ML20141K249
| ML20141K249 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1986 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8601220379 | |
| Download: ML20141K249 (142) | |
Text
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m g-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of:
COMMISSION MEETING Briefing by GPU on TMI-2 Cleanup and TMI-l Operational Experience (Public Meeting)
Docket No.
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Location: Washington, D. C.
Date: Tuesday, January 14, 1986 Pages:
1 - 90 8601220379 360114 PDR 10CFR PDR PT9.7 I
i ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES Court Reporters 1625 I St., N.W..
x,.
Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 b-
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1 D I SCLA I M EP 2
3 4
5 6
This e5 an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the 7
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on 3
1/14/86 to the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9
N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain 12 inaccuracies.
13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.
Expressions of epinion in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any stafement 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Ccmmission may 21 authorire.
22 23 24 25 l
i
.e 1
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 BRIEFING BY GPU ON TMI-2 CLEANUP 5
AND~TMI-1 OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 6
7 PUBLIC MEETING 8
9 Nuolear Regulatory Commission 10 Room 1130 11 1717 "H"
- Street, N.W.
12 Washington, D.C.
13 14 Tuesday, January 14, 1986 15 16 The Commission met in open session, pursuant to 17 notice, at 10:05 o* clock a.m.,
NUNZIO J.
PALLADINO, Chairman 18 of the Commission, presiding.
19 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
20 NUNZIO J.
PALLADINO, Chairman of the Contai s s i on 21 THOMAS M.
ROBERTS, Member of the Commission 23 JAMES X.
ASSELSTINE, Member of the Commission 23 FREDERICK M.
BERNTHAL, Member of the Commission 24 LANDO W.
- ZECH, JR.,
Member of the Commission 25
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STAFF AND PRESENTEMS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
2 H.
PLAINE l
3 T.
ROTHSCHILD I'
4 W.
KUHNS i
5 P.M.
CLAMK
}
I 6
E.
E.
KINTNER i
7 J.F.
O' LEARY I
6 F.
E.
STANDERFER 1
3 9
H.
HUKILL 10 1-7 11 I
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15 J
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20 4
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22 23 24 25 i
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1 P RO CEED I NG S 2
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Good morning, ladies and 3
gentlemen.
The Commission is meeting today to be briefed by 4
the General Public Utilities Corporation and GPU Nuclear 5
Corporation on the Status of their Three Mile efforts and the 6
damaged TMI-2 nuclear power reactor and on TMI-1 reactor 7
operations.
8 With respect to the clean-up of TMI-2, it is my 9
understanding that GPU will discuss their organization and 10 schedule, react;r defueling and decontamination and project 11 completion criteria.
12 At the completion of the GPU presentation regarding 13 these items a short summary of the status of operations at 14 TMI-1 will be provided.
15 I have been informed that NHC members from Region I 16 are listening to this meeting by telephone.
Before we begin 17 do any of my fellow Commissioners have opening remarks at this 18 time?
19
[No response.2 20 CHA1HMAN PALLADINO:
Then let me turn the meeting 21 over to Mr. Kuhns.
22 MR. KUHNS:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am Bill 23 Kuhns of GPU.
I appreciate the courtesy of the Commission in 24 granting us this opportunity to come in and talk about the 25 status of the cleanup and following that, we of course are
l i
s 4
1 also pleased to provide a summary of the startup operations at 2
TMI-1 as you requested.
l 3
With me are Jack O' Leary, chairman of the board of 4
GPU-Nuclear, Phil Clark, president and chief executive officer 5
of GPU-Nuclear and members of the GFU-Nuclear Staff.
6 Dr. Jim Fletcher, the chairman of our GPU-Nuclear 7
TMI-2 Safety Advisory Board is unable to be here today but he 8
has prepared a statement summarizing the observations of the 9
Safety Advisory Board over the last year and that has been 10 included in the material that we are turnishing you.
11 We last met with you to discuss TM1-2 on November 7,
12 1984.
Since then a number of important milestones have been 13 passed regarding the cleanup.
The reactor vessel plenum has 14 been removed.
15 A complete system for removing damaged fuel debris 16 has been designed, tested and installed over the open reactor 17 vessel.
Defueling operations commenced last October.
18 Throughout this period, considerable progress has 19 been made in obtaining turther understanding of the conditions 20 of the damaged core and in planning an increased effort to 21 decontaminate the TMI-2 buildings and systems.
22 f,
accordance with the financial plan we presented 23 to you in 1984 a total of s122 million was provided for the 24 TMI-2 project in 1983, s124 million is budgeted for 1980.
25 More than the s25 million dollars promised as the first year *s
e 3
1 contribution from private utilities through EEI has been 2
received.
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3 Japanese participation in the cleanup continues as 4
promised with a three million dollar funding annually and a m
5 total of more than 20 engineers, professionals working at 6
TMI-2 and in Idaho National Engineering baboratory.
Funding 7
from the states of Pennsylvania and new Jersey and from the 8
GPU customers throughout the system also continues as planned.
9 We have spent through 1985 a total of 5615 million 10 of the estimated s985 million total cost.
11 There is, however, a potential funding problem 12 today.
The funding plan which we provided you when we last 13 met relied upon total offset funding for work at the Island of 14 583 million dollars from the Federal Government.
15 We have been advised that as of this time that
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16 funding for 1986 will be 55.5 million less than the planned
^
17 lovel of 518 million and we understand that DOE may not 18 provide as much funding in subsequent years as was planned.
19 Heduction in the Federal Government *s funding 20 support concerns us.
It would threaten we believe not only 21 the ability to obtain the maximum possible information from
\\ t work [at 22 the Island but it also threatens the ability to obtain 23 1.ntormation from examination of the damaged core materials i
~
24 themselves.
l 25 Certainly a thorough understanding of the TMI-2 4
[
s 1
, accident scenario and the implications for safety that 2
that understanding would provide are in our-Judgment of great 3
importance to the utility industry and to the NRC.
4 Further, we were concerned that reductions in 5
Government funding could undermine the commitments of others 6
to the cleanup funding plan.
Ettorts are underway to have DOE 7
tunding' restored in accordance with what we believe were tow 8
prior commitments and we are proceeding on the basis that 9
these efforts will be successful 10 When we last met I committed to you the GPU System's 11 full support for completing the cleanup of TMI-2 and for the 12 operation of TMI-1 with full attention and high priority given 13 to public and worker health and safety.
I reattirm those q,
a 14 commitments here today.
15 I would now like to turn the presentation over to 16 Phil C 1'a r k'.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Are you going to come back to 18 this funding,quystion or would you like questions now?
19 MR, KUHNS:
We had not intended to but we would 20 certainly be happy to answer any questions.
We would be happy 21 to do that.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You speak about ettorts being 23 made to restore the DOE funding.
What 11 it isn't restored?
, s 24 What' impact will i{ have on the schedule and what olisetting 25 steps can we take to try to get the important information from f
f s
7 1
this accident?
i 2
ME. KUMNS:
As I have indicated we are concerned 3r chout it.
We think it is a part of the total fabric of the
+
4 Thornburgh funding plan and we are planning that it will be 5
there and are spending for 1986 at the 5124 million dollar 6
level and that assumes that it will be there.
?
It it isn*t there, we certainly recognize our 8
continuing responsibility for the health and safety and the 5
i 9
completion of this cleanup and we can assure you that while 10 fundinD in its totality could certainly atiect the pace of the 11 cleanup, it is not going to affect the health and safety of 12 the public or the workers.
13
,l So it is ditticult at this point to be more specific
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14 than that, Mr. Chairman.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I gather you haven *t looked at 16 what impact it would have on the schedule as yet?
17 MR.
KUMNS:
No, we haven *t.
We are just assuming 18 that we would continue.
The dollars in themselves are not 19 enormous when you look at the total budget of 5124 million.
20*
, The shortfall at least in the calendar year 1986 is not that y
21 great.
It is 55.5 million short of the budgeted amount.
22 We are concerned again about the package of this 23 whole program.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
It may be prudent to look at 25 your contingency plans in the event that the funding doesn*t
8 1
come as you hoped both with regard to the impact on the 2
schedule and whether or not we can recover at least the 3
minimum amount we ought to with regard to information from 4
this cleanup.
5 MR. KUHNS:
Yes, indeed.
I think we can say 6
categorically that it will not affect 1986 progress.
?
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I, for one, would be interested 8
in what the picture looks like beyond that.
9 MM. KUHNS:
Long range, yes, sir.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I appreciate that you may not 11 have it now but it seems to me it would be prudent to do it as 12 contingency planning.
13 MR. KUHNS:
Yes.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I think there is a concern 15 though that the Commission should have beyond the cleanup 16 schedule which is arguably at least our primary concern and 17 that is the impact that these DOE outs are also going to have la on the R&D associated with the o l' e a n u p.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That*s right.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Those cuts come at a time 21 when it is quite clear we are gathering a great deal of 22 information, very important information that may influence, 23 for example, our source term considerations.
1 l
24 My understanding is 11 these cuts go through as l
l 25 planned a lot of that analysis simply won't be carried out and I
e 9
1 we won *t get the benefit of the research that we ought to be 2
getting out of this incident.
3 It is protty clear that by now and at some point I 4
would like to solicit GPU's comments but at least it seems 5
clear based on the briefing that I had at INEL not long ago 6
that by any measure this was a severe accident in the scenario 7
that we like to talk about here at the NMC.
Call it a core 8
melt down if you will.
9 We ought to be learning everything we can about it 10 and for DOE now or the Administration now to cut out the 11 funding for that knowledge is just untimely and I think is 12 unsupportable and I would suggest that the Commission consider 13
' writing a-letter to DOE and/or the Administration pointing 14 that out, Joe.
I think it is most ill-advised for that kind 15 of cut to be taken at this time.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I am already having that looked 17 at as an option.
Meanwhile, I think it would behoove GPU go 18 look at both of these questions, schedule and R&D, to see what 19 options they see 11 DOE tunding were not to come through.
20 COMMISSIONEH BERNTHAL:
The schedular part certainly 21 there is a better case that GPU simply is going to have to 22 find a way to acquire the resources to carry out the cleanup 23 but the R&D question is something that affects the industry 24 at large and affects our mission in the larger sense.
25 There, I think, the Government has a legitimate and
O 4
10 1
important role to play.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Still there are other options 3
in the event that DOE funding doesn't come through.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Were are the other options 5
for funding, Joe, unless you go to EPRI or an industry group.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You just mentioned a few.
I 7
wasn't trying to determine what the options were now.
8 t,OMMI S S I ONER ASSELSTINE:
Why is that outside the 9
realm of possibilities?
10 CHAIRMAN E' ALL ADINO:
That*s right.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I think that lies in the 12 same realm as the "wish."
It is a little more than a wish I 'd right now that we can obtain a significant traction of our 14 research funding by taxing the industry as it were.
I don't 15 object to that.
I think it is a fine idea.
I think we have 16 already learned there are going to be real problems associated 17 with that, Jim.
I agree with the idea but it isn*t going to 18 Le easy.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I wasn't suggesting that it was 20 easy.
I really think it is something that they might look at 21 and I would expect that it could be profitable for them to do 22 it 2 'J MR. CLARX:
We have identified this as DOE tunding.
l 24 I wouldn't want to leave the impression that we think that DOE 23 simply took all the money out.
I think it is an
11 1
Administration decision and we think DOE is looking at whether 2
they can restore some of the funding.
So there is an effort 3
underway to restore the funding.
4 I don't think we would want to leave the impression 5
that it is definitely lost.
6 COMMISSIONEH ASSELSTINE:
Phil, I think your 7
statement make< an excellent point though and that is the B
tabric of the funding program as a package.
Our statt had 9
told us that they thought the impact on the schedule would be 10 minimal from these reductions because of the small amounts of 11 money but I think you make a good point that that is not the 12 whole picture, that this is a package and in many instances 13 the parts are fairly delicately balanced and I think your 14 point is well taken.
15 MR.
KOHNS:
Admittedly, so many of the participants, 16 all of the participants really have had changes occur in their 17 own ability and attitudes.
We have had major utilities while 18 a voluntary portion of the utility program, 525 million, has 19 gone up, we have some major participants in that program who 20 are facing individually very severe financial problems and we 21 may get some adjustments there.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Y,e s.
23 MR.
KUHNS:
So this whole fabric is involved here 24 and we would like to see it in place and continue because it 25 has worked very well and it promises to cont 5nue to be very,
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12 l
1 very helpful.
2 MR. CLARK:
The DOE program was an element in the 3
discussions, for example, with the Japanese underlying their 4
participation including some numbers and duration of program 5
we believe.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's right.
7 MR. CLARK:
So I think we are somewhat concerned 8
about the overall impact more than simply the Federal funding.
9 MR. KOHNS:
Without intending to be too heavy about 10 it, we think there was a commitment here that did affect 11 others in terms of joining this effort.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
13 MR. KUHNS:
We'would hate to see that commitment 14 weakened.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
The Japanese already offered 16 to help us cleanup our own mess and now to Jerk the rug out 17 from under our element of that commitment, I think, clearly 18 Jeopardizes the commitment and the arrangement that they made 19 in good faith and we might lose that, too.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
By my question and comment I 21 don't mean that you should stop trying to get the DOE funding.
22 MR. KUHNS:
No, we did not understand that, 23 Mr. Chairman.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I do want the Commission to 25 look at possible actions we might take to help in that regard.
13 1
MR. CLARK:
Mr. Chairman, we do not expect an impact 2
on the 1986 schedule.
The question is, what impact would 3
there be beyond 1986.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
5 MR. CLARK:
I think in terms of exploring options 6
there is a little time yet to see what funding there is before 7
we have to put much effort into seeing what the options would 8
be depending on the outcome.
9 We are not facing an immediate impact on the 10 schedule nor do I believe anything in 1986.
There is some 11 time to look at options.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
Do ycu want to 13 proceed?
14 MR. CLARK:
As you may recall from prior discussions 15 our cleanup operations at TMI-2 are carried out by an 16 integrated organization of GPU Nuclear and Bechtel.
17 The vice president and director of the TMI-2 project 18 who is full-time on the site directing it is a GPU employee, 19 Mr. Frank Standerier, who is with us today.
The deputy 20 director is a Bechtel employee, Tom Demmit.
21 We have expended since we were last here 22 considerable effort in strengthening and integrating the 23 organization into an effective whole.
We believe the 24 organization is working well 25 As of the end of 1985, the total manning from GPUN
14 1
in the project is just over 500.
The total Bechtel mann,ing is i
2 275.
With 300 craft workers supplied from Catalytic 3
Corporation, there are about 1,100 persons working fulltime on 4
the cleanup.
5 As completion of the cleanup approaches, we are 6
talking 1988, it is obvious, it was obvious and is obvious to 7
members of the TMI-2 staff that there must be a reduction in 8
the number of persons working on the project.
9 To help insure that the necessary stati is available 10 to.see the cleanup to the end, we have developed and announced 11 this fall a special program intended to provide confidence to 12 GPUN personnel working at TMI-2.
We value them and we will 13 work with them to utilize their talent in the future 11 they 14 continue to support the cleanup efforts as long as they are 15 needed.
16 I think we have had a fairly good response to that 17 program and are encouraged.
18 We are two months into defueling operations.
That 19 effort has had a number of startup problems due to the 20 developmental nature of the work, but it is gaining momentum.
21 We expect to ship the first fuel off site under our contract 22 with the DOE this spring, to complete in-reactor vessel 1
23 detueling by April 1987, complete decontamination by July 1
24 1988, and complete the cleanup project in September 1988.
25 In summary, our budget, project manning, schedule i
15 1
and planning are generally consistent with the information 2
we provided you in November of 1984.
3 As preparations for defueling neared completion this 4
summer, we took steps to proceed more intensively with planning and conduct of the remaining major phase of the 6
operation, that of decontamination of the reactor building
?
and reactor systems.
8 Organizational changes were made to focus 9
responsibility for this effort.
Additional funds were 10 advanced by GPU in 1965 to commence build up of equipment and 11 trained personnel for the work, and an overall decontamination 12 plan establishing criteria, techniques and schedules for 13 decontamination of each portion of the plant was ' developed.
14 Throughout the TMI-2 cleanup project, we have 15 continued to utilize the technical assistance and advisory to group which is funded by DOE and directed by GPUN, DOE and NHC 17 together.
18 It meets monthly for two days at TMI to render its 19 best judgment and advice on the major technical problem areas 20 in what is, to a large degree, a research and development 21 program.
22 Furthermore, our safety advisory board continues to 23 meet on a quarterly basis to review all aspects of.the project 24 from the standpoint of public and worker safety.
You have a i
i 25 report on the SAB's conclusions in your package.
It is
. l
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16 1
basically a two-page letter signed by Dr. Fletcher.
It is 2
Appendix B and we included biographical information on the 3
members of the safety advisory board, many of whom I am sure 4
are well known to you, Norm Rasmussen, Merril Eisenbud, Bill 5
Stratten.
6 We just feel enormously pleased that we have been 7
able to have the advice of that group.
I would like to quote 8
several of the most significant parts of the SAB*s report to 9
you.
10 "The members of the Board are unanimous in their i
j 11 opinion that TMI-2 does not currently pose a significant risk l
12 to public or worker health and safety.
The Board *s continuing 13 review of cleanup activities supports the conclusion that the i
14 risks are substantially less than those associated with an j
15 operating plant.
In the Board *s estimation, the progress and i
16 efficiency of the cleanup have improved markedly over the 17 years as the GPUNC/Bechtel integrated project organization has
.l 18 improved its ability to function as a team."
19 Continuing, "One primary concern that the Board 20 shares with the senior management of GPUNC is the need to 21 ensure that no criticality or release to the environment can 22 occur.
This requires controls such as the use of boron and a 23 constant evaluation of fuel locations, conditions and removal l
24 methods..
To this end, the Board has strongly requested that 25 the ex-vessel fuel characterization program which is basically
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finding whatever fuel is outside the reactor vessel that that i
l 2
program be given parity with the in-vessel defueling program 3
currently in progress."
