ML20141J287
| ML20141J287 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/15/1997 |
| From: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Harbison S UNITED KINGDOM |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141J291 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9705280027 | |
| Download: ML20141J287 (10) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _
c of
- Y"DPN UNITED STATES
,s
- r[a seag*#,4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
{ je WASHINGTON, D.C. 20655-4001 k...*,/
May 15, 1997 CHAIRMAN l.
i Dr. S. A. Harbison, HM Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations Health and Safety Executive Nuclear Safety Directorate Rose Court, 2 Southwark Bridge London SE1 9HS United Kingdom
Dear Dr. Harbison:
+ Thank you for your letter of March 24,.1997 transmitting the draft UK paper on i
the effectiveness of nuclear safety assistance to the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE). This draft paper is a solid basis for our joint presentation at the May 29-30, 1997 meeting of the Working Group on International Nuclear Regulator Coordination in Paris.
I have reviewed the draft paper with great interest. It is a very complete and well-reasoned analysis of a difficult topic, including both the successes achieved and the difficulties encountered in implementing nuclear safety assistance since 1992. I suggest two additions be incorporated into the paper as well as a change in its form. First, there should be an assessment of the potential role the proposed International Nuclear Regulators Association (INRA) could play in furthering international nuclear safety and cooperative efforts. Second, the paper's scope should be expanded beyond a description of efforts to improve nuclear safety in countries operating Soviet-designed reactors. I have enclosed for your preliminary review a revised draft paper which incorporates these changes.
With regard to the first substantive suggestion, the draft paper correctly notes that the nature of Western nuclear safety activities with the regulatory authorities in the FSU and CEE gradually are moving from assistance towards cooperation. Nonetheless, I believe it will be necessary to develop and
! maintain a long-term dialogue and relationship with the recipient country
- regulators after this change has occurred. The specific nature of this relationship needs to be defined. In light of the above developments, as well ,
as the present restructuring of the G-24 Nuclear Safety Assistance Coordination (6-24 NUSAC) mechanism, I believe INRA will have an important role in facilitating both this crucial transformation process and the resulting long-term dialogue and relationship. This needs to be reflected in
. the. draft paper.
Second, efforts to improve nuclear safety are not limited to countries operating Soviet-designed reqctors. For example, the U.S. is pursuing nuclear !
safety dialogues with the govl%ments of India and Vietnam, both of which have i
a need and desire to develop more rigorous nuclear safety programs. The IAEA pf b .I 9705280027 9705'15 PDR .COMMS NRCC 7
glglll,lljllll
.,, .... d.
CORRESPONDENCE PDR 3 L [j]cgcc,tilf;G w n .r + sm
2 also is considering formulating a new program entitled " Safety of Nuclear Instaliations in the South East Asian, Pacific and Far East Countries," which would affect China, Indonesia, Vietnam and others. The maturing of these activities undoubtedly will result in requests to strengthen the regulatory authorities in these countries. For this to be implemented effectively and efficiently, this er rort will require extensive inter-governmental coordination, building on experience gained and lessons learned in other assistance efforts (such as with the FSU and CEE). I suggest INRA also will play an important role in this area, i I have requested that Mr. John E. Ramsey, Senior Program Manager, Office of ;
International Programs, NRC, contact Mr. Jim Reed of your staff to review the !
enclosed document. Their resulting collaborative draft should be provided such that a final paper may be submitted to the Working Group members by May 16 so they will have sufficient time for adequate review in preparation for the meeting May 29-30.
l Sincerely,
-g' a k [/%.
