ML20147B096

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Trip Rept of 880120 Visit to Vendor Re Insp & Testing of Valves Returned to Automatic Switch Co & Pilot Valve Event at Brunswick on 880102
ML20147B096
Person / Time
Issue date: 02/22/1988
From: Petrosino J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Baker E
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-QA-99900369 NUDOCS 8803010455
Download: ML20147B096 (5)


Text

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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February 22, 1988 Docket No. 99900369 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Edward T. Baker, Acting Chief Program Development and Reactive Inspection Section Vendor Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM:

Joseph J. Petrosino Program Development and Reactive Inspection Section Vendor Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

TRIP RC' ORT TO AUT0*M14 SWITCH COMPANY (ASCO)

BACKGROUND:

We were requesteo by Region II to witness the inspection and testing of velve'. returned to ASCO and to participate in the vendor-licensee discussions concerning the ASCO pilot valve event at the Brunswick nuclear plant that occurred on January 2,1988.

I contacted Mr. Shank, Production Engineering Manager for ASCO, on January 7, 1 W 8 and requested him to keep me informed as to the tentative schedule for their inspection and testing of the Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L) ASCO valvet. On January 19, 1988, I was informed by ASCO that CPAL wouid be at the ASCO facility on January 20, 1988 to begin testing.

DISCUSSION:

I met with the CP&L representative and ASCO perconnel at apprm:N.ately 8:00 am on January 20, 1988 at ASCO's Florhan J

Park, New Jersey facility. At that time ASCO presented its proposed valve check out procedure to CP&L for review and approv01 Only minor modifications were made by CP&L, and CP&L thei. presented its pilot valves that they had brought with them n r ASCO's inspection and test. Discussions on the K18 "R120 GE relay failure and its associated valves (CP&L #G-10-F004 and F020) were also conducted.

It was 1

revealed that d es F004 and F020 operated satisfactorily after the defecti.s K18 relay was replaced.

Simultaneously, as F004 and F020 co w nced operation. F003 operated.

It was CP&L's conjective thac The minor vibration from F004 and F020 aided the previous 1;r stuck valve F003 enough to enable it to operate. The four valves that were brought to ASCO by T

ff.0f 8803010455 900222 PDR GA999 ENVAUSC 99900369 PDR y

Edward T. Baker.

February 22, 1988 CP&L are listed below,'as well as a fifth valve that was previously supplied to ASCO for its initial evaluation and tests.

1.

CP R valve #G-16 F003, Name plate missing.

2.

CP&L valve #G-16 F004, Ser. #98222N-7, Cat. fL206832-3RF 3.

CP 1 valve fG-16 F019 Ser. #98222N-9, Cat. #L206832-3RF 4.

CP&L valve #G-16 F004, Ser. #65989R-1, Cat. #L206832 3RG 5.

CP A valve #G-16 F020, Ser. #99222N-10, Cat. #L206032-3RF TEST OBSERVATIONS:

Item f4 was taken out of service by cpi in October,1987 due to operability problems and was replaced by item #2.

Item #2 was disassembled, inspected and reassembled by CP L and Region 11 prior to this ASCO test inspection.

Items #2 and #4 were not disassembled prior to this ASCO test and inspection for any other maintenance by CP&L.

Item #2 and f5 were the valves associated with the K-18, GE CR120 relay failure.

Item #1 had the worst history of problems, and was rebuilt twice by CP&L.

Item #3 was disassembled by CP&L at its plant, where the seats and internals were removed, manually operated and observed that only a film of lubricant was present.

Items #3 and #4 were observed to have shorter upper springs than valves #1 and #2.

Items #2 and #5 had a coating on their lower valve discs.

CONCLUSION.

No substantial reasons were revealed that would indicate any common problems. However, discussions revealed that a potential contamination of the lower valve disc appears to be occurring due to the mechanical operator atmosphere during the purge cycle. Additional follow-ups will be performed by the licensee and ASCO to determine if the operator contanina-tion theory is credible.

The recent LaSalle MSIV transient event involved several ASCO valves with clesr indications of a varnish like material in the exhaust port of the valve disc.

The VIB will be following up in this area.

It was noted that in a typical nuclear plant, there is no filter between the ASCO valve and the associated mechanical operator.

Fobrucry 22, 1988 Edward T. Baker -

4 Additional VIB follow-up may focus on the following areas:

(1) Upper & lower spring differential pressure; (2) ASCO conversion kits; (3) ASCO replacement kits; (4) Potential operator internal atmosphere contamination of the ASCO valve; (5) Lubricant used by ASC0; and (6) Licensee methodology in its utilization of the ASCO kits.

PERSONNEL CONTACTED AT ASCO:

John Shank - Product Engineering Manager, ASCO Kenneth Thomas - Service Engineer, ASCO Erich Plant - Product Engineer, ASCO Stephen Casadervall - Engineer Technician, ASCO William Bracey - CP&L, ASCO

-.d

.sujj Joseph

. Petrosino Program Development and Reactive Inspection Section Vendor Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

r February 22, 1988 Edward T. Baker.

Additional VIB follow.up may focus on the following areas:

(1) Upper & lower spring differential pressure; (2) ASCO conversion kits; (3) ASCO replacement kits; (4) Potential operator internal atmosphere contamination of the ASCO valve; 1

(5) Lubricant used by ASC0; and (6) Licensee methodology in its utilization of the ASCO kits.

PERSONNEL CONTACTED AT ASCO:

John Shank - Product Engineering Manager, ASCO Kenneth Thomas - Service Engineer, ASCO Erich Plant - Product Engineer, ASCO Stephen Casadervall - Engineer Technician, ASCO William Bracey - CP!L, ASCO

/5/

Joseph J. Petrosino Program Development and Reactive Inspection Section Vendor Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION:

,jEl&5 Code IE:09 VIB Reading DRIS Reading JStone EBaker JPetrosino JPartlow BGrimes i

  • See previous page for concurrences.

1 0FC

VIB:DRIS
ASC/VIB:DRIS :ABC/VIB:DRIS:

NAME :JPetrosino:jh*:EBaker*

JStone*

i

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DATE :02/11/88

02/11/88
02/19/88 1

l J

February 22, 1988 Edward T. Baker 3

Additional VIB follow-up may focus on the following areas:

(1) Upper & lower spring differential pressure; (2) ASCO conversion kits; (3) ASCO replacement kits; (4) Potential operator internal atmosphere contamination of the ASCO valve; (5) Lubricant used by ASC0; and (6) Licensee methodology in its utilization of the ASCO kits.

PERSONNEL CONTACTED AT ASCO:

John Shank - Product Engineering Manager, ASCO Kenneth Thomas - Service Engineer, ASCO Erich Plant - Product Engineer, ASCO Stephen Casadervall - Engineer Technician, ASCO William Bracey - CP A., ASCO

/5/

Joseph J. Petrosino Program Development and Reactive Inspection Section Vendor Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION:

RIDS Code IE:09 VIB Reading DRIS Reading JStone EBaker JPetrosino JPartlow BGrimes

  • See previous page for concurrences.

OFC :V;8:DRIS

ASC/VIB:DRIS :ABC/VIB:DRIS:

NAftE :JPetrosino:jh*:EBaker*

JStone*

DATE :02/11/88

02/11/88
02/19/88

.