ML20141B655
| ML20141B655 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1997 |
| From: | Nydes R WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141B652 | List: |
| References | |
| GW-GJR-100, NUDOCS 9706240087 | |
| Download: ML20141B655 (203) | |
Text
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, O
AP600 Emergency Response Guidelines l List of Affected Pages for Revision 3 l
r Emergency Response Guidelines Replace AE-0 Revision 2 with Revision 3 Replace AES-0.1 Revision 2 with Revision 3 Replace AE-1 Revision 2 with Revision 3 Replace AES-1.2 Revision 2 with Revision 3 Replace AE-3 Revision 2 with Revision 3 Replace AFR-C.1 Revision 2 with Revision 3 Replace AFR-C.2 Revision 2 with Revision 3 Replace AFR-H.1 Revision 2 with Revision 3 Replace AFR-li.3 Revision 2 with Revision 3 Replace AFR-I.1 Revision 2 with Revision 3 4
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AP600 Emergency Response Guidelines AP600 Document Number GW-GJR-100 O
P Revision 3 May 31,1997 O
I Number Title Rev./Date AE-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3 5/31/97 A. PURPOSE This guideline provides actions to verify proper response of the automatic protection systems following manual or automatic actuation of a reactor trip or safety injection, to assess plant conditions, and to identify the appropriate recovery guideline.
B.* SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS
- 1) The following are symptoms that require a reactor trip, if one has not occurred:
- a. Source range high neutron flux (interlocked with P6)
- b. Intermediate range high neutron flux (interlocked with P10)
- c. Power range high neutron flux - low setpoint (interlocked with P10)
- d. Power range high neutron flux - high setpoint
- e. Power range high positive flux rate
- f. Overtemperature delta-T
- g. Overpower delta-T
- h. Low pressurizer pressure (interlocked with P10)
O 1.
j.
Low reactor coolant cold leg flow (interlocked one loop out of four with P8 and two loops out of four with P10)
Low reactor coolant pump speed (interlocked with P10)
- k. Reactor coolant pump bearing water high temperature (interlocked one loop out of four with P8 and two loops out of four with P10)
- 1. High pressurizer pressure
- m. High pressurizer water level (interlocked with P10)
- p. ADS actuation signal
- q. Safety injection actuation signal
- r. CMT actuation signal
- t. Low pressurizer level (DAS)
- 2) The following are symptoms of a reactor trip:
- a. Any reactor trip alarm
- b. Rapid decrease in neutron level indicated by nuclear instrumentation
- c. All shutdown and control rods are fully inserted O
Page 1 of 15
l Number Title Rev./Date AE-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3 5/31/97 SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS (continued)
- 3) The following are symptoms that require a reactor trip and safety injection, if one has not occurred:
- a. Low pressurizer pressure
- b. Hi-1 containment pressure
- c. Low compensated steam line pressure
- d. Low cold leg temperature
- e. Manual
- 4) The following are symptoms of a reactor trip and safety injection:
- a. Any SI alarm
- b. CMT injection valves open
- c. PRHR isolation valves open I I All reactor trip parameters, safety injection paramet9rs and alanns listed in the symptoms or entry conditions are preliminary and are subject to change to be consistent with the AP600 PMS and DAS design.
l I l Page 2 of 15 l
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Ntanber Title Rev./Date AE-0 AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3 1 S/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE e Steps 1 through 3 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps.
- Foldout page should be open.
I Verify Reactor Trip: Manually trip reactor. IE reactor will 110I trip, IllEN go to e All control rods - INSERTED AFR-S.1, AP600 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION /ATWS, e Reactor trip breakers - OPEN Step 1.
. Neutron flux - DECREASING 2 Verify Turbine Trip: Manually trip turbine, e All turbine stop valves -
CLOSED 3 Check If SI Is Actuated: Check if SI is required. IE SI is O [ Include additional AP600 details required,111E8 manually actuate.
in E0Ps] IE SI is HDI required. IllE8 go to AES-0.1, AP600 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1.
4 Verify Main FW Isolation: Manually close valves as necessary.
- Main flow control valves -
CLOSED e Main FW isolation valves -
CLOSED 5 Verify SG Blowdown Isolation: Manually close valves as necessary.
SG blowdown isolation valves - CLOSED O
Page 3 of 15
AE-0 AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3 l 5/31/97 -
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED i
6 Verify Containment Isolation:
- a. Containment isolation - a. Manually actuate containment ACTUATED isolation.
- b. Containment isolation b. Manually close valves, valves - CLOSED 7 Verify CMT Actuated: Actuate CMT initiation. 1E valves will HDI open, IEEN manually open
. CMT injection valves - OPEN valves as necessary.
8 Verify PRHR Actuated:
- a. Verify PRHR isolation valves - a. Actuate PRHR Initiation. IE OPEN valves will HQI open IllEN manually open valves as necessary.
- b. Verify IRWST gutter drain b. Manually close valves.
isolation valves - CLOSED 9 Verify All RCPs Tripped Manually trip RCPs.
l l Page 4 of 15 l
Number Title Rev./Date AE-0 AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3 5/31/97
.O STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 10 Check If Main Steamlines Should 8e Isolated:
- a. Check if any of the a. Go to Step 11.
following signals have occurred:
. Low steam line pressure
-0R-
. Low T-cold
-OR-e Hi-1 containment pressure
- b. Verify main steamline b. Manually close valves, isolation and bypass valves - CLOSED 11 Verify Passive Containment Verify PCS initiated. If NDI, Cooling Not Required: IHEN manually initiate, e Containment pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN (P01) PSIG e Containment temperature - LESS THAN (T03)
)
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N aber Title Rev./Date AE-0 AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 12 Check RCS Temperatures: H temperature less than (T04) F and decreasing, m :
e RCS cold leg temperatures -
STABLE AT OR TRENDING T0 a) Stop dumping steam.
(T04) F b) 1E cooldown continues, a control total feed flow.
Maintain total feed flow greater than (F01) gpm until narrow range level greater than (LO3)% [(LO4)% for adverse containment] in at least one SG.
c) lE cooldown continues, m close main steamline isolation and bypass valves.
E temperature greater than (T04) F and increasing, m:
. Dump steam to condenser.
-0R- -
-0R-e Initiate PRHR.
13 Verify Power to ECS AC Busses:
- b. AC busses - ALL ENERGIZED b. Try to restore power to deenergized ac busses.
i I
Page 6 of 15
Number Title Rev./Date AE-0 AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE
- It may be necessary to block the Low T-cold to restart SFW pumps.
14 Verify SFW Pumps Running Manually start pumps.
15 Verify Total SFW Flow - GREATER H SG narrow range level greater THAN (F01) GPM than (LO3)%
containment][in any SG, M(LO4)% for adverse control feed flow to maintain narrow range level.
E narrow range level less than (LO3)% [(LO4 containment])% in all for SGs,adverse M
manually start SFW pumps and align valves as necessary. E SFW O flow greater than (F01) gpm can 1101 be established, M initiate PRHR.
H PRHR can fiDI be initiated, M 90 to AFR-H.1, AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS HEAT SINK, Step 1.
16 Verify SFW Valve Alignment - Manually align valves as PROPER SHUTDOWN ALIGNMENT necessary.
I O
Page 7 of 15
Number Iltle Rev./Date AE-0 AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3 5/31/97 --
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION If adverse containment conditions exist, RCS makeup should be operated in manual to maintain pressurizer level.
17 Check RCS Makeup Status:
- a. PRZR level - GREATER THAN a. Verify one makeup pump (LOS)% [(L23 running. If 801, IEEN CONTAINMENT])% FOR ADVERSE manually start one makeup
. pump.
- b. PRZR level - LESS THAN (LO6)% b. Verify all makeup pumps
[(L31)% FOR ADVERSE stopped. If HQI, IEEN CONTAINMENT] manually stop all makeup pumps.
- c. Verify demineralized water c. Manually close valves.
1 solation valves - CLOSED 18 Verify SWS System Operation: I I a' . SWS pumps - AT LEAST ONE a. Start SWS pumps as necessary.
RUNNING
- b. Verify proper valve b. Manually align valves as alignment: necessary.
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
19 Verify CCS System Operation:
RUNNING
- b. Verify proper valve b. Manually align valves as alignment: necessary.
[ Include additional AP600 l details in E0Ps]
j i i Page 8 of 15
Number Title Rev./Date l AE-0 AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3 l g 5/31/97
{G STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 20 Verify VWS System Operation:
l
- a. VWS pumps - AT LEAST ONE a. Start VWS pumps as RUNNING necessary.
- b. Verify proper valve b. Manually align valves as alignment necessary.
[ Include additional ArS00 details in E0Ps]
21 Verify Containment Fan Coolers - Manually start fan coolers.
RUNNING 22 Check If SG Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:
- a. Check pressures in all SGs - a. Go to AE-2, AP600 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, e NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING Step 1.
IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER e NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED 23 Check If SG Tubes Are Intact: Go to AE-3, AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
. Turbine island vent discharge radiation - NORMAL e SG blowdown radiation - NORMAL 24 Check If RCS Is Intact: Go to AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.
- Containment radiation - NORMAL e Containment pressure - NORMAL e Containment level - NORMAL l
Page 9 of 15
Number Title Rev./Date AE-0 AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 25 Check If Passive Safety Systems Should Be Terminated:
- a. RCS subcooling based on core a. Go to Step 27.
exit TCs - GREATER THAN (S01) F
. Total feed flow to SGs - Step 27.
GREATER THAN (F01) GPM
-0R-
. Narrow range level in at ,
least one SG - GREATER l THAN (LO3)%
-OR-
. PRHR - OPERATING { }
INCREASING
- d. itZR level - GREATER THAN d. Go to Steo 27. '
(LO5)%
26 Go To AES 1.1, AP600 PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS TERMINATION, Step 1 27 Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees I
l l Page 10 of 15
l Number Title Rev./Date AE-0 AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE tiOT OBTAINED 28 Check SG Levels:
- a. Narrow range level - GREATER a. Maintain total feed flow THAN (LO3)% greater than (F01) gpm until narrow range level greater than (LO3)% in at least one SG.
- b. Control feed flow to b. IE narrow range level in any maintain narrow range level SG continues to increase in between (LO3)% and 50% an uncontrolled manner, IliEN go to AE-3, AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
29 c:ieck SGS Main Steamline Go to AE-3, AP600 STEAM GENERATOR Radiation - NORMAL TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
O O
Page 11 of 15
Number Title Rev./Date AE-0 AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3 5/31/97 -
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 30 Check If ADS Should Be Actuated:
- a. CMT level - LESS THAN (L01)% a. H RCS hot leg level indication greater than (L32), IHEN go to Step 31.
H NQI, lHEN manually actuate ADS.
- b. Verify first stage ADS b. Manually open valves as isolation valves - OPEN necessary.
- c. Check second stage ADS c. WHEN (T01) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from first stage ADS signal, IHEN verify second stage ADS valves open. H HQI, IllEN manually open second stage ADS valves as necessary.
- d. Check third stage ADS d. hEEN (T02) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from second stage l l ADS signal, IHEN verify third stage ADS valves open.
H HQI, IBEN manually open third stage ADS valves as necessary.
- e. Align RNS to inject into RCS
- f. Verify proper valve f. Manually align valves as alignment necessary.
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
- g. Go to AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.
31 Check Plant Vent Radiation - Evaluate cause of abnormal NORMAL conditions. E the cause is a loss of RCS inventory outside containment, IHEN go to AECA-1.1, AP600 LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, Step 1.
l I Page 12 of 15
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1 Numbar ittle Ray./Date AE-0 AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3
! 5/31/97 l
l l STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT 0 STAINED l
l 32 Reset SI 33 Reset Containment Isolation .
1 34 Establish Following Support Systems Into Containment:
l e Instrument Air e VWS e CCS i
35 Check If Diesel Generators Should Be Stopped:
Verify ECS ac busses -
O' a.
ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER
- a. Try to restore offsite power to ECS ac busses. If offsite power can NQI be restored, IBEH load the following equipment on ac busses:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
- b. Stop any unnecessary diesel generator and place in standby 36 Check If PRHR Should Be Isolated l
- a. Check the following: a. Go to Step 37.
l
- SFW - IN OPERATION e Narrow range level in at least one SG - GREATER THAN (LO3)%
i
- b. Close PRHR isolation valves Page 13 of 15 l
Number Title Rev./Date AE-0 AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 3 5/31/97 -
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l l
l 37 Return To Step 12
- END -
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. . . . - . ~ . ~ - . ~ . - . . . . . . - . . - . _ . . . . . - . . . - . . . - - - . - .
1 Number Title Rev./Date I' AE-0 AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJEP. TION Rev. 3 5/31/97 )
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FOOTNOTES Refer to FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted parameters used in this guideline. i i
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- d Page 15 of 15 l
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. .. m ___ _ . . _ . . . _ . . . . . . _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ . .._______m. __
Number iltje Rev /Date AES-0.1 AP600 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Rev. 3
) 5/31/97 A. PURPOSE l l
This guideline provides the necessary instructions to stabilize and control the l plant following a reactor trip without a safety injection.
B. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS l This guideline is entered from AE-0, AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 3 when SI is neither actuated nor required. i
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Page 1 of 9
Number Title Rev./Dato l AES-0.1 AP600 REACTOR TRIP RESFONSE Rev. 3 S/31/97 -
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION If Si actuation occurs during this guideline, AE-0, AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, should be performed.
NOTE Foldout page should be open.
1 Check RCS Temperatures - E temperature less than (T04) F and decreasing, M :
e RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE STABLE
. AT OR TRENDING TO (T04) F IF a) Stop dumping steam.
ANY RCP RUNNING b) H cooldown continues, M
-0R- control total feed flow.
Maintain total feed flow e RCS COLD LEG TEMPERATURES greater than (F01) gpm until STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO narrow range level greater (T04) F IF NO RCP RUNNING than (LO3)% in at least one SG.
c) H cooldown continues, E close main steamline isolation g and bypass valves. 4 d) E cooldown continues and both SFW in operation and narrow range level greater than (LO3)% in both SGs, M isolate PRHR.
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
IF temperature greater than (T04) F and increasing, M:
. Dump steam to condenser.
-0R-e Dump steam using SG PORVs.
-OR-e Initiate PRHR.
Page 2 of 9
Number Title Rev./Date AES-0.1 AP600 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 2 Verify All ECS AC Busses - Try'to restore offsite power to ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER ECS ac busses. If offsite power can HQI be restored, ItiEN load the following equipment on ac busses:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps] ,
3 Check FW Status:
- a. Check RCS average a, Continue with Step 3c. EtiEli temperatures - LESS THAN temperature less than (T08) F (T08) F, IHEN do Step 3b and c.
- b. Verify main FW flow control b. Manually close valves, p valves - CLOSED
- c. Verify feed flow to SGs c. Establish feed flow to the SGs using SFW line. IE feed flow HQI available AND SG narrow range level less than (L36)%, IREN verify PRHR actuated. IE HDI, IHEU-manually actuate PRHR.
4 Verify All Control Rods Fully 1E two or more control rods NOI Inserted fully inserted, IHEN immediately s borate (B01) ppm for each control )
rod not fully inserted, j I
4 lO Page 3 of 9 l
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Number Title Ree,/Date AE5-0.1 AP600 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Rev. 3 5/31/97 --
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 5 Check RCS Makeup Status:
- a. PRZR level - GREATER THAN a. Verify one makeup pump (L37)% running. IE HQI, IHEN manually start one makeup pump.
- b. PRZR level - LESS THAN b. Verify all makeup pumps (L38)% stopped. IE HQI, IHEN manually stop all makeup pumps.
- c. Verify demineralized water c. Manually close valves.
isolation valves - CLOSED
- d. Operate makeup and letdown as necessary to maintain PRZR level - BETWEEN (L37)%
AND (L38)%
i I 6 Check CMT Status:
- a. PRZR level - GREATER THAN a. Verify CMT injection valves (L17)% open. If HQI, IHEN manually open valves. Continue with Step 7. WHEN PRZR level greater than (L17)%, IHEN do Step 6b.
- b. Verify CMT injection b. Manually close valves, valves - CLOSED I l Page 4 of 9
Numb 2r Title Rev./Date
- AES-0.1 AP600 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Rev. 3 l rQ
'V 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 7 Check PRZR Pressure Control:
l
Go to AE-0, AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 4.
- b. Pressure - STABLE AT OR b. E pressure less than (P12)
TRENDING T0 (P12) PSIG psig and decreasing, M :
- 1) Verify PRZR spray valves closed. H HQI, M manually close. H l
valve (s) can HQI be i closed, M close PRZR spre.y valve (s) block valve. E valve (s) can HQI be closed, M stop RCP(s) supplying failed gD e spray valve (s).
