ML20141P036

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Transcript of Commission 860311 Meeting in Washington,Dc Re TVA Briefing on Status,Plans & Schedules.Pp 1-117.Supporting Documentation Encl
ML20141P036
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Issue date: 03/11/1986
From:
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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References
REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8603180466
Download: ML20141P036 (167)


Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of COMMISSION MEETING Briefing by TVA on Status, Plans and Schedules 2

(Public Meeting)

Docket No.

l Location: Washington, D. C.

Dates Tuesday, March 11, 1986 Pages:

1 - 117 G603100466 860311 PDR 3OCFR PT9.7 PDR ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES Court Reporters

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1625 I St., N.W.

Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950

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D 1 SCLA 1 MER 2

3 4

5 6

This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the 7

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on S

3/11/86 In the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9

N.W.,

Washington, DC.

The meeting was open to public i

10 attendance and observation.

This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain

'/

12 Inaccuracies.

i 13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 Informational purposes.

As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.

Expressions of epinion in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.

No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may 21 authorire.

22 23 24 25

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i

2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

.4 L

5 BRIEFING BY TVA ON STATUS, PLANS AND SCHEDULES l

6 l

y 8

PUBLIC MEETING l

1 9

j 10 1717 H Street, N.W.

l l

11 Room 1130 1

1 12 Washington, D.C.

j 13 Tuesday, March 11, 1986 14 15 The NRC commission met in public session at 9:35 l

16 a.m., pursuant to notice, the Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino, t

j 17 Chairman of the Commission, presiding.

j 18 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

7 19

  • Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman j

20 James K. Asselstine, Commissioner j

21 Frederick M. Bernthal, Commissioner 1

22 Thomas M. Roberts, Commissioner 3

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23 Lando W. Zech, Jr., Commissioner

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24 25 l

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STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:

2 S. Chilk 3

H. Plaine 4

S. White 5

J. Waters 6

C.

Dean 7

8 AUDIENCE SPEAKERS:

9 N. Zigrossi 10 H. Sanger 11 E. Sliger 12 H. Abercrombie 13 i

14 15 16 17 I

18 19 20 21 1

22 i,

23 24 25 4

3 1

PROCEEDINGS 2

CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Good morning, ladies and 3

gentlemen.

4 This morning TVA will brief the Commission on status 5

of activities presently in progress.

The Commission last met 6

with TVA on January 9th, 1986.

7 My understanding is that TVA intends to discuss the 8

following topics:

history and background, organization and 9

people, employee concerns, quality assurance, and the matter 10 of engineering.

11 The Commission recognizes that TVA has a significant 12 amount of work underway.

The Commission also recognizes that 13 it wasn't until January this year the significant management 14 changes at TVA were approved and implemented.

15 When today's meeting was originally scheduled, it 16 was believed that the update of Volume I of the TVA Corporato 17 Plan would have been available.

However, the plan has not yet 18 been received.

Nevertheless, the Conmission feels that 19 today's meeting is valuable, and that a follow-up meeting next 20 Monday may be necessary, given that TVA will finalize its 21 corporate plan within the next day or so.

22 I understand that TVA would like to discuss the need i

23 for the next meeting next Monday.

Therefore, at the end of 24 today's meeting, I intend to discuss with my fellow 25 Commissioners if a follow-up meeting should be ocheduled for I

4

4 1

March 17th.

2 I understand that members from Regions II and V and 3

the sequoyah resident inspector are listening in on the 4

telephone.

5 Let me ask if my fellow Commissioners have any 6

additional remarks.

7 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

No.

8 CHAIRMAN PALIADINot All right.

Then I will turn 9

the meeting over to Charles Dean, Chairman of the TVA Board of 10 Directors.

11 MR. DEANt Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of 12 the Commission.

I am Charles Dean, Chairman of the Board of 13 Directors of Tennessee Valley Authority.

With we here today 14 is my colleague on the heard, Director John B. Watere, and our l

15 Manager of Nuclear Power, Steven A. White.

I would.also like 16 to introduce our General Managar, William W1111st our General 17 Counsel, Herbert Ganger, Jr. ; and our Inspector General, 18 Norman Zigrossi.

11 We are here today to present the NRC TVA's plan for 20 the proper operation oI our nuclear program as we discussed it 21 with the Commission during our meeting on January the 9th.

22 When we last met with you, we told you that we had 23 arranged for the services of retired Admiral Steven A. White 24 to address the management problems in TVA's nucipar program.

25 Since that time Mr. White has taken firm control of TVA's

5 1

office of Nuclear Power.

2 Before he came to work for TVA, we agreed with 3

Mr. White that he would have the resources and the authority 4

he needs to correct the problems within TVA's nuclear S

program.

In his first few veoks he has made a good 6

beginning.

He has brought in many capable people to help him 7

in his efforts.

He has made some changes and he is in the 8

process of making more.

9 The TVA Board's actions in bringing Mr. White to TVA 10 waro unprecedented, absolutely unprecedented.

HowcVer, the 11 Board firmly believes that it did what hed to be done to 60 i

12 trun to our top priority at TVA, which is the safe operation 13 of these nucinar plants.

14 TVA is committed to that priority.

The current is ohutdown of our nuclear plants today is grim testimony to the 16 need for that conmitment.

None of TVA's nuclear plants will 17 he operated until the Board is satisfied that each plant can 18 and will be operated safely and in accordance with TVA's 19 standards and commitments.

20 Mr. Whito la vigorously engaged in the effort to 21 bring TVA8s nuclear program up to those standards and to 22 regain confidence in that program.

He is prepared to report l

23 to you on his efforts.

But before ha gives his report, I 24 would like to give Director Waters an opportunity to say a few 25 words.

6 t,

1 NR. NATERSt Thank you very much.

2 Good acrning, Mr. Chairman and members of the 3-Commission.

I appreciate the opportunity to again be with you 4

this morning,

+

I 5

I want to emphasize to you this morning that in my 6

opinion what we have now at TVA in our nuclear program is more 7

than just a new plan or a new organization.

It's a 8

far-reaching reestablishment, restudy of principles, 9

objectivas and goais.

We think we have been through the 10 entire process.

We think that was absolutely necessary.

And 11 I want to emphasise to you this morning that I think that's 12 what you are going to hear, an absciutely new approach from 13 TVA's standpoint of vieV.

14 We think that Admiral White hem made a good 15 beginning, and we would hope that all of us will give him an 16 opportunity, which basically what is needed is going to be 17 time to do the work that I au firmly convinced that he and his 18 people that_he now has in TVA and will bring into TVA can do.

19 I intend to support him fully, and I hope that this 20 Commission and the public in general will let us earn the 21 confidence that we now, I think, we are able to do in our 22 nuclear systan.

23 With your permission nov, Mr. White will give you 24 his assessment of our program and what he is doing to bring it f

25 back to where it should be, where you know it should be and l

[

7 1

where we knew it should be.

2 Thank you, sir.

3 HR. WHITE:

Commissioners, gentlemcn.

4 First of all, I am happy to be here this morning to 5

give you my first report on the situation at TVA as I see it.

6 I have been in the job new, as you know, for about 7

two months, and I think you will all recall that shortly B

before I took the job, I stopped by to see each of you, ar.d at 9

that time I told you that I felt I could come back within a 10 month, approximately a month, and at that time be able to toll 11 you the major problems as I saw thnm, and perhaps come 12 outlines of plans of action.

13 I very much appreciated the additional three weeks 14 which, Mr. Chairman, you and the members, the commissioners, Ib gave me, to get my arms really around our major problem.

So 16

' shat you ars going to hear this morning is ny view of our 17 major probinar., some plans of action that we intend to take, 18 and some of the things that we have already accomplished in 19 this first two months.

20 Let ma also say I do not know all of the prcblems.

21 I do not know all of the problems, nor do I have all the 22 answers.

23 Go co the topic slide.

24 (Slide.)

1 25 Here are the subjects we will be covering this

l 8

1 morning.

As much as possible, I will try to deal from Volume 2

I of our !!uclear Performance Plan, so in that way I hope to 3

minimize the number of questions that you genticmen and the 4

Staff will have after you receive that plan for review.

5 Facilities.

On this slide, really, there are only 6

several things that I'd like you to take off of it.

First is 7

that TVA is one of the two largest nuclear organizations in 8

the United States.

Please also note that we have both boiling 9

water and pressurized water plants, and that even in the case 10 of the PWRs, they are from different vendors.

11 The other thing I'd like you to take off of this and 12 the following chart is the geographic separation.

13 (slido.)

14 For example, from my headquarters in Chattanooga, 15 it's a good two hours drive to Knoxville, and from my 16 headquarters on a good day, it's a good three-hour drive to 17 Browns Ferry.

This certainly dcasn't simplify our management 18 problems.

It isn't as if I can walk out the door and into one 19 of the plants.

20 I'd like to also briefly review the plants in terms 21 of their status.

22 Five operational plante, all shut down.

Four under 23 construction, with one of those essentially complete and 24 unlicensed.

25 Unfortunately, you will also note that several of

9 1

the plants have been shut down over a year or about a year.

2 The specific reasons for the shutdown given on this 3

slide, you will also note, are no longer the reasons that we 4

can't start the plants up.

And when you look at those 5

reasons, you should take a little care.

They are brief 6

descriptions, but the words may not fully describe the depth 7

of the problems.

8 For example, if you look at Browns Ferry Unit 3, it 9

says reactor vessel water level discrepancies.

That in truth 10 was the result of what I consider a series of serious 11 personnel errors.

12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

In essence, those are all 13 symptoms of much deeper problems?

14 MR. WHITE:

Precisely correct.

15 And I think it is also valuable to go back to your 16 concerns from your 3 July 1985 letter, and here in the next 17 few slides is a resume of what you said in that letter.

18 As far as I am concerned, even in retrospect, as I 19 look back over this letter, you did a good job as regulators.

1 I

20 These are good calls.

These are good calls.

And they 21 clearly, to me, show the reasons you were getting after TVA.

22 Particularly if you look at the enforcement history.

Just 23 look at that.

24 In retrospect, again, even in retrospect, you as l

25 regulators were clearly trying to send us a message with those

10 1

enforcement actions.

2 (Slide.]

3 Again, on this slide, the descriptive words don't 4

fully describe what perhaps is the seriousness of the 5

situation.

6 For example, the Browns Ferry partial scram in 1980 7

was actually the failure of about one-third of the control 8

rods to insert as they should have, to scram as they should 9

have.

So the brief words don't necessarily tell you the 10 significance of the item.

11 (Slide.]

12 Finally, management.

This is the gut issue, and 13 that was a good call last July.

4 14 Subsequent to this letter, you wrote TVA a letter on 15 the 17th of September, and in that letter, which was a legally t

16 binding letter, legally binding on TVA, you asked for specific l

17 corrective actions.

i 18 (Slide.]

l 19 Now let me shift a little into the more recent 20 history.

21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

Admiral White, I think just 22 for the public record, it is worth noting that this July 23 letter was a letter initiated by the NRC Staff, that that was 24 Staff action which I appreciate that you recognize was taken in a timely manner at that time, without any specific prodding 25

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_ _. _. -,. _,, _ _,..,...,,. -.. _. _ _,......., _ ~,

11 1

on thy part of any member of this commission.

And I believe 2

the Staff deserves some credit for that.

3 MR. WHITE:

Well, of course, I didn't note that, 4

Mr. Bernthal, but it is very clear that the work they did --

5 as I say, even in looking at it today, I look at those calls 6

and they're pretty clear-cut, and many of those are the same 7

problems I face today.

8 Now the more recent history.

In November 1985, I 9

led a team of nine people from Stone & Webster Engineering 10 Corporation to look at TVA, and the purpose was to see if we 11 could find out perhaps what the problems were, and if there 12 was any way Stone & Webster might be able to help TVA.

/

13 (Slide.)

14 Now you can see the problems thet we identified in 15 that two weeks, and note that they all really refer to 16 management.

They all refer to management.

17 The Board, the Directors, of course, knew that we 18 were making that look and asked that I come to Knoxville and 19 brief them personally on those results, which I did, I think, 20 on Christmas Eve or the day before.

21 After I discussed those conclusions and told them 22 what we had found, and they asked a number of very good 23 questions, at the conclusion of that session they said, "okay, 24 you've been down here and you've pointed out the problems.

25 Now how about coming down as a full-time person to fix those l

12 1

problems."

2 So by the 3rd of January we had in fact come to an 3

agreement.

As Chairman Dean has said, unprecedented; 4

unprecedented for TVA.

And I know you gentlemen have all seen 5

that MOU, Memorandum of Understanding, and know that it gives 6

very sweeping, very sweeping authority to me, along with the 7

accountability and responsibility to fix the problems.

8 Significantly, it does a number of things, but 9

perhaps the most important is it pledges the Board's support 10 to me in those efforts.

And I can honestly tell you from the 11 day that we signed that MOU, I have received only the fullest 12 support from the members of the Board.

.c 13 When ths're were three, I received it from all three; 4

14 now with two, I'm still receiving full support.

4 15 Finally, on the 13th of January, I started. work, and 16 I brought with me a handful, a handful of people who had the 17 reputation in the nuclear industry for having looked at and 18 solved problems similar to those at TVA, had looked at those 19 in other utilities.

20 From Basic Energy Technology Associates, I brought 21 Bill Weger, Bob Brodsky and Bill Bass.

And all three of those 22 gentlemen have over 30 years experience in both Navy and 23 commercial nuclear power.

24 From Stone & Webster, I brought two senior vice 25 presidents, Mr. Walt Sullivan and Mr. Ed Siskin, and each of

13 4

1

.those gentlemen has over 25 years experience in the nuclear 2

business.

3 And finally, from General Electric, I brought 4

Mr. Henry Stone.

Mr. Stone is the chief engineer for Nuclear

)

5 General Electric.

4 6

Now the first thing that we did was to start a 7

categorization of problems.

~

8 Now you have to understand that in November, in 9

November when I was there with a team of nine people, the 10 results which you have seen were a slice out of a piece of 11 salami.

And I looked at that slice and I said, gee, there's 12 some bad spots in it.

(

13 When you do that, you've got to take some other 14 slices to find out the extent of those problems.

So with 15 special teams that we set up, we looked at 800 source 16 documents.

We took outside criticisms that had been leveled 17 against TVA by NRC, by INPC, by Congress, by nuclear liability 18 insurance companies, by a vast number of such inputs.

19 And as I said, 800 source documents.

20 We came up with 1300 specific criticisms.

1300.

21 And the timef::ame we chose was only the 16 months prior to my 22 arrival.

23 We then put all of those concerns into a computer, 24 and we sorted them in a dozen ways.

We categorized them in 25 various fashions.

And from that effort, we were able to I

l i

14 1

quickly see not only some of the major problems, some of the 2

symptoms of the problems, and some of the problems that 3

perhaps aren't as major, but we must resolve, and from that 4

could determine which corrective actions we should do first, 5

and what areas we should hit hardest.

6 So what are we doing?

7

[ Slide.]

8 Well, first in organization -- and let me first 9

mention, as I go through my brief to you this morning, my 10 report, obviously I am going through it in series.

You have 11 to understand that these efforts have been taking place in 12 parallel.

13

[ Slide.)

14 The immediate goals were in organization, to correct 15 the organizational deficiencies as fast as possible, and to 16 provide strength in the weak areas of great importance, and 17 you see those are QA, engineering and licensing.

Clearly at 18 the top of the list.

And those were the critical areas.

19 Now you see " remove non-nuclear-matters" --

20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

What does that mean?

I didn't 21 understand that one.

22 MR. WHITE:

Well, by non-nuclear, Mr. Chairman, if 23 you would believe it, you gentlemen would believe it, I'm 24 responsible for the design, the oversight of construction 25 repair of 53 dams, and of contracts with, for example, the

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15 1

Corps of Engineers in Bonneville to do work for those.

2 You know, I don't mind lying awake at night worrying 3

about my nuclear problems, but I don't intend to lie awake at 4

night worrying about whether a storm in Washington is going to 5

cause a problem on the Bonneville Dam or something is going to 6

happen to the Okefenokee Dam in Georgia.

Those are 7

non-nuclear matters which we must get out of my 8

responsibility.

9 MR. DEAN:

I might say parenthetically that in the 10 past, say civil engineering had been grouped into one large 11 group, and they did civil engineering work for the nuclear 12 program, as well as all these dam safety matters.

So, as he 13 said, efforts are being made just to split t' hat out.

14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

All right.

15 MR. WHITE:

What I'm saying is I have a lot of dam 16 inspectors.

17

[ Laughter.)

18 MR. WHITE:

Go to the next slide.

19 (Slide.]

20 This is the organization as it existed about 18 21 months ago.

Notice the discontinuity between operations and 22 maintenance, and between those and design.

23 Notice that nuclear, non-nuclear, both engineering 24 and construction, are lumped together.

They aren't under the l

25 authority of the guy running the plants.

A very fragmented i

. -. _. ~. -... _. _, _, _,, _. _.. _..., _ _ _ _. _,.., -,,, _

16 1

organization, with no single person in charge of nuclear.

2 I might point out at this time that the NRC picked 3

this up and severely criticized TVA for having this type of 4

organization.

5

[ Slide.]

6 Here is the way we look today.

Let me first mention 7

at the top, I've mentioned the Board of Directors who give me 8

support, and Mr. Bill Willis has been introduced.

I would 9

like also to say that the general manager from that first day 10 has given me the utmost cooperation and support.

11 Notice on this chart that we are no longer 12 fragmented.

We have simple clean lines, clear lines of

(

13 responsibility and accountability.

We are in the process of 14 removing the non-nuclear.

We are in the process of 15 strengthening QA licensing and engineering under this scheme.

16 All the nuclear business is under a single hat.

As 17 you look through that, you will see that some of the changes, j

18 I have appointed a new Assistant Manager, because I needed i

19 that type of help in the headquarters.

20 I also have the Nuclear Safety Review Staff who 21 report directly to me.

22 I might mention, Mr. Chairman, that on the i

j 23 non-nuclear, I might also ask you if you gentlemen would

.l 24 believe that I'm responsible for operating the largest diesel 25 truck engine overhaul facility in the Southeast, and I'm told l

l I

17 i

1 it's probably the,best in the United States.

And that's again 2

-- I'm going to get rid of' diesel trucks.

3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

So you don't have that 4

responsibility now?

5 MR. WHITE:

We are transferring it now.

It is not 6

complete yet.

We started several weeks ago to' transfer.

7 It's, as you can imagine, quite a process to separate

~

8 functions and people into two organizations.

But it's well, 9

well into being.

10 Now I'm going to come back to this slide --

11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

Let me ask a dumb question.

f 12 How does it happen that all came in the package?

You were 13 appointed to head the nuclear program.

That just was rolled 14 into the nuclear program or -- I don't understand.

15 MR. WHITE:

Historically those things had been 16 there.

When the Board got me, they said, Look, you know, 17 you've got a broad charter.

Go fix the thing."

And part of 18 fixing the thing is getting that out, so that I can -- I only 19 should have to worry about nuclear.

20 MR. DEAN:

Commissioner, I might comment, to give 21 you a little historical perspective on that.

Until last 22 summer, all of power, engineering, construction -- well, at 23 that point in time they had all been lumped together.

We 24 certainly included a lot of things like dam safety and l

25 repairing the diesel trucks and that sort of thing.

Now the

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effort is being made to bring everything nuclear under one 2

umbrella, which is quite proper, but to split out things which 2

3 have been caught up in that not the first time.

And as he 4

points out, quite correctly, it takes a little bit of doing.

5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

But those are

(

6 responsibilities, I take it, that Mr. Parris brought with me 7

when --

f 8

MR. DEAN:

They were thrust upon him.

