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Category:Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Analysis
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[Table view]
Category:Final
MONTHYEARML21048A3882021-02-18018 February 2021
Transmittal of Final Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2 Accident Sequence Precursor Report
ML21054A0492021-02-0808 February 2021
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[Table view] |
Text
LER 316/82-011 Event
Description:
ESW Header and ECCS Train A Inoperable Date of Event: January 28, 1982 Plant: D.C. Cook 2 Summary On January 28, 1982, while Cook was operating at 100% power, a leak was discovered in the emergency service water (ESW) system piping, downstream of the outlet valve from the east component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger. In order to effect repairs, the ESW piping was isolated, rendering equipment supplied by that train of ESW inoperable. In addition, emergency core cooling system (ECCS) train A was declared inoperable. At the same time, the B train of high-pressure injection (HPI)/high-pressure recirculation (HPR) was rendered inoperable by an obstruction in the system piping. This failure is discussed in licensee event report 316/82-113 and the associated analysis.
This event was modeled as an unavailability of ECCS train A and other systems dependent on the affected train of ESW. Since the duration of the unavailability was not given, a 24-hour duration was assumed. Systems assumed to be affected included high-pressure recirculation, residual heat removal, and the A train emergency diesel generator. The B train of HPI/HPR was also assumed to be inoperable. Two calculations were performed: one for the case of a potential loss of offsite power (LOOP), and another for all other initiators. For the LOOP case, the equipment associated with the inoperable A emergency diesel generator (EDG) was considered inoperable, including the A motor-driven AFW pump, HPI/HPR train A, and RHR train A. The B train of HPI/HPR was assumed to be inoperable also. The charging pumps at Cook can provide a redundant source of high-pressure injection but, since flow from two pumps may be required to equal the flow of an HPI pump, this redundant source was assumed to be unavailable because the A charging pump would be de energized. For all other initiators, train B of HPI/HPR was assumed to be unavailable, along with train A of HPR and RHR.
The increase in core damage probability (CDP), or importance, over the duration of the event is 1.5x10-6. The base-case CDP over the duration of the event is 3.5x10-7, resulting in an estimated conditional core damage probability of 1.9x10-6. The dominant core damage sequence involves a postulated loss of offsite power (LOOP), failure of emergency ac power, seal LOCA, and failure to recover ac power before core uncovery.
