ML20141J100
| ML20141J100 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone, Maine Yankee  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1997 |
| From: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Backus R BACKUS, MEYER & SOLOMON |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141J107 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9705270244 | |
| Download: ML20141J100 (2) | |
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\\.....[E May 9, 1997 CHAIRMAN Mr. Robert A. Backus, Esq.
116 Lowell Street P.O. Box 516 Manchester, New Hampshire 03105-0516
Dear Mr. Backus:
I am responding to your letter of February 27, 1997, on behalf of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League and in support of Henry R. Myers' letters of February 21 and 26, 1997.
You ask whether the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) can state that, at the present time, the Maine Yankee facility is in substantial compliance with its design basis and NRC requirements, and if not, why the NRC has not taken action to suspend the license, similar to what was done regarding the Millstone units in Connecticut.
I am forwarding to you the staff's responses to Mr. Myers' letters of February 21 and 26, 1997.
l After the NRC staff completed its review of the October 7,1996, independent safety assessment team (ISAT) report and the immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee, the staff determined that continued operation of Maine Yankee at 2440 MWt. in accordance with current license restrictions and authorizations, would pose no undue risk to public health and safety.
In reaching this determination, the staff was guided by the fact that the Commission's regulations and adjudicatory decisions on whether prompt remedial action, including shutdown, is necessary, are not based on a " substantial compliance" standard.
Rather, such decisions are made on a determination as to whether operation of the facility poses an undue risk to public health and safety. The deficiencies that have come to light over the last year, largely as a result of the ISAT, currently are being evaluated to determine what enforcement action is warranted.
Subsequently, the licensee, in the course of addressing deficiencies identified by the ISAT, shut down the Maine Yankee facility on December 6, 1996, to resolve equipment operability concerns.
Later, the licensee agreed, pursuant to an NRC Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) dated December 18, 1996, and Supplement 1 to the CAL dated January 30, 1997, to resolve to the satisfaction of the NRC staff certain design and configuration control j
concerns at th. ".aine Yankee facility prior to restart. The NRC staff is following closely the licensee's resolution of these concerns and the i
licensee's corrective actions in response to the ISAT report.
The NRC staff will not permit restart of the Maine Yankee facility until we conclude that there is reasonable assurance that the plant will be operated in a manner that will pose no undue risk to public health and safety.
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Additionally, on January 27, 1997, the Maine Yankee facility was designated as a Category 2 plant on the NRC's Watch List.
Plants in this category have weaknesses that warrant increased NRC attention until the licensee demonstrates a period of improved performance.
You requested that the Commission arrange for and attend a public hearing to be held in the vicinity of Maine Yankee. The Commission is interested in hearing from the interested members of the public living in the vicinity of the NRC licensed facilities.
On February 4, 1997 the Commission held a meeting at the NRC headquarters and was briefed by the officials of Maine i
Yankee Atomic Power Company, Entergy Nuclear Incorporated, and four interested members of the public.
At that meeting, members of the public from the vicinity of Maine Yankee presented their concerns directly to the Commission.
Further, the NRC staff held two additional public meetings on April 3,1997, in Wiscasset, Maine, to discuss the licensee's Restart Readiness Plan (RRP) i dated March 7, 1997. The first meeting was between the staff and licensee during the afternoon and was open for public observation.
The second meeting was between the staff and the public during the evening, and began with a summary of the afternoon meeting. After the introductory remarks, the staff received questions and comments from members of the public regarding the Maine l
Yankee RRP. The staff will consider these comments in completing its plan to l
assess the readiness of Maine Yankee for restart.
In view of the above activities, a Commission hearing in the vicinity of the Maine Yankee facility is not being planned.
However, the staff will conduct additional public meetings in the vicinity of Maine Yankee during the current outage, including a meeting to receive public comments on the licensee's i
implementation of the RRP and the staff's related oversight activities.
I trust this information is responsive to your concerns.
Sincerely, A
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Shirley A Jackson
Enclosures:
1.
Ltr to H. Myers frm J. Zwolinski dtd 4/14/97 2.
