Text

Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1978
	ML20147B461
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	12/01/1978
From:	Caba E; TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20147B458	List: ML20147B454; ML20147B461;
References
	NUDOCS 7812150298
	Download: ML20147B461 (10)
	v • d • e

-

OPERATING DATA REPORT 50-346 DOCKET NO.

DATE 12 /1R8_

COMPLETED BY Erdal Caba TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000 Ext. 236 OPEILATING STATUS Davis-Besse Unit 1 Notes

1. Unit Name:

November, 1978

2. Reporting Period:

2772

3. Licensed Thermal Power (MW.):

4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 925

5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 906

6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe).To be determined

7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): To be determined _

8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last R'eport, Give Reasons:

None

9. Power Lesel To Which Rettricted,if Any (Net MWe):

10. Reasons For Restrictions,if Any:

This Month Yr..to Date Cumulative 720 8,016 11,021

11. Hours in Reporting Period 691.9 4.510.9 6.303

12. Number Of Hours Reactor Was Critical 0 38.9 422.6

13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours 567.2 3,952.1 5,419.1 14, Hours Generator On Line 0 0 0

15. Unit Resene Shutdown Hours 1,380,036 7.896.674 9.560,706 .

16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH)

17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) 453,563 _ .

2,662.334 3.186.783 423,578 2.438.330 2,868,148

18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) 78.8 49.3 52.2

19. Unit Sen-ice Factor 78.8 49.3 52.2

20. Unit Availability Factor To be Determined

21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net) 64.9 33.6 33.9

22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net)

[

23. Unit Forced Outage Rate 4.2 22.5 23.2 l 24. Shutdowns Scheduled Oser Next 6 Months (Type.Date and Duration of Eacht:

l

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup:

26. Units in Test Status (Prior io Commercial Operation): Forecast Achiesed INITIA L CRITICALITY 8/12/77 INITI AL E'LECTRICITY 8/28/77 7812156M6- coyyyaciu opra,1,oN 11/2) m * ~

Declared operational at 25% 12/19/77**

- Declared operational at 40% (f rom 25%) 1/23/78***

. *** Declared operational at 75% (from 40%) 7/31/78****

- - - Declared operational at 100% (f rom 75%) (9777)

,' . 1 i

. AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL s 50-346 DOCKET NO.

~

'N UNIT . Davis-Bessc Unit 1 l

DATE .12 /1/78 ~

' COMPLETED BY Erdal C. Caba 419-259-5000, Ext. -;

TELEPHONE . 236 I!

November, 1978 l.

MONTil ,

',~

DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL anye. Net)

(MWe Net) 882- ;

0 37 l

886 0 3g 2 . 4 888 ,

0 39 3

888 3 0 20 4 .

883 0 21 5 .

887 .

211 3 .

6 856 F 456 23 1 7

885 413 24 8 !

884 415 25 9 -

888 520 26 10 786 gg 686 27 840 ;

878 28 12 820 l 463 29

=

13 656 205 30 14 NA 856 33 15 16 888 -

, b INSTRUCTIONS i On this format. list the average daily unit power level in MWe. Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to I the nearest whole megawatt.

(9/771 l

l.

l -- ~ . _ , _ . _ , _, _ '"'#' ' -f"9--T-f^ wg.sg,9_ ,

,_m_ ____

Y t

DO E . .

esse Unit 1 Da -

UNIT SilUIDOWNS AND POWLit REDUCTIONS DATE 12/1/76 Ah COMPLETED BY _Charien N-REPORT MONT11 TELEPl!ONE (419) 259-5000 ext. 251 1

1 c

Cause & Currective j yO ,E t, E4 j

., jg 3 Licensec y

o o- Action to y]

Date g 3g s ;s& Event m (' Pievent Recurrence No.

H fE $ jgg Report *r 0 .

NA NA The Natural Circulation Test, 127.2 N/A NA -

26b Continued S B TP 800.04, was completed. The reactor from Oct. was manually tripped at 0250 hours0.00289 days 0.0694 hours 4.133598e-4 weeks 9.5125e-5 months on 11/4/78 per TP 800.04. Reactor criticality was re-established at

1657 hours0.0192 days 0.46 hours 0.00274 weeks 6.304885e-4 months on 11/4/78 and the turbine-generator was synchronized on line at 0710 hours0.00822 days 0.197 hours 0.00117 weeks 2.70155e-4 months on 11/6/78. .

4 NA NA NA The Turbine-Generator was taken off

~. 27 78-11-11 S .5 B line to, perform the Unit Load Rejectici Test, TP 800.13 RELAYX A fuse in the Reactor Coolant Pump 78-11-13 F 25.1 A NP-33-78-129 CB 28 .3 (RCP) Cabinet blew which tripped the RCP 1-2. The reactor then tripped on flux-delta flux-flow limit setpoints. ~

Ref'er to the Operational a mmary for

^

\

further details.

