch) (

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook, 21st ed., 1979, p. 440) The collapsing pressure of the capsules is calculated to be 2,576 pounds per square inch (17.7MN/m ). Therefore, the capsule can withstand an 2 external pressure of 25psig. O P 4 r O REVISION 0 2.5 4 August 1987

/) 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport 2.6.1 Heat The thermal evaluation is performed in Chapter 3 of this application. From this evaluation, it can be concluded that the Model 884 can withstand the normal heat transport conditions. 2.6.2 Cold The metals used in the manufacture of the Model 884 can all withstand temperatures of -40*F (-40*C). The lower operating limit of the poly-urethane foam foam is -100*F (-73*C). Thus, it is concluded that the Model 884 will withstand the normal transport cold conditions. 2.6.3 Pressure The Model 884 is open to the atmosphere; thus, there will be no dif-ferential pressure acting on it. In Section 3.5.4, the source capsulc~, are demonstrated to be able to withstand an external pressure reduction of 0.5 atmospheres (50.7kN/m2). 2.6.4 Vibration The Model 884 is similar to Amersham Model 676 which has been in use for 15 years. During that time there has never been a vibrational failure fs reported. Thus, we contend the Model 884 will not undergo a vibrational ( ) failure in transport. 2.6.5 Water Spray Test The water spray test was not actually performed on the Model 884. We contend that the materials used in construction of the Model 884 are all highly water resistant and that exposure to water will not reduce the shielding or affect the structural integrity of the package. 2.6.6. Free Drop The drop analysis performed in hypothetical accident conditions (see Section 2.7.1) is sufficient to satisfy the requirements outlined for the normal transport free drop condition in 10CFR71 and IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973. On this basis, we conclude that the Model 884 can withstand the free drop without impairment of the shielding or package integrity. 4.',7 Corner Drop Not Applicable O REVISION 0 2.6 4 August 1987

-l i f] 2.6.8 Penetration %) A penetration test of the Model 884 was not actually performed. However, the similar Model 684 was subjected to the penetration test with no 1 resulting loss of shielding or package integrity (a copy of the test report is enclosed in Section 2.10). The following analysis demonstrates that the maximum damage exhibited by the Model 884 due to the penetration test would be less than that of the Model 684. In both cases, the load (40 inch drop of a 13 pound hemispherical billet) and the materials of construction (hot roll steel) are the same. The body of the Model 884, 0.25 inch (6.35mm), is thicker than the Model 684, 0.1875 inch (4.76 mm), and, therefore, will withstand a greater penetrating load. The shipping plate which protects the lock mechanism is the sama in the two models. As the Model 684 successfully withstood the penetration test with no loss of structural integrity or shielding, we contend the Model 884 will withstand the penetration test also. 2.6.9 Compression The gross weight of ti model 884 is 925 pounds (420kg). Tne maximum cross-sectional area oi che package is 429 square inches (0.28m2). Thus two pounds per square inch times the cross-sectional area (858 pounds, 390kg) is less than five times the package weight, 4625 pounds (21022g). For this analysis, the load will be taken to be 4625 pounds. 4p The maximum stress generated in a flat rectangular steel plate with all v edges fixed and a load distributed uniformly over the surface of the plate can be computed from: 0.5 F =S L + 0.623 15 t 2 1 LS where: Si maximum stress F: total load (4625 pounds) t: thickness of plate (0.25 inches) 1: width of plate (19.5 inches) L: length of plate (22 inches) (

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook, 21st ed., p.436) From this relationship, the maximum stress generated in the plate is 25,186 pounds per square inch (174MN/m ). This figure is below the yield strength 2 of the material, 40,000 pounds per square inch (276MN/m ). Thus, it can be 2 concluded that compression will not adversely affect the package. V REVISION 0 2.7 4 August 1987

( e 2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions %/ 2.7.1 Free Drop The Model 884 was not actually submitted to the 30 foot drop test. However, the Model 672 was submitted to the drop test (the test report appears in Section 2.10). The Model 884 has approximately the same weight and is constructed from the same materials as the Model 672. Model 672 Model 884 Length 24 inches (610mm) 22 inches (533mm) Width 14 inches (356mm) 19.5 inches (371mm) Height 12.5 inches (318mm) 17.5 inches (305mm) Weight of Shield 401 lbs. (182kg) 470 lbs. (149kg) i Gross weight of Container 580 lbs. (264kg) 925 lbs. (420kg) Shell Material i inch thick (6.35mm) i inch thick (6.35mm) steel steel Based on the satisfactory performance of ths Model 672, we conclude that /., - s the Model 884 will undergo no loss of shielding or structural integrity as a result of the 30 foot drop test. 2.7.2 Puncture The Model 884 was not submitted to the puncture test of 10CFR71. However, the similar Model 676 was submitted to the puncture test. There was no resultant damage to the container, nor reduction in shielding. (A copy of the test report appears in Section 2.10). The shipping plate used in the Model 884 is the same as that used in the Model 676. The Model 676 puncture test report included in Section 2.10) shows that the shipping plate withstood the puncture test. On this basis, we conclude that the Model 884 can successfully withstand the puncture condition of 10CFR71. l i O REVISION 0 2.8 4 August 1987

(- ) ( 2.7.3 Thermal The thermal analysis is presented in Section 3.5. There it is shown that the melting point of the materials, except the potting compound and the lead, used in the construction of Model 884 are all greater than 1475*F (800*C). The lead collar does not cr. tribute significant shi.elding during transport. The Model 884 without the lead collar when prepared for transport, is less than 200 mR/hr at the surface as indicated in the radiation profiles. Therefore, the melting of the lead during the thermal accident condition would not adversely affect the shielding efficiency of the Model 884. Thus, it is concluded that the Model 884 satisfactorily meets the requirements for the hypothetical accident-thermal evaluation as set forth in 10CFR71. 2.7.4 Water Immersion Not Applicable 2.7.5 Sumary of Damage The tests designed to include mechanical stress (drop, puncture) would cause minor deformation, but no reduction in the safety features of the

f. w package. The thermal test will result in no reduction of the safety of the package.

It can be concluded that the hypothetical accident conditions have no adverse effect on the shielding effectiveness and structural integrity of the package. 2.8 Special Form The Model 884 gamma ray projector is designed for use with Amersham source assembly A424-13. This source assembly has been previously certified as special form radioactive material. (IAEA Certificate of Competent Authority No. USA /0165/S, see Section 2.10). We contend that this certificate is sufficient evidence that the requirements for special form radioactive materials, as established in IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 are satisfied. 2.9 Fuel Rods Not Applicable OV REVISION 0 2.9 4 August 1987