4 We met with the SAB last Friday.
I think they feel S
that we have responded to that, that that program is moving.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Does that include more than 7
Just boron?
Does it include monitoring for criticality?
8 MR. CLARK:
In terms of criticality control, the 9
reliance is on boron.
There is monitoring but it is not 10 teasible to monitor effectively into the middle of the core.
11 The core with all of the borated water is so black that you 12 can't effectively see into the middle.
13 We know that you have referred that matter to the 14 ACRS.
We had had in addition to our work on criticality some 15 special ettorts done and maybe Ed could just highlight 16 those.
17 MR. KINTNER:
Let me quickly review criticality 18 because that is a question that you raised with the advisory 19 committse or they with you.
20 After the accident the boron content was about 2,300 21 parts per million and the core was obviously sub-critical.
22 The content was raised to 3,750 and the core sat there for 23 three or four years at that level with no problem.
l 24 We did have a total of six different reviews of 25 criticality, people making estimates of potentials for-
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18 1
criticality.
The last one which performed a bounding 2
calculation, the best geometry, the best isotopic 3
concentration, the best moderation, no structural or poison 4
materials present and the conclusion was that it was one 5
percent effective sub-critical at the worst case with 4,350 6
parts per million.
7 We have now established for ourselves a level of 8
5,050 parts per million as the spec requirements for our 9
procedures.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Five thousand and fifty?
i i
11 MR. KINTNER:
I am sorry, 4,750 and the last time 1 12 looked yesterday, I guess it was, the boron level was 5,400.
13 We did have Bill Stratton spend considerable time reviewing 14 all of the calculations and made some additional calculations 4
i 15 of his own and his report is that we are fully sub-critical 16 under any circumstances.
17 As Phil said, what we did look and try very hard to 18 establish some capability of reactivity monitoring and under 19 the circumstances we believed it was just impractical to do-20 that and at the same time take any fuel out.
We do have two 21 neutron channels watching the core.
If there is an increase 22 by a factor of ten in the neutron levels, they will pick that 23 up.
24 We believe that is the very best we know how to do 25 under the circumstances with regard to criticality.
I can
19 1
assure you that this was something that was of concern from 2
the beginning and.a lot of good people worked on it to try to i
3 be absolutely certain that there was no criticality 4
possibilities.
5 MR. CLARK:
We have sought the best advice and haoe 6
taken a conservative approach.
I believe the meeting with 7
ACRS is scheduled for later this month and we will be 8
presenting to them both the studies we have done and 9
responding to their questions.
But it has been looked at, wo 10 think, very carefully, very professionally and dealt with 11 conservatively.
12 We would anticipate ACES will come to that same 13 conclusion but that is coming up here within about two weeks.
14 MR.
O' LEARY:
Mr. Chairman, last year one of the 15 outside directors on the GPU Nuclear Board, Warren Witzig, 16 raised the question with regard to changes, accidental.
17 changes, in core geometry prompting some criticality event.
18 As a consequence of that, there was yet another 19 review and it concluded that even with the least favorable 20 changes in geometry that the borating would still forestall 21 criticality.
22 This at least gave Dr. Witzig a good deal of comfort 23 in his prior concern, in resolving his prior concern over this i
24 problem.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I presume you all carefully
20 1
monitor the boron concentration.
2 MR. CLARK:
Yes.
3 MR. KINTNER:
Let me speak to that.
First of all, 4
any possibility of deborated water entering is precluded by 5
lock valves and by surveillance.
6 There is a continuous boron meter on the reactor
?
vesser and that is backed up by regular chemical analysis to 8
assure that the boron meter is operating correctly.
One man's 9
assignment is to report daily that everything associated with 10 boron control is in place and working properly.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
How frequently do you make the 12 chemical analysis?
13 MR. STANDERFER:
It is weekly unless we are adding 14 water to the system
'nd then it is overy eight hours so 11 15 there are changes being made, it is every eight hours and if 16 there is no water in addition, then it is once a week.
17 MR. KINTNER:
There is one other very simple matter 18 which I think helps us a little bit and that is the level in 19 the vessel, the vessel is open and the level in the vessel 20 which is perfectly obvious on instruments as well as people 21 working on the platform, would change it there are any 23 additions or subtractions.
23 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
You mean the water level?
24 MR. STANDEHFER:
The water level, yes.
25 MM. KINTNER:
Yes.
It is opened to the atmosphere.
o 21 1
COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Hight.
2 MR. CLARK:
I think the loss of boron without the 3
loss of water just is not in any way reasonable to expect.
We 4
have had boron in all the water in the plant for six years now and we are going in on the seventh and the concern is the 6
addition of unborated water and we do not have significant
?
quantities of unborated water in the reactor building.
8 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
What if you lost the water?
9 MR. CLARK:
If you lost the water from the plant, 10 there is a system which would pump borated water back in and 11 we have the borated water source available to do that.
12 Without appearing to underestimate this problem it really has 13 been looked at by many, many people.
14 We had, of course, the concern about criticality.
15 That was the overriding safety issue in our vien, for the rust 16 six years.
It has been kept well shut down and we will see 17 what ACRS comes up with but i t.
really has been given a lot of 18 attention by many, many people including we think all of the 19 experts in the country to conclude that vT do have adoquate
)
20 protection against criticality.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
We have the same interest you 1
22 do.
l l
23 MR. CLARK:
Yes, absolutely.
I l
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That is why we raise these l
25 questions not because we are not sure that you are doing the l
l
.i I
22 1
job but rather to explore whether anything had been 2
overlooked.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I have a curiosity about 4
maintaining borated water.
I don't know how else to say this 5
but simply to ask, why does it matter in view of the fact that 6
a substantial fraction of your core is apparently sitting in 7
the bottom as a congealed or relatively congealed mass, pretty 8
well solid from what I understand.
There is not much avenue 9
for ingress of water flow anyway I would think, is there?
Am 10 I missing something?
You are sort of surrounding it.
11 MR. STANDERFER:
A number of plants have systems 12 that go back to water sources t h-a t are valved.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I mean within the vessel 14 itself.
15 MR. CLARK:
Within the fuel mass itself 16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes, within the fuel mass 17 itself you have borated water around the outside of this mass 18 of material but it probably isn*t penetrating very well, is 19 it?
20 MR. CLARK:
The mass is, we think, somewhat porous.
21 Perhaps Frank could speak better to that.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
It is heterogeneous 23 MR.
KINTNER:
Frank's presentation will give you 24 some indication of that.
25 MR. STANDERFER:
You are right.
It is diffusion
23 1
that would change the concentration if you change the 2
concentration of the water outside of the mass.
So it would 3
still be very slow and if you knew something had happened, you 4
would have lots of time to try to react.
It is not a quick 5
fix.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
You surely do want to keep a 7
well borated water around it but I am curious just how 8
much really penetrates into the core material that is sitting 9
on the bottom ind apparently on the lower plenum.
10 MR. CLARK:
I think an answer to that is whatever 11 was within the fuel mass volume, it was shut down and 12 sub-critical and known to be so back in April of 1979.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes, I understand that.
14 MR. CLARK:
We have now added to all the water i
15 around it that might or might not seep in additional boron.
I 16 think maybe that is a way to --
17 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
But you added the water.
18 MR. CLARK:
No, the water was there.
l 19 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
The water has been there all 20 along?
21 MR. CLARK:
Yes.
22 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
You have just borated it.
23 MR. CLARK:
Every since March 30, 1979.
24 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Hight.
25 MR. CLARK:
It has been there and it was initially I
24 1
think at 1,700 ppm right after the accident and then it went 2
to 2,300 and now we have taken it to a spec of 4,700 and an 3
actual which has been kept over 5,000.
4 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
I see.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is criticality a possibility 11 6
you drain the water?
?
MR. KINTNER:
The calculations are that if you drain 8
water, borated water will not go critical at any time.
If you 9
refill after that with fresh water, then it would in fact.
10 MR. CLARK:
You can't say whether it would or 11 wouldn*t.
It might.
You can not show that it would not go 12 critical 11 tilled with fresh water.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
Why don *t you 14 proceed?
15 MR. CLARK:
Continuing with the SAB, an additional 16 concern of the Board involves progress of the decontamination 17 and dose reduction work.
The recent acceleration of this 18 program by GPUN is strongly endorsed by the Board and will be 19 closely monitored by the Board members most knowledgeable on 20 the subject.
21 "A
final concern of the Board is the need to educate 22 the public on the nature of the cleanup and the true level of 23 risk associated with it.
The undue concern with which the 24 public views TMI-2 is itself a source of concern to the 25 Board.
Every effort should be made to reassure the public
25 1
that its safety and interests are being served."
2 That is the end of the quote and you have the entire 3
SAB letter in the package.
4 I want to assure you that we are taking all 5
practical steps to go forward with the tMI-2 cleanup as 6
quickly as practicable, consistent with the safety of the 7
publi8c and workers.
We believe that the present organf.zation 8
and funding arrangements allow the project ot proceed at the 9
best rate consistent with the nature of the task and 10 considerations of safety.
We intend those circumstances 11 should continue until completion of the project.
12 I would now like to turn over the presentation to 13 Frank Standerier who is vice president and director of the j
14 TMI-2 project.
He will describe to you the status of the 15 defueling operation and preparation for final 16 decontamination.
17 Then Ed Kintner, the executive vice president within 18 the office of the president, who has the primary 19 responsibility for TMI-2 matters will discuss our 20 consideration of the endpoint criteria for the cleanup 21 project.
Frank.
22 MR. STANDERFER:
In the interest of time I will 23 delete a few of the details from my written statement.
- I also 24 have a good seven minute video tape at the end of my 25 presentation to show you the condition of the core and some of
26 1
the detuoling operations.
2 Let me begin by saying that I have been struck 3
during the 18 months since I have been director of the degree l
4 that the TMI-2 cleanup is a first of a kind developmental task.
6 Almost every piece of equipment that we use is new 7
and unique.
We have to learn how to use it.
Almost every 8
evolution gets changed two or three times before it is working 9
satisfactorily so it really is a new and unique activity.
10 Each time we examine an unex4 mined portion of the 11 core we get surprises.
Based on fuel samples that were taken 12 a couple of years ago, the DOE concluded last February that 13 some fuel during the accident reached temperatures as high as 14 5,100 degrees Fahrenheit which could melt uranium dioxide, 15 another surprise.
16 In several television examinations in 1985 we found l
I 17 the lower head of the reactor vessel had piles of previously 18 melted core material.
That was unexpected.
The material is 19 in chunks resembling lava rock and is estimated to total about 20 ten to 1$ tons of material and we will show you that on the 21 video tape.
22 The chunks raise in size from pea size gravel to i
23 pieces several inches across.
This material is relatively 24 porous with an average bulk density of between 6.$ and eight
.s grams per cubic centimeter.
It appears to be triable.
It l
27 1
breaks relatively easily and last night I got from the DOE 2
Idaho folks an analysis of the uranium content and it is 3
preliminary but the uranium content of the material that we 4
have sampled so far appears to be 60 to 70-percent uranium 5
which again indicates that it is a mixture of fuel and 6
structural material 7
The internal reactor examinations to date have found 8
no apparent damage to the exterior of the core support 9
assembly, the interior of the reactor vessel wall or the 10 interior portions of the reactor vessel bottom head that are 11 visible.
12 While we may still find some damage to the reactor 13 vessel bottom head under the pile of debris, our analysis of 14 the reactor vessel temperature time performance after the 15 accident leads us to conclude that the bottom head is 16 sufficiently sound to allow defueling to proceed safely.
17 When the plenum was removed in May, 1985, we found 18 the center of its underside severely damaged by overheating.
19 However, the upper parts of the plenum, its lower outside 20 diameter were undamaged and the plenum lifted from the vessel 21 with no binding.
22 In March we devoted an entire TAGG meeting to 23 reviewing all that we know about the fuel damage and the l
24 current fuel conditions.
25 The goal was to predict what had happened during the
28 1
accident and predict what we would found in the yet 2
uninspected parts of the damaged core.
3 That review based on evaluations by EG&G and the 4
TAGG 1eads to the conclusions show in figures one, two and 5
three in your package.
6 If you will start with figure one, at about 174 7
minutes into the accident, it was about 6:54 a.m.,
just prior 8
to reinitiation of B main coolant pump operation, the water 9
level in the reactor vessel it is speculated had dropped to a 10 point that left approximately eight teet of the 12 foot core 11 uncovered.
12 The upper part of the core was severely overheated, 13 cladding had reacted with steam and a solidified layer had 14 formed in the core at that water line.
15 Turning to figure two, when the core was reflooded 16 by the B pump operation the rapid quenching of the hot upper 17 part of the core shattered it and formed the visible pile of 18 debris and the void that now exists in the upper part of the 19 original core volume.
20 Then it is speculated that the solidified layer that 21 had formed at the previous water line blocked cooling of the 22 lower part of the core even though the vessel was full of 23 water at this time 24 Turning to the third figure, the lower part of the 25 core not being able to be cooled because of the hard layer
29 1
above it slowly heated.
A pocket of molten material formed 2
and that subsequently vented to the bottom of the reactor 3
vessel at about an hour later, 7:45 in the morning.
That is 4
the material that we now see in the bottom of the vessel.
5 Of course, this damage scenario has not yet been 6
confirmed, but it is generally consistent with the information 7
presently in hand about in-vessel conditions.
Whether we 8
will, in fact, find a void in the lower part of the core or 9
not is speculative.
10 This shows substantial damage to the bottom part of 11 the core support structure as we have put TV cameras further 12 and further in the bottom of the vessel, we have not seen that 13 kind of damage so we don *t know the path that the material 14 took to get to the bottom of the core.
15 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
In this figure three picture is 16 water completely filled in the vessel then?
17 MR. STANDERFER:
YEs.
18 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
I see.
Thank you.
19 MR. STANOERFER:
It has been since the afternoon of 20 the accident.
21 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
I know that but in figure one 22 you said that the coolant level went down to about one-third 23 and shortly after that --
24 MR. STANDERFER:
It refilled.
25 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Right.
Thank you.
30 1
MR. STANDERFER:
The DOE R&D support to the project 2
has been important.
The support has contributed such 3
essential items as the early development of decontamination 4
techniques, the design and the procurement of detuoling 5'
tooling and analysis of core conditions through both sample 6
analysis and experiments run in the PMP and boFT f a c.:. l i t i e s at
?
8 In addition, the DOE has funded first-of-a-kind 9
operations and inspections and provided technical assistance 10 through the TAGG and their Idaho contractor, EG&G, and other 11 DOE contractors.
12 I think the importance of the DOE R&D program was 13 best summarized by Dr. Hobbins of EG&G at the 1985 Summer 14 Nuclear Power Reactor Safety Series at MIT.
15 He said, "It nuclear reactor safety researchers 16 cannot demonstrate a clear understanding of the TMI-2 17 accident, they have little hope of reaching consensus within 18 the technical community on source term issues and even less of 19 convincing the public and decision makers of the safety of 20 nuclear power.
21 It is not enough to state the obvious, that despite 22 the severity of the damage to the core of the TMI-2 reactor no 23 significant public health consequences resulted.
The 24 scientific community and the public demand that we fully 25 understand how the accident progressed and why the publio l
I l
l l
31 1
health consequences were so benign."
2 For our part, we are working with all responsible i
3 parties, particularly DOE and its laboratories and EPRI to 4
ensure that all information and insights gained from our work 5
are made fully and promptly available to those intorested.
6 For example, in October we co-sponsored with DOE a 7
two day American Nuclear Society Executive Level Topical 8
Conference in Hersney, Pennsylvania, "TMI-2, A Learning 9
Experience."
10 Next I would like to turn to the project schedule 11 and 11 you will turn to figure tour this shows --
12 COMMISSIONER.BERNTHAL:
Are we going to have a 13 chance to speak in a little bit more detail about the 14 condition of the reactor vessel internals and what happened?
15 You said that you are going to show a video tape.
16 MR. STANDERFER:
You will see a video tape that 17 shows much of that structure and then we can talk a little bit 18 about it then.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
All right.
Thank you.
Go 20 ahead.
21 MR. CLARK:
I would like to comment at this point on' 22 the relative role of GPUN and DOE.
By agreement with them i
23 their focus is understanding what happened in the accident and 24 they have the experts at the national labs for examining the 25 samples, doing the calculations and the scenario.
~..
33 1
We are concentrating on understanding what it will 2
take to clean it up.
So in large part the best understanding 3
of the accident and how it progressed will come not from us.
4 We are reflecting here really information they have developed 5
and we will show you the video tape.
The real experts in that s
6 are DOE and not GPUN but we will respond to any questior.s 7
obviously.
s 8
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I understand that but I did i
9 want to spend some more time on what the perceived condition 10 of that stuff is.
11 MR. CLARK:
Yes, sir.
12 MR. STANDERFER:
I think the video will help and i
13 then we can talk about it.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Fine.
15 MR. STANDERFER:
With regard to the cleanup sc,hedule 16 shown here is the entire cleanup program from the time of the 17 accident to the planned completion of cleanup in 1988.
\\
18 Of course, there is general contamination occurring i
19 throughout that period of time.
The ear,1y phases of the 20 cleanup dealt with venting the krypton and decontamination of 21 large volumes of water, initial quick looks and early 22 examinations of the core, waste shipments and of course the 23 crane repair and problems delayed the project about a year.
24 What I would like to talk about is the defueling 25 line on the chart.
In 1983 the detuoling concept was for a
\\
33 H
1 remote, underwater shredding system with the shredded fuel 2
slurry pumped out of the containment building.
3 In that concept it was estimated that the defueling 4
would be initiated in late 1986.
At the start of 1984, the 5
defueling concept was' changed to the use of manual tools 6
operated from a work platform mounted over the reactor vessel 7
and a challenging goal for the start of detuoling was set for 8
July 1,
1985, an improvement in schedule of about 15 months 9
over the previous remove defueling concept.