G
- 2) Verify PRZR heaters on.
H HQI, M manually turn on.
E pressure greater than (P12) PSIG and increasing, M:
- 1) Verify PRZR heaters off.
H HQI, M manually turn off.
- 2) Control pressure using normal PRZR spray. E normal spray HQI available, M use auxiliary spray.
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Number Title Rev./Date AES-0.1 AP600 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Rev. 3 l 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 8 Check SG Levels:
1
- a. Narrow range level - GREATER a. Maintain total feed flow THAN (LO3)% greater than (F01) gpm until narrow range level greater than (LO3)% in at least one SG.
- b. Control feed flow to b. If narrow range level in any l maintain narrow range level intact SG continues to l between (LO3)% and 50% increase, IHEN stop feed to l that SG. '
9 Transfer Condenser Steam Dump To IE condenser 801 available, IHEN ,
Pressure Control Mode use SG PORVs. l l
NOTE RCPs JA rnd 18 should be run to provide nonnal PRZR spray.
l I i 10 Check RCP Status - AT LEAST TWO Try to start RCPs 1A and 18:
RUNNING
- a. Establish conditions for starting RCPs: 1 l
[ Include additional AP600 l details in E0Ps] . l
- b. Start RCPs 1A and IB. If no l RCP can be started, IHEN refer l to ATTACHMENT A to verify natural circulation. If natural circulation HDI verified, IEEH increase dumping steam.
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M Number Title Rev./Date AES-0.1 AP600 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 11 Check If Source Range Detectors 4
Should Be Energized:
- a. Check intermediate range a. Continue with Step 12. WHEB flux - LESS THAN (V02) flux less than (V02), IHffi do Step lib.
- b. Verify source range b. Manually energize source ,
detectors - ENERGIZED range detectors. I 12 Shut Down Unnecessary Plant Equipment:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
13 Maintain Stable Plant Conditions:
0 t . PRZR pressure - AT (P12) PSIG
. PRZR level - BETWEEN (L37)%
AND (L38)%
e SG narrow range levels -
BETWEEN (LO3)% AND 50%
e RCS average temperature - AT (T04) F 14 Determine If Natural Circulation Cooldown Is Required:
- a. Criteria - MET a. Go to appropriate plant procedure.
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
- b. Go to AES-0.2, AP600 NATURAL CIRCULATION C00LDOWN, Step 1 O - END -
,V Page 7 of 9
Number Title Rev,/Date AES-0.1 AP600 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Rev. 3 l 5/31/97 i
I l
l ATTACHMENT A The following conditions support or indicate natural circulation flow:
l e RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - GREATER THAN (S01) F e SG pressures - STABLE OR DECREASING e RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR DECREASING e Core exit TCs - STABLE OR DECREASING l
e RCS cold leg temperatures - AT SATURATION TEMPERATURE FOR SG PRESSURE l l
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Page 8 of 9
. . _ . . . . _ . . _ . ..~,_.___._._._.....m _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . . . . . . _ . . . . - .
i i
8 Number iltle Rev./Date
! AES-0.1 AP600 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Rev. 3
?
4 5/31/97 -
) FOOTNOTES
! Refer to FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted
- parameters used in this guideline.
t 1
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)
1 1
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.. _ . . . , ~ . ... ~- .=_- .. .. .~-. - . - . - . - . - - .
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l Number Title Rev./Date AE-1 Rev. 3 O AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT 5/31/97 A. PURPOSE This guideline provides actions to recover from a loss of reactor or secondary coolant.
B. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS This guideline is entered from:
- 1) AE-0, AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 24, with any of the following symptoms: high containment radiation, high containment pressure,
, or high containment level.
- 2) AE-0, AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 30, AES-1.2, AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, Step 8, and AE-3, AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 13, if ADS has been actuated.
- 3) AES-1.1, AP600 PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS TERMINATION, Step 4 and Step 22, and AFR-I.2, AP600 RESPONSE TO LOW PRESSURIZER LEVEL, Step 4, if SI has to be reinitiated.
- 4) AE-2, AP600 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 5, af ter identification and isolation of a faulted SG.
- 5) AECA-1.1, AP600 LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, Step 2, after actions to isolate a LOCA outside containment have been taken.
- 6) AFR-C.1, AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING, Step 16 and Step 25, and AFR-C.2, AP600 RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING, Step 15, af ter core cooling has been re-established.
- 7) AFR-H.1, AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF HEAT SINK, Step 2, if RCS pressure is less than all non-faulted SG(s) pressure.
- 8) AFR-H.1, AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF HEAT SINK, Step 16, after ADS has been actuated.
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- Number ittle Rev./Date AE-1 AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION ff PRHR is not available, one SG should be maintained available for RCS cooldown.
NOTE Foldout page should be open.
1 Check If Any SGs Are Faulted:
. NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER e Steamlines.
. NO SG COMPLETELY e Feedlines.
DEPRESSURIZED IE HQI, IHEN go to AE-2, l AP600 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1.
1 2 Check Intact SG Levels:
- a. Narrow range level - GREATER a. Maintain total feed flow l THAN (L03)% [(LO4)% FOR greater than (F01) gpm until '
ADVERSE CONTAINMENT] narrow range level greater than (LO3)% [(LO4)% for adverse containment] in at least one SG.
- b. Control feed flow to b. If narrow range level in any maintain narrow range level SG continues to increase in between (LO3)% [(LO4)% for an uncontrolled manner, IEEN adverse containment] and 50% go to AE-3, AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
3 Check SGS Main Steamline Go to AE-3, AP600 STEAM GENERATOR Radiation - NORMAL TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
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Number Title Rev./Date AE-1 AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Rev. 3 O 5/31/97 I l V I
- STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION If adverse containment conditions exist, RCS makeup l should be operated in manual to maintain pressurizer level. ,
1 4 Check RCS Makeup Status i
l a. PRZR level - GREATER THAN a. Verify one makeup pump !
l (LOS)%[(L23)% FOR ADVERSE running. If HQI, IHEN l CONTAINMENT] manually start one makeup l pump. IE level continues to I decrease or cannot be j restored, IBEN start second makeup pump,
- b. PRZR level - LESS THAN b. Verify all makeup pumps (LO6)%[(L31)% FOR ADVERSE stopped. IE HQI, IBEH CONTAINMENT] manually stop all makeup pumps.
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Number Tttle Rev./Date AE-1 AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 STEP iCTION/ EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l
S Check If Passive Safety Systems Should Be Terminated:
l a. RCS subcooling based on core a. Go to Step 7.
exit TCs - GREATER THAN (501) F [(S 2) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT
- b. RCS heat sink: b. 1E neither condition satisfied, IliEH go to e Total feed flow to intact Step 7.
SGs - GREATER THAN (F01)
GPM
-0R-e Narrow range level in at least one intact SG -
GREATER THAN (LO3)%
[(LO4)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT] I
-OR-e PRHR - IN OPERATION
INCREASING
- d. PRZR level - GREATER THAN d. Go to Step 7.
(LOS)% [(L2 )% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT 6 Go To AES-1.1, AP600 PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS TERMINATION, Step 1
I I I Page 4 of 10
Number Title Rev./Date i
7 AE-1 AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Rev. 3 x 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBIAINED l
7 Check If ADS Should Be Actuated:
- a. CMT level - LESS THAN (L01)% a. H RCS hot leg level reater than indication (L32) [(L33 g)%-FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT.i, M go to l Step 8. H RQI, M manually actuate ADS.
- b. Verify first stage ADS b. Manually open valves as isolation valves - OPEN necessary.
- c. Check second stage ADS c. M (T01) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from first stage ADS signal, E verify second stage ADS valves open. H.
HQI, M manually open second stage ADS valves as necessary.
I V d. Check third stage ADS d. M (T02) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from second stage ADS signal, M verify third stage ADS valves open.
H HDI, M manually open third stage ADS valves as necessary.
- e. Align RNS to inject into RCS
- f. Verify proper valve f. Manually align valves as alignment necessary.
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
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Number Tltle Rev./Date AE-1 AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 8 Check If Passive Containment Cooling Should Be Stopped:
- a. Passive containment a. Go to Step 9.
cooling - OPERATING
- b. Containment pressure - LESS b. Continue with Step 9. WHEN THAN (P10) PSIG containment pressure less than (P10) psig, IHEN do Steps 8c and d.
- c. Reset passive containment cooling signal
- d. Stop passive containment cooling and place in standby:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps] i 9 Check RCS And SG Pressures: Return to Step 1. j e Check pressure in all SGs -
STABLE OR INCREASING r
e Check RCS pressure - STABLE OR W DECREASING l
10 Check If Diesel Generators Should l Be Stopped
- a. Verify ECS ac busses - a. Try to restore offsite power i ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER to ECS ac busses. IE offsite power can HDI be restored, ;
IHEU load the following 4 equipment on at busses:
l
[ Include additional AP600 6
details in E0Ps]
- b. Stop any unloaded diesel generator and place in standby l l I i Page 6 of 10
Number TitIe Rev./Date AE-1 AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT
,O Rev. 3 V 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 11 Initiate Evaluation Of Plant Status:
- a. Check plant vent radiation - a. Try to identify and isolate NORMAL leakage:
[IncludeadditionalAP600
, details in E0Ps]
lf the cause is a loss of RCS inventory outside containment, IEEN go to
- AECA-1.1, AP600 LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, Step 1.
4
- b. Obtain samples:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
t c. Evaluate plant equipment:
! [ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
- d. Start additional plant equipment to assist in recovery:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
12 Check If RCS Cooldown And Depressurization Is Required:
- a. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN a. IE RNS flow greater than (P03) PSIG [(P04) PSIG FOR (F02) gpm, ItiEN go to ADVERSE CONTAINMENT] Step 13.
ACTUATED
- c. Go to AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND p DEPRESSURIZATION Step 1.
U Page 7 of 10
Number Title Rev./Date AE-1 AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Rev. 3 5/31/97 1
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED PESPGN51 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l
13 Check If Fourth Stage ADS Should Be Actuated:
- a. CMT level - LESS THAN (L10)% a. Perform the following:
- 1) H CMT level decreases to less than (L10)%, Jiifa do Steps 13b and c.
- 2) E RCS hot leg level indication decreases to less than (L32) [(L33)%
FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT],
IlifS manually actuate fourth stage ADS and do Steps 13b and c.
- 3) Continue with Step 14.
- b. Verify fourth stage ADS b. Manually open valves as isolation valves - OPEN necessary. l l '
- c. Verify IRWST injection c. Manually open valves as i isolation valves - OPEN necessary.
l 14 Check IRWST Level:
- a. IRWST level - LESS THEN a. Continue witn Step 15. knifS !
(L11)% IRWST level less than !
(L11)%, Ilif3 do Step 14b. i
- b. Verify containment sump b. Manually align valves as recirculation valves - OPEN necessary.
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~ . - . - - . - - . . . --- . ~ . - -~. -. - . . . . - . . . _ _ . . ~ . .
Nurther iItle Rev /Date AE-1 AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Rev. 3 i
() 5/31/97 STEP AC, TION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 15 Check If Intact SGs Should Be Depressurized To RCS Pressure:
- a. RCS pressure - LESS THAN a. Go to Step 16.
INTACT SG PRESSURES
[ Include additional AP600 feed flow to a SG with high details in E0Ps] radioactivity.
- c. Dump steam to condenser from c. Dump steam using intact SG intact SGs until SG pressure PORVs until SG pressure less less than RCS pressure than RCS pressure.
16 Determine If Reactor Vessel Head
, Should Be Vented 1
( 17 Evaluate Long Term Plant Status
- END -
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Page 9 of 10
Number Title Rev./Date AE-1 AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Rev. 3 5/31/97 FOOTNOTES Refer to FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted parameters used in this guideline.
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_~ .~ - -- .._. - - . ~. . - . . . _ . - - . . . - .-.. .. - - . . . . - - .- - _ -
Number Title Rev./Date l
, O V
AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 5/31/97 s
l A. PURPOSE This guideline provides actions to cool down and depressurize the RCS to cold !
shutdown conditions following a loss of reactor coolant inventory.
1 B. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS l
This guideline is entered from AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, i j Step 12 when RCS pressure is greater than the RNS cut-in pressure and ADS is not actuated.
1 1
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Page 1 of 15
Number Title Rev./Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 STEP A TION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE Foldout page should be open.
1 Verify All ECS AC Busses - Try to restore offsite power to ENERCIZED BY OFFSITE POWER ECS ac busses. IE offsite power can HQI be restored, M load the following equipment on ac busses:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
CAUTION
- If IRWST level decreases to less than (Lil), RNS alignment to the containment sump should be verifled.
- If adverse containment conditions exist, RCS makeup should be operated in manual to maintain pressurizer level. l 2 Check RCS Makeup Status
- a. PRZR level - GREATER THAN a. Verify one makeup pump (L05)%[(L23)% FOR ADVERSE running. IE HQI, M CONTAINMENT] manually start one makeup pump. IE level continues to decrease or cannot be restored, E start second makeup pump,
- b. PRZR level - LESS THAN b. Verify all makeup pumps i (LO6)%[(L31)% FOR ADVERSE stopped. IE HQI, M ;
CONTAINMENT] manually stop all makeup l pumps. 1
- c. Operate makeup and letdown !
as necessary to maintain
)
PRZR level - BETWEEN (LOS)% '
AND (LO6)%[BETWEEN (L23)%
AND (L31)% FOR ADVERSE i CONTAINMENT]
l I Page 2 of 15
Number Title Rev./Date AES-1.2 3 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 3 Check If PRHR Should Be Isolated
- a. Check the following: a. Go to Step 4.
. SFW - IN OPERATION e Narrow range level in at least one SG - GREATER THAN (LO3)% [(LO4)% FOR
, ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
! b. Close PRHR isolation valves 4 Check Intact LG Levels:
- a. Narrow range level - GREATER a. Maintain total feed flow THAN (LO3)% [(LO4)% FOR greater than (F01) gpm until ADVERSE CONTAINMENT] narrow range level greater
.T than (l03)% [(LO4)% for
! d adverse containment] in at !
least one SG.
1
- b. Control feed flow to b. If narrow range level in any j maintain narrow range level SG continues to increase in '
between (LO3)% [(LO4)% for an uncontrolled manner, IllEN adverse containment] and 50% go to AE-3, AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, 4
Step 1.
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Number Title Re v . / Da t e-AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE
- Low steamline pressure 51 and low T-cold SI should be blocked when PRZR pressure decreases to less than (P06) psig.
- After the low steamiine pressure Si signa 1 is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.
- Shutdown margin should be monitored during RCS cooldown.
5 Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown:
- a. Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs - LESS THAN 100 F/HR
- c. Use RNS if in service
- d. Use PRHR as necessary l
6 Turn All PRZR Heaters 0FF l
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i Number Title Rev./Date I AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION
- Voiding may occur in the RCS during RCS depressurization. This will result in a rapidly increasing PRZR level.
- Cycling of the PRZR ADS valves should be minimized.
7 Depressurize RCS To Refill PRZR:
- a. RCS subcooling based on core a. Go to Step 8.
exit TCs - GREATER THAN (501) F [(S 2) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT
- b. Use auxiliary spray b. Use one set of first stage PRZR ADS valves.
- c. PRZR level GREATER THAN c. Continue with Step 8. When (LO7)% , (L0 )% FOR ADVERSE level greater than (LO7)%
CONTAIF ENT [(LO9)% for adverse h'
containment], IEEli do Step 7d.
- d. Stop RCS depressurization l
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Page 5 of 15
Number iitle Rev./Date l AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 l_ l 5/31/97 <
\
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 8 Check If ADS Should Be Actuated:
- a. CMT level - LESS THAN (L01)% a. H RCS hot leg level indication reater than (L32) [(L33 % FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT , HEN go to Step 9. E HQI, IllEN manually actuate ADS.
- b. Verify first stage ADS b. Manually open valves as isolation valves - OPEN necessary.
- c. Check second stage ADS c. WtiEN (T01) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from first stage ADS signal, IllEN verify second stage ADS valves open. E MlI, IHEN manually open second stage ADS valves as necessary.
- d. Check third stage ADS l I
- d. WiiEN (T02) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from second stage ADS signal, IllEN verify third stage ADS valves open.
E 1101, EEN manually open third stage ADS valves as necessary.
- e. Align RNS to inject into RCS
- f. Verify proper valve f. Manually align valves as i alignment necessary. !
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
I
- g. Go to AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF l REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 13.