)
Enclosure:
As stated l i
l l
t d
E i
4 i
i THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES: l ANALYSIS AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE l l
I. Assistance at the Crossroads: The Beginning of a New Phase? l After at least five years of intense assistance activities many now believe that, as regards the FSU and CEE regulatory assistance programs, it is time for the G-24 to consider transitioning from " assistance" to " cooperation. To .
do this, the G ald build on achievements and lessons learned, and I consolidate progress by continuing to expose recipient countries to accepted I best regulatory practices, as well as to promote a questioning, critical and '
dynamic approach to safety culture. INRA can have an important role in facilitating both this crucial transformation process and the resulting long-term dialogue and relationship. Further, the G-24 should evaluate its ability to respond to the need for nuclear safety assistance programs in areas beyond the FSU and CEE. Through its activities in coordinating long-term policies among its constituent regulatory agencies, INRA can be a useful mechanism for advancing this agenda.
Judgements on the effectiveness of assistance programs need to be viewed in the context of political, economic, and social changes in the FSU and CEE over the last 7-8 years. In that time, new safety authorities have been formed.
New nuclear safety legislation is in place or being updated in most countries.
Better safety standards and licensing practices are coming on line, and ageing reactors have been critically examined and upgrading requirements implemented.
However, the totality of changes that should be in place are far reaching and often beyond the mandate of the safety authorities, such as stable and sufficient energy supplies which allow the regulators to exercise judgements without undue social and political pressure; improvements to salaries that will allow regulators to compete in the market place for adequately qualified staff; and modernization of more detailed prescriptive licensing regulations.
II. Background to Assistance A. Governmental Issues The market-based reforms in the new democratic societies led to major government departmental reorganizations. In many cases the parent ministries and relationships with the regulators have changed, now providing legal regulatory independence from energy promotional ministries, or having chief regulators report directly to Prime Ministers. Inter-governmental pressure and advice from regulatory assistance programmes on best practices have undoubtedly contributed tc these fundamental safety reforms.
Slow to emerge and still incomplete, fundamental over-arching legal provisions for licensing, inspection and enforcement are in place. Initial regulator to
! regulator contacts were not productive because of a lack of real understanding
! by donors of the recipients' cultures, legal systems, problems on the ground and issues involved. As a result many of the early exchanges remained at the level of first principles and with few exceptions the time to introduce new nuclear safety legislation was longer than originally anticipated, needing to wait until the new democratic processes had reached a measure of stability and appropriately skilled personnel were available.
~
I
I i
l 2 <
B. Assistina the Safety Authorities Managing Change. The capabilities of the FSU and CEE safety authorities to ;
absorb and utilize the assistance offered, and hence its effectiveness, !
depended not only on the internal state of their countries (political, -
economic, social), the power and influence of the state utilities, and the :
state of development of their own organization, but also on their ability to .
manage change in a fluid and difficult environment and accept the need for .
change (Governmental, organizational, and personal). The extent and pace of (
the change that was experienced by the recipient countries' regulators in the l full glare of international publicity had never been faced by donor country !
regulators, who were thus ill-equipped to understand fully the situation or to empathize with it. The recipient senior staff often did not possess the management of change skills that were needed to deal with their internal situations, or with the many offers of assistance.
Developing Assistance Plans. At the start of the assistance programs the majority of the donor / recipient contacts were at senior level as plans were ;
developed for the various facets of the programmes, e.g., for technical l exchanges or for equipmen+ supply. Inter-European regulatory authority i coordination (through the Regulatory Assistance Management Group) avoided t I
duplication of programs and presented a uni'ed view to the European Commission for funding assistance through the PHARE and TACIS programs. Coordination !
with other donor non-European authorities through the G-24 mechanism remained !
good throughout. However, on the ground the regulators faced for the first time the complex contractual rules and procedures of the Commission. The .
major lesson from this phase of the assistance programme is that the funding l route and its complexities have to be understood and resolved by all parties !
before commitments are given on time scales. Bilateral programmes are !
undoubtedly the more effective means of delivery of assistance programmes. !