10 About a year later, early in 1985, a detailed 11 schedule was prepared when we had all of the equipment 12 designed and under procurement that included all of'the s
13 preparatory work for the start of defueling, including 14 hardware receipt, installation and testing, procedures 15 preparat(.on and approval, training and licensing of detueling 16 supervisors, mockup testing a n'd safety analyses and approvals.
17 That schedule indicated that we could not complete 18 all the many soitware and hardware tasks by, July and a target s
19 date of September luth was established.
Defueling operations 20 were actually started six weeks later on October 30th.
21 Defueling activities to date are depicted in the 22 next figure, figure five.
November and December was a period 23 of installing some of the defueling equipment that required 24 some of the fuel to 5e moved, gaining experience with the s
25 defueling equipment and tools.
The operators and support f
i
.I
4 1
s 34 s
i 1
teaus gained experience with modifying and improving the 2
tools, lights, cameras, protective clothing, communications f
3 and work scheduling.
4 A fair amount of that work was done in respirators 5
to be sure that we didn't have any airborne problems and the 6
full month cf December was in respirators.
That is why we 7
were able to increase to'a longer stay times in December after
\\
re'uired.
8 the respirators were no longer q
9 We now have five fuel cans loaded and we continue to e
10 learn and imp?ove the rate of our defueling and the removal of 11 fuel 12 Turning to the next page, we are now conducting
'13 defueling operations on a seven day, a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day basis.
g 14 That doesn't mean that operations are 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day.
On 15.
the back shift, we have support personnel preparing equipment 16 for the next day's defueling.
You can see the first week and 17 a half of January is typical 'o f the type of operation that we 18 expect through the next two to three months.
19 Defueling has been scheduled over the next nine to 20 12 weeks to remove the loose fuel *d'ebris over the hard layer.
21 That quantity of material represents about 20 to 25-percent of 22 the damaged core.
23 At that point, together with EG&G, we will obtain l
24 core samples from the unknown core region below the hard layer 25 for detailed hot cell examination at Idaho.
That coring
35 1
activity will take about four weeks.
After core boring and l
2 before removing the EGSG coring machine, we plan to use it to 3
drill a number of holes through the hard layer as an aid to 4
further fuel removal.
5 Another important action that will begin this spring 6
is fuel shipping.
?
DOE has procured two specially designed rail casks 8
to ship the TMI-2 fuel to Idaho for storage.
GPU will load 9
the casks and transfer the shipment to DOE on site.
DOE will 10 take responsibility for the shipment from there to Idaho.
It 11 will take about two years to ship all of the fuel with the 12 finish of shipping at the end of the first quarter of 1988.
13 In parallel with the detuoling activities, we havo 14 started another important activity in 1985 and it will 15 continue in 1986 and that is examining the ex-vessel portion 16 of the plant for fuel, 17 In order to quantify accumulations of damaged fuel 18 in ex-vessel locations, we have-developed and are using a 19 technique which is based on measurement of Cerium 144.
Cerium 20 is insoluble and therefore remains with the damaged fuel in 21 predictable proportions.
22 The measurements are made externally to systems and 23 components.
The technique appears to be sensitive enough.to i
24 detect as little as one kilogram of fuel depending upon l
25 geometry and vessel wall thickness.
So far we have used this
30 1
method to view fuel quantities in several ex-vessel locations 2
such as the pressurizer and the A-steam generator upper head.
3 Those external, measurements indicated between eight 4
to 25 kilograms were in the pressurizer.
In December, we 5
removed the manway cover from the pressurizer and performed an 6
internaa visual inspection.
This qualitatively confirmed the 7
external measurement of contained fuel and samples have been 8
taken for quantitative analysis.
9 Based on ex-vessel inspections to date and the 10 quantity of fuel that we now know is in the bottom of the 11 reactor vessel, it appears that very little fuel was 12 transported out of the reactor vessel 13 The maximum quantity found in any single ex-vessel 14 location to date is in the letdown cooler system and appears 15 to be less than 33 kilograms.
16 Our current gross estimate of the total quantity of 17 ex-vessel tool is about 125 kilograms which is considerably 18 less than one percent of the core, more like two-tenths of a 19 percent of the core, that may be in ex-vessel locations.
20 In addition to detueling, the other major project 21 task is the decontamination of the plant.
We continue to make 22 significant progress in releasing more of the auxiliary 23 building spaces for unrestricted access and reducing radiation 24 levels in work spaces.
25 By July of 1986 we will have installed and begun the
~
r
,+r rw
+
37 i
1 use of a system to flush and remove the solidified sediments 2
from auxiliary tanks and from the containment building 3
basement floor.
4 Major dose reduction efforts are scheduled this year 5
in the "D
ring" areas in containment which contain the steam 6
generators and main coolant piping.
This is necessary to 7
support the ex-vessel iwel location and removal activities.
8 Finally, the d e r.on t ani n a t i on ettort in the basement 9
of the containment building most of which will be done by 10 robots, will start in late 1936 and will be the primary focus 11 of the project in 1987.
12 In figure six we show an update of a similar figure 13 shown to you a year ago of the radiation levels in the 14 containment building.
As you can see, the dose reduction work 15 continues to lower the mean exposure rates in the containment 16 building on the two main operating levels, level 305 and i
17 level 347.
I l
18 In addition, we have included the exposure level 19 that the detuoling operators are experiencing on the detuoling i
20 platform.
That is nine millirem per hour.
That includes l
21 their access and leaving the platform area.
So that is an i
i 22 average of their entire time in the building while they are 23 working.
24 This is the lowest occupational radiation-level in 25 the containment building.
38 1
Also indicated on this same figure are results of 2
robotic examination surveys performed in 1985 of the-3 basement.
We find radiation levels in the basement between 4
ten and 1,000 rem per hour.
Of course, there has been no 5
manned entry into this area since the accident.
The 6
decontamination work was initially done by robots.
7 Finally, in table one we show the Person Rom 8
expenditures to date.
Through 1985 there has been 2,700 9
Person Rem expended.
We project in 1986 as we do more and 10 more defueling and decontamination work in containment, there 11 will be additional exposure between 1,$00 and 2,000 Person 12 Rem.
The total at the end of 1980 then would be somewhere 13 between 4,200 and 4,700 Person Rem.
We believe the overall 14 cleanup total exposure will fall within or below the NRC PEIS 15 values of 13,000 to 46,000 Person Rom.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How do you compare say the 17 4,700 you expect through 1986 with what you would expect 18 beyond that point?
l 19 MR. STANDERFER.
I hesitate to speculate further but 20 I would imagine that 1987 would be about like 1986 and 1988 21 which is a wrap-up year would be about half of that 22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So you might well come in 23 under 13,000?
24 MR. STANDERFER:
Possibly, but the 13,000 25 anticipated some activities which we won *t be performing.
So
f t
O 39 1
it is a little bit like mixing apples and oranges.
2 MR. CLARK:
The reason that we have not made a new 3
number of a new forecast is two-fold.
One, the difficulty in 4
some of the decontamination in the buildings, how many hours it will take is unknown and two, the question of how much will 6
have to be done by people in the basement is unknown.
So 7
there still are large uncertainties.
8 I think we are quite comfortable that we would be 9
within and I think the words here say perhaps below the range 10 of the FEIS.
11 MR. STANDERFER:
This assumes the robotic work will 12 be entirely successful.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
14 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
This has given us total 15 numbers.
I presume as far as individual exposure rates, you 16 are remaining well within those as you go along, is that 17 right?
18 MR. CLARK:
We have set internally an administrative 19 limit of four "R"
per year and I don *t think we have exceeded 20 that in the last four years.
The average exposure per worker 21 also is fairly consistent with industry average although I 22 think you may see that go up a little bit as we get into more l
23 intense activities but we clearly are meeting and staying well 24 within all the regulatory requirements as well as cut own l
25 somewhat tighter limits.
I
40 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So there have been on j
2 individual over exposures?
3 MR. CLARK:
Since the time of the accident, there 4
have been no individual over exposures and I think I can say 5
nobody over five "M"
per year although I am not absolutely 6
certainly about that in 1980.
?
There is a very comprehensive report that we have 8
put together on worker exposure for our own and other people's 9
edification.
I think it shows that there has been a very 10 effective job of radiation ocntrol for the workers at TMI-2.
11 These numbers are below what you would have had 12 during that period at an operating plant by in large as I am 13 sure you people recognize.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How about occupational 1S injuries as part of the cleanup as,well?
How have you been 16 doing there?
17 MR. CLARK:
I think not too badly but not as well as 18 we would like.
As a mattar of fact, one of the continuing 19 refrains from the SAB members such as Eisenbud is whether we 20 are over-doing radiation protection at the potential expense 21 of industrial safety so when people are working in 22 respirators, is that more of a burden on them physiologically 23 or whatever than you are protecting them from.
That is a 24 continuing balance where we have been moving away from 25 respirators.
l l
I
l 42 1
I think everybody is going to have to increasingly 2
balance the radiation protection versus other industrial 3
safety pr,otection of people and that is an area where we found 4
the Safety Advisory Board which does have a couple of medical 5
people on it, Jack Fabrikant and Eisenbud, very helpful in 6
helping us steer towards a proper balance.
7 CHAIEMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
Please proceed.
8 MR. CLARK:
We have a video tape of seven minutes of 9
core in-vessel examination.
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Dirty movies!
11
[ Laughter.]
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Fine.
13
[Whereupon, a video presentation was held.]
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
It was stated in there that 15 these canisters were stored after being tilled -- were stored 16 under water.
Is that borated water?
17 MR. KINTNER:
Yes.
They are handled in the way a 18 normally expended fuel assembly would be, transferred out of 19 containment into a canal in the Exhibit Building.
They are 20 stored there until shipped.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is that borated water?
22 MR XINTNER:
Yes, it is.
And the canisters have
.x 23 horal plates in them, and they are very carefully arranged 24 first.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
Thank yott.
Go on.
em
--e
i 42 1
MR. KINTNER:
Did you wish to ask some questions?
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, yes, I had a question 3
that has been troubling me since my visit to INEL, and that*s i
4 the following, and I'm sure you must have thought about this 5
by now:
6 I gather that we started this process with an 7
assumption that you would be able to vacuum a substantial 8
amount of material, that it would be very loose and fairly 9
small grain constituency of one kind or another.
But it's 10 pretty clear nova that on the bottom of the vessel and, I i
11 gather, also on this flow distributor plate, there is a 12 tairly well soliditied mass of material.
13 Have you had any thoughts on how you are going to 14 deal with that?
15 MM. STANDERFER:
It appears to be chunks, and the 16 vacuumable portion, the smaller portion both on the upper part 17 of the core and the lower part of the core, may comprise as 18 much as 40 percent of the original core.
Some of the 19 solidified material, we believe, in the bottom head can be 20 oroken up either mechanically or hydraulically, because it is 21 friable.
So right now it looks like 40, 45 percent of the 22 core is that granular material, and the other 50, $$, 60 23 percent of the core are pieces of fuel elements and fuel stubs 24 and so forth which we'll have to handle as chunks.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But you are not. concerned i
43 1
that you'll have to go in with the equivalent of an underwater 2
Jackhammer to sort of tear this stuit apart?
)
3 MR. STANDERFER:
We have underwater jackhammers.
4 E L a u g h t e r. 'J 5
MR. STANDERFER:
We have that kind of equipment, 6
yes.
7 MR. KINTNER:
We are concerned.
There are a lot of 8
questions, as you can see from looking at that debris, that 9
it*s going to take a lot of different techniques to get it 10 out.
11 MR. CLARK:
The tool kit includes saws, you know, 12 pry bars, chisels, you know, in a grossly simplified way.
I 13 think we're going to be very careful what kind of loads we can 14 put inside that vessel.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, that*s the other 16 question, whether the bettom of the vessel has the integrity 17 to take severe mechanical jolts.
18 MR. STANDERFER:
One of the reasons for these 19 inspections was to determine whether or not there are any 20 columns of material that have been formed that would transmit 21 those kinds of loads.
We haven't seen those columns yet.
We 22 are very careful in working around any of the original 23 structural members that are continuous through the core.
So 24 that's a very sensitive issue that is evaluated continually as 25 we plan operations.
44 1
MR. K1NTNER:
The loads that can be applied to the 2
core, there is a specific limit to that.
1 3
MR. CLARK:
In roughly March, we get this 4
core-boring machine which is going to take cores all the way 5
down through the core, down to the head, and which Frank, in 6
his presentation, said we also hope to use the drill, some 7
holes, you know, to help break up the material.
The stuff 8
they've touched so far tends to break up when you try to grab 9
it.
But there may be, you know, more onerous, more difficult 10 material in there, and we're just kind of going very carefully 11 to see what there is and try to be ready to deal with it.
12 CHAIRMAN FALLADINO:
But you'll stop short of 13 drilling through the vessel bottom?
14
[ Laughter.'J 15 MR. CLARK:
We have every intention of doing so.
16 CHAIRMAN FALLADINO:
Well, stranger things have 17 happened in a variety of businesses.
18 MR. CLARK:
Yes, sir.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
It does take special attention.
f 20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
How much of the core do you 21 now estimate is sitting on'the bottom of the vessel?
l 22 ME. STANDERFER:
Ten to fifteen percent.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Ten to fifteen percent, 24 MR. STANDERFER:
Ten to fifteen tons approximately.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And the exact physical 1
\\
\\
i l
45 1
" composition," I guess, isn*t the word physical character 1
2 of that distribution is not very well known yet, or --
3 MR. STANDERFER:
That*s correct, i
4 MR. CLARK:
Then the number of samples, we've looked essentially all the way into the middle, and 5
all the way 6
first looks only look down.
We've been able to get under and
?
look up.
I think you saw in the video that the structure, 8
anyplace we've seen it, is unatiected.
You don't see, you 9
know, missing structural material in the course of poured 10 structure.
You don't see fusing to it.
You don't see fusing 11 to the vessel.
And the samples that have come out, they're 12 beginning to get depth density.
It's fairly porous.
They're 13 beginning to get some c on t e re t that Frank *s comment was 60 14 percent fuel in the sample they had pulled out.
So we're 15 beginning to have, you know, some better understanding of how 16 to get it out.
17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
So you don't foresee that 18 what I guess until a year ago, maybe even six months ago, 19 was a relatively unexpected development, that there was a 20 significant amount of melting, that you got a more or less 21 solidified mass of material in two locations in the vessel, I i
22 guess, that you don't see that, though, affecting your 23 timetable.
You think you're able to cope with that.
"4 MR. STANDERFER:
Not yet.
In fact, 11 our original 25 speculation that 10 to 13 percent of the core had actually
46 1
been distributed out in the primary system, I'm sure that 2
would be a tougher task, to go get that.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes, right.
4 MR. STANDERLER:
I was encouraged when I saw that 5
much material in the bottom of the vessel.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Do you have an estimate 7
for how much of the fuel itself may have melted, as opposed to 8
all of the related components melting to form this mass around 9
it or not?
10 MR. CLARK:
We really don't, and I don't think we 11 even have seen anything from DOE or EG&G, but, you know, I 12 think they would have to speak for themselves.
13 In terms of sampling to determine material content, 14 there's just a very limited amount that has been done yet.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All hight.
Do you want to go i
16 on?
l 17 MR. CLARK:
I think we're going to proceed with Ed 18 Kintner.
l 19 MR. KINTNER:
Well, as you well appreciate, the i
20 circumstances of TMI-2 are unique in more than one way.
There i
i l
21 are few available precedents, either technical or regulatory, 22 on which to pattern recovery and the project endpoint 23 c'iteria.
We have, therefore, been working since the release 24 of the NRC PEIS revision in 1984 to try to arrive at some 25
- easonable definition of the endpoint of the cleanup that
-.v.-
n.
--w
,.. -, ~ - -
47 1
is, how to achieve a secure, safe condition such that there is 2
virtually no hazard to the public or the environment.
- This, 3
as we see it, is not a decommissioned status, either real or 4
implied; rather it would be a safe and secure project endpoint 4
5 which would preserve plant disposition options.
6 To that end, we have identified preliminarily a set 7
of general criteria for the endpoint, and these are stated as' 8
follows:
9 The overall objective of the recovery program are to 10 effectively remove any significant risk to public and worker 11 health and safety from potential releases of radioactivity and l
12 to monitor the plant to prevent any risk developing, while 13 minimizing the radiation exposure to the cleanup workforce, 14 and we believe that there are subsidiary objectives which 15 would satisfy that general criteria.
16 The first is that the possibility of criticality is 3
17 no longer credible.
There is simply not enough material, 18 fission material, left to in any way support criticality.
19 The fuel which has been removed from the plant has 20 been shipped offsite.
The potential for fission product 21 mobility has been eliminated for all practical purposes 22 that is, radioactive water, airborne contamination, loose 23 surface contamination will be removed or controlled.
24 Hadiation levels throughout are reduced to permit i
25 access for continued plant monitoring.
Water is removed from
48 1
plant systems and spaces, and the potential for reintroduction 2
of water is precluded, and special systems are provided for 3
fire detection and for prevention of fires and for security.
I 4
A safe, monitored plant condition is tstablished 5
throughout.
We are calling that condition " interim monitored 6
storage."
7 These criteria have been discussed in a very general 8
way with the TAAG, the Sately Advisory Board, and the NHC 9
Advisory Panel for Decontamination of Three Mile Island Unit 10 2,
but the concurrence of none of these has been yet sought.
11 In September, we established a TMT-2 Strategic 12 Planning Task Force to develop in detail a strategy for 13 meeting the criteria given above.
That task force has now 14 produced a dratt plan for meeting or exceeding these general 15 criteria for the endpoint.
It is out plan now to obtain the 16 comments et the TAAG and the SAB, finalize this plan, and then 17 obtain its approval by our Board of Directors.
18 In order to make the Safety Advisory Board review, 19 the Board has established an internal task force, which is 4
20 going to be chaired by Dr. Norman Rasmussen, to review the 21 plan and advise the company on its technical and safety 22 appropriateness.
23 After we obtain the concurrence of all these 24 interested parties, the completed plan will serve as the basis j
l 25 for a Safety Evaluation Report which will be submitted to the I
l
49 1
Commission for its acceptance.