4 L
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.l Number Title Rev./Date 1 AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I
9 Check If CMT Injection Should Be
- Isolated
- a. ADS - NOT ACTUATED a. Go to Step 10.
- c. RCS subcooling based on core c. Go to Step 10.
exit TCs - GREATER THAN (501) F [(S 2) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT
- d. PRZR level - GREATER THAN d. Go to Step 10.
(LO5)% [(L23)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
{ e. Close CMT injection valves i
i L/ 10 Verify CMT Injection Not Required:
(501) F [(S 2) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT
- b. PRZR level - GREATER THAN b. Manually open CMT injection (LO5)% [(L2 )% FOR ADVERSE valves.
CONTAINMENT 11 Check RCP Cooling: Establish normal cooling to RCP(s). Refer to [ Include e RCP CCS flow - NORMAL additional AP600 details in E0Ps].
. RCP temperature (s) - NORMAL O
Page 7 of 15
Number Title Rev./Date i AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 L_ l 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE l RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE RCPs JA and 18 should be run to provide normal PRZR l spray.
12 Check If RCPs should Be Started:
Go to Step 13.
- b. RCS subcooling based on core b. Go to Step 13.
exit TCs - GREATER THAN (S01) F [(S 2) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT
- c. PRZR level GREATER THAN c. Return to Step 7.
(LO7)% [(L0 )% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT
- 1) Establish conditions for to verify natural
{ }
starting RCPs: circulation. If natural circulation HDI verified.
[ Include additional AP600 IEEN increase dumping steam.
details in E0Ps]
- 2) Start RCPs l l Page 8 of 15
. . . _ . . . - _ _ _ _ . . . _ - - - . ..___--__.__.__---__...___-..-___m._. _.
4 4
,. Number Title Rev /Date
- AES-1.2 AP600 POST !.0CA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 j 5/31/97 l
1
- STEP AGTION/ EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l l
4 CAUTION
- Voiding may occur in the RCS during RCS l depressurization. This will result in a rapidly increasing PRZR level.
i
)>
- Cycling of the PRZR ADS valves should be minimized, i.
- i.
- If CMT injection is necessary to maintain PRZR level, RNS pumps should be started to inject into i 1 i the RCS when RCS pressure is less then (P03) [(PO4)%
l FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
13 De ressurize RCS To Minimize RCS I Su$ cooling:
l s
- a. Use nonnal PRZR spray a. Use auxiliary spray. IE auxiliary spray HQI i available, IfB use one set of first stage PRZR ADS
- valves.
j i
! b. Turn on PRZR heaters as j necessary
,i c. Depressurize RCS until EITHER of'the following conditions satisfied:
. PRZR level-- GREATER THAN (L13)% [(L14)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
-0R-e RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - LESS THAN (S03) F [(SO4) F FOR ADVERSECONTAINMENT]
l 14 Verify Adequate Shutdown Margin:
- a. Sample RCS
- b. . Shutdown margin - ADEQUATE. b. Borate as necessary.
Page 9 of 15
Number Title Rev./Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 ,
NF i STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 15 Check If SI Accumulators should Be Isolated:
- a. RCS subcooling based on core a. If both RCS hot leg exit TCs - GREATER THAN temperatures less than (S01) F [(502 (T05) F, IBEN go to l CONTAINMENT] ) F FOR ADVERSE Step 15c. If NQI, IHEH go l to Step 16.
l i
- b. PRZR level GREATER THAN b. Return to Step 7. 1 (LO7)% [(LO )% FOR ADVERSE I CONTAINMENT
- c. Restore power to isolation valves
- d. Close all SI accumulator d. Vent any unisolated isolation valves accumulators.
I I I I Page 10 of 15
Number Title Rev./Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 '
( 5/31/97 i
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED j 16 Check If Diesel Generators Should Be Stopped:
i
- a. Verify ECS ac busses - a. Try to restore offsite power ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER to ECS ac busses. IE offsite l power can HQI be restored, '
IHEN loadthe following equipment on ac busses:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
- b. Stop any unnecessary diesel generator and place in standby 17 Check If Passive Containment Cooling Should Be Stopped:
- a. Passive containment a. Go to Step 18.
V cooling - OPERATING
- b. Containment pressure - LESS b. Continue dith Step 18. WHEN THAN (P10) PSIG containment pressure less than (P10) psig, IREN do Steps 17c and d.
- c. Reset passive containment cooling signal
- d. Stop passive containment cooling and place in standby:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
18 Check If Source Range Detectors Should Be Energized:
- a. Check intermediate range a. Continue with Step 19. WHEN flux - LESS THAN (V02) flux less than (V02), IHEN do Step 18b.
- b. Verify source range b. Manually energize source
'v detectors - ENERGIZED range detectors.
Page 11 of 15
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Number Title Rev./Date i AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l
l 19 Shut Down Unnecessary Plant I Equipment:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
20 Check If RCP(s) Must Be Stopped:
1
THAN (P07) PSIG
[ Additional steps related to normal AP600 cooldown will be placed after Step 20]
1 21 Check If RNS Can Be Placed In Service:
- a. Check the following: a. Go to Step 22. g
{
e RCS temperatures - LESS THAN (T06)"F [(T07) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
. RCS pressure - LESS THAN (P08) PSIG [(P09) PSIG FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
- b. Determine if RNS should be placed in service in :
accordance with [ Include i additional AP600 details in l E0Ps]
I 22 Check RCS Temperatures - LESS Return to Step 2. '
THAN 200 F 23 Evaluate Long Term Plant Status And Maintain Cold Shutdown Conditions 1
- END - '
i Page 12 of 15
Number Title Rev./Date AES-1.2 O AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 5/31/97 ATTACHMENT A The following conditions support or indicate natural circulation flow:
RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - GREATER THAN (501) F [(S02) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
SG pressures - STABLE OR DECREASING RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR DECREASING Core exit TCs - STABLE OR DECREASING i
RCS cold leg temperatures - AT SATURATION TEMPERATURE FOR SG PRESSURE '
i O
1 1
O Page 13 of 15
Number Title Rev./Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 5/31/97 ,
FOLDOUT FOR AE-1 SERIES GUIDELINES
- 1. CMT INJECTION CRITERIA Open CMT injection valves if EITHER condition listed below occurs:
e RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - LESS THAN (S01) F [(S02)'F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
e PRZR level - CANNOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN (LOS)% [(L23)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
- 2. RED PATH
SUMMARY
- a. SUBCRITICALITY - Nuclear power greater than 5%.
- b. CORE COOLING - Core exit TCs greater than 1200 F
- c. HEAT SINK - Narrow range level in all SGs less than (LO3)%[(LO4)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT] AND total feedwater flow less than (F01) gpm AND PRHR not in service
- d. INTEGRITY - Cold leg temperature decrease greater than 100 F in last { }
60 minutes AND RCS cold leg temperature less than (T14) F
- e. CONTAINMENT - Containment pressure greater than (P21) PSIG
- 3. SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA Go to AE-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1, if any SG pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner or has completely depressurized, and has not been isolated.
- 4. AE-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA Go to AE-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1, if any SG level increases in an uncontrolled manner or any SG has abnormal radiation.
l l
l I Page 14 of 15
. , . . . . - ~ . - ~ ~ - _ - . - . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . ~ . . - . . . . ~ . . . - . . ~ . . . . . . - . ~ - - - - . _ . . . . - . _ . - - - - - . - - - . .
1
{ Number Title Rev./Date AES-1.2 j
4 f AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 3 5/31/97 -
1
- I I
i j FOOTNOTES i
l l Refer to FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted I
a parameters used in this guideline.
a 4
i 1
1-i i
i s
i0 1
O Page 15 of 15
1 1
Number Title Rev./Date 4 -
AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 5/31/97 A. PURPOSE a
This guideline provides actions to terminate leakage of reactor coolant into the secondary system following a steam generator tube rupture.
B. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS This guideline is entered from:
- 1) AE-0, AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 23 when condenser air ejector radiation or SG blowdown radiation is abnormal.
- 2) AE-0, AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 29, AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 3 AE-2, AP600 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 4, and AFR-H.3, AP600 RESPONSE TO STEAM GENERATOR HIGH LEVEL, Step 7, when secondary radiation is abnormal.
- 3) AE-0, AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step'28, AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 2, g AES-1.2, AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, Step 4, when a SG i, narrow range level increases in an uncontrolled manner.
- 4) AE-1 series foldout page whenever any SG level increases in an uncontrolled manner or any SG has abnormal radiation.
Page 1 of 22
i Number Iit10 Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE e Foldout page should be open.
- Personnel should be available for sampling during this guideline.
1 Identify Ruptured SG(s): Continue with Steps 4 through 8 WHEH ruptured SG(s) identified, e Unexpected increase in any SG IEEN do Steps 2 and 3 narrow range level
-0R-e liigh radiation from any SG sample
-OR-
. High radiation from any SG steamline l I
-0R-
. High radiation from any SG blowdown line:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
l l Page 2 of 22
-. ._ . - . . . _ , ~ . - . .- ~. _- -- . . . . - - - - - . . _ . - . . - - .
Number Title Rev,/Date i
AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION If PRHR is not available, one SG should be maintained avatlable for RCS cooldown.
l l 2 Isolate Flow From Ruptured SG(s):
- b. Check ruptured SG(s) PORV - b. E ruptured SG pressure CLOSED less than (P05) psig, M verify SG PORV closed. IE EDI closed, IHEN place PORV controller in manual and close PORV. 1E PORV can RQI l be closed, IHEN close PORV block valve.
- c. b c. Manually close valve (s).
O.
\
Verify valve (s) from lowdown isolation ruptured SG(s) - CLOSED
- d. Close ruptured SG(s) main d. Perfonn the following:
steamline isolation and bypass valves 1) Close remaining main steamline isolation and bypass valves.
- 2) Verify following valves closed.
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps] .
- 3) Use intact SG PORV for steam dump IE the ruptured SG can NOI be isolated from the intact SG, IEEN PRHR should be used for cooldown actions in this
! guideline.
I
- e. [ Include additional AP600 l details in E0Ps]
L l
Page 3 of 22
Number Title Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 5/31/97 _
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION If any ruptured SG is faulted, feed flow to that SG should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS couldown.
3 Check Ruptured SG(s) Level:
- a. Narrow range level - a. Maintain feed flow to ruptured GREATER THAN (LO3)% SG until level greater than
[(LO4)% FOR ADVERSE (LO3)% [(LO4)% for adverse CONTAINMENT] containment] . Continue with Step 4. RBEB ruptured SG level greater than (LO3)% [(LO4)% for adverse containment], IHEN stop feed flow to ruptured SG(s).
- b. Stop feed flow to ruptured SG(s)
- c. Narrow range level - LESS c. Perform the following: { l THAN (L12)%
- 1) Verify SFW flow isolated to !
ruptured SG. !
l
- 3) Verify RCS makeup line :
isolated. If HDI, IHEN !
manually isolate. !
- 4) Continue with Step 5. WHEN ruptured SG(s) narrow range level less than (L12)S., IHEN do Step 4.
I l
{ I l
Page 4 of 22
l I Number iltle Rev./Date j AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 O 5/31/97 V
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION
- If IRWST level decreases to less than (Lil), RNS alignment to the containment sump should be vert fled.
e if adverse containment conditions exist, RCS makeup should be operated in manual to maintain pressurizer level.
4 Check RCS Makeup Status
- a. PRZR level - GREATER THAN a. Verify one makeup pump (L05)%[(L23)% FOR ADVERSE running. E E , M CONTAINMENT] manually start one makeup pump. E level continues to decrease or cannot be restored, M start second makeup pump,
- b. PRZR level - LESS THAN b. Verify all makeup pumps I
(~~N (LO6)%[(L31)% FOR ADVERSE stopped. H E , M
( CONTAINMENT] manually stop all makeup ;
pumps. !
i
- c. Operate makeup and letdown I as necessary to maintain PRZR level - BETWEEN (LOS)%
AND (LO6)%[BETWEEN (L23)%
AND (L31)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
5 Check If SGs Are Not Faulted:
. NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING RCS cooldown:
I IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER
. Steamlines.
. N0 SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED . Feedlines.
l E E , M go to AE-2, AP600 FAULTED STEAM
- GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1.
l O
O Page 5 of 22
i Number Title Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 6 Check If PRHR Should Be Isolated
- a. Check the following: a. Go to Step 7.
. SFW - IN OPERATION
. Narrow range level in the intact SG - GREATER THAN (LO3)% [(LO4)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
- a. Narrow range level - GREATER a. Maintain total feed flow THAN (LO3)% [(LO4)% FOR greater than (F01) gpm until ADVERSE CONTAINMENT] narrow range level greater than (LO3)% [(LO4)% for { }
adverse containment] in at least one SG.
- b. Control feed flow to b. If narrow range level in any maintain narrow range level intact SG continues to between (LO3)% [(LO4)% for increase in an uncontrolled adverse containment] and 50% manner, IliEN return to Step 1.
8 Verify All ECS AC Busses - Try to restore offsite power to ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER ECS ac busses. IE offsite power can HQI be restored, IHEN load the following equipment on ac busses:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
l l Page 6 of 22
)
Number Ittle Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 l
) 5/31/97 i
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l
l 1
CAUTION isolation of the ruptured SG from the intact SG to be l used for RCS cooldown should be completed by closing the main steamline isolation and bypass valves for the ,
ruptured SG or for the intact SG before continuing to !
Step 9, unless a ruptured SG is needed for RCS cooldown l 0r the tooIdown Wi11 be perfonned using PRHR. \
9 Check If RCS Cooldown Rate Should Be Maximized )'
- a. Check the following: a. IE neither condition satisfied, It[EN go to e Ruptured SG pressure - Step 10.
DECREASING
-OR- i e RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - LESS THAN
[\ (S01) F [(S02) F FOR '
ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
-OR-e CMT level - DECREASING
- b. Maximize RCS cooldown rate HQI exceeding the Tech Spec 1imit Page 7 of 22
l Number T1tle Rev./Date l AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR T'JBE R,iPTURE Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION RCS and ruptured SG(s) pressures must be maintained less than the ruptured SG(s) PORV setpoint.
NOTE
- Low s teamline pressure SI and low T-cold SI should be blocked when PRZR pressure decreases to less than (P06) psig.
- After the low steamline pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.
- Shutdown margin should be monitored during RCS cooldown.
- Since ruptured SG(s) may continue to depressurize to less than the minimum RCS pressure necessary for continued RCP operation, cooldown to cold shutdown should not be delayed.
10 Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown:
l
- a. Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs - LESS THAN 100 F/HR
- c. Use RNS if in service
- d. Use PRHR as necessary 11 Turn All PRZR Heaters 0FF l l Page 8 of 22
~ - . _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _
l Number Title Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- CAUTION
- depressurization. This will result in a rapidly
\
increasing PRZR levei.
- Cycling of the PRZR ADS valves should be minimized. '
L 12 Depressurize RCS To Refill PRZR:
l
- a. Use auxiliary spray a. Use one set of first stage l PRZR ADS valves.
- b. PRZR level GREATER THAN b. Continue with Step 13. When (LO7)% [(L0 )% FOR ADVERSE level greater than (LO7)%
CONTAINMENT [(LO9)% for adverse containment], IllEN do Step 12c.
l
- c. Stop RCS depressurization
/ O l
l l
i Page 9 of 22 l
Number Title Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 5/31/97 1
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l 1
13 Check If ADS Should Be Actuated: l
- a. CMT level - LESS THAN (L01)% a. IE RCS hot leg level i reater than indication (L32) [(L33J p% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT;, IllEN go to l Step 14. IE HQI, IEEN I manually actuate ADS. l
- b. Verify first stage ADS b. Manually open valves as-isolation valves - OPEN necessary.
- c. Check second stage ADS c. WHEN (T01) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from first stage ADS signal, IliEN verify second stage ADS valves open. IE l HQI, IHEN manually open i second stage ADS valves as necessary.
l l l
- d. Check third stage ADS d. WHEN (T02) seconds have i valves - OPEN elapsed from second stage ADS signal, IEEN verify third stage ADS valves open.
IE E01, IEEN manually open third stage ADS valves as necessary. ,
- e. Align RNS to inject into RCS
- f. Verify proper valve f. Manually align valves as alignment necessary.
[Includeaddition 9 Go to AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 13 l l Page 10 of 22
_. . _ m.-. _ . . . _ - . _ . . . . _ . . . _ _ __m__ . _ . . . _ . _ . _ . . _ . _ . . ~ - . ~ . - - . _ _ .
l J
Number Title Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 5/31/97 i
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESr')NSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED i ,
j 14 Check If CMT Injection Should Be
' Isolated:
i l
- a. ADS - NOT ACTUATED a. Go to Step 15.
l b. RCS subcooling based on core b. Go to Step 15. I i exit TCs - GREATER THAN T
(S01) *F [(S02 l CONTAINMENT] ) F FOR ADVERSE l
- c. PRZR level - GREATER THAN c. Go to Step 15.