In other 9

words, the trucks, the diesel trucks he refers to, were used 10 in the power operation.

But as Mr. White points out, if he's 11 going to lose sleep, he doesn't want it to be over diesel 12 trucks.

Diesel generators, perhaps, but not diesel trucks.

(

13 MR. WHITE:

So we will come back to this slide 14 again, but the importance is, it's under one hat.

15

[ Slide.]

i 16 I am not going to take you or try to take you i

17 through a slide which shows how the sites used to be t

i 18 crganized, because to be honest with you, that diagram is l

19 still confusing to me.

But this is the way it is now.

20 Simple, clean, clear lines.

21 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:

This is per site?

j 22 MR. WHITE:

This is each site, that's correct.

We 23 are rapidly moving in this direction.

24 Now I should say this is an operational site.

The 25 sites under construction would be a little bit different.

L i

1 I

l 19 i

1 MR. DEAN:

But that's a typical site up there, 2

Mr. Roberts.

That's what he means by per site.

3 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

Do you have all those people in 4

place?

5 MR. WHITE:

Yes.

6 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

At this time?

7 MR. WHITE:

Yes.

At the upper tier, I think there 8

are a couple of exceptions, Mr. Zech, but at the upper tier we 9

have certainly the majority of them.

I would guess about 85 10 percent.

11 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

Fine.

12 MR. WHITE:

Now what this does, this simple diagram, 13 is it -- with regard to engineering, it places the resources 14 and the responsibilities with the site director, while 15 maintaining that strong technical line to the engineers.

And 16 that ensures design integrity for the life of the plant, for 17 the life of the plant.

A very important point.

18 In addition, the other significant changes that you 19 see up there is that we have consclidated all the QA 20 functions, and I'll discuss that later in more detail.

But 21 they are all now under one hat, and you notice he doesn't 22 report t7 the line, he reports to a manager who reports i

23 directly to me.

Strong centralized control.

24 In safety and licensing, for the first time, for the 25 first time we have put in place, or putting in place, offices

20 i

1 of licensing at the sites who will report ag. sin to a person 2

who reports directly to me.

3 (slide.]

4 Now let me go on and talk about people.

5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

The Director of Engineering 6

reports to you, not to the site director?

7 MR. WHITE:

That is correct.

That is correct.

8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

And the Director of Safety and 9

Licensing reports --

10 MR. WHITE:

Reports directly to me.

11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Why was that, instead of going 12 to the site director?

I'm not saying it's wrong, I am just 13 interested in your philosophy.

14 MR. WHITE:

Clearly it's a similar case to QA, where 15 there's technical direction, and that has to be centralized.

16 I have to know what's going on.

I have to keep it 17 independent, frankly, of the site or the line organization, to 18 maintain independence, to give it strong technical control in 19 all of those areas.

I have to have hands-on control of those 20 things.

21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

While you might have some 22 engineers at the site, you still have a centralized office of i

23 nuclear engineering that reports to you?

24 MR. WHITE:

Yes, sir.

And later on I will get into 1

25 some details in the engineering area.

21 1

COMMISSIONER ZECH:

But the site director is 2

allowed, it looks to me like, according to your organization 3

here, to spend his time and his energies focused directly on 4-his site and focusing on operations and maintenance and those 5

kinds of things.

6 MR. WHITE:

While having the people there, the 7

resources there --

8 COMMISS'IONER ZECH:

Right, to do that.

9 MR. WHITE:

-- to call on, but under that strong 10 centralized technical --

11 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

But having the centralized staff 12 functions report to you, but servicing him, of course, back 13 down the hill.

14 MR. WHITE:

That's correct.

15 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

All right.

16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Can I ask one more question on 17 this slide?

It says Director -- I'll just pick one of these 1

18 boxes -- Director of Nuclear Engineering.

Is there a Director 19 of Nuclear Engineering for this site, or -is this Director of 20 Nuclear Engineering for all your centralized --

21 MR. WHITE:

That's Director of Nuclear Engineering 22 for all sites.

23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINC:

Okay.

1 24 MR. WHITE:

I should have pointed that out.

That 25 upper tier all report directly to me.

,- _ _.._ ~,.. ___ _.-. _ _.,_ __.___ _ __ _ _ --_- _,

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1 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

That's really the 2

corporate level?

3 MR. WHITE:

That's the corporate level, that's 4

correct.

5 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

That's why you want it 6

centralized, so you can make uniform consistent decisions.

7 MR. WHITE:

Consistent, uniform, and have them under 8

my control.

I must have those things under my control.

9

[ Slide.]

10 Okay, now, let's get back to the problem.

11 Leadership.

And that's as succinct as I can make it.

A lack 12 of leadership and direction.

13 It became evident immediately, immediately in 14 searching those first few weeks, of looking around TVA, that I 15 could not find the level of expertise and experience in the 16 nuclear business within TVA.

7mmediately went outside of TVA.

17 Now going outside of TVA is difficult for a number 18 of reasons, but let me just go through my difficulty.

~

19 First of all, it's not easy to get those people.

20 You understand that I'm out looking for people with 25 or 30 21 years experience, with a reputation that backs it up.

And 22 those people in industry today are at very senior levnis in 23 their companies.

Very senior levels.

They're the top in the 24 industry.

So they're hard to find.

25 When I can find some, they go through an interview

I 23 i

1 process similar to the one that Admiral Rickover taught me 2

years ago.

And of the ones that I interview, I select about 3

one out of five.

Now once having obtained these people and selected 4

5 them, it's not easy to get them to come to work.

You go in to 2

6 a person who's at a high level in industry and you're saying, j

7 "Look, leave your job as executive vice president in your 3

8 company and come to Chattanooga or Knoxville for two years, 9

temporary thing, and work for me in this large problem we're 10 trying to solve."

It's not easy.

11 Fortunately in several cases I have a commitment 12 from the top people in the company in some very reputable, s'

13 cred. table companies, a commitment to me to furnish the people 14 I need.

And believe me, I'm calling on those chits.

And so 15

-- to get the people that I need.

16 So once having found them, selected them, and I have 17 them now coming, let me tell you it is not inexpensive.

Those 18 people are not inexpensive, and fortunately the Board l

19 understands that and supports it.

20 The very simple truth is that without those people,

)

21 I nor anyone else can do this job.

That's the caliber of i

22 people it will take to get this thing righted in a reasonable 23 timeframe.

24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

Can I ask -- it may be 25 premature right now, but I would hope some time today, and it l

l

24 1

may be premature today, you would be able to address a i

2 question that's troubled me, not to cross bridges before we l

3 get there.

But I'm concerned about the transition --

4 MR. WHITE:

I will cover that.

l 5

COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

I have great confidence in 6

your ability to assess the problem, and perhaps through the i

j 7

good graces of pulling chits, as you put it, of some of the 8

people that you know bringing in the personnel that you need 9

to assist in solving the problem today.

But as you point out, 10 these people don't come cheap, and I think it's time the s

11 Congress understood that they don't come cheap, and I'm i

12 concerned what happens two or three years down the road here.

/

13 MR. WHITE:

Well, I an also very concerned, but I Il 14 later on will tell you the things that I'm trying to do to l

t l

15 solve that problem.

A very, very valid concern.

2 l

16 Now again if I can refer back to what you said 17 earlier, Mr. Asselstine, the problems can vary from place to 18 place, but they all stem from a root cause.

And everything i

19 else, frankly, we're going to talk about today are symptoms, J

20 are merely symptoms of this problem.

This is the problem I 21 have to solve.

22 (Slide.]

j 23 I would like now to take a couple of minutes to 24 introduce the TVA managers, and very briefly, so you will have 4

25 a sketch of the kind of people we are talking about.

f m _ _ _ -,.,_ -.. _ _ _

25 Deputy Manager of Nuclear Power is Mr. Chuck Mason.

1 2

He has about 22 years experience in nuclear industry, both j

3 Navy, Wolf Creek and TVA.

4 Mr. Bill Cottle, the recently-appointed Assistant 5

Manager of Nuclear Power, has 18 years experience in the Navy, j

6 at Farley and at TVA.

7 Mr. Kelly, Director of Nuclear QA from Stone &

8 Webster.

Mr. Kelly has 27 years experience in the nuclear l

9 business, and for the last -- how many years have you been, 10 eight years, Dick, the number one guy -- the last eight years, 11 the number one QA person for the Stone & Webster Corporation.

12 Mr. Bill Drotleff, the Director of Nuclear

(

13 Engineering, also from Stone & Webster.

He has 23 years i

14 experience in the nuclear industry, and 17 of those, the last 15 17, have been in design, and he is my new Director of Nuclear 16 Engineering.

17 Mr. Dick'Gridley, the Director of Nuclear Licensing i

18 and Safety.

Dick has 29 years experience in the nuclear 19 business.

He's had 10 years experience in licensing, and his

~i 20 last job, the one I took him from, he was the number one GE 21 licensing manager worldwide for operating BWR reactors.

22 Mr. McCullough, the new Director of Nuclear l

23 Construction, is not here this morning.

He reports in a 24 week.

He's coming to me from Bechtel.

He has 29 years 25 experience in nuclear construction, and his most recent job i

26 1

and the one he's now working himself out so he can come to us 2

for two years is he had the oversight for the construction of i

3 six units.

4 Bill Bibb from MAC is the site director at Browns 5

Ferry.

Mr. Bibb has 30 years experience in the nuclear 6

business, almost all of it with BWRs.

7 Mr. Abercrombie, site director at Sequoyah, has 18 8

years experience nuclear at TVA.

9 Mr. Robertson, my new Director of Nuclear Services, 10 is also not here this morning.

He reports in today.

We have 11 hired him from Houston Lighting & Power as a TVA employee, 12 which answers, commissioner Bernthal, one of your questions.

{

13 I'm trying to do that wherever I can.

He.has 13 years l

14 experience.

15 Mrs. Taylor, the Manager of Nuclear Personnel, has 16 21 years experience in the personnel business.

17 could you stand up?

18 She also asked me to say that she started working in 15 that business at the age of seven, so she's 28.

l 20 (Laughter.)

21 For the last seven years, for seven years she has i

22 been the personnel person for all of TVA, and that tells you I 23 have stolen the personnel officer for TVA, and she is now 24 working only on nuclear problems for the next two years.

25 Dr. Johnson, Director of Nuclear Training.

He has i

27 1

over 20 years experience in the nuclear business, including 2

nine years at Georgia Tech.

3 And Kermit Whitt, the Director of the Nuclear Safety j

4 Review Staff, has had 25 years experience in the nuclear 5

field, in operations, in testing, in regulation.

1 6

All of these people that I just introduced, with the 7

exceptions of Mr. Abercrombie, Mr. Whitt and Dr. Johnson, are 8

new to their jobs.

As of today we have 13 contractor people 9

in various line positions in the organization, and that number 10 will grow as we fix the problem.

11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

I must say you've been pretty 12 successful in getting some pretty key people.

13 MR. WHITE:

Don't say that too loud, please, 14 Mr. Chairman.

You might inadvertently shut off my sources.

15 I promised you earlier we'd get back to this slide.

16 I'd like to now do it, because I'd now like to show you the

)

17 new organization and superimpose on it the changes that we 18 have made already to give you an idea of what we have been 19 doing.

20 (Slide.)

f 21 The yellow on that slide indicates the people who 22 are filling these -- only these top slots I'm talking about 23 now, top slots, who are from contractor sources.

24 (Slide.)

25 Overlaid on that is the people who have been new, l

1

28 1

who are the new TVA employees.

These are people that now work 2

for TVA.

L 3

(Slide.]

4 And finally, the next overlay shows TVA employees 5

who I have taken from other parts of TVA and placed in that i

6 organization.

If you look at that -- now, of course, I did 7

not place Inspector General, that's entirely separate and 8

distinct from my organization, but he is new to that job.

9 If you look at that, you get a full appreciation for 10 the management -- I think quite dramatic management -- changes 11 we have made so far.

12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Do you have another copy of 13 that one?

I don't seem to have that one.

14 MR. WHITE:

Let's have another copy for the l

15 Chairman.

We should have it.

1 16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Okay, thank you.

l 17 MR. WHITE:

Now let me talk to this slide again.

18 Perhaps partially in answer again, Commissioner Bernthal, to 19 your question.

Under the Director of Nuclear Construction, I 20 actually have two TVA employees.

I have told both of those 21 individuals personally, "You are in a position to compete for, 22 to compete for the top position at the end of two years."

And i

23 they understand that.

24 In the Nuclear Engineering organization, I have 25 three, three TVA employees, and I have spoken to each of those i

29 1

three and said, "You three must compete for that top job."

So 2

I hope that in two years, in some areas -- and Lord knows, 3

wherever I can -- but in some areas we not only want somebody 4

that we think has the potential, I'd like to have some 5

selectivity at the end of the two years.

So we are trying to 6

do that wherever we can.

7 You will notice on the other hand -- I'll give you 8

the down side with the up side -- I have no one yet in QA that 9

I can put as a TVA employee there, and we are looking very, 10 very hard to find a person such as that.

11 In the case of Browns Ferry, by the way -- and l

12 that's the only site that has a Deputy Director right now --

13 Browns Ferry, Mr. Walker, who is now a TVA employee, he came 14

-- he was one of the people that Bechtel sent to me for 15 interview as a contractor guy to come to work for TVA.

We 16 convinced him, quit Bechtel and go to work for TVA.

So now he 17 is -- and I apologize, of course, to the corporation for doing 18 that.

But he is now a key --

4 19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

I wouldn't apologize.

They t

20 can probably take care of themselves.

I 21 (Laughter.]

22 MR. WHITE:

I said that obviously in jest.

But he 23 now is a Deputy Director, and certainly has the potential of 4

24 taking over from Mr. Bibb, the contractor fellow from MAC, 25 from taking that over in this two-year period.

{

-....--m

30 1

So it's hard, it's very difficult, as you indicated, 2

and I agree with you, Commissioner Bernthal, it is difficult.

3 We have had some success and we will continue to push for 4

that.

5 (Slide.]

6 Now let me shift here slightly and say, you know, 7

when you change people and you change an organization, it 8

doesn't do you any good at all, in my opinion, unless you can 9

assign responsibility and accountability.

So we have set up a 10 team of people to rewrite all the position descriptions.

And 11 by that I mean from my own position description to the lowest 12 management level in Nuclear, the people called M-1s, the very 13 lowest level.

14 We have to eliminate duplication, and we have to i

15 cover the missing functions.

And if I can have another aside, 16 I would tell you that when I reported, one of the first things 17 that I found out when I looked around and saw soma problens, I 18 said, "I'd like to talk to the person accountable, the 19 responsible guy for that."

You know what I got?

Everybody 20 was responsible, and therefore no one was responsible.

21 I'm afraid we had too much responsibility by 22 committee.

And I guess another lesson that I learnc4 years 23 ago from Adniral RickcVer was when something goes wrong, if 24 you can't point to the person, the individual responsible, 25 you've never had anybotj responsible.

And I happen to firmly

31 1

believe in that.

2 So the key points on this slide are we are going to 3

assign responsibility.

I am going tb nensure performance, and 4

I am going to hold people accountable after those position 5

descriptions are in place, I expect that in the next few 6

months, 7

CHAI5 MAN PALLADIN6:

I diso p. resume you are given 8

the authority to do the assigned responsibility, to carry it 9

out?

i 10 MR. WH;TE:

I nave very sweeping -- oh, you mean 11 whether I delagate to then?

Or whether I have --

12 CHAIRMAlf PALLADINO:

The question always r:omes about 13 when ye'l have a job, do you have the authority to carry it all 14 out.

15 MR, WHLIE:

I have parhaps a p6rsonal view og 16 authority and responsjhility, and although I believe t.5at +/ou 17 can delegate responsib,ility, I also believe that merely the 18 fact of deleg4 ting it does not absolva you from 19 respGnsibility, so even though I'm going to delegata that, as i

20 far as I'm concerned, I retain the responsibility.

21 C1fAIRMAN PALIADINO:

Stat still I am concerned -- and 22 you didn't satisfy ma yet --

23

?tR. WHITE:

Okay.

24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Does the individual that has s 25 position not only have the responsibility, but he has enough k

y

,m

, _ _ym_.,-,,,

_. _,,__,. _ _._-_.,.m_%_,.,

_.m.._,

1 32 1

authority to carry it out?

The authority that is associated 2

with his carrying out those responsibilities?

3 MR. WHITE:

Clearly he must have not only authority, t

4 I have to give him the tools.

You can't hold an individual 5

responsible without giving him the resources to do this, which 6

has been one of our problems.

7 CEAIRMAN PALLADINo:

Did you answer my question on 8

the authority?

9 MR. WHITER Yes, yes, I said that they do have that, 10

yes, 11 Now this kind of thing, a complete rewrite of 12 position description, has been done in industry before, in the

/

13 nuclear industry.

I'm sure you all know that.

But I have had 14 33 years of association with civil service types of 15 organizations, and TVA is a civil service type of 16 organization.

And in that 33 years, I know of no single 17 undertaking of this magnitude ever done.

t 18 Now you may find one, but I certainly have never t

19 seen one.

So I would say this is kind of unprec6 dented, and I

20 certainly it is a mammoth, mammoth undertaking.

And I have 4

21 set a goal, which I hope we can achieve.

As I say, I want to 1

22 have essentially all that complete in the next four mcnths.

l 23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

How many positions are 24 involved in this effort?

25 MR. WHITE:

We have about 1680.

i 23 1

COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Okay.

2

[ Slide.]

3 MR. WHITE:

Now let ne say that once, once you --

4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

One other statistic, I'm 5

sorry, you said that you were categorizing management 6

positions down to M-1.

How many management positions then do 7

you define M-1 and above?

How many people are in that 8

managenent category?

9 MR. WHITE:

Well, that's about 1700, is it not?

10 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:

Oh, those are only 11 management, so-called M-1s and above?

12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Those are managers.

l

(

13 MR. WHITE:

All managers, that's correct.

14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

It's a very significant 15 undertaking, and I commend you for it.

16 MR. WHITE:

Oh, it is.

But I have to do it.

I must 17 do it.

If I'm going to hold anybody accountable in the 18 organization.

19 MR. DEAN:

You understand these are TVA's levels of 20 managers.

The general managers, the M-13s, and it's very 21 similar to the civil service type of classifications.

22 HR. WHITE:

And I hope my voice is going to hold, 23 and please excuse the throat.

24 Now let ne continue by saying after you hava 25 organized, reorganized, and after you have put the people in l

. =.

i 34 place, and after you have defined responsibility and 1

2 accountability, you aren't there yet.

You've got to continue, 3

and you muat have a system so'that you can establish policies, 4

that the practice will follow those policies, and that the l

l 5

procedures will reflect the actual practices.

And that's what 4

l 6

this slide tells you.

i 7

In the second bullet we have hired a person who has 1

8 rewritten procedures for a number of other nuclear utilities l

9 who have been in similar trouble, and she starts to work this 4

j 10 week with a team of people to review and rewrite procedures, 11 our hierarchy procedures.

i 12 Management information system.

They had four

[

i t

13 man'agement information systems.

We are working down.

Pretty 14 soon we will have one.

I i

15 In the corporate ccamitment tracking system, it's a l

16 crazy situation.

We had over a dozen systems.

You know, l

17 almost literally, everybody had their own little tracking l

f 18 system.

And what we are doing is, we are almost down to the l

19 point where we will have one tracking system, which is 20 obviously the way it should be.

i l

21 (Slide.)

22 Now you cannot run an crganization, particularly one 23 of this size, unless you have sources of information.

You've l

24 got to have sources of information.

You've got to have the 1

i 25 truth, you've got to have the facts, the unvarnished facts, I

I i

i 35

\\

1 the unbiased facts, you have to have assurance that the l

2 problems are being raised to your level.

