ML20142A388

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COL Docs - FW: Hearing Request and Possible 2.206 Petition
ML20142A388
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Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 05/21/2020
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Text

From:

Santos, Cayetano Sent:

Thursday, May 21, 2020 12:29 PM To:

Vogtle PEmails

Subject:

FW: Hearing request and possible 2.206 petition Attachments:

E200511t090718_200511_Declaration Gundersen.pdf; E200511t090718_200511_BREDL Petition to Intervene_Vogtle 3_Docket 52-025-LA-3.pdf From: Santos, Cayetano Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 4:57 PM To: Buckberg, Perry <Perry.Buckberg@nrc.gov>

Cc: King, Mike <Michael.King2@nrc.gov>; Hall, Victor <Victor.Hall@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Hearing request and possible 2.206 petition

Perry, We received a petition to intervene from the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League on license amendment request (LAR)20-001 from Southern Nuclear Company regarding Vogtle Unit 3. The petition and expert declaration are attached to this email and are also available in ADAMS:

Expert Declaration of Gundersen(ML20132D309)

Petition for Leave to Intervene and Request for Hearing.(ML20132D303)

I am forwarding these documents to you because they appear to seek relief that is ordinarily considered as part of the agencys 10 CFR 2.206 process.

Thank you, Cayetano (Tanny) Santos Project Manager Vogtle Project Office

Hearing Identifier:

Vogtle_COL_Docs_Public Email Number:

566 Mail Envelope Properties (MN2PR09MB55137D6ACC4ED06EBF8CF6CAE5B70)

Subject:

FW: Hearing request and possible 2.206 petition Sent Date:

5/21/2020 12:29:18 PM Received Date:

5/21/2020 12:29:21 PM From:

Santos, Cayetano Created By:

Cayetano.Santos@nrc.gov Recipients:

"Vogtle PEmails" <Vogtle.PEmails@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None Post Office:

MN2PR09MB5513.namprd09.prod.outlook.com Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 1318 5/21/2020 12:29:21 PM E200511t090718_200511_Declaration Gundersen.pdf 269276 E200511t090718_200511_BREDL Petition to Intervene_Vogtle 3_Docket 52-025-LA-3.pdf 268420 Options Priority:

Normal Return Notification:

No Reply Requested:

No Sensitivity:

Normal Expiration Date:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of Southern Nuclear Operating Company License Amendment Application for Combined License NPF-91 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 Docket No. 52-025-LA-3 DECLARATION OF ARNOLD GUNDERSEN TO SUPPORT THE PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE AND REQUEST FOR HEARING BY THE BLUE RIDGE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE LEAGUE REGARDING SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANYS REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT VOGTLE UNIT 3 AUXILIARY BUILDING WALL 11 SEISMIC GAP REQUIREMENTS (LAR-20-001)

I, Arnold Gundersen, declare as follows:

1. My name is Arnold Gundersen. I am sui juris. I am over the age of 18-years-old.

2. The Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League (BREDL) and its chapter Concerned Citizens of Shell Bluff have retained Fairewinds Associates, Inc to issue an expert report in support of the Parties Petition For Leave To Intervene And Request For Hearing. I have specifically been retained to examine the Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 for License Amendment and Exemption: Unit 3 Auxiliary Building Wall 11 Seismic Gap Requirements (LAR-20-001).

3. I earned my Bachelor Degree in Nuclear Engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) cum laude. I earned my Master Degree in Nuclear Engineering from May 11, 2020

Page 2 of 17 RPI via an Atomic Energy Commission Fellowship. Cooling tower operation and cooling tower plume theory were my area of study for my Masters Degree.

4. I began my career as a reactor operator and instructor in 1971 and progressed to the position of Senior Vice President for a nuclear licensee prior to becoming a nuclear engineering consultant and expert witness. My Curriculum Vitae is Attachment 1.

5. I have testified as an expert witness to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) and Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), in Federal Court, the State of Vermont Public Service Board, the State of Vermont Environmental Court, and the Florida Public Service Commission.

6. I am an author of the first edition of the Department of Energy (DOE)

Decommissioning Handbook.

7. I have more than 49-years of professional nuclear experience including and not limited to: Cooling Tower Operation, Cooling Tower Plumes, Consumptive Water Loss, Nuclear Plant Operation, Nuclear Management, Nuclear Safety Assessments, Reliability Engineering, In-service Inspection, Criticality Analysis, Licensing, Engineering Management, Thermohydraulics, Radioactive Waste Processes, Decommissioning, Waste Disposal, Structural Engineering Assessments, Nuclear Fuel Rack Design and Manufacturing, Nuclear Equipment Design and Manufacturing, Prudency Defense, Employee Awareness Programs, Public Relations, Contract Administration, Technical Patents, Archival Storage and Document Control, Source Term Reconstruction, Dose Assessment, Whistleblower Protection, and NRC Regulations and Enforcement.

8. I am employed as the chief engineer for Fairewinds Associates, Inc, an expert witness and paralegal services firm specializing in nuclear engineering, nuclear operations, and nuclear power plant safety analysis and assessment. My declaration is intended to examine and analyze the technical issues regarding the Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 for License Amendment and

Page 3 of 17 Exemption: Unit 3 Auxiliary Building Wall 11 Seismic Gap Requirements (LAR 001).

9. My declaration is intended to examine and analyze the technical issues regarding the License Amendment Application by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, [herein called SNC] to receive an exemption allowing it to modify the Vogtle Unit 3 Auxiliary Building Wall 11 Seismic Gap Requirements (LAR-20-001).

The Condition and Construction History of the Vogtle Unit 3 Nuclear Power Plant 10.The condition of the Vogtle Unit 3 foundation is critical to the safe operation of this nuclear power plant because all systems, structures, walls and components are attached and depend upon its integrity to assure public health and safety as well as reliable operation. The interaction between the Vogtle Unit 3 foundation and the soil underneath it, is the first and most important design parameter that assures public safety during the entire operating life of this atomic power reactor. According to the 2012 license amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) for changes to be made to the foundation basemat1 concrete and rebar, the foundation is of critical safety importance.