- i. (LOS)% [(L23 l CONTAINMENT])% FOR ADVERSE i
- d. Close CMT injection valves 15 Verify CMT Injection Not Required:
O)
(S01) F [(S02 l CONTAINMENT] ) F FOR ADVERSE l
- b. PRZR level - GREATER THAN b. Manually open CMT injection (LO5)% [(L23 valves.
CONTAINMENT])% FOR ADVERSE
(
(
Page 11 of 22 ;
I
Number Tttie Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 i 1
1 l
l STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ;
I l
l 16 Initiate Evaluation Of Plant Status:
- a. Check plant vent radiation - a. Try to identify and isolate NORMAL leakage:
[ Include additional AP600 detailsinE0Ps]
- b. Obtain samples:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
- c. Evaltate plant equipment: I l
[ Include additional AP600 i details in E0Ps] !
l
- d. Start additional plant j I
equipment to assist in )
recovery:
[ Include additional AP600 ,
details in E0Ps]
17 Check RCP Cooling: Establish normal cooling to l RCP(s). Refer to [ Include
. RCP CCS flow - NORMAL additional AP600 details in
~
. RCP temperature (s) - NORMAL l
l l l l
Page 12 of 22 1
4
, Number Title Rev./Date AE-3 APWO STF.AM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3
/
5/31/97
- V STEP AETION/ EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION Inadvertent criticality may occur following any natural 1
circulation or PRHR cooldown if the first RCP started is in the ruptured loop.
1 NOTE RCPs 1A and 1B should be run to provide normal PRZR
- sorar.
18 Check If RCPs Should Be Started:
I Go to Step 19.
- b. RCS subcooling based on core b. Go to Step 19.
exit TCs - GREATER THAN (501) F [(S 2) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT
- c. PRZR level GREATER THAN c. Return to Step 12.
(LO7)% [(L0 )% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT
- 1) Establish conditions for to verify natural ;
starting RCPs: ci rcul ation. IE natural l circulation ROI verified,
[ Include additional AP600 ItiG increase dumping steam details in E0Ps] from intact SG.
- 2) Start RCPs O
U Page 13 of 22
Number Title Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION
- Voiding may occur in the RCS during RCS depressuriza t fon. This wi1i result in a rapidly increasing PRZR level.
- Cycling of the PRZR ADS valves should be minimized.
- If CMT injection is necessary to maintain PRZR level, RNS pumps should be started to inject into the RCS when RCS pressure is less then (PO3) ((PO4)%
FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) 19 De)ressurize RCS To Minimize RCS Su) cooling:
- a. Use nomal PRZR spray a. Use auxiliary spray. IE auxiliary spray 110I available, IllEti use one set l }
of first stage PRZR ADS valves.
- b. Turn on PRZR heaters as necessary Step continued on next page A >
Page 14 of 22
. _ _ ~ . _ , _ . - . - .- .. . ~ . . . . . . _
l l
Number Title Rev /Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l c. Depressurize RCS until EITHER of the following conditions satisfied:
e RCS pressure - LESS THAN RUPTURED SG PRESSURE IF BACKFILL DESIRED
-OR-e RCS pressure - EQUAL TO RUPTURED SG PRESSURE IF BACKFILL NOT DESIRED
-OR-e PRZR level - GREATER THAN (L13)% [(L14)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
-OR-e RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - LESS THAN (503) F [(SO4) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
20 Check If Diesel Generators Should Be Stopped:
- a. Verify ECS ac busses - a. Try to restore offsite power ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER to ECS ac busses. IE offsite power can HQI be restored, IEES load the following equipment on ac busses:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
- b. Stop any unnecessary diesel generator and place in standby O
lV Page 15 of 22
Number Title Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 21 Check If Passive Containment Cooling Should Be Stopped:
- a. Passive containment a. Go to Step 22.
cooling - OPERATING
- b. Containment pressure - LESS b. Continue with Step 22. WHEN THAN (P10) PSIG containment pressure less than (P10) psig, IBEN do Steps 21c and d.
- c. Reset passive containment cooling signal
- d. Stop passive containment cooling and place in standby:
[ Include adiiitional AP600 details in E0Ps] { }
22 Minimize Secondary System Contamination:
[ Include additional AP600 details ;
in E0Ps]
1 23 Turn On PRZR Heaters As Necessary To Saturate PRZR Water At Ruptured SG(s) Pressure 24 Verify Adequate Shutdown Margin:
- a. Sample ruptured SG(s)
- b. Sample RCS
- c. Shutdown margin - ADEQUATE c. Borate as necessary.
I I Page 16 of 22
.._.._...________.__...._-.____._....___..___._.._._m. . _ _ .
I i
Number Title Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 O l O 5/31/97 i l
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I 25 Check If SI Accumulators Should !
- Be Isolated
exit TCs - GREATER THAN temperatures less than l 4
(501) F [(S02 (T05) F, M go to
] CONTAINMENT] ) F FOR ADVERSE Step 25c. 1E 110I, M go to Step 26.
- b. PRZR level - GREATER THAN b. Return to Step 12.
(LO7)'s [(LO9 CONTAINMENT])% FOR ADVERSE j
- c. Restore power to isolation i valves
, d. Close all SI accumulator d. Vent any unisolated
, isolation valves accumulators.
i
~ 26 Check If Source Range Detectors Should Be Energized:
- a. Check intennediate range a. Continue with Step 27. M 3 flux - LESS THAN (V02) flux less than (V02), M do Step 26b.
- b. Verify source range b. Manually energize source detectors - ENERGIZED range detectors.
a 1 27 Shut Down Unnecessary Plant
, Equipment:
1
[ Include additional AP600 details j in E0Ps]
28 Check If RCP(s) Must Be Stopped:
THAN (P07)PSIG pressure - GREATER O
Page 17 of 22
Number htle Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION
- Steam should not be released from a ruptured SG if water may exist in its steamline.
- Ruptured SG pressure may decrease rapidly when steam is released.
- Voiding may occur in the RCS during RCS depressurization. This may result in a rapidly increasing PRZR 1evel.
29 Check If Ruptured SG Pressure Should Be Reduced:
- a. Ruptured SG pressure - a. Go to Step 30.
GREATER THAN RCS PRESSURE
- b. Perform the following:
. Decrease RCS makeup and increase letdown to l )
initiate backfill
-OR-
. Initiate blowdown from ruptured SG(s)
-OR-e Dump steam from ruptured SG(s)
- c. Check RCS c. Go to Step 30.
THAN (P08) pressure - LESSPSIG [(P09) PSIG FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
- d. Stop ruptured SG depressurization l l Page 18 of 22
l l
l Number htle Rev./Date
! AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3
! 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION
- Feed flow should not be established to an)' ruptured SG which is also faulted unless needed for RCS cooldown.
30 Check Ruptured SG(s) Narrow Range Refill ruptured SG to (L15)%
Level - GREATER THAN (LO3)% [(L16)% for adverse containment]
[(LO4)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT] using feed flow. IE either of the r following conditions occurs, IliEN l stop feed flow to ruptured SG:
e Ruptured SG pressure decreases in an uncontrolled manner.
-0R-e Ruptured SG pressure increases to (P05) psig, 31 Check If RNS Can Be Placed In (n) Service:
- a. Check the following: a. Return to Step 10.
e RCS temperatures - LESS THAN (T06) F [(T07) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
. RCS pressure - LESS THAN (P08) PSIG [(P09) PSIG FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
- b. Determine if RNS should be placed in service in accordance with [ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
32 Check RCS Temperatures - LESS Return to Step 10.
THAN 200 F l
I l 33 Evaluate Long Term Plant Status l And Maintain Cold Shutdown i Conditions O - END -
Page 19 of 22 i
Number Title Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 5/31/97 ,
ATTACHMENT A The following conditions support or indicate natural circulation flow:
RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - GREATER THAN (S01) F [(S02)#F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
SG pressures - STABLE OR DECREASING RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR DECREASING Core exit TCs - STABLE OR DECREASING RCS cold leg temperatures - AT SATURATION TEMPERATURE FOR SG PRESSURE l l I l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l I Page 20 of 22
_ ....._.-.m. ...-..______._._..-_._____.._...__...__~....__...mm_.
ji
- Number iitle I Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev, 3 i .
5/31/97 7
i FOLD 00T FOR AE-3 GUIDELINE
- 1. CMT INJECTION CRITERIA l- Open CMT injection valves if EITHER condition listed below occurs:
l e RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - LESS THAN (S01) F [(S02) F FOR
- ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
- e-t PRZR level - CANNOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN (LOS)% [(L23)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
I 2 RED PATH
SUMMARY
- a. SUBCRITICALITY - Nuclear power greater than 5%.
- b. CORE COOLING - Core exit TCs greater than- 1200 F
- c. HEAT SINK - Narrow range level in all SGs less than (LO3)%:(LO4)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT] E total feedwater flow ' ess than (F01) gpm E PRHR not in service p d. INTEGRITY - Cold leg temperature decrease greater than 100 F fii last l 60 minutes E RCS cold leg temperature less than j (T14) F l
- e. CONTAINMENT - Containment pressure greater than (P21) PSIG 3.. SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA Go to AE-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1, if any SG pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner or has completely depressurized, and has not been isolated.
- 4. MULTIPLE TUBE RUPTURE CRITERIA Return to AE-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1, if any intact SG level increases in an uncontrolled manner or any intact SG has abnormal radiation.
i O
Page 21 of 22
Number Title Rev./Date AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev. 3 5/31/97 FOOTNOTES Refer to FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted parameters used in this guideline.
O l I Page 22 of 22
. . - . . . - . . . - . ~ . - ~ . . . . . . . - . - . - . . . ~ . . , _ - . . . ~ . . - . - - . .
s I
~
Number Title Rev./Date AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 3
- O\ 5/31/97 A. PURPOSE 4
This guideline provides actions to restore core cooling. )
B. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS
=
This guideline is entered from AF-0.2, CORE COOLING Critical Safety Function Status Tree, on a RED condition.
i i
4 4
t M
i d
1
+ l l
O Page 1 of 9
1 Number Title Rev./Date AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE CCOLING Rev. 3 L I 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1 Turn On Hydrogen Igniters l 2 Verify CMT Actuated: Actuate CMT initiation. If valves will hQI open, IHEN manually open e CMT injection valves - OPEN valves as necessary.
l
\
l 3 Verify All RCPs Tripped Manually trip RCPs.
4 Start All RCS Makeup Pumps 1 I
1 5 Check RCP Support Conditions - Try to establish support AVAILABLE conditions.
[ Include additional AP600 details ( )
in E0Ps]
6 Check SI Accumulator Isolation Val-ve Status:
- a. Restore power to isolation valves
- b. Isolation valves - OPEN b. Open isolation valves unless closed after accumulator discharge.
7 Check Core Exit TCs:
- a. Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN a. Go to Step 8.
1200 F
- b. Return to guideline and step in effect l l Page 2 of 9
1 Number Title Rev./Date l 4
AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 3 l
- 5/31/97 l STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION If IRWST level decreases to less than (L11), RNS \
l alignment to the containment sump should be vertfled.
I l
8 Depressurize RCS To Inject IRWST:
} a. Actuate ADS 2 b. Verify first stage ADS b. Manually open valves as 4
isolation valves - OPEN necessary.
- c. Check second stage ADS c. WHEN (T01) seconds have
- valves - OPEN elapsed from first stage ADS signal, M verify second stage ADS valves open. E E , ItiEN manually open second stage ADS valves as necessary,
- d. Check third stage ADS d. W11EN (T02) seconds have
/^i valves - OPEN elapsed from second stage V ADS signal, .IliEN verify third stage ADS valves open.
H E. IllEN manually open third stage ADS valves as necessary.
- e. Align RNS to inject into RCS e. H RNS injection into RCS can E be established, IHEN actuate fourth stage ADS.
- f. Verify proper valve f. Manually align valves as alignment necessary.
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
9 Check Core Exit TCs:
- a. Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN a. E decreasing, IllEN return 1200 F to Step 1. E E , IHEN go to Step 10.
- b. Return to guideline and step in effect O
O Page 3 of 9
Number Title Rev./Date AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION A faulted or ruptured SG should not be used in subsequent steps unless PRHR is not available and no intact SG is available.
10 Check Intact SG Levels:
- a. Narrow range level - GREATER a. Maintain total feed flow THAN (LO3)% [(LO4)% FOR greater than (F01) gpm until ADVERSE CONTAINMENT] narrow range level greater than (LO3)% [(LO4)% for adverse containment] in at least one SG. If total feed flow greater than (F01) gpm can HQI be established, IllEN continue attempts to establish a heat sink in at least one SG and go to Step
- 18. OBSERVE NOTE PRIOR TO STEP 18.
- b. Control feed flow to l I maintain narrow range level between (LO3)% [(LO4)% for adverse containment] and 50%
Page 4 of 9
. _ . . -.. ~ . - - - . ~ . . . . . _ . - _ . _ ._ ... _-. -
Number Title Rev /Date AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 3
NOTE
- Partial uncovery of SG tubes is acceptable in the
- .following steps.
- After the low steamline pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolatton Wi1i occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.
I 11 Depressurize All Intact SGs To i
(P15) PSIG:
l
i '
THAN (P15) PSIG M return to Step 10. H E, M verify PRHR actuated and go to Step 18.
OBSERVE NOTE PRIOR TO STEP
- 18.
- c. Check RCS hot leg c. H RCS hot leg temperatures temperatures - AT LEAST TWO decreasing, M return to i
LESS THAN (T05) F Step 10. H E, M verify PRHR actuated MD go to Step j 18. OBSERVE NOTE PRIOR TO STEP 18.
- d. Stop SG depressurization
.I 4
12 Check If SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated:
- a. At least two RCS hot leg a. Go to Step 18. OBSERVE NOTE temperatures - LESS THAN PRIOR TO STEP 18.
(T05) F
- b. Close all SI accumulator b. Vent any unisolated isolation valves accumulator.
Page 5 of 9
m Number Title Rev./Date AFR-C.) AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 13 Depressurize All Intact SGs To Atmospheric Pressure:
- a. Dump steam to condenser at a. Dump steam at maximum rate maximum rate using SG PORVs. IE steam can NOT be dumped, IHG verify PRHR actuated AHD go to Step
- 18. OBSERVE NOTE PRIOR TO STEP 18.
14 Verify RNS Flow Continue efforts to establish RNS flow. IE core exit TCs less than 1200 F, IRB return to Step 13.
IE H01, IR B go to Step 18.
OBSERVE NOTE PRIOR TO STEP 18.
15 Check Core Cooling:
- a. Core exit TCs - LESS THAN a. Go to Step 18. OBSERVE NOTE 1200 F PRIOR TO STEP 18.
- b. At least two RCS hot leg b. Return to Step 13.
temperatures - LESS THAN 350 F
- c. RCS hot leg level indication c. Return to Step 13.
- GREATER THAN (L32)%[(L33)%
FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]
16 Go To AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 13 l
17 Initiate Reactor Cavity Flooding
. Open cavity flooding squib valve l I I l
Page 6 of 9
. .- -~ .- -
_ = _ _ . . . .. - ~ . . . . . .- . ..
Number Title Rev./Date i AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 3
/
5/31/97 N]/ l l
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE Normal conditions are desired but not required for starting the RCPs.
j 18 Check If RCPs Should Be Started:
- a. Core exit TCs - GREATER THAN a. Go to Step 19.
1200 F
- b. Check if an idle RCS cooling b. Perform the following: !
loop is available:
l
- 1. Open all other vent paths e Narrow range SG level - to containment.
GREATER THAN (LO3)%
[(LO4)% FOR ADVERSE 2. Go to Step 19. l CONTAINMENT]
e RCP in associated loop -
AVAILABLE AND NOT OPERATING l A
l
(,]- c. Start RCP in one idle RCS cooling loop i l
- d. Return to Step 18a. I l
l 19 Check Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN lE core exit temperatures l 1200 F decreasing, M return to l Step 18. lE core exit l temperatures increasing and RCPs l running in all available RCS l
cooling loops, M go to SACRG-1, SEVERE ACCIDENT CONTROL CONTROL ROOM GUIDELINE INITIAL RESPONSE, Step 1.
i 20 Try to Depressurize The RCS By Try to locally depressurize SGs l Cooling Down With PRHR to atmospheric pressure.
'O l b t Page 7 of 9 f
1 Number ittie Rev./Date AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 3 ~~
5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 21 Check If SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated:
- a. RNS flow indicators - AT a. Return to Step 20.