4 3 Exhibit G.lnstrutilons I 2 Method:

Reason: for Preparation of Data F: Forced . I-Manual Entry Sheets for Licensee S: Schedu!cd A Equipment Failure (Explain) 2 Manual Scram. Event Repost (LE R) File (NUREG.

B-Maintenance of Test 3- Automatic Scram.

C ftefueling 4-Other (Explain) Of61)

D-Itegulatory Resttiction E-Operator Training & License Examination 5 ~

F-Administ ative Exhibit 1.Same Source .

G-Operational Eiior (Explain)

Il-Other (Explain) 19/77)

--p -

'*w y a- - . , . , , ,

t 3

I DOCKET NO 50-346 __

, UNIT SitUIDOWNS AND POM.:t REDUCITONS UNIT NAME Davis-Besse Unit 1 DATE 12/1/78 Charles N. Alm COMPtJTED BY REPORT MONTil TELEPIIONE (419) 259-5000 ext. 251 I

"t - {

c Cause & Corrective i

- E: 3 *Y3 Licensee 53, $".

9g Action to ;

Nie. Date E 5E 5 .g g 5 Event U wv 8v Prevent Recurrence 4 BI O-y , . = =

u mg Report er u 6

l 78-11-29 F 0.0 4 , NA NA NA The reactor power was runback to 20% c 29 11

' when a metal tag on a transmitter was dislodged,.by pdrsonnel working in the EHC cabinet, and fell across a terminal board for the power supply .

of the high pressure turbine pressure transmitters. Refer to the Opera-tional summary for further details.

~.

- 3 4 I 2 Method: Exhibit G-Instructions F: Forced Reason: for Preparation of Data A-Equipment Failure (Explain) 1-Manual S: Schedu!cd 2-Manual Scram. Entry Sheets for Licensee B Maintenance of Test 3 Automatic Scram.

Event Report (LER) File (NUREG -

C-Refueling 4-Other (Explain) 0161)

D Regulatory Restriction E-Operator Training & License Examination 5 -

~ ' F-Administrative ~ ~~ '

Exhibit I-Same Source G-Operational Er rur (Explain)

Il-Other (Explain)

(9/77)

.I

OPERATIONAL

SUMMARY

FOR NOVDiBER, 197S

?

i to 11/1/78 - 11/6/78 Reactor power was maintained at approximately four percent perform testing required by the Natural Circulation Flow Test, TP 800.04. Data collection for the test was completed at 0152 hours0.00176 days 0.0422 hours 2.513228e-4 weeks 5.7836e-5 months on November 4, 1978, and the reactor was then manually ,

I tripped at 0250 hours0.00289 days 0.0694 hours 4.133598e-4 weeks 9.5125e-5 months on November 4,1978, per TP 800.04.

Reactor criticality was re-established at 1657 hours0.0192 days 0.46 hours 0.00274 weeks 6.304885e-4 months on Novem- l ber 4, 1978, and the turbine-generator was synchronized on line at 0710 hours0.00822 days 0.197 hours 0.00117 weeks 2.70155e-4 months on November 6, 1978. The turbine-generator syn- l f

chronization was delayed because the feedwater 02 concentration I was discovered as exceeding specifications on November 4,1978, at 2316 hours0.0268 days 0.643 hours 0.00383 weeks 8.81238e-4 months .

11/7/78 Reactor power had attained 72 percent full power. At 0900 i hours, reactor power was reduced to 38 percent because the out of core detectors were discovered out .of calibration, and the incore detector computer calculation of imbalance was inopera-ble. At 1645 hours0.019 days 0.457 hours 0.00272 weeks 6.259225e-4 months , the.out of core detectors had been re-calibrated and reactor power was increased to 50 percent.

11/7/78 - 11/10/78 Reactor power was limited and maintained at 50 percent because of speed control problems on the Main Feedwater Pump Turbine (MFPT) 1-2. The MFPT 1-2 had been removed from service at 1034 hours0.012 days 0.287 hours 0.00171 weeks 3.93437e-4 months on November 7, 1978. The problem on the MFPT 1-2 '

was resolved by the completion of a circuit calibration on the system's signal converter.