N 2.10 APPENDIX - Nuclear Metals, Inc. Test Report: Iron Uranium Alloying - Test Reports Penetration Test, Model 684 Test Report: Drop and Puncture Tests, Model 672 l - Test Report: Puncture Test, Model 676 Descriptive Assembly Draw'.ngs, Source Assembly IAEA Certificate of Competent Authority No. USA /0165/S I [ ( i I i r l i f e W 4 a i 4 5 REVISION 0 + 2.9a 4 August 1987

j .h N U C l. E A lt M E T A L S, I N C, \\./ ';' ? m n a, #. S i tt t t 8 f C C'F orit' W A*A ac nv3 g ti s es ta g 28 January 1971 Technical Operations, Inc. Radiation Products Division Snuth Avenue Burlinoton, Massachusetts 01803 Attentien: f1r. J. Lima Gentlemen: in re'.prmse to a reones t by loe i inn of Tech Ops, a simulated fire test was perfonned on samples of bare depleted uraniun in contact with mild s teel, t he eb.inc t beinq to detei nine whc.'. if any, allovina er mel tine would otcur under these condition".. TEST LW A: N A 3/4-inch diameter x 5/8-inch lonq have d< nleted uranitmi specinien was set on a 1-inch diameter x 1/3-inch thi(I mild steel plate, placed in a 7 thin wall ceramic crucible. A mild.toel c over plate was used on top ) of the crucible to act as a part ial air seal. The crucible was loaded in a preheated 1450*F resistance heated fornace, held for 35 minutes, then removed and allowed to air cool under a ventilated hood. RESULTS: l'o reaction was evidenced between the two netals. Both separated readily and showed no alloying or meltina characteristics. Oxidation of the uranium was about the same degree as that reported to Joe Lima on an earlier experiment. The test was performed by NMI on 25 January 1974. Very truly? ^, )

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EFE 1 1 TESI' Td:lCIU F.A'_' AT10:, TF.CD'.JCTS DIV:S: C:, BY: John J. Munro III DATE: 5 September 1979 S%"SCT: : cdel t'Sh re etratio : Test 0-5 Cap. rier :lT9, a pe etrati c: te:- ve s r e rfer:.e 3 o a Ttei :ce] Operati e.s ?.' ciel 6% Shippin? Cc-tai er ' a cccrdn :ce v!+h 11CF.xT Appe. dix A.? s 2d I AEA Safe t. Se r i e s k. ', 13~3. reregra::hs 71hc

t. 37 Lb.

Tine i.e: : c rher.ct'. e d cf a ' tert:eni s.e+' 0: _ '.ec ch i a : =r. er ve;d c IL po ds ve s dre.t re-i frc-th : h ; /- - Je ..cher c c de ' t et r' c ce ter cf il.e be*tcr. 3.rface f ti:e "odel 53k. Tnere var : t forma t tu:: and ::o dar.use which ve ld affect ti.e shield'.:.2 er str..c t ure; ir.tegrity of the package. A second test was conducted using the same cyli: der. It was drepped frcm the hei ht cf L 3 ! :ches or.tc the shippi :6 plate. There was no defor:.aticn 5 at.d "e dameca v'vich would affect the shieldi.g er structt.ral 1"tegrit:- of the packa6e. Docment.ry pheterra phs are e cc1csed. Ferformed by Witnessed by / 4 / / / tu I Ar.g61o Kik1ts Uoh J. }'unro III l l t l 2-11

4 s ~- 1 .w s ~ OOTd\\ O O 0 @iii) ~ a c :... -.. T \\ cc O "1 I = y g V in Z e r o g y b z o, i (J.l 2i 1 E l UO 1 i r e-l 3 L.-." 7 'a b O t I 11 luf f o =- 9 l REVISION O 2-12 l [ l

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("') TES1 REPORT a LJ DE S C R I P T I Oll: Model G72 - 30' Drop DATE March 18,1970 The first drop test landed nn the rinht rear corner of the side plate and was bent in 1-1/2" and forward 1/2", No other damtige was sustained. The sceand drop test landed on se soft side of the side plate breaking 2/3 of the wcld and was bent in 1". The Source Tube rentained straight and the front nut turned freely. The puncture test (11" drop on to a C" dia, steel billet) left a slight mark on the

skin, C 0tJC L US I 011:

's U BY ltichard Evan8 WIIt1ESS ED BY _ Fred llauser I -)1 REVISION C t3 2-15 V

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',_x,.., : ,...' y ,, y, i t, ; t p y s 3, s, 3, i. i s. v. YIl f 4 i >, g i.';.' W 'l ?.} l W., i f .. : x..... ':. i '.c .r. L';C'S *h{d.I.I')'?lY..MN$$ *'{$\\u}i*:.D .la r ., y L y _ '! yt, ? [. g. MODEL 672 BEING RAISED TO 30 FEET FOR DROP TEST ~I ENISION O 2-16 I

g N my ..-,w~ l + l t 8 e - * '.p j. } ,,r j I 1< g ( ,J: ),' p i, smpc4.D..h'b b $. * ,% ' iq' t ;w'd:r 3 c%. i s.n $AT$..:sp,h:. M'.:-Q6*&iW-5.s.d + c ' d 'U. G 1.' 3MYc xrg'"[-NI4 A 4 W 8$, Y W:-~M,4.Q.3 5 m~T x hh 0 MODEL 672 DROPPING FROM 30 FEET ONTO STEEL PLATE I l

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rh I (V 4 ,1 1 t IAk k$l'M.il,5!h M h3 d$T OfM,# o LV] a.h..,c, >/*de$'$k61. ~- e ~ - s& d <C e-Yb[3:p.N:/.$ 5N~ ~ h e' w( .uac#m ~ eu p'$Yb?h$u&;={=((&$hy5.'%~2 ie. LQ- 'N.. ':k'y'.Y$v)b - ' khv%pl., sng.b fg-Q;g:s.OTs 55 e$t'f. ' Yf h jl 'hth?MIY Ns ;*. v.b'IkId! N 'f 4-I

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~- ,'$b V a MODEL 672 UPON IMPACT ON STEEL PLATE AFTER BEING DROPPED T11ROUGli 30 FEET l REVISICIi 0 2-18

~ . =.. 8 ,d - TEST REPORT i ~ n DATE 9 recember lo7h DESCRIPT10N: i d'. Puncture Test of Model b76 Container Connector 4 A Medel 676 Ge:=a Bey Projector with Shipping, Plate installed ves dro inch higi. sted Eillet LO inches onto o' six inch diameter, eight a fron,o height of es shown in Figure 1 s. The Container. impected on the Shippire Plate as 4 rhown in Figure 1 b. 1 CONCLUSION: O 4 Uo darsge to the container, shipping piste or control cable connecter s There was no reduction of shieldire effectiveness nor loss

resulted, f

of Radioactive Material. i l l L l wy ), b a t WITNESSED BY T hn J. t+r. o 112 r l-D ren vr m our i p,gy]3;ON 2-19 \\ s' E_....,.---...,_.-. ...---..-m.--m-

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1 I w-, 3, h, I (- r s n ~ ~ I.ia s f 9.',,.% s, ' I i . jh,*{g' e...: n. Mclel 076 at Conclusion of.-uncture Test "~ 2-21 REVI5 ion o ., v: w..-.--..-

R EV. DATE DESCRIPTION _, A( 0060_ I MODEL CAPACITY C APSULE SY!..E DIM A l DlFA B po (CUPlES) ' INCNES) O n CHES,'> l...li 4. ].. ? "l9_ AA ?A-2 22 .#DQll..! % ?i. -. -... / 424-3 22 6001i ; G E01 N.A. i 1 1 %__..__ 4424.4 . -6001l 6000C NA 90 7 i M 24 -7 IEE 600lk : 6 GCO2 N,A, 17 % I M ?A -8. l.l O....-.. 10C'Il>20003 N.4. II % MPJ-10 G 600lJ, 60004 l.226 7% 9 94 s ) M2 ! -il _M 6 0 0Ilj 6 0_l_3.4 . _.l22?_____l t 4 m.4 -12 I IIC 6 0'.1 I, 6 00 M l.225 10 7/s T 10'8,16 i /4..;-l?l F' 6N I2, 6 C097 !.7>~ 1 ' A424 -l4 l I!" r '." l I i 6 cc.'d iM. ' N 10 %~ l A12_4-15 Ii 63~;l 1 -.5 O N ' 2 1.'229 _.L.fi',4 ~ 11 V2 1 GM -lO ... a.... : a' ' I > ' :' ' ' '