LEAST INTERMITTENT FLOW
- b. Close all SI accumulator b. Vent any unisolated isolation valves accumulator.
22 Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:
- a. At least two RCS hot leg a. Go to Step 23.
temperatures - LESS THAN 350 F
- b. Stop all RCPs 23 Verify RNS Flow Perform the following: { }
- a. Continue efforts to establish RNS flow,
- b. Actuate fourth stage ADS.
- c. Verify IRWST injection isolation valves open. If MQI, IBEN manually open valves.
24 Check Core Cooling: Return to Step 18.
. Core exit TCs - LESS THAN 1200 F e RCS hot leg level indication -
GREATER THAN (L32)%:(L33)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT ~ 4 l
. At least two RCS hot leg I temperatures - LESS THAN 350 F l l
l 25 Go To AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR l OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 13 l l l l
- END - l Page 8 of 9 j
. _ . . . . ~ . ~ . . - . - . - - . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . ~ - - . . - - . . .
. . . . ~ . -
Number Title Rev./Da'te AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rew. 3
., N Sir.
__97 '
I l
' FOOTNOTES Refer to FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted parameters used in this guideline.
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Number iltle Rev./Date AFR-C.2 AP600 RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING Rev. 3 5/31/97 l
l A. PURPOSE l i
This guideline provides actions to restore adequate ore cooling.
i I
- 8. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CCNDITIONS i
i l This guideline is er.tered from AF-0.2, CORE COOLING Critical Safety Function )
l status Tree, on an Oi!ANGE condition. '
\
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1 O 1 Page 1 of 7 l
Number ittle Rev./Date AFR-C.2 AP600 RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ,
1 Verify CMT Actuated: Actuate CMT initiation. If valves l will HQI open, IEEN manually open e CMT injection valves - OPEN valves as necessary.
CAUTION Symptoms for AFR-C.1, AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING should be closely monitored during subsequent steps, 1 1
2 Verify All RCPs Tripped Manually trip RCPs. l l
CAUTION If adverse containment conditions exist, RCS makeup should be operated in manual to maintain pressurizer level.
3 Check RCS Makeup Status:
l I
- a. PRZR level - GREATER THAN a. Start all makeup pumps.
(L05)%[(L23 % FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT
- b. PRZR level - LESS THAN b. Verify all makeup pumps (LO6)%[(L31)% FOR ADVERSE stopped. IE HQI, IHEU CONTAINMENT] manually stop all makeup pumps.
4 Check Core Cooling:
- a. Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN a. IE decreasing IEEE return to (T13) F Step 1. If HQI, IHEN 90 to Step 5.
- b. Return to guideline and step in effect.
l h Page 2 of 7
Number Title Rev./Date AFR-C.2 AP600 RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING Rev. 3 O 5/31/97 V
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 5 Check SI Accumulator Isolation Valve Status:
- a. Restore power to isolation valves
- b. Isolation valves - OPEN b. Open isolation valves unless closed after accumulator di schr.rge.
CAUTION If IRWST level decreases to less than (l.11), RNS alignment to the containment sump should be verifled.
6 Depressurize RCS To Inject IRWST:
- a. Actuate ADS g b. Verify first stage ADE b. Manually open valves as isolation valves - OPEN necessary.
1
- c. Check second stage ADS c. M (T01) seconds have I valves - OPEN elapsed from first stage ADS signal, M verify second stage ADS valves open. 1E E , M manually open second stage ADS valves as necessary.
- d. Check third stage ADS d. M (T02) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from second stage ADS signal, E verify third stage ADS valves open.
If E , M manually open third stage ADS valves as necessary.
- e. Align RNS to inject into RCS e. IE RNS injection into RCS can E be established, E actuate fourth stage ADS.
- f. Verify proper valve f. Manually align valves as alignment necessary.
[ Include additional AP600 f] details in E0Ps]
l
'v Page 3 of 7
NinbQr Title Rev /Date AFR-C.2 AP600 RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 7 Check Core Cooling:
- a. Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN a. If decreasing IEEN return to (T13) "F Step 1. If 801, IEEN go to Step 8.
- b. RCS hot leg level indication b. If increasing, IHEH return
- GREATER THAN (L32)%[(L33)% to Step 1. If HQI, IHEN go FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT] to Step 8.
- c. Return to guideline and step in effect.
C4UTTGN A faulted or ruptured SG should not be used in subsequent steps unless PRHR is not available and no intact SG is available.
8 Check Intact SG Levels:
- a. Narrow range level - GREATER ( l '
- a. Maintain total feed flow THAN (LO3)% [(LO4)% FOR greater than (F01) gpm until l ADVERSECONTAINMENT] narrow range level greater l than (LO3)% [(LO4)% for l adverse containment] in at l least one SG.
- b. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range level between (LO3)4 [(LO4 adverse containment])% and 50% for l I Page 4 of 7
i Number Title Rev./Date AFR-C.2 AP600 RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING Rev. 3 b) q --
5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION The fo1 lowing step wili cause accumulator injection which may cause a red path condition in AF-0.4, INTEGRITY Status Tree. This guideline should be
, completed before transition to AFR-P.1, AP600 RESPONSE l TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK.
NOTE After the low steamline pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.
9 Depressurize All Intact SGs To (P15) PSIG:
- a. Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs - LESS THAN 100 F/HR l
- b. Dump steam to condenser b. Manually or locally dump steam from SGs:
} e Use PORV.
- OR -
. [ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps] .
l l c. Check SG pressures - LESS c. Return to Step 8.
l THAN (P15) PSIG
- d. Stop SG depressurization 10 Check RNS Pumps - RUNNING Start pumps as necessary.
11 Check If SI Accumulators should Be Isolated:
- a. At least two RCS hot leg a. Go to Step 12.
temperatures - LESS THAN
[ (T05) F
, b. Close all SI accumulator b. Vent any unisolated isolation valves accumulator.
Page 5 of 7
l l
1 Number Title Rev /Cate AFR-C.2 AP600 RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING Rev. 3 5/31/97 l^
- 1 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 12 Depressurize All Intact SGs To Atmospheric Pressure:
- a. Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs - LESS THAN 100 F/HR 1
- b. Dump steam to condenser b. Manually or locally dump l steam from SGs:
l e Use PORV.
- OR - l e [ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps] . l l
13 Verify RNS Flow Perform the following:
- a. Continue efforts to establish RNS flow. l l
- b. Actuate fourth stage ADS. l
14 Check Core Cooling: Return to Step 12.
. Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN (T13) F e RCS hot leg level indication -
GREATER THAN (L32)%:(L33)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT.
- At least tw') RCS hot leg temperatures - LESS THAN 350 F 15 Go to AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR
- OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 13 l I
- END -
l l
Page 6 of 7 l
f I.
Number ittle '
AFR-C.2 AP600 RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING Rev 3 5/31/97 FOOTNOTES Refer to FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted parameters used in this guideline.
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. ._.... ..- .-- - --... .__._--.. --. ~. - ~ ...~ ~ -. .. .... - ..- -~ .- - -...,~
i 1
4, .
Number 11tle Rev /Date
! AFR-H.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF HEAT SINK Rev. 3
- 5/31/97 i
A. PURPOSE This guideline provides actions to respond to a loss of heat sink in all steam
- 9ee rators.
, B. $YMPT0MS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS
}
!' This guideline is entered from:
l- 1) AE-0, AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 15, when minimum SFW flow
- is not verified E narrow range level in all SGs is less than (LO3)%
i
[(LO4)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT] E PRHR can not be initiated.
l 2) AF-0.3, HEAT SINK Critical Safety Function Status Tree on a RED condition.
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O Page 1 of 9
l l
Number Title Rev./Date AFR-H.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF HEAT SINK Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 l
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l l
1 1 Try To Establish PRHR Flow:
1
- a. Actuate PRHR initiation i
- b. Verify PRHR isolation b. Manually open valves as valves - OPEN necessary.
- c. Verify PRHR flow c. Manually open valves as necessary. If PRHR flow can NOT be established IliEN 90 l to Step 2.
- d. Return to guideline and step in effect CAUTION
- If total feed flow is less than (F01) gpm due to operator action to control RCS temperature, this l l guideline should not be perfonned.
2 Check If Secondary Heat Sink Is Required:
- a. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN a. Go to AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF ANY NON-FAULTED SG PRESSURE REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.
- b. RCS temperature - GREATER b. Try to place normal RNS THAN (T06) F [(T07) F FOR System in service to cool ADVERSE CONTAINMENT] RCS while continuing in this guideline. Refer to [ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps] . If adequate cooling with normal RNS System established, IHEN return to guideline and step in effect.
l I Page 2 of 9
I l
Number htle Rev./Date AFR-H.1 AP600 RESPONS: TO LOSS OF HEAT SINK Rev. 3 Q 5/31/97 l STEP g ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1
CAUTION
- If parameter (VO4) [(VO5) for adverse containment] l
\ is exceeded due to loss of secondary heat sink, '
Step 9 should be innrediately initiated for feed and bieed cooIdown.
3 Try To Establish SFW Flow To At least One SG- !
l
- a. Check control room '
indications for cause of SFW failure:
e Condensate storage tank level e SFW pump power supply l
e SFW valve alignment I o e Low T-cold SFW isolation k- e High-2 SG NR level SFW isolation
- b. Try to restore SFW flow
- c. Check total flow to SGs - c. Dispatch operator to locally GREATER THAN (F01) GPM restore SFW flow. Go to Step 4.
- d. Return to guideline and step in effect O
Page 3 of 9
Number Title Rev./Date AFR-H.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF HEAT SINK Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 4 Try To Establish Main FW Flow To At Least One SG
- a. Check Condensate System - IN a. Try to place Condensate SERVICE System in service. E E ,
Ili8 go to Step 8.
, b. Check FW isolation valves - b. Perform the following:
OPEN
- 1) Reset SI iT necessary.
- 2) Reset FW isolation.
- 3) Open FW isolation valves.
E nn FW isolation valve can be opened,1118 go to Step 8.
- c. Establish Main FW flow: c. Go to Step 6.
{ }
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
5 Check SG Levels:
- a. Narrow range level in at a. H feed flow to at least one least one SG - GREATER THAN SG verified, HB maintain (LO3)% [(LO4 flow to restore narrow range CONTAINMENT])% FOR ADVERSE level to greater than (LO3)%
[(LO4)% for adverse containment] . E E verified, BG go to Step 6.
- b. Return to guideline and step in effect Page 4 of 9
Number iltle Rev./Date AFR-H.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF HEAT SINK Rev. 3 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION Following block of automatic SI actuation, manual Si actuation may be required if conditions degrade.
6 Try To Establish Feed Flow From Condensate System:
- a. Depressurize RCS to less than (P06) PSIG:
- 1) Use normal spray 1) Use auxiliary spray. IE auxiliary spray HQI available, IBEN use one set of first stage PRZR ADS valves.
- b. Block SI signals:
e Low Steamline Pressure SI
. Low PRZR Pressure SI e Low T-cold SI
- c. Depressurize at least one SG to less than (P20) PSIG:
- 1) Dump steam to condenser 1) Manually or locally dump at maximum rate steam from SGs:
. Use PORV.
-OR-
. [Includeadditional AP600 details in E0Ps].
If h01, IBEN go to Step 8.
- d. Establish condensate flow: d. Go to Step 8.
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
/
O Page 5 of 9 1
l I Number Tttle Rev./Date AFR-H.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF HEAT SINK Rev. 3 5/31/97 1
l l STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1
l i
7 Check SG Levels:
i
- a. Narrow range level in at a. If feed flow to at least one least one SG - GREATER THAN SG verifled, IHB maintain (LO3)% [(LO4 flow to restore narrow range CONTAINMENT])% FOR ADVERSE level to greater than (LO3)%
[(LO4)% for adverse containment] . IE HQI verified, IBM go to Step 8.
- b. Return to guideline and step in effect 8 Check For Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink:
- a. Parameter (V04) [(V05) for a. Return to Step 1.
adverse containment] -
EXCEEDED
{ }
CAUTION Steps 9 through 12 must be performed quickly in order to establish RCS heat removal by RCS feed and bleed.
9 Actuate SI 10 Verify CMT Actuated: Actuate CMT initiation. IE valves will HQI open, IBEN manually open
. CMT injection valves - OPEN valves as necessary.
11 Verify All RCPs Tripped Manually trip RCPs.
Page 6 of 9 f
. . _ . ... . _ m. - ...____._______..___.._.m. - . _ _ . . _ _ . _ ___ _ . . .
Neber Tttle Rev./Date AFR-H.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF HEAT SINK Rev. 3
[ 'l 5/31/97
\/ -
1 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION ff IRHST level decreases to less than (Lil). RNS l alignment to the Containment sump should be Verified.
l 12 Establish RCS Bleed Path:
- isolation valves - OPEN necessary.
signal, IBEN verify second stage ADS valves open. IE NQI, IHEN manually open 1
second stage ADS valves as necessary,
- d. Check third stage ADS d. WHEN (T02) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from second stage
()N
\s_ ADS signal, IHEN verify third stage ADS valves open.
IE NQI, IEEN manually open third stage ADS valves as necessary.
4
- e. Align RNS te inject into RCS e. IE RNS injection into RCS can HQI be established, IEEN actuate fourth stage ADS.
- f. Verify prcper valve f. Manually align valves as alignment necessary.
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
13 Perform Steps 1 Through 11 Of E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION While Continuing With
- This Guideline 4
O Page 7 of 9
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Number Title Rev./Date i AFR-H.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF HEAT sit.K Rev. 3 5/31/97 l
_ j STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION If adverse containment conditions exist, RCS makeup {
should be operated in manual to maintain pressurizer 1 level. l 14 Check RCS Makeup Status:
I
- a. PRZR level - GREATER THAN a. Verify one makeup pump (LO5)%[(L23)% FOR ADVERSE running. If HQI, IRQ CONTAINMENT] manually start one makeup pump. IE level continues to decrease or cannot be restored, IRB start second makeup pump.
- b. PRZR level - LESS THAN b. Verify all makeup pumps (LO6)%[(L31)% FOR ADVERSE stopped. lE E0.I, IHB CONTAINMENT) manually stop all makeup i pumps.
l CAUTION e If containment pressure increases to greater than b (PO2), containment spray should be vertffed.
15 Continue Attempts To Establish Secondary Heat Sink In At least One SG:
l
. SFW flow e Main FW flow e Condensate flow
. Other low pressure flow 16 Go To AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 13
- END -
l l Page 8 of 9
- - ~ ~ ~ ~ . ... - ...... _. . _ _ . . . , _ , , , _ , ,
Number iitle AFR-H.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK Re . 3 O 5/31/97 FOOTNOTES Refer to FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted parameters used in this guideline.
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l Number iltle Rev./Date {
/N AFR-H.3 '
AP600 RESPONSE TO STEAM GENERATOR HIGH LEVEL Rev. 3 b 5/31/97 l
i l A. PURPOSE This guideline provides actions to respond to a steam generator high level l
condition and to address the steam generator overfill concern.
B. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS This guideline is entered from: 1
- 1) AF-0.3, HEAT SINK Critical Safety Function Status Tree on a YELLOW condition, and
- 2) AFR-H.2, AP600 RESPONSE TO STEAM GENERATOR OVERPRESSURE, Step 3, if the affected SG narrow range level is high.
O i
!O Page 1 of 4
l Number Title Rev./Date AFR-H.3 AP600 RESPONSE TO STEAM GENERATOR HIGH LEVEL Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 ,
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION If SG narrow range level has increased to greater than ,
(L27)% [(L28)% for adverse containment) an evaluation \
should be made for SG overffil considerations. Steam should not be released from any SG with level greater than (L27)4 [(L28)4 for adverse containment] prior to overfill evaluation.
NOTE Throughout this guideline, "affected" refers to either SG in which narrow range level is greater than (L12)%.
1 Identify Affected SG(s):
- a. Narrow range level - GREATER a. If less than (L12)% in all THAN (L12)% SGs, IBEN return to guideline and step in effect.
2 Verify FW Isolation: )
{
- a. Main FW pumps - STOPPED a. Manually stop pumps.
- b. Flow control valves - CLOSED b. Manually close valves.
- c. Feedwater isolation valves - c. Manually close valves.
CLOSED 3 Verify SFW Flow To Affected SG(s)
- ISOLATED I l Page 2 of 4
_ . . . . .. - . - . . ..-.-. . _ . . . _ _ . ._ . . . _ . . .a i
Number Title Rev./Date AFR-H.3 AP600 RESPONSE TO STEAM GENERATOR HIGH LEVEL Rev. 3 l i
5/31/97 l STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1 l 1
4 Check Affected SG(s) Level:
- a. Narrow range level - LESS a. Go to Step 5. l THAN (L27)% [(L28)% FOR ADVERSECONTAINMENT]
i
- b. Narrow range level - b. Go to Step 5.