Programme Delivery. On a person-to-person basis there is little doubt that the programmes achieved their micro objectives of increasing the knowledge and .
skill base of individual recipient regulators, but what was required for the !
macro objective of increasing the effectiveness of the regulatory body as a i whole was an almost total change of recipients' safety cultural approach and i values. In the enrly days donors over-estimated the ability of their senior recipient counterparts to deliver the necessary and timely changes to their !
organizations so that new knowledge, safety standards and techniques could be [
practiced. l Technical Programmes. Feedback from the technical exchanges on nuclear science and %gineering topics has been positive. Some technical assistance programmes based on studies by western consortia have, however, drawn ,
criticism from recipients who believe that real skill transfer often did not !
take place, with resulting loss of " ownership," understanding and :
effectiveness. The better option would have been to fund recipients directly '
for joint and cooperative action with donor partners, and this should be the preferred route in the future. -
Safety Standards. Safety standards of VVER and RBMK reactors are substantially identical throughout the FSU and CEE. However, harmonized n , .. - - . . -- -. ,- . - . - w.- n,.
4 3
l
- safety standards at detailed technical levels do not exist between western l donor countries, leading to recipient confusion. Where more than one donor is
- involved, better coordination of advice on safety standards and/or a common i line on the explanation of key differences should be agreed between them to avoid confusion of recipients.
l Regulators and Utilities. The regulators were exposed more rapidly to western
( thinking and practices than the utilities, and thus were frustrated in their
- ambitions to achieve change in the utilities. The regulators became more quickly conversant with modern safety standards but were unable to insist that the utility produce a safety analysis to those standards because the appropriate skills did not exist within the utility. Greater cooperation l between assisting donor regulators and utilities would have assisted a more '
measured transition by recipient counterparts to modern standards.
Regulatory Style. Many recipients were attracted to the well-documented NRC l style of regulatory organization in contrast, say, to the French and UK styles l which are less " hands-on," while the German Federal systm had attractions for l larger countries with regional organizations. As is now seen after hesitant beginnings, the predominant feature of changes to regulatory style has been its evolutionary character. The political, governmental, economic and cultural factors in changing regulatory style played a greater role than was forecast at the outset; donors need to accept that the process can be assisted but should not be unduly hastened.
Economic and Social Factors. The donors did not take sufficient account of l economic and social conditions of the recipients during the early days of the assistance programmes, although they could not have predicted the economic hardships that were, and still are being, faced by the recipient counterparts.
Better assurances about retention of those staff who benefit from assistance programmes in improving their specialist skills should be pursued, perhaps i l
with some forms of incentives or by seeking a commitment from the recipients I of some form of contractual pay-back to their organization.
Financial and Insurance Issues. The net effect of slow resolution of Third Party Liability insurance, Vienna Convention adherence, double taxation (i.e.,
purchase / VAT and import of equipment) has weakened the standing of the regulators and their decision making processes at a time when the major thrust of advice in assistance programmes was to put safety first. Regulators, being best placed to observe the effects on safety of financial and insurance l issues, should provide early advice to governments should similar situations j arise in the future. )
Psychological Factors. Donor regulator contacts at the senior level worked smoothly, but there is anecdotal evidence that the West was acting in a
, teacher / pupil role as the assistance programmes penetrated lower down the
! ranks, which caused some resentment. Further, the G-7 Munich intent of forcing VVER 440/230 and RBMK reactors to close because of poor safety standards did not sit well with those who in good faith had worked with pride to maintain the reactors safe, as they saw it. This period emphasizes the continuing need for staff to be tactful, well prepared and briefed about the i
country situations and about with whom they will be working.
l
1 I
- 4 Transition from Assistance to Cooperation. One of the major difficulties in making this transition will be that few, if any, of the recipients in the near l
future will be able to fund themselves with the hard currencies necessary for travel, subsistence, new equipment and research. The continuing dependency on donor aid, if it is seen to be directly given, does not lend itself to the promotion of confidence and self esteem in the recipients nor, ultimately, does it promote the safety culture that all would wish to see.
