ML20147C615

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Ack Receipt of Ltr Transmitting Concerns Raised by J Roberts Re Bad Design,Mismanagement & Inexperienced Reactor Operators.Order Issued Addressing Listed Items,Including Adequacy of Mgt,Training & Sys
ML20147C615
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/26/1988
From: Stello V
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To: Broomfield W
HOUSE OF REP.
Shared Package
ML20147C617 List:
References
NUDOCS 8803030120
Download: ML20147C615 (8)


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\ l 2 6 1988 The Honorable William S. Broomfield United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515-2218

Dear Congressman Broomfield:

Thank you for your letter transmitting concerns raised by one of your constituents, Mr. John M. Rober ts. Mr. Roberts' concerns stem from newspaper articles that appeared in the Detroit Free Press and the Oakland Press.

The article in the Detroit Free Press cited claims that the Fermi-2 nuclear power plant is badly designed, that its managerrent has a poor safety attitude, ar.d that its reactor operators are inexperienced. The article nentions a 1985 incident where an operator started a nuclear chain reaction without knowing it.

In 1985, the NRC shared some of the. same concerns that are expressed in the newspaper article. The operator error cited in the article resulted in a civil penalty of $300,000, one of the largest civil penalties ever imposed by the NRC. In addition, the Commission issued an Order to the Fermi-2 licensee, the Detroit Edison Company (Deco). The Order set forth a number of concerns regarding the operation of Femi-2 and required DECO to address the following:

1. The adequacy of management, management structures and systems that had contributed to the poor performance of Femi-2.
2. The adequacy of training to ensure that responsible personnel recognized and appropriately responded to significant safety conditions.
3. Changes in control needed to ensure that Fenni-2 would better meet the NRC's regulatory requirements.
4. Actions planned to ensure that the plant is ready for restart and for readiness of the facility to support increasing power after testing is completed at each power ascension plateau. (The Cerrrnission imposed hold points in power increases at 20%, 50%, and 75%.)
5. i review of the management and system performance at each power ascension plateau, including who will perform the review, objective criteria for determining adequacy of perfomance at each plateau, and the manager who will authorize proceeding to the next plateau.
6. Actions planned to improve regulatory and operational perfonnance during and after the startup testing phase of operation.

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Congressman Broomfield In response to the NRC's order, management changes at Fermi-2 have occurred and officers with nuclear experience have been hired. DECO has formed an independent overview ccmittee to provide corporate management with an evaluation of operation of Fenni-2. A security improvement program was begun.

Finally, DECO, in compliance with the Connission's Order, ccmitted to resolving system and equipment problems and to conducting a comprehensive control room monitoring plan that would allow corporate management to assess, in detail, control room performance.

As a result of the actions initiated by DECO, the NRC allowed Fermi-2 to restart and closely monitored the controlled power ascension program. On December 15, 1987, the NRC approved DECO's request for operation at 100% power, removing the last hold point. While the NRC believes that DECO has taken the proper steps to improve performance, we are continuing to closely monitor the effectiveness of DECO's management and its ability to implement the programs necessary to improve the performance of the plant.

Mr. Roberts also expressed concerns about safety standards at nuclear power plants in the U.S. since the Chernobyl disaster. The NPC believes that no imediate changes are needed in the NRC's regulations regarding the design or operation of commercial nuclear reactors in the United States. Nuclear design, shutdown margin, containment, and operational controls at reactors in the United States protect them against a combination of lapses such as those experienced at Chernobyl. Although the NRC has always acknowledged the possibility of major accidents, our regulatory requirements provide adequate protection informationagainst that maythe risks, particular suggest subject toweaknesses (1) continuing and (vigilance for any new

2) continuing measures to ensure compliance with the requirements.

Assessments made in the light of Chernobyl have indicated that the causes of the accident have been largely anticipated and accomodated for in the design of comercial reactors in the United States. Nonetheless, the Chernobyl accident reminds us of the continuing importance of safe design in both concept and implementation; of operational controls; of the competence and motivation of plant management and operating staff to operate in strict compliance with centrols; and of backup features of defense-in-depth against potential accidents.

I hope this will be helpful to you in your responding to Mr. Roberts. If we can be of any further assistance, please let us know.

Sincerely, ISigned) T. A, Hebm

Victor Stello, Jr. I Executive Director for Operations See Previous Concurrence
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  1. Congre'ssman'Broomfield }nresponsetotheNRC'sorder,managementchangesatFermi-2haveoccurred and officers with nuclear experience have been hired. DECO has formed an independent overview committee to provide corporate management with an evaluation of operation of Fermi-2. A security improvement program was begun.