DECREASING s
i c. Control SFW flow to maintain l
., ~~ narrow range level between (LO3)% [(LO4 containment])% and 50% for adverse
"- ~
- d. Return to guideline and step in effect 5 Adjust Affected SG(s) PORY l Controller Setpoint To (POS) PSIG !
6 Close Affected SG(s) Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass Valves 7 Check SGS Main Steamline if AE-3 guidtline is in effect, Radiation - NORMAL lliEN return to guideline and step in effect. IE fiQI, ItiEH go to AE-3 AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
8 Establish Blowdown From Affected SG(s):
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
9 Return To Guideline And Step In Effect t
- END -
Page 3 of 4
Number Title Rev./Date AFR-H.3 AP600 RESPONSE TO STEAM GENERATOR HIGH LEVEL Rev. 3 5/31/97 FOOTNOTES Refer to FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted parameters used in this guideline.
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Page 4 of 4
. . _ . . . . . - - . . . - ~ . - - - - - . - - . . - - . . = . - . - . . - - . . - - - - . . ~ . . _ .- - - . _. .- .-.
1 i
Number intle Rev./Date O AFR-I.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO HIGH PRESSURIZER LEVEL Rev. 3 l l
4
+
5/31/97 1
I A. PURPOSE This guideline provides actions 'to respond to a high pressurizer level.
i B. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS
' l This guideline is entered from AF-0.6, INVENTORY Critical Safety Function Status
- Tree on a YELLOW condition.
i O
O Page 1 of 4
Number Title Rev./Date AFR-I.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO HIGH PRESSURIZER LEVEL Rev. 3 L 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1 Check CMT Injection Valves - ALL Return to guideline and step in CLOSED effect.
2 Check RCS Makeup Status:
- a. RCS makeup pumps - STOPPED a. Stop all makeup pumps.
3 Check Letdown - IN SERVICE Establish letdown:
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps] .
IE letdown can H01 be established, IHEN establish reactor head vent flow.
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]. q g 4 Check PRZR Pressure:
- a. Pressure - LESS THAN (P02) a. Control makeup and letdown PSIG as necessary to decrease l PRZR pressure to less than l (P02) psig. I 5 Turn On PRZR Heaters O
Page 2 of 4
I ttumbe r Title Rev./Date !
AFR-I.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO HIGH PRESSURIZER LEVEL Rev. 3 l 5/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l
6 Check PRZR Spray Valves:
1
- a. Normal spray valves - CLOSED a. Manually close spray valves.
If valve (s) can NDI be closed, IHEN close PRZR spray valve s) block valve. l IE valve (s)(can HDI be i closed, IHEN stop RCP(s) supplyin valve (s)g failed spray
- b. Auxiliary spray valve - b. Manually close auxiliary CLOSED spray valve. If valve can 3 NDI be closed, IHEN open
- normal RCS makeup line.
7 Control Letdown As Necessary To Maintain RCS Pressure Stable
. 8 Check PRZR Level - LESS THAN Return to Step 7.
(L24)%
1 1
9 Return To Guideline And Step In Effect
- END -
O Page 3 of 4
Number Title Rev./Date AFR-I.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO HIGH PRESSURIZER LEVEL Rev. 3 5/31/97 FOOTNOTES Refer to FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted parameters used in this guideline.
1 l l I l Page 4 of 4
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AP600 Emergency Response Guidelines Q
%/
Background Information List of Affected Pages for Revision 3 Background Book 1 i l
Document M Section(s)
I-AE-0 4-11 Basis, Actions, Instrumentation, Control / Equipment 4-24 Basis, Actions, Instrumentation, Control / Equipment 4-24a new page
]
4-28 Additional Information 4-28a new page 4-38 Actions 4-39 Additional Information AES-0.1 4-8 Additional Information l 4-10 Basis, Instrumentation, Control / Equipment i 4-10a new page-4-22 Knowledge -
4-22a new page
( AES-0.2 4-4 Basis
( 4-12 Knowledge AE- 1 4 13 Actions 4-14 Additional Information 4-15 Knowledge AES-1.1 4-12 Knowledge 1 4-22 Basis 4-30 Knowledge 4-30a new page AES-l .2 4-20 Basis, Actions 4-21 Additional Information 4-22 Basis, Instrumentation 4-25 Basis 4 37 Knowledge AE 4-11 Basis, Actions, Instrumentation, Control / Equipment 4-12 page rollover 4 19 Additional Information 4-38 Basis, Actions 4-39 Additional Information 4-47 Basis
(- 4-57 Knowledge
(
)
l I
O AP600 l
l Emergency Response Guidelines AP600 Document Number GW-GJR-100 0
1 Revision 3 l May 31,1997 l l
l O
'----T- -- _____________w _ - __. _ _u___
!O AP600 Emergency Response Guidelines l
AP600 Document Number GW-GJR-100 Background Information i
Book 1 l O
Revision 3 May 31,1997 O
l O
l l
l BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR AP600 EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE i
AE-0 p AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION v
Rev.3 l May 31,1997
)
I l
O o \newproj2\2064w\rev3\ae4 wpf.lb 061297 REVISION: 3
-. . - -- - . - - ~ = . -- -. - --- - - -- -.
. STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 0 i
STEP 8 STEP: Verify PRHR Actuated 3 PURPOSD -To ensure that PRHR is actuated BASIS:
During a plant transient resulting in a reactor trip, nonsafety grade core heat removal wi!) b provided by the SGs, steam system and the SFWS. In the event that these systems are una.ailable then safety.
, grade core heat removal is provided by the passive residual heat removal system (PRHR).
At this point safety injection has been determined to be required and PRHR actuation is included in
. the safety injection actuation " sequence" (i.e., whenever the CMTs have actuated PRHR). PRHR is l
! required upon CMT actuation to mitigste the impact (over filling the pressurizer) of increasing RCS !
inventory as a result of CMT heatup and fluid expansion during an event where significant CMT recirculation occurs (such as for spurious safety injection actuation). Therefore the operator verifies that PRHR has actuated. If the PRHR isolation valvis have not opened, the operator is instructed to
, manually open the individual valves. The operator atro vetifies that the IRWST gutter drain isolation j valves close.
ACTIONS: i
. Verify PRHR isolation valves are open a Manually open valves
Status indications for:
- PRHR isolation valves position indication
- IRWST gutter drain isolation valves position indication L CONTROllEOUIPMENT:
Controls for:
- PRHR isolation valves
- IRWST gutter drain isolation valves J
KNOWLEDGE:
. The operator should know that PRIIR is actuated whenever CMT actuation occurs.
- If the protection and safety monitoring system is unsuccessful in actuating the PRHR, the operator should be aware that the DAS has provisions for manually actuating the PRHR.
(O ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A REVislON; 3 owwproj2\2064*\rev3\ae.0.wpf it> 061397 4 11
STEP DESCRIITION TABLE FOR AE-0 STEP 9 STEP: Verify All RCPs Tripped PURPOSE: To ensure thet all RCPs are tripped BASIS:
The RCPs get tripped on CMT actuation. The RCPs are not pemiitted to be operating after CMT actuation since RCP operation will impact proper CMT operation. RCP trip is delayed 15 seconds to allow reactor trip to occur first.
ACTIONS:
Verify all RCPs tripped
- Manually trip all RCPs INSTRUMENTATION:
RCP :ndication CONTROLF.OUIPMENT:
l Controls for manual trip of all RCPs KNOWLEDGE:
If the protection and safety monitoring system is unenecessful in tripping the RCPs, the operator should be aware that the DAS has provisions for manually actuating the CMTs, which will result in tripping the RCPs.
ADDITIONAL INFORM ATION:
N/A O
m:sp6002064wse4*pt:15:20596 4 12 REVistoN: 2
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 0 STEP 17 - CALTION l CAUTION: If adverse containment conditions exist. RCS makeup should be operated in manual to maintain pressurizer level PURPOSE: To alen the operator that RCS makeup should be operated in manual if adverse contamment conditions exist BASIS' RCS makeup is controlled in the automatic mode using the pressurizer level setpoints which correspond to normal containment conditions. In the automatic mode, one makeup pump is staned on low pressurizer level and the makeup pump (s) are stopped on high pressurizer level. For adverse contamment conditions, RCS makeup should be operated in manual to maintain pressurizer level between the adverse containment setpoint values.
, ACTIONS:
N/A INSTRUMENTATION:
[ N/A CONTROUEOUIPMENT:
N/A '
KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A mpo6w .o.wpr: b-120596 4 23 REvlsioN: 2
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE.0 STEP 17 STEP: Check RCS Makeup Status PURPOSE: To ensure that the chemical and volume control makeup pumps are operating properly BASIS:
The nonsafety-related chemical and volume control (CVS) makeup pumps provide makeup to the RCS for RCS inventory controi. Operation of the makeup pumps is automatically controlled on pressurizer level between the low and high pressurizer level setpoints during normal operations.
Following CMT actuation, the control level setpoints are automatically adjusted so that the makeup pumps automatically control pressurizer level between (LOS) and (LO6). One makeup pump is started on low pressurizer level and the makeup pump (s) are stopped on high pressurizer level. This step ensures that the CVS makeup pumps are operating properly by checking pressurizer level. The demineralized water isolation valves receive an isolation signal on a safeguards actuation and are therefore verified to have closed.
ACTIONS:
. Determine if pressurizer level is greater than (LOS)% ((L23)% for adverse containment]
= Determine if pressurizer level is less than (LO6)% [(L31)% for adverse containment] ,
. Verify that one CVS makeup pump is running
{
- Start one CVS makeup pump :
= Verify all makeup pumps stopped
. Verify demineralized water isolation valves closed INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
a CVS makeup flow
= CVS makeup pump status a CVS makeup valve position
- Pressurizer levei
. Demineralized water isolation valve position CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Controls for:
- CVS makeup pumps
. Demineralized water isolation valves KNOWLEDGE:
N/A o \new proj2\20Mwvev3 Nae 0 wpf Ib-061397 4 24 REvislON: 3
-. -. -.- . . - .- . ..-.. ~ - - ... -. - . - - .-. _ . _ _ - - - . .
4 4
j STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 0 ;
i-3 !
i STEP 17 (Cont.)
i ,
l ADDITIONAL INF0r: 'nTION:
i
=
l (LOS) Pressurizer post S low level setpoint for starting RCS makeup for normal containment I a conditions
! . (LO6) Pressurizer post-S high level setpoint for stopping RCS makeup for normal containment conditions l
=
(L23) Pressurizer low level setpoint for starting RCS makeup for adverse containment conditions (L31) Pressurizer high level setpoint for stopping RCS makeup for adverse containment conditions O
l
+
ohwprojN064wVev 3W-0.w pf. l b-061397 4 24a REVISION: 3
STEP DESCRII" TION TABLE FOR AE 0 STEP 20 STEP: Verify VWS Operation .
PURPOSE: To ensure VWS pumps are running and valves properly aligned l
BASIS:
The chilled water system (VWS) supplies chilled water to all air handling units of the plant heating, l'
ventilation and air conditioning systems, and provides proper equipment environmental conditions.
Therefore, operation of the VWS is verified.
ACTIONS:
Vedfy that at least one VWS pump is running Stan VWS pumps as necessary
. Verify proper valve alignment Manually align valves as necessary 1
INSTRUMENTATION: I
. VWS pumps status indications l
'T .
VWS valve indications l (U
CONTROLEOUIPMENT:
- Controls for VWS pumps
. VWS valve controls KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Include additional details in EOPs i
l l
I mWo6w 4.pt:tb izos96 4 27 REvlsloN: 2
l
! STEP DESCRIPTION TAllLE FOR AE 0 l
STEP 21 STEP: Verify Containment Fan Coolers RUNNING PURPOSE: To ensure containment fan coolers are running to limit containment pressure, temperature, and humidity D6S.!S:
Containment fan coolers provide non-safety grade cooling of the containment atmosphere to limit containment pressure, temperature, and humidity during accident conditions.
ACTIONS:
Determine if containment fan coolers are running l
- Manually start the fan cooler INSTRUMENTATION:
Containment fan coolers status indication CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Containment fan coolers controls KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Containment fan coolers have two-speed motors. If containment pressure / temperature are above the limits for high-speed operation, the fan coolers should be run at slow speed.
When preparing the EOPs, consideration should be given to the potential for water hammer in the chilled water piping following a heatup of containment and subsequent reinitiation of the containment fan coolers and chilled water system consistent with the huidance provided in GL96-M. The following precautions and limitations have been identified in order to prevent flashing and potential water hammer in the chilled water piping.
- Following an event which results in heatup of the containment air / steam above 228'F, the isolated cooling water supply and retum containment isolation valves should not be opened to restore chilled water flow to the operating fan coolers, until the containment atmosphere temperature has
! been reduced to 5228'F.
l l
+ Following an event which results in heatup of the containment air / steam above 228'F, cooling water flow should not be initiated to fan cooler coils unless the fans for these coolers have been running for a sufficiently long time to ensure the water in the coils is ::t equilibrium temperature o \newproj.Nos4w\rev3w-0 m pf:Ib 061397 4 2g REVISION: 3
__ _ ~ .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ .. - __ _ _ ..._._ _ _. ._
l STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE-0 1
l
( with the containment atmosphere temperature, and until the containment atmosphere temperature has been reduced to 5228'F.
The chilled water now to operating fan coolers should be stopped and isolated using the containment isolation valves, whenever the containment atmosphere temperature exceeds 228 F.
. Following an event which results in heatup of the containment air / steam above 228 F, chilled water now to operating fan coolers should be initiated by first closing the manual valve in the chilled water return line header (exiting containment), opening the remotely-operated containment isolation valves, and then slowly opening the manual valve to slowly fill the potentially voided system piping.
The temperature of 228'F is the saturation temperature for the chilled water system at which voiding could occur. As this temperature is dependent on the elevations of the chilled water system sunge tank and the elevation of the containment fan cooler units, this number should be revalidated with as-built information.
O l
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.- . - . - . ~ - . - --. - . . - - . . - ... - .- . . - - - . - . . .
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE-0 l
STEP 29 STEP: Check SGS Main Steamline Radiation - NORMAL PURPOSE: To identify any niptured (failure in primary to secondary pressure boundary) SGs l
EASIS- !
l Abnormal radiation in a SG indicates primary to secondary leakage. Since the turbine island vent and !
blowdown lines may have been isolated at th. .nitiation of the transient, it may be necessary to check I each SG at tbt time. Optimal recovery in dealing with a SGTR is provided in AE-3, AP600 STEAM GENb. \ TOR TUBE RUITURE.
ACTIONS:
Determine if SGS main steamline radiation level is normal Transfer to AE-3, AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUITURE, Step I INSTRUMENTATION:
SGS main steamline radiation instrumentation l
CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
Defining " normal" as the value of a process parameter experienced during routine plant operations ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A t
mWo6w=-o.wpf:1b-120596 4-37 REVislON: 2
- a. _ _ . - -
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE-0 STEP 30 STEP: Check if ADS Should Be Actuated PURPOSE: To determine if ADS should be actuated based on prevailing plant conditions BASIS:
If the operator has progressed to this step, then passive safety systems may still be required and the operator is directed to see if automatic depressurization system (ADS) actuation is required. ADS
, actuation is required if CMT level cannot be maintained above the first stage ADS actuation setpoint or if RCS hot leg level is low, if ADS actuation is required, then the operator verifies that the first three ADS actuation stages have operated successfully. The second and third stages ADS are actuated after the first stage following a time delay.
If ADS is actuated, the operator is directed to go to guideline AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
ACTIONS:
- Determine if ADS should be actuated
=
Determine if CMT level is less than (LOI)%
= Determine if RCS hot leg level is greater than (32)%
Determine if (T01) seconds have elapsed from first stage ADS actuation signal
. Determine if (T02) seconds have elapsed from second stage ADS actuation signal
= Verify actuation of first three ADS actuation stages was successful l
. Manually open first, second and third stage ADS actuation valves l
- Align normal residual heat removal system to inject into RCS
= Manually align valves as necessary INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for-
= CMT level e RCS hot leg level
. ADS actuation
- ADS actuation isolation valve position
- Normal residual heat removal system valves position
- Normal residual heat removal system pumps status CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
- Manual ADS scruation valve controls
- Controls for nonnal residual heat removal system valves a Normal residual heat removal system pump controls KNOWLEDGE:
The operator should be aware that the DAS has provisions for actuating ADS.
o bewprojN064w\rev3\ae 0 wpf Ib-061397 4 38 REVislON: 3
l i STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE-0 1
4 STEP 30 (Cont.)
I 1
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
i j- . (LOI) CMT low level ADS actuation (L32) RCS hot leg level greater than bottom of hot legs for nonnal containmero conditions (T01) Time delay for second stage ADS actuation
- e (T02) Time delay for third stage ADS actuation j i include additional details for valve alignments in EOPs such as verifying the closure of ADS l discharge header drain isolation valves.
e
- Re operator must manually block the containment isolation signal to the RNS containment -)
j isolation valves prior to aligning the system for injection 1
i k
l.