Ltr to H. Myers frm J. Zwolinski dtd 4/28/97 a
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Mr. Henry R. Myers Post Office Box 88 Peaks Island, ME 04108
Dear Mr. Myers:
Your letter of February 21, 1997, to Chairman Jackson of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regarding the Maine Yankee facility has been referred to me for reply. As noted in the Chairman's_ letter to you of January 31, 1997, Chairman Jackson will continue to monitor the staff's actions related to Maine Yankee, including your correspondence. Therefore, my i
assignment for responding to you on these matters should not be misinterpreted to mean that your concerns will not receive proper attention and consideration.
In my letter of February 3,1997, I responded to your letter of January 22, 1997, regarding the availability of information about noncomplying conditions and associated violations for the Commission meeting on February 4,1997. My response of February 3 remains valid; however, you appear to be under the impression that the staff deprived the Commission of information not relating to restart issues at the February 4, 1997, Commission briefing and that such information is necessary to assess the situation at Maine Yankee. To the contrary, the staff has apprised the Commission of the significant noncomplying conditions the staff has determined to exist at Maine Yankee, While these conditions have not been compiled into lists in the manner you requested, they have been identified to the Commission through staff briefings and in the Integrated Safety Assessment Team report, memoranda from the staff to the Commission and staff Commission papers.
In addition, the NRC staff is in the process of implementing the procedures outlined in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, " Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval," under which a list of restart issues will be compiled.
As a part of the near-term NRC Inspection Manual 0350 activities, the staff _
i met with the public on April 3, 1997, to receive comments on the licensee's restart readiness plan. Comments received from the public will be considered by the staff prior to finalizing the NRC's restart plan which will be developed in accordance with the guidance in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter l
0350.
You also raise an issue that relates to the appropriate standard for permitting operation of the plant.
First, you state that you " assume that the staff is prepared to allow Maine Yankee to operate on the basis of a lesser standard than a finding of compliance with regulations."
In addition, you asked if the Commission believed that "the public should reach conclusions as to the adequacy (or inadequacy) of plant safety on the basis of statements made by senior NRC staff that such staff would (or would not) be willing to tyglh9A31 jff
Mr. Henry R. Myers April 14, 1997 live in the plant's vicinity." The appropriate standard for allowing plant operation to continue is set forth in my letter to you of February 14, 1997.
The NRC's approach to compliance, as set forth in that letter, is best understood in light of the fact that protecting public health and safety is based on the philosophy of defense in depth. This philosophy was recently summarized in a letter to David A. Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists dated February 27, 1997, which is enclosed for your information.
Your concerns regarding outstanding maintenance items and incomplete corrective actions, compliance with TMI Action Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31, and the Entergy Corporation were answered in my letter of February 3, 1997.
I believe this letter addresses your concern regarding the standards the staff considers for allowing continued operation of nuclear power plants, and with respect to the appropriate standard for allowing Maine Yankee to restart, the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350 mentioned previously provides an effective process to ensure that issues that led to concerns at Maine Yankee are effectively addressed.
I trust that this information is responsive to your concerns about the Maine Yankee plant.
Sincerely, a1 John
. Zwolinski, Deputy Director Division of Reactor Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
Letter to D. Lochbaum from S. Collins
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February 27, 1997 Mr. David A. Lochbaum Nuclear Safety Engineer Union of Concerned Scientists 1616 P Street, NW., Suite 310 Washington, DC 20036
Dear Mr. Lochbaum:
I am responding to your letter of January 6,1997, to Hubert J. Hiller, Regional Administrator, Region I, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
regarding the Hillstone Salem, and Haine Yankee nuclear power plants.
In your letter, you appear to imply that any failure on the part of a nuclear power )lant to meet any aspect of the NRC's regulations, license requirements.
or tecinical specifications automatically translates to a finding that the plant was unsafe during the period of nonconformance. While compliance with the Commission's regulations, as a general matter, provides reasonable assurance that public health and safety will be adequately protected, the agency must exercise its judgment regarding thresholds for determining the i
safety of plant operation.
The NRC's approach to protecting public health and safety is based on the philosophy of defense in depth.