Finally, DECO, in compliance with the Commission's Order, committed to resolving system and equipment problems and to conducting a comprehensive control room gonitoring plan'that would allow corporate management to assess, in detail, control room performance.

As a result of th'e actions x initiated by DECO, the NRC allowed Fermi-2 to restart and closelysmonitored the controlled power ascension program. On December 15, 1987, the NRC approved DECO's request for operation at 100% power, removing the last holdspoint. While the NRC believes that DECO has taken the proper steps to improve' performance, we are continuing to closely monitor the effectiveness of DECO!s m'apagement and its ability to implement the programs necessary to improve the performance of the plant.

N Mr. Roberts also expressed concerns about safety standards at nuclear power plants in the U. S. since the Chernobyl disaster. The NRC believes that no immediate changes are needed in t'he NRC's regulations regarding the design or operation of commercial nuclear reactors s in the United States. Nuclear design, shutdown margin, containment, and opeqational controls at reactors in the United States protect them against a c6mbination of lapses such as those experienced at Chernobyl. Although the 'NGC has always acknowledged the possibility cf major accidents, our regulatpry requirements provide adequate protection against the risks, subject to (1}xcontinuing vigilance for any new information that may suggest particular weakne ses and (2) continuing measures to ensure compliance with the requirem(eqts.

Assessments made in the light of Chernobyl have ind(cated that the causes of the accident have been largely anticipated and accomhpdated for in the design of commercial reactors in the United States. Nonethe ss, the Chernobyl accident reminds us of the continuing importance of saf design in both concept and implementation; of operational controls; of the competence and motivation of plant management and operating staff to operate in stri t compliance with controls; and of backup features of defense-in-depth agains potential accidents.

I hope this will be helpful to you in your responding to Mr. R erts. If we can be of any further assistance, please let us know. \

Sincerely, Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations See Previous Concurrence

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Congressman Broomfield In response to the NRC's order, management changes at Fermi-2 have occurred and officers with nuclear experience have been hired. DECO has formed an independent overview comittee to provide corporate management with an evaluation of operation of Fermi-2. A security improvement program was begun.

Finally, DECO, in compliance with the Comission's Order, comitted to resolving system and equipment problems and to conducting a comprehensive control room monitoring plan that would allow corporate managerrent to assess, in detail, control room performance.

As a result of the actions initiated by DECO, the NRC allowed Femi-2 to restart and clcsely ironitored the controlled power ascension program. On December 15, 1987, the NRC approved DECO's request for operation at 100% pcher, removing the last hold point. While the NRC believes that DECO has taken the proper steps to improve perfomance, we are\ continuing to closely monitor the effectiveness of DECO's management and its ability to implement the programs necessary to improve the perfomance of the plant.

\

Mr. Roberts also expressed concerns about safety standards at nuclear power plants in the United States since the Chernobyl disaster. The NRC believes that no imediate changes are needed in the NRCs's regulations regarding the design or operation of conriercial nuclear reactnrs in the United States.

Nuclear design, shutdown margin, containment, and operational controls at reactors in the United States protect them against a combination of lapses such as those experienced at Chernobyl. Although the NRC has always acknowledged the possibility of major accidents, our regulatoryL re adequate protection against the risks, subject to (1)quirements continuingprovide vi any new information that may suggest particular weaknesses and continuing (2) gilance for reasures to ensure cwpliance with the requirements.,

Assessments made in the light of Chernobyl have indicated that the causes of the accident have been largely anticipated and accomodated for in the design of comercial reactors in the United States. Nonetheless, the Chernobyl accident reminds us of the continuing importance of safe design in both concept and implementation; of operational controls; of the comp'etence and motivation of plant management and operating staff to operate in strict compliance with controls; and of backup features of defense-in-depth against potential accidents.

\

l hope this will be helpful to you in your responding to Mr. Roberts. If we can be of any fur ner assistance, please let us know.

Sincerely, Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations See Previous Concurrence

  • PM/PD31:DRSP* TECH ED* D/PD31:DRSP* AD:DRSP* D:DRSP* ADP*

T(uay:lt MVirgilio GHolahan DCrutchfield FMiraglia 02/09/88 02/09/88 02/09/88 02/10/88 02/10/88 02/10/88 DONRR EDO GPA/CA OGC TMurley VStello 02/ /88 02/ /88 02/ /88 02/ /88 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

Congressman Broomfield  ;

In response to the NRC's order, management changes at Fermi-2 have occurred and officers with nuclear experience have been hired. Deco has formed an independent dv.erview committee to provide corporate management with an evaluation of operation of Fermi-2. A security improvement program was begun.