The nuclear island structures, consisting of the containment, shield building, and auxiliary building are founded on the 6-foot-thick, cast-in-place, reinforced concrete basemat foundation. The basemat provides the interface between the nuclear island structures and the supporting soil. The basemat transfers the load of nuclear island structures to the supporting soil. The basemat transmits seismic motions from the supporting soil to the nuclear island. Resistance to sliding of the concrete basemat foundation is provided by soil friction. Soil-structure interaction (SSI) sensitivity analyses were performed using the Vogtle best estimate soil profile and seismic input.2 [Emphasis Added]

1 For those not familiar with the term basemat: According to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the Nuclear Island (NI) basemat is a very thick reinforced concrete mat sitting on sub-grade soil to function as one-piece-foundation to support all super-structures anchored above the basemat. https://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/ICONE/proceedings-abstract/ICONE25/57808/V002T03A038/251926 2 https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1221/ML12215A084.pdf, page 3

Page 4 of 17 11.The initial construction activities by the Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) for Vogtle Unit 3 were begun in 2012 under a Limited Work Authorization issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on February 10, 20123. At that time, work was limited to construction activities related to the foundation of the Seismic Category 1 Nuclear Island (NI). Between March 2013 and February 2014 most of the concrete for the NI foundation was poured.4 Foundation problems have plagued the construction of both Vogtle 3 and 4 reactors since the very beginning of construction project. For example, in 2012, construction was halted due to improperly installed rebar. And, then in 2013, the first concrete pour at Vogtle led to an NRC finding of significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance of [then contractor] CB&I. 5 12.The construction of the foundation for the Auxiliary and Annex Buildings, portions of which are considered part of the NI, was poured sometime in 2014 with walls constructed and poured shortly afterward, certainly by sometime in 2015. SNC has determined that the Vogtle construction schedule is Proprietary and the NRC has concurred so it is impossible for experts representing Non-Governmental Organizations such as BREDL to determine the exact construction dates from NRC documentation.

The construction schedule information contained within the Enclosures is considered proprietary to both Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC (Westinghouse) and Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Company, and was determined to be treated as such by the NRC in its letter to Westinghouse dated August 12, 2009 (ADAMS ML092240522). Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the enclosed VEGP Units 3 and 4 construction schedule information be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390. The project schedule information provided with this letter is proprietary in its entirety; thus, a non-proprietary version is not provided. 6 13.Five years later, after the foundation and walls were already completed, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) notified the NRC on February 7, 2020 that it was 3 https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML113350133 4 https://www.southerncompany.com/innovation/nuclear-energy/plant-vogtle-3-and-4.html 5 https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1221/ML12215A084.pdf 6 https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1403/ML14038A172.pdf

Page 5 of 17 seeking a License Amendment due to the discovery that walls and the entire foundation of the Auxiliary Building have inexplicably moved, sunk and become distorted. Now, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is proposing to modify what it calls the seismic gap between the walls of the NI and the Annex building: In order to facilitate the construction of the nuclear island and adjacent buildings7, according to its Request for License Amendment and Exemption: Unit 3 Auxiliary Building Wall 11 Seismic Gap Requirements (LAR-20-001). [Emphasis Added]

13.1.The construction of the walls and foundations in question were completed at least a half-decade ago, therefore, it is technically impossible to facilitate construction on structures that were completed at least five years earlier and that fall under strict seismic regulatory guides. Therefore, I believe that the above statement by SNC is materially false.

13.2.Moreover, by proposing a licensing amendment related to this so-called and allegedly newly discovered seismic gap change, Southern Nuclear Operating Company is once again attempting to ignore the critical underlying safety conditions that caused the gap to change, which is that the foundation of the Annex Building is sinking into the ground. In the same document, Request for License Amendment and Exemption: Unit 3 Auxiliary Building Wall 11 Seismic Gap Requirements (LAR-20-001), SNC stated, The VEGP Unit 3 settlement survey data of the past few years indicates that the nuclear island basemat has deflected more in the center and less at the perimeter which would tend to cause the perimeter walls to lean towards the center of the nuclear island.

Theoretically, this suggests that the nuclear island tends to tilt away from the annex building.8 [Emphasis Added]

13.3.Furthermore, the VEGP Unit 3 settlement survey data shows that SNC has known that the foundation under Vogtle Unit 3 was sinking and portions were 7 Page 4, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3, 2/7/2020, Request for License Amendment and Exemption: Unit 3 Auxiliary Building Wall 11 Seismic Gap Requirements (LAR-20-001) 8 IBID, page 8

Page 6 of 17 tilting in different directions during several years of the construction process.

The necessary requirement for a licensing amendment is not new, but has been evident to on the Vogtle site and SNC management for at least five years.

13.4.My review of the submitted data and evidence in the Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) file shows that:

13.4.1.Either Westinghouse knew and did not inform SNC or 13.4.2.Westinghouse and SNC knew and chose not to inform the NRC in a timely fashion or 13.4.3.Westinghouse, SNC and the NRC knew and chose to wait until the last minute to amend the Vogtle 3 license in hopes that the application would slide right through the statutorily required formal hearings and NRC oversight.

13.5.Additionally, I remain significantly concerned that either SNC and its contractors lack the technical competence to ascertain that the walls within Vogtle Unit 3 were moving uncontrollably because the basemat of the nuclear island is not stable, or SNC deliberately chose not to inform the NRC of these safety violations until this late hour in hopes that the serious ramifications would be overlooked.

13.6.As the licensee (SNC) is ultimately responsible for the accuracy and truthfulness of all of its correspondence with the NRC and since SNC has admitted that it was measuring the deflection of the basemat for a period of years, it seems that SNC has chosen to seek quick forgiveness from the NRC rather than correct a problem at a much earlier date. The nuclear industry knows that it is easier to seek forgiveness from the NRC after the fact than it is to see the NRCs approval when a problem is initially identified.

13.7.SNC now has the audacity to ask the NRC for an expedited review of a problem that requires license amendment hearings in addition to being a significant unreported safety risk that has existed for more than five years.

Page 7 of 17 13.8.Now, in the midst of an international pandemic, SNC is attempting to slide this request in front of NRC staff for a quick internal review and approval of its License Amendment Request (LAR) no later than August 7, 20209 even though the problem has been known to SNC for more than five years.

License Amendment Technical Description 14.The critical importance of a well-designed and well-constructed foundation should have been known to SNC when it originally applied for its license for Vogtle Unit 3.

According to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME),

Since passive-safety-plant NI basemat is a deep foundation, basemat is deeply buried below the grade, the complete foundation model not only shall consider the basemat and immediate soil under the basemat, but also need to consider the backfill soil, the surrounding soil in vicinity, fill concrete under the basemat and deeper soil condition under the basemat.

Since seismic loads pose great effects on basemat and its foundation design, how to evaluation [sic] seismic loadings and simplified their application for basemat static analysis is critical for such type of foundation.10 15.In seeking to minimize the underlying structural requirements approved as a baseline safety design feature for Vogtle Unit 3 for the approval of its initial construction license, Southern Nuclear Corp (SNC) is attempting to obfuscate the true facts.

Merely amending its license and modifying requirements for the seismic gap between a portion of a wall in the Annex Building and the NI (Nuclear Island), SNC appears to be using this alleged emergency license amendment request to ignore the significant seismic and structural concerns. In this License Amendment process, SNC has chosen to ignore these key factors relating to the degraded condition of the nuclear island:

9 IBID, Cover letter, page 2 10 https://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/ICONE/proceedings-abstract/ICONE25/57808/V002T03A038/251926

Page 8 of 17 15.1. The foundation of the Seismic Category 1 Nuclear Island has settled more at the center and less at the perimeter 15.2. A wall has moved closer to the NI 15.3. That same wall now is not level, and is leaning 15.4. If the foundation of the NI has settled, more at the center and less at the perimeter, other systems and structures must also have become deformed yet have not been evaluated.