We are keeping the NHC Site 2
Office at TMI-2 generally advised of the strategic program 3
plan as we develop it.
4 A part of this plan addresses the disposal of the 5
accident-related water.
In your recent meeting with the 6
Advisory Committee, you indicated a desire to come to grips
?
with the method of disposal of water earlier than we had 8
planned, which was about a year from now, and it the 9
Commission believes it would be useful to have that proposal 10 made earlier than that, we will attempt to provide a 11 recommendation at an earlier date.
12 In summary, we are proceeding to develop a specific, 13 agreed-upon criteria for a safe monitored condition which i
14 removes the risk of TMI-2 to the communities which round 15 the island.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Do you see any need for a i
17 decision on what to do with that water, an urgent need?
13 MR. KINTNER:
We don't see the need to do it, and 19 we, as I say, had planned to face that problem a year from 20 now. We are using the water, much of it -- we're using it for 21 operations in the plant.
22 CHAIEMAN PALLADINO:
But this gives the impression 23 that we were pushing for an earlier decision.
Now we asked i
24 some questions that may have been interpreted to express an 25 urgent need.
But I think we were more interested, rather than re
.,e
.-..w,
,n.
J 50 4
1 pushing it.
l 2
MR. KINTNER:
We read the transcript to mean that 3
you felt that there would be suiticient public discussion or 4
interest in this matter that you would like to have it met 5
earlier rather than later.
6 MR. CLANX:
There is no urgency.
We had a plan to 7
present the proposal about a year from now as to what should 8
be done with the water.
If the Commission telt it w est1 d be 9
helpful, and the discussion we read was, would you have time 10 to review it, you know, et cetera.
If you thought it would be 11 helpful, we would attempt to provide that perhaps this 12 summer.
Otherwise, I think we would continue with our plan, 13 which is to provide it about a year from now.
It's not an 14 urgent issue.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
If I understood the l
16 concern that some of the Advisory Panel members had raised 17 with us, I think it was more in the nature that, apart from 18 they didn't challenge the fact that it wasn*t an urgent 19 matter, but their concern was that this is obviously a matter 20 of great sensitivity to the people up there. and the earlier i
21 you develop your plan for what you want to do with it, then 22 the more time there is to fully ventilate any concerns that 23 there may be, make sure that those resolved, and that people at least understand the program, understand 24 are generally i
25 the plan, understand the implications of it.
Then there is
gg 1
more of an opportunity to build that understanding and achieve 2
more of a consensus on the approach.
l 3
I think from my standpoint, that appeared to be a 4
tairly sensible idea, from your standpoint as well as from 5
ours.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
However, there is time even 7
later to completely ventilate the question of where it goes.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
There may be.
9 MM. CLARK:
I think we have recognized the concerns 10 and, you know, the validity of those thoughts, and what we are 11 saying to you today is, they are an Advisory Panel to the 12 Commission, and it the Commission feels it would be helpful 13 for us to advance the date of our recommendation, we feel wo 14 can, and we vio u l d.
15 Our plan have been to provide it in about a year, 16 you know, as we go down the sequence of the things that we 17 have to do.
It is not urgent, and, you know, I don't want to 18 put it out of proportion.
We noted the dialogue and thought 19 that we would are in a position to be responsive, if you 20 would like to have a proposal submitted.
21 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
It seems to me, it would be 22 helpful to have it somewhat earlier than you had proposed.
23 It seems to me that it would be, as far as the public is 24 concerned, keeping them informed earlier and might be, 25 certainly, in your best interests as well as the p v.*J 1 1 c ' s best
32 1
interest.
2 It seems to me that an earlier plan, if you can do 3
so without detracting from the safety of your work, would be 4
appropriate.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, I would agree with 6
that.
?
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
My concern was, giving this 8
attention should not interfere with what's going on, because I 9
think we have all the time in the world to 10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
It doesn*t sound like it's 11 a problem.
12 MR. CLARK:
It would not be allowed to interfere 13 with safety, and given this discussion, we will plan to make a 14 submittal mid-year rather than early next year.
15 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Yes, good.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Good.
17 MR. CLARK:
I mean, that*s why we raised it, in 18 order to get this sense of whether it would be helpful.
19 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
I think that's fine.
I think 20 it's a good move.
21 MR. KUHNS:
There is a lingering concern there.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Another question:
Phil, you 23 had said earlier that you were going to complete the cleanup 24 project in September of 1988, and at that time, I note an 25 aside.
I was going tc ask you, what are your criteria?
And
o 53 1
now you've given us those criteria.
2 Is that what you art -- do the criteria shown on
+
3 page 19 and I guess the bottom of 18 represent what you call 4
completion, what you hope to achieve by September
'88.
5 MR. CLARK:
Yes.
6 MR.
KINTNER:
The schedule, cost, and the dosage all 7
bear some parallels to these general criteria.
There will be 8
specifics which fall under this 9
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But this is what you hope to 10 achieve by September of 1988?
11 MR. CLARK:
Yes, sir.
12 MR.
KINTNER:
That is correct.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Do these criteria and the j
14 extent to which you would anticipate cleanup at the endpoint 15 that those criteria define, do they difier in any way from the 16 assumptions that were made in the PEIS or earlier judgments or 17 assumptions on what would be deeme-1 to be completion?
18 MR. KINTNER:
In one significant way, they differ, 19 and that is the remaining radiation levels in the basement.
20 That is the most difficult, single task remaining with regard 21 to decontamination.
As Frank said, we will be heavily 22 dependent upon robotics to get it done at all, and to the 23 degree to which we carry out basement decontamination, it is 24 going to be I think they assumed in the PEIS that we would 25 go further than these criteria allow.
54 1
Now we are saying that the basement will be dry, and 2
it would reduce or tend to reduce the levels to 1 to 10 R, 3
which.would allow surveillance of 40 minutes, as compared to 4
full decontamination of the basement which was assumed in the 5
PEIS.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So the PEIS assumed
?
cleanup sufficient so that you could have unrestricted access 8
to that area?
9 MR. CLARK:
No, I don't believe so, Commissioner.
I 10 think neither our prior estimates nor the FEIS were really 11 that definitive in terms of the endpoint, that there were some 12 implied assumptions, and is you go through the analysis, you 13 would say it appears that msybe they thought this would happen 14 or that would happen.
15 What we are developing is really the most complete, i
16 must definitive d e f i r.' : t o n of endpoint oriteria, and I think 1
l 17 not generally inconsistent with the PEIS or the prior 1
18 estimates, to the extent that they had any detail.
19 Earlier on, people thought you might have to 20 chemically decontaminate the loops.
It doesn't appear to be 1
21 necessary.
22 Is that different?
Well, I don *t think so in terms 23 of how you are going to leave the plant.
The methods that i
24 will be used to reach that endpoint are somewhat different, 25 and as you get more definitive in looking at this part of this
55 1
level, we're getting more detail.
I would not think that they 2
are inconsistent with the prior studies in my view.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
How would they 4
compare to, say, our proposed -- what would havo to be done to 5
meet our proposed decommissioning rule?
Is there going to be 6
a greater burden?
7 MR. CLARK:
It does not reach a point of the I
8 don *t know what to call it safe store.
This does not reach 9
a decommissioned endpoint.
f 10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
11 MR. CLARK:
It does not.
12 JOMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So in essence, what you 13 would be doing, assuming that that rule became final, is 14 deferring this work until later on.
15 MR. CLARK:
We will have to separately address the 4
16 future of the plant after cleanup.
This is intended to get it 17 into a condition which would be safe, not an offsite hasard, 18 not a worker hasard, and monitorable while a decision is made 19 on future activities.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
21 MR. CLARK:
We've talked about decommissioning of 22 Unit-2 being no later than decommissioning of the adjacent I
23 Unit-1, for example, and we have not finalized our plan.
But 24 there has been that kind of discussion.
i 25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
56 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Ready to go o n 't 2
MM.
O' LEARY:
Mr. Chairman, I'm the next one in the 3
batting order here.
It's a pleasure to be with you this 4
morning.
i 5
As you know, I am one of the tour outside members of 6
the Board of Directors of GPUN.
All of us of the outside 7
Directors have maintained a high level of interest in the 8
progress of the cleanup of TMI-2, as you may well expect.
9 We review progress periodically at each of the 2
10 Board's monthly meetings.
We have discussions rather 11 trequently as individuals outside of the monthly meetings, and 12 we feel that we are being maintained very current on the i
13 matter as it proceeds.
14 I had a complete review of the project with site 15 managers and with the SAB just last Friday.
In addition, the 16 Board of Directors has been regularly brieted by the Safety 17 Advisory Board on their views of the cleanup project.
18 Based on these reviews, I am convinced that we are 19 making good progress.
We are learning a great deal as we go 20 along.
You will appreciate that the TMI-2 cleanup is a major 21 research and development task, dealing at almost every turn 22 with unprecedented problems.
23 Let me just give you one example of that, 24 Mr. Chairman.
Last week, as we discussed this with the 25 Project Manager, he was telling us that he thought that the
$7 1
" pick up sticks" phase, the early phase, would be relatively 2
straightforward.
They pick up the fuel rods that were spread 3
around the top, put them into canisters, and away they*d go.
j 4
It turned out, as they began to pick up individual 5
rods, they were interconnected deep down in the core, and he 6
characterized it, at one point they found that they were 7
pulling up the entire core.
This is just one example of the 8
unpredictability of the matter.
You know, we haven't really 9
seen it firsthand; we've only seen the first layers and what 10 we can view on the sides.
And it does, as Mr. Standerter 11 described it, take on all of the aspects of an R&D or highly 12 developmental project, with all of the unpredictabilities that 4
I 13 are involved in that sort of thing, and we, as outside Board 14 members, fully appreciate that.
j 15 Nonetheless, I am confident, looking at the progress 16 to date and looking at the people who are doing this, that the i
17 effort is going well and that we will accomplish this within a i
18 reasonable timeirame.
i 19 At the Board's request, GPU Nuclear has recently 20 complet d a reassessment of the overall cost of the project.
l 21 It concluded that, based on the definition of " endpoint" that 22 Ed Kintner has just discussed, about s1 billion for the j
23 overall cleanup cost still appears reasonable.
And what this 24 means to us is that the cost estimates have remained stable l
25 for a three-year period now, and we are beginning to have a l
{
i y.
+
-- +
58
,1 fair degree of confidence, then, that we will, in fact, be 2
able to accomplish this task within the outlined amounts.
3 The TMI-2 cleanup is unprecedented not only for us, 4
but also for your Staff.
They have worked responsibly and 5
etticiently with us in meeting each new problem as it has 6
developed.
We believe their good and hard work is one of the 7
major reasons the project has moved forward.
We appreciate 8
that good work on the part of your Staff, especially 9
Dr. Snyder and Dr. Travers and the site ottice at TMI-2.
10 Finally, as we now remove fuel from the reactor 11 vessel in preparation to remove it from the site, the risk to 12 the public is even further reduced from that reported in our 13 last meeting.
We believe that the SAB concurs in that 14 estimate, and, indeed, the discussions that I had with 15 Dr. Fletcher last week he is very much encouraged at the 16 progress tnat we have made, particularly in the last year, and j
17 all in all, I think we can be quite comfortable with the pace I
18 of work that is now proceeding at TMI-2, 19 MR. CLARK:
Mr. Chairman, that completes our planned 20 presentation on TMI-2 olean-up.
In summary, we believe good 21 progress is being made, and made safely.
A recent re-estimate i
22 confirms the expected overall cost and schedule.
We have not 23 been funding-limited in '84 or '85 and are not currently 24 tunding-limited.
l 25 We would be pleased to respond to any questions on l
l
59 1
clean-up, after which we would turn, Mr. Hukill, to TMI-1 2
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I have only one other question, 3
and I think you have implied the answer.
The early delays j
4 that you had with the fueling, has that significantly affected 5
your estimate of the end date?
6 MR. STANDERFER:
Well, I had expected to complete 7
the clean-up in 12 to 18 months, and now I believe 18 months, 4
8 the defueling, and I still expect the defueling to be 9
completed in the spring of 1987.
But it is going to take a 10 little longer than I had predicted on the optimistic side.
11 But well within the plans that the project had laid out for i
12 defueling.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
And how about your end point of 14
'86?
Does that still look good?
l 15 MR. STANDERFER:
Yes.
16 MR. CLARK:
In a sense those are separable in terms 17 of the clean-up and the detuoling, and we still believe the 18 cost and schedule estimates that we gave you basically last 19 year and have confirmed today.
20 Now 11 there is a real surprise down there in that 21 vessel you know, something we wouldn't say there is no 22 risk, but we think we have got a reasonable cost and schedule 23 estimate to complete the clean-up in September at
'88.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Any other questions?
t 25 COMMISSIONER HOBERTS:
One quick one.
You said you
60 1
were going to do the clean-up in the basement with robotics.
2 Is all of that equipment, both knowledge and ability to do 3
that, is that in place?
I don't mean necessarily with you 4
now.
5 MR. STANDERFER:
We have had several robots in the 6
basement.
Earlier this year one of the robots did the 7
examination and surveys that we mentioned.
Starting this 8
tall, another robot actually went down to take core samples 9
from the walls, the concrete walls.
That was done in December 10 and is continuing this month.
We will receive a new robot in 11 February called " Work Horse" from Carnegie-Mellon, and it is a 12 machine that is flexible and we can attach hoses to it, we can 13 attach scoops to it, we can attach vacuum systems to it.
It 14 can actually be used to knock down the brick wall down there 15 11 we did to remove it, rather than shield it, and we believe 16 we have the tools to do the job.
17 MR. CLARK:
We have been trying very hard to bring 18 in the expertise throughout the country, wherever it exists, 19 on robotics or decon or criticality.
I think we have gotten a 20 lot of help and basically believe we will have the tools to 21 complete it.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay.
Other questions?
23 COMMISSIONER BEMNTHAL:
I would Just make the 24 comment it's too bad this experiment wasn*t better 1
25 instrumented when it occurred.
)
el 1
tLaughter.3 2
And I would like again to stress, Joe -- and I just 3
noticed the memo you sent out yesterday, which apparently 4
concurs in that view -- we have just got to figure out a way, 5
whether we tax the industry somehow or the industry does it on 6
its own or whether DOE makes sure that it gets done, we have 7
got to figure out a way to make sure that the knowledge that 8
is sitting there for the taking now is not lost in view of the 9
source term work that we have ongoing here.
I just think that 10 is vitally important.
11 CHAIMMAN PALLADINO:
That is one of the reasons I 12 would like tnem to think of options open, in the event DOE 13 tunding doesn't come out.
But, meanwhile, we will press to 14 see that DOE, it at all possible, will meet its commitment.
15 COMMISSIONEH ASSELSTINE:
I just have a couple of 16 questions as well.
1 17 When do you think you're going to be in a position 18 to talk with the Statt, and I assume the Advisory Panel will 19 be interested in this as well, on the criteria and the end 20 point estimate for clean-up*
You said internally you were now 21 doing the finalizing it.
22 MM.
KINTNER:
Our view is that within six months now 23 we will have gone through all these processes of internal 24 gestation that we have talked about, constantly keeping i
25 Dr. Travers advised of where we stand on this matter, so he 1
G2 1
will be fully advised of everything that we get from the SAB 2
and so forth, and have a document which we will be able to use 3
as a preparation base for the Environmental Impact Statement.
4 MR. STANDER' ER :
The Advisory Panel was given a
/
5 summary, not quite as detailed as we have today, almost a year 6
ago.
So there has been -- and there was another briefing in 7
our meeting at Annapolis in October with the Advisory Panel on 8
the end point, given by the chairman of the task force that 9
produced the current report.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How would your cost 11 estimate and schedule be affected 11 that end point target was 12 not accepted and you were forced to do a more thorough 13 decontamination of the basemat?
14 MR. KINTNER:
It would be just almost linear.
15 MR. CLARK:
How much more thorough, I think, is the 10 only way to answer that, Commissioner.
I think the definition 17 of the end point is important from a great many respects.
18 Without suggesting in any way, you know, concurrence or 19 anything of that sort from the Staff or the Advisory Panel 20 which we have not had or sought.
21 We have been t e l l i r.g them what we're doing in draft 22 documents.
You know, I think they've seen some of them.
They 23 have posed various parties questions, which we then tried to l
l 24 address in developing the end point.
So there has been that 25 kind of dialogue ongoing as we try to reach o u r otin definition l
._. ~.
G3 1
here, but recognising people *s concerns.
2 MR. STANDERFEM:
The general comment that we have 3
gotten from the Advisory Panel and some other sectors, 4
questions in some areas whether we are going farther than we 5
should be going; that they*re concerned about ALARA exposure 6
kind of issues.
So, so far we don't anticipate a big 7
difference with where we're coming out.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Also, could you tell me 9
what you found out in terms of cosium concentrations and 10 locations, and to what extent does that information support or 11 contradict the hypothesis that cesium iodide was the form of 12 the release of the tission products during the accident?
13 MM. CLARK:
I cannot.
I don't know whether Frenk 14 can, or Ed.
15 MR. KINTNER:
My understanding is that the cesium 16 iodide theory is supported by almost everything we found 17 there, but you would have to ask -- or maybe you picked this 3
18 up at Idaho when you were there talking with them, but the DOE 19 people or the ones at S&G are the ones who'd have to answer 20 that.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
22 COMMISSIONEH BERNTHAL:
I would just wonder, in that 23 connection -- and given the fact that these gentlemen are 24 understandably more concerned with clean-up project than in 25 the implications for source term and what research knowledge
94 1
might be gleaned from the accident -- I*d wonder how soon it 2
might be appropriate for the Commission to get a briefing from 3
DOE and their associates and the others that are looking at 4
the research end of this thing.
I think it"s in the public 5
interest, too, not just ours, but the general public, I think.
6 would like to have a better understanding of what happened and 7
what the implications might be.
We*ve already learned some 8
new things in the last six or eight months that I think were 9
somewhat unexpected.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Why don *t we take that up at 11 agenda planning?
