ML20141E962
| ML20141E962 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1986 |
| From: | Burnett P, Jape F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141E917 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-86-06, 50-416-86-6, NUDOCS 8604220431 | |
| Download: ML20141E962 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000416/1986006
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UNITED STATES
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N' OLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.'
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ATL ANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.: 50-416/86-06
Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Company
Jackson, MS 39205
Docket No.:
50-416
License No.: NPF-29
Facility Name: Grand Gulf
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Inspection Conducted: March 10 - 14, 1986
Inspector:
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Approved by:
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F. Jape, Section Chief
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Date Signed
Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 32 inspector-hours on site
inspecting the areas of review of startup test results, review of reactor
operations, review of core performance monitoring, and followup of outstanding
items.
Results:
One violation was identified:
Failure to follow an operating
procedure - paragraph 6.
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8604220431 860410
ADOCK 05000416
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- J.
E. Cross, Site Director
- C, R. Hutchinson, General Manager
R. F. Rogers, Assistant to the General Manager
- D. G. Cupstid, Technical Support Superintendent
- L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent
- J. D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator
M. J. Wright, Manager, Plant Operations
J. L. Robertson, Operations Superintendent
Other licensee employees contacted included a shift technical advisor,
engineers, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- R. C. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. L. Caldwell, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 14,1986, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not
identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the
inspectors during this inspection.
The following new items were identified:
VIO 416/86-06-01: Failure to follow an operating procedure - paragraph 6.
UNR 416/86-06-02: Define the allowed applications of rod position bypass
switches - paragraph 6.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
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4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
deviations. One new unresolved item identified during this inspection is
discussed in paragraph 6.
5.
Review of Startup Test Results (72532)
The inspector reviewed the following completed startup tests for
completeness, and followup of test exceptions by the licensee:
a.
1-000-SU-23-06 (Revision 2), Feedwater System, test results were
submitted for review on October 18, 1985, and the results accepted by
the general plant manager on November 4, 1985.
Four open test
exceptions, all level 2 acceptance criteria, existed at the time of
closure and were to be tracked by the Plateau Procedure - Full Power.
b.
1-B21-50-26-06 (Revision 3), Relief Valves, was submitted for results
review on September 6,1985, and accepted by the plant manager on
October 3, 1985.
There were no open test exceptions at the time of
acceptance.
c.
1-M51-SU-72-06 (Revision 1), Drywell Cooling System, was submitted on
September 10, 1985, and the results accepted on February 6, 1986.
d.
1-000-SU-99-FP (Revision 2), Plateau Procedure - Full Power, was used
to all track test exceptions that existed at the start of full power
testing as well as those generated during the full power test program.
All test exceptions had been cleared by February 7,1986, at which time
the procedure was submitted for review. The results were accepted by
the general plant manager on February 12, 1986.
Following discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector had no
questions on the procedures reviewed. Within the areas inspected, no
violations or deviations were identified.
6.
ReviewofPlantOperations(71707)
On March 2, 1986, unit power was reduced rapidly in response to a condenser
tube leak. The initial reduction was by reducing forced flow to about 40%
of rated.
Subsequent reduction was by inserting rods. The rods selected
for insertion were not those that would return the rod pattern to that
enforced by the rod pattern control system (RPCS). Consequently, when flow
was reduced to the extent that there was an automatic transfer to the low
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frequency motor generator, power dropped below the low-power setpoint
(LPSP), and further rod motion was inhibited by the RPCS,
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The LPSP was set conservatively, at about 23% rated thermal power (RTP),
insteau cf the 20% RTP required by technical specifications. Hence power,
as recorded in the log kept by the shift technical advisor (STA), did not
drop below 22% RTP, or into the power regime of concern for the rod drop
accident for which RPCS enforcement of rod pattern is essential for safe
operation.
Nevertheless, the Integrated Operating Instruction, Power Operation
(03-1-01-2, Revision 2), in step 6.15, requires that the rod pattern, or
sequence, required by the RPCS be established prior to decreasing power
below 25% RTP, the low power alarm point (LPAP). This requirement is also
addressed in a note following step 4.4.1.e of System Operating Instruction
(501), Rod Control and Information System (04-1-01-C11-2, Revision 4).
Failure to comply with these procedural requirements has been identified as
an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.b, VIO 416/86-06-01:
Failure to follow an operating procedure.