16.SNC seeks to portray the as-built condition of the wall as a minor issue, less than an inch deflection from the designed value. SNC states in its License Amendment request that it seeks:

to modify the north-south seismic gap requirement above grade between the nuclear island and the annex building west of Column Line I from El.

141 through El. 154 in the licensing basis to accommodate construction as-built localized nonconformances at VEGP Unit 3. Elevation 141 is mid-span with respect to the auxiliary building and annex building.

[Emphasis Added]

17.This statement by SNC is incorrect. The as-built condition of the wall in question was correct at the time it was built. Its most recent location is not an as-built localized nonconformance. Without human intervention, the wall moved after it was constructed because the NI is sinking.

Technical Analysis: Broad Seismic Overview 18.SNCs February 7, 2020 Request for a License Amendment for Vogtle Unit 3 presents issues of great significance yet lacks adequate engineering analysis to support both the start-up and operation of Vogtle Unit 3. Page 8 of the SNC LAR request states:

The VEGP Unit 3 settlement survey data of the past few years indicates that the nuclear island basemat has deflected more in the center and less at the perimeter which would tend to cause the perimeter walls to lean

Page 9 of 17 towards the center of the nuclear island. Theoretically, this suggests that the nuclear island tends to tilt away from the annex building.

19.The NRC seems to have become aware of this structural defect in the Vogtle Unit 3 foundation on January 23, 2020 in a meeting with SNC. Notes from that meeting state that the NRC requested that SNC:

Provide additional information on the settlement monitoring at the site for the NRC staff to evaluate the actual settlement trends and future projected total settlement. 11 Based on information in the NRC ADAMS database, this NRC request for additional information either was never honored by SNC or has not yet been filed in the NRC ADAMS database as require by statute.

20.The allegedly newly discovered sinking of the Nuclear Island at Vogtle 3 is reminiscent of the significant foundation problem faced at the Midland Nuclear Plant located in Michigan, where construction had to be completely terminated due to similar foundation issues related to poor soil compaction. According to the New York Times, the buildings had begun to sink into the soft earth along the Tittabawassee River here, and the difficult tunneling needed to shore up the foundation had helped drive up costs.12 21. The structural engineering term for the differential downward deflection forming at the center of the Vogtle foundation, due to additional weight in the middle of the structure, is called dishing or cupping and is known to present serious structural and seismic problems beyond the leaning walls encountered at Vogtle Unit 3. The dishing being exhibited at Vogtle was never anticipated and therefore was not considered in Vogtles original design. Currently the serious structural and seismic risk issue at Vogtle has been ignored in the 2020-02-07 License Amendment Request (LAR). According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, dishing 11https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML20027A231 12 https://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/19/us/decision-to-halt-nuclear-project-in-michigan-brings-hardships.html

Page 10 of 17 may have a more significant effect on bending moments in the mat [basemat]

foundation Dishing or cupping of a foundation can be visualized by considering the difference in pressure at the center of a uniformly loaded mat as compared to the very edge of the mat. The pressure at the edge of the mat dissipates quickly into the soil continuum because of lack of pressure on the adjacent soil, but the pressure at the center of the mat dissipates more slowly because of the adjacent loaded soil. To accurately model this effect, a variable subgrade modulus may need to be used in the analysis model. To select the appropriate modulus, iterations must be performed between the structural engineer and geotechnical engineer. Depending on the subgrade behavior, dishing may have a relatively small effect on soil pressure distribution but may have a more significant effect on bending moments in the mat foundation (Horvilleur and Patel 1995). 13 22.Dishing will change the Modulus of Subgrade Interaction because it redistributes the bearing pressure between the soil and the basemat. Assuming a flat foundation during design creates a vast simplification of the true subgrade response14 compared to the existing condition dishing of the foundation of Vogtle Unit 3s Nuclear Island. SNC only identified this deterioration for the first time in the 2020-02-07 License Amendment Request (LAR).

23.According to the American Institute of Steel Construction, "It is well known that dishing creates three dimensional bending with nonlinear yield lines.15 24.Yet while acknowledging that dishing has occurred and will continue to occur, SNC attempts to obfuscate the dishing in the guise of the LAR concerning seismic gap modifications.

25. SNC admits that it has known and indeed spent years measuring the disproportional settling of the Nuclear Island. Yet, Southern Nuclear Operating Company seems to believe that by waiting until the last minute to acknowledge these severe foundation 13 Seismic Design of Reinforced Concrete Mat Foundations, NIST GCR 12-917-22, https://www.nehrp.gov/pdf/nistgcr12-917-22.pdf 14 slide 24, Frequently Misunderstood Foundation Design, Ian McFarlane, Provisions https://seanm.org/images/meeting/041719/frequentlymisunderstoodfoundationdesignprovisions.pdf 15 Slide 63, American Institute of Steel Construction, AISC Live Webinar, Dr Amit Kanvinde, June 14, 2012, Column Base Connections, https://www.aisc.org/globalassets/continuing-education/quiz-handouts/column-base-connections.pdf

Page 11 of 17 issues. By cloaking these series issues as deflection of a single wall, and by seeking an expedited review schedule, it may be able to avoid serious oversight by the NRC of the broader fundamental issue that the Nuclear Island itself - the bedrock of the entire Vogtle AP1000 Unit 3 is ominously sinking and dishing.

26.Such a dire situation makes it clear that the construction of Vogtle Unit 3 should be stopped until Southern Nuclear Operating Company:

26.1. actually reevaluates the structural integrity of the entire Nuclear Island, 26.2. performs a complete root cause analysis of the new stresses on basemat Nuclear Island on Vogtle Unit 3 is being constructed, 26.3. presents the complete analyses and root cause analysis information in public licensing hearings, 26.4. and an entire new licensing review and full analysis of the new stress conditions placed on other components on the site that are no longer level as a result of the disproportionate sinking have been concluded and subjected to satisfactory independent engineering review.

27.Quite simply, walls inside nuclear power plants do not move of their own accord.

While SNC admits that the Nuclear Island (NI) foundation is sinking disproportionately causing at least one wall to move, SNC does not discuss or address the root cause of the sinking of the foundation, nor does it discuss how the public will be protected from the increased safety risks that now exist from the movement of the wall. That movement will not only continue during the 80-years of projected operation for Vogtle Unit 3, and likely will accelerate.