III. Effectiveness of Assistance or Cooperative Programmes and the Future If, as appears, the assistance phase is moving to a new era cf cooperation, the experience gained needs to be taken forward. Most of the highlighted points above can be read across to new programmes to enhance their l effectiveness, but it is worth asking how effective to date have the assistance programmes been for the resources expended.
l Effectiveness needs to be judged on a particular country's goals and the criteria it set for success. If success means the establishment of independent, well qualified and resourced regulatory authorities able to license, inspect and enforce modern nuclear safety legislation, then the answer seems to be for all countries a qualified ~yes" to the effectiveness of
- assistance programmes. Economic, social and governmental changes have l dominated the background to the programmes, more so than could have been predicted at the outset, and with hindsight, donors could have been better briefed for the tasks they were given as experience mounted of the conditions l
under which recipients were operating. Expectations were perhaps too high at
'he outset about the extent and pace of change that could be achieved, and time has brought a more sober assessment of the realities. j IV. Assistance / Cooperation Beyond FSU/CEE i
From the dissolution of the Soviet Union emerged new independent states, states in which reactors with serious safety deficiencies were being operated.
Unfortunately, these states did not inherit the extensive infrastructure and safety culture (such as an independent regulatory authority, an effective l operating organization, etc.) needed to support the safe and effective utilization cf nuclear power. Economic difficulties precluded the immediate !
closure of these unsafe facilities, necessitating that the countries of the G-7 and G-24, international institutions (such as the IAEA and the NEA) and others respond quickly to provide needed safety improvements and assistance.
To date, in excess of $1,500,000,000 has been pledged towards this effort.
As a result, we now recognize that we must ensure that countries planning to develop or in the early stages of developing nuclear power truly have the infrastructure needed to support safe and effective utilization of this technology. Several countries of the Pacific Rim have announced their intention to develop and utilize nuclear power, while others have announced their intention to significantly expand their current programs. We must l ensure that these countries have the necessary nuclear safety infrastructure in place before undertaking developing or significantly expanding their nuclear power programs, failure to do so now will only result in our having to respond to another nuclear safety-related crisis later. Thus, we must provide I
l 1-5 appropriate nuclear safety assistance to the countries of the Pacific Rim in the near-term.
Following on my colleague's outline of the areas in which assistance was needed and in which it was effective in the FSU/CEE context, I would like to l extrapolate on the needs of the developing context of the broader Pacific Rim !
and South Asia regions (e.g., China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Indonesia). It seems to me that this broadly conceived region affords INRA l
the opportunity of processing the information gained in the assistance to the more developed countries of the FSU/CEE, in anticipation of assistance which will be needed in the medium-term by other countries which are only now contemplating a nuclear power option (e.g., Turkey and Egypt).
A. Governmental Issues Whereas market-based reforms in the FSU/CEE new democratic societies led to l
major government departmental reorganizations, the countries of the Pacific Rim / South Asia have faced no such political and economic disruption. The parent ministries have created regulatory institutions which, in most but not all cases, are neither independent from energy promotional ministries nor have chief regulators with access to the highest levels of the political hierarchy.
i As with the FSU/CEE case, inter-governmental pressure and advice from regulatory assistance programmes on best practices can, if applied consistently and with knowledge of the local context, contribute to l fundanntal safety reforms.
l Unli in the FSU/CEE, in most cases fundamental over-arching legal provisions ;
for . censing, inspection and enforcement are being created. However, there i
! still exists a lack of real understanding by Jonors of the recipients' i cultures, legal systems, problems on the ground and issues involved. As in !
the FSU/CEE, the time to introduce new nuclear safety legislation will take time, and political / economic stability. The availability of appropriately skilled personnel will be decisive in instituting a viable nuclear safety i culture. '
B_.
Assistina the Safety Authorities Managing Change. The capabilities of the Pacific Rim / South Asia regions and other recipient states' safety authorities to absorb and utilize the '
assistance offered, and hence its effectiveness, will depend on the internal
- state of their countries (political, economic, social), the power and
- influence of the state utilities, and the state of development of their own i l organization. The recipient countries' regulators must be given the .
l opportunity to interact with (onor regulatory organizations at all levels in
! order to best absorb the management and implementation skills that will be
! needed to deal with their internal situations, or with the many offers of assistance. It is the U.S.'s experience that this can be done effectively through relatively low-cost training and assignment programmes in donor countries, including management and inspector shadow-training opportunities.