12 COMMISSIONEH ASSELSTINE:
I think it might be 13 interesting to hear what the evidence is, because we*ve had 14 this hypothesis that's before us for quite some time, and it 15 would be usetel to know what the evidence they -- what 16 empirical evidence has been developed so far.
17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL; It*s pretty clear now that 19 this accident reached a fairly advanced stage, and it*s also 19 pretty clear that a relatively small amount of water in the 20 bottom of the vessel had a tremendous mitigating ettect on the 21 progression of the accident.
Things like that, I think, are 22 worth having a more comprehensive briefing on.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay.
24 MR.
CLARK:
Mr. Commissioner, we are very interested 25 in that, but we are not the experts.
@5 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I understand, I understand 2
that.
3 CHAIMMAN PALLADINO:
Any more questions on TMI-2, or 4
are we ready to go on to TMI-1?
5 Okay.
6 MR. CLARK:
With regard to TMI-1, as you know, the 7
entire Hestart Test and Power Ascension Program has been 8
completed as planned.
Overall, the performance of the plant 9
and equipment was very good.
There was a minimal amount of 10 difficulty with equipment, less than we or others reasonably 11 expected for a plant shut down that long.
12 Performance of the staff was also very good, 13 although there are areas which should'be improved.
They have 14 been and continue to be addressed.
Mr. Hukill will present a 15 raore detailed review.
16 One potential problem we have been alert to is the 17 impact of the staff on the statt and management at the site of 19 the very extensive oversight.
Such oversight includes our own 19 review groups, full-time onsite statt of the Nuclear and 20 Saiety Compliance Conuni t t e e of the GPU Nuclear Board of i
21 Directors, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and your Statt.
22 While oversight is needed, I am sure you recognise 23 it levies some demand on the operating statt to report, 24 explain, answer questions and respond to comments.
Throughout 25 the restart program, this impact, while noticeable, has been
i I
60 1
manageable.
Dr. Murley, and his onsite director, Mr.
- Kane, 2
provided close, etteetive scrutiny of our ettorts with due 3
regard for minimizing that impact, and I can report to you 4
that there have been no significant problems in that 5
oversight.
6 As TMI-1 operation proceeds. NRC plans a continued 7
extraordinary level of oversight, including, as we understand 8
it, a performance appraisal team inspection and three SALP 3
o 9
reviews during the course of this year, in addition to tour 10 onsite inspectors.
11 There will need to be continued careful attention to 12 assure that these oversights are also all accomplished with 13 minimum impact.
We trust the appropriate direction and 14 coordination of these ettorts will be provided so we*d be able 15 to tell you next year, and tell you today, there has not been 16 a significant impact from oversight to date.
That is a 17 potential concern that we have been watching very carefully, 18 including looking at our own oversight and review groups 19 internally.
There are a great many.
I 20 With that, I would like to turn the presentation 21 over to Hank Hukill, Vice President and Director of TMI-1, the 22 man onsite who has been responsible for conducting the 23 start-up and test program.
24 MH. HUKILL:
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, 25 Commissioners.
_ _,. ~.
67 1
The test sequence at TMI-1 was basically a modified 2
NTOL philosophy.
What we did was 3
MR. CLARK:
Excuse me, Hank, Just one moment.
4 There is an outline supposedly in the package as a separately I
5 bound document that Hank will be following.
I'm sorry.
6 MR. HUKILL:
We did get together with your Statt and 7
take a look at a plant that*s been shut down as long as we had 8
been and to come up with a testing philosophy that was 9
certainly ditterent than the normal short range testing after 10 a normal refueling, and we came cut with a test program that 11 was about three months.
12 If you noticed, we called the test program s 13 sequence rather than a schedule, mesning that each part of it l
14 progressed to the sequence.
We did not want to be looked into 15 a schedule where we had to hurry through something to try and 16 meet a schedule.
We wanted to be deliberate, controlled, l
17 thorough and safe, and we felt we could do that by not having 18 people continually asking us, "Well, how do you tit on the 19 schedule and where are you going on the schedule?"
So we used 20 it as a sequence and tollowed a sequence.
I 21 We had very close management involvement, both by 22 myself and my senior managers onsite, and very close 23 direction.
24 The major elements of the program consisted of i
1 25 criticality, low power physics testing, two planned reactor
)
i
)
. - - _.- _ -_ ~ - - _ -
48 I
1 trips, one at 40 percent and one at maximum power, each 2
designed to test some of the new modifications, integreated 3
control system tuning and testing.
We had 30 days at 48 4
percent power that were totally dedicated for crew training and equipment check-out; another 30 days at 75 percent power 6
for crew training and equipment check-out; and then we also a
7 tested natural circulation.
8 Generally, as Mr. Clark telt, I certainly felt that 9
the overall test program was excellent, and all acceptance i
10 criteria were met.
This was possible due to the dedicated 11 ettorts by all elements of the GPU system and especially GPU 12 Nuclear.
i l 'J Morale is very high at TMI-1 at the present time, I
14 and I've got a group of tremendous people who made this test 15 program possible and who made our success possible in this 16 operation.
17 Especially noteworthy, I think, was the performance 18 of the operators because of their inexperience for the vast 19 majority, the newness of them.
They really performed well, i
20 which 1 think was a pat on the back to our training program, 21 also a pat on the back to their dedication to their job, and 22 essentially the operators really shined through in this 1
23 program as doing an outstandinD Job.
l 24 It certainly didn't hurt us that we had tour months 25 of hot operations with the plant hot and not critical before 4
09 1
we went critical As you know, we went hot in June, and 2
stayed hot through the period while it was being handled in 3
the courts up until October 2nd when the Supreme Court gave us 4
permission, and we went to critical on October 3rd, So 5
handling the plant hot really helped us.
6 Material performance likewise was excellent.
We had 7
no major problems.
It was really amazing to me that after six 8
and a half year shutdown with a plant this size that we didn*t 9
have major problems.
I think the strong preventive 10 maintenance program that we have implemented and been working 11 on certainly contributed to this.
12 We also, as problems occurred, kept up with them.
13 On every single day we kept up with the small problems and 14 corrected them as they were small problems before they could 15 get bigger.
16 Some maintenance problems actually turned out to be 17 a blessing in disguise.
When we first put the turbine on the le line, you may remember we had a problem with leaking one-inch 19 drain valves ott the turbine control valves.
This problem 20 actually again was a blessing in disguise because it resulted 21 in about five start-ups of the turbine and putting the turbine 22 on the line and paralleling with a grid, which is one of the 23 major evolutions, So although we had a materiel problem at 24 the time that seemed to set us back, we were actually very 25 happy with it, because our crews all got training at this
70 i
i 1
evolution.
2 I might just say that in all these evolutions, we 3
had senior management onsite.
We had two shitt supervisors i
i 4
instead of one, both of whom were previously experienced.
The t
5 operations manager, Mike Moss, was there for almost every j
6 major evolution, and as we proceeded through the test program 7
and each crew got experience, we slowly backed ott and let 8
the crews themselves handle it with less supervision by 9
management.
l 10 On the steam generators, the primary to secondary 11 leak was consistent throughout the program and below the i
12 baseline which is gallons per hour.
It's been running 1
13 somewhere in the vicinity of about
.2 gallons per hour.
This 3
i 14 gives us confidence that the steam generator !!x that took two i
I i
15 to three years was successful, and that we do not have steam i
i j
16 generator leakage beyond the baseline.
i a
17 COMMISSIONEH ASSELSTINE:
How does that compare to 18 the steam generator leakage you experienced when you first I
l 19 started up?
i 20 MM. HUKILL; I don't think we ever measured it.
I i
21 don't think anybody ever really knows.
22 MR. CLANK:
I think it*s above what we had 2J MM. HOKILL:
Frobably above.
24 MM. CLAHK:
The spec is a gallon per minute, a
a 25 compared to a halt gallon an hour we experienced, and I l
{
}
l vi 1
believe that this number is consistent or below those with j
2 which other plants have operated, 3
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
All right.
4 MR. HOKILL:
One problem we did run into that was 5
unexpected was a deposit build-up on the secondary side of the 6
steam generators which really has absolutely nothing to do I
7 with the previous problems or detects on the internal side of i
8 the tubes.
The secondary problem, build-up of deposits, is 9
common to B&W steam generators.
We knew about this problem 10 before we went up.
We had graphs of steam generator level j
11 which is an indication of the problem.
As you build up the l
12 deposits, the delta P gets higher and your level goes up.
We 13 had graphs of this it did not indicate we would have the 14 problem for at least two or three cycles.
Come to find out 15 now, atter our first trip and this was a planned trip 16 that it knocked the deposits loose and they clogged the steam 17 generator and steam flow more, and we saw a sudden shift in 18 the level of about 20 percent, as I remember, right atter the s
19 tirst trip.
So that as we came up in power, we had a 20 temporary power limit of 80 percent, which we had not 21 expected, again, but did appear, and this was based on maximum 22 steam generator water level of 92 percent which had been 1
23 upgraded from formerly at 82 percent by safety analysis done 24 by us and B&W.
25 The power level, unexpectedly but very much to our
72 1
satisfaction, after the high level trip, the trip ai maximum 2
power, 68 percent, we saw another shift back and the steam 3
generator levels are now running down around '/ 2 percent, 72 4
to 79 percent, and we were able to achieve 100 percent power.
5 As I understand from the B&W history, sometimes the 6
trips help you to knock it loose and open up the passageways; 7
sometimes they make it worse.
Our first one made it worse; 8
the second one made it better.
9 I was told excuse me.
10 CHAIMMAN PALLADINO:
I was going to say, that stuti 1
11 doesn't float around, though, or does it?
12 MR. HUKILL.
No.
It does not ficat around, we don *t 13 think, and you can*t see it.
We tried to drain it down
/
14 atterwards and you could not see anything in there.
Ndw there I
15 are plans and there are procedures being developer for the 16 other units that we will be implementing latei on, probably at 17 our next refueling outage, to remove the deposits, and those 18 are in progress now.
7 19 What we did find out was the plants that run very 20 well and don't have trips, this deposit tends to build up and 21 solidities, and then when you have your first trip, it all i
i 22 comes loose and clogs the passage.
Our last run that ended, I l
23 guess, in 1979, was an extreately good run with a capacity 24 taator above 90 percent and ns trips.
So it we*d been smarter 23 and we knew more, we probably would have seen this coming, but i
l t
73 1
we didn*t, and certainly our graphs didn*t show it.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Do you think that the movement 3
of this clog could impose a limit on your power level later?
4 MM. HUXILL:
Yes, sir, I do.
I don *t 5
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
So you have to monitor 6
MM. HUXILL:
there*s that possibility that it i
7 could.
8 MR. CLARK:
It is not a safety issue, as we or I 9
think anybody else sees it.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, unless there is a sudden i
11 shitt, then I'm not sure how big a safety problem it is.
12 MM.
CLANK:
1 think, you know, that has been looked 13 at and the controls, we think, do protect you against any 1
l 14 safety issue trom this.
The concern is in getting the 15 generator water level high enough that it begins to interfere 1
4 16 or go out the peak pipes or things of that
,l 17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, I have a slightly 1
18 different philosophy than maybe others.
I think almost 1
,)
a 19 everything has a safety implication.
So 11 I see a problem i
20 t h a '. indicates some lack of understanding or some area that
)
21 maybe requires a litt1'e bit more exploration, I don't divide 22 1t into saiety versus nonsatety.
I think we ought to know 4
i 2 'J these plants well, we ought to know what they*re going to do.
24 As a matter of tact, the experience that 1 gained i
25 trom looking at all these reportable events is that it's the J
l
.n 1
balance-of-power that gives you the problem most of the time.
2 lt*s where the problems initiate and they eventually have some 3
intricate tie-in to the rest of the plant.
4 So while it may be that this is "not a safety 5
problem," I still think this is something we ought to try to 6
understand, because it there is a sudden shift that can take 7
place, it could have an impact on the overall operation of the 8
plant.
9 MM. CLARK:
I personally share that philosophy, and 10 while we are not planning to give an extensive discussion 11 today, we are going very aggressively to understand it and 12 attempt to remove the material I wouldn't want to leave the 13 impression that we are not doing anything about it.
We are, i
14 and I think are going atter it very aggressively.
1 i
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
What is this junk made out j
16 of, anyway?
We keep talking about material.
What is itt j
17 MR. HUKILL:
Well, as I understand, and from what l
18 I've gotten from the research that has been done so tar, that i
19 it varies from plant to plant.
It*s got magnetite in it, so 1
i 20 it*s probably got iron coming from somewhere in the piping and i'
21 deterioration of the piping.
It*s got chemicals that have 22 hardened on the tubes in it, and it will vary irom plant to l
2 *J plant And so our plans the first plan we have to have is t
24 tind out what we have in there, and then to make plans to get 25 it out, wnich is already being done in some of the other M&W l
_~,__,_________. __-,__ __-___._._,_,
.._y___
,~,, _.. _
75 1
plants.
2 i
MR. CLARK:
The other plants show that there are at i
3 least two problems.
One is a general, slow buildup of a 4
4 silica-based material within the hole.
And I think I heard 5
that described by somebody as the " cholesterol problem."
It 6
just kind of builds up inside the hole, and it is not hard, it 7
is not brittle, it's, you know, got some give and take to it.
9 The other problem has been referred to as the i
9 "cornflake problem."
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What is it?
11 MR. CLAHX:
Cornflake.
It tends to be magnetite, 12 which seems to have formed a scale on tubes, probably the 1 "J steam generator tubes themselves, and then during cooldown or 14 other transients, the scale breaks of into, you know, 15 sizeable, definitive, tend-to-be-brittle kinds of flakes.
16 We've seen each of those and a combination of them 17 in the other plants.
The plants that really have had the most 18 experience with this are Arkansas, Duke at Oconee, and they 19 are the tarthest advanced in the investigations, and really 20 what we've done is to buy into some of the technology and j
21 currective and preventive measures which are basically 22 hydraulic pulses to clean it out and ultimat91y chemical 2 :J cleaning of the secondary side, which is, I think, for anybody 24 probably a year or more away to be satisfied that you know how i
25 to clean it without causing some other unforeseen ettect.
l
i 76 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
It sounds like they*re all 2
products of an alkaline water environment, though, much like 3
you get in your plumbing.
4 MR. O'LEANY:
Commissioner, one explanation that I 5
tound useful from the Statt is as follows:
Anything that 6
comes into the once-through steam generators in the way of 7
impurities, because of the nature of the mechanism that goes 8
on in there, the 11 ashing into supercritical steam at the top, 9
stays in, and even though you have an exquisite degree of 10 control over the material going in, even a tiny, tiny bit at 11 impurities in parts per million stays there, and over time, it 12 butids up with the enormous volumes that go through.
I 'J And I suspect that what we are going to have to do 14 is find a way to deal with the stuit and to get it out 15 periodically in order to keep down the ditticulties in terms 16 of plant operations.
17 MM. CLAME:
Water purity is at parts per billion of 18 tron, but at 10 million pounds per hour and, you know, 19 multiply it out, you're going to have to find ways to remove 20 it.
It*s not practical, in our view, to prevent'its getting 21 in there in quantities of concern.
22 CHA!HMAN PALLADINO:
Do you have moret 2 'J MR. HUKILL:
Just to go on with the presentation, as 24 tar as incidents go, we really have had no incidents with 25 significant safety implications.
Obviously with this number
??
1 of people and an operation this big, we did have some 2
personnel errors, some small incidents.
Each one of these 3
were critiqued, so that the lessons learned could be passed to 4
everyone.
5 We have two unplanned trips.
We had gone all 6
through October and November with no unplanned trips, and we 7
were looking to keep going.
Both trips came from the 6
secondary side.
One was a relay that either had drifted lower 9
or had been set low on the generator output.
The second trip 10 was on our final startup after the last high-level trip from a 11 high-level moisture separator.
Again as in the material 12 problems, both of these trips proved one thing to us.
During i
13 all the rest of the test program, we had excess management 14 there, lots of people there, everybody watching.
Both of 15 these trips occurred in the middle of the night at about two i
'l 16 or three o' clock, with one shift on, and both trips were 17 handled in a highly professional manner, and in both cases, 18 the plant was back online, basically critical within twelve 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> or making power within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
20 The meterial problems I mentioned, we didn*t have 21 major material problems, the buildup in the steam generator 2
22 being the major one we have now.
i 2'J Radiation releases, olisite releases and this is 24 considering the man standing next to the fence around a 25 controlled area of the island -- was less than.01 millirem i
o 78 1
total, and that's a figure as of the end of 1985, which the 2
test program ended about January 3rd, and we had figures 3
through the end at 1983.
A person-rem of 11 person-rem is the 4
exposure to the workers on the site at TMI-1 during the 5
period, October through December.
Total for the year now, 1 6
believe, has been figured out for 1983 to be somewhere around 7
78.
i 8
There was no increase above normal background 9
variation in olisite monitoring.
l 10 I mentioned before that management emphasis was 11 required and is required.
Phil mentioned this.
We do need 12 some improvement in implementation and updating of 13 administrative control procedures.
We need to pay more 14 attention and improvement in work habits in areas outside of i
15 the control room.
These are the two major areas that I feel l
16 at this time and, 1 believe, that your Statt found in 17 monitoring.
18 In involvement with NEC inspections, as Phil 19 mentioned, I thought the relationship with the inspectors was 20 exceptionally good.
I, trankly, before we started, was i
i 21 worried about having inspectors around the clock, looking over 22 my operators' shoulders with a notebook and a pencil in their 23 hand.
It actually worked out very well The level of 24 inspection was unprecedented with 3000 inspection hours in i
25 about 94 days.
That's normally, I think, what a plant gets in
79 1
about a year.
2 Around-the-clock coverage initially and for all 3
evolutions.
They did back ott to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> for awhile and then i
4 to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> towards the end.
5 We did need to obtain Region I Administrator j
6 permission for all major evolutions, such as criticality, 7
power l e it e l changes, return to power after planned trips.
