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Category:Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Analysis
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[Table view]
Category:Final
MONTHYEARML21048A3882021-02-18018 February 2021
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ML21054A0492021-02-0808 February 2021
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[Table view] |
Text
LER 316/82-072 Event
Description:
Control Room Instrument Distribution Bus IV Fails, Trip Date of Event: August 24, 1982 Plant: D.C. Cook 2 Summary During normal operation at 100% power, Cook Unit 2 suddenly tripped when a component failure resulted in the loss of the control room instrument distribution (CRID)-IV 120V ac vital bus. In addition to causing a reactor trip, the loss of the CRID-IV bus resulted in loss of power in the control room to several instrument and control circuits. Power was also lost to the solid state protection system (SSPS) channel B slave relays.
The four CRID trains provide power to channels in the reactor protection system (RPS), the solid-state protection system, and various instrumentation panels. Licensee event report (LER) 316/82-072 does not specifically identify the affected system; however, such a listing may be found in LER 316/89-0I4, which reports a similar failure of CRID-JV. These systems include the protection system status lights, 24 reactor coolant pump (RCP) operating parameter indication, steam generator wide-range level indication, loop 4 indication of auxiliary feedwater flow, two main steam pressure indicators, one channel of steam generator narrow-range level indication, and the steam dump control system.
The RPS is designed to fail safe on loss of CRID power, so loss of a CRID train will not prevent a trip. Redundant indications not dependent on CRID-IV exist to ensure that operators can monitor and control all necessary safety functions. The SSPS is designed so that two of four channels are generally sufficient to initiate a trip, so loss of certain CRID trains will not render either SSPS train inoperable. However, CRID-IV also provides power to the SSPS train B slave relays. Concurrent with the failures described in this event, the B train of HPI/HPR was rendered inoperable by an obstruction in the system piping. This failure is discussed in LER 3I6/82-1I3 and the associated analysis.
This event was modeled as a transient with unavailability of auto-initiation of HP by SSPS. Train B of HPI/HPR was also assumed unavailable due to the failure described in LER 316/82-113. The conditional core damage probability estimated for this event is 1.3x10-6. The dominant core damage sequence involves the observed transient, and failure of auxiliary feedwater, main feed water, and feed and bleed.