J j

3 Now in turn I have a responsibility to the Board of i

)

4 Directors to report to them and keep them informed.

So the i

)

5 top of this slide shows those methods, the monthly briefings l

l 6

and the average -- the slide says twice, 18m sure the everage l

i 7

is more than that.

Chairman Deans says it seems to him it's 1

1 3

daily.

But I would tell you if you asksd the Board, they

}

9 would tell you that in the two months I've been there, I have j

10 not hesitated at all to report to them my problems and where I

[

[

11 needed their support.

And, of course, they have a lot of 12 other sources -- the Office of Inspector General.

  • +

)

13 They were also present, for example, a couple of

[

l 14 weeks ago, within the last two weeks, at an INPO exit brief I

l 15 after an inspection of Browns Ferry, so they are also e

l 16 involved in getting direct information, L

f j

17 Now how do I get my information?

I 18 Daily contact with key management.

That's one way.

[

19 Site representatives is another.- In two of the t

20 sites I have already placed representatives who are not part l

21 of the line management.

Those people report directly to me, l

l 22 and so I have another source of information, because I also I

i 23 learned a long time ago never to depend on one source of 24 information.

t 25 And again, I guess frca Admiral Rickover, you've got l

i

.~

f

D j

36 l-to know what the heck's going on all the time.

You've got to t

2 know that.

j 3

The other means, obviously, are my personal looks.

[

4 And when I first took over, by the way, the first few weeks, I i

5 talked to about nine to ten thousand employees at the various f

6 locations, so I could tell them what they could expect from 4

1 7

me, and the major things that we were going to accomplish.

8 In addition to that, in visiting through the i

9 organizations, I have literally on a one on one, or one on two i

i 10 or one on three basis talked to hundreds, perhaps as many as a t

i 11 thousand, employees.

And let me tell you, that's a good 12 source of information.

)

i i

13 You know, in 33 years in the Navy, I never knew a 14 commanding officer worth his salt who didn't walk his ship.

4 1

15 TVA is not a ship, but we're going to walk the ship.

i

\\

j 16 Now having set that pattern, I require my people to

\\

17 do that.

I require my managers, the site directors, for i

i 18 example, walk their ship, walk their spaces.

They in turn f

19 require their subordinates to walk.

And how do I know that's 20 going on?

Because I require each of them to report to me once 21 a week on who's been doing what, how many have been doing it, i

22 what have they been finding, and if I get too many good t

{

23 reports, I say, "Okay, let me have the bad ones," because I I

4 I

24 know buried in there, there are some bad signs.

What problems l

f i

25 have you found?

What did you do about it?

i

37 1

So'those are certainly some of my multiple enurces.

2 And obviously most of these reports are made orally to me, 3

directly.

They don't go to some middleman.

Orally to me, 4

directly.

5 And, of course, in addition, I have groups such as 6

NSRS reporting directly to me.

So I have formal means of 7

communication and many forms of informal communication.

8

[ Slide.]

9 Let me very briefly on this slide recap the areas we 10 have coverod.

11 We have centralized control.

12 We have installed good experienced people at the 13 top.

~

14 We are beefing up weak areas.

15 We are precisely defining responsibility and 16 accountability, and have established sources of information.

17 (Slide.]

18 Employee concerns.

4 19 This is the single biggest symptom, in my view, the 20 biggest single symptom of the management problems that TVA has 21 had.

22 (Slide.]

22 So we are on a common ground, as I talk about 24 these.

We divide them into two categories, called the Watts 25 Bar Special Program and the new TVA Employee Concern Program.

38 1

[ Slide.]

2 Let me first go through the Watts Bar Program, which 3

you see on this slide.

As you know, that's the one in which 4

we hired a contractor, QTC, to interview everyone associated 5

with the Watts Bar Project.

And let me point out, something 6

like this has never been done before, I don't believe, 7

anywhere.

8 We also paid QTC to investigate those concerns as 9

directed by TVA.

10 In Phase 1 that you see there, that is now 11 completed, and we are in Phase 2, which is let's get at the 12 root causes and let's do something about it.

(

13 (Slide.]

\\

14 Here is kind of the status of where we stand.

15 Notice that less than 25 percent of those concerns have been 16 resolved.

Less than 25 percent.

And these are concerns that 17

. started early last year.

18 Please also note that some concerns are 19 double-counted.

For example, if I had a -concern in we'lding 20 and it also involved harassment and intimidation, that's two 21 concerns, not one, and it goes into two piles.

22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Now how are you resolving 23 these?

24 MR. WHITE:

Well, I'm going to got to that in a 25-short bit here.


,,n-

39 1

[ Slide.)

2 Now NRC came down in October and looked at that 3

Watts Bar program,.and here is what you said about it.

You 4

said, you know, you recognized progress was extremely slow.

l 5

You found many deficiencies in the program, and in general 6

these are the things you said.

You said, you know, you guys 7

are solving these case by case.

Why don't you do it 8

efficiently and group them?

9 1 think those suggestions, particularly, were very 10 good.

Particularly those suggestions.

11 Next slide.

12

[ Slide.)

13 If I am going too fast, I hope that you won't 14 hesitate.

15 So as I said, quit dragging our feet and let's get 16 on with the resolution, and let me tell you, I don't want to 17 diminish the size of this problem, because there is a lot of 18 work to be done, a lot of work to be done.

But by grouping 19 them, we are going to come to the end and'get satisfactory 20 resolution faster.

21 So again, your suggestion was good.

22 Using this means, we would expect to formally and 23 objectively and with the right technical talent resolve the 24 problems.

25

[ Slide.]

., - -,.. -, - - -., ~.,,..,..,.

40 1

So we have divided them into nine categories.

And 2

this slide shows you who is responsible for the review of 3

those categories.

There's a team in each of these areas.

4 In intimidation and harassment and misconduct, our 5

General Ccunsel will only do those until the new Inspector 6

General is fully staffed up.

7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Now what does he do, when you 8

say do these?

I don't mean in great detail.

9 MR. WHITE:

Well, he will be taking those kind of 10 cases, if they're of the level that the IG ought to get into, 11 and I have already -- for example, even though he's not 12 staffed up, in some that I felt were more important, I have 13 already turned those to him.

So, you know, it's to get --

14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

What I'm getting at, does he 15 investigate, does he propose solution?

16 MR. WHITE:

No, no.

17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

How does he --

i 18 MR. WHITE:

He investigates, and I get a report, and 19 so does the Board get a -- because he reports to the Board, of 20 course, but I get a report of what he finds.

21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

And then you take the action?

22 MR. WHITE:

Then it's up to the line manager to take 23 that action, that's right.

24 Now I like, by the way -- and although we haven't 25 really come to a full conclusion on this, so maybe I'm

41 1

speaking out of turn, and the new IG will have other Words, 2

but I also like to get from him not recommendations but i

3 perhaps the highest level he thinks he can support from what 4

he found.

That's sometimes of help to me, to know.what is the 5

highest level that the facts will support, in your opinion.

6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

How many inv'estigative staff 7

does he have now, and do you project that he will have?

8 MR. WHITE:

I am going to ask Mr. Zigrossi if he 9

Will come up.

Did you hear the question?

10 MR. ZIGROSSI:

As of yesterday, I have three, three 11 investigators full time.

12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Mr. Zigrossi, why don't you

(

13 identify yourself.

14 MR. ZIGROSSI:

Norm Zigrossi, Inspector General with 15 TVA.

16 As of yesterday, I have three full-time 17 investigators.

By the end of the month I should have ten.

By 18 the end of April, I hope to have at least 20.

That may -- and I

19

..then I'll evaluato the work load as wa go but I should be 20 totally functional by the end of April.

21 And, of course, Steve's work will get our priority 22 attention because I know the importance of what he's doing to 23 TVA.

24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

Thank you.

25 MR. WATERS:

You might bo interested in noting that

42 1

Mr. Zigrossi was with the Washington office of the Federal 2

Bureau of Investigation and supervised about 1000 people 3

here.

Quite frankly, we felt like that anybody that could run 4

the Washington office of the FBI could do the job of Inspector 5

General at TVA, and we are very proud to have him, and we are i

6 very proud of the way he's taking hold of his office and the 7

support he's giving Steve White.

8 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

Before you move off of I

9 intimidation and harassment, how do you follow up on i

10 discrimination and harassment, and how do you plan to follow 11 up on it in your Inspector General's office or your Office of 12 General Counsel?

Now as far as the categories of, first of 13 all, of the discrimination type charge, and then the safety 14 concerns, and they're a little different sometimes, and how do 15 you reach closure on both of those things?

Have you got into 16 that from the point --

17 MR. WHITE:

Yes, and I'll let the General Counsel 18 speak to part of this, because his office has been doing the 19 investigations.

But in essence there have been about 106 20 allegations.

His office has investigated 28.

Of those, there 21 was one case of harassment and intimidation, which involved 22 three concerns, and I discharged that person.

23 Now do you want to add anything, Mr. Sanger?

24 MR.SANbER:

No, I think that describes it.

I 25 reported on it the last time I was here.

I would be glad to l

43 1

respond to any specific questions.

2 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

Well, my concern is twofold:

3 First of all, if the discrimination part shows some l

4 kind of management weakness, that could be pervasive.

That's 5-important.

1 6

And the second thing is, if it shows any kind of I

7 safety concern, we at the NRC have got to know about it, and 8

you have got to have some kind of a system, in my judgment, of 9

making sure that our staff, the Commission, we know about any 10 safety concern, even if you have solved it or you have gotten 11 into it to the extent that you think you've solved it.

We've 12 got to know, to be sure ourselves that you've solved it.

13 So, again, the intimidation and harassment has those 14 two concerns for me.

One of them to see whether it's a 15 management pervasive thing that could bear on other fields; 16 and two, if it's a safety concern, then we must be able to 17 assure ourselves that the problem has been resolved.

18 Now how do you come to closure especially on the 19 safety concern, and how are we assured that we're informed 20 when you are investigating these type charges?

21 MR. SANGER:

My practice has been to report, both to i

22 the Board and to the line manager, the personnel issues 23 involved.

If there has been harassment, the individuals 24 involved.

I tell the Board and the management what type of 25 action they can take that I think I can support legally, i

44 1

Ternination, for example.

2 If there is any sort of criminal activity involved, 3

I report that to the United States Attornsy.

In several 4

instances where I did not find harassment, I did report to 5

Steve, for example, that I thought some of his managers had 6

failed in enforcing the policy throughout TVA, and Steve has 7

also taken action on that.

~

8 Those reports, as I indicate, go both to the Board 9

and to the manager.

They are required, the manager is 10 required within a certain number of days to report back to the 11 Board and to inform me what action has been taken.

12 Then I have been very free about making that l

13 information available to the NRC Staff people.

I have made 14 available all of my reports to them.

15 And on the safety aspects, to the extent that they 16 are involved in my report, that would be the function of our i

17

-- Steve's people to coordinate that with the NRC.

i 18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

I want the record to make sure 19 we have your name.

i 20 MR. SANGER:

I am Herbert Sanger, General Counsel i

21 with TVA.

2 22 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

Well, the only comment I would 23 like to make is I'd like to make sure that we are informed 24 about how you are handling these intimidation and harassment 25 charges, so that we can carry out our responsibilities for

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45 1

public health and safety, as you are carrying out your i

2 responsibilities for public health and safety.

We jointly 3

come together on this issue, and we simply must be able to 4

4 have the confidence that you are doing -- you are making the 5

proper decisions, and we are going to look over your shoulder 6

to make sure you are, at least to our satisfaction.

l 7

But it's important that we follow through and can 8

also agree that the decisions you've made that might come out of these intimidation and harassment charges are indeed 9

10 sufficient -- the decisions you've made are proper ones, so t

11 that we can also agree that public health and safety is being 12 protected.

It's the safety concern across the board that I'm l

13 mostly interested in, and I'm interested to make sure that you 4

i 14 inform us of those things so we can indeed review what you're r

15 doing and therefore assure ourselves that public health and i

16 safety is being protected.

I 17 MR. WHITE:

I understand the point, and with regard 10 to safety, let me clarify.

You mentioned management, and if I

)

19 can take just a second to go through under our new program, 20 which I'll discuss in a minute here.

l 21 We have into that program -- either I personally or 22 my staff -- have received 14 allegations of harassment and 23 intimidation.

We have completed an investigation of two of 24 those.

i 25 In the first case -- and lot me just call the 1

1 e

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46 1

complainant " Smith" for these purposes.

Smith said there are 2

some bad things going on in the office.

So we started an 3

investigation.

4 During the investigation one of Smith's supervisors 5

came to Smith and said, "I hope you slept well last night."

I 6

gave that person three days suspension, and that's a couple 7

hundred dollars fine, because the manager -- if that isn't 8

really intimidation or harassment, it's sure as heck poor 9

management.

10 Smith's second level supervisor, believe it or not, 11 came in the following day and told not just Smith but the 12 entire office, "When this thing is over," meaning the 13 investigation, "when this thing is over, there are going to be 14 new rules in this office and nobody is going to like them."

15 That person I gave two weeks suspension to, and that's about 16

$1000.

17 In the third level, the manager, who didn't know the 18 problems he was having, but should have, I reprimanded him 19 with a formal letter and told him he has one week to get his 20 act together.

21 Now those are not in the specific -- none of them 22 dealt with safety.

As a matter of fact, they dealt with paint 23 and some other things not associated in any regard to safety.

24 Those I frankly would not think you'd expect me to report.

25 But certainly any safety-related ones, we will ensure that you

47 i

1 are fully cognizant of them.

Because I feel the same as you 2

do in terms of the public health and safety responsibilities.

3 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

And also -- the safety-related 4

are important and I appreciate that you will inform us of all 5

those.

But it is also important that at least we be informed 1

6 even of some of your management problems, because then what it j-i 7

really means is that certainly it sounds like in that case you '

8 handled it very promptly and very effectively.

But if you had 4

9 not, or even knowing you do that is important for us to know, 10 because then it gives us the confidence that you are handling 11 it.

j 12 For example, if you didn't handle them that way, or 13 if you handled them a lot less effectively, it might concern j

14 us as to how other management decisions are being reviewed and 15 handled.

But I think it's important that we figure-out a way 16 that at least we are informed of those management actions that 4

j 17 perhaps even aren't safety-related.

18 I'm not exactly sure how to do that myself, but I f

19 think it's important.

20 MR. WHITE:

Let me ask Mr. Abercrombie.

Some of 21 those cases were at your site.

Was the NRC resider.t cognizant l

22 of --

i 23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Maybe if you picked a couple of c

l 24 examples also in the nuclear area, it might help us.

25 MR. ABERCROMBIE:

Edward Abercrombie, Site Director, i

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2 48 t

1 Sequoyah.

2 In that case he was not aware of the situation.

3 MR. WHITE:

We will make sure that he's aware.

l j

4 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

Very good.

Thank you.

5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Let me ask a couple of i

1

)

6 follow-on questions, if I may.

7 The fact that you are taking strong action, I think, i

8 will help the situation, but I was wondering, have there been 4

J 1

j 9

continuing intimidation and harassment events, even though j

i 4

j 10 you've taken this kind of action?

Do they still continue to i

l l

6 11 arise, the allegations?

I I

I 12 MR. WHITE:

The allegations continue to arise.

Let r

13 me say this, Mr. Chairman:

i

(

14 First of all, these are symptoms of a problem.

j f

15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Yes.

16 MR. WHITE:

The problem has existed, in my opinion

}

]

17

-- I don't know for how long, probably 53 years.

Steve White, J

j 18 when he walked in the door, did not bring a magic wand to say, t

19 "I can correct all the past injustices and make everything in i

20 the past right."

j 21 What I did was to come in and say, look, here's the 5

22 standard -- as I said, I personally talked to 10,000 people 1

4 2

23 and told them the standard, in addition to various writing I

i 24 means of telling them -- here's the standard, and I'll punish 25 anybody that crosses that line.

I r

I

. =

49 l

l 1

Now their allegations are being investigated.

If 2

people cross that line, they will be swiftly and appropriately 3

dealt with.

4 So the allegations -- yes, the allegations l

5 continue.

I don't expect them --

j

]

6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO But have they slowed --

I

^

7 MR. WHITE:

-- to stop for some time.

4 8

CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Have they slowed down?

9 MR. WHITE:

Number one, I don't think even if they 10 had -- and I think they probably have, but I wouldn

. depend i

j 11 on that.

I think it's too early.

I've only been there two i

j 12 months, and if I in fact am trying to correct a 53 year old 13 problem, then it's going to take -- they're going to continue, 14 I would suspect, for a period of time, until people gain trust i

15 and confidence.

16 The real answer to your question is I'm getting 17 very, very positive response from the people.

I've got lots il 18 of sources of information, and those responses uniformly are 19 positive to things we are doing.

j 20 But I'm a very skeptical person.

I say fine, 4

21 they're all positive from some pretty meaningful sources, 22 they're all positive, but I'm going to wait and see, I'm going 23 to wait and see.

l l

24 so I'm not in a position to -- I think they are 1

25 decreasing, but I am not in a position to guarantee at this l

50 1

point that they won't last for months.

I hope they don't.

I 2

hope a few cases will perhaps put the right rigor in the 3

organization.

But understand, I'm trying to change a 4

culture.

You've got a culture I'm trying to change.

And I 5

may exaggerate when I say 53 years.

I don't know how old it 6

is.

Maybe as old as TVA.

I will discuss some of that later 7

on.

8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Well, I was really asking the 9

question to lead into the assurance that at least you have 10 gotten the message across to all your managers that you are 11 not going to tolerate intimidation and harassment.

12

.3G4. WHITE:

No.

In fact -- I's, of course, being i

13 very open with you.

Of one of the cases that came up about a 14 week ago, which wasn't harassment and intimidation, it turned 15 out, it was closer to mismanagement of a number of factors 16 involved.

And based on that, I wrote another letter to my 17 head people and said, "You think you've got the message out, 18 but I want you to redouble your efforts.

I am not convinced 19 that everybody in the organization knows yet, despite the fact l

20 I've told them and written it and we've posted it.

I'm not i

f 21 comfortable that everyone in the organization knows it."

And 22 I'm skeptical.

I f

23 But that doesn't mean I'm not going to keep trying

}

24 to get the word to everybody.

I think we'd better move on.

25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINot Well, this is an area that I

)

51

[

1 figured we were going to dwell on.

2 MR. WHITE:

Well, I've got a lot left to go.

3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

I realize that, but I 4

guess I've got a couple of questions on the IEH area.

And I 5

want to go back, Steve, to a couple of points you made earlier 4

6 about your recognition that you have to have the facts and 7

that problems have to be surfaced up to your level.

~

i I

8 While I an encouraged and pleased to hear the things 9

you skid just now about your efforts to get the message out j

and also the discussion we had at the last meeting where, 10 11 Charlie, you and Steve both said that's a high priority item.

i 17 As you well know, I am quite troubled by at least a few of the I

13 intimidation and harassment allegations that have cropped up 1

i 14 since that last meeting, including the ones that have to do 15 with the briefing I received in December.

16 And quite frankly, I think my view is that all the 17 words in the world aren't going to overcome the chilling f

18 effect that continuing discriminstion and intimidation and 19 harassment actions will have, if those actions are still 20 occurring.

21 And I had a couple of questions about how you are 22 handling those specific allegations.

f j

23 Now as I understand it, you've gotten three 24 allegations of intimidation and harassment.

People have gone 25 to the Department of Labor, based upon the briefing I received I

r 4

-~

52 1

from NSRS.