Further rod motion was prevented by the RPCS because eight rods were out of
sequence. Four symmetrically-located rods were fully withdrawn, at notch
48, and should have been fully inserted to notch 00. Another four symmetric
rods were fully inserted and should have been at notch 04. To return the
rods to their in-sequence position the licensee bypassed them in the RPCS,
by using the rod position bypass switches, as provided for in section 5.1 of
SOI 04-1-01-C11-2. The bypassing was done serially, only one rod was
bypassed at one time, starting with the out rods, each was fully inserted,
and ending with withdrawing the in rods to notch 04.
In reviewing the FSAR, the inspector could find only one reference to the
rod position bypass switches, and that was in section 7.6.1.7.3.1, " Bypass
of the RPCS". That discussion addresses only the bypassing of failed rods
to fully insert them.
No mention is made of other applications of the rod
position bypass switches. Technical Specification 3.1.4.2, action b,
addresses use of the bypass switches as discussed in the FSAR.
In addition,
the following Technical Specifications authorize use of the rod position
bypass switches under narrowly defined conditions:
3.1.3.4 - action a.2,
3.1.3.5 - action a.3,
3.10.2.
None of these specifications addresses the application of the rod
position bypass switches as used by the licensee on March 2, 1986. The
issue of allowed use of the rod position bypass switches will be referred to
the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for resolution.
It will be
tracked as UNR 416/86-06-02: Define the allowed applications of the rod
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position bypass switches.
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In addition to the procedures cited above, the following procedures that
were or appeared to be germane to this issue were reviewed:
a.
03-1-01-002, Power Operations,
b.
01-S-06-002, Conduct of Operations,
c.
01-S-06-006, Fuel Management and Control,
d.
01-S-06-017, Responsibilities and Authorities of Shift Technical
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Advisors,
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e.
09-S-01-6, Engineering Personnel Qualification and Certification, and
f.
09-S-02-400, Control Rod Sequences and Movement Control .
7.
Core Performance Monitoring (61702, 61703, 61704, 61706)
The following procedures used in core performance monitoring were reviewed
for technical content and adherence to technical specification surveillance
requirements:
a.
09-S-02-1 (Revision 5), Core Heat Balance Power Range, provides a
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manual method of calculating thermal power when the process computer,
or the program 00-3, is not available. The equations include all the
necessary inputs for an acceptable calculation.
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b.
09-S-02-18 (Revision 6), APRM Calibration to Core Thermal Power, is
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used when the average power range monitors (APRMs) are not required to
read other than actual core thermal power.
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06-RE-SB13-V-0017 (Revision 23), Reactivity Anomalies, addresses the
c.
surveillance requirements of Technical Specification 4.
Review of the
records of completed procedures confirmed that it had been performed
with acceptable frequency between April and December 1985.
d.
06-RE-1C51-0-0001 (Revision 22), Local Power Range Monitor Calibration,
was performed with acceptable frequency between February and August
1985. More recent records were in the process of being microfilmed.
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and were not readily accessible for review.
e.
06-RE-SC11-V-0402 (Revision 24), Control Rod Scram Testing, was
reviewed for technical content only, and was fou.^d to be acceptable.
f.
06-RE-1J11-V-001 (Revision 27), Power Distributior Limits Verification,
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satisfies the surveillance requirements of Technicti Specifications 4.
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Station records confirmed that the surveillance hail been performed with
acceptable frequency from October through Decembe.1985.
No violations or deviations were identified during this review of
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procedures,
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8.
ReviewofOutstandingItems(92701)
(Closed)UNR 416/86-01-01: Review of level 1 acceptance criteria failures. -
The licensee has reviewed all test exceptions taken against level 1 test
acceptance criteria and documented that review in memo to file 86/0363.
That review demonstrated that all test exceptions had been accepted by NRR
review, closed by successful retest, or passed new criteria generated within
the limits allowed by the test description in the FSAR.
At the exit interview, the inspector raised the issue that some of the new
criteria had been acceptably generated on the basis of steam line tempera-
tures currently existing at full power, but, if improvements in plant
operation or efficiency raised steam line temperature, an untested condi-
tion, with respect to thermal expansion, would exist for the steam lines.
The licensee acknowledged the potential, but argued that the prospect for
increasing steam line temperature was slim. They stated that control and
review of plant modifications would identify the untested condition.
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