ML20141D377
| ML20141D377 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1997 |
| From: | Chandu Patel NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141D379 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9705200083 | |
| Download: ML20141D377 (6) | |
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UNITED CTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E
f W/.SHINGTON, D.C. 20666-0001
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ENTERGY OPERATIONS. INC.
DOCKET NO. 50-382 WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION. UNIT 3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.127 License No. NPF-38 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) dated March 27, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),
and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
9705200083 970515 PDR ADOCK 05000302 P
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Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.127, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license.
1 The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the i
Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 60 days, j
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
dh 0h Chandu P. Patel, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
May 15, 1997 i
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 127 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. NPF-38 DOCKET N0. 50-382 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
REMOVE PAGES INSERT PAGES 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-5 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 8 3/4 5-3 B 3/4 5-3 l
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EMERGENCY CORE' COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) l 2.
A visual inspection of the safety injection system sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
3.
Verifying that a minimum total of 380 cubic feet of granular l
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trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
1 4.
Verifying that when a representative sample of 13.07 i 0.03 grams of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 4 1 0.1 liters of 120 i 10*F water borated to 3011 i 30 ppm, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to greater than or equal to 7 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
e.
At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
1.
Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on SIAS and RAS test signals.
2.
Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test signal:
a.
High pressure safety injection pump.
b.
Low pressure safety injection pump.
3.
Verifying that on a recirculation actuation test signal, the low pressure safety injection pumps stop, the safety injection system sump isolation valves open.
f.
By verifying that each of the following pumps required to be OPERABLE performs as indicated on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
1.
High pressure safety injection pump differential pressure greater than or equal to 1429 psid.
2.
Low pressure safety injection pump discharge pressure greater than or equal to 177 psig.
WATERFORD UNIT 3 3/4 5-5 AMENDMENT NO. 64,127,
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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
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BASES 1
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i 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS l
The OPERABILITY of each of the Reactor Coolant Systen (RCS) safety j
injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be j
immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks.
j This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism i
during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron' concentration, and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the safety analysis are met.
I The safety injection tank power operated isolation valves are considered j
to be " operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires l
that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever 4
j permissive conditions are not met.
In addition, as these safety injection j
tank isolation valves fail to meet single failurs criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.
j; reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the The limits for operation with a safety injection tank-inoperable for any i
j plant to a LOCA event occuring concurrent with failure of an additional safety i
injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.
If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prompt action is reqcired to place the reactor in a mooe where this capability is not required.
l 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS I
l The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core fooling capability will be available in the j
event of a LOCA assuming the loa of one subsystem through any single failure 4
i consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection toks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double-ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.
In addition, each ECCS subsystes provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.
When in mode 3 and with RCS temperature 5000F two OPERABLE ECCs subsys-tems are required to ensure sufficient emergency corc cooling capability is available to prevent the core from becoming critical during an uncontrolled cooldown (i.e., a steam line break) from greater than 5000F.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 8 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 34 M E O G58 u
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l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 1i BASES j-1 l
ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)
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With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is '
i acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable 1
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reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.
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-The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation nf the ECCS i
following a LOCA. The T.SP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump l'
water and causing its final pH to be raised to greater than or equal to 7.0.
The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of water 4
borated to be representative of post-LOCA sump conditions provides assurance j
that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post-LOCA temperatures. A boron concentration of 3011 ppm boron is postulated to be representative of the highest post-LOCA sump baron concentration based on the assumptions used in calculation EC-S96-013. The RWSP, SITS, and RCS maximum boron concentrations assumed are conservative estimates of futher anticipated boron concentrations. 'The assumed maximum boron concentrations for the RWSP and SITS are greater than those currently allowed in Technical Specifications in crder to bound future expected increases in required boron concentrations because of longer fuel cycles and higher energy fuel designs.
Post-LOCA sump pH will remain between 7.0 and 8.1 for the maximum (3011 ppm) and minimum (1504 ppm) boron concentrations calculated using the maximum and minimum post-LOCA sump volumes and conservatively assumed maximum and minimum source boron concentrations.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERAMLITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance -
Requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.
Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
l The requirement to verify the minimum pump discharge pressure on recirculation flow ensures that the pump performance curve has not degraded below that used to show that the pump exceeds the design flow condition assumed in the safety analysis and is consistent with the requirements of ASME Section XI.
WATERFORD WIT 3 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 127
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS a
BASES a
l 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE POOL (RWSP) l
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The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage pool (RWSP) as part of the ECCS also ensures tSat a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWSP minimum j
volume and boron concentration ensure that (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 1
(2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing 1
j of the RWSP and the RCS water volumes with all CEAs inserted except for the
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most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of pool discharge line' location or other physical characteristics.
The lower limit on contained water volume, the specific boron concentration and the physical size (approximately 600,000 gallons) of the RWSP also ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic' stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
l The maximum limit on the RWSP temperature ensures that the assumptions used in the containment pressure analysis under design base accident conditions i
remain valid and avoids the possibility of containment overpressure. The minimum limit on the RWSP temperature is required to pre w nt freezing and/or boron precipitation in the RWSP.
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WATERFORD UNIT 3 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No.127 1