28.No evidence was found in the ADAMS database that SNC has even researched, discussed, or proposed how the ongoing disproportionate lack of structural integrity on the nuclear island will impact safe operations for the next 80 years of planned operation. Finally, SNC has not analyzed or presented solutions regarding the impact of foundation settlement on other systems and structures. Every single one of these issues by itself is critical, and taken together show the overwhelming requirement that the design and engineering integrity of this Westinghouse designed reactor must be

Page 12 of 17 fully evaluated and firm solutions must be put in place prior to any operation of the Vogtle Unit 3 atomic power reactor.

Leaning Wall Technical Analysis 29.In its proposed License Amendment, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) has alleged that a single concrete wall that is a critical part of the structural integrity of the entire reactor unit has moved of its own accord. SNCs analysis is also severely lacking for the following reasons:

29.1.SNC claims this solid concrete wall is leaning because the foundation under it is sinking. This major safety and operational flaw places one side of the concrete wall in compression and one side in tension. While concrete can be shaped and molded, it is not an effective structural member when it is placed under tension.

Now, the wall in question may be weaker and able to bear less weight than it was designed for, and because this wall is a significant component of the entire building, the impact of its loss of structural integrity must be fully analyzed. In addition to the one wall SNC has identified in this 2020-02-07 LAR, there must be other structures within the Nuclear Island (NI) that are similarly distorted and unanalyzed.

29.2.SNC admits that it did not do a seismic analysis of the wall, but rather conducted a much less expensive estimation using a bounding analysis and linear interpolation to determine the walls alleged adequacy and structural integrity. In this particular location, a simple estimation is nothing less than a guess that risks public safety.

29.3.Since the AP1000 Generic SASSI analysis does not explicitly model the north-south displacements between the [basemat] nuclear island and the annex building, an assessment of the bounding nature of the north-south displacements between the nuclear island and the turbine building was performed. Linear

Page 13 of 17 interpolation is used to estimate the relative displacements between the walls at elevations between 100 and the roof.16 30.Southern Nuclear Operating Company knows that the Nuclear Island has departed from its design conditions and is no longer level. Using the Generic SASSI bounding analysis and linear interpolation are completely inappropriate and places public health at risk, because both the Generic SASSI bounding analysis and linear interpolation are based upon the mathematical assumption of a level foundation. The Generic SASSI does not include provisions for the dishing exhibited by the Vogtle Unit 3 Nuclear Island foundation. Given the alarming condition of the sinking nuclear island (NI) foundation, it is obvious that none of the current engineering design, schematics, and actual build on site fits the original licensing permit, so that a new SASSI analysis is undoubtedly required.

31.SNC also admits that it only analyzed the area near the wall using a two dimensional stick model minimalist structural analysis. The latest AP1000 generic 2D SASSI analyses that shows that the SASSI models also include the annex building east-west and the turbine building first bay as stick models.17 Given the dishing of the basemat, this minimalist analytical approach serves to ignore the specific operational consequences of this nonconformance.

32.SNC knows that the Nuclear Island has departed from its design conditions Generic AP1000 license and the NI foundation is no longer level. Using stick models and a two-dimensional analysis that assumes a level foundation is wholly inappropriate and places public health and community infrastructure at a severely increased risk level.

Therefore, a complete three-dimensional seismic analysis of the Vogtle Unit 3 Nuclear Island is required given the condition of at least one leaning wall and the sinking foundation prior to any operation of the reactor.

16 IBID Page 7 17 IBID Pages 6 and 7

Page 14 of 17 Analysis Hindered by Lack of Available Data 33.My review and analysis have been seriously hampered due to the lack of any complete engineering analyses or accurate information provided for review by SNC.

In an email from Santos, Cayetano to Lou Zeller, Executive Director of the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, dated May 8, 2020, it is clear that the NRC has no intention of providing the public and BREDL with any additional information about the dangerous dishing that is occurring in the Vogtle Unit 3 foundation.

As I indicated in my e-mailed response this morning, May 8, 2020, at 9:05 a.m., the licensee made the documents and calculations you request available to the staff in an electronic reading room as part of an audit. The staff does not have possession of the documents and calculations that were identified in the audit plan. The NRC staffs safety review of License Amendment Request 20-001 will rely on information placed on the docket by the licensee. You also request documents, notes or calculations the NRC staff audit team made in carrying out the audit. As stated in the audit plan, the staff will prepare an audit summary report that will be entered as an official agency record in ADAMS.

34.Furthermore, in its recognition of the lack of information received from SNC, the NRC issued an Audit Plan on March 20, 2020 for LAR 20-001 that clearly states:

The audit team will view the documentation and calculations that provide the technical support for LAR 20-001 On completion of the audit, the staff will prepare an audit summary report that will be declared and entered as an official agency record in ADAMS. The audit outcome may be used to identify any additional information to be submitted for making regulatory decisions and will assist the staff in the issuance of requests for additional information (if necessary) in completing its review of LAR 20-001.18 35.Lastly, as I write this report in late April and early May 2020, the detailed NRC Audit Summary has yet to be placed in the ADAMS system, and none of the information reviewed by the NRC Audit Team been placed in ADAMS either. Therefore, due to a lack of timeliness by the NRC in filing these necessary reports, I reserve the right to 18 NRC Memorandum, Santos to Hall, Audit Plan, 3/20/2020, ML20063H206

Page 15 of 17 modify this report when the appropriate information is finally placed in ADAMS for public review as required by federal statute.

Conclusions 36. The seismic gap problem identified in this Southern Nuclear Operating Companys proposed License Amendment for Vogtle Unit 3 is the tip of the iceberg for a much more significant safety issue. SNC has known the following issues for half a decade:

36.1.First, that the Seismic Category 1 Nuclear Island at Vogtle Unit 3 is sinking into the ground.

36.2.The Nuclear Island is not sinking uniformly but rather bowing downward at the center in a structural defect called dishing.

36.3.Other surrounding structures are not sinking at the same rate.

36.4.This sinking was not anticipated in the original Vogtle License and has never been analyzed.

36.5.Ever since the earliest stages of ongoing construction, 12-foot high walls have moved sideways by more than one inch as a result of this descent of the entire nuclear island into the Georgia soil.

36.6.No analysis has been initiated by SNC to determine if Vogtle can withstand an earthquake given that its foundation is plunging underground in the shape of a dish.

36.7.Therefore, until such time as a new complete evaluation of the integrity of the Vogtle 3 Nuclear Island is complete, construction on Unit 3 should stop.

36.8.The specific Seismic Gap License Amendment Request should be put in abeyance until a much broader, complete structural/seismic reanalysis is completed and approved, including with the required license amendment public hearings.

37.The absolute lack of accurate technical information and engineering oversight shows that SNC either lacks the technical competence to accurately measure that the walls

Page 16 of 17 inside Vogtle Unit 3 are moving uncontrollably or SNC deliberately chose not to inform the NRC of this technical breakdown until this late hour in the midst of a pandemic.