8 We had no signittoant interface problems with the 9
NRC We actually had very close dealings with them.
And one 10 of the surprise things to me in talking to my people was the 11 benefit gained by having these people there, because we had 12 inspectors from all various Hegions, all areas of the country, i
13 and they brought with them new ideas, new suggestions, things 14 that they saw at their plant that maybe could help us do 15 better, and they were very tree in giving this information, 16 and yet at the same time did not interfere with our operations 17 and made sure that when they had things to say particularly to 18 us, they got with senior management and let the operators IV operate the plant.
P 20 As Phil said, we've got many more inspections to 21 come, and we need to be prepared for those and work on those.
22 Demonstrations, the night the Supreme Court made the 23 decision, we had 45 about, plus or minus a tow, demonstrators 24 at the gate.
We have seen absolutely none since.
25 In news coverage, our poltoy is full disclosure at r.
80 1
everything that happens at the plant.
We have tried to live 2
up to that.
We have a tull media statt to ensure we do that, 3
and we have had considerable local coverage.
The only thing 4
that I see that this hurts a little bit is, it still 5
accentuates the negative and does not very much put out the 6
positive.
7 Emergency exercise, this is our annual emergency 8
exercise, was conducted in the middle of this period on 9
November 20th.
We had tull Region I participation and 10 coordination with us.
Their team came down and participated.
11 This is a first for us.
12 There was good performance by GPUN personnel, good 13 participation and performance by state and local agencies, and 14 it was our first exercise with TMI-1 in power.
15 Our future schedule, we intend to operate at maximum 16 power, and depending upon material conditions in the plant, 17 continue that into about March, early to mid-March, when wo 18 will go into the eddy current outage, which is required by 19 tech specs now, by license amendment.
We figure the eddy 20 current outage will be about six weeks.
We will come back up 21 to power, continue through the cycle, which will probably go 22 our best estimate now is January 1987 for refueling outage.
23 At the same time, during the eddy current outage, we 24 will be inspecting the steam generator secondary side to 25 determine what the deposits are, the best way to remove them,
81 1
using the technology developed by the other B&W plants, and be 2
ready to do that during the January refueling outage.
3 In summary, the test program, I'm personally very 4
pleased, and I think it was highly successful.
It certainly 5
exceeded even my expectations, which were high to start with.
6 It was an excellent training period, considerable operational 7
experience gained by our crews, which, as you know, we had a 8
number of new people in the crews.
We have gone now for a 9
period I think it's about three years without having any 10 operators leave the company.
We have moved some to different 11 positions for training, but we have not had anybody resign.
12 We have now got a reasonably experienced crew.
13 The one thing we've got to worry about is, we can*t 14 become complacent, and we can't think we're that good.
We've 15 still got a lot to learn, and we've got enough to do to keep 16 us busy to achieve the goals we*ve set for ourselves, and our 17 primary goal is continued sate operation of TMI-1 18 Thank you.
19 CHAIMMAN PALLADINO:
Okay, thank you.
20 I have two questions.
Mr. Murley, the Regional 21 Administrator at Region I,
had some kind remarks to say about 22 the operators at TMI-1 He said, "The plant is very good.
2 *J The plant is clean.
And with regard to management, there is 24 quite a depth of talent."
25 However, he went on to indicate that the Three Mile
82 J
1 Island nuclear plant "needs to improve the attitude of its 2
employees, to make them more careful about following proper 3
procedures."
4 And I was just wondering what comment you had about 5
that, and also what plans you have or what are you doing to 6
try to cope with the attitude question with regard to 7
procedures?
l 8
MM. HUKILL:
Yes, sir.
That was -- we knew about 9
that comment-We certainly agreed with that comment.
But I 10 don't want to leave the impression that we've got a bunch of 11 bad workers and a bunch of great management.
12 It is management's job to get the procedural 13 compliance issue down to the people and ensure that it's 14 happening.
That's my job; that's my people's job; it's up to 1
15 us to see that this happens.
l 16 As a first step in this area. I have talked to I
17 won't say ever single person, because somebody was probably on 16 vacation, but I have been with every crew, every group on the 19 island, and talked this subject with them.
I have instructed 20 my monitors in the plant who wora for me to be alert for this, j
21 people who monitor on the oft-shift tours.
We have people go 22 through at nighttime and holidays and weekends, that sort at 23 thing.
And I also have talked to the QA Department and asked 24 them to be on the alert for this and to keep me cut in on 25 these two areas of where we're going.
9
o 83 1
I think we're making improvements.
I don't think it 2
was a major safety issue.
It was more the administrative type 3
procedure, that people just weren't sure that we were going to 4
enforce.
And we are going to enforce.
5
-COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
The sense I had i r os' 6
talking with some of our people was there were two kinds of
?
concerns that they had with the startup program.
a 8
On the procedures side, it was not that the peop14 9
weren't doing things properly, but they weren't following the i
10 existing procedure in some instances, and rather than go back 11 and use the administrative controls and get the procedure 12 changed, they would simply do steps, for example, out of the 13 order listed, knowing that that was the proper way to do them.
14 Is that your sense on the procedural side as some of 15 the examples?
i 16 MM. HUKILL:
Yes, sir.
That is one of the problems, 17 although we have had some problems where not major 18 procedures, but administrative procedures people have not 19 been totally familiar with them.
20 But your problem is a correct one, as you stated, in 21 that some procedures, people knew they weren't right and 22 weren't changing them, and this is one of the areas that I've 23 addressed and one of the areas that I'm now getting trequent 24 daily reports on, that we are making the changes to the i
25 procedure, and we don't operate with a procedure that*s not t
,~ - _ _ _
84 1
correct, knowing it*s not correct.
2 COMMISSIONEM ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
The sense I had from 3
our Stati is that,your process for changing p r oc e dtir e s is a 4
pretty ettective one.
It*s just a question of getting the 5
message across to people that you expect it to be followed, 6
and it there's a problem with the procedure, you change it and 1
7 get it corrected.
8 MM. HUKILL:
Yes, sir, and I agree with that.
9 COMMISS10NEN ASSELSTINE:
On the work habits side, I 10 gather part of the concern was that our inspectors would see i
11 instances in which people would, rather than go get a ladder l
12 or put up a scattold, they would j 's s t climb on equipment, and l
13 that gave some cause for concern to our folks.
14 How are you going about getting the message across 15 that there needs to be a respect 4 6 the equipment in the 4
16 plant and to treat it 17 MR. HUKILL:
Heally the same way in that I have 18 well, basically I feel it*s a supervisor *s job to see that i
19 this is done right, the immediate, on-the-spot supervisor.
20 They have got to support us.
They are the primary people 1 21 have talked to on this.
22 The second thing is that I have our people that are 23 looking down in the spaces on the ott-hours, seeing how people 24 their work habits in the plant.
I might just s a," that, you 25 know, we got to the point at one time, I had a s tir-d ; F i s o r down
85 1
there, and they were working in the emergency feedpump area, 2
and people were climbing on things, and he raised cane with i
j 3
them and said, "Get a ladder in there and get it secured, and 4
don't climb on the thing," and low and behold, they did that, 5
and they lett the ladder in there, 6
LLaughter.1 f
7 So sometimes we're not totally successful, but I 8
think we're making progress in that area, and I think it's a 9
vitally important area to us, because it we have trips, it wo 10 have problems, it can easily be caused outside the control 11 room by inappropriate work habits.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
13 MM. CLARK:
I think without minimizing the need for 14 continued attention, which we do not, the degree of procedural 15 compliance has been fairly good, and the NSCC, in parthoular, 16 has commented on that and on the worker attitudes.
17 We have been working on that problem since March of 18 1980, when shortly after arriving, one of the things I put out 19 was the instruction, "We will tollow the procedures or change 1
20 it,"
getting everybody everyday to do that on everything, 21 particularly the administrative procedures, when they know 22 it's okay, is an area that just needs continued attention ana 23 will be getting it,
)
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I would share the 25 perception that Joe gave, that when I talked with our Region I 1
06 1
folks, they we,re quite positive about the experience of the 2
start up, and they indicated that that reflected not only 3
their view, but the view of the inspectors that were drawn 4
from other parts of the country.
l 5
You are right, I think, when you talked about 6
coverage where the focus still is on the negative, and I 7
think it will be for some time to come.
You always can expect 8
tocus on incidents or problems that you have in the operation 9
of the plant.
10 One of the things I*ve suggested to Region I,
11 perhaps in conjunction with the upcoming SALP meeting, is that 12 perhaps they try to have some meetings in the area with some l
l 13 of the local groups to provide an overall perspective on the i
14 operational experience and discuss both of the problem areas It that have been identitled and the areas where we*ve viewed the 16 operation as being quite successful, and indeed more 17 successtui that I think some of you all or we anticipated in
}
18 terms of mechanical problems with the plant.
19 I would otter one other suggestion on that score, 20 though.
One of the concerns I hear trom both our folks and 21 from people in the area is that when something happens at the 22 plant, there is obvious local concern, and it would be useful 23 to provide tactual information on what occurred as soon as 24 possible.
I hear some trustration, and it*s directed both at 25 us and you, that when something happens, it takes awhile to i
87 1
get information, to find out what went on.
You get a 2
statement that everything is okay, that there*s not a problem, 3
but without some of the tactual information to support that.
4 And I think even some of our tolks have suggested that you 5
might think about an expanded role on your part.
6 We have to worry about that as well, because people 7
look to us for scme independent judgment on these things.
But 8
that*s a suggestion that you might consider as an area where 9
you might be able to do more.
10 MR. CLARK:
Well, we will 11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I was going to say, that was my 12 second area, and I think it*s related to developing public 13 confide'nce, and communication is perhaps one of the most 14 important steps it can take.
15 The hour is getting late.
But at our next session, le discuss in more depth what steps GPU has been taking to try to 17 improve public confidence.
I know you mentioned it in your 18 remarks, Phil.
19 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
It I might make one comment, i
20 Mr. Chairman, I agree with that on public confidence.
I do 21 think that would be something that you should continue to do, 22 but to try to do even better.
It*s important, I think.
The 23 public should be informed, and I think anything you can do to i
24 improve that would be the right thing to do.
25 I agree that your program has been very successful, l
l l
l 88 1
although you have had some minor problems which you've alluded 2
to.
And I appreciate the fact that you shouldn't be 3
complacent.
You are being watched very carefully, not only by 4
us, but by the public and others.
You've simply got to do it right.
There is a lot of pressure on you.
But as far as I'm 6
concerned. I expect you to do it right, and I expect you to go 7
by procedures, and I expect you to really do it absolutely in 8
an excellent manner.
9 You simply have no other alternative, as far as I'm 10 concerned, but to perform that way.
So I don't think you 11 should be complacent.
I think you should be ever vigilant and 1
12 mindful and just continue to do the job you ve done, but 13 recognizing that you simply have to do it in an excellent 14 manner.
i 1$
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay.
Thank you, Lando.
16 Are there any other comments?
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
One quick question, 18 perhaps.
Have you all looked at these overcooling transients 19 at Rancho Seco to determine whether to what extent you 20 sutter from the same kind of design vulnerabilities that seen 21 to be a problem with the integrated control system out there?
22 MR. CLARK:
Yes, we have.
And of course, I don't 23 think anybody knows everything yet that happened at Rancho 24 Seco.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
1
~
89 1
MR. CLANK:
But we've looked and concluded that we 2
are different, less vulnerable to the initiating event, and 3
our ICS really is different.
I think.the more we've looked at 4
it, the more I have concluded that we should not lump all ICS 5
systems, just because they've got the same acronym, into one 6
bucket.
They control different things.
They're designed 7
ditterently.
And there are a couple of things that I think 0
are maybe readily explainable that say we're different.
9 In terms of the rate at which you can inject water 10 into the generator and cause the overcooling, our design fix, 11 after the overcooling event, was a passive flow limiter in the 12 pipe, which limits the rate at which water can be introduced.
13 I think that's a significant advantage.
14 In addition, our response to the Crystal River event 15 in terms of the loss of power to the ICS/NNI allows the 16 operator to find what power was lost.
It tells him where the 17 instruments tail We had a partial loss of ICS power a couple le of months ago, and as I recall, the operator identified it, 19 tound it in two and a halt minutes.
There was a third similar
]
20 element.
21 But I think there are a number of things, and we 22 participated with the other B&W owners in a presentation to a 23 large group of the Statt here last week and are very actively 1
24 involved in looking at that.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Good.
9U 1
MR. CLARK:
That is not to say that there won *t be I
2 some lessons for us also when we get to the bottom of this, 3
but I think we do feel there are a number of major differences 4
which make us less vulnerable and better able to cope.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
- Okay, Well, thank you very
?
much, gentlemen.
This has been very useful, 8
I would urge you to maintain the vigilance that you 9
have shown so far, as Commissioner Zech has said.
10 MR. CLARK:
Thank you.
We appreciate the chance to 11 make the presentations.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Thank you.
We will stand 13 adjourned.
14
[Whereupon, at 12:2U o' clock, p.m.,
the Commission 15 meeting was adjourned.3 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
=
1 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 2
3 4
5 This is to certify that the attached proceedings 6
before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the 7
matter of.
COMMISSION MEETING e
9 Name of Proceeding:
Briefing by GPU on TMI-2 Cleanup and TMI-l Operational Experience (Public to Meeting) t 11 Occket No.
12 Place:
Washington, D.
C.
]
19 Cate:
Tuesday, January 14, 1986 14 15 were held as herein appears and that this is the original 16 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 17 Pegulatory Commission.
13 (Signature)
,1
_jf,,,, f cMns (Typed Name of Reporter)
Lynn Nations 20 21 22 23 Ann Riley & Associates. Ltd.
24 25 w
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1/3/S6 SCHECU!.:'3
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BRIEFING BY GPU ON TM1-2 CLEANUP AND IMI-1 UPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE SCHEDULED:
10:00 A.M., TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1986 (OPEN)
AGENDA:
- W.G. KUHNS 3 MIN INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
- P.R. CLARK 10 MIN ORGANIZATION AND SCHEDULE
- F.R. STANDERFER 20 MIN DEFUELIllG AND DECONTAMINATION WORK
~
- E.E. KINTNER 10 MIN PROJECT COMPLETION CRITERIA
- J.F. O' LEARY 5 MIN
SUMMARY
- P.R. CLARK 5 MIN UPDATE ON IMI-l STATUS
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- 2000 l
1985
- 700 1
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WITHIN OR BELOW THE NRC PEIS VALUES OF 13,000 to 48,000 PERSON-REM.
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I Y
January 14, 1986 STATEMENT OF GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION AND GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION ON TMI-2 CLEANUP BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0pti!SSION Mr. Chaiman and Comissioners:
I am William G. Kuhns, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Public Utilities Corporation (GPU) and a Director of GPU Nuclear Corporation (GPUN).
I appreciate your courtesy in granting GPU Nuclear's request to meet with you today to provide a status report on the TMI-2 Cleanup.
Following that report, we are prepared to provide a sumary of the Startup operations of TMI-1, as you requested.
With me today are John F. O' Leary, Chaiman of the Board of GPUN, Philip R. Clark, President and Chief Executive Officer of GPUN, and members of the GPUN staff.
Dr. James Fletcher, Chairman of the GPUN TMI-2 Safety Advisory Board (SAB), is unable to be here today, but he has prepared a statement containing the observations of the SAB over the last year.
That statement is included in the presentation material provided you. ( Appendix B)
We last met with you to discuss TMI-2 on November 7,1984.
Since then a number of important milestones in the TMI-2 Program have been passed.
The reactor vessel plenum has been removed.
A complete system for removing damaged fuel debris was designed, tested and installed over the open reactor vessel.
Defueling operations commenced on October 30, 1985.
Throughout this period, considerable progress was made in obtaining further understanding of the conditions of the damaged core and in planning an increased effort to decontaminate the TMI-2 buildings and systems.
. In accordance with the financial plan we presented to you in 1904, a total of $122 million was provided for the TMI-2 Project in 1985, $2 million of which was advanced from the 1986 budget late in the year to intensify decontamination efforts in the reactor building.
$124 million is budgetec; for 1986.
More than the $25 million promised as the first year's contribution from private utilities through the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) has been received.
Japanese participation in the Cleanup is continuing as promised with
$3 million of funding provided annually and a totai of more than 20 professionals working at TMI-2 and in Idaho National Ergineering Laboratory to help understand the safety implications of the accident.
Funding from the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey and from GPU customers also continues as planned.
We have spent through 1985 a total of $615 million of the estimated
$985 million Clear.up cost.
There is, however, a potential funding problem.
Tne funding plan, which we provided you when we last met, relied upon total offset funding f or work at TMI-2 of $83 million from the Federal Government.
We have been advised that, as of this time, that funding for 1986 will be $5.5 million less than the planned level of $18 million, and we understand that the Department of Energy may not provide as much funding in subsequent years as was planned.
. )
i Reductions in the Federal Government's funding support would threaten not only the ability to obtain the maximum possible information from work at TMI-2, but it also threatens the ability to obtain infonnation from examination of the damaged core materials.
A thorough understanding of the TMI-2 accident scenario and the implications for safety that understanding would provide are, in our judgment, of great importance to the utility industry and to the NRC.
Furthermore, reductions in Government funding could undennine the commitments of others to Cleanup funding.
Efforts are underway to have DOE funding restored in accordance with prior comitments, and we are proceeding on the basis these efforts will be successful.
When we last met, I committed to you the GPU System's full support for completing the Cleanup of TMI-2 and for operation of TMI-l with priority given to fully assuring public and worker health and safety.
I reaffirm those comitments today.
i I would now like to turn over the presentation to Mr. Clark.
,m-.,
o i
l
_4 (Mr. Clark)
I too am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you the TMI-2 Cleanup and our assessment of the TMI-l Startup Program.
As you may recall from our previous discussions, Cleanup operations at TMI-2 are carried out by an integrated organization of GPU Nuclear and 1
Bechtel.