2 I was told yesterday that you have now gotten three 3

letters back from the Department of Labor, including two of 4

them involving that briefing, the other case being Mansour 5

Guity, in which Labor has found that there was intimidation 6

and harassment, and in which the Department of Labor has 7

directed certain actions.

8 one of the questions I have is I understand you have 9

asked for a hearing in one of those cases, the case of Mansour 10 Guity, and I wonder why you felt that it was necessary to go l

11 that route, and in essence put the burden back on this 12 employee to have to prove once again, now having convinced the 13 Department of Labor staff that he was discriminated against, 14 that now he's got to prove it again in a hearing.

15 I mean it smacks a bit, if you will forgive me for 16 saying so, of the way TVA handled the Dan DeFord case.

17 MR. WHITE:

I'm going to let the General Counsel, 18 Mr. Herb Sanger, deal with the reason for the appeal.

19 MR. SANGER:

We discussed that amongst the Board and t

20 the management.

In some cases -- for example with the Doka f

21 and Thomas case, where Steve dismissed Thomas, we were able to i

22 conduct a parallel investigation and find out what TVA 23 employees were involved.

l 24 With these three cases, TVA really doesn't know what i

25 was involved.

The people -- the three individuals you are

....m.

53 1

talking about have not given TVA the information.

The 2

Department of Labor decisions are merely conclusory 3

decisions.

They do not tell us what information they have.

4 We don't know what the evidence is.

5 If Steve had those decisions, he doesn't know the 6

people involved in them, and we thought -- it was the Board's 7

and Steve and my discussion, that if we asked for hearings, we 8

could use that as a way to fully determine what TVA employees 9

were involved in it, and what actually occurred, so that we 10 can act on it.

That was the reason for that.

11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

What other options do you 12 have available for obtaining information about what happened?

13 Why can't you sit down with those guys?

14 MR. WHITE:

Wall, let me -- can I answer this?

15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Sure.

16 MR. WHITE:

Let me just say this, let me tell you, 17 you asked several questions, and that's the one that I wanted 18 OGC to answer.

19 Obviously we need to gaf the facts.

The first thing 20 that I did -- I did really two things in parallel.

I asked my 21 management, give me your side of what happened.

22 I then immediately, before even receiving that, W

23 turned those over to the Inspector General, and a few days 24 after turning them over, I asked the Inspector General, put 25 those at the top of your list and start investigating beneath

54 1

the facts.

2 And then --

3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Apparently he didn't do i

4 that[right?

5 MR. WHITE:

No, he's in the process of doing that.

6 He's in the process of making those investigations right now.

j And t.se third thing I did was I sat down with the 7

8 two Department of Labor investigators who had investigated the 9

DD case and were looking at the Sauer and Smith' cases and said 10 to them, "You've given me a report, and you say your 11 conclusions are harassment and intimidation.

I need the names 1

12 of the people so I can discharge them."

\\

l

/

13 And we had two meetings -- I've had two meetings

)

14 with the Department of Labor people directly, I have another 15 one scheduled this week, because we have to, I think, simply 1

]

16 get out of this mode that we're operating in.

I would like

=

j 17 those people to come to me and tell me that they have the j

l 18 problem and get us to investigate it.

Dut as long as they've i

19 gone to the Department of Labor, I'm going to try to get 20 whatever I can from those people.

i 21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Have you been successful --

22 MR. WHITE:

But I also --

i 23 CMAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Have you gotten names from 24 them?

j 25 MR. WHITEt No, I have not.

We're having another I

55 1

meeting this week.

But I would also caution all the members 2

of the Commission, an allegation is an allegation only.

3 In the case of Smith, for example, on the surface it 4

appears that a couple of his allegations are frankly frivolous 5

and superficial.

He alleges that the Board of Directors 6

doesn't have the authority to change the organization.

He 7

alleges he's being intimidated just because they've been 8

transferred to me, just the act of transferring.

To me, those 9

are frivolous and superficial.

10 Nevertheless, he says other things, and I have asked 11 the Inspector General to look into those.

12 So I want to assure you that I intend to get to the

(

13 truth, and when I get to the truth, I'm going to take 14 appropriate action.

15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

I guess my question still 16 is, though, if the office of General Counsel, the office of 17 Inspector General can conduct their own investigations, if you 18 can obtain at least some information from Labor about not only 19 their conclusion, but also the basis for their conclusion, why 20 in the world do you need to put Mansour Guity and perhaps the 21 others through the burden of having to go through a hearing 22 before an Administrative Law Judge at the Department of Labor 23 and once again prove their case?

Why can't you take the i

24 burden and say, "We'll do the investigation.

By golly, we 25 really do take this matter seriously.

We're going to do the t

i 56 1

investigation ourselves.

We're going to find out if there was s.

2 wrongdoing here.

We're going to identify the people 3

responsible, and we are going to make examples of them to back up our words with concrete actions, so that everyone f

4 J

5 throughout the TVA organization will know that this attitude 6

of doing business in the past the way that TVA handled the

{

l l

7 DeFord case is not going to be tolerated in the future"?

s And the reason why I think it's important is if you I

}

9 don't do that, you're not going to be able to get the

)

10 information you need about whether there are problems in the 11 organization, and we aren't going to be able to get the 12 information that we need about whether there are safety

[

i 13 problems in tae organization.

i 14 I can't conceive of why a TVA employee down in the 15 line would, looking at what happened to DeFord -- and if the f

l 16 same thing happens again for these people -- why he'd be l

j 17 willing to stick his neck out, or she would be willing to 1

l 18 stick her neck out and come forward with concerns.

They'd i

I 19 say, well, whatever they say, let's look at what they do and 1

l 20 let's look at what happened to these poor people when they I

j 21 tried to raise concerns.

[

l 22 MR. WHITE:

And I agree with the thrust of what

\\

i 23 you're saying.

But let me answer that in three ways i

24 First of all, the Inspector General, you've heard i

I 25 he's only recently come aboard.

He's building up his staff, f

57 1

and so I can't have expected in retrospect to say, well, why 2

weren't you here in October to investigate that case.

He's 3

now doing it.

4 The second point is that what I'm doing now with the 5

Department of Labor is plowing new ground.

We've not done 6

this before.

I'm also looking for a better way.

It's plowing 7

new ground.

8 Meanwhile, I'll let the IG speak to the legal reason

^

9 where the facts have to come out.

Hopefully, from all of 10 this, Mr. Commissioner, we'll come up with something.

But let 11 me change the thrust of this thing, because one of the things 12 you said that disturbs me, you said if we have these 13 problems.

These are not the problems, they are the symptoms 14 of the problem.

I will get taose people to come to line 15 management when they feel they can do it freely.

I have to 16 promote that trust.

I didn't come in one day, as I said, with 17 a magic wand.

I didn't walk in the door and they say, "We 18 trust him."

Although, as I say, the indications are very 19 positive that they have -- that the trust has increased.

All 20 the signals indicate that.

21 And by all the signals, I'm not just referring to 22 the people I've talked to.

I've talked, not at my request, to 23 labor union leaders who are the leaders for over or almost 50 24 percent of my people, came to me individually, voluntarily, to 25 tell me what they were getting out of their people.

58 1

And let me tell you, they were bubbling 2

enthusiastically, because when the people are happy, so are 3

the labor leaders happy.

And they went through a list of 4

things.

They said workers down there, our people tall us that 5

for once it's no longer lip service.

They've sean management 6

changes and they agree with it.

They've seen reorganizations 7

and they agree with it.

They even agree with the drug 8

program, and the employee concern program.

They think it's 9

good and it's a direction we have to go.

10 Those are two union people who have almost half of 11 my people.

12 I get the same signals from other places, and so --

13 but I remain skeptical still.

But I have to correct -- I am 14 draining the swamp, and the swamp is full of alligators.

15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

That's right.

16 MR. WHITE:

Okay?

17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Got to shoot a few 18 alligators.

19 MR. WHITE:

And you want me perhaps to shoot some 20 alligators, and I agree --

21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

That's exactly what I 22 want.

23 MR. WHITE:

But I don't want to get off the basic r

24 thing, which is draining the darned swamp.

Because when I 25 drain the swamp, I'll get rid of a lot of symptoms.

So I I

59 1

don't mind shooting some alligators when it happens -- and by

/

2 that I nean getting rid or problems -- but I got to keep my 3

direction te draining the swamp.

And when I do that, thono 4

other things will fall into place, and that's the secret.

5 COMMISSIONER BERNTIIAL:

Let me see if I can get the 6

record straight, though, on this specific issue that 7

Conmiosicner Asselstine raises and what is happening.

8 I gather that you have no access to the DOL record 9

in this caset is that correct?

You only got the decision?

10 MR. WHITEt only gec the report.

Get the decision.

11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHALt You only get the report, you 12 only get the decision, you don't get the record.

13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINEt Are you saying you have no 14 means of obtaining the record?

15 MR. WATERS The only way we can get their evidence 16 is to appeal.

Is that right?

i 17 MR. WHITE:

I'll leave it to the CGC.

18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

You can't file a Froodom 19 of Information Act with'the Department of Labor and obtain 20 everything in the file other than specific indicators of 21 employees who have asked for confidentiality?

f 22 MR. SANGERt Up to this peint they have boon Willing 23 to give us only their decisions.

24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE That's because rio f.2 -

25 was not closed; isn't that right?

My understand:.

from Labor l

n

_ _ ~

1 1

l 60 I

i 2

MR. SANGER:

If you've read that, you know more than 3

I do.

4 COMMISSIONER ASSEL3 TINE:

Okay.

Well, I talked to l

5 6

MR. SANGER; Decause that is not their response to 1

7 UG.

8 COMMISSIONER ASCELSTIUE:

I talked with the guy from 9

Labor that signed the letter to you, and what he told me lo yesterday was when they send a lotter out, they close the 11 file.

When they close the file, they are prepared to respond 12 to Troedom of Information Act requesto frcm TVA.

In rosponse 13 to a FOTA request, they will provide you with overything 14 they've got, the file, their underlying report, except that 15 they will remove identifiers of individuels where people have 16 requested confidentiality.

That's what I was told yesterday.

1.7 MR. SAUGER:

Well, I think that would be very l

18 helpful, and it would be a new step for them.

Of course, it's 19 mrf unucusi r: -ng for ene. g ve nment agency to use the FOIA i '

another u,

but --

l

(

e.

CGr,'d:::Ic! ER AE c;-

Well, I jtant you ii I

12 struck =e :- kind of strange, too, but --

2 'J liR. S 'd,' G E P -

I 'eculd ha.vo hered that they cull hwa 24 just come forward with that internatica.

25 IIR. WHI'ZE Understand, Cornissioner Ascolstina, i

t.

m.

_s M

1 61 1

these are all legal things that you are discussing.

I have i

2 gone to the Department of Labor and sat down with them twice, l

3 and I am trying to find a way to get those facts.

It I can do F

4 it legally, certainly I want to.

l l

5 COMMISSIONER BERNTEAL If I may follow up on my own 6

questien here, and could I inquire of the General Counsel t

7 what happens to this agency in similar circumstances with

[

a respect to the DOL 7 I

9 MR. PLAINE:

Are you talking about obtaining their l

10 racords?

I 11 COMMISSIONER BERNTKAL The record of a complaint.

f L

12 I think the situation is somewhat analogoue.

We are ancther l

/

13 federal agency.

DOL, in some cases, investigates harassment

{

14 and intimidation of employees.

i 15 How do we stand with respect to access to the I

16 records?

17 MR. PLAINE:

Well, they report to us on what they l

l 18 have done and that they are dealing with a complaint and that

[

i 19 they have made an investigation within 3G days after the

[

t 20 complaint has been filed.

l 21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

I'll answer that question 22 for you, too, Fred.

The answer is, we have full And complate 23 access to the file from Department of Labor, subject only to i

24 the limitation that if we get a Freedom of Information Act f

25 request for that information, we have to refer it to Labor.

f h

62 4

1 We have full access to the file.

i 2

COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

But then why are you 3

suggesting that TVA should need to resort to the Freedom of i

4 Information Act to get the information in their case?

5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Because Labor won't give 6

it to them completely the way they will to us, because they 7

are the subject of the investigation.

8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

But they will under FOIA?

9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

That's right.

2 i

10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

Okay.

Well, maybe that's 11 something the lawyers understand.

12 MR. WHITE:

You know, I've got a lot of ground to i

i 13 cover, and I know this is important, but th' era are some other j

14 very important things that I want to tell you this morning.

15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Maybe we can stop now.

I j

16 still have a number of questions.

17 MR. WHITE:

Can we?

And then at the and --

18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

Look, I want to finish the 19 comment.

The point is that apparently there is a way for you 20 to get access to the record of the Department of Labor.

And 21 the other point that needs to be made here, as I understand l

22 it, you have asked your Inspector General to investigate on 23 your own these allegations, and as you point out, I don't know 24 how many of us have been in his office recently -- I was not 25 long ago, and I think he just about had furniture there a i

_~ _. _ _. _

63 1

month or so ago, but I take it that you are proceeding with 2

your own investigation.

3 MR. ZIGROSSI:

The investigators I have are 4

reviewing the documents to date.

5 CHAIRMAN PALIADINO:

Mr. White, did you want to 6

break fo'r a minute?

7 MR. WHITE:

I can go a few more minutes.

8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Okay.

9 MR. WHITE:

My voice is holding up pretty well, but 10 the rest of me isn't.

11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Just let me know.

12 MR. WHITE:

Moving right along, leave that slide up

[

13 a second, because it's important for you to understand that I 14 expect from this system to get the correct technical judgments 15 in a timely fashion with a satisfactory resolution.. But you 16 were going to ask how I ensure that happens.

Go to the next I

17 slide.

t 18

[ Slide.]

19 We have overviews provided.

First of all, the 20 Senior Board -- and I have already selected three of the 21 people on that Board, and I'd like to go over them with you 22 now, because I think this is an important question that you 23 may have.

4 24 First, Mike Bender.

Mike Bender had fourteen years 25 a.s the Director of Engineering at the Oak Ridge National 4

^'

64 i

1 Laboratories, fourteen years as the Director.

He was ten 2

years a member and, for part of that time, Chairman of the NRC 3

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

So he's one of the 4

three.

5 Dan Garland has had over 25 years experience in QA, i

6 mostly at Westinghouse, and for a number of years, he was the 7

Westinghouse Manager of QA.

i 8

And the third person I've selected is Jim Dunford.

9 Mr. Dunford has over 30 years experience in the nuclear 10 business in a number of positions and most recently was a

]

11 member of the Admiral Rickover team that went to investigate 12 the management at GPU Nuclear.

I 13 And I'm looking for a fourth such expert, but I have l

j 14 to tell you, these guys don't grow on trees either.

So I'm 7

trying to be very selective, trying to get the right people, 15 16 and they're hard to find.

But at least we have three of them.

17 Our new beefed up QA organization will conduct i

18 audits of the systems to make sure that we are adhering to 19 the procedures we've established.

And finally our new IG will i

f 20 kind of look over my shoulder to make sure that all of these 21 things are being honestly approached.

22 After the resolution of the issues, then copies of 23 the fornal closeout report -- and we're still talking Watts 24 Bar -- are going to be made available to all our employees.

l 25 There are a lot of lessons in this, not just for the

.._e.,,

_,,,-,e.,-.,,,

.an_,__,_n_,,,,,,,_ _ _._ _,,,-_,_.,--,,

[

65 1

individual who came in with the initial complaint.

There are 2

lessons in this for all of the people at Watts Bar and at the 3

other sites.

So I want to make these available, and I will 4

encourage the people to look at least at the summaries, to 5

know that people raised some safety issues, and, by golly, we 4

6 faced up to them and resolved them.

7 Now let me shift to the new TVA Employee Concern 8

Program.

This is our permanent program.

Remember, the last 9

one was the one done by a contractor.

This is the permanent 10 one.

It's the one for the long haul with TVA, and it will be 11 standard in all major locations at TVA.

12 The contractor, QTC, you see in the last bullet, 13 they actually trained our site representatives -- I have a 14 representative at each site -- actually trained those people 15 in the interview process for us, and we paid them also to 16 review the plan.

They made some comments, which were good, 17 and they assisted us not only in the procedures but in the 18 training materials for the employees.

So we took benefit of 19 the year, roughly, the year's work that they had done at Watts 20 Bar.

21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

When will we get a copy of your 22 program, or have you given it to the Staff?

23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Is that in the first 24 volume?

25 MR. WHITE:

It's in the first volume.

i

t 66 1

CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

It is?

1 i

2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

When are we going to get 1

3 the first volume?

4 MR. WHITE:

Is it out of the princer yet?

No, but i

i 5

let me answer two questions.

Is it out of the printer's yet, l

6 the first volume?

7 MR. ZIGROSSI:

Volume 1 is out.

i 8

MR. WHITE:

It's out.

You'll have that today.

I l

9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Okay.

4 1

l 10 MR. WHITE:

I have sent you, to the Staff and to the i

11 Commissioners, the program as it exists.

As a result of that

j letter, which I think was dated like the lith of February or 12 t

l 13 something -- and I may be wrong on that date -- but you've i

14 come back to us with a whole list of questions.

In fact, 15 you've come back to us with a couple of lists, and we are in i

i 16 the process of trying to answer those for you and move on to j

17 the program.

So really, in essence, you have the program.

i 5

18 Your Staff has asked questionst we'll answer the questions and i

19 hopefully get it all resolved.

20 (Slide.]

I 3

i 21 Now in this slide, let me make -- it's not on the

(

)

22 slide, but I want to make what I think is an important point, i

l 23 and this is an opinion of mine, is that we've been through i

24 three phases at TVA on employee concerns.

i g

25 In the first phase, I consider that the phase where i

I s

67 1

management was reluctant, they resisted accspting complaints 2

and concerns from our people.

Despite what the Board's 3

policies were, I think line management was resistant, and I 4

categorize before 1985, maybe back 53 years, but that's the 5

period of resistance.

6 The second period is 1985.

We had an outside 7

contractor come in, and the thrust of that was to protect the 8

individual, to maintain confidentiality.

And so I call that 9

kind of the confidentiality phase.

10 And we're on now what I call the third phase, and 11 this is the phase where we want to promote the concerns.

We 12 want the individuals to understand that if we are going to 13 carry out our obligation, our primary obligation, which is the 14 public health and safety, the best source of information I 15 have is the guy that's down there that knows something, and so 16 I want to promote those concerns.

And that's kind of the i

17 third phase that this deals with.

18 As I said, I've been around and I've talked 19 personally to about 10,000 employees.

I preach to them safety 20 and quality first, safety and quality first.

Honesty and 21 integrity and that type of thing.

But I want the employee 22 concerns.

23 Likewise, in those talks to those 10,000 employees, 24 I preach to the managers, " Listen to your people.

Listen to 25 your people and act on it.

Do something.

Get it up the

. _ =

L s

68

}

1 line.

solve the problem."

i 2

And that's going to take time.

Lord knows, it's

[

l i

3 going to take time to have that permeate through the 4

i 4

organization.

And it will take some examples.

l l

J 5

If the employees will come forth early with those l

6 concerns, then I think we can have the early identification, t

J l

7 the early correction of problems that we want, and I think you I

8 want, too.

So it's all contingent on our ability to promote I

9 these things in this phase.

l i

10 Obviously, we must provide confidentiality to those I

r i

11 who request it.

12 (Slide.)

l

(

13 And so the next slide now shows you, we're trying to j

{

14 encourage the employees, and we have provided multiple levels, I

15 input levels, through lots of places that those employees can 16 go.

Obviously, I'd prefer they go to the next guy up the line j

17 and just solve the problem.

But we also provide multiple l

18 means of input.

They have lots of ways in which they can do 19 that.