38.As the licensee is ultimately responsible for the accuracy and truthfulness of its correspondence with the NRC and since SNC has admitted that it has been measuring the deflection of the basemat nuclear island for a period of years, it seems that SNC has chosen to seek quick forgiveness from the NRC for the sin of not reporting rather than to take the necessary engineering steps required to correct this horrendous problem at a much earlier date, which might have made it possible to correct and repair as a much less costly venture. Such behavior proves that Southern Nuclear Operating Company should be investigated by the NRCs Office of Investigation to determine what did it know and when did it know it in relation to its deliberate coverup of the sinking basemat of the nuclear island and the walls that moving uncontrollably.

39.The leaning 12-foot high wall that began this License Amendment request lacks adequate structural/seismic analysis and the License Amendment request should be rejected until a complete, detailed, and independently reviewed technical analysis is presented to the NRC and to the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League.

40.The broad seismic basemat foundation degradation that underlie the LAR-001 submitted 2020-02-07 by SNC prove that the acceptance criteria of the ITAAC in the combined license are not capable of being met by SNC at Vogtle Unit 3. The seismic structural engineering flaws that exist in the basemat foundation create operational consequences from the nonconformance that would be contrary to providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety.

Furthermore, these flaws increase the likelihood of seismic failure, including and not limited to meltdown of the reactor core and the ensuing radiation releases into the environment that would severely comprise public health and safety.

End

Page 17 of 17 Attachments: - Curriculum Vitae I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 11th day, May 2020 in Charleston, South Carolina

__________/s/_____________________

Arnold Gundersen, MSNE, RO Chief Engineer, Fairewinds Associates, Inc

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of:

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.

License Amendment Application for Combined Licenses NPF-91 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 Docket No. 52-025-LA-3 NRC-2008-0252 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the DECLARATION OF ARNOLD GUNDERSEN TO SUPPORT THE PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE AND REQUEST FOR HEARING BY THE BLUE RIDGE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE LEAGUE AND ITS CHAPTER CONCERNED CITIZENS OF SHELL BLUFF REGARDING SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANYS REQUEST FOR A LICENSE AMENDMENT AND EXEMPTION FOR UNIT 3 AUXILIARY BUILDING WALL 11 SEISMIC GAP REQUIREMENTS, LAR-20-001 has been filed through the Electronic Information Exchange system this 11th day of May, 2020.

Louis A. Zeller Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League PO Box 88 Glendale Springs, NC 28629 (336) 982-2691 BREDL@skybest.com

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of:

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.

License Amendment Application for Combined Licenses NPF-91 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 Docket No. 52-025-LA-3 NRC-2008-0252 PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE AND REQUEST FOR HEARING BY THE BLUE RIDGE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE LEAGUE AND ITS CHAPTER CONCERNED CITIZENS OF SHELL BLUFF REGARDING SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANYS REQUEST FOR A LICENSE AMENDMENT AND EXEMPTION FOR UNIT 3 AUXILIARY BUILDING WALL 11 SEISMIC GAP REQUIREMENTS, LAR-20-001 Introduction Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f) and a notice published by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) at 85 Fed. Reg. 13944 (March 10, 2020), the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League and its chapter Concerned Citizens of Shell Bluff (BREDL or Petitioner) hereby petition for leave to intervene and request a hearing in the above-captioned License Amendment Request (LAR) by Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC or Company). BREDL opposes the granting of the license amendment. This petition sets forth our interests in this proceeding, the reasons this intervention should be granted, and specific contentions we seek to have addressed. As demonstrated below, Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League has representational standing, through its members, to make this request.

May 11, 2020

2 Description of the Proceeding On February 9, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved Southern Nuclear Operating Companys application for a license to construct and operate two additional Westinghouse AP1000 reactor units at Plant Vogtle, located on the banks of the Savannah River in Shell Bluff, Georgia. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4 are now under construction.

On February 7, 2020, the Company summited a request seeking a license amendment and exemption for Vogtle Electric Generating plant (VEGP) Unit 3 proposing to depart from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Tier 2 and Tier 2 information.1 The request involves related changes to VEGP Unit 3 plant-specific Tier 1 information, with corresponding changes to the associated VEGP Unit 3 COL Appendix C.

The requested amendment proposes changes to VEGP Unit 3 ITAAC (Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria); specifically, to modify the north-south minimum seismic gap requirements above grade between the nuclear island and the annex building west of Column Line I from elevation 141 feet to 154 feet to accommodate as-built nonconformances in the construction of Unit 3. See Figure 1 at right.

1 Request for License Amendment and Exemption LAR-20-001, 7 February 2020 Figure 1

3 Figure 1: Plan View Showing Area of Non-conformance2 Description of the Petitioners Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League is a regional, community-based non-profit environmental organization working in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama and Georgia. BREDLs founding principles are earth stewardship, environmental democracy, social justice, and community empowerment. BREDL encourages government agencies and citizens to take responsibility for conserving and protecting our natural resources and protecting public health. BREDL also functions as a watchdog of the environment, monitoring issues and holding government officials accountable for their actions. BREDL is a league of community groups called chapters. BREDL and its chapters are unitary, with a common incorporation, financial structure, board of directors and executive officer. BREDL chapter Concerned Citizens of Shell Bluff was founded March 6, 2010 to advocate for environmental justice in Georgia.

Standing Under 10 CFR § 2.309(d), a request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene must address 1) name and address of petitioner, 2) the nature of the petitioners right under the Atomic Energy Act to be made a party to the proceeding, 3) the nature and extent of the petitioners property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding, and 4) the 2 Request for License Amendment, LAR-20-001, 7 Feb 2020 Location of Nonconforming Gap between End of Annex Building Wall I.1 and the Auxiliary Building, Enclosure 1, Page 4, Figure 1,

4 possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioners interest. Other standing requirements are found in NRC case law. See Pacific Gas &

Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation),

LBP-02-23, 56 NRC 413, 426 (2002).3 As demonstrated by the declarations of standing filed, Petitioners members live near Vogtle. Representational standing has been granted to an organization with members within 15 miles of a plant. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 553-54.

Further, as in Vermont Yankee, the LAR is an action with obvious potential for offsite consequences. A catastrophic earthquake affecting Vogtle Unit 3 could reasonably create a distinct and palpable harm that constitutes injury-in-fact within the zone of interests arguably protected by the governing statutes. The injury could be fairly traced to the conditions permitted by granting the LAR and the injury could be redressed by a denial or modification of the LAR.

3 In determining whether a petitioner has sufficient interest to intervene in a proceeding, the Commission has traditionally applied judicial concepts of standing. See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 332 (1983) (citing Portland General Electric Co.

(Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610 (1976)). Contemporaneous judicial standards for standing require a petitioner to demonstrate that (1) it has suffered or will suffer a distinct and palpable harm that constitutes injury-in-fact within the zone of interests arguably protected by the governing statutes (e.g., the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)); (2) the injury can be fairly traced to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plants), LBP-99-25, 50 NRC 25, 29 (1999). An organization that wishes to intervene in a proceeding may do so either in its own right by demonstrating harm to its organizational interests, or in a representational capacity by demonstrating harm to its members. See Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Road, Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), LBP-98-9, 47 NRC 261, 271 (1998). To intervene in a representational capacity, an organization must show not only that at least one of its members would fulfill the standing requirements, but also that he or she has authorized the organization to represent his or her interests. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-7, 47 NRC 142, 168, affd on other grounds, CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26 (1998).

5 Also, there is authority indicating that to establish injury-in-fact it is not necessary to proffer radiation impacts that amount to a regulatory violation. See Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-01-35, 54 NRC 403, 417 (2001) (citing Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 247-48 (1996)).

Finally, a recent decision expands on previous holdings regarding associational representation. The Court held that an organization had standing to sue on behalf of people associated with the organization who were the functional equivalent of members. See Flyers Rights Educ. Fund v. USDOT, No. 19-1071 (D.C. Cir. 5-5-2020),

slip op. at 3-6.

In light of the above, standing to participate in this proceeding is demonstrated by the declarations of the following members of the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League and Concerned Citizens of Shell Bluff who have authorized Petitioners to represent their interests.

1. Richard Colclough, Hephzibah, GA
2. Claude Howard, Waynesboro, GA
3. Melvin Stewart, Augusta, GA
4. Rev. Charles N. Utley, Augusta, GA These individuals who signed declarations of standing live well within 25 miles of Plant Vogtle; in fact, some are within 5 miles. Locus standi is based on three requirements: injury, causation and redressability. Petitioners hereby request to be made a party to the proceeding because: 1) Granting of the LAR would present a tangible and particular risk of harm to the health and well-being of our members, 2) The NRC has initiated proceedings for a license amendment, the granting of which would directly affect our members, and 3) The Commission is the sole agency with the power to approve

6 or deny the modification of a license to construct and operate a commercial nuclear power plant. The Petitioners members seek to protect their health and lives by opposing the license amendment requested by SNC.

=

Background===

Under Title 10 CFR Part 52, all nuclear power plant construction must be in accord with the plants design and current licensing basis (CLB) as well as the applicable statutes and regulations. The process for modifying the CLB is set forth in 10 CFR 52.98(f).4 A licensee that requests an amendment or exemption must perform 1) an applicability determination evaluation, 2) a safety-security interface evaluation, 3) a construction impacts evaluation and 4) a 10 CFR 50.59-like screening evaluation. See COL-ISG-025. If upon completion of its review the NRC finds that there would be unacceptable incompatibilities, it may condition its approval of the LAR upon the licensee making adjustments to the existing design and licensing basis. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 565 (2004).

Analysis Hindered by Lack of Available Data Our review and analysis have been seriously hampered due to the lack of any complete engineering analyses or accurate information provided for review by SNC. In an email from Cayetano Santos, NRC Project Manager, to Louis Zeller, Executive 4 §52.98(f): Any modification to, addition to, or deletion from the terms and conditions of a combined license, including any modification to, addition to, or deletion from the inspections, tests, analyses, or related acceptance criteria contained in the license is a proposed amendment to the license. There must be an opportunity for a hearing on the amendment.

7 Director of the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, dated May 8, 2020, it is clear that the NRC has no intention of providing the public and BREDL with any additional information about the dangerous dishing that is occurring in the Vogtle Unit 3 foundation.

As I indicated in my e-mailed response this morning, May 8, 2020, at 9:05 a.m.,

the licensee made the documents and calculations you request available to the staff in an electronic reading room as part of an audit. The staff does not have possession of the documents and calculations that were identified in the audit plan. The NRC staffs safety review of License Amendment Request 20-001 will rely on information placed on the docket by the licensee. You also request documents, notes or calculations the NRC staff audit team made in carrying out the audit. As stated in the audit plan, the staff will prepare an audit summary report that will be entered as an official agency record in ADAMS.

Furthermore, in its recognition of the lack of information received from SNC, the NRC issued an Audit Plan on March 20, 2020 for LAR 20-001 that clearly states:

The audit team will view the documentation and calculations that provide the technical support for LAR 20-001 On completion of the audit, the staff will prepare an audit summary report that will be declared and entered as an official agency record in ADAMS. The audit outcome may be used to identify any additional information to be submitted for making regulatory decisions and will assist the staff in the issuance of requests for additional information (if necessary) in completing its review of LAR 20-001.5 Lastly, as of 11 May 2020, the detailed NRC Audit Summary has not been placed in the ADAMS system, nor has the information reviewed by the NRC Audit Team been placed in ADAMS. Therefore, due to a lack of timeliness by the NRC in filing these necessary reports, we reserve the right to modify this report when the appropriate information is finally placed in ADAMS for public review as required by federal statute. Gundersen Declaration Paragraphs 33-35.

5 NRC Memorandum, Santos to Hall, Audit Plan, 3/20/2020, ML20063H206

8 Overview of the Contentions to be Raised in this Petition Sometime in 2014, Southern Nuclear Operating Company commenced construction of the foundation for the Auxiliary and Annex Buildings, portions of which are considered part of the Nuclear Island (NI). Walls were constructed and concrete poured shortly afterward, certainly by sometime in 2015.6 Five years later, after the foundation and walls were already completed, SNC notified the NRC on February 7, 2020 that it was seeking a License Amendment due to the discovery that walls and the entire foundation of the Auxiliary Building have inexplicably moved, sunk and become distorted. Now, the Company is proposing to modify what it calls the seismic gap between the walls of the NI and the Annex building.

The Petitioners hereby seek to raise two contentions centered on both the seismic gap and the information gap which are at the core of SNCs license amendment request:

1) License Revocation for Materially False Statements and 2) Basemat, Foundation and Construction Factors Create Unacceptable Operational Risk to Public Health and Safety.

Petitioners requests for leave to intervene and a hearing are supported by an affidavit submitted on behalf of the Petitioner by Arnold Gundersen (Gundersen Declaration) (Attachment A).

Based on our review, the license amendment request has not been fully evaluated by the NRC and is not justified by the information presented by the Company.

6 SNC has determined that the Vogtle construction schedule is Proprietary and the NRC has concurred so it is impossible for experts representing Non-Governmental Organizations such as BREDL to determine the exact construction dates from NRC documentation.

9 CONTENTION ONE: License Revocation for Materially False Statements.

(i) Specific issue of law or fact to be raised Chapter 16 of the Atomic Energy Act provides in relevant part that: Any license may be revoked for any material false statement in the applicationfor failure to construct or operate a facility in accordance with the terms of the construction permit or license or the technical specifications in the application. See Section 186 of the Act.7 Other parts of Section 16 govern administrative procedures and license amendments.