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, f,,.< ;4 < J... -F ~44.n 5.-9 i 55 7 T00011, 60000 _. 2.373 13 W I? A4 5? - l^- l 55 6001I.60'.'..-- - ?.373 A = l ~ ,3 mj -- .:Q , om u M AT E RI ALS TECHNIC AL OPER ATIONS INC, RADIATION PRODUCTS DIVISION e u;t t.t N G TO N, MA 01803 r:Ngq /, CWG TliLE 60 ( c.,. ydf[g%[gyayctsatt h, ,5 ) g h.. I. ORAWP tsY I A,,, 's' // e ,,6,', 11 9) ,1 g K CHECKED BY ,n 4 CLASSIFIC ATIO N SilE DWG. NO. f ,gy \\ APPROVED BY ANottg 3 _1 SHEET l OF

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g R EV. DATE DESCRIPTION I N N E F, C AP.'.-o ti : [h A6:ClI-I 'n,) A600l l-2 A603ll-3 E A6K l:-a .' /W: [)l/ 4600: I-5 .o g ] ./ f h \\ [I \\ l \\ GUTER CAPSULE O'JTE.f2 Fi.D5 A 6'Xll-G ~ ,9% /'.V!' l : - G 600lll I: n,0;. ' HC 1 \\ N A60017 - I \\ L&CGIS '. \\

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l l g .V .,I w s il i i i 860002 B60004 , M AT ERIALS TECHNICAL OPERATIONS INC. RADIATION PRODUCTS DIVISION y BURLINGTON. MA 01803 ~. silNISM , '/ - OnG TIT.L ,n u v j_., ~, f ~,s Jla,s. n .r. n e~

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US Department a ser seni s w y/ of Tronsportaten

    • 5"S'" DC "

Research and ins ration IAEA CERUFICATE OF COMPETENT AUTHORITY SPECIAL FORM RADIOAC'ITVE MATERIALS ENCAPSULA'110N CEREFICATE NUMBER USA /0165/S, REVISION 2 This certifies that the encapsulated sources, as described, when loaded with the authorized radioactive contents, have been demonstrated to meet the regulator { requirements for special form radioactive material as prescribed in IAEA and USA regulations for the transport of radioactive materials. 1. Sourec Description and Radioactive Contents 'Ihe sources described by this certificate consist of the following Amersham Corporation models which are welded capsules constructed of either 304 or 304L stainless steel to the listed capsule designs (see Appendix A) and which contain not more than the listed quantitles of Cobalt-60 in metallic form: Model Capsule Style Activity (Curies) A424-2 60011,60001 22 A424-3 60011,60001 22 A424-4 60011,60000 55 A424-5 60011,60001 6 A424-7 60012,60002 165 h A424-8 60011,60000 110 V A424-10 60011,60004 6 A424-11 60011,60004 55 A424-12 60011,60004 110 A424-13 60012,60002 330 A424-14 60011,60004 110 A424-15 60011,60004 11 A424-16 60011,C0000 55 A424-17 60011,60000 55 A424-18 60011,60000 33 A424-19 60001,60004 0.11 A453-1 60011,60000 110 A453-2 60012,60002 165 A453-5 60012,60002 550 A453-6 60013,60003 1100 A453-7 60011,60000 110 A453-8 60011,60000 55 A453-9 60011,60000 55 A453-10 60011,60000 55 Safety Series No. 6, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive 1 " Materials,1973 Revised Edition" published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, Austria. 2 Titic 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 170-178, USA. 2-25 we -,y

2 Certificate Number USA /0165/S, Revision 2 2. This certificate, unless renewed, expires on September 30,1992. This certificate is issued in accordance with paragraph 803 of the IAEA Regulations and in response to the July 24, 1987, petition by Amersham Corporation, Burlington, Massachusetts, and in consideration of the associated information therein. Certified by: ) AUG 31 1987 J g Michael E. Wangler / @ ATE) g Chief, Radioactive Mate als Branch Office of Hazardous Ma ials Transportation Revision 2 - issued to extend expiration date and to reflect a change in the source manufacturer's name from Tech / Ops RPD, Inc. to Amersham Corporation. O

O 2-26

c..._ -. -,1 :x :. _ _ _. = _ - USA /0165/S j Appendix A Page 1 APPDiDIX A I A M 60 "EY I oArc otseniptioN INNER CAPSJL5 : AGOOl l-1 A600l l-2 .A6 coll. 3 .MO C'A A600 II-4 ?A9 460011- 0 r~ ( (p -t g OUTER CAPSULE OUTEE PLUG , 956 A6 Coll-6 AGOOll-G r 60011 INNER CAPSULE: A60012 - 1 AGOOljt-2 J A600t2-5 7 ( T \\\\W / M50 y 's e \\ h,\\ .349 q 4 h CUTER CAPSULE l.279 r OUTEE PwG 460012 4 600l2 Ascol2 4 .O ~-INNER CAPSLG \\ 8 60013-3 4 J h ~ .4 76 3 ~ \\ wi,l / u .\\ 473 N,c f X } s s ll BGoors-3 (OUTER PLtG OtMR CAPiULE ~ l.588 600l3 B60015-4 73 <s: W;n M9i 2-27 i$ M.~"aMmtiv.::-u:r t%7:.WWWweM+-m,=cmvc-WMn'n w.r mww.

r USA /0165/S /m Appendix A 1 Page 2 1 nrv. out otscamnon AGCCGO .476 _.250 g _.250 3 g_ 249 a49 .47 p k' Nomii -A6: i o y ,4gocco.2

  • V

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'3.0' Thermal Evaluation 3.1 Discussion The Model 884 is a completely passive thermal device and has no mechanical _ cooling system nor relief valves. All cooling of the package is through free convection and radiation. The heat source is 330 curies of cobalt-60. The corresponding decay heat is 5.51 watts. 3.2 Summary of Thermal Properties of Materials .The melting points of the materials used in the construction of_the Model 884 are: Lead 707'F (375'C) Steel 2453*F (1345'C) Uranium 2070'F (1133*C) Copper 1940*F (1060*C) Titanium 3300*F (1820*C) 4 The polpurethane foam has minimum operating range of -100'F (-73'C) to 200*F (93'C). It will decompose at the fire test temperature (800*C). Decomposition will result in gaseous byproducts which will burn in air. 3.3 Technical Specification of Components Not Applicable 3.4 Normal Conditions of Transport 3.4.1 Thermal Modd The heat source in the Model 884 is a maximum of 330 curies of cobalt-60, Cobalt-60 decays with a total energy liberation of 2.82 MeV per i disintegration or 16.7 milliwatts per curie. Assuming that all of the decay energy is transformed into heat, the heat generation rate for the 330 curies of cobalt-60 would be 5.51 watts. To demonstrate compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 231 and 232 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 Edition for Type B(U) packaging, an analysis is presented in Section 3.6.1. The thermal model employed is described in that section. l To demonstrate compliance with the requirements of paragraph 240 of IAEA j Safety Series No. 6, 1973 Edition for Type B(U) packaging, an analysis is presented in Section 3.6.2. The thermal model employed is described in i that section. lO l l REVISION O 3.1 August 1987