And so far, as I've said, there's been a very positive i

j 20 response, as I get not only from the labor union leaders that

}I 21 I mentioned, my site representatives we'll discuss in a l

l 22 moment; I get the reports from them.

We've got a lot of I

i 23 people, for example, who don't have a concern, but want to i

24 walk up and talk about the program.

Lord, to me, that's a i

l 25 positive sign.

1

69 1

(Slide.]

2 Now let me talk about the site representatives, 3

because they're one of the keys to this program.

These people 4

went through a selection process, you know, psychological 5

stuff, interview stuff, good technical backgrounds and so 6

forth, and were selected for this job.

I then personally 7

talked to each of these people in my office, and I made sure 8

that the individually knew of my interest in this program.

9 And let me tell you, I made no bones about it.

I told them 10 very frankly that if they didn't carry out my intent with this 11 policy, I would immediately remove them from those positions, 12 and they heard me.

13 By the way, my discussion with them of saying, "If

(

14 you don't carry out my policy, I'm going to remove you from 15 the position," is not intimidation; it's a good management 16 practice.

17 (Laughter.1 18 (Slide.)

19 MR. WHITE:

Now the TVA Inspector General, this 20 slide lists the responsibilities agreed to between the new IG 21 and the Board of Directors.

22 Let me say at this point that we are extremely 23 pleased with Mr. Zigrossi.

He's already done some 24 investigative work for me, and he's impressed me with his 25 thoroughness, his objectivity, and the professionalism which

70 1

the FBI brings to this job.

He's done a good job so far in 2

the things that he's done, and I expect that to continue.

3 (Slide.)

4 Now here is the new employee concern status.

I will 5

just let you read those numbers.

Two-thirds of the concerns 6

-- there are 67 concerns there -- interestingly, two-thirds of 7

those are walk-ins, mail-ins, and phone-ins.

In other words, 8

they're not the forced kind, the exit interviews.

Two-thirds 9

of them are walking in and saying, "I want to say something."

10 Now I don't think that's a bad start, but as I say, 11 I'm skeptical; I'll continue to watch it, konitor it, and form 12 decisions as to possible changes that we may want to make in 13 that program.

14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINot I don't understand.

" Contacts 15 and concerns."

What's the difference?

16 MR. WHITE:

A contact would be an individual who 17 Walks up and says, "I don't have any concern, but I'd just 18 like to talk to you.

How does this new program work?

I've 19 read the poster, and I have some questions about it."

That's 20 a contact.

21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

I see.

22 MR. WHITE:

A concern obviously, the guy says, "I'm 23 really concerned."

24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE On the 24 new concerns for 25 Watts Bar, have you had a chance to take a look at those to

l 71 I

see to what extent they are just further illustrations of 2

previously identified problems in the 5000 you already have, 3

or are they still turning up new things?

4 MR. WHITE:

No.

I'll let my expert speak on that.

5 But so far, we're finding a lot of crossover, not only there, 6

but some of the ones from Browns Ferry are really Watts Bar 7

issues.

8 Eric, did you hear the question?

How about coming 9

up to the microphone.

10 MR. SLIGERt I'm Eric Sliger, Employee Concern

[

11 Manager.

12 of the Watts Bar issues that have been raised to f

13 date, this slide shows 24.

We have identified some, and I i

14 don't have the exact number, but some were previously 15 expressed in the Watts Bar program.

16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE Okay.

But some are new?

17 MR. SLIGER:

Some are new, and some are expressed in la the old program.

They're a rehashing of the same ones.

19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE So essentially a year l

l 20 after you started the first program, you're still turning up 21 new problems?

22 MR. SLIGER:

Yes, but I don't have the exact number.

23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Okay.

Thanks.

24 MR. DEAN:

We will be happy to supply that 25 information for the record.

1

72 1

COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

That would be fine.

2 MR. WHITO:

I want to correct the record.

The 3

question of the employee concern volume, which of course 4

you've already received and we are changing, as you know, 5

because Watts Bar has changed and so forth.

My people tell me 6

by the end of March, so you should have it along those lines.

7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

What is it we're going -- what 8

is it?

9 MR. WHITE:

It is tailored to the letter.

10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

No, I'm sorry.

What is it 11 we're going to get by --

12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

The response to our 13 letters?

14 MR. WHITE:

No, no, this is a separate issue.

15 Let me clarify three things.

First, I've sent you 16 each a letter which describes the program overall.

You've 17 written back and asked certain questions about that.

18 Meanwhile, we are taking the volume on the Employee 19 Concerns Program, which was submitted, I think, last October 20 21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Oh, okay.

22 MR. WHITE:

And we are changing that, because since 23 you've made comments, we've changed the whole Watts Bar thing, 24 so we're having to rewrite it, and my people tell me we're 25 still two or three weeks away from that.

So to correct the

E 73 l

1 record, you should have it by the and of the month.

l 2

CHAIRMAN PALLADINo All right.

Thank you.

3 Let me suggest that before you start on quality 4

assurance, maybe we ought to take a break.

5 MR. WHITE:

I want to very badly.

6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Okay, fine.

Let's taku at 7

least a ten-minute break.

8 (Brief recess.)

9 Please come to order.

We would like to continue.

10 Before we start with QA, I still have a question. I 11 understand your general counsel is prepared to clarify the 12 situation, and that is a better understanding of why you feel 13 you have to go to hearings on these most recent intimidation 14 and harassment allegations because if you go to hearings, this 15 in itself is an inhibitor in getting the results you would 16 like. I gather general counsel of TVA has some comment on 17 that.

18 MR. SANGER:

I appreciate the opportunity to respond 19 to that further.

20 TVA's practice has been that whenever there was a 21 complaint, even if it went to the Department of Labor, TVA 22 would begin its own investigation.

We did that in the Doka l

23 matter, for example.

The Department of Labor went a certain 24 way in investigating that, threw the claim out as being time 25 barred, filed too late. TVA nevertheless continued with that

\\

e 74 1

investigation and made its own determination, and Steve White 2

then took action against the person involved in the 3

retaliation.

4 Now, with the Smith, Getty and Sauer matters, I 5

think because of the problem that Steve identified as those 6

people being somewhat suspect of line management, they have 7

not been Willing to talk with TVA once their complaint was 8

filed. So TVA does not have the capability of doing the same 9

thing in those three cases as we did in the Doka and Thomas 10 case.

11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Why couldn't they be encouraged 12 to go to QTC or the Nuclear Safety Review staff or some other 13 part of TVA where they can get a feeling of confidence and 14 thereby provide management with enough so they can do the job 15 that they feel needs to be done?

16 MR. SANGER:

I guess all of that is theoretically 17 possible. There are a lot of time limits involved here.

Labor 18 issues -- they have a 30-day period, and then TVA gets what 19 is, in effect, is a one-line decision from Labor that says you 20 did it or you didn't do it.

Then TVA has five days in which 21 it either has to accept it and move with it or ask for a 22 hearing.

You know, in the most perfect of worlds, we would 23 have all that information.

We have not had it, and we 24 were searching.

If those are ways of getting the same kind of 25 information that Steve wants out of a hearing, certainly I

t 75 1

think that would be satisfactory, whatever way we can get the 2

information.

3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

I certainly would encourage 4

seeking other ways of getting the information because a 5

hearing could take a while, and meanwhile these people don't 6

know where they stand, and I'm not sure you are getting the 7

message across that you want to get.

8 MR. SANGERt I might indicate that in the one 9

hearing TVA just had, and Commissioner Asselstine, the DeFord 10 case, I think I would like to point out that Mr. DeFord 11 himself has pointed out that the problem was with the line 12 management.

In the hearing he felt that that was handled by 13 TVA in a fair way.

14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

I appreciate that, Herb, 15 but at the same time, I think the perception has to.be, and 16 particularly your role and the role of your office as the 17 defender of the Agency's position had to be that throughout 18 the DeFord matter, here was TVA marching right down this line, 19 fighting every step of the way, fighting the Labor staff's 20 findings, fighting the adninistrative law judge's 21 determination, fighting the Secretary of Labor's 22 determination, fighting all the way through the Sixth 23 Circuit.

I think you have got to get out of that mode.

24 MR. SANGER:

It is always a management judgment as 25 to whether an appeal or a hearing is taken.

It is not the

P 76 1

lawyer's judgment.

2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

That is true, although 3

when I look at a page from the February 5, 1981 Nucleonics 4

Week, you are the one that got stuck with having to make the 5

argument.

6 MR. SANGER:

Oh, yes.

7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE I mean here you were 8

quoted as saying, well, it is the TVA's judgment that there 9

wasn't any intimation and harassment herer this was a 10 necessary management action to take away this guy's staff and 11 to take away his office and to take away his phone and to put 12 him in a room with a desk all by himself.

You get stuck with 13 that label, and I think it is something that you and the Board 14 and Steve, you need to think about in terms of the message 15 that you are sending.

There have to be alternative ways, ways 16 that provide both the incentive for employees to come forward 17 and the assurance that they are going to be protected if they 18 do.

19 MR. SANGER:

I think you correctly point out that it 20 is one of the difficult problems.

We have struggled with this 21 immensely.

The Board has supported it. They have supported me 22 in those investigations.

We have done those fairly.

It la an 23 enormous perception problem. I couldn't agree with you more.

24 COMMISSIONtR ASSELSTINE:

How many TVA employees 25 have been disciplined or fired as a rosult of the intimidation

77 0

1 and harassment cases, starting with DeFord and moving up to 2

the present time?

3 CMAIRMAN PALLADINot Starting from when, Jim?

4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

With DeFord.

How many in 5

the Deford case, how many employees were disciplined or fired 6

as a result of that case, and how many have been disciplined 7

or fired in other intimidation and harassment cases that you 8

have done so far?

9 MR. SANGERt I think the DeFord case as it relates 10 to nuclear matters -- there have been other intimidation 11 matters on which TVA has acted -- the DeFord case was the 12 first case we had.

I think the report shows that none of 13 those people that were involved in the DeFord matter are with 14 TVA.

I don't,want to imply that it was some TVA action that 15 resulted in that because it wasn't.

16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

They retired or left on 17 their own.

18 MR. SANOER Yes.

19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

We found harassment in the 20 Deka case, and the harassing individual was dismissed.

We 21 found management problems in other cases, and various actions 22 were taken with regard to those managers.

In two Department 23 of Labor investigations -- you see, the action that was 24 proposed of asking for hearing is not done automatically.

In 25 two of those cases that were related to DeFord, and that is

4 i

78 1

Mindel and Blevins, they raised complaints recently that as a l

r i

2 result of their support of DeFord, adverse action was taken i

3 against them.

They came to us.

We had those facts, and they 4

were correct.

5 MR. WHITE:

Let me interrupt you for a second.

What i

6 we are doing is we are talking about history.

I really need i

7 to get on with the presentation.

We have to answer your 1

j 8

question, which is what punishment, and I will tell you.

One 1

i j

9 person for harassment and intimidation we fired; three others 10 for misconduct, two of those being for falsification of 11 records, and the third for racial slurs, and I fired those i

1 12 three, and those are the numbers you want.

So since I have

(

13 been there, we fired four people for those causes.

j l

14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINo I'm not looking at history.

i 15 I'm looking --

l

[

16 MR. WHITE:

Well, we were getting into a lot of i

j 17 history.

18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

I want to make sure of two 19 things: one, that you do explore other ways of getting the 20 information you need, and --

1

]

21 MR. WHITE:

We are doing that.

l l

22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINo And there may be ways of l

l 23 getting it from the employees, and there may be other ways of 1

24 getting it from the Department of Labor.

J 25 The other thing is that between now and the time t

I t

I

\\

I 79 1

1 that your IG is up to speed, you are going to have a number of 2

these cases to look at, and I think you need to look at how l

l 3

they are going to be handled in the interim so that you --

4 MR. WHITE:

We are doing that.

Let me explain.

l 5

CHAIRMAN PALLADINot Well, I'm not quite sure that I 6

understand.

It seems to me that on the cases of intimidation 7

and harassment, that we don't really have the vehicle yet to 8

explore those.

9 MR. WHITE:

No.

The intimidation and harassment 10 cases which are now coming in, either directly to me or the I

11 system, there have been 14 of those.

The IG was not yet 12 staffed up, but I am in very close coordination with him.

Wo 13 are inspecting those, investigating those cases, and I am 14 keeping him apprised, and we have investigated, as I said, a 15 couple, and I have punished four people.

None of them were l

16 safety-related.

They are all management things.

And we have l

17 punished those four people from the new system.

l 18 There has been no bona fide harassment and 1

19 intimidation, and if we come across one, it is now going right 20 to the 20.

l 21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINo:

But he has got a problem l

22 because he is not quite staffed up.

l l

23 MR. WHITE:

Until the and of this month.

In the 24 meantime, I'm not letting any grass grow under my feet.

I I

25 have got to investigate these things, and that is what we ara I

80 i

i doing, Mr. Chairman.

t 2

COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

Can I just cut through the 3

junk here for a minute on a question, the question of getting t

4 information?

I think Commissioner Asselstine uttered four 1

5 letters that we often use around here.

They are FOIA.

It l

\\

6 strikes me as bizarre that one Federal agency has to resort et 7

FOIA to get information.

It does seem like you can get that 8

information from the Department of Labor.

I don't know in I

9 cases like this whether it might also help to have a 10 memorandum of understanding like we do.

I don't know.

But it

(

11 is clear that you can get some information.

There is a pretty 12 simple mechanism to get it.

I think that is a point that 13 should not be lost.

L 14 MR. WHITE:

And it's a very valid point, 15 Mr. Bernthal.

That is what I'm trying to do, as I say, find I

16 new ground.

I want to meet with those people.

Two meetings 17 so far, and I haven't gotten the information, and I'm meeting 18 with them again this week.

I hope we will be able to develop 19 something.

20 COMMIS8IONER BERNTHAL But that is for the DCL 21 record now, and that may assist you in resolving this question l

22 of need to go to hearing and whatnot that the Chairman brought 23 up.

I 24 MR. WHITE:

In the future it may. I will wait and 25 see.

That's all I can say.

[

t

t 81 1

CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

I want to get one other thing 2

on the record and then we will go on.

I don't know if the 3

staff has made you aware of the fact that I have asked our 4

office of Investigation and our staff to develop a plan for 5

our identifying safety issues associated with the intimidation 6

and harassment allegations, and the plan calls generally for 7

review of each allegation and concern by a multidiscipline 8

team of NRC headquarters personnel and a determination of 9

whether the allegation or concern, if substantiated, would 10 have a significant health and safety isnue.

11 You will probably get brought up to date more on 12 this with the staff, but I thought you ought to know it.

13 Why don't we go on to quality assurance.

14 MR. WHITE:

Quality assurance.

Speeding right along 15 with QA.

16 I am now going to discuss QA and then engineering, 17 two other areas where we have found significant problems.

18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINot Let me ask the Commissioners if 19 they have any problem going to 12:15, and then I will ask 20 going to 12:30.

21 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

Fine.

Let's go.

22 COMMIDGIONER ASSELSTINE:

As long an it takes.

23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINot We will go to at least 12:30.

24 (Slide.)

25 HR. WHITE This slide is pretty self-explanatory.

82 1

Briefly, QA simply was not getting the attention from 2

management that QA deserved.

In that third bullet where I say 3

it was dispersed, can you believe that there were 52 units 4

reporting to five headquarters groups in this area, 52 units 5

to five headquarters groups, and that included construction, 6

engineering, operations, purchasing and QA.

7 Now, when I talk about unresolved issues in the 8

fourth bullet there, let me give you some examples of what 9

I mean, in a kind of mundane way, perhaps.

When I first 10 reported in, in my first discussion with the manager of my 11 engineering and the manager of my construction organization, 12 it came out that they had had negotiations going on between 13 them for two years, and the negotiations were on an issue 14 about cable sidewall pressure.

15 For two years they had been negotiating that.

I 16 said For goodness sakes, why didn't you bump it up the line?

17 They said We did.

I said What happened?

They said No 18 decision was made, it came back down, and we are still 19 negotiating.

The negotiations stopped that day.

20 But that wasn't the worst one.

We had a case whero 21 for over five years, those two offices had been in 22 negotiations as to whether or not to inspect structural fillot 23 weld fitups with the welder and outside inspector.

I 24 said What have you been doing?

They said: Well, we're 25 negotiating.

One guy said I don't want to do this, I don't

i 83 i

1 like his technical reasons.

After that day, or a few days 2

afterwards, actually, we quit negotiations.

We are going to 3

inspect those with an outside QA inspector.

i 4

so when I say that things were unresolved and not f

5 getting escalated, I am really saying they weren't escalated t

6 or decisions weren't made when they were escalated.

7 (Slide.]

i 8

MR. WHITE:

One of the things we have done is we l

9 have put two good people and you have met one of them this 10 morning -- we put two good people at the top of that i

11 organization.

One of them is the Director.

As I mentioned, I 12 have hands-on control.

My sources tell me that the word is

{

13 getting out into the organization that White really believes 14 in QA.

I j

standardization; would you believe we had five QA I

15 l

16 managers?

We are working down so that we can have one QA 17 manager.

t 18 I earlier mentioned the 52 units scattered among the l

l 19 five offices.

They now are in the process, not yet completed 20 but almost, where they will have one home.

Those people have i

i 21 the message, you are going to work; you are going to work.

I 22 The last bullet, the establishment of the l

23 improvement concept -- once this thing is in place and i

t i

24 operating, "this thing" being the QA organization, then I want 25 QA to be a management tool for the line organization.

I i

}

04 t

i 1

expect them to use it as a management tool.

I intend to hold 2

line management accountable for quality.

That's where it l

3 belongs, and that's what I intend to do.

4 The most significant thing on this slide perhaps, 5

and not really written there, but if you read between the 6

lines, I have removed line influence from QA.

There is no t

7 more Mr. Nice Guy.

Line influence is removed from QA.

F 8

Quality is coming first, not schedule.

That's the most 9

significant thing.

I 10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINot But the line needs to know l

11 that they have to provide the quality in their operation.

12 MR. WHITE:

That's right.

I hold them accountable, 13 but they will not influence the QA guy.

The trap you have to l

14 stay out of is the line manager has to build something on a i

i 15 certain schedule at a certain cost, so you always have the i

16 pressure in any organization of wait a minute, with a QA i

17 person, so I want him entirely separate.

The QA person has

[

18 got to look after quality only and not be worried about the 19 schedule and be pressured.

20 COMMISSICHER 2ECHI That is very significant; 21 very significant.

l l

22 MR. WHITE:

That's a very significant change in the 23 organization.

24 COMMIS8IONER ZECH:

Yes; it is, and that's t

25 important.

i l

t 85 e

1 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

But also the people doing the I

2 work need to know that they have to install or provide the 3

quality.

The other people can check it and assure it, but l

4 they alone can provide it.

j 5

(Slide.)

l 6

MR. WHITE:

We move on to engineering.

As I said, I

i l

7 just as QA, we had problems there.

Engineering was being done l

1 I

a everywhere, literally.

on some of the sites, we had five i

9 engineering organizations.

The Office of Construction had i

^

10 their own. engineering organisation.

To compound that i

l 11 situation, in the case where for example you had five I

j 12 different QA organisations on one site, the relationships i

13 weren't clearly defined.

t 14 The managers, as I have mentioned earlier, were also l

15 I think seriously distracted by their non-nuclear 16 responsibilities, and I have mentioned the trucks and the 17 dams.

I guess I could mention the fish ladders.

Would you l

I 18 believe -- I assume you all know what a fish ladder is, so you

{

19 can get past the dam?

I'm responsible for fish ladder 1

20 design.

Well, somebody else can worry about fish ladders.

1 j

21 There were many cases in this multiple organisation j

22 where the procedures being used by the site, were different l

23 procedures being used other places or at the technical 24 headquarters.