1 )
a ll t
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o:\newproj2\2064wirev3\ac-o.w pf: I b-061397 4 39 REVISION: 3
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 0 STEP 31 STEP: Check Plant Vent Radiation - NORMAL PURPOSE: To ensure that there is no primary leakage into the auxiliary building BASIS:
During the initiation of the transient, there should be no abnormal indications in the auxiliary building. If abnonnal radiation levels exist, the operating crew should attempt to identify the cause of the abnormal conditions. If the cause is determined to be a loss of RCS inventory outside containment, then the operator should go to AECA 1.1. AP600 LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINhENT, to try to terminate the ledage.
ACTIONS:
- Determine if plant vent radiation is normal Determine if cause a' abnormal radiation is loss of RCS inventory outside containment Evaluate cace of abnormal radiation conditions Transfer to AECA-1.1. AP600 LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, Step 1 INSTRUMENTATION:
Plant vent radiation monitors CONTROL /EOUIPNENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
Determining loss of RCS inventory outside containment Defining " normal" as the value of a process parameter experienced during routine plant operations ADDITIONAL INFORM ATION:
N/A O
m Wo64*-o.wpf:Ist2io96 4 40 REVislON: 2
_. . .. . . -. . . - . . - . - . - - .- -._- .~ .. .. . .-_
lO
- BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR AP600 1
1
- EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE l
AES-0.1 4
AP600 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE l
\ Rev.3 May 31,1997 l
4 4
O c:\newproj2\2061w\rev3\aes-01.wpf. l b-061297 REVISION: 3
_._ _ _ , _ ._ _ _ _ _ . ._...._ . _ _ .- _._ _ _~._ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ - . - _ . _ _ _ _ .
STEP DESCRIITION TABLE FOR AES 0.1 STEP 3 j.TEP: Check FW Sta:us PURPOSE- To ensure the proper feedwater alignment following a reactor trip Eb.5l&l Following a reactor trip, the main feedwater pumps continue to operate while flow is automatically switched from the main feed line to the startup feedwater line. The main feedwater flow control valves isolate if RCS average temperature reaches a setpoint to prevent an uncontrolled RCS -
cooldown from excessive feeding of the SGs through the main feed line. Verifying feed flow to the SGs ensures a secondary heat sink for decay heat removal. The feedwater source is from the main feed pumps or the startup feedwater pumps (if the main feed pumps are stopped). If feedwater is not l
available and SG narrow range level is below the setpoint for PRHR actuation. PRHR should be actuated.
ACTIONS:
Determine if RCS average temperatures are less than Ci"08)'F l Determine if main feedwater flow control valves are closed
- Close main feedwater flow control valves Establish feedwater flow the SGs Detennine if SG nanow range level is less than (L36)%
- Actuate PRHR INSTRUMENTATION:
l
- RCS average temperature
=
Main feedwater flow control valve position indication Feedwater flow to SGs indication
- Startup feedwater pump status indication
- SG narrow range level indication
- PRHR indication CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
i Controls for main feedwater flow control valves
! = Controls for startup feedwater pumps
- Controls for main feedwater pumps
- Controls for PRHR l KNOWLEDGE:
N/A 2
mwo64ms.ol.wpf:Ibt2:2% 4-7 REvlsloN: 2
l l
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES-0.1 STEP 3 (Cont.)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
= (T08) RCS low average temperature
= (L36) SG narrow range .e ! <*tnoint for PRHR actuation
=
Section 3 of the Adverse Systems Interactions report (WCAP 14477) should be referred to for additional insights when writing EOPs O
O o \newproj2\2064wvevhaes 01 wpf.lb-061397 48 REVISION: 3
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES 0.1 i
i STEP 4 STEP: Verify All Control Rods Fully insened PURPOSE: To ensure all control rods are insened for adequate shutdown margin i
BASIS:
A subcritical core is verified if all rods are at the bottom based on rod position indication. If this indication reveals that one rod is not insened, no immediate action is required since the core is designed for. adequate shutdown margin with one rod stuck out. However,if more than one rod fails to insert fully, the shutdown reactivity margin must be made up through emergency boration to
] account for the reactivity wonh of the stuck rods.
ACTIONS:
Determine if au control rods are fully inserted Determine if two or more control rods are not fuuy insened Borate (B01) ppm for each control rod not fully inserted INSTRUMENTATION:
O . Control rod position indication CVS makeup pump suction three way control valve position indication CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
CVS makeup pump suction three way control valve control KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
(B01) Boration requirement for stuck rod r%
m:po6w sai.wpt:ib.121296 4-9 REVisloN: 2
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES 0.1 STEP 5 STEP: Check RCS Makeup Status PURPOSE: To ensure that the CVS makeup pumps are operating properly BASIS:
The nonsafety grade CVS makeup pumps provide makeup to the RCS for RCS inventory control.
Operation of the makeup pumps is automatically controlled on pressurizer level between the low and high pressurizer level setpoints during normal operation. Following reactor trip, the control level setpoints are automatically adjusted so that the makeup pumps automatically control pressurizer level between (L37) and (L38). One makeup pump is started on low pressurizer level and the makeup pump (s) are stopped on high pressurizer level. This step ensures that the CVS makeup pumps are operating properly by checking pressurizer level. Pressurizer level should be maintained between the makeup pump start and stop level setpoint values. If boration or auxiliary spray is desired, letdown may be placed in service. The demineralized water isolation valves receive an isolation signal on a reactor trip and are therefore verified to have closed.
ACTIONS:
- Determine if pressurizer level is greater than (L37)%
- Determine if pressurizer level is less than (L38)7c
- Verify that one CVS makeup pump is running
- Stan one CVS makeup pump Verify all makeup pumps stopped
- Operate makeup and letdown to maintain pressurizer level between (L37)7c and (L38)7c INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
- CVS makeup flow e CVS makeup pump status
- CVS makeup valve position
- Pressurizer level
- Letdown flow
- Demineralized water isolation valve position l CONTROL /EOUTPMENT:
Controls for:
1
- CVS makeup pumps l
- Letdown control valves l
- Demineralized water isolation valves I KNOWLEDGE:
l N/A o snewpro3mo64wsrev3xaes.oi wpt:ib-06:397 4 10 REVislON: 3
. - . . . . ~ . - . - . - -
. . . _ . - - - . - - - . . . ~ . - . - - . - . - - . - . - . .
I'.
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES-0.1 STEP 5 (Cont.)
5 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
l (L37) Pressurizer post trip no-load minimum level setpoint for starting RCS makeup i = (L38) Pressurizer post-trip no-load maximum level setpoint for stopping RCS makeup l
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STEP DESCRII' TION TABLE FOR AES 0.1 STEP 13 STE Maintain Stable Plan'. Conditions PURPOSE: To maintain stable plant conditions D.6LIS' After stabilizing the plant following the reactor trip, the plant should be maintained in a stable condition while investigating the cause of the tdp and detennining if a startup or cooldown should be performed.
ACTIONS:
Maintain stable plant conditions:
- Pressurizer pressure at (P12) psig Pressurizer level between (L37)% and (L38)% ,
- SG narrow range levels between (LO3)% and 50%
- RCS average temperature at (T04)'F INSTRUMENTATION:
Indications for:
- Pressurizer pressure
. Pressurizer level
- SG narrow range level
. RCS temperature i CONTROL /EOUIPhENT:
Controls for:
Pressurizer spray valves (normal or auxiliary)
- Makeup and letdown
. Feedwater flow control valves a SG PORVs
=
Condenser steam dump valves KNOWLtiDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
=
(P12) Pressurizer normal operating pressure (LO3)% SG level above U-tubes for nonnal containment conditions
- (T04) No load RCS temperature
'Os =
(L37)% Pressurizer post trip no-load minimum level setpoint for starting RCS makeup
+ (L38)% Pressurizer post-trip no-load maximum level for stopping RCS makeup mup60m206w.es otspf*121296 4-21 REVisloN: 2
i
(
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES-0.1 l
STEP 14 STEP: Determine if Natural Circulation Cooldown Is Required PURPOSE: To determine if a cooldown must be done on natural circulation BASIS:
If the plant staff determines that a natural circulation cooldown is required, then a transition to AES-0.2. AP600 NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN, is made.
ACTIONS:
- Determine if a natural circulation cooldown is required a Transfer to appropriate plant procedure Transfer to AES-0.2, NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN, Step 1 INSTRUMENTATION:
Instrumentation to determine if a natural circulation cooldown is required CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
During a prolonged station blackout event. the accident management plan should contain manual procedures to permit manual override of the timer-driven ADS actuation, to be implemented no later than 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> following the loss of offsite and onsite AC power. Criteria for manually overriding the timer-driven ADS actuation include that the plant is in a stable condition, with the CMTs full, the pressurizer water level is stable, and the IRWST water level is stable. It is intended that the manual override of the timer-driven ADS actuation would be implemented about 20-22 hours from the start of the event. Loads supplied by the 24-hour battery, including the PMS actuation cabinets would be de-energized at the time of the override decision. This would preserve the battery power of the two electrical divisions powered by the 24-hour battery and these batteries would have at least a two-hour charge for a later ADS actuation,if needed. The operators would continue to monitor plant parameters via instmmentation that is powered from one of the two electrical divisions with 72-hour battery capacity, if the event continues beyond 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the 72-hour batteries allow the operators to monitor the plant parameters to decide if ADS actuation is needed. Since the batteries are conserved, as described above, sufficient power is available for actuation of ADS during the 22-72 hour time frame. After 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the ancillary diesel generators will allow continued monitoring the plant conditions. If ancillary diesel generators cannot be staned, and other ac power sources cannot be brought to the site l
from other locations, the accident management plan for this beyond design basis scenario should direct the operators to manually actuate the automatic depressurization system while post-accident
- monitonng capability is still available, i
o \newproJ2\2064*\rev3\aes.01 wpf.Ib 061397 4-22 REVIStoN: 3
i l 1
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES 0.1 l 1
l l
( STEP 14 (Cont.)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
l if a Technical Specification limitation that requires a cooldown before an RCP can be started is l
violated, a natural circulation cooldown should be performed.
l l
1 l
l l
1 l
t l
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O l
l BACKGROUND INFORMATION l FOR l
l AP600 i
EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE l
l AES-0.2
, AP600 NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN O
D Rev.3 l May 31,1997 l
l l
i l
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STEP DESCRII" TION TABLE FOR AES 0.2 O
V STEP 1 - NOTE 1 NOTE: Foldout page should be open PURPOSE: To remind the operator that the foldout page for the AE-0 series of guidelines should be open BASIS:
The foldout page provides a list of important items that should be continuously monitored, if any of the parameters exceed their limits, the appropriate operations should be initiated.
ACTIONS:
N/A INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A CONTROLEOUIPMENT:
[ N/A KNOWLEDGE:
Since each foldout page for a particular series of guidelines is potentially unique, the operator should
- know what items comprise each foldout page. Refer to the FOLDOUT PAGE Section in the appropriate background documents.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A O
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STEP DESCRIITION TABLE FOR AES-0.2 l
l STEP 1 - NOTE 2 l
' 1 NOTE RCPs I A and IB should be run to provide normal PRZR spray I PURPOSE: To inform the operator of a preferred order for starting RCPs l l
BASIS:
Subsequent steps require operator actions to control RCS pressure. The preferred means of control is normal pressurizer spray since this conserves reactor coolant inventory. Since spray line connections I are provided in only two loops, the RCPs should be run in those loops. '
1 In addition, operation of either RCP 1 A or RCP IB precludes the possibility of developing reverse flow through the PRHR HX, which can potentially lead to the degradation of the PRHR as a heat sink.
When any RCP is operating, either RCP 1 A or IB shall be operating.
ACTIONS:
N/A INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A O
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STEP DESCRIITION TABLE FOR AES-0.2 O
Q STEP 6 l STEP: Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown l PURPOSE: To begin a controlled RCS cooldown to cold shutdown at a specified maximum rate, with preferred and altemate methods l BASIS:
To establish the cooldown of the RCS, steam should be released through the condenser steam dump valves. However, if the main condenser is not available for steam dump, the cooldown should be established using of the SG PORVs, and releasing steam to the atmosphere. If the SG PORVs are not available, passive residual heat removal (PRHR) should be used to cooldown. With control air pressure available and no main condenser, the plant steam pressure will be controlled at the set pressure of the PORVs on the SGs. The plant cooldown is initiated by decreasing the pressure setpoint of the PORVs. The cooldown rate should be controlled and maintained less than the maximum cooldown rate for a natural circulation cooldown. Steam dump must be discontinued if the actual cooldown rate exceeds these permissible values.
To prevent uneven RCS temperature distributions, the pressure difference between SGs must be minimized. This ensures that decay heat removal is evenly distributed to each active coolant loop.
SG level is maintained at the no-load level to provide a stable heat sink for the decay heat removal.
Deviation from the required cooldown rate could lead to excessive heat removal rates during the RCS cooldown. Since the intent of this guideline is to perform a controlled RCS cooldown and stay within Technical Specification limits, the requirement to maintain RCS temperature and pressure within these limits is explicitly emphasized in this Step and Steps 10 and 13. Though this is not a pressurized thermal shock concem, emphasis needs to be placed on maintaining RCS temperature, and pressure within certain limits needs to be emphasized. For this Step and Step 10, the requirement on RCS temperature and pressure is to stay within the Technical Specification limits. Step 13 contains additional requirements on RCS temperature and pressure.
ACTIONS:
- Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs less than (T09)*F/hr Dump steam to the condenser using normal steam dump system
- Use PRHR for cooldown
- Maintain SG narrow range level at (L19)%
- Control feedwater flow
- Maintain RCS temperature and pressure within limits of (C01) 1 l O l
V m.%p600ao64.w.02 wpf;lb 1212% 41I REvlsioN: 2
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES-0.2 STEP 6 (Cont.)
O INSTRUMENTATJON:
Indication for:
- RCS cold leg temperature indication
- Steam dump system indications
- SG narrow range level
- Feedwater flow ,
a RCS temperature a RCS pressure
- PRHR isolation valves position CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Controls for:
- Steam dump to condenser
- PRHR isolation valves KNOWLEDGE:
If PRHR is being used for the cooldown, the operator should take actions to cool the IRWST.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
(T09) Maximum cooldown rate for natural circulation cooldown (L19) SG no-load level
- (C01) Technical Specification limit for natural circulation cooldown rate e
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l l
l O 1 I
i BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR AP600 EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE AE-1 AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT l Rev.3 May 31,1997 .
O owwproj2\2064 wVev 3\ae- l .w pf: I b-061297 REVISION: 3
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l STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 1 f
STEP 7 SIEB Check if ADS Should Be Actuated l
PURPOSE: To determine if ADS should be actuated based on prevailing plant conditions BASIS-If the operator has progressed to this step, then passive safety systems are still required and the operator is directed to check and see if automatic RCS depressurization is required. Automatic depressurization system (ADS) actuation is required if core makeup tank (CMT) level cannot be maintained above the first stage ADS actuation setpoint or if RCS hot leg level is low. If ADS actuation is required, then the operator verifies that the first three ADS stages have operated successfully. The second and third stage ADS are actuated after a time delay, if ADS is actuated, (or if CMT level is approaching the first stage ADS setpoint) the operator is directed to align the normal residual heat removal system to inject the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) to the RCS to prevent, the need for, fourth stage ADS actuation. The normal residual heat removal system provides injection into the RCS from the IRWST at about 100 psig.
This injection stops the CMT injection and prevents the fourth stage ADS valves from being actuated.
This feature prevents containment pressurization and flooding. Therefore, at this time if ADS is actuated, the normal residual heat removal system is aligned from the IRWST to inject into the RCS.