d x 3.4.2 Maximum Temperatures (a I The aaximum temperatures encountered under normal condition of transport will have no adverse effect on the structural integrity or shielding. As presented in Section 3.6, the maximum temperature in the shade would be less than 39.2'C and the maximum temperature when insolated would be less than 73'C. t 3.4.3 Minimum Temperature The minimum normal operating temperature of the Model 884 is -40'C (-40*F). This temperature will have no adverse affect on the package. 3.4.4 Maximum Internal Pressure Normal operating conditions generate negligible internal pressures. Any pressure generated is significantly below that generated during the hypo-thetical thermal accident, which is shown to result in no loss of shielding nor containment. 3.4.5 Maximum Thermal Stresses I The maximum temperatures that occur during normal transport are low enough to insure that thermal gradients will cause no significant thermal stresses. 3.4.6 Evaluation of Package Performance for Normal Conditions of Transport The thermal conditions of normal transport are insignificant from a functional viewpoint for the Model 884. The applicable conditions of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 Edition for Type B(U) packages have been shown to be satisfied by the Model 884. 3.5 Hypothetical Accident Thermal Evaluation 3.5.1 Thermal Model The Model 884, includ,'.ng the source assembly, is assumed to reach the thermal test temperature of 800*C. At this temperature the polyurethane foam will have decomposed and the resulting gases will have escaped the l package through vent holes and non-leak tight assembly joints. 3.5.2 Package Conditions and Environment The Model 884 would not have any significant damage from the free drop and puncture tests as demonstrated by comparison to similar models. The models used in this analysis in considered undamaged. f f i O I i REVISION O 3.2 August 1987 1

'g 3.5.3 Package Temperatures O As indicated in Section 3.5.1, the entire package is assumed to reach a temperature of 800*C. Examination of the melting temperatures of the materials used in the construction of the Model 884 indicates that there will be no damage to the package as a result of this temperature. The possibility of the formation of an iron-uranium eutectic alloy was addressed in Section 2.4.1 whcre it was concluded that the formation of the alloy was not a likely eventuality. 3.5.4 Maximum Internal Pressures The Model 884 packaging is open to the atmosphere. Therefore, there will be no pressure buildup within the package. In Section 3.6, an analysis of the source capsules under the thermal test condition demonstrates r. hat the maximum. internal gas pressure at 800'C is 54 psi (377kN/m ), 2 In Section 3.6.3, an analysis is presented which demonstrates that the maximum stress generated in the source capsule (containment) under the thermal test conditions could only be 5% of the yield strength of the material at the test temperature. 3.5.5 Maximum Thermal Stresses There are no significant thermal stresses generated during the thermal test. () 3.5.6 Evaluation of Package Performance I The model 884 will undergo no loss of structural integrity or shielding when subjected to the thermal accident condition. The pressures and temperatures have been demonstrated to be within acceptable limits. i I I i REVISION 0 3.3 August 1987 i

... _ _ _....=... _ _. t 1 L f 3.6 APPENDIX 3.6.1 -Model 884 Type B(U) Thermal Analysis: Paragraphs 231 and 232 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 Edition 3.6.2 Model 884 Type B(U) Thermal Analysis: Paragraph 240 of l j-IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 Edition 3.6.3 Model 884 Type B(U) Source Capsule Thermal Analysis: t Paragraph 238 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 Edition i I [ 4 i i 1 i E i 4 d i j I i i l l i l l i i f' l i ) i I i i 1 J 3 } 1 i 4 1 34 REVISION 0 t August 1987 I l i i..,.-_..---...__....-_-------.--__-._.--__-_--.__-__-_----,._.-__.i

3.6.1 Model 884 Tvoe B(U) Thermal Analysis ParanraDhs 231 and 232 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6. 1973 Edition This analysis demonstrates that the maximum surface temperature of the Model 884 will not exceed 50*C (122*F) with the package in the shade and at an ambient temperature of 38'C (100*F). J To assure conservatism, the following assumptions are used: The entire decay heat (5.5 watts) is deposited in the a. exterior faces of the Model 834. b. The interior of the Model 884 is perfectly insulated and heat transfer occurs only from the exterior wall i to the atmosphere. c. Because each face of the package eclipses a different solid angle, it is assumed that 25% of the total heat is deposited in the smallest face (side). d. The only heat transfer mechanism is free convection. Using these assumption, the maximum wall temperature is found from q= hA(T T, ) v o s and h= 1,42 T -T y a L j s where q: Heat deposited per unit Time in the face of interest (0.224m ) 2 h: Free convective heat transfer coefficient for air in watts /m2 *c A: Area of the face of interest (0.224m ) 2 T Maximum temperature of the wall of the package w T,: Arabient temperature (38'C) L: Height of the face of interest (.448m) From this relationship, the maximum temperature of the wall is 39.2*C (102.6*F). This satisfies the requirement of paragraphs 231 and 232 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 Edition. O 3-5 REVISION 0 August 1987

3.6.2 Model 884 Type B(U) Thermal Analysis s.-) Paraaraph 240 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6 1973 Edition This analysis demonstrates that the maximuu surface temperatures of the Model 884 will not exceed 82*C (180*F) when the package is in an ambient temperature of 38'C (100*F) and insolated in accordance with paragraph 240 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 Edition. The calculational model consists of taking a steady state heat balance over the surface of the package. The following assumptions are used. a. The package is insolated at the rate of 775 w/m2 (800 cal /cm2 12h) on the top surface, 194 w/m 2 (200 cal /cm2 12h) on the sides and no insolation in the bottom. b. The decay heat load is added to the insolation heat load. c. The solar absorbtivity is assumed to be 0.9. The solar emissivity is assumed to be 0.8. d. The package is assumed to undergo free convection from the top and sides and undergo radiation from the top, sides and bottom. The inside faces are considered in-sulated so there is no conduction into the package. The (N faces are considered to be sufficiently thin that no \\s-) temperature gradients exist. e. The package is approximated as a rectangular solid of .50m length,.45m high and.56m wide. The maximum surface temperature is established from a steady state heat balanced relationship, aqt + qd " 9c + 9r where a: Absorptivity (0.9) qt Solar Heat Load (182.2 watts) qd: Decay Heat Load (2.0 watts) qct Convective Heat Transfer gr Radiative Heat Transfer l l 'L 3-6 REVISION 0 l August 1987 l