The site directors were allowed by the 25 procedures to contract out for engineering services to i

}

l

?

86 e

1 requirements which were different than the requirements in the 2

technical organization.

3 By streamlining this thing, as I showed you on the 4

earlier grid, we get rid of those kind of problems.

I have a 5

centralized strong technical organization.

6 Let me briefly mention before we get off that chart, 7

plant modifications.

It is unclear to me at the sites that 8

the modification packages were being properly reviewed for 9

safety implications, because the people there perhaps didn't 10 have the right information.

That simple little line means 11 that at Sequoyah, we have to go back and review every single 12 modification package for licensing for safety implications 13 because of the concern that perhaps the people didn't have the 14 right information.

15 (Slide.)

16 MR. WHITE:

What are we going to do about it?

17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

How long is that going to 18 take?

19 MR. WHITE:

I wish I could tell you.

We are wo.xing 20 on it.

21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

To what extent are there 22 also those kinds of concerns about modifications in the 23 construction work itself, once the package has left 24 Engineering's hands?

If they weren't doing the job on plant 25 modifications after licensing, what assurance do you have that

87 e

1 they were doing the job when the plant was being built to 2

start with, particularly when you have the same allegations 3

about Watts Bar?

4 MR. WHITE:

Well, that's the key point to what you 5

say.

We are reviewing the issue of Watts Bar in that area to 6

see which ones are generic to Sequoyah and we will resolve 7

those.

That is a very key point; a very key point.

By doing 8

that and the mod's, we ought to be able to look at it very 9

clearly.

I 10 What we are doing about it is that where engineering 11 was dono everywhere before, a single organization technically 12 responsible, and we are working to have that done under a 13 single standard and a single group of procedures.

At the 14 sites where we had as many as five offices, we are going to 15 have one single engineering manager instead of those five.

16 On the third one, I have talked about it.

Pretty 17 soon I won't have to worry about the Okefenokee Dam and the 18 fish ladders and so forth.

19 Finally, we are going to be talking about the fourth 20 bullet because it flies to Sequoyah also.

Just as we have to 21 review the modifications from a safety implication standpoint, 22 because of these problems, we are going to have to go back and 23 review each of those for as-built, including required 24 documentation.

We are having to go back and do a lot of 25 things to make it right.

?

88 e

1 The last bullet says once this thing is fixed, we 2

never want to get back into this swamp again.

3 Don't put up the closing remarks yet.

Find the 4

Sequoyah slide.

5 (Slide.)

6 MR. WHITE:

You brought up a question about Sequoyah 7

a moment ago, so let me address it now, before I conclude.

8 I cannot yet give you a schedule for the start-up of 9

Sequoyah.

My estimate is that in about three months, I should 10 be able to give you such a schedule.

The reason is we are 11 going to do this thing right.

We are going to do it right 12 because as far as I'm concerned, we are setting a standard for 13 TVA to follow.

I will not allow myself frankly to be 14 pressured into anything until I'm satisfied that standard is 15 right, because it is a standard we are going t'o continue to 16 follow.

17 On EQ, environmental qualification, you gentlemen 18 know that was the initial reason we shut down Sequoyah.

Your 19 staff has seen a lot of dates many times as to when that was 20 going to be completed.

Unless I'm mistaken, I think the 21 current date would have had it completed about now.

You see I 22 have a June date up there.

The reason is on environmental 23 qualification, we are going to meet the standard and set the 24 standard I'm talking about.

I want that to be squeaky clean.

25 I'm going to make sure it is and we are taking more time to do

89 1

that.

?

2 The next few items, electrical welding and the main l

3 steam vault, the temperature which you hear referred to as l

4 a super heat problem, there are uncertainties with those three i

5 issues.

My best judgment is we will be doing very well if we j

6 can complete those in the same timeframe as environmental 7

qualification.

I'm concerned on those three areas.

j 8

The last two, design configuration control and i

9 employee concerns at Sequoyah and elsewhere, are my biggest 1

i

(

10 concerns, and particularly employee concerns, because I don't i

i 11 know if or when or which employee concern is golng to come up i

12 and bite me, or I don't know which one from Watts Bar may 13 transfer to Seq" yah and bite me.

i 14 I guess I would just conclude by saying that my I

15 experience also tells me that whatever the critical. path is 16 going to be, it's probably not even on the slide yet.

f 17 Murphy's Law.

1 j

18 Let me shift a little bit before I conclude and tell i

i 19 you that a couple of Sundays ago, I was at Sequoyah.

Despite I

k 20 these problems, despite what the workers are facing and the r

j 21 long shutdown behind them, their spirit was good.

As I walked I

22 around and talked to those people, not that some of them i

f

]

23 didn't give me some problems, because they did, but their j

24 spirit was good.

It is almost as if they see a light at least i

25 at the end of the tunnel.

I want to make very clear that I'm i

90 1

getting excellent support from the nuclear power people, and 2

not only at Sequoyah.

The rank and file people at TVA are 3

good people, and all the signs so far are they are fully 4

supporting the efforts.

)

5 Equally, from the management.

I can give you a lot 6

of stories that would tell you why I feel this way, but let me 7

tell you, the management within nuclear power is in fact very 8

much supporting what we are doing.

9 How about going to the conclusion and closing 10 remarks.

11 (Slide.)

12 MR. WHITE:

You know, I've talked way too long and I 13 realize that.

We have been very busy for the first two 14 months.

There has been a lot going on.

By the way, what I 15 have given you are only kind of the high spots.

They are a i

16 lot of other things that are going on.

I've given you kind of 17 the high spots, the prominent things.

18 clearly we have made, I think, very dramatic changes 1

19 in organization management and how we are going to control i

20 that.

I would just say I have as frank as I know how and 21 openly discussed with you the major problems we face.

It is 22 going to take time to fix those.

The job is big but it is 23 doable.

I think I am getting the people on board who can aid 24 me in doing it.

That's what that last bullet really says; 25 it's doable.

91 1

I thank you for allowing me to run over 2

considerably.

3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Thank you very much, 4

Mr. White.

I must say that was an impressive presentation.

5 It doesn't mean that all the problems are solved.

I think the 6

most impressive part of it was your forthrightness, your 7

objectivity with which you are approaching problems and your 8

sincerity in making sure they get resolved properly.

That 9

doesn't mean you don't have a lot of things still to do.

You 10 have many, many things to do.

It seems as though you are 11 addressing the issues.

12 Now I know all of us have a number of questions.

I 13 am going to limit myself to two for the moment and then see 14 what my colleagues have.

15 The one question that I want to start with is the 16 one that Commissioner Bernthal brought up, and that is how can 17 we be assured that the present TVA reorganization will lead to 18 permanent solution of the TVA management problems?

19 I know Mr. White pointed out some things he was 20 doing.

I think this is an issue that we probably ought to 21 hear more from the Board on, as well as input from Mr. White.

22 Maybe today isn't the right time, but I think it is one 23 concern we all share, that when Mr. White gets all these 24 things in line, it will be about two years maybe coming to an 25 end, and he and his people may leave and it is not clear to me L

92 1

that we see a plan for follow through after that.

I think 2

maybe that is something we might pick up at a later time.

It 3

is one in which we have a great concern.

4 MR. DEAN:

Let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the 5

Board shares your concern.

We don't want to get everything 6

running real good and then have it drop off the end of the 7

cliff.

We have the programs that Mr. White mentioned to bring -

8 up people into these various jobs, but we also recognize that 9

just bringing people up in these jobs does not mean that we 10 can retain them.

We have to consider this problem, and let me 11 assure you, we are giving that a lot of thought.

12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Well, I think somewhere along 13 the line, when you think you are ready, we would like to have 14 a presentation or a submittal on what your plan of action is 15 to assure this more effective management would continue.

16 MR. WATERS:

Mr. Chairman, let me just speak very 17 briefly to that.

I know this Commission r4nd many others have 18 been concerned that the Board was not involved in the nuclear 19 problem at TVA as much as it should.

Let me tell you that 20 personally I've got the signal.

I've got it pretty clear.

21 We have a saying down home sometimes that when you 22 are trying to get a mule's attention, you hit him with a two 23 by four.

You folks can put away the two by four.

I've got 24 the message.

I know that as a Board member, I have to stay 25 daily involved in TVA's nuclear problems.

I have to visit the

)

93 1

plants.

I have to stay informed.

I have to work with this 2

Commission and the staff.

I have to work with INPO, with 3

other plants.

My nuclear education is fairly new, and I still 4

certainly have a lot to learn.

5 From a Board member's standpoint, I can assure you 6

that I'm going to keep up on the nuclear problem and give it 7

the attention.

I'm absolutely convinced this is a commitment 8

that the Chairman and I both' share.

We intend to not shirk 9

that duty so that hopefully we won't lose the benefits we are 10 doing now in the future, and that it can be passed on.

11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

What I am getting at is we are 12 going to want to see a specific plan, not today, not next 13 week.

14 MR. WATERS:

We will be happy to.

15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

In the relatively near future.

16 MR. WHITE:

Mr. Chairman, let me just inject in 17 here.

I am not really sure I understand what you mean by 18 plan.

To do this, we are going to have to continue what we 19 are doing, and that is to get good people.in.

20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

That's right.

21 MR. WHITE:

I'm not sure if you asked me to show you 22 what we would normally call a plan, that I tell you much more 23 than I am going to continue trying to get the right people in 24 those jobs.

I don't want to work for two years to fix this 25 thing and then leave and have the tide wash the footprints in

l 94 1

the sand away, so I intend to keep after that.

But in terms 2

of a plan, I don't know what I could tell you other than that.

t 3

' CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

I would like to have whatever 4

you come up with.

See, you already identified pieces of the 5

plan, such as putting two people here so they can compete, l

6 three people there.

Is that a pervasive concept that the 7

Board accepts?

Who will they replace you with?

I don't mean 8

by name.

What efforts are being made or how will they achieve 9

whatever their objectives are.

Even setting for the 10 objectives, I think, would be important.

11 MR. WATERS:

We are giving that attention, let me 12 assure you of that, Mr. Chairman.

)

13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

Let me piggyback on that 1

i 14 just a little bit and ask a question that I'm sure you have 15 dealt with many times over the last several months and this 16 Commission has dealt with, perhaps not as firmly in assisting 17 you as we could have and should have.

1 18 You can demur, I suppose, and not answer if you wish 19 not to, but can I ask straight out: Mr. White, you have worked 20 in the private sector now for some period of time, and you I

21 have spent a rather hectic last several weeks trying to 22 recruit in the private sector. In your judgment, is it going f

23 to be possible to retain this organizational structure and the

{

24 people you are bringing in for the kind of salaries that are 25 being paid today within the TVA system in the nuclear program 7 i

l 95 1

Now, I don't want to worry about the whole TVA 2

system.

I want to talk about the nuclear program and the t

3 management that you are having to hire today.

Is it going to 4

be possible for TVA to compete in this business with this kind 4

5 of salary structure?

6 MR. WHITE:

FIrst of all, the management that I'm 1

7 bringing in today are a different type of management than 8

would be needed on a long-term basis.

You understand that to 9

bring it back up, I need that quality.

I am very concerned, i

10 although I will let the Beard speak to it.

There are several 11 plans which they have put effect already, but you are 12 referencing one, the salary plans.

They have put in some i

)

13 plans that have allowed me -- and it has been kind of a l

i 14 critical factor in some of the people we have brought in so 15 far, and those are not at the upper levels.

They are kind at i

16 the middle level.

But the Board has already done some of 17 that.

i 1

18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

I think that is part of the 19 plan that --

I 20 MR. DEAN:

That we will submit, yes, sir.

21 MR. WHITE:

I don't know yet if that will be 22 sufficient.

i l

23 MR. DEAN:

Of course, Mr. Bernthal certainly knows 24 that we have been to Congress many times and discussed this 25 problem, and we have promises of support and help, and we will

_ -. _ _ _. _ - _ _.. _,.. ~,,. _ _ _, _. _. - -. _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ - - _ _,. _ _.. _ _,. - -., _ _.

l s

96 1

see.

2 MR. WATERS:

When we earn the right to convince the 3

Congress and the public that we are ready for that, I feel 4

sure that we will get that kind of action.

I am that much of t

5 an optimist, maybe, but I think we will.

This is part of the 6

credibility we have to earn, not only here but with the 7

Congress.

8 MR. WHITE:

Part of the answer to that may be,'if 9

you look at my previous incarnation, you know the Navy found 10 that not only in nuclear power but certain other very 11 technical and difficult to keep skills, both with officers and 12 enlisted, as you know, they paid specific people, not 13 everyone, but specific people various methods of bonus and i

14 incentive pay.

The answer may lie in that. It is just too 15 early for me to form that judgment right now.

I 16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Let me ask my second question.

1 17 The NRC has prepared its draft TVA Task Action Plan, and the I

18 plan identifies issues, it identifies the responsible 19 personnel in N C, and has some tentative schedules.

So that i

20 the NRC can make the resources available which are necessary 21 to complete the TVA review, the TVA plan is needed, and I was 22 wondering if you could give us an idea when the TVA will 23 provide the plan so that the NRC schedules and i

24 responsibilities can be meshed in with your schedule.

25 MR. WHITE:

Mr. Chairman, I cannot do that yet.

I i

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i 97 r

i 1

know you do not intend that to be in any means a pressure, but 2

the --

3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

No, I was asking when.

4 MR. WHITE:

And I just don't know yet.

5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

When do you think you might 6

know?

7 MR. WHITE:

When I do know, then we will submit it, 8

and it may be, obviously, piecemeal that this occurs. I think 9

our communications, certainly mine with the Commissioners, I 10 think, is good, and also with the key members of your staff, j

and if I see the light at the end of the tunnel, let me tell 11 I

t

]

12 you, I will be pleased, for example, to call Mr. Stallo and 13 tell him.

So as soon as we can is, unfortunately, the best 14 answer I can give you.

15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Now I am going to turn to other

}

16 Commissioners for questions.

I am going to suggest one or two 4

17 from each person.

I do want to at least by 12:20 to talk i

about the next meeting and when it should be held.

18 19 Commissioner Roberts.

j 20 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:

To go to your organization 21 chart, the color-coded one, if I can ccunt properly, below or 22 including your position, Mr. White, you have got 24 positions 23 here and eight are contractors or consultants.

They are not 24 on the TVA payroll directly.

They don't get a U.S. Government 25 check.

.-~.---+,e

,-.w.._en._m

,_y.,

98 1

I 1

MR. WHITE:

That's correct.

j 2

COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:

Has the legality or the 3

permissibility for this scheme been thoroughly confirmed?

4 MR. WHITE:

I will let the lawyers talk about it in 5

a minute, but from my perspective, the contracts under which 6

we entered into this were reviewed by well over a dozen 7

lawyers. They were reviewed by Stone & Webster, and I don't j

8 know how many lawyers there.

They were reviewed by the top 9

TVA lawyers and they were reviewed by a legal firm that i

+

10 specializes in this kind of thing. So any time you can get 11 more than a dozen lawyers to agree on anything, let me tell 12 you, I feel pretty confident.

[

13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

I was about to say that one l

14 thing you learn in this business is that a dozen lawyers is 15 worse than a half-dozen.

]

16 (Laughter.]

I 17 MR. WATERS:

I can give you the viewpoint of a very i

18 fine lawyer, myself.

19 (Laughter.)

20 MR. WATERS:

It is perfectly legal, Mr. Roberts.

t 21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Did you want the general 22 counsel to respond?

3 23 MR. WHITE:

I don't know if he has anything to i

24 add.

25 MR. SANGER:

We have looked at this very carefully, G

l

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l 99 1

of course, and what we are doing here is contracting for work, 2

and we have express authority under Section 9(b) of the TVA 3

Act to do that.

While this is an unprecedented kind of thing 4

in terms of placing people in line management positions, TVA 5

has always had these kinds of contracts.

I don't have any 6

doubt about their legality, and I have so assured the Board l

7 and did so before we entered into this arrangement.

i 8

CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Jim, do you want to ask one or 9

two and then give the others a chance?

i 10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Let me start with a couple 11 on quality assurance.

Do you have a plan for when you think i

12 you are going to be able to respond to the 50.54(f) letter on 13 quality assurance, particularly as it relates to Watts Bar?

(

14 MR. WHITE:

The so-called Appendix B letter?

15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

That's right.

i 16 MR. WHITE:

Let me start out by saying that I have l

17 kind of swept the problems up several times and thought I had l

i 18 my arms around them when suddenly something else squirted out i

19 over here, the most recent being concrete at Watts Bar, which 20 we now have that under active review.

21 Within the next two weeks, I think I will be in a i

22 position to answer the Appendix B letter.

i 23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

One of the things I did 24 since we last met was to go back and reread some of the NSRS 25 reports, and when I look in particular at one from March of f

--m.

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100 j

1 1982, one of the conclusions was that the programs of greatest 2

concern at Watts Bar -- the quality assurance program, quality i

1 assurance interdivisional audits, interface controls, design 3

l 4

process controls, training engineers and quality control 5

inspectors, and the quality control program -- the reviews 6

indicated that major deficiencies were present in these areas 7

of sufficient magnitude that management could not have 8

reasonable assurance that activities had been accomplished 1

9 according to the regulations and commitments.

10 Have you looked enough at the situation to reach a j

11 conclusion whether NSRS was right?

i 12 MR. WHITE:

I would have to, very frankly, review

(

13 the specific letter you are referring to.

Ntisfouryears 14 old.

I would be happy to respond after I have had a chance to 15 review the specifics, i

16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

That would be useful to 17 know.

I guess more in general terms, given what you know and 18 what you described earlier about the quality assurance i

19 problems and the root causes of them, can you say with any 20 degree of confidence at the present time that, say, starting 21 with the Browns Ferry fire in 1975 and running right up till i

22 the present time, that you can see a point in time where TVA 23 had a sound quality assurance program, an independent and 24 capable QA organization, and that those two things were l

25 working so that you had, in effect, an implementation of an

101 1

effective QA program?

2 MR. WHITE:

I couldn't possibly answer that question 3

because I have not gone back.

To answre that question 4

honestly and frankly, I would have to go back and review the 5

whole series of events, which frankly would take some time.

I 1

6 want to emphasize that what I have done is I have kind of 7

drawn a line and said this is the way it's going to be, QA 8

included, and have not gone back in employee concerns or QA to 9

try to figure out what were the causes of the fire in '75 or 10 the partial scram in '80, other than very superficial.

11 I know personnel error caused one of them.

But I have not 12 gone back and I would not intend to go back and try to review 13 15 years of history.

14 My job is to fix what is there now, and that is what 15 I am devoting my attention and time to.

16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

It does seem to me, 17 though, and the way I asked the question was really on the 18 positive side, given all of the problems and everything that 19 has gone wrong over 15 years of this program, can you really 20 say with any assurance that, by golly, I have got the 21 information in hand now to say that there was at least some 22 point in time where this was all working?

I can't see it.

23 MR. WHITE:

I would have to go back and look. All I 24 can say to you is the QA organization on January 13, 1986 was 25 not to my satisfaction.

I'm not in a position to say that I i

i

i 102 1

have gone back and can say in 1980 it was or wasn't.

I am 2

just unable to do that.

3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Now, I take it at least 4

the answer to the 50.54 (f) letter will give us the span for 5

Watts Bar.

6 MR. WHITE:

Yes, the ten issues, obviously.

I 7

COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

A quick question on 8

Sequoyah.

The last Vu-graph, your closing remarks, you 9

mentioned and specifically highlighted that Volume II was 10 submitted and being reviewed.

Does that mean that Volume Two 11 reflects basically what you think is a sound approach for 12 Segoyah, schedules apart, but the key elements are all in 13 Volume Two so that we can start?