Briefly stated, this chilosophy (1) requires the application of conservative codes and standards, w11ch create substantial safety margins in the design of nuclear plants (2) requires high quality in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear plants to reduce the likelihood of malfunctions, including the use of automatic safety system actuation features: (3) recognizes that equipment can fail and operators can make mistakes, thus requiring redundancy in safety systems and components to reduce the chances that malfunctions or mistakes will lead to accidents that release fission products from the fuel: and (4) recognizes that, in spite of these precautions, serious fuel damage accidents can happen, thus requiring containment structures and other safety features to prevent.the release of fission products off site. Additionally, emergency planning is considered another layer of defense in depth. Therefore, even in the unlikely event of an offsite fission product' release, there is reasonable assurance that emergency protective actions can be taken to protect the population around nuclear power plants.
It is a given that the agency regards compliance with regulations, license conditions, and technical specifications as mandatory. But the agency also l
recognizes that plants will not operate trouble free. This is clearly i
articulated in Criterion XVI of Appendix B to Part 50, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants." Criterion XVI states that,
- Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected." The NRC does not contend that all reactors are in full compliance with their respective licensing basis on a continuous basis.
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The appropriate regulatory response to an identified deficiency can and should vary, de>ending on the importance of the element in which the deficiency is found.
- or example, during rapidly developing situations where prompt action is required to assure plants are not in an unsafe condition, automatic safety systems are in alace to shut down the reactor.
In other, less time critical situations, tec1nical specifications, which cover the structures, systems and components (SSC) most vital to the safe operation of a nuclear plant, require specific actions within predetermined time periods when an SSC is determined to be inoperable. Even a pattern of lesser deficiencies such as degraded or nonconforming conditions emerging over a discrete time period may be enough to warrant a decision to shut down an operating plant. NRC Generic Letter 91 18 "Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability,"
provides guidance for licensees when they identify degraded or nonconforming conditions. However, once a plant has been shut down, for whatever reason, it is often more prudent to permit restart only after significant nonconformances have been corrected. Thus, it is possible that a particular deficiency that would have been insufficient by itself to warrant shutdown of a plant might be sufficient to warrant repair prior to restart. Such decisions are typically reached following discussions between the NRC and the licensee and may result in the issuance of a confirmatory action letter.
You appear to conclude that if a nuclear plant shuts down on any given day for reasons other than planned outages, it can be presumed to have been operating unsafely the previous day.
For the reasons discussed above, this conclusion is invalid.
In your letter, you asked three specific questions, the first being "Does the NRC consider the three Hillstone units, the two Salem units, and Maine Yankee safe enough to allow these plants to restart today?" As you noted, these plants remain shut down because of plant specific safety concerns. Although the specific circumstances for the extended shutdown of these facilities vary, the respective licensee, for each of the sites identified, has begun to identify and address root causes for problems and to implement corrective actions for the specific problems identified. These units will remain shut down until the identified restart issues have been appropriately addressed.
Your second question was "If these plants are not safe enough to operate today, does the NRC think that these plants were operating safely in the days and weeks arior to their being shut down?" Although the causes of the extended slutdowns for each of the Hillstone, Salem, and Haine Yankee units existed before the shutdown of the facilities, the NRC considers that the plants were operating safely before they were shut down because of the protection afforded by the defense in depth philosophy. Stated otherwise, although there are safety equi > ment deficiencies at each of these facilities, the conservatism provided by t1e multi)le levels of design and operating-requirements reasonably assured that t1ere was no undue risk to public health and safety and the NRC did not find it necessary to require the snutdown of the plants to rotect public health and safety. However, the resulting reductions of he margin of safety led the staff to conclude that correction of the problems is called for before the restart of the plants. Additionally, for Maine Yankee, and to an even greater extent, for the Hillstone and Salem plants, it was determined that there were significant programmatic weaknesses that warranted correction before plant restart in order to prevent recurrence
Mr. David A. Lochbaum 3
of similar nonconformance problems.
In this regard H111 stone has been designated as a Category 3 Watch List plant requiring Commission approval prior to restart. A confirmatory action letter (CAL) was issued on the Salem facility documenting broad programmatic and technical issues which need to be addressed prior to restcrt. Regarding Maine Yankee, NRC recently issued a CAL j
. documenting actions required by the licensee to resolve several specific technical issues before restart of that facility.