The convective heat transfer is: g) ( s r v' qe = (hA) + (hA) (T -T) w a top sides where h: Convective Heat Transfer Coefficient A: Area of the surface of interest T: Tamperature of the wall w Tt Ambient Temperature a The heat transfer due to radiation is: gr = ceA (T 4 4 -Ta) w where o: Stephan Boltzman Constant (5.67 x 10-8 w/m2 Og4 s: Emissivity (0.8) Iteration of this relationship demonstrates that the wall temperature is 73'C which satisfies the requirement of paragraph 240 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 Edition. 3.6.3 Model 884 Source Capsules - Thermal Analysis Paragraph 238 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 Edition O V This analysis is intended to demonstrate the Amersham Corporation source capsules which are of 0.35 inch (8.89m) diameter, eeal welded to a minimum penetration of 0.050 inch (1.21m), made of Type 304 or 304L stainless steel, and licensed as special form containers under IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973, also meet the requirements of paragraph 238 IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 i.e., containment under specified thermal test conditions. The actual containment vessel for the radioactive material is the welded source capsule. These capsules are all 0.35 inches (8.89m) in diameter and less than 1.5 inch (38.1mm) in length. The internal volume of the source capsules contains only cobalt-60 metal (as a solid) and air. It is assumed at the time of loading that the entrapped air in the capsule is at standard temperature and pressure (20*C, 0.101 Meganewtons per square meter). We contend that this is a conservative assumption because, during the welding process the internal air is heated, causing some of the air mass to escape before the capsule is sealed. When the welded capsule returns to ambient temperature, the internal pressure is somewhat taduced. As described in Amersham's standard source encapsulation procedure, the minimum weld penetration is 0.020 inch (0.51mm). Under conditions of internal pressure, the critical location for failure is this weld. Since the capsule has an outside diameter of 0.35 inch (8.89m), this weld has a cross-sectional area of 0.021 square inches (13.5m ). 2 U 3-7 REVISION 0 August 1987

Under conditions of paragraph 238 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, it is assumed that the capsule could reach a temperature of 1475'F (800'C). A Using the ideal gas law and requiring the air to occupy a constant volume l t P2 PT12 = T1 P1 Initial pressure (0.101MM/m ) = 2 T1 Initial temperature (793*k) = T2 Final temperature (1J93*k) = l The internal gas pressure could reach 0.377MN/m. It is assumed that the 2 capsule can be treated as a thin-walled, cylindrical pressure vessel. I The maximum longitudinal tensile stress can be calculated by writing a longitudinal force balance through the weld stress x area pressure x area =0 s p 8 d 8) - P1rd 8 =0 I } S ti (do i i i 4 4 where Si = longitudinal :, tress l do = outer diameter (8.89 sun) ( di = inner diameter (7.87mm) { P = pressure (0.377MN/m ) 2 l Thus, the longitudinal stress is 1.36MN/m8 The hoop stress can be found in a similar fashion. Taking a longitudinal cross-section and sununing forces: i hoop stress x area, pressure x area =0 p i 2S lt - Pd l = 0 i h i where Sh e hoop stress l 1 = length 't cylinder (32.5mm) l t = thickness of weld (0.51mm) Thus, the hoop stres, is 2.91MN/m8 3 i At a temperature of 1600*F (870'C) the yield strength of type 304 stainless i steel is 10,000 psi (69.0MN/m ). Thus, the pressure induced stresses are [ 2 1ess 5% of the yield strength at 800'C. t 9 I 1 3-8 REVISION 0 August 1987 E l . ~ _ _ _ _ _ _, _.. - - _ - - __,.,. _

4.0 Containment 4.1 Containment Boundary 4.1.1 Containment Vessel The containment system for the Model 884 gamma ray projector is the Tech / Ops Model A424-13 source assembly. The source assembly is currently certified as special form containment for radioactive materials (IAEA Certificate of Competent Authority Number USA /0165/S). The actual containment vessel is the welded source capsule, either style 60002 or 60012. The capsules are made of Type 304 or 304L stainless steel. They are seal welded with a minimum weld penetration of 0.020 in. (0.51mm). the capsules are rounded cylinders 0.35 inches (8.89mm) in diameter and 1.28 inches (32,5mm) in length. Capsule style 60012 is a double encapsulation, the inner capsule located inside the capsule of the above dimensions. Appropriate design dravings are enclosed in section 2.10. 4.1.2 Containment Penetrations There are no penetrations of containment. The source capsule is seal welded to provide conformity to special form requirements. 4.1.3 Seal and Welds .r4 The containment vessel is tungsten inert gas welded by General Electric Company, Vallecitos, California. Th'.s is done in accordance with Amersham Corporation standard source encapsu?.ation procedure (see section 7.4). the minimum weld penetration is 0.020 iriches (0.51mm). This has proved acceptable for approval of this vessel as special form. 4.1.4 Closure Not Applicable 4.2 Requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport 4.2.1 Release of Radioactive Material The source assemblies used meet the requirements of special form radioactivo material as delineated in IAEA Jafety Series No. 6, 1973 and 10CFR71. Thus, there will be no release of radioactive materials under conditions of normal transport. 4.2.2 Pressurization of the Containment Vessel Pressurizatien of the source capsules under the condition of the hypothetical thermal accident was demonstreated to generate stresses well below the yield strength of the capsule material as dsscribed in Section 3.6.3. Therefore, the containment will withstand the pressure variation of normal transport. (' -) REVISION 0 4-1 August 1987

4.2.3 Coolant Contamination Not Applicable 4.2.4 Coolant Loss Not Applicable 4.3 Containment Requirements for the Hypothetical Accident Condition 4.3.1 Fission Gas Products Not Applicable 4.3.2 Release of Contents The hypothetical accideat condition as outlined in 10CFR71, subpart F have been shown (Sections 2.Y.1, 2.7.2, and 3.5 respectively) to result in no loss of package containamt. O l O REVISION O August 1987 4g

5.0 Shielding Evaluation 5.1 Discussions and Results The Model 884 is shielded with 470 pounds (214kg) of depleted uranium. The uranium metal is cast around the titanium "S" tr5: which holds the source. The storage position for the source is at the 1;i.ection in the "S" tube. A radiation profile of Model 884 SN 1 containing 162Ci of cobalt-60 (see section 5.5) was made. An extraploation to capacity of 330Ci yielded the results which are presented in Table 5.1. From this data, it is concluded that the Model 884 complies with the regulatory standards, in 10CFR71 and IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973. TABLE 5.1

SUMMARY

OF MAXIMUM DOSE RATES (mR/hr) t: Contact At 1 Meter Side Top Bottom Side Top Bottom Gamma 179 91 68 2.04 2.04 2.04 Neutron Not Applicable Not Applicable I) Total 179 91 68 2.04 2.04 2.04 V Hypothetical accident conditions will result in essentially no change in the above radiation intensities. 5.2 Source Specifications 5.2.1 Gamma Source The gamma source used in encapsulated cobalt-60 in quantities of up to 330 curies. 5.2.2 Neutron Source Not Applicable O REVISION 0 5.1 August 1987