14 MR. WHITE:

No, no, no.

Volume Two is under your 15 review right now, and I think you will recall that when I 16 first took over, I said you already had the nuclear 17 performance plan and you already had Volume Two on Sequoyah, 18 and understand when I came into the organization, I did not 19 have everything come te a standstill.

I didn't say stop 20 everything while I find out what is going on and fix it. I 21 said keep doing what you are doing, and as I find things, I 22 will tell you to change course.

23 That is the method I have been operating under, 24 including, obviously -- I wrote you a letter at one point in 25 time on the performance plan and said that isn't the one we

103

~

1 are following, we are going to follow a different l

2 one. Sequoyah is kind of the same thing.

We are continuing to i

3 review it, but if your question is will there be changes to 4

it, yes.

Yes.

And that is being worked on now.

5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

So in the next few months, 6

you think you will get to the point where you will be able to q

say something fairly specific about Sequoyah, but right now, 7

i 4

8 it's just this is in place and we are working along those j

l l

9 lines.

i i

j 10 MR. WHITE:

We are working on it now; that's l

l l

11 correct.

i 12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Why don't I stop there for l

j 13 the moment.

i 14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Fred.

j i

15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

Let me toss a couple here i

l 16 and give Commissioner Zech a shot.

One of the' concerns that I I

f l

17 know Jim has referred to more than once, and I don't know I

l 18 whether it is a concern now, but it's a change, and I would 19 like a better illumination, I guess, on that change and how 20 you expect that organization to work.

I'm talking about NSRS.

t 21 My understanding is that they are now placed i

t 22 directly under you as part of the in-line management there.

{

l' f

23 The question for you, Mr. White, I guess is how do you

\\

24 envision, then, that they will function under you?

Will it ba l

25 a similar function except that they report to you?

An I

I

i 104 1

attempt, perhaps, to do as we have talked about here from time l

j 2

to time, having a separate evaluation, investigative body or 3

whatever reporting directly to the person or persons at the 4

top?

Is that going to be as effective -- and maybe I am i

i 5

asking the Board now -- as their reporting directly to the 6

Board?

And especially for the Board, in your judgment should l

7 you or is it possible for you to have your own independent 8

outside group of experts, perhaps outside of TVA entirely, 9

that would review safety issues?

10 There are several questions there.

i 11 MR. DEAN:

We are committed to having a group of i

12 outside experts to serve as a nuclear advisory board, and we l

1 l

j 13 are already in consultation with people like Zach Pate at INPO i

i j

14 and Dennis Wilkerson and others to help us draw the modus j

15 operandi of these people and help us with some candidates for i

l 16 this type of thing.

17 So we will have this group of senior-type people to 18 take an overall look at the program and advise the Board.

We 19 are committed to getting that done and we are working on it.

20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

Let me follow up for a i

21 second, though.

I am aware of some of the individuals that i

i 22 you have looked at there.

Will that body have the kind of 1,

23 detailed technical expertise that NSRS' presumably had and, for f

24 example, our ACRS at the NRC here presumably provides to the 25 Commission, or will we have senior statesmen who take a broad i

s I

I 105 l

1 view of the organization and progress and that sort of thing?

i 2

I am curious.

a 3

MR. DEAN:

They will have access to everything there 1

4 is, commissioner. We are being monitored constantly by INPO, f

5 which is, of course, an industry-created group, which reports 4

l 6

directly to the Board of Directors.

We went down to an INPO 7

exit not long ago, and that is a source, you might call it an 8

independent source of checks.

And, of course, your own people 9

are constantly monitoring our operations. So there are a lot i

j 10 of people keeping an eye on our operations, as well as other i

11 commercial reactors.

l

]

12 MR. WHITE:

Let me just discuss NSRS and discuss a i

i

)

13 couple of the questions you have asked.

Will NSRS have the I

14 same function as before?

Precisely the same function.

Well, 1

j 15 of course not, because the NSRS was responsible for doing i

16 investigations at Watts Bar individually.

The NRC came down l

17 and said, as I've discussed, you ought to do this generically, I

18 in groups, and we agreed.

Once we have gone to that, then the j

19 NSRS are no longer involved, so they will..be different.

l j

j 20 I'm going to be very frank with you.

In the NSRS

[

1 21 organization, I think there is a lot of frustration.

The i

22 frustration, in my opinion, is based on years of resistance to

{

l

{

23 management and listening to them.

I think the result of that I

j 24 is the management of that group is demoralized.

1 25 I have a peculiar situation when I have 11 t

1

106

[

1 1

supervisors at Mr. Smith's level and above, for example; 11 l

2 supervisors.

Guess how many people are supervising?

i l

3 Seventeen.

Each of them says in their complaints -- I want to 4

emphasize they are not investigated yet -- each of thom in 5

their complaints say, I'm not managing all the people I was j

)

6 managing before.

I've got a problem.

I've got a problem when l

7 you have 11 chiefs and 17 Indians, and with the history of I

i i

i S

this group, I've got a big problem.

i

]

9 What have I done?

I've gone outside of TVA to hire l

I j

10 a person with good credentials, with credibility, a person j

11 whose reputation is he reports what he finds, not what I

I j

12 management tells him to report.

That's his reputation.

He's i

{,

13 come in and he's looking at the NSRS for me ta tell me how I 1

l 14 can most effectively use that group in the future.

I want i

15 that group to continue.

I want them to report to me, because

)

16 one of the problems in the past -- I think the concept was 17 flawed, not the people; the concept.

f L

{

j 18 What I saw when I got there was a group coming up l

l l

19 with safety concerns and then reporting to the Board complete l

)

i 20 loggerheads with the line organization.

You look, they were l

1 1

i j

21 coming up with concerns, nothing was being done.

They got

}

t 22 frustrated.

23 They now are reportirg to me in line management and 1

24 now I can get the things done, because line management has to

[

l t

i 25 support that.

That's not been the case in the past.

i i

I 107 i

k 1

COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

It sounds like you are f

j 2

suggesting that it wouldn't be wise, and it may not be, there 3

are many ways to skin a management cat, I guess, that may not 1

4 be wise, but it sounds like you are suggesting that it i

5 wouldn't be wise to now set up an independent outside group l

6 whose primary focus is on technical matters, as I questioned l

l t

7 and maybe suggested earlier.

4

]

8 MR. WHITE:

Well, that's up to the Board, of course, 9

to decide.

Some utilities do this and some don't.

I guess 2

j 10 you are suggesting we should re-look at that.

]

11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

No.

I'm not urging that on i

l i

j 12 you.

I was just curious exactly how you are headed, where you i

13 are going here.

l 14 MR. DEAN:

We expect to know what is going on in our t

15 nuclear program.

We are confident we are going to know what i

16 is going on in our nuclear program.

That's one object of the j

17 separate loop.

I 18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

All right.

Thank you.

19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Commissioner Zech?

20 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

Yes; just a couple of things.

21 First of all, just some comments.

First of all, I 4

t 22 thought it was an excellent presentation.

I think you focused 23 on line management problems and that's exactly where they

)

j 24 are.

That was my impression when I visited the various 25 facilities.

i i

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108 I

1 You've got a significant challenge.

You obviously 2

are aware of that.

You are identifying some problems, 3

employee concerns, quality assurance, documentation and l

4 configuration control; those are real big problems and you j

5 know that.

obviously, you are working on those.

f~

6 I was frankly impressed by your emphasis on the 7

people, because you are absolutely right.

You have to get the 8

people and the qualified people and the right kind of people l

l and then put them in the places where they can get the job 9

i j

10 done, give them the responsibility, the authority and i

11 accountability to hold them to it.

That sounds just exactly

}

12 what you are doing.

As far as I'm concerned, that's the right j

i j

13 thing to do.

i 14 You have come up with some solutions, or you think j

t i

f 15 they are solutions, and you are working with them.

I think i

16 that's appropriate, too.

i 4

i 17 I appreciate the fact that you are not sure where 18 the problems are.

I think you are exactly right.

I think you

{

19 have identified a lot of them.

My perception was the line t

20 management problems they had, it was a gigantic undertaking.

i 21 I appreciate the fact you are not so confident that you have l

22 found all the problems yet.

I would feel the same way if I f

23 were ynu.

You have identified certainly a number of the key I

i 24 problems.

25 I think your emphasis on quality first and safety i

i i

i i

I

109 1

first is exactly right on.

I appreciate the fact that you 2

are not being pressurized by schedule.

That's the right thing 3

to do in my view, too.

You have so many things on your plate b

4 that you simply have to -- we have to give you as others and r

l 5

your Board has to give you time to solve those problems and do l

6 them with the confidence that you need and your Board needs 7

a'nd this commission needs.

I agree that's exactly the right i

8 approach to take.

t 9

I think or hope that you are working towards a state L

10 of excellence at TVA.

I think there is no reason why TVA l

11 shouldn't -- and hopefully with your leadership you can bring j

12 TVA to a state of leadership in the industry.

There is no Il (

13 reason in my view -- the people down there have the capability 14 to do that.

I think they have the desire to do it.

It's just I

(

15 a matter of bringing them together and directing their

.i 16 energies.

They have the talent.

I think they need some t

17 support and coordination.

It looks like you are going in the 18 right direction to me.

19 I think that what I have heard today is j

20 encouraging.

The problems are not solved yet, we know that, i

21 but you are on the right track in my view.

22 Mr. Chairman, you asked about a meeting coming up.

23 If I just may offer a suggestion.

It seems to me that we have 24 heard a fine presentation here today.

I think we have them 25 tentatively scheduled to come back on Monday.

I don't see any J

l i

1

e

--__a w- - - - - - - -

110 1

need for that at all.

I would suggest that we let them go 2

back and get to work and come back to us in several months, 3

when the time seems more appropriate.

I would suggest that 4

would be the right thing to do.

5 CHAIRMAN PALIADINO:

Let me make a few comments 6

about the schedule.

I think there are several things I've 7

learned in talking to various people within the last few days.

8 We have a meeting scheduled tentatively for the 9

17th.

The reason this got scheduled that way was when we In scheduled the meeting we had today, we were hoping to have 11 your volume one at least ahead of time so we could get l

12 acquainted with it, know what it is in and maybe even get some 13 staff comments on it.

14 That didn't materialize.

We said, well, if you are i

15 going to get it out within a day or two after this meeting, 16 maybe a meeting next week would be in order, so that we could 17 understand and raise questions about your volume one.

18 one of the reasons next week was picked was we have 19 three or four hearings coming up where TVA may very well come 20 up.

We thought being brought up to date would be appropriate.

21 However, other information that I've learned, you 22 pointed out in your conversation with me by phone yesterday 4

23 that having a meeting next week would represent a significant 24 delay in trying to get things done that you want to get done.

25 I talked to the staff and asked them, suppose we got the plan

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _. _ _ _.. ~. _ _. _ _ _ _. _ _ _

111 l

l 1

today, how long,it would take them to review it, and give the 1

2 Commission some feedback, and the first cut estimate by Vic k

3 stallo was three weeks.

I don't know if you have any new idea I

4 on that.

j l

1 5

Certainly we want a chance to read it, and want to j

6 make sure we get in-depth questions.

I was going to give a

!l modification to the proposal that commissioner Zach had, that 7

I 8

assuming we get that report today, that we ask for a staff i

9 feedback on that report, maybe about April lat.

I think we f

l i

t 10 have a day in April when we are all going to be here.

Maybe l

t 11 then have TVA come back and interact on the basis of that j

i 12 volume one report.

{

13 MR. WHITE:

I don't know if it is appropriate of me 14 at this point to offer a suggestion.

I t

I 15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Go ahead.

We are trying to i

16 get a resolution of a problem.

17 MR. WHITE:

All right.

I would like frankly, from i

i 18 my perspective, to wait a few months and come back.

I don't i

l

{

19 like to have to, even on the first of April, tie up the talent f

/

20 I

{

21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

I was thinking you were going l

l t

22 to interact with the staff.

}

23 MR. WHITE:

I would even suggest that perhaps if we 24 could have the key members of your staff actually come to i

4 I

I 25 Chattanooga or Knoxville, where the information and the people

)

4

112 1

are available and we can tap an individual person rather than 2

tying the whole group up, if that isn't too much trouble.

I 3

really would prefer that, and get the things resolved quickly 4

and on the spot.

5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

That is certainly acceptable 6

to me.

The thing that seems to me that we need to remember on 7

this side of the table is every meeting like this, whether or a

not it is with the commission or with the staff, it isn't just 9

the day of the meeting.

It's a lot of preparation.

I don't 10 know how many days you and your top people spent in preparing 11 what you gave

.3 here today.

I suspect it's quite a bit of 12 time.

13 I agree with you, Lando.

I think we should let you 14 get on with your work down there.

You are going to have to be 15 somewhat solicitous of us because we have an auditing 16 responsibility.

I would hope that our staff can be 17 accommodating.

If you think the right thing to do is for them 18 to go down to Chattanooga, then I would prefer to have us do 19 that.

20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

My view, I think, is 21 somewhat different.

I think first on the staff level, the 22 staff has to have the opportunity to set up what I suspect 23 will be a whole sories of meetings, to focus both on volume 24 one as well as on the continuing relationship on the plants.

25 I think the kind of interaction that we talked about

- _ _ =

113 1

at the last meeting, the kind of interaction we have seen at 2

least on some issues, identifying the responsible people in 3

TVA's side and the staff doing the same thing, has to 4

continue.

Some of that, maybe we can do down there, but I 5

think some of it is going to have to be done up here as well.

6 I guess I would not want to foraclose the 7

opportunity for the staff to continue with the day by day 8

interactions that they think are necessary to get on top of 9

this situation.

10 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

I think the staff ought to keep 11 working, too, as they are now, but I just don't see any need 12 for another formal presentation next Monday up here by these 13 people.

I think they ought to get back and get to work.

It 14 sounds to me like they have plenty to do.

15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

On that issue, for myself, 16 at least, I still have a whole host of questions.

I think 17 today was a good first step, but I don't think it was much 1

18 more than a first step.

Quite frankly, I think we have

[

19 scratched the surface on a number of issues that still deserve 20 further exploration.

21 If the sense of the Commission is not to hold 22 further meetings for the foreseeable future, I will accepc 23 Mr. White's invitation to come down there and we will explore 24 some of these issues.

1 25 MR. WHITE Very fine.

114 1

CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

As a matter o,f fact, it might 2

help if you articulate ahead of time, so they can address 3

them.

4 MR. WHITE:

If I may say, that would probably be the 5

best way, if the staff comes up with certain questions.

6 Obviously, the communications are good and I would expect to 7

get those.

I didn't mean to propose that the entire staff 8

would come down a once, but rather the specific ones that 9

have a series of questions in an area, then we could get them 10 with the right person or persons.

I would suspect they would 1

11 want to see more than one.

12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

It seems to me maybe we 13 might ask our staff, and we don't need to do it right now, but 14 I suspect they can let us know and I hope we can trust them to 15 tell us what they need to do to make sure they are aware of 16 what is going on down there, whether they have to travel there 17 or you here or something.

18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Let me make a suggestion.

19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

By the way, let me add I 20 like your idea of having another meeting with the staff in a 21 few weeks because I have a lot of questions there, too.

22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

I was going to suggest that we 23 cancel the meeting next week.

l 24 COMMISSIONER ZECH:

I agree.

25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Agreement?

115

~

1 (Chorus of ayes.]

2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

That doesn't mean we are not 3

going to have meetings, but we will cancel the one tentatively 4

scheduled for next Monday, and we ask the staff to think in 5

terms of meeting with the Commission some time around April 6

let or thereabouts, after they have had a chance to look at 7

this, and if it takes more time, then the other date might be d

8 April 17th.

9 You interact with the TVA people as you would 10 normally do and that we delay scheduling another meeting with 11 TVA until at least we hear from the staff on their assessment 12 of the appropriate plans.

13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

I'm sorry.

What was the 14 April 17th date?

That flew right by me.

15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

I said if the staff needs more 16 time, in case they can't meet with us on April 1st, there are 17 a lot f questions here, I said looking at the schedule, the 18 next or 7 spot is April 17th.

Incidentally, there aren't many 19 days 11. April where the commission is here as a whole.

l 20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

For myself, my preference 21 would be to have the staff on the 1st and have TVA back on the 22 17th.

23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Why don't we keep that open?

24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:

I think that's too soon.

25 CHAl 4AN PALLADINO:

Why don't we keep that open?

116 1

We can take the matter up at agenda planning.

For now, we j

2 will agree not to have the meeting next week.

We will be in 3

touch with the staff and later with you on when we will meet.

l 4

MR. DEAN:

Needless to say, Mr. Chairman, it is like i

5 appearing before a congressional committee.

If people want to j

6 submit questions for the record, we are obviously always glad l

7 to work on them.

i i'

8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

I am going to suggest that the 9

Commissioners try to articulate their questions, even in 10 advance of any meeting, to give you a chance to address them 11 and consider them and have a more considered answer.

12 MR. WHITE:

Before you bang the gavel, may I say l

13 that I personally appreciate a couple of things.

One is the i

14 attention that all of you paid to a message we were trying to i

i 15 deliver.

The second is I thank you very much for your i

l 16 patience with me.

I covered a lot of ground and you were very l

17 patient.

{

18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

We thank you, as I said before, 19 for a very impressive presentation.

We did cover a lot of l

l 1

20 ground.

I know we still have a lot more to cover.

We will be 21 in touch with each other on the future issues.

22 Anything more?

I 23 (No response.)

24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

Thank you very much again.

We j

25 stand adjourned.

t

117 1

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m.,

the meeting was adjourned.)

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

3 1

CER'I'iFt2 ATE OF OFF1CIAL REPORTER 2

3 4

5 This is to certify that the attached proceedings 6

before the United States Nuclear Regu l a t ory Ccerve.i s s i on in the 7

matter of-COMMISSION MEETING e

9 Name of proceeding-Briefing by TVA on Status, Plans and Schedules (Public Meeting) 10 11 Docket No.*

12 place: Washington, D. C.

~

13 Date: Tuesday, March 11, 1986 14 15 were heldc as hero t r$ appears and thak this is the original 16 transcript thereof f or* the file of the United States Nuclear 17 Regulatory Commission.

19 (Signature)

_ r,.

g (Typed Name of Reporterblarilynn M.