11/10/78 The MFPT 1-2 was returned to service at 1045 hours0.0121 days 0.29 hours 0.00173 weeks 3.976225e-4 months , and reactor power was increased to 75 percent power. The Integrated Con-trol System (ICS) decreased reactor power to 60% at 1507 hours0.0174 days 0.419 hours 0.00249 weeks 5.734135e-4 months .

because of an asymmetric rod fault indication which was caused by a faulty absolute position indication of the group 3 rod 4 position. Reactor power had been returned to 75 percent at i

1718 hours0.0199 days 0.477 hours 0.00284 weeks 6.53699e-4 months , 11/11/78 The turbine-generator was taken off line at 0009 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months for 30 minutes to perform the Unit Load Rejection Test, TP 800.13. '

Reactor power was increased at 0039 hours4.513889e-4 days 0.0108 hours 6.448413e-5 weeks 1.48395e-5 months and attained 92 per- i cent at 0700 hours0.0081 days 0.194 hours 0.00116 weeks 2.6635e-4 months . The ICS decreased reactor power to 60%

l at 1630 hours0.0189 days 0.453 hours 0.0027 weeks 6.20215e-4 months . This power reduction was caused by the same occurrence as on November 10, 1978. Refer to Licensee Event Report NP-33-78-135 for further details on the group 3 rod 4 l asymmetric rod faults, j I

1

~ * " - -- -+ ..-- --.. .,__ , _ _ , , , . _ _ ,_.

4 OPERATIONAL

SUMMARY

FOR NOVEMBER,1978 PACE 2 0F 3 ,

11/11/78 Continued Reactor power was increased immediately af ter runback and attained 92 percent at 1800 hours0.0208 days 0.5 hours 0.00298 weeks 6.849e-4 months .

11/12/78 Reactor power was increased at 0300 hours0.00347 days 0.0833 hours 4.960317e-4 weeks 1.1415e-4 months and attained 100 percent power at 0446 hours0.00516 days 0.124 hours 7.374339e-4 weeks 1.69703e-4 months .

11/13/78 Reactor power was maintained at 100 percent until 1300 hours0.015 days 0.361 hours 0.00215 weeks 4.9465e-4 months . f At this time, the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1-2 tripped which '

initiated a reactor trip on flux-delta flux-flow limit setpoints.

After the reactor trip, the RCp 2-1 tripped. Investigstion revealed that the main fuse for the non-safety related RCP Cab-inct was blown. The fuse was blown because two non-safety related relays were defective and caus.ed an increase in circuit load. For further details refer to Licensee Event Report NP-33-78-129.

11/14/78 Reactor criticality was re-established at 0629 hours0.00728 days 0.175 hours 0.00104 weeks 2.393345e-4 months and the turbine-generator was synchronized on line at 1406 hours0.0163 days 0.391 hours 0.00232 weeks 5.34983e-4 months , and a reactor power increase was initiated.

11/15/78 Reactor power attained 92 percent at 0140 hours0.00162 days 0.0389 hours 2.314815e-4 weeks 5.327e-5 months . This power level was maintained to comply with xenon limits and then at 0740 hours0.00856 days 0.206 hours 0.00122 weeks 2.8157e-4 months , reactor power was established at 100 percent.

11/16/78 - 11/26/78 Reactor pcser was maintained at 100 percent with the turbine-generator gross load at 930 + 10 MWE.

11/27/78 The feedwater heater 1-4 was discovered as having tube leaks.

Reactor power was decreased at 0510 hours0.0059 days 0.142 hours 8.43254e-4 weeks 1.94055e-4 months and attained 72 per-cen' at 0930 hours0.0108 days 0.258 hours 0.00154 weeks 3.53865e-4 months . The train 1 feedwater heaters were iso-lated and reactor power was increased at 1350 hours0.0156 days 0.375 hours 0.00223 weeks 5.13675e-4 months .

11/28/78 - 11/30/78 At 0900 hours0.0104 days 0.25 hours 0.00149 weeks 3.4245e-4 months on November 28, 1978, reactor power was at 100 l

percent and the turbine-generator gross load was 876 + 10 MWE.

l This power level was maintained until 2342 hours0.0271 days 0.651 hours 0.00387 weeks 8.91131e-4 months on November '

1 29, 1978, when reactor pow 3r was runback to 20 percent by the ICS unit master. The runoack was caused when a metal tag on a transmitter was dislodged by Instrument and Control personnel working in the EllC Cabinet, and fell across the terminal board for the power supply of the high pressure turbine pressure i

- RJ

i OPERATIONAL SIRC4ARY FOR NOVEMBER,1978 PAGE 3 OF 3 ,

11/28/78 - 11/30/78 transmitters. This caused the transmitter output to fail low Continued and the EUC System called for high pressure turbine throttle pressure limiting to attempt to raise the false low pressure signal. Other automatic actions initiated by this system's response to the false signal created the runback. To prevent further occurrences, the metal tag was removed and will be replaced in a different location. Reactor power was then ;

increased at 0050 hours5.787037e-4 days 0.0139 hours 8.267196e-5 weeks 1.9025e-5 months and reached 100 percent power at l 1140 hours0.0132 days 0.317 hours 0.00188 weeks 4.3377e-4 months on November 30, 1978. l l