5.3 Model Specifications tiot Applicable 5.4 Shieldina Evaluation The Model 884 shielding evaluation was performed on Model 884 Serial Number 1, containing 162Ci of cobalt-60. The radiation profile is included in Section 5.5. Extrapolation of this data to the capacity of 330 curies (Section 5.1) clearly indicates that the Model 884 conforms to regulatory radiation limits. As the hypothetical accident evaluation (Section 2.7) revealed no change in the shielding arrangement, it is concluded that shielding after the hypothetical accident is essentially unchanged. There-fore, the radiation profile indicates the package will be within acceptable

limits, t

i T l l i e i i IlO I 1 REVISION 0 5-2 August 1987 i

5.5 APPENDIX - Model 884: Radiation Profile I k l 4 O r i 1 J i a .i i l a k i i J i i REVISION 0 4 i 5-3 August 1987 1

f f t i RADIATION PROFILE i Model 884 Serial Number 1 Source Model Number A424'13 I Serial Number 20261 162 Curies Cobalt-60 [ Location At Surface At 1 Meter from Surface Top 40 1.0 r i Right Side 45 1.0 L Bottom 60 1.0 i J Left Side 30 1.0 t j Front 80 1.0 l Back 30 1.0 b t NOTES: 1. All intensities are expressed in units of milliroentgens per hour. l l i l 2. Intensities exprassed are the maximum intensities on the particular a surface. ( 1 3. Measurements were made with an AN/PDR - 27(J) Survey Meter. l ) r 1 i i l a I 1 j k 4 1 I i i i i t l I i E I i I ? I t i ii REVISION 0 } 5-4 August 1987 1

6.0 Criticality Evaluation i 1 Not Applicable l i l 1 l I i i i 1 j i i 4 1 1 1 l l 1 l l. l s 1 I REVISION O I 6-1 August 1987 1 i i

l 7.0 Operatina Procedures ~ 7.1 Procedures for Loadina the Packame Section 7.4 describes the procedure for fabricating the special form source encapsulation. Section 7.4 also contains the procedure for loading this source assembly into the package and preparing the package for transport. 7.2 Procedures for Unloadina the Packame L I Section 7.4 contains the procedure for unloading the source assembly from the package. I 3 7.3 Preparation of an Factv Packame for Transport Section 7.4 describes the procedure for preparing an empty package for j. transport. J I l a 3 } r ( 1 8 J i i 4 4 i l l i }' t a Y f 4 I i I i REVISION 0 [ 7-1 August 1987 i

7.4 APPENDIX - Encapsulation of Sealed Sources t - Amersham Corporation Model 884: Procedures of Loading - Unloading the Package 1 4 ( l r a 1 i t I t I i i i I + i I J 4 i I i l l 4 .I i I .i 4 1 1 8 [ i i I i. 1 I t l L 1 i i l i l REVISION 0 7-2 August 1987 l 1 i

RADIATION SAFETY MANUAL O Part B In Plant operations Section 2. dv s i ENCAPSULATION OF SEALED SOURCES I i i -A. personnel Reauirements Only an individual qualified as a Radiological Technician shall perform the l operations associated with the encapsulation of sealed sources. A second i Radiological Technician must be available in the building when these operations are being performed. B. General Reauirements 1. In the Burlington, Ma, facility, a loading cell shall be used for the 4 d encapsulation of sealed sources and repackaging of sealed sources. The I l maximum amount and form of radioactive material which may be handled in the loading cell is specified below: [ Radioisotope Form Maximum Activity } I i 1ridium-192 Solid Metallic 2000 curies l Cobalt-60 Solid Metallic or ' = sealed sources 1 curie 1 Cesium-137 Sealed Sources only 100 curies Ytterbium 169 Sealed Sources only 100 curies Tantalum 182 ' Sealed Metallic or Solid Carbide 100 curies Gadolinium-153 Solid oxide 300 curies t t i Limits for any other radioisotopes or forms shall be specified by the i l Radiation Safety Committee. j i 2. The loading and general purpose hot cells are designed to be operated at less than atmospheric pressure. The exhaust blower should not be turned off during the operation or at any time that radioactive material is in the l

cell, i

3. Unencapsulated radioactive material shall not be stored in these cells when i the cell is unattended. Material may only be stored inside these cells in i i welded capsules or screw top capsules. When radioactive material is stored i i in these cells, a radioactive material tag identifying the types, l quantities locations and storage dates of all such material shall be attached to the manipulator or to the cell body adjacent to the window. l i i B l() t l REV!S'ON 9 i 19 DECEMBER 1955 l 73 1 i i

4. When any "through the wall" tool is removed, the opening shall be closed O with the plug provided. All tools shall be decontaminated whenever they are removed from the cell. 5. Each individual performing this operation must wear a film badge and pocket dosimeter at waist level and a second film badge and pocket dosimeter in the vicinity of the head. All operations must be monitored with a calibrated and operational radiation survey meter. l C. preparatorv procedure 1. Record the names and initial pocket dosimeter readings for the personnel performing the loading operation on the Loading Log Sheet. i 2. Check the cell lights for proper operation. Check the cell manipulators both visually and operationally. Assure that all cell ports are plugged. 3. Assure that the exhaust system is operational. Record the manometer reading on the Loading Log Sheet. If the manometer reading is less than 0.5 inch or greater than 2.0 inches of water the filter must be changed. 4. Assure that the air sampling system is operational and that sample filters are in place. 5. Perform the pre operational contamination survey a= tr.dicated on the Leading ] Log Sheet. Record the results on the Loading Log Sheet. 6. Perform the encapsulation procedure omitting the insertion of any activity. 4 Examine this phantom capsule veld. If this weld is acceptable, preparation of active capsules may proceed. If the weld is not acceptable. the condition responsible for this unacceptable weld must be corrected and an i acceptable phantom capsule weld produced prior to proceeding. This step must also be performed each time the welding electrode is changed. D. Encapsulation procedure 1. Prior to use, assemble and visually inspect the two capsule components j to assure the weld zone does not exhibit any misalignment and/or separation. j Defective capsules shall be rejected. l 2. Degrease c'psule components in the Ultrasonic Bath, using iso 5eopyl alcohol ] as degreasing agent, for a period of 30 minutes. Dry the capsule components at 100 C for a minieve of 20 minutes. 3. Insert capsule components into hot cell with the posting bar. i 4 Place capsule bottom in weld positioning device. Withdraw the posting bar. 5. Move the drawer bar of the source transfer container into the loading cell. Open the screw top capsule. 4 1 I B.2.3 19 DECE.'.13E? 15e. 74

i I' s P j 6. Withdraw the proper amount of activity from the screw top capsule and p4 ace ( it in the capsule bottom. A brass rivet must be used with wafers to prever.t. I contamination of weld zone. i 7. Assure that all unused radioactive material is removed from the loading ce'.. i by installing it in the screw top capsule and withdrawing the drawer bar of the source transfer container from the cell. 8. Remove the rivet (if applicable). 9. Assemble the capsule components.