The Vice President and Director of the TMI-2 Project is a GPUN employee, Mr. Frank Standerfer, who is with us today; the Deputy Director is a Bechtel employee.
We have expended considerable effort in strengthening and integrating the organization into an effective whole.
We believe the organization is working well.
As of the end of 1985, the total GPUN manning in the Project is over 500, the total Bechtel manning is about 275.
With 300 craf t workers from Catalytic Corporation, there are a total of about 1100 persons working on the Cleanup.
As completion of Cleanup approaches, it is obvious to members of the THI-2 staff that there must be a reductior. in the number of persons working on the Project.
To assure that the necessary staff in both quality and quantity is available to see the Cleanup to its end, we have developed and announced a i
special program intended to provide confidence to GPUN personnel working at TMI-2 that we value them as employees and will work with them to utilize their talent in the future if they continue to support the Cleanup efforts as long as they inre needed.
. We are two months into Defueling Operations.
That effort has had a number of startup problems due to the unprecedented and developmental nature of the work, but it is gaining momentum, and we expect to ship the first fuel off site under our contract with the DOE this Spring; to complete in-reactor vessel defueling by April 1987, complete decontacination by July 1988, and complete the Cleanup Project in September 1988.
In summary, our budget, i
project manning, schedule and planning are generally consistent with the infonnation we provided you in November 1984.
As preparations for defueling neared completion, we took steps to proceed i
more intensively with planning and conduct of the remaining major phase of' the operation, that of decontamination of the reactor building and reactor systems.
Organizational changes were made to focus responsibility for this effort. Additional funds were advanced by GPU in 1985 to commence build up of equipment and trained personnel for the work, and an overall decontamination plan establishing criteria, techniques and schedules for decontamination of each portion of the plant was developed.
Throughout the TMI-2 Cleanup Project we have continued to utilize the Technical Assistance and Advisory Group (TAAG), which is funded by DOE and directed by GPUN, DOE, and NRC.
It meets monthly for two days at TMI to render its best judgment and advice on the major technical problem areas in what is, to a large degree, a Research and Development Program.
Further, our Safety Advisory Board (SAB) continues to meet on a quarterly basis to review all aspects of the Project from the standpoint of public and worker safety.
You have a report on the SAB's conclusions in your package.
. Let me quote several of the most significant parts of the SAB's report:
The members of the Board are unanimous in their opinion that TMI-2 does not currently pose a significant risk to public or worker health and safety.
The Board's continuing review of Cleanup activities supports the conclusion that the risks are substantially less than those associated with an operating plant.
In the Board's estimation, the progress and efficiency of the Cleanup have improved markedly over the years as the GPUNC/Bechtel integrated project organization has improved it ability to function as a team.
One primary concern that the Board shares with the senior management of GPUNC is the need to ensure that no criticality or release to the environment can occur.
This requires controls such as the use of boron and a constant evaluation of fuel locations, conditions, and removal methods.
To this end, the Board has strongly requested that the ex-vessel fuel characterization program be given parity with the in-vessel defueling program currently in progress.
An additional concern of the Board involves progress of the decontamination and dose reduction work.
The recent acceleration of this program by GPUNC is strongly l
endorsed by the Board and will be closely monitored by the Board members most knowledgeable on the subject.
1
. A final concern of the Board is the need to educate the public on the nature of the Cleanup and the true level of risk associated with it.
The undue concern with which the public views TMI-2 is itself a source of concern to the Board.
Every effort should be made to reassure the public that its safety and interests are being served.
I want to assure you that we are taking all practical steps to go forward with the TMI-2 Cleanup as quickly as practicable, consistent with the safety of the public and workers.
We believe that the present organization and funding arrangements allow the Project to proceed at the best rate consistent with the nature of the task and considerations of safety.
We intend those circumstances should continue until completion of the Project.
I would now like to turn over the presentation to F.R. Standerfer, who is Vice President and Director of the TMI-2 Project. He will describe to you the status of the defueling operation and preparation for final decontamination; then E.E.Kintner, the Executive Vice President of GPUN, who has the primary I
responsibility within the GPUN Office of the President for TMI-2 matters, will discuss our consideration of the Endpoint criteria for the Cleanup Project.
i l
i
o
. (F.R.Standerfer)
Let me begin by saying that I have been struck during the 18 months I have been Director of TMI-2 to what degree the TMI-2 Cleanup is a first of a kind, developmental task.
A particular point is how our understanding of the accident and the damage to the core changes with each new investigation within the reactor vessel.
Based on the analysis of fuel debris samples at INEL, DOE concludes that some fuel during the accident reached temperatures high enough to melt UO, about 5100 F.
In several television inspections of the lower 2
head of the reactor vessel, we found piles of previously melted core material.
Tne material is in chunks resembling lava rock and is estimated to total 10-15 tons of material.
The chunks range in size from pea size gravel to pieces several inches across.
This material is relatively porous with an 3
average bulk density of 6.5 to 8 gms/cm, and it appears to be friable.
We also sad pieces within the lower core support flow divider.
These were larger than the 6 inch diameter flow holes.
With the amount of fuel debris we have seen in the lower reactor head and 1
from ex-vessel fuel location estimates made by gama spectroscopy, we conclude j
that about 99% of the damaged fuel is in the reactor vessel.
Relatively i
little fuel was transported to the rest of the primary system.
l l
9 Internal reactor vessel examinations have found no apparent damage to the exterior of the core support assembly, the reactor vessel wall, or the portions of the reactor vessel bottom head that are visible.
While we may still find some damage to the reactor vessel bottom head under the pile of debris, our analysis of the reactor vessel temperature / pressure performance after the accident leads us to the conclusion that the bottom head is sufficiently sound to allow defueling to proceed safely.
When the plenum was removed in May, we found the center of its underside severely damaged by overheating.
However, the upper parts of the plenum and the lower outside diameter were undamaged, and the plenum lifted from the vessel with no binding.
In March we devoted a TAAG meeting to reviewing all we know about fuel damage and current fuel conditions.
The goal was to conclude what happened during the accident and predict what we will find in yet uninspected parts of the damaged core.
That review, based on evaluations by EG&G, leads to the following core damage speculation by TAAG and EG&G. (See Figures 1, 2, and 3.)
e
i
.- At 174 minutes into the accident (approximately 6.54 a.m.), just prior to reinitiation of B main coolant pump operation, the water level in the reactor vessel had dropped to a point that left approximately the top 8 feet of the 12 foot core uncovered.
The upper part of the core was severely overheated, cladding had reacted with steam; and a solidified layer had formed in the core at the water line. Then the core was reflooded by starting the B main coolant pump. This rapid quenching of the hot upper part of the core shattered it and formed the visible pile of debris and void that exists in the upper part of the 6riginal core volume.
Then the layer that solidified at the previous water line blocked cooling of portions of the lower part of the core.
Those portions of the lower core slowly heated to form a pocket of molten material that vented downward into the bottom of the reactor vessel about an hour later (approximately 7:45 a.m. ).
Of course, this damage scenario has not yet been confinned, but it is generally consistent with information presently in hand about in-vessel conditions. Whether we will, in fact, find a void in the lower part of the core is speculative.
1 We have prepared a short video tape whicn will quickly summarize what we now know of conditions in the reactor vessel (show tape).
The DOE R&D support to the Project has been important.
The support has contributed such essential items as the early development of decontamination techniques, the design and procurement of defueling tools, and analysis of i
core conditions through experiments in PBF and LOFT at INEL.
l l
l l
An
- In
- addition, the DOE has funced first-of a-kind operations and inspections, and provided technical assistance through the TAAG, EG&G and other DOE contractois.
The special coring rig that will be used this spring to sample and inspect the damaged fuel below the "hard layer" has been provided by DOE This rig will be used to obtain complete core samples down through the lower support plate at several iocations, so as to accurately define conditions at each level.
I think the importance of the DOE RD&D program was best sumarized by R. R. Hobbins (EG&G) at the 1985 Sumer Nuclear Power Reactor Sdfety Series at MIT. He said:
"If nuclear reactor safety researchers cannot denonstrate a clear understanding of the TMI-2 accident, they have little hope of reaching consensus within the technical comunity on source term issues and even less of convincing the public and decision makers of the safety of nuclear power.
It is not enough to state the obvious--that despite the severity of the damage to the core of the THI-2 reactor no significant public health consequences resulteo.
The scientific comunity and the public demand that we fully understand how the accident progressed and why the public health consequences were so benign."
l
. For our part, we are working with all responsible parties, particularly DOE and its laboratories and EPRI, to ensure that all infonnation and insights gained from our work are made fully and promptly available to those interested.
For example, in October wc co-sponsored with DOE a two day American Nuclear Society Executive Level Topical Conference, "TM1-2 A Learning Experience."
The overall Cleanup schedule is shown in Figure 4.
In 1983 the defueling concept was for a remote, underwater shredder system with the shredded fuel slurry pumped out of the containment building.
With that concept, it was estimated that defueling could be initiated in late 1986. At the start of 1984, the defueling concept was changed to the use of manual tools operated from a work platform mounted over the reactor vessel, and an intentionally difficult goal for the start of defueling was set for July 1,1985--an improvement in schedule of about 15 months over the remote defueling concept.
Early in 1985, a detailed schedule was prepared which included all the preparation work for the start of defueling, including:
hardware receipt, installation, and testing; procedures preparation and approval; training and licensing of defueling supervisurs; mockup testing, and safety analyses and approvals. That schedule analysis indicated we could not complete all the many sof tware and hardware tasks by July, and a target date of September 10 was established.
Defueling operations were actually started on October 30.
l
.- Defueling activities to date are shown in Figure 5.
This has been a period of gaining experience with the defueling equipment and tools, with defueling operators and support teams gaining experience, and with modifying and improving tools, lights, cameras, protective clothing, comunications, and work scheduling.
We continue to learn and improve our rate of fuel removal.
As a precaution, the work in November was performed in respirators until we developed enough experience to conclude that the level of airborne radioactivity was low enough to pennit work without them.
Without respirators the operators have better visibility, better communications, and can work longer.
The beginning work periods were used to modify the fuel debris bed so that canister handling equipment could be installed.
During the week of November 12, we conducted operations for five days straight for about seven hours a day. We loaded the first fuel material, but also concluded that with the tangle of fuel pins and fuel assembly hardware, we could not directly load with any reasonable efficiency.
So for the next three weeks, we shifted to an operation using a l arge cutting tool to cut down the tangle of overhanging core debris.
. On December 5, we again shifted to loading fuel and also changed froni an eight-hour defueling day to a twelve-hour defueling day.
Fous fuel cans weie loaded with fuel assembly end fittings, and fuel pins were loaded into a debris bucket prior to the Christmas week when we conducted a number of scheduled inspections and sample collection operations.
During New Years week we resumed defueling operations and demonstrated the practicality of the vacucming system for collecting small size fuel debris.
We will soon be conducting defueling operations on a 7 day, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day, basis.
We have scheduled defueling over the next nine to twelve weeks to remove the loose fuel debris down to the "hard layer."
That quantity of material represents about 20 to 25% of the damaged core.
At that point, working together with EG8G, we will obtain core samples from the unkncwn core region below the hard layer for detailed hot cell examinations at INEL.
That coring activity will take about four weeks.
After core boring and before we remove i
the EG&G coring machine, we plan to use it to drill a number of holes through the hard layer as an aid to further fuel removal.
l l
. DOE has procured two specially designed rail casks to ship the TM1-2 fuel to INEL for storage.
GPUN has procured a fuel transfer cask and loading interface equipment from the same supplier.
The final mate-up and check out i
tests of this fuel loading and shipping equipment will be perfonned next month at the DOE Hanford site.
We now estimate the first fuel shipment to leave Three Mile Island in early May.
GPU will load the casks and transfer the shipment to DOE on site.
DOE will then take responsibility for shipment from there to INEL.
It will take about two years to ship all the fuel.
In order to quantify any accumulations of damaged fuel in ex-vessel locations, we have developed and are using a technique which is based on gama spectroscopy measurement of Cerium 144 Cerium is insoluble and therefore remains with the damaged fuel in predictable proportions.
The measurements are made external to systems and components.
The technique appears to be sensitive enough to detect as little as i kg of fuel depending on geometry and vessel wall thicknesses.
So far we have used this method to measure fuel quantities in several ex-vessel locations, such as the pressurizer and the A-steam generator upper head.
l These external measurements indicated 8 to 25 kg of fuel are in the pressurizer.
In December we removed the manway cover from the pressurizer i
and performed an internal visual inspection.
This qualitatively confirmed i
the external measurements of contained fuel; samples have been taken for quantitative analysis.
We expect to make a similar internal inspection of the A-steam generator upper head next month, r
l
.a e Based on ex vessel inspections to date, it appears that very little fuel was transported out of the reactor vessel.
The maximum quantity found in any single location to date is in the letdown' cooler system and appears to be less than 33 kgs.
Our current estimate of the total quantity of ex-vessel fuel is about 125 kgs.
s In addition to defueling, the other major project task is the s
decontamif,ation of the plant.
We continue to make significant progress in releasing more of the auxiliary building spaces for unrestricted access and reducing radiation level s in work spaces.
By July 1986 we will have installed and begun to use a system to flush, remove, and solidify sediments from auxiliary tanks and from the containment building basement floor.
Major dose reduction efforts are scheduled 'this' year in the "D ring" areas in containment which contain the steam generators and main coolant piping.
This is necessary to support ex-vessel fuel location and removal activities.
Finally, the decontamination effort in the basement of the containment building, most of which must be done with robots, will start in late 1986 and will be a primary focus of the Project in 1987.
Figure 6 is an update of the occupational radiation levels in the containment building.
As you can see, our dose reduction work continues to lower the mean exposure levels on the two main operating levels - elevation 305' and elevation 547'.
In addition, we have included the exposure level that the defueling operations are experiencing on the defueling platform.
It has the lowest occupational radiation level in the building.
. Indicated on this same figure are the results of robotic radiation surveys in the basement level (elevation 282').
There has been no manned entry to this area since the accident.
Sumarized in Table 1 are the Person Rem expenditures to date.
We now expect to complete the Cleanup at a total Person Rem level which is comparable to the lower end of the NRC PEIS range.
Now I will turn to Ed Kintner who will discuss our efforts ta achieve an agreed Endpoint.
l l
l
[
18-(E.E.Kintner)
As the Comi ssion will appreciate, the circumstances of THI 'c are unique.
There are few available precedents, either technical or regulatory, on which to pattern recovery and Project Endpoint criteria.
We have, therefore, been working since the release by NRC of its PEIS Revision in 1984 to arrive at a reasonable definition of the Endpoint of the Cleanup; that is, achieving a secure, safe condition, such that there is virtually no hazard to the public or the environment.
This, as we see it, is not a decommissioned status, either real or implied.
Rather, it would be a safe and secure Project Endpoint which would preserve plant disposition options.
To that end we have identified preliminarily a set of general criteria for the Endpoint. These are stated as follows:
'he overall objectives of the TMI-2 Recovery Program are to effectively remove any significant risk to public and worker health and safety from potential releases of radioactivity and to monitor the plant to prevent any risk developing, while minimizing the radiation exposure to the Cleanup workforce.
l i
We believe these objectives will be achieved when:
The possibility of criticality is no longer credible.
Fuel removed from the plant has been shipped off site.
t The potential for fission product mobility has been eliminated for all practical purposes; i.e.,
radioactive
- water, airborne J
contamination, and loose surface contamination will be removed or controlled.
Radiation levels are reduced to permit access for continued plant monitoring.
Water is removed from plant systems and spaces and the potential for reintroduction of water precluded.
i Special systems are provided for fire detection and prevention, and for security.
A safe, monitored plant condition is established.
We are calling that condition Interim Monitored Storage.
These criteria have been discussed in a general way with the TAAG, the SAB and the NRC Advisory Panel For Decontamination of Three Mile Island Unit 2, i
but the concurrence of none of these bodies has yet been sought.
1 In September 1985, we established a TMI-2 Strategic Planning Task Force to develop a strategy for meeting the criteria given above.
That Task Force has now produced a draft Strategic Program Plan for meeting or exceeding the general criteria for the Cleanup Endpoint.
l
. It is our plan now to obtain coments by the TAAG and the SAB, finalize the Plan and then obtain its approval by the GPUN Board of Directors.
The SAB has established an internal task force chaired by Dr. Norman Rasmussen to review the Strategic Plan and advise the Company on its technical and safety appropriateness.
After we obtain the concurrence of the interested parties within GPUN the completed plan will serve as the basis for a Safety Evaluation Report which will be submitted to the Comission for its acceptance.
We are keeping the NRC Site Office at THI-2 advised of the Strategic Program Plan as we develop it.
A part of the Plan addresses the disposal of the accident related water.
In your recent meeting with the Advisory Comittee on the TMI-2 Cleanup', you indicated a desire to come to grips with the method of disposal of the water earlier than we had planned, which was about one year from now.
If the Comission believes it would be helpful, we will attempt to provide a recomendation on the water disposal question at an earlier date.
In sumary, we are proceeding to develop specific agreed upon criteria for a safe monitored condition which remove the risk of TMI-2 to the comunities surrounding the Island.
Now I would like to turn our presentation over to Mr. John O' Leary, Chairman of the GPU Nuclear Board.
. (O' Leary)
I am glad to be able to appear before you as the Chairman of the Board of GPU Nuclear to report on my view of the TMI-2 Cleanup.
As an outside member of the Board, I and the other outside members have, of course, maintained a close contact with the TMI-2 Project.
Progress on the Cleanup is reviewed at the Board's monthly meetings.
In addition, I have visited the Site on a number of occasions and talked frequently to the TMI-2 officials with regard to plans and progress on the Cleanup.
I had a complete review of the Project with site managers and the SAB just last Friday.
In addition, the Board of Directors has been regularly briefed by the Safety Advisory Board on their views of the Cleanup Project.
I Based on these reviews, I am convinced that we are making good progress.
We are learning a great deal as we go along.
You will appreciate that the TMI-2 Cleanup is a major research and development task, dealing at almost every turn with unprecedented problems.