Developing Assistance Plans. Learning from the FSU/CEE experience, contacts at all levels are needed to implement the various facets of the programmes.
l
i 6
Regulatory authority coordination should avoid duplication of programmes and present a united view. Coordination with other donor authorities is critical.
As stressed in the G-24 context, the funding route and its complexities at both donor and recipient ends must be understood and resolved by all parties C before commitments are given on timescales. Bilateral programmes are undoubtedly the more effective means of delivery of assistance programmes.
Programme Delivery. From NRC's experience with the countries of the FSU/CEE and the Pacific Rim / South Asia area, there is little doubt that the training programmes have achieved their objectives of increasing the knowledge and skill base of individual recipient regulators. But there has been residual doubt that the effectiveness of the regulatory body has been increased as a I whole, and effectiveness has depended on individual recipients
- safety cultural approach and values. The INRA members need to keep in mind the FSU/CEE donors' overestimation of the ability of the senior recipient counterparts to deliver the necessary and timely changes to their organizations, so that new knowledge, safety standards and techniques could be practiced. Assiduous coordination among INRA members can be used to increase donor knowledge, and increase recipient receptivity to implementation of culturally alternative safety techniques. !
Technical Programmes. As the Pacific Rim / South Asia area broadens its variou:
nuclear programmes, the twin issues of skill transfer and " ownership" need to be extensively emphasized. Joint activities which fund recipients directly in cooperative action with donor partners is more cost effective and is a preferable avenue of assistance.
Safety Standards. Unlike what was observed in the FSU/CEE arena, safety standards in the Pacific Rim / South Asia region vary tremendously across a multitude of reactor options. This further complicates the transference of safety standards at detailed technical levels between and among western donor countries. Recipient confusion is a real threat to the message of standardized safety culture. Coordination of advice on safety standards and/or a common line on the explanation of key differences among donors must be agreed between them to avoid confusion of recipients. INRA is a logical place for this coordination of policy to begin.
Regulators and Utilities. In the Pacific Rim / South Asia region, regulators l and utilities need to be jointly exposed to western thinking and practices.
l At this time, unlike the FSU/CEE countries, neither is clearly in advance of l the other, and neither can produce a safety analysis to western standards
! because the appropriate skills do not exist within either institution. When
. expanded to envelop key recipient states, INRA should be able to afford the i
necessary cooperation between assisting donor regulators and utilities to assist in the necessary creation by recipient counterparts of modern standards.
Regulatory Style. It is clear there can be a ripple effect from a country's choice between the well-documented NRC style of regulatory organization, the less hands-on French and UK styles, and the German Federal system emphasizing regional organizations. As my colleague has so aptly summarized, the political, governmental, economic and cultural factors in changing regulatory
l .
i 7
style will play an important role, and donors need to accept that the process can be assisted but should not be unduly hastened.
l Economic and Social Factors. The development of each country's energy sector l must take into account economic and social conditions, including the economic
- hardships that are continuously being faced by the recipient counterparts.
l Assistance cannot be effectively assimilated without retention of the staff benefitting from assistance programmes. INRA members need to coordinate the types and forms of incentives which will have the best promise of retaining those staff.
i Financial and Insurance Issues. Early and effective institution of Third i
Party Liability insurance and Vienna Convention adherence will strengthen the standing of the regulators and their decisionmaking processes. As indicated l by Dr. Harbison, regulators, being best placed to observe the effects on safety of financial and insurance issues, should provide early advice to governments to adhere to these important international commitments and to the Supplemental Funding Convention which is expected to be adopted in a Diplomatic Conference late this summer.