6 P

i i

FACILITY CHANGE REQUESTS CO'fPLETED DURING NOVEMBER, 1978 FCR NO.78-486 SYSTEM: 13.8 KV Electrical System COMPONENT: Operating Procedures CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: On October 30, 1978, modifications were made to Plant Procedure PP 1102.04, and Emergency Procedure EP 1202.03, and a special order was issued to modify the operation of the 13.8 KV electrical system. The 13.8 KV busses A and B are to be supplied from the startup transformers 01 and 02 (prefera-bly both f r om 01) . Also procedures were modified so as to instruct operators to power the essential busses C1 and D1 from the Emergency Diesel Generators should the grid f requency go below 59.9 hertz.

REASON YOR THE FCR: The reason for the above changes in operating procedures is to comply with the requirements of FSAR Section 8.2.1 and NRC General Design Criterion

17. Shifting of the essential busses to the diese1' generators on an abnormal grid frequency provides protection of the engineered safety features loads from under-frequency on the grid. These changes in operating procedures will continue until a penmanent fix can be comnleted. (FCR 78-459)

SAFETY EVALUATION: This interim mode of operation will not degrade the safety of Davis-Besse Unit 1 for the following reasons:

1. The total housepower load including ECCS loads is less than the 65 MVA rating of each startup transformer. Therefore, there is adequate capa-city to carry the total load'on each transformer.

2. The manual transfer of ECCS loads (busses C1 and D1) to the Emergency Diesel Generator at system f requencies below 59.9 hertz will assure that these loads will function properly under degraded grid conditions. This equipment will saf ely operate at system f requencies down to 58.2 hertz.

The lowest f requency that has occurred on the 345 KV grid was 59.83 hertz on January 17, 1977. This was the only time that the grid f requency went below 59.9 hertz. During this event, the frequency was below 59.9 hertz for 47 minutes.

3. The protection against low voltage on the grid will not be degraded by this change since this protection uses the busses C1 and D1 4.16 KV voltage i

to start the Emergency Diesel Generator and carry the ECCS loads.

This change in the mode of operation during the interim period of operation is not an unreviewed safety issue.

t m

?

i FACILITY CHNIGE REQUESTS COMPLETED DURING NOVDGER,1978

+

'i FCR NO.77-233 SYSTDf: Component Cooling Water (CCW)

COMPONENT: CCW Pump Motor 1-3 Outboard Bearing Thermocouple (TE-1686B)

CHANCE, TEST, OR EXPERDIENT: FCR 77-233 was written to approve the use of a 1/2" diameter black iron pipe nipple as a temporary replacement for the Q-listed ther-mocouple connection which was broken and leaking oil. The black iron pipe was installed on October 11, 1976 and replaced with the Q-listed replacement part on November 3, 1978. ,

REASON FOR THE FCR: The original thermocouple oil coupling was broken and leaking oil. As no Q-listed replacement was in stock, the above mentioned pipe nipple was j installed on a temporary basis until the Q-listed replacement part became available, ,

at which time it was installed.

j i i

SAFETY EVALUATION: The change per this FCR is on a temporary basis only. Although this is non-Q material in a Q-system, it is felt that this temporary fix vill not ,

I impair system function or plant safety. Q-listed caterial was installed as soon as possible. ;

I 1

L i

i

o ye FACILITY CHANGE REQUESTS COMPLETED DURING MOVEMBER,1978 l l

TCR NO. .77-308 SYSTEM: Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

COMPONENT: ECCS Room Sumps !

CHANCE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: This FCR was written to provide 18" x 18" access openings, with cover plates, in the covers of ' the ECCS room sumps. This modifica- ;

tion was completed on May 13, 1978, with the prior approval of the unit architect /

engineer, Bechtel Corporation, and the ECCS room sump vendor, Crane Chempump. Crane Chempump's analysis indicated that the openings have no adverse effect on the cover's adequacy for a13 design loads, including scismic.

REASON FOR THE FCR: The openings are necessary to provide access to the sumps for maintenance of the pumps and for c1 caning. .

SAFETY EVALUATION: The proposed change per this FCR affects the seismic design of the sump cover plate only. The sump vendor, Crane Chempump, has evaluated this change and has concluded that the 18" square hole will have no effect.on the overall strength of the cover plate. As this change will not affect the saf e operation of the ECCS room sump pumps, an unreviewed saf ety question does not exist.

9 JL

ML20147B461

Text

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

Navigation menu

Search