Any responsible officer of a firm constructingany facility or activity which is licensedpursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amendedwho obtains information reasonably indicating that such facilitycontains a defect which could create a substantial safety hazardshall immediately notify the Commission of such failureto comply. 42 USC 5846 Sec. 206.

(ii) Brief explanation of contention After Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 foundation and walls had been completed, SNC notified the NRC on February 7, 2020 that it was seeking a License Amendment due to the discovery that walls and the entire foundation of the Auxiliary Building have inexplicably moved, sunk and become distorted. Now, the Company is proposing to modify what it calls the seismic gap between the walls of the Nuclear Island and the Annex building, ignoring the critical underlying safety conditions that 7 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L.83-703) 42 USC 2236, Sec. 186. Revocation

a. Any license may be revoked for any material false statement in the application or any statement of fact required under section 182, or because of conditions revealed by such application or statement of fact or any report, record, or inspection or other means which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application, or for failure to construct or operate a facility in accordance with the terms of the construction permit or license or the technical specifications in the application, or for violation of, or failure to observe any of the terms and provisions of this Act or of any regulation of the Commission.

10 caused the gap to narrow. Petitioner contends that materially false statement and administrative delay call for revocation of the COL by the Commission.

(iii) Contention is within the scope of the proceeding Information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee or information required by statute or by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the applicant or the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. 10 CFR §50.9(a) Completeness and accuracy of information. Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.98, the NRC is responsible for approval of any modification, addition or deletion from the license (CLB).

(iv) Issues raised are material to the findings NRC must make Federal regulations require that information provided to the Commission shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. An applicant or licensee violates this rule when information has significant implications for public health and safety or common defense and security. § 50.9 Completeness and accuracy of information. The Atomic Energy Act provides that any license may be revoked for any material false statement in the application. Chapter 16 Section 186 of the Act. Even without scienter, forgiving innocent mistakes puts a premium on ignorance. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,

(North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-22, 4 NRC 480, 491 (1976), affd, 571 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1978).

(v) Expert opinion supporting Petitioners contention SNC posits a justification of its License Amendment Request: In order to facilitate the construction of the nuclear island and adjacent buildings. Request for License Amendment and Exemption: Unit 3 Auxiliary Building Wall 11 Seismic Gap

11 Requirements (LAR-20-001), at 4 of 14 [emphasis added]. However, in his review of the LAR, Arnold Gundersen reached the following conclusion: The construction of the walls and foundations in question were completed at least a half-decade ago, therefore, it is technically impossible to facilitate construction on structures that were completed at least five years earlier and that fall under strict seismic regulatory guides. Therefore, I believe that the above statement by SNC is materially false. Gundersen Declaration at paragraph 13.1.

A statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence or to be capable of influencing the decision of the decisionmaker to which it was addressed, regardless of whether the agency actually relied upon it.

Three possible explanations for the false statement are: 1) Westinghouse knew and did not inform SNC; 2) Both Westinghouse and SNC knew and did not inform NRC in a timely fashion; or 3) Westinghouse, SNC and NRC staff knew and delayed seeking amendment of the license under an expedited schedule in order to limit scrutiny. See Gundersen Declaration at Paragraph 13.4.3.

(vi) Information showing a genuine dispute with licensee The position taken by SNC throughout the LAR is that there is an as-built reduction in the distance between the walls of the Nuclear Island and the Annex Building.

Petitioners submit that the reduction is the result of movement of the walls and not a so-called as-built error.

12 CONTENTION TWO: Basemat, Foundation and Construction Factors Create Unacceptable Operational Risk to Public Health and Safety.

(i) Specific issue of law or fact to be raised New nuclear power plant construction must be conducted in accordance with the combined license (COL) current licensing basis (CLB), the Atomic Energy Act, and the applicable regulations. The change process for the COL is set forth in 10 CFR 52.98.

Any modification to, addition to, or deletion from the terms and conditions of a combined license, including any modification to, addition to, or deletion from the inspections, tests, analyses, or related acceptance criteria contained in the license is a proposed amendment to the license. There must be an opportunity for a hearing on the amendment. § 52.98(f).

Any responsible officer of a firm constructingany facility or activity which is licensedpursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amendedwho obtains information reasonably indicating that such facilitycontains a defect which could create a substantial safety hazardshall immediately notify the Commission of such failureto comply. 42 USC 5846 Sec. 206.

(ii) Brief explanation of the contention Construction of Vogtle Unit 3 should be stopped until Southern Nuclear Operating Company: 1) reevaluates the structural integrity of the entire Nuclear Island, 2) performs a complete root cause analysis of the new stresses on the basemat upon which the Nuclear Island on Vogtle Unit 3 is being constructed, 3) presents the complete analyses and root cause analysis information in public licensing hearings, and 4) an entirely new licensing review and full analysis of the new stress conditions placed on

13 other components on the site that are no longer level as a result of the disproportionate sinking have been concluded and subjected to satisfactory independent engineering review.

(iii) Contention is within the scope of the proceeding New nuclear power plant construction must be conducted in accordance with the combined license (COL) current licensing basis (CLB)8 including Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC), the Atomic Energy Act, and the applicable regulations. The change process for the COL is set forth in 10 CFR 52.98.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.98, the NRC is responsible for approval of any modification, addition or deletion from the license (CLB). SNCs requested amendment proposes to depart from CLB Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Tier 2*

and Tier 2 information applicable only to VEGP Unit 3 (which includes the VEGP Unit 3 plant-specific Design Control Document (DCD) Tier 2* and Tier 2 information) and involves related changes to VEGP Unit 3 plant-specific Tier 1 information, with corresponding changes to the associated VEGP Unit 3 COL Appendix C information.

(iv) Issue is material to the findings NRC must make Material issues: Are the nonconformance and exemption of the LAR inimical to public health and safety. Is the so-called seismic gap the result of foundation problems 8 As defined in 10 CFR 54.3 - CLB is the set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant and a licensees written commitments for ensuring compliance with and operation within applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis (including all modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the license) that are docketed and in effect. The CLB includes the NRC regulations contained in 10 CFR Parts 2, 19, 20, 21, 26, 30, 40, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 70, 72, 73, 100 and appendices thereto; orders; license conditions; exemptions; and technical specifications. It also includes the plant-specific design-basis information defined in 10 CFR 50.2 as documented in the most recent final safety analysis report as required by 10 CFR 50.71 and the licensees commitments remaining in effect that were docketed licensing correspondence such as licensee responses to NRC bulletins, generic letters, and enforcement actions, as well as licensee commitments documented in NRC safety evaluations or licensee event reports.

14 which have plagued the construction of Vogtle 3 and 4 reactors since the very beginning of construction project; for example, in 2012 construction was halted due to improperly installed rebar, and in 2013 the first concrete pour at Vogtle led to an NRC finding of significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance of [then contractor] CB&I.9 Is the differential downward deflection at the center of the foundationdishingexhibited at Vogtle being ignored in the current LAR.