Your third question was "If these plants are safe enough to operate today, does the NRC have the right to conduct additional inspections and impose additional requirements for these troubled plants that prolong the duration, and significantly increase the costs, of their outages?" You stated that your third question only applied if the staff believed the plants were safe enough to operate today. As noted previnusly, the staff concluded the plants have problems that should be corrected before they restart in order to prevent recurrence of similar nonconformance aroblems in future operation. However, you can be assured that when the NRC 3ecomes aware of information which demonstrates that an undue risk to public health and safety exists, the NRC will take prempt remedial action, including shutdown of operating facilities.
In taking any remcdial measures, the NRC must choose actions sufficient to deal with the risk involved.
In your letter, you noted that " economics played a significant role in the poor safety performance at these troubled nuclear alants." Although you did not request that the staff address this comment, tie NRC is concerned about potential safety impacts on NRC power reactor licensees from the economic deregulation and restructuring of the electric utility industry. The NRC staff is currently carrying out an action plan to determine the appropriate NRC response to deregulation and restructuring. Thus far, instead of economic indicators, the NRC has relied primarily on its inspection process to indicate when safety aerformance has begun to show adverse trends. On the basis of the results of tie inspection 3rogram, the NRC can take appropriate action to adequately protect public lealth and safety.
I trust this discussion provides you with a better understanding of the NRC's process for assessing the appropriate regulatory response to identified nonconformances.
Sincerely, i
n D
rector Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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April 28, 1997 Mr. Henry R. Myers Post Office Box 88 Peaks Island, ME 04108
Dear Mr. Myers:
Your letter,f February 26, 1997, to Chairman Jackson has been referred to me for reply.
At the outset of this letter, again let me assure you that the Commission is interested in hearing public concerns regarding the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (MYAPS).
Public concerns, whether expressed in the February 4. 1997, Commission meeting on MYAPS, in letters such as yours, or through other means, will always receive serious consideration.
Your lettar of February 26, 1997, is primarily concerned with whether the NRC's " undue risk" standard, applied when determining whetner to permit plant operhtions to continue, is the same as " substantial compliance" with Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations. The Commission's regulations and adjudicatory decisions do not rely upon a " substantial compliance" standard.
Rather, as explained in my letter of February 14, 1997, the question that the Commission must ask in determining whether prompt remedial action, including shutdown, is necessary, is whether operation of the facility poses an undue risk to public health and safety, not whether compliance with NRC requirements is " substantial."
Your letter of February 26. 1997, also questions why the Commission has permitted operation of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station when the report of the Independent Safety Assessment Team (ISAT) did not make a finding that continued operation would not pose an undue risk to public health and safety, and instead found that overall performance was considered adequate for operation (after an extensive review of design and licensing bases, operational safety performance and Maine Yankee's self ar.sessment, corrective actions, and plans for improvement). Although the ISAT report made no finding that continued operation of the MYAPS posed or did not pose an undue risk to public health and safety, the ISAT findings resulted in Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company's shutting down the facility from July 20, 1996, to September 2,1996, in order to resolve equipment operability concerns. At the time of the September 2,1996, restart the staff was not aware of any issues taken individually or collectively that would pose an undue risk to public health and safety.
Since the ISAT, additional substantive issues at the MYAPS have been identified or further developed and addressed in the NRC staff's Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) dated December 18, 1996, and Supplement 1 to the CAL dated January 30, 1997, that must be resolved before restart. Before approving t9056/03F y
Mr. Henry R. Myers April 28, 1997 restart of the MYAPS the NRC staff will determine whether the licensee's corrective actions provide reasonable assurance that the plant can be operated in a manner that will pose no undue risk to public health and safety.
As noted in the Chairman's letter to you of January 31. 1997. Chairman Jackson will continue to monitor the staff's actions related to Maine Yankee.
including your correspondence. Therefore, my assignment for responding to you on these matters should not be misinterpreted to mean that your concerns will not receive proper attention and consideration.
Finally, you assert in your letter that the NRC staff has an overall position to defend past actions with respect to the Maine Yankee situation. As acknowledgement of this concern, a copy of your letter will be forwarded to the NRC's Office of the Inspector General for whatever action the Inspector General deems appropriate.
I trust that this information is responsive to your concerns about the MYAPS.
O Sincerely.
John A Zwolinski. Deputy Director Divisi of Reactor Projects Office Of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 9
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