Finally, DECO, in compliance with the Commission's Order, committed to resolving system and equipment problems and to conducting a comprehensive control room monitoring plan that would allow corporate management to assess, s

in detail, control room performance.

\

As a result of the actions initiated Ly OECo, the NRC allowed Fermi-2 to restart Fermi-2 and closely monitored the controlled power ascension program.

On December 15, 1987, the NRC approved DECO's request for operation at 100%

power, removing the last hol'spoint.

d While the NRC believes that DECO has taken the proper steps to improve performance, we are continuing to closely monitor the effectiveness of DECO's management and its ability to implement the programs necessary to improve the rformance of the plant.

Mr. Roberts also expressed concerns about safety standards at nuclear power plants in the U. S. since the Chernobyls disaster. The NRC believes that no immediate changes are needed in the NRC's regulations regarding the design or operation of commercial nuclear reactors'in the United States. Nuclear design, shutdown margin, containment, and operational controls at reactors in the United States protect them against a combination of lapses such as those experienced at Chernobyl. Although the NRC his always acknowledged the possibility of major accidents, our regulatory' requirements provide adequate protection against the risks, subject to (1) continuing vigilance for any new information that may suggest particular weaknesses \and (2) continuing measurestoensurecompliancewiththerequirements(

Assessments made in the light of Chernobyl have indica'ted that the causes of the accident have been largely anticipated and accommodated for in the design of commercial reactors in the United States. Nonethelesh the Chernobyl accident reminds us of the continuing importance of safe design in both concept and implementation; of operational controls; of the compete'ce n and motivation of plant management and operating sitaff to operate in strict kompliance with controls; and of backup features of defense-in-depth against phtential accidents.

I hope this will be helpful to you in your responding to Mr. Roberts. If we can be of any further assistance, please let us know.

Sincerely, Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations PM/P031:0 P TECH ED 0/PD31:0K A P ADP TQuay: 1t Ip MVirgilio/ GHolahan DCr tchfield FMiraglia 02/$/88 02/3/88pc 02/1/88 02/jo/88 02/gs/88 02/ /88 00NRR EDO GPA/CA OGC TMurley VStello 02/ /88 02/ /88 02/ /88 02/ /88 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

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DISTRIBUTION FOR GREEN TICKET NO. 003442 dated - / /88

- Doc'ket ' File NRC & Local POR EDO # 003442

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SECY (3) (Control Ticket No. 88-46)

V. Stello

.A. Bert Davis, Region III

.D. Mossburg (EDO NO. 003442)

P. Shea R. Ingram

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M ESSAGE Murray, Olmstead, and Chandler have no legal objections to the attached,  !

i OK for. your concurrence.

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[M FROM: DilE 02/Q9/Ef8 Enn CONTROL: 003442

/ DOC DT 01/11/88 REP. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD FINAL RFPLY:

TO:

CHAIRMAN 7ECH FOR SIGNATURE OF ** GREEN ** SECY NO: 88-46 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DESC: ROUTING:

ENCLOSES LETTER FROM JOHN M. ROBERTS RE FERMI II DAVIS ,

MURRAY '

DATE: 01/26/88 ASSICiNED TO: NRR CONTACT: MURLEY j __

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

NRR RECEIVED: JANUARY 27, 1988 ACTION: yDRSP:CRUTCHFIELD)

NRR ROUTING: MURLEY/SNIEZEK l MIRAGLIA wr GILLESPIE nasssUa i ACTl0tl DUE TO NRR DIRECTOR'S OF

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, n 0FFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET PAPER NUMBER: CRC 0046 LOGGING DATE 1/25/88 ACTION OFFICE: EDO AUTHOR:

William S. Broomfield .. Const Rhf AFFILIATION: U.S. Hcuse of Representatives LETTER DATE: 1/11/88 FILE CODE: ID&R-5 Fermi II SUILTECT: Safety concern of the Fermi II nuc power plant ACTION: Direct Reply DISTRIBUTION: OCA to Ack SPECIAL HANDLING: None NOTES:

  • John M. Roberts DATE DUE: Suspense: Feb 8 SIGNATURE: DATE SIGNED:

AFFILIATION:

9et'd Oil. ED0

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ELO --- 003442