Nations 20 21 22 s

23 Ann Riley & Associated, Ltd.

24 25 A

3/11/86 SCHEDULING NOTES i

TITLE:

BRIEFING BY TVA ON STATUS, PLANS, AND SCHEDULES SCHEDULED:

9:30 A.M., TUESDAY, I! ARCH 11,1986 (OPEID l

SPEAKERS:

IVA BOARD OF DIRECTORS

- CHARLES fl. DEAN, JR., CHAIRMAN

- JOHN B. WATERS I

I MR. STEVE WHITE i

MANAGER NUCLEAR POWER l

DOCUMENTS:

VIEWGRAPHS DUE 3/10 1

TOPICS:

- HISTORY AND SACKGROUND l

t

- ORGANIZATION AND PEOPLE

- EMPLOYEE CONCERNS i

- CUALITY ASSURANCE

- ENGINEERING

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HISTORY AND BACKGROUND i

ORGANIZATION AND PEOPLi:

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EMPLOYEE CONCERNS QUALITY ASSURANCE i

ENGINEERING i

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1 1

l l

l l

l I

HISTORY l

AND i

i BACKGROUND

4 1

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i

+

r MAJOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES NAMEPLATE CAPACITY IN MEGAWATTS CONSTRUCTION COMMERCIAL NAME UNITS LOCATION (EACH UNIT) START OPERATION TYPE GROWNS FERRY 3 DECATUR,AL 1,152 9-12-66 UNIT 1-1974 BWR (GE)

UNIT 2-1975 l

UNIT 3-1977 SEQUOYAH 2

SODDY-DAISY, TN 1,221 4-1-69 UNIT 1-1980 PWR (W)

UNIT 2-1982 WATTS BAR 2

SPRING CITY, TN 1,270 12-26-72 PWR (W) l BELLEFONTE 2

SCOTTSBORO,AL 1,332 9-18-74 PWR (B&W)

CORPORATE CHATTANOOGA, TN (NUCLEAR) l

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l ENGINEERING KNOXVILLE, TN (NUCLEAR) l CONSTRUCTION KNOXVILLE, TN

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(NUCLEAR) l

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KNOXVILLE O

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FERRY BELLEFONTE 4

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TVA'S NUCLEAR PLANT STATUS 1

I l

e OPERATING PLANTS STATUS DATE REASON FOR SHUTDOWN I

BROWNS FERRY UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN 3/19185 PROBLEMS WITH CONTAIN-MENT ISOLATION VALVES 1,

BROWNS FERRY UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN 9/15184 SCHEDULED REFUELING BROWNS FERRY UNIT 3 SHUTDOWN 3/9/85 REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL DISCREPANCIES i

i i

SEQUOYAH UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN 8/22185 ENVIRONMENTALQUALIFICA-f TlON OF EQUIPMENT DOCU-MENTATION PROBLEMS l

SEQUOYAH UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN 8/21/8 5 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICA-l j

TION OF EQUIPMENT QUAll-FICATION PROBLEMS l

l PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION STATUS OF CONSTRUCTION CURRENT ACTIVITY WATTS BAR UNIT 1 COMPLETE WAITING RESOLU-TION OF EMPLOYEE CONCERNS WATTS BAR UNIT 2 757. COMPLETE WORK IN PROGRESS BELLEFONTE UNIT 1 86T. COMPLETE WORK IN PROGRESS i

BELLEFONTE UNIT 2 55T. COMPLETE WORK IN PROGRESS i

l

NRC CONCERNS NRC JULY 3,1985 LETTER i

i a

AREAS OF CONCERN I

1.

ALLEGATIONS AND TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM

}

- SAFETYISSUES

- ABILITY TO RESOLVE SAFETY QUESTIONS

- EFFECTS OF FEARS OF REPRISAL & INTIMIDATION

~'

l 2.

SALP HISTORY

- SEQUOYAH - PROBLEMS IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, QUALITY ASSURANCE 1

I

- WA1TS BAR - PROBLEMS IN SUPPORT SYSTEMS l

i BELLEFONTE - ONLY SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT l

- BROWNS FERRY - MAJOR WEAKNESSES IN A NUMBER OF AREAS I

l 3.

ENFORCEMENT HISTORY i

- THREE TIMES NATIONAL AVERAGE

$910,625 FINES (CECO $134,000)

- 39?6 OF VIOLATIONS IN MANAGEMENT-RELATED AREAS 4

l

1 i

I i

i

)

NRC CONCERNS (Continued) i 4.

TVA OPERATING EXPERIENCE e

BROWNS FERRY FIRE - 1975 l

i e

BROWNS FERRY PARTIAL SCRAM - 1980 i

i i

e HIGHER SCRAM RATES AT BROWNS FERRY - 1980-1983

)

l I

e HIGHER SCRAM RATES AT SEQUOYAH - 1984 4

e ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTUATIONS SEQUOYAH AND BROWNS FERRY - 1984 J

e ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES TRENDING.UP FOR BROWNS FERRY i

4 i

NRC CONCERNS (Continued) i 5.

MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE & EXPERIENCE i

l e

WEAK IN TOTAL NUCLEAR EXPERIENCE AND ACTUA.L. OPERATING EXPERIENCE

)

l e

EIGHT EXPERIENCED MANAGERS LOST (ASST PLANT SUPERINTENDENT AND ABOVE) IN 6 YEARS 1

e TECHNICAL SUPPORT NOT UNDER LINE MANAGEMENT, UNDER SENIOR VP

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j EFFECT OF RECENT DECENTRALIZATION NOT YET DEMONSTRATED e

1 1

I

}

l l

DIAGNOSIS & CONFIRMATION OF PROBLEM NOVEMBER 1985 e, PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED (SWEC TEAM LEAD BY S. A. WHITE)

- LACK OF EFFECTIVE TOP MANAGEMENT

- LACK OF WORKER CONFIDENCE IN MANAGEMENT

- LACK OF TOTAL COMMITMENT TO QUALITY

- DIFFUSED ORGANIZATION, LINES OF AUTHORITY

(

- LITTLE OR NO CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

- DIFFERENT STANDARDS, REQUIREMENTS, PROCEDURES (ALL SITES)

I

l DIAGNOSIS & CONFIRMATION OF PROBLEM (CONT.)

6 ACTION TAKEN

- DISCUSSED WITH BOARD OF DIRECTORS DECEMBER 1985 S. A. WHITE APPOINTED MANAGER OF ALL

~ JANUARY 3,1986 TVA NUCLEAR MATTERS

- MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING SIGNED S. A. WHITE ASSUMED POSITION OF MANAGER JANUARY 13,1986

- TEAM OF ASSISTANTS ARRIVE-START CORRECTIVE ACTION REVIEW OF ALL EXTERNAL CRITICISMS COMPLETED JANUARY 31,1986 w

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MANAGER J

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POWER I

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l DIRECTOR DIRECTOR OF DIRECTOR SITE OF SAFETY NUCLEAR i

OF NUCLEAR DIRECTOR

& LICENSING ENGINEERING I

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NE SITE PLANT j

SITE SERVICES NUCLEAR SAFETY &

SITE OA MOO 4FICATIONS MANAGER ENGINEERING LICENSlHG j

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PROBLEM l

LACK OF LEADERSHIP AND DIRECTION e

SOLUTION

- GO "OUTSIDE" FOR THESE PEOPLE (CONTRACTOR).

USE THEM ON A TEMPORARY BASIS (TWO YEARS).

CONTINUE SEARCH FOR TALENT WITHIN TVA.

CONTINUE SEARCH OUTSIDE FOR TALENT WILLING TO IllRE IN AS TVA EMPLOYEE.

- CONTRACTOR MANAGERS WILL BE TVA LINE MANAGERS, WITH A PERMANENT TVA " DEPUTY" TO TRAIN.

O G

W

.---,_.e

INTRODUCTION OF TVA MANAGERS l

NAME TITLE EMPLOYER MASON DEPUTY MGR TVA NUCLEAR POWER COTTLE ASSISTANT MGR TVA NUCLEAR POWER KELLY DIR. NUCLEAR SWEC QA DROTLEFF DIR. NUCLEAR SWEC ENG.

GRIDLEY DIR. NUCLEAR GE SAFETY & LICENSING McCULLOUGH DIR. NUCLEAR BECHTEL CONSTRUCTION BIBB SITE DIRECTOR MAC BFN ABERCROMBIE SITE DIRECTOR TVA SQN ROBERTSON DIR. NUCL8AR TVA SERVICES TAYLOR MGR. NUCLEAR TVA PERSONNEL JOilNSON DIR. NUCLEAR TVA l

TRAINING WillTT DIR. NSRS TVA

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REWRITE POSITION DESCRIPTION O DEVELOP POSITION DESCRIPTIONS ESTABLISH ACCOUNTABILITY ELIMINATE RESPONSIBILITY DUPLICATION ASSIGN MISSING FUNCTIONS PROVIDE CENTRALIZED CONTROL DEFINE INTERFACE RESPONSIBILITIES PROVIDE BASIS FOR EMPLOYEE EVALUATION I

l

O IMPROVING MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS l

e REDEFINE ORGANIZATIONAL INTERFACES AND RESPONSIBILITY e

ESTABLISH HIERARCHY OF PROCEDURES TO REFLECT NEW INTERFACES AND RESPONSIBILITY e

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM a

COMMITMENT TRACKING (CCTS) l l

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O IMPROVEMENTS IN TVA*S MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND PROGRAMS INCREASING UPPER MANAGEMENT AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR ACTP/ITIES e

BRIEFINGS FOR THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER 1.

MONTHLY BRIEFINGS 2.

AT LEAST TWICE WEEKLY DIRECT CONTACT WITH BOARD MEMBERS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL BRIEFINGS FOR THE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH LINE MANAGEMEf;T REGlXAR MEETINGS WITH STAFF AND LINE MANAGEMENT I

MULTIPLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- SPECIFIC GROUPS REPORTING TO MANAGER, SUCH AS NSRS. ETC.

1 9

O RECAP e

MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

- RESTRUCTURED ORGANIZATION

- SIGNIFICANT PERSONNEL CHANGES OUTSIDE TALENT l

e WELL DEFINED RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 3

STRONGER MANAGEMENT CdNTROLS e

9 9

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l EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAMS e

WATTS BAR "SPECIAL PROGRAM" e

NEW TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM i

i 1

l i

I

^

WATTS BAR SPECIAL PROGRAM ON EMPLOYEE CONCERNS s

ESTABLISHED APRIL 1985 e

PHASE 1 - IDENTIFICATION OF CONCERNS

- NOW COMPLETE e

PHASE 2 - RESOLUTION OF SUBSTANTIATED PROBLEMS

- GENERIC TREATMENT OF ISSUES TO OTHER SITES

i WATTS BAR SPECIAL PROGRAM

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS TO DATE 4

i i

i l

l INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED 5,876 i

l EMPLOYEES WITH CONCERNS 1,858 l

TOTAL CONCERNS IDENTIFIED 5,159 i

m TOTAL RESOLVED 1,213 i

i s.

1 l

i 1

l

i i

2 NRC CONCERNS ON WATTS BAR SPECIAL PROGRAM e

RESULTS NOT VISIBLE (HARDWARE EFFECTS, NCR'S, REPORTS TO NRC, TRENDS) e NEED FOR IMPROVED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS e

INCONSISTENT TRACKING OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS j

i LACK OF COORDINATION WITHIN TVA e

e NO SYSTEM TO KEEP MANAGEMENT AWARE OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES e

RESPONSES ON CASE-BY-CASE RATHER THAN COMPREHENSIVE o

NEED FOR GROUPING OF ISSUES FOR EFFICIENT INVESTIGATION AND l

CORRECTIVE ACTION i

l e

SOME EARLY CORRECTIVE ACTION PROPOSALS INADEQUATE

)

l l

4

WATTS BAR SPECIAL PROGRAM REMAINING ACTIVITIES OBJECTIVE.

TIMELY RESOLUTION OF IDENTIFIED CONCERNS EMPHASIS ON:

1 e

IDENTIFYING i

- ROOT CAUSE I

APPLICABILITY TO OTHER PLANTS i

APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION e

PROVIDING

- HIGH QUALITY TECHNICAL REVIEWS

- INDEPENDENT OVERVIEW

- FORMAL PROCEDURES

- EFFECTIVE CLOSEOUT REPORTS,

4

WATTS BAR SPECIAL PROGRAM CATEGORIZATION OF CONCERNS AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR REVIEW 1

CONCERN CATEGORY REVIEW ORGANIZATION i

e QClQA STONE & WEBSTER i

e MATERIAL CONTROL TVA STAFF I

e MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL ISSUES TVA STAFF e

ENGINEERING BECHTEL l

e WELDING EG&G AND TVA STAFF h

j e

OPERATIONS TVA STAFF l

e INTIMIDATION, HARASSMENT, AND TVA OFFICE OF THE MISCONDUCT GENERAL COUNSEL l

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF QTC l

e INDUSTRIAL SAFETY TVA STAFF 4

i o

CONSTRUCTION TVA STAFF -

~.

1

1 WATTS BAR~SPECIAL PROGRAM i

OVERVIEW AND RESOLUTION 1

OVERVIEW WILL BE PROVIDED BY:

o A SENIOR REVIEW BOARD MADE UP OF 3 OR 4 INDEPENDENT EXPERTS s

QUALITY ASSURANCE AUDITS BY TVA QA STAFF i

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL e

i l

1 I

.I

1 P

i l

NEW TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM i

l e

IMPLEMENTED FEBRUARY 1,1986 1

I e

LONG TERM l

e APPLICABLE TO ALL TVA NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES e

BASED ON WATTS BAR "SPECIAL PROGRAM" EXPERIENCE e

QTC REVIEW AND ASSISTANCE USED IN PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT 4

I i

4 i

I i

j 4

l I

l NEW TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM t

PROGRAM FUNDAMENTALS l

.i f

EMPLOYEE OBLIGATION TO REPORT PROBLEMS' '

6

}

i i

I SUPERVISOR'S RESPONSIBILITY TO LISTEN AND RESPOND OR, REFER TO l

e OTHER SUPERVISION AND FOLLOWUP i

i i

EARLY IDENTIFICATION AND CORRECTION OF PROBLEMS i

e t

I l

j l

e CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS i

1 j

i i

i l

EMPLOYEE REPORTING PROVISIONS EMPLOYEE CAN INPUT THE SYSTEM AT ANY OF THE FOLLOWING LEVELS i

e IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR OR HIGHER MANAGEMENT j

e DIRECT TO THE EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM (SITE REPRESENTATIVE) e THE INSPECTOR GENERAL e

THE NRC OR OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WITH JURISDICTIONAL

~

AUTHORITY REPORTING MECHANISMS l

e DEDICATED PHONE e

MAIL-IN FORMS l

e WALK-IN INTERVIEWS a

LINE ORGANIZATION REFERRAL o

EXIT INTERVIEWS I

1 4

SITE REPRESENTATIVE I

i e

ASSIGNED TO EACH NUCLEAR SITE AND CORPORATE OFFICES

- REPRESENTATIVES t

e BASIC RESPONSIBILITIES t

- HEAR AND RESPOND TO EMPLOYEE CONCERNS

- REPORT PROBLEMS TO UPPER MANAGEMENT l

- EVALUATE /lNVESTIGATE EMPLOYEE CONCERNS 1

l

- PROVIDE CONFIDENTIALITY WHEN REQUESTED l

i i

L l

9

l TVA INSPECTOR GENERAL

.I i

j i

e REPORTS TO TVA BOARD AND CONGRESS e

RECOMMENDS POLICIES TO PREVENT AND DETECT FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE KEEPS THE TVA BOARD AND CONGRESS INFORM'Eb ON PROBLEMS IN TVA l

e PROGRAMS AND ON CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRESS l

e WILL MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY e

WILL INVESTIGATE NEW EMPLOYEE CONCERNS DETERMINED BY THE i

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER TO INVOLVE INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT 4

1 l

e WHEN APPROPRIATE WILL INVESTIGATE EMPLOYEE CONCERNS RELATED TO l

MISCONDUCT

~..

l

NEW EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM STATUS 1

l 2/1/86 - 3/7/86 l

CONTACTS

  • CONCERNS I

i CHATTANOOGA 39 3

KNOXVILLE 15 5

SEQUOYAH 81 11 BELLEFONTE 72 3

BROWNS FERRY 179 21 WATTS BAR 106 24 l

' TOTALS 492 67 l

  • WALK-INS, PHONE-INS, MAIL-INS, REFERR^LS FROM LINE ORGANIZATION, SCHEDULED INTERVIEWS, EXIT INTERVIEWS, FIELD CONTACTS, INQUIRIES i

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i BASIC QUALITY ASSURANCE PROBLEMS i

t i

e LACK OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE l

i 1

1 REDUNDANT AND INCONSISTENT STANDARDS AND ' PROCEDURES

(

e e

QUALITY ASSURANCE ORGANIZATION DISPERSED AND NOT RECElVING l

l

}

FOCUSED CONTROL AND DIRECTION e

FAILURE TO ESCALATE UNRESOLVED QUALITY ASSURANCE ISSUES - LACK OF LINE MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILlTY i

i

)

1

J 1

4 MAJOR QUALITY ASSURANCE INITIATIVES i

l e

CENTRALIZATION OF QUALITY ASSURANCE MANAGEMENT UNDER ONE DIRECTOR REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER j

e STANDARDIZATION OF THE QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM i

i e

CONSOLIDATION OF THE VARIOUS QUALITY ASSURANCE FUNCTIONS INTO A i

SINGLE ORGANIZATION WITH APPROPRIATE RESOURCES AND AUTHORITY I

j e

ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROPRIATE ESCALATION PROCEDURES FOR j

UNRESOLVED QUALITY ASSURANCE ISSUES i

e ESTABLISHMENT OF QUALITY IMPROVEMENT CONCEPT I

i l

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FUNDAMENTAL PAST ENGINEERING WEAKNESSES-1 I

i e

HEADQUARTERS ENGINEERING DIDN'T ALWAYS ADEQUATELY DIRECT l

AND CONTROL ALL ENGINEERING e

WEAKNESSES EXISTED IN THE CONTROL OF PLANT MODIFICATIONS o

TECHNICAL AUDITING WAS INEFFECTIVE i

1

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i i

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)

CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR ENGINEERING 1

e NEW NUCLEAR ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT IN PLACE l

l e

FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL HEADQUARTERS AND SITE ENGINEERING I

e ELIMINATING ALL NONNUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES

'l I

UNIFORM EXPANDED DESIGN CONTROL PROCEDURES BEING e

IMPLEMENTED e

FULL ENGINEERING ASSURANCE PR'OGRAM BEING IMPLEMENTED j

l 1

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SEQUOYAH MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES i

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION l

e NEARING COMPLETION - ALL WORK INCLUDING DOCUMENTATION SHOULD BE 4

DONE BY JUNE 1986.

l ELECTRICAL SYSTEM REVIEW e

ALL ELECTRICAL CALCULATIONS FOR SYSTEMS RELATED TO SAFE SPUTDOWN OR ACCIDENT MITIGATION REVIEWED. SARGENT & LUNDY PERFORMING INDE-l 1

1 PENDENT REVIEW.

i i

WELDING PROGRAM REVIEW i

I REVIEW COMPLETED. MINOR DOCUMENTATION DISCREPANCIES l

r TO BE RESOLVED.

l i

l 1

MAIN STEAM VALVE VAULT TEMPERATURE l

!l ANALYSIS IN PROGRESS. MODIFICATIONS MAY BE REQUIRED.

l e

f DESIGN AND CONFIGURATION CONTROL l

e REVIEW ALL COMPLETED, PARTIALLY COMPLETED, AND PLANNED MODIFICA-l l

TIONS FOR SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE. STRINGENT CONTROLS ARE BEING SET IN PLACE TO CONTROL FUTURE WORK.

EMPLOYEE CONCERNS AT PRESENT, THERE ARE 63 CONCERNS WHICH REQUIRE RESOLUTION AT SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT.

~

i

1 i

CLOSING REMARKS G

MAJOR ORGANIZATION CHANGES

- RESTRUCTURED ORGANIZATION l

- SIGNIFICANT PERSONNEL CHANGES

~

- USE OF OUTSIDE TALENT l

l 8

GETTING TO ISSUE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

- STRONGER MANAGEMENT CONTROL I

9 MANY ACTIVITIES NOT COVERED

- ONLY KEY POINTS DISCUSSED l

VOLUME I SUBMITTAL TODAY

}

- PLANT SPECIFIC VOLUMES 1

- VOLUME il (SON) SUBMITTED TO NRC AND DEING REVIEWED i

i

- VOLUME fil (BFN) VOLUME IV (WBN)IN PREPARATION i

i G

OPTIMISTIC THAT THE JOB CAN BE DONE l

- IT WILL TAKE TIME, DEDICATION, AND RESOURCES - NOT BE ABLE l

TO CORRECT ALL THE PROBLEMS IMMEDIATELY

- THE TASX IS LARGE, BUT MANAGEABLE.

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