Psychological Factors. A pervasive problem in dealing with emerging nuclear programmes is that of the perception that the West is acting in a teacher / pupil role, causing resentment throughout the regulatory and utility infrastructure. Assistance staff should learn from the FSU/CEE experience, and be tactful, well prepared and briefed about the country situations and about those that they will be working with to maximize the effect of their i interactions. l Transition from Assistance to Cooperation. Given the G-24's FSU/CEE experience that the continuing dependency on donor aid, if it is seen to be directly given does not lend itself to the promotion of confidence and self esteem in the recipients nor, ultimately does it promote the safety culture that all would wish to see, INRA donors need to be aware of the evolutionary nature of their assistance, and prepared for a transition to cooperation among participatory partners. .i IV. What Role Can INRA Play in Furthering Assistance / Cooperative Efforts?
The technical and organizational ability of the FSU and CEE regulators to !
absorb the benefits of future cooperative exchanges or the continuing assistance programmes for newer staff is now not in doubt, but their resource difficulties continue to be of concern. As stated above, hard currency difficulties will continue until their economies improve, at some .
indeterminate time in the future. Means will need to be found to continue to i fund activities, preferably at source, i.e., thr;> ugh governments, rather than by individual handouts, as cooperation will be viewed in a more positive light when the donor-recipient climate is removed to the background.
The improvement in safety culture in the nuclear industry, particularly in the bigger FSU countries, will continue to need attention. A significant majority ;
of their operators, designers, constructors, etc. have yet to have (or are likely to have) any contact with or be influenced by modern standards.
l -
l
( 8 l
Conservatively, a new generation of staff will be needed for a better safety culture to permeate the industry. The safety authorities should have a major role to play in this area, and should be trained and encouraged in safety culture philosophy and techniques. In this area the IAEA can play a major role as it reaches all parties.
Cooperative ventures in research seem to offer the greatest promise for technical benefits to both sides. Many FSU and CEE countries still possess world class institutes which advise their safety authorities, but they need funding if they are to retain their expertise and staff. Coordination of exchanges in this area, as happened through the G-24 for the " pure" regulatory matters, or jointly sponsored and funded research ventures would lead to more effective cooperation. The OECD/NEA might play an enhanced or leading role in coordination of such ventures.
i INRA's stated purpose is to exchange views on broad regulatory policy issues, ;
and to advance nuclear safety through cooperation among its members, with intergovernmental organizations, and others as appropriate. Other mechanisms which guide the provision of nuclear safety assistance worldwide are the IAEA, .
NEA and the G-7. Each of these groups has focused on near-term nuclear safety projects to react to the deteriorating conditions in the FSU and CEE.
l However, as seen in the analysis above, G-24 NUSAC activities are moving from a reactive and technical fix mode to one of exerting influence over broader
- policy concerns and over a longer period of time. The same is true in the other organizations.
G-24 activities are still focused on assistance to the FSU and CEE, but requests from other quarters are beginning to filter in. The IAEA offers another assistance / cooperation venue for the FSU and CEE countries, and it is essential that the two agencies' activities be well coordinated. Further, the IAEA is developing a process to evaluate new requests for assistance, such as the May 22-23 IAEA meeting to discuss how to prioritize requests from Asia. ,
The results of this deliberative process will not be implemented until 1999. l Again, as active members in the IAEA, the INRA members can help to focus on i the regulatory aspects of the IAEA's assistance activities and will have more impact if we have coordinated our policy positions throughout the process.
In each of these nuclear safety assistance coordination mechanisms INRA can -
have immediate, positive impact. It is essential that the regulatory component of assistance, or cooperation, not be lost in the transitional phases now occurring in each of these groups. As active and contributing members of the G-7, G-24, IAEA and NEA, we INRA members can have more impact on those organization's processes by coordinating our policies and seeking to direct these groups' efforts to those areas of regulatory improvement which, in our experience, will have the greatest effect on changing recipient country I
safety culture.
l l
l I
i l
c.__.