10. Weld in accordance with the written welding procedure for the capsule being welded.

. 11. Visually inspect the wald. An acceptable weld must be continuous without cratering, cracks or evidence of blow out. If the weld is defective, the capsule must be cleaned and re welded to acceptable conditions or disposed j 1 of as radioactive waste. 12. Check the capsule in the height gauge to be sure t nat the weld is at the i center of the capsule, f

13. Wipe the exterior of the capsule with a flannel patch wetted with EDTA solution or equivalent.

14 Ccant the patch with the sca'er counting system. The patch must show no .i j more than 0.005 microcurie of contamination. If the patch shows more than 0.005 microcurie, the capsule must be cleaned and re-wiped. If the re-wipe l patch still shows more than 0.005 of contamination, s'aps 10 through 14 must j be repeated. j i

15. Vacuum bubble test the capsule. Place the welded capsule in a glass vial i

containing isopropyl alcohol. Apply a vacuum of 15 inch Hg(Gauge) while alertly watching the capsule for the emergence of bubbles. Any visual l detection of bubbles will indicate a leaking source. If the source is determined to be leaking, plalce the source in a dry vacuum vial and boil off 7 i the residual alcohol. Re-weld the capsulet repeat steps 10 through 15. i; i 16. Transfer the welded source capsule to the sealed source sect 4,on of the j loading cell. a r i 17. For wire mounted source capsules, transfer the capsule to the swaging j fixture. Insert the wire and connector assembly and svage. Hydraulic I pressure should not be less than 1250 nor more than 1500 pounds. 2 For source holder mounted source capsules transfer the capsule to the i appropriate source holder loading fixture. Insert the source capsule into the source holder. Screw the source holder together and install the roll pin (if applicablt). Check to assure that the pin dces not protrude on either side. I i 3.2.4 a RE'a$!ON g 7-5 19DECEygga1933 -**eus---.re g --.g-,----,,__ ..,p..,,.9

18. Apply the tensile test to assembly between the capsule and connector (where [3 applicable) by applying proof load of 100 lbs. Extension under the load Cl shall not exceed 0.05 inch. If the extension exceeds 0.05 inch, the source must be disposed of as radioactive vaste. 19. Assure that the cell tunnel door is closed. Position the source in the exit port of the loading cell. Use the remote control to insert the source into the ion chamber and position the source for maximum response. Record the meter reading. Compute the activity in curies and fill out a temporary source tag. 20. Again using remote control, eject the source from cell into source changer or transport container through the tube gauze wipe test fixture. Monitor the radiation level as the cell tunnel shielded door is opened. Remove the tube gauze a I count with scaler counting system. This assay must show no more than 0.005 microcurie. If contamination is in excess of this level, the source is leaking and shall be rejected. 21. Secure the source in the source changer or transport container and remove the container from the source loading area. 22. At the end of the day's operations, perform the post-operational contamination survey as indicated on the Loading Log Sheet. Record the results on the Loading Log Sheet. 23. Record the final pocket dosimeter readings for the personnel performing the loading operation on the Loading Log Sheet. 24. Record the daily air sample results on the Leading Log Sheet. B.2.5 O mm 15 O!?iM3ER 1935

Amersham Corporation D Model 884 L) Procedures for Loadina - Unloadina the Package Wear personnel monitoring devices during all source changing procedures. Monitor all operations with a calibrated, operable survey meter. Note: All the precautions used when making radiographic exposure must be be followed. 1. Survey the projector to ensure that the source 's in the proper position. 2. Locate the projector and source changer in a restricted area. Locate the devices so as to avoid sharp bends in the guide tube or control housing. The control cable housing bend radius should not be less than 36 inches (0.914m), and the guide tube bend radius should not be less than 20 inches (0.508m). 3. Set the source changer to the projector. 4. Attach one end of a guide tube fitting to the fitting above the empty chamber in the source changer and the other end to the source changing fixture attached to the projector. 5. Attach the control cable to the projector. a. Unlock the projector with the key provided and turn the connector selector ring from the LOCK position to the CONNECT position. When the ring is in the CONNECT position, the storage cover will disengage from the projector. b. Slide the control cable collar back and open the jaws of the swivel connector, exposing the male portion of the connector. Engage the male and female portions of the swivel connector by depressing the spring loaded locking pin toward the projector with the thumbnail. Release the locking pin and tert that the connection has been made. c. Close the jaws of the control cable connector over the swivel type connector. d. Slide the control cable collar over the connector jaws. Hold the control cable collar flush against the projector connector and rotate the selector ring from the CONNECT position to the OPERATE position. O REVISION 0 August 1987 7-7

(5) Complete the shipping papers indicating: O a. Proper shipping name (Radioactive Material, Special Form, n.o.s.) and identification number (UN2974). b. Name of radionuclide (Cobalt-60). Physical or chemical form (special form). c. d. Activity of Source (expressed in curies or millicuries). Category of label applied (i.e., Radioactive Yellow III). l e. f. Transport Index. g. USNRC Identification Number of DOT Specification Number (USNRC: USA / /B). h. For export shipments IAEA Identification Number ( IAEA: USA / /B) 1. Shipper's Certification: J "This is to certify that the above named materials are properly classified, desc'ibed, packaged, marked and labeled and are in proper condition for transport according to the applicable regulations of the Depart-i ment of Transportation." j Notes: 1. For air shipments, the following shipper's certification may be used: "I hereby certify that the contents of this consignment are fully and accurately described above by proper shipping name and are classified, packaged, marked and i labeled and are in proper condition for carriage by air ] according to applicable national governmental regula-i tions." i 2. For air shipments, the package must be labeled with a "CARGO AIR-d CRAFT ONLY" label and the shipping papers must states j "THIS SHIPMENT IS WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED TOR CARGO-ONLY AIRCRAFT." J

O REVISION O

^ I"* 7-8 l {

6. Crank tho source into source changer. I a. Survey this operation with a survey meter to be sure the source has been transferred from projector to changer. b. With a survey meter verify radiation level does not exceed 200 mR/hr l at the surface of the changer. 7. Disconnect the control cable from the source assembly. Disconnect the guide tube tros the source changer. Secure the source in the source changer. 8. IF THE PROJECTOR IS TO REMAIN EMPTY: a. Fully retract the control cable. Disengage the control cable from the projector and lock the projector. b. Attach the identification plate of the source to the source changer, c. Affix a green "empty" tag to projector. d. Perform a wipe test of the projector to assure that the contamination level observed is less than 0.001 microcuries per 100 square conti-

meters, e.

Survey the projector to determine the proper RADIOACTIVE shipping labels.to be applied. O f. Mark the projector: Radioactive "LSA." Nos UN 2912. Affix the proper shipping labels to the package. 3 Complete the proper shipping papers, as described in the transpor-tation section. 9. IF THE PROJECTOR IS TO BE RELOQGt Connect the source changer end of the guide tube to the fitting above the new source in the source changer. Connect the drive cable to the new source assembly, 10. Crank source to full retraction within the projector. a. Survey this operation with a survey aeter to be sure the source has been transferred into the projector. b. With a survey meter verify radiation level does not exceed 200 mR/hr at the surface of the projector.

11. Disconnect the control cable and lock the projector.
12. Disconnect the source guide tube from the projector and source changer.