That makes it difficult to schedule and carry out each step of the Cleanup with precision.
We will continue to have difficulties which were not fully foreseen simply because the Cleanup of a major reactor accident of this kind has never been necessary before.
But I am confident that we will complete this difficult task as we have describea here today.
1 1
4
- At the Board's request, GPUN has recently completed a reassessment of the overall cost of the Project and concluded that, based on the definition of Endpoint described by Mr. Kintner previously, about $1 billion for the overall Cleanup cost still appears reasonable.
That estimate has remained steady over the last 3 years.
The TMI-2 Cleanup is unprecedented not only for us, but also for your staff.
They hase worked responsibly and efficiently with us in meeting each new problem as it has developed.
We believe their good and hard work is one of the major reasons tne Project has moved forward.
We appreciate that good work on the part of your staff, especially Dr. Snyder and Dr. Travers and. the Site office at TMI.
Finally, as we now remove fuel from the reactor vessel in preraration to remove it from the site, the risk to the public is even further reduced from that reported in our last meeting.
We believe the SAB concurs in that estimate.
1
. (Clark)
That completes our planned presentation on TMI-2 Cleanup.
In summary, we believe good progress is being made and made safely.
Our recent re-estimate confirms the expected overall cost and schedule.
We have not been funding limited in 1984 or 1985, and are not currently funding limited.
We would be pleased to respond to any questions on Lleanup.
Then I end Mr. Hukill will proceed with a brief discussion of the TMI-1 Restart Program.
With regard to TMI-1, as you know the entire Restar t Test ano Power Ascensio,1 Program has been completed as planned.
Overall, tne performance of the Plant and equipment was very good.
There was a minimal amount of difficulty with equipment, less than we or others reasonably expected, l
Performance of the Staff was also very good, although there are areas which should be improved. They have been and continue to be addressed.
Mr.
Hank Hukill, Vice President and Director of Till-1, will provide a more detailed review.
i l
.,. _,~
. One potential problem we have been alert to is the impact on the staff and management at the site of the very extensive oversight.
Such oversight involved our own review groups, including the full time on-site staff of the Nc?. lear Safety and Compliance Comittee of the GPU Nuclear Board of Direct 's, the Comonwealth of Pennsylvania and your staff.
While oversight is needed, I am sure you recognize that it levies some demand on the operating staff to report, explain, answer questions and respond to coments.
Throughout the Restart Program this impact, while noticeable, has been manageable.
Dr. Murley and his on-site. Director, Mr.Kane, provided close, effective scrutiny of our efforts with due regard for minimizing that impact, and I can report that there have been no significant problems.
As TMI-l operation proceeds, NRC plans a continued extraordinary level of oversignt including a Performance Appraisal team inspection ar.d three SALP reviews.
There will need to be continued careful attention t.o assure these are all also accomplished with minimum impact.
We trust that appropriate direction and coordination of these efforts will be provided.
Now Mr. Hukill (Hukill) l
Coro Condition Just Prior to
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f 00f, Condition Just Aftor I
B Pump Transient (175-180 Minutes) l l
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FIGURE 2 i
l Estimated End State Core Conditions i
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FIGURE 3 L
1
l TMI-2 CLEANUP SCHEDULE l
i GeneiFM!! Plant Decontarninasi6n.!i i
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March 28,1979 AccessilisifFn(!gmove Fuel a
i Project Funding
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i TMI-2 REACTOR BUILDING RADIOLOGICAL STATUS 1982 1983 1984 1985 i
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400 1000 I
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BASEMENT GRADE LEVEL OPERATIONS FLOOR DEFUELING
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ELEVATION 281' ELEVATION 305' ELEVATION 347' PLATFORM l-
~~
l TMI-2 CLEANUP WORKER EXPOSURE 1979 --
1984
-2000 1985
- 700 1986 (PROJECTED) 1500 to 2000 1979 -
1986 TOTAL 4200 to 4700 1
OVERAl", CLEANUP PROJECT TOTAL WILL FALL WITHIN OR BELOW THE NRC PEIS VALUES OF 13,000 to 46,000 PERSON-REM.
TABLE 1
\\
APPENDIX B THE THI-2 SAFETY ADVISORY BOARD As chartered by the President of GPUNC, the TMI-2 Safety Advisory Board is an independent advisory group of nationally recognized experts in nuclear sciences, engineering, physics, medicine, and large-scale project management.
The charter of the Board and a biographical summary of its members are attached. The Board meets four times each year to review current and future i
cleanup plans and issues, and to evaluate these in terms of the health and safety of the work force and the general public.
The Board members also participate in various working panels that take advantage of each member's expertise. These panels are currently focused on core removal, external affairs, source identification and radioactive waste management, and radiation hazards. Recommendations are submitted by the full Board to the President of GPUNC, who then formally responds. Each year, the Safety Advisory Board issues a public report of its activities and its assessment of the cleanup project. The Board met on the 9th and 10th of this month, but we have not yet sent our findings and recommendations to GPUNC.
What follows brings you up to date as of our meeting last November; however, personally, I do not anticipate any substantial changes in the findings that follow.
The members of the Board are unanimous in their opinion that TMI-2 does not currently pose a significant risk to public or worker health and safety.
The Board's continuing review of cleanup activities supports the conclusion that the risks are substantially less than those associated with an operating plant.
In the Board's estimation, the progress and efficiency of the cleanup have improved markedly over the years as the GPUNC/Bechtel integrated project organization has improved its ability to function as a team.
The Safety Advisory Board evaluates a broad spectrum of issues, designs, and operations to ensure the health and safety of the public and the work force. One primary concern that tne Board shares with the senior management of GPUNC is the need to ensure that no criticality or release to the environment can occur. This requires controls such as the use of boron and a i
constant evaluation of fuel locations, conditions, and removal methods. To this end, the Board has strongly requested that the ex-vessel fuel characterization program be given parity with the in-vessel defueiing program currently in progress. A related aspect of ensuring safety is the need to l APPENDIX B
complete th2 cleanup as sotn as possibl@ in crder to reduce the risks associated with any potential deterioration of plant systems or components.
The recent start of fuel removal operations exemplifies the interactions between GPUNC and the Board.
After reviewing in substantial detail the equipment, operations, and training, the Board questioned several aspects of the operations and, when satisfied, reached the conclusion that no reason existed for GPUNC not to proceed with the planned start of early defueling in October 1985.
An additional concern of the Board involves progress of the decontaminatior, and dose reduction work. The recent acceleration of this program by GPUNC is strongly endorsed by the Board and will be closely monitored by the Board members most knowledgeable on the subjects. Other aspects of the project such as the safety of the core stratification experiment (which is the penetration of the resolidified crustal material below the loose rubble bed) and the integrity of the lower reactor vessel head have been questioned by the Board and, so far, satisfactory responses have been provided by GPUNC.
The Safety Advisory Board will continue to raise questions, express concerns, and make recommendations during the remainder of the cleanup projec t.
The issue of airborne particulates in the reactor building is one that GPUNC must address more completely. The benefits of improved air quality are already apparent in the decreased use of respirators, but GPUNC must implement a comprehensive program to control sources of recontamination if it is to achieve its 1986 goal of 25% of entries without respirators.
A final concern of the Board is the need to educate the public on the nature of the cleanup and the true level of risk associated with it. The undue concern with which the public views THI-2 is itself a source of concern to the Board. Every effort should be made to reassure the public that its safety and interests are being served. The development of a long-term plan for the plant and specific completion criteria is in progress and will help to achieve this end.
b%-
ames C. Fletcher
,/
hairman Safety Advisory Board APPENDIX B
APPENDIX C SAFETY ADVISORY BOARD CHARTER INTRODUCTION The unique importance of the TMI-2 Program to GPUNC and to the utility industry in general requires the highest quality technical performance possible.
The program should reflect the best scientific and engineering judgement.
Provision of an independent safety advisory board of highly qualified people to provide a broad appraisal of the TMI-2 Program will further this purpose.
ESTABLISHMENT AND PURPOSE i
The Safety Advisory Board is established by the President of GPU Nuclear Corporation and serves in an advisory capacity to him.
The primary purpose of the Board is to provide to GPUNC Management a high level appraisal of the technical aspects of the TMI-2 Program as to how it fulfills the responsibility to protect public and worker health and safety.
(A secondary purpose is to support and evaluate communications between GPUNC and interested groups outside of GPUNC in carrying out this program.)
SCOPE t
The TMI-2 Program encompasses cleanup, waste disposal, and decommis-sioning or recovery.
The Board will review the technical plans for Program operations and the j
technical basis for these plans and report to the President of the GPU Nuclear Corporation on the safety and operational adequacy of these plans.
It may also perform other related duties as mutually agreed l
between the SAB and President of GPUNC.
BOARD SIZE AND COMPOSITION The size of the Board should be the minimum consistent with providing a broad overview capability with the required variety of skills and backgrounds.
BOARD OPERATION 1.
The SAB will meet approximately once every 3 months.
l 2.
The SAB meetings will be scheduled so as to permit review of planning for major activities before they are implemented.
i 3.
The proposed agenda for each SAB meeting will be agreed upon j
between the Chairman and GPUNC prior to each scheduled meeting.
i l
l 4.
The agenda and relevant written material will be distributed to the SAB members 2 weeks before each scheduled meeting.
- 1 APPENDIX C j
l t
m
_ _ ~ -
nonvoting secretary, supported by apprcpriate staff, will be A
5.
made available to the SAB by GPUNC to assist in the development j
of the agenda, arranging meetings, and the drafting of the re-quired reports.
GPUNC, its contractors, or other interested parties, as agreed, will 6.
The SAB shall be provide briefings to the SAB on agenda topics.
provided full access to all relevant information.
A formal report of each meeting will be submitted by the SAB 7.
Chairman to the President, GPU Nuclear Corporation, within I week following each meeting.
Meetings will be scheduled to provide time In addition, for preparation of a draft report before adjournment.
the SAB summarizes the Board's overall assessment bf the adequacy of TMI-2 activities as they relate to public, and of all aspects employee health and safety.
The SAB is expected to reach a consensus on all important issues.
8.
If this is not the situation in a particular instance, the Chairman's i
report should include identification of significant minority views.
The President of GPUNC will respond formally to all recommenda-9.
tions made by the SAB, stating what action resulted or explaining t
why particular recommendations were not adopted.
Correspondence between the SAB and any of its members and the 10.
President, GPUNC, involving recommendations and conclusions will be made available to interested groups and members of the public.
Approved:
/s/
R. C. Arnold President, GPU Nuclear Corporation i
1 I
i 1
! I APPEt10!X C I
APPENDIX D SAFETY ADVISORY BOARD MEMBERS BIOGRAPHICAL 1NTORMATION l
Dr. James C. Fletcher, SAB Chairman Dr. Fletcher is currently Distinguished Public Professor (Whiteford Professor of Technology and Energy Resources), University of Pitts-burgh, and a director of several companies.
He has a PhD in Physics from the California Institute of Technology.
Formerly, he was President of the University of Utah and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering.
He brings to the SAB his extensive experience in directing large and complex advanced technological and organizational projects.
Dr. John A. Auxler Dr. Auxier is currently the President of the Applied Science Laboratory, Inc., in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
He has a PhD in Nuclear Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology.
He was formerly Director of the Division of Health Physics and Safety at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and a past president of the Health Physics Society.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience in nuclear health physics and 3
i radiological protection.
J j
Dr. Merril Eisenbud Dr. Eisenbud is currently Professor Emeritus of Environmental Medicine and Director of the Laboratory for Environmental Studies, Institute of Environmental Medicine, New York University Medical Center.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and the National Academy of Sciences Board on Radioactive Waste Management.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience and expertise in the fields of environmental i
i and industrial health and hygiene, with special emphasis on environ-l mental radioactivity and radiological protection.
l Dr. Jacob I. Fabrikant Dr.
Fabrikant is currently Professor of Radiology, University of I
California School of Medicine, San Francisco, and Professor, Biophysics and Medical Physics, University of California, Berkeley.
He has an MD i
from McGill University and a PhD in Biophysics from the University of London.
He is a Fellow of the American College of Radiology, and is certified in. diagnostic, therapeutic, and nuclear radiology. He brings to l
t the SAB expertise on radiological protection and the health effects of lonizing radiation exposure.
APPENDIX D
Dr. Robert S. Friedman Dr. Friedman is currently Program Director for the Center for Science Policy, Institute of Policy Research and Evaluation, and Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University.
He has a PhD from the University of Illinois.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience in the politics of developing public policy in response to scientific and technical issues.
Dr. Bruce T. Lundin Dr. Lundin is currently a private consultant.
He was formerly Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Lewis Research Center.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering.
Dr. Lundin has a degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of California and an honorary Doctorate of Engineering degree.
He brings to the SAB i
extensive experience in the organization and management of large,
advanced technology programs.
Professor Howard Ratifa Professor Ralffa is currently the Trank P. Ramsey Professor of Manage-ment Economics, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration and the Kennedy School of Government.
Professor Raiffa has a PhD in Mathematics from the University of Michigan.
He brings extensive experience to the SAB in the application of risk analysis techniques and decision-making processes to advanced technology activities.
Professor Norman Rasmussen Professor Rasmussen is currently the McAfee Professor of Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and the National Academy of Sciences.
He was the chairman and principal author of the WASH-1400 Report, a major contribution in the area of nuclear power plant safety analysis.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience in nuclear engineering, nuclear safety, and technical risk assessment and risk management.
Mr. Lombard Squires Mr. Squires, currently a consultant, was formerly a faculty member in Chemical Engineering at MIT; Technical Director and, later, Manager, of Du Pont's Atomic Energy Division; and Assistant General Manager of Du Pont's Explosives Department.
He was a member of the US AEC's General Advisory Committee and its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering.
He brings extensive experience to the SAB in nuclear chemlstry and in the management of large, advanced technology programs.
2 APPENDIX D
Dr. Willirm R. Stratton Dr. Stratton is currently a consultant to the Los Alamos Scientific l
Laboratory.
He has a PhD in Physics from the University of Minnesota and was formerly Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safe-guards of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience in nuclear reactor design and safety and nuclear fuel technology.
2 i
I t
I I
3-APPEflDIX 0 l
e OUI'LINE OF PRESENTATION 'IO NRC ON JANUARY 14, 1986 BY HENRY D. HUKILL, DIRECIDR 'IIIREE MILE ISIAND UNIT ONE
'IMI-l PONER ESCALATION TFSTING REVIEN GENERAL Modified N'IOL Philosophy - Not Normal Reinaling e
Sequence - Not Set Schedule (Basically 3 Months) e Deliberate, Controlled, Thorough, Safe e
o Close Managsnent Involvement And Direction e mjor Elenents Criticality Irw Power Physics Testing 2 Reactor Trips (40% And Maximum Power) 3 Reactor Rurbacks Integrated Control System (ICS Tuning) 30 Days At 48% Power (Crew Training) 30 Days At 75% Power (Crew Training)
Natural Circulation Testing RESULTS Generally Excellent - All Acceptance Criteria Met e
Dedicated Efforts By All Elanents Of GPUNC e
Ccrmitted People Morale liigh Operators Performance Especially Nottwrthy e
Dcronstration Of Strorry Training Program 4 Months Hot Before Criticality !!ciped e Material Performance Likewise Excellent No Major Problem Minimum Problcms After 6 Years Shutdown Strong Preventative Maintenance Program Corrected Probluns As They Occurred - Kept Up Continued Preventative Maintenance Program Sane Maintenance Problans A BlessirrJ In Disguise (Training For Both Operators And Maintenance Techs)
Conpleted Program Within One Day of Expected Duration Laid out In May 1985 e
h STEAM GENERATORS e Primary To Secondary Leak Consistent And Below Baseline (.5 Gallons / Hour)
Steam Generator Fix Successful e Deposit Buildup On Secondary Side Comon To B&W CTPSGs Tsoporary Power Limit (88%)
l Changed After Second Trip Future Plans INCIDEms No Incidents With Significant Safety Inplications e
e Critiqued And Learned Fr m Each One o
2 Urplanned Trips (Over Excitation Relay - High level Nisture Separator) 3 MATERIAL PROBID4S e No Major Equipnent Problerts l
Most Significant Problen Is Deposit Buildup In OTSG Secondary Side e
i l
l PADIATI0ti RELEASES I
e Off Site Releases - Iess han.01 Millirem Total e Person Pan - 11 i
i No Increase Above Normal Background Variation In Off Site Monitoring 1
e MANAGE 2CTF D4PIIASIS RDOUIRED e Ir:provement In Inplementation And Updating Of Administrative Control Procedures e Inprowrent In Work Habits In Areas Outside We Control Roan NTC INVOLVDCTr/INSPECTICt1S Urprecedented - 3000 Inspection Hours In 94 Days e
e Around-Se-Clock coverage Initially And For All Evolutions e Region One Administrator Permission For Criticality, Power Invel j
CharrJes, Ard Peturn To Power After Planned Trips l
e No Interface Problens e Good Opportunity For Icarning Ard Adoption Of New Ideas - Cross j
Fertilization
(
l e Many Irnpections And Nre Coverage To Cme l
3
] i
ID ONSTRATIONS e 45 When Supreme Court Announced Decision - None Since NEWS CIATRNE o Full Disclosure Policy e Considerable local e Still Accentuate 'Ihe Negative EMERGENCY EXERCISE e Annual Conducted Novenber 20 e Full Region One Participation e Good Performance By GPUN e Good Participation And Performance By State And Iocal Agencies e First Exercise With Plant At Power WIURE SCHEDULE e Continue To Operate At Maximzn Power e Steam Generator Eddy Current Outage In March (6 Weeks)
Develop Solution To Steam Generator Deposit Issue e
Refueling Outage Probably January 1987 e
SL N e Highly Successful Test Program Excellent Training Period - Considerable Operating Experience obtained o
e Deronstrated Ability To operate Safely e Can't Boome Caplacent - Still Much To Be Done 'Ib Achieve our Goal Of Excellence e Continued Ccmnitment To Safe Operation
.