One necessary component of NRC review of a license amendment application is review of the proposed amendments compatibility with the licensees existing design and licensing basis. If the NRC finds that there would be unacceptable incompatibilities, it may condition its approval of the amendment upon the licensee making necessary adjustments to the existing design and licensing basis to resolve these incompatibilities.

Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 565 (2004).

(v) Expert opinion supporting Petitioners contention In seeking to minimize the underlying structural requirements approved as a baseline safety design feature for Vogtle Unit 3 for the approval of its initial construction license, Southern Nuclear Corp. (SNC) is attempting to obfuscate the true facts. Merely amending its license and modifying requirements for the seismic gap between a portion of a wall in the Annex Building and the NI (Nuclear Island), SNC appears to be using this alleged emergency license amendment request to ignore the significant seismic and 9 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4 Request for License Amendment: Basemat Concrete/Rebar Details (LAR-12-007) August 1, 2012 The nuclear island structures, consisting of the containment, shield building, and auxiliary building are founded on the 6-foot-thick, cast-in-place, reinforced concrete basemat foundation. The basemat provides the interface between the nuclear island structures and the supporting soil. The basemat transfers the load of nuclear island structures to the supporting soil. The basemat transmits seismic motions from the supporting soil to the nuclear island. Resistance to sliding of the concrete basemat foundation is provided by soil friction Enclosure 1 at 3 of 10, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1221/ML12215A084.pdf

15 structural concerns. In this License Amendment process, SNC has chosen to ignore these key factors relating to the degraded condition of the nuclear island: 1) The foundation of the Seismic Category 1 Nuclear Island has settled more at the center and less at the perimeter; 2) A wall has moved closer to the NI; 3) That same wall now is not level, and is leaning; 4) If the foundation of the NI has settled, more at the center and less at the perimeter, other systems and structures must also have become deformed yet have not been evaluated. SNC seeks to portray the as-built condition of the wall as a minor issue, less than an inch deflection from the designed value. SNC states in its License Amendment request that it seeks:

to modify the north-south seismic gap requirement above grade between the nuclear island and the annex building west of Column Line I from El. 141 through El. 154 in the licensing basis to accommodate construction as-built localized nonconformances at VEGP Unit 3. Elevation 141 is mid-span with respect to the auxiliary building and annex building. [Emphasis Added]

This statement by SNC is incorrect. The as-built condition of the wall in question was correct at the time it was built. Its most recent location is not an as-built localized nonconformance. Without human intervention, the wall moved after it was constructed because the NI is sinking. Gundersen Declaration paragraphs 15-17.

The structural engineering term for the differential downward deflection forming at the center of the Vogtle foundation, due to additional weight in the middle of the structure, is called dishing or cupping and is known to present serious structural and seismic problems beyond the leaning walls encountered at Vogtle Unit 3. The dishing being exhibited at Vogtle was never anticipated and therefore was not considered in Vogtles original design. Currently the serious structural and seismic risk issue at Vogtle

16 has been ignored in the License Amendment Request. Gundersen Declaration at paragraph 21.

(vi) Information showing a genuine dispute with licensee In January 2020, SNC informed the Commission that its scheduled date for initial loading of fuel into the reactor for Vogtle Unit 3 is November 23, 2020. 85 Fed. Reg. 8031 (Feb 12, 2020). The Commission will hold a hearing on whether the facility as constructed complies, or on completion will comply, with the acceptance criteria in the combined license. 10 CFR § 52.103 Operation under a combined license. SNCs February 7, 2020, cover letter to the NRC submitting LAR-20-001 states:

The requested amendment proposes changes to VEGP Unit 3 COL Appendix C (and VEGP Unit 3 plant-specific Tier 1) Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC), and corresponding UFSAR Tier 2* and Tier 2 information applicable only to VEGP Unit 3, to modify the north-south minimum seismic gap requirements.

10 CFR § 52.103(b) requires that A request for hearing under paragraph (a) of this section must show, prima facie, that(1) One or more of the acceptance criteria of the ITAAC in the combined license have not been, or will not be, met; and (2) The specific operational consequences of nonconformance that would be contrary to providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety.

The changes identified by the Petitioner in the LAR show prima facie that the acceptance criteria of the ITAAC in the combined license are not capable of being met. These seismic concerns within the basemat/foundation increase the likelihood of seismic failure and meltdown, creating operational consequences from the nonconformance which would be contrary to providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety.

17 BREDL hereby seeks to ensure that the requested license amendment is not issued by the Commission without resolution of the Petitioners contentions, including the operational consequences of nonconformance with the Current Licensing Basis. SNC has not demonstrated full compliance with the Atomic Energy Act and implementing regulations. A licensee generally bears the ultimate burden of proof. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-697, 16 NRC 1265, 1271 (1982), citing 10 C.F.R. § 2.325 (formerly § 2.732).

For the foregoing reasons, the contention is admissible.

Conclusion The Companys License Amendment Request does not comply with the current licensing basis, the applicable statutes and regulations, or the process for modifying the current licensing basis for Vogtle Unit 3 as set forth in 10 CFR 52.98(f). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission cannot approve this license amendment request. Our principal interests are the health and safety of our members living near the plant and the general public.

The Combined Operating License for VEGP Unit 3 issued under Part 52 is, pursuant to § 52.98, final and its terms may not be modified, added to or deleted unless, pursuant to § 52.103, the Commission provides proper notice to request a hearing. The Commission has done so. Further, the Petitioner has shown prima facie that criteria have not been met regarding seismic gap and that there are operational consequences of the nonconformance as requested by the Company which are contrary to public health and safety. The Commission did not, as prescribed under § 52.97(a)(2), make a finding that

18 this criterion had been meet when it issued the combined license. We hereby request a hearing.

Respectfully submitted Louis A. Zeller, Executive Director Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League PO Box 88 Glendale Springs, NC 28629 Phone: (336) 982-2691 Email: BREDL@skybest.com

19 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of:

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.

License Amendment Application for Combined Licenses NPF-91 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 Docket No. 52-025-LA-3 NRC-2008-0252 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE AND REQUEST FOR HEARING BY THE BLUE RIDGE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE LEAGUE AND ITS CHAPTER CONCERNED CITIZENS OF SHELL BLUFF REGARDING SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANYS REQUEST FOR A LICENSE AMENDMENT AND EXEMPTION FOR UNIT 3 AUXILIARY BUILDING WALL 11 SEISMIC GAP REQUIREMENTS, LAR-20-001 has been filed through the Electronic Information Exchange system this 11th day of May, 2020.

Louis A. Zeller Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League PO Box 88 Glendale Springs, NC 28629 (336) 982-2691 BREDL@skybest.com

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