O REVISION O 7-9 August 1987

13. Affix the identification plate of the new source to the projector and

(N attach the identification plate of the old source to the source changer. / 4 14. Prepare for shipnent. a. Again survey projector to insure that the radiation level does not exceed 200 mR/hr at the surface of the projector, b. Survey the radiation level at a distance of one meter from the surface of the projector. This radiation level should not exceed 10 mR/hr. The highest radiation level measured at one meter from the container is used to determine the Transport Index in accordance with 49CFR173.389(h). G I L O REVISION O 7*10 August 1987

m. I i A . Amersham Corporation i Procedure for Shippina Radioactive Material The Medal 884. meets the requirements for a Type B shipping container under the ' regulations of the U.S., Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Department of Transportation and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The container has been 1 assigned USNRC Certificate of-Compliance No. for domestic shipments and IAIA Certificate No. USA /. /B(U) for international shipments. The following shipping procedures comply with NRC Regulations 100FR Part 71 and DOT Regulations 49CFR Parts 171 through 179 regarding the transportation of radioactive materials. (1) Ensore that the source is locked into place in its storage position. To check this, the lock should be in the down position, and the selector riag should be immobile. Secure the cover plate to the container, and seal wire the hex head bolts to provide a tamperproof seal. (2) Perform a radioactive contamination wipe test of t.he outer shipping package. This consists of rubbing filter paper or other absorbent 2 (161n ) of a material, using heavy finger pressure, over an area of 100cm the package surface. The activity on the filter paper should not exceed 0.001pCi of removable contamination. (3) Survey the package with a survey meter at the surface and at a distance of one meter from the surface to determine the proper radioactive shipping labels to be applied to the package as required by 49CFR Part 172.403. The radiation es:posure-limits for each shipping label are given in Figare 1. If radiation levels above 200 mR/hr at the surface, or 10 mR/hr at one meter from the surface are measured, the container must not be shipped. (4) Properly complete two shipping labels indicating the radioactive isotope, activity-and the transpect index. The transport index is used only on Yellow II and Yellow III labels and is defined as the maximum radiation level in milliroentgens per hour measured at a distance of one .neter from the surface of the package. Put these two labels on the opposite sides of the container after making sure any previous labels i have been removed. The package should be marked with the proper L shipping name (Radioactive Material, Special Form, n.o.s.). If the exposure device is packaged inside an outer container, mark the outside package "INSIDE PACKAGE COMPLIES WITH PRESCRIBED SPECIFICATIONS - TYPE B USA / /B(U)." O l REVISION 0 August 1987 7-11 l l l'

Shipment of Empty Container .,m (1) Ensure that the source is removed, and the connector assembly in in the LOCK position with the lock plunger in the down position and the key removed. Secure the cover to the outer container with the he. head j bolts, and secure the bolts with seal wire. (2) Perform a radioactive contamination wipe test of the shipping package and ensure that the wipe test does not exceed 0.001 microcuries per 100 square centimeters. (3) Survey the package at the surface and at one meter from the surface to determine the proper radioactive shipping labels to be applied to the package. A. If the surface radiation level is less than 0.5 milliroentgens per hour and there is no measurable radiation level at one meter from the surface, no label is required. Mark the outside of the package with the statement: "Exempt from specification packaging, marking and labeling, and exempt from the requirements of 49CFR Part 175 per 49CFR173.421-1 and 173.424." Additionally, a notice mist be enclosed in or on the package, included with the packing list or otherwise forwarded with the package. The notice :aust include the name of the consignor or consignee and the statement: "This package conforms to the conditions and limitations specified in 49CFR173.424 fo'r q excepted radioactive material, articles manufratured from Q depleted uranium, UN 2909." B. If the surface radiation level exceedu 0.5 milliroentgens per hour, of if there is a meararable radiation level at one meter from the surface, use the criteria of Table 7.4.2 to determine the proper radioactive shipping labels to be applied to the package. Complete the shipping papers indicating: (1) Proper Shipping Name (Radioactive Material, LSA n.o.s.) and identification number (UN2912). (2) Name of radionuclide (Depleted Uranium). (3) Physical or Chemical Form (Solid Metal). l (4) Activity (In curies or millicuries). (5) Category of label applied (i.e., Radioactive Yellow II). (6) Transport Index. 1 ( (7) USNRC Identification Number (USNRC USA / /B). l p) t u REVISION 0 August 1987 7-12

(8) For Export Shipments, IAEA lJentification Number ( IAEA USA / /B). ]V \\ (9) Shipper's Certification: "This is to certify that the above named materials are properly classified, described, packaged, marked and -labeled and are in proper condition for transport according to the applicable regulations of the Depart-ment of Transportation." Notesi 1. For air shipments, the following shipper's certification may be used: "I-hereby certify that the contents of this consignment are fully and accurately described above by proper shipping name and are classified, packaged, marked and labeled and are in proper condition for carriage by air according to applicable national governmental regula-tions." 2. For air shipments, the package must be labeled with a "CARGO AIR-CRAFT ONLY" label and the shipping papers must state: "THIS SHIPMENT IS WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED FOR CARGO-ONLY AIRCRAFT." OV l l l l l l l O REVISION 0 7-13 August 1987 L.- .. - -.. -, - - - = _. - _-

r 8.0 Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program (V ) 8.1 Acceptance Tests 8.1.1 Visual Inspection The package is visually examined to assure that the appropriate fasteners are wired properly and that the package is properly marked. The seal weld of the radioactive source capsule is visually inspected for proper closure. 8.1.2 Structural and Pressure Tests The swage coupling between the source capsule and cable is subjected to a static tensile test with a load ever 75 pounds. Failure of this test will prevent the source assembly from being used. 8.1.3 Leak Tests The radioactive source capsule (the primary containment) is wipe tested for leakage of radicactive contamination. The source capsule is subjected to a vacuum bubble leak test. The capsule is then subjected to a second wipe test for leakage of radioactive contamination. These tests are described in Section 7.4. Failure of any of these test will prevent use of this source assembly. ('N 8.1.4* Component Tests The lock assembly of the package is tested to assure that security of the source will be maintained. Failure of this test will prevent use of the package until the lock assembly is corrected and retested. 8.1.5 Test for Shielding Integrity The radiation levels at the surface of the package and at one meter from the surface are measured using a small detector survey instrument (e.g., AN/PDR-27). These radiation levels, when extrapolated to the rated capacity of the package, must not exceed 200 milliroentgens per hour at the surface, nor ten milliroentgens per hour at one meter from the surface of the package. Failure of this test will prevent use of the package. 8.1.6 Thermal Acceptance Tests Not Applicable i V REVISION 0 8-1 August 1987

-o -Docket No. 71-9220 NOV 2 519g7 Amersham Corporation ATTN: Ms. Cathleen M. Roughan Radiation Safety Officer 40 North Avenue Burlington, MA 01803 Gentlemen: This refers to your September 2,1987 application for a certificate of compliance for the Model 884 Type B package. Your letter referenced the enclosure of a $150 fee, which we did not receive. Enclosed is a copy of revised 10 CFR 170, which became effective June 20, 1984. Please notice 5170.31, fee Category 100, which specifies fees for applications for Part 71 approvals, including renewals and amendments thereto of evaluations of fissile packages. Applicants in fee Category 10D pay an initial application fee of $150 and are subsequently billed at 6-month intervals for all accuirulated NRC costs or upon completion of the review, whichever occurs sooner. The total Tee assessed will be based on the actual NRC cost (professional staff-hours) to process tt:e application as well as any contractual cost incurred. Based on the above, please remit an application fee of $150 and mail it to my attention. If you have any questions concerning the fee, please let me know. Sincerely, /S/ Maurico E. f4essict Y /.. G enda' Jackson j License Fee Management Branch Division of Accounting and Finance Office of Administration and Resources Management

Enclosure:

10 CFR 170 DISTRIBUTION: Pending Fee File GJackson, LFMB 00degaarden, FCTC NMSS ARM /DAF R/F LFMB R/F (2) DW/REJ/ Amersham / 0FFICE: ARM /LFMB4'// ARM /LFMB /< SURNAME: MMessier:rej GJackson / DATE: 11/;z.[/87 11/gg/87 22 :=&s -}}

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