ACTIONS:
- Determine if ADS should be actuated Determine if CMT level is less than (L01)%
- Determine if RCS hot leg level is greater than (L32)% [(L33)% for adverse containment)
- Determine if (T01) seconds have elapsed from first stage ADS signal
. Determine if (T02) seconds have elapsed from second stage ADS signal e Verify actuation of first three ADS stages
- Manually open first, second and third stage ADS valves
- Align normal residual heat removal system to inject into RCS
- Manually align valves as necessary INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
!-
- ADS valve position
- ADS isolation valve position
- Normal residual heat removal system suction valve position l- = Normal residual heat removal system discharge valve position
- Normal residual heat removal system pump status indication
[
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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 1 STEP 7 (Cont.)
CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Controls for:
- ADS valves
- ADS isolation valves Normal residual heat removal system suction valve
=
Normal residual heat removal system discharge valve a
Normal residual heat removal system pump KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.:
=
(LOI) CMT low level ADS actuation (Tul) Time delay for second stage ADS actuation
=
(T02) Time delay for third stage ADS actuation
=
(L32) RCS hot leg level greater than bottom of hot leg for normal containment conditions (L33) RCS hot leg level greater than bottom of hot leg for adverse containment conditions Include additional details for valve alignments in EOPs such as verifying the closure of ADS discharge header drain isolation valves The operator must manually block the containment isolation signal to the RNS containment isolation valves prior to aligning the system for injection O
o \newproj2\2064wwv3\ae lb wpf.lb.061297 4 14 REVISION: 3
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 1 i
\/ STEP 8 STEP: Check if Passive Containment Cooling Should Be Stopped PURPOSE: To stop passive containment cooling if operating and no longer needed l
L BASIS Passive containment cooling (PCS) is actuated on the containment PCS actuation pressure (HI-2 containment pressure). In AE-0, AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, the operator verifies that PCS is operating if required. During a LOCA, the need for continued PCS operation is monitored by this step. After containment pressure is reduced below the containment pressure to terminate PCS, it is reset so that it can be stopped to prevent passive containment cooling water storage tank depletion. If after PCS reset, the containment pressure increases above the containment 3 PCS actuation setpoint, PCS should automatically actuate. In addition, the ORANGE path of the Containment Setus Tree sends the operator to AFR-Z.1, AP600 RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE. Step 3 of AFR-Z.1 checks the need for PCS and verifies that PCS is 1 operational if required, 1 ACTIONS:
=. Dete'mine if passive containment cooling is operating
. Dete rmine if containment pressure is less than (P10) psig e Reset passive containment cooling signal
. Stop passive containment cooling and place in standty INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
= PCS isolation valve position
- Containment pressure
. -PCS Reset status C_ONTROL/EOUIPMENT:
Controls for: i e PCS reset i
- PCS isolation valves !
l i
KNOWLEDGE:
! This step is a contmuous action step. If PCS reactuates after it was stopped, the operator should leave
! it in service until the containment fan coolers are running and can ma'mtain containment conditions.
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
l V (P10) Containment pressure to terininate PCS o \newproj2\20Nwirev3\ae lb wpf.lb 061297 4 15 REVislON: 3
i STEP DESiRII'rION TABLE FOR AE 1 I l
STEP 9 STEP: Check RCS And SG Pressures PURPOSE: To determine if the passive safety systems termination criteria should be rechecked BASIS:
Since guideline AE-1 is used to recover from both a LOCA and secondary side break, a second check on SG pressures is necessary in case there is a faulted SO which was not fully depressurized at the time the passive safety systems termination criteria were t hecked. A check on RCS pressure is also necessary in case the SG pressures are stable and there is a faulted SG which is depressurizing at the i time the passive safety systems termination criteria were checked. If there is a faulted SG which is still depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or if ti;e F.CS pressure is increasing, the operator is durcted to retum to Step 1, since the initial steps in AE-1 snould be rechecked. Eventually, the faulted SG will blow down to atmospheric pressure and dry out, RCS pressure will stabilize or increase, and all passive safety systems termination criteria in AE-1 should be met. If the operator proceeds past this step in AE-1 with a depressurizing SG, the operator could be directed to AES-1.2, AP600 POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, and encounter more restrictive passive safety systems termination criteria than necessary.
ACTIONS:
Determine if both SG pressures are stable or increasing
=
Determine if RCS pressure is stable or decreasing 1
INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
- SG pressure
= RCS pressure CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
With a LOCA and no faulted SG, the SG pressure could be decreasing slightly. This is considered a " stable" SG pressure. This step addresses the presence of a secondary side break in which the faulted SG is still depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner. If this is the case, the passive safety systems termination criteria may not be met when the check is encountered, and the operator should retum to Step 1 in AE-1. The operator should proceed to AES-1.2 until all SG pressures have been stabilized or are increasing and RCS pressure has stabilized or is decreasing.
" Uncontrolled" means not under the control of the operator, and incapable of being contmiled by the operator using available equipment.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A mMp6002064wNae 1b.wpf:lb-121796 4-16 REV!slON: 2
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR AP600 EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE AES-1.1 AP600 PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS TERMINATION
- Rev.3 May 31,1997 l
4 i
o Wwproj2\20Mw\rev3wsI la wpf.lb-061297 REVISION: 3
STEP DESCRIPT10N TABLE FOR AES 1.1 STEP 7 l
l STEP: Realign Other Components To Pre-SI Configuration PURPOSE: To realign systems to their pre safety injection configuration B.6Ei-Since the passive safety systems are twing terminated, other systems / components that are actuated on a safety injection signal are realigned to their pre-safety injection actuation configuration ACTIONS:
Realign other systems / components (actuated on a safety injection signal) to their pre-safety injection configuration INSTRUMENTATION:
Instrumentation for other systems / components (actuated on a safety injection signal) needed to support realignment to the pre-safety injection configuration CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Controls for other systems / components (actuated on a safety injection signal) needed to support O- realignment to the pre-safety injection configuration KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: '
N/A l
l I
l l G I
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l l
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES.I.1 i
i STEP 8 STfEE:
_ Check if Passive Containment Cooling Should Be Stopped EURPOSE: To stop passive containment cooling if operating and no longer needed BASIS:
Passive containment cooling (PCS) is ar tuated on the containment PCS actuation pressure (HI-2 containment pressure). In AE-0, AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, the operator verifies that PCS is operating if required. During a LOCA, the need for continued operation of PCS is monitored by this step. After containment pressure is reduced below the containment pressure to terminate PCS, PCS is reset so that PCS can be stopped to prevent passive containment cooling water storage tank depletion. If, after PCS reset, at any time the containment pressure increases above the containment PCS actuation setpoint, PCS will again automatically actuate. In addition, the ORANGE path of the Containment Status Tree sends the operator to AFR-Z.1, AP600 RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE. AFR-Z.1 checks the need for PCS and verifies that PCS is operational if required.
ACTIONS:
Determine if passive containment cooling is operating Determine if containment pressure is less than (P10) psig Reset passive containment cooling signal Stop passive containment cooling and place in standby INSTRUMENTATION:
- PCS valve position indication
- Containment pressure indication Passive containment cooling reset status indication CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Controls for:
- Passive containment cooling reset
- Passive containment cooling isolation valves KNOWLEDGE:
This step is a continuous action step. If PCS reactuates after it was stopped, the operator should leave it in service until the containment fan coolers are running and can maintain containment conditions.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
(P10) Containment pressure to terminate PCS o \newproj2\2064wirev3\aes1 1a.wpf:1b-061297 4 12 REVISION: 3
l l STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES 1.1 1
L STEP 16 l
STEP: Verify All ECS AC Busses ENERGlZED BY OFFSITE POWER PURPOSE: To verify electrical power supply is available to all essential equipment used in j this guideline E6.SlS:
If offsite power is lost to any ac electrical bus, manual action may be required to establish an electrical power supply to non safeguards equipment used during recovery, such at instrument rir compressor, PRZR heaters, makeup pumps, etc. If offsite power cannot be restored, essential non-safeguards equipment used in subsequent steps, such as instmment the air compressor, must be loaded on the ac emergency busses.
ACTIONS:
i Determine if all ECS ac busses are powered by offsite power ;
- . Try to restore offsite power to all ECS ac busses
. )
Load essential equipment on the ECS ac busses l
INSTRUMENTATION:
^ l f . Diesel backed bus voltage I
. Power supply to diesel backed busses
=
Status indication for equipment to be loaded on the ECS ac busses Indication of available diesel capacity CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Controls to restore offsite power Breaker controls for additional equipment to be loaded on the ECS ac busses KNOWLEDGE:
This step is a continuous action step. Since power to the ECS ac busses could be lost at any time, this step applies throughout the guideline as needed.
PL ANT-SPECIFIC INFORMATION:
=
Means to restore offsite power
+
List of equipment on each service bus which can be loaded on the ECS ac bus,if necessary for recovery l
o -
mWo64hai.ia.wpt:Ib-121796 4-21 REV!sloN: 2
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES 1.1 STEP 17 NOTE NOTE: RCPs l A and IB should be run to provide normal pressurizer spray PURPOSE: To inform the operator that an RCP should be run in the loops which provides pressurizer spray if possible BASIS:
Subsequent steps require operator actions to control RCS pressure. The preferred means of control is normal pressurizer spray since this conserves reactor coolant inventory. Since spray tir,e connections are provided in only two loops, the RCPs should be run in those loops, if possible.
In addition, operation of either RCP 1 A or RCP IB precludes the possibility of developing reverse flow through the PRHR HX, which can potentially lead to the degradation of the PRHR as a heat sink. When any RCP is operating, either RCP 1 A or 1B shall be operating.
ACTIONS:
N/A INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A CONTROL /EOUIPME ,r N/A KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A O
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't . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES 1.1 STEP 22 i
STEP: Vprify CMT Injection Not Required PURPOSE: To evaluate plant conditions relative to established criteria. and to reinitiate CMT injection if conditions cannot be maintained E6.EE' 4
The combination of RCS subcooling and pressurizer level verifies that RCS conditions are under !
adequate operator control. Loss of control will require injection from the CMTs.
1 ACTIONS: '
Determine if RCS subcooling based on core exit thermocouples is greater than (S01)'F [(S02)'F for adverse containment]
=
Determine if pressurizer level is greater than (LOS)% [(L23)% for adverse containment]
=
Manually open CMT injection valves INSTRUMENTATION: l i
Indication f-
=
Core exit thenr.ocouples temperature
- RCS pressure-
- Pressurizer level
- CMT injection valves position CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
CMT injection valves controls KNOWLEDGil:
This step is a continuous action step.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
- (S01) Minimum RCS subcooling for normal containment conditions
- (S02) Minimum RCS subcooling for adverse containment conditions (LO5) Pressurizer low level serpoint for starting RCS makeup for normal containment conditions (L23) Pressurizer low level serpoint for staning RCS makeup for adverse containment conditions f'%
U my a206w= 1 ia.wpr:1b.1217% 4 29 REVisloN: 2
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES 1.1 STEP 23 l STEP: Go To Appropriate Plant Procedure PURPOSE: To determine the next course of action following recovery from a safety injection BASIS:
At this point in this guideline, passive safety systems have been terminated, the plant is stabilized and normal control is reestablished. The cause of safety injection actuation should be evaluated and a determination should be made for the next course of action, whether it be a plant cooldown or restart.
These subsequent actions are part of the plant procedures and are not part of the Emergency Regulatory Guideline (ERG) set. A transition to the appropriate plant procedure is made at this time.
ACTIONS:
Transfer to appropriate plant procedure INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
Since this guideline terminates safety injection flow and it is possible that the RCS makeup flow is keeping up with a small leak /LOCA, the operator should be aware of symptoms that would indicate that a small leak /LOCA has occurred. Symptoms for a small leak /LOCA could be indicated by performing an RCS inventory balance or by monitoring local area radiation monitors for an increase in activity. If symptoms indicate an RCS leak, then appropriate action should be initiated.
During a prolonged station blackout event, the accident management plan should contain manual procedures to permit manual override of the timer-driven ADS actuation, to be implemented no later than 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> following the loss of offsite and onsite AC power. Criteria for manually overriding the timer-driven ADS actuation include that the plant is in a stable condition, with the CMTs full, the pressurizer water level is stable, and the IRWST water level is stable. It is intended that the manual override of the timer-driven ADS actuation would be implemented about 20-22 hours from the start of the event. Loads supplied by the 24-hour battery, including the PMS actuation cabinets would be de-energized at the time of the override decision. This would preserve the battery power of the two electrical divisions powered by the 24-hour battery and these batteries would have at least a two-hour charge for a later ADS actuation,if needed. The operators would continue to monitor plant parameters via instrumentation that is powered from one of the two electrical divisions with 72-hour battery capacity.
O o \newprq2\206.twVev3\aesI la wpf Ib-061297 4-30 REVISION: 3
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES 1.1 STEP 23 (Cont.)
If the event wantinues beyond 24 ho trs, the 72-hour batteries allow the operators to monitor the plant parameters to decide if ADS actuation is needed. Since the batteries are conserved, as described above, sufficient power is available for actuation of ADS during the 22 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> time frame. After 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the ancillary diesel generators will allow continued monitoring the plant conditions. If i ancillary diesel generators cannot be started, and other ac power sources cannot be brought to the si te from other locations, the accident management plan for this beyond design basis scenario should direct the operators to manually actuate the automatic depressurization system while post-accident monitoring cap' ability is still available.
ADDITIONAL INFORM ATION:
Appropriate plant cooldown or stanup procedure n
v l
O 1
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1 l
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR AP600 EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE l
l AES 1.2 AP600 POST LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev.3 May 31,1997 0 .
o \newproj2\2061w\rev3\aest 2.wpf:Ib-061297 REVISION: 3
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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES.I.2 i
i i STEP 7 (Cont.)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
i
! . (S01) Minimum RCS subcooling for normal containment conditions i . (S02) Minimum RCS subcooling for adverse containment co".ditions (LO7) Pressurizer level on span for normal containment cond.lans
! . (LO9) Pressurizer level on span for adverse containment conditions I
1 l
O b
mwo64.ws12.wpf:Ib-121796 4 19 REVISloN: 2
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES-1.2 STEP 8 l l STEP: Check If ADS Should Be Actuated PURPOSE: To determine if ADS should be actuated based on prevailing plant conditions BASIS:
If the operator has progressed to this step, then passive safety systems are still required and the operator is then directed to check if automatic RCS depressurization (ADS) is required. ADS actuation is required if CMT level cannot be maintained above the first stage ADS actuation setpoint, or if RCS hot leg level is low. If ADS actuation is required, then the operator verifies that the first three ADS actuation stages have operated successfully. The second and third stage ADS are actuated after the first stage after a time delay.
If ADS is actuated, or if CMT lesel is approaching the first stage ADS setpoint, tne operator is directed to align the normal residual heat removal system to inject the IRWST to the RCS to prevent the need for fourth stage ADS actuation. The normal residual heat removal system provides injection into the RCS from the IRWST at about 100 psig. This injection stops the CMT injection and prevents the fourth stage ADS actuation valves from being actuated. This feature prevents containment pressurization and flooding. The operator will then continue recovery in AP600 AE-1, loss of reactor or secondary coolant.
ACTIONS:
- Determine if ADS should be actuated Determine if CMT level is less than (L01)%
- Determine if RCS hot leg level is greater than (L32)% ((L33)% for adverse containment) i
= Determine if (T01) seconds have elapsed from first stage ADS signal
- Determine if (T02) seconds have elapsed from second stage ADS signal
= Verify actuation of first three ADS stages was successful
- Manually open first, second and third stage ADS valves
- Align normal residual heat removal system to inject from the IRWST into RCS
= Manually align valves as necessary INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
. CMT level
= RCS hot leg level
- ADS actuation
- ADS isolation valve position
- Normal residual heat removal system suction valve position
. Normal residual heat removal system discharge valve position
. Normal residual heat removal system pump status e
i o snewproj2s2064wsrev3saes t.2 wpf Ib-061397 4-20 REVislON: 3 i
. - . . . - - - - . . ~ . . - - - - - - - . . . . - - . - _ . . . . - . -
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES.I.2 1
i l l
- [ STEP 8 (Cont.) I
- CONTROL /EOUIPMENT
Controls for:
- ADS valves
- Normal residual heat removal system suction valves l
- Normal residual heat removal system discharge valves l
- Normal residual heat removal system pumps 4
KNOWLEDGE:
i 4
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
=
(LOI) CMT low level ADS actuation
. (TOI) Time delay for second stage ADS actuation '
- (TU2) Time delay for third stage ADS actuation
)
= (L32) RCS hot leg level greater than bottom of hot legs for normal containment conditions
- (L33) RCS hot leg level greater than bottom of hot legs for adverse containment conditions
= Include additional details for valve alignments in EOPs such as verifying the closure of ADS
' schuge header drain isolation valves di I
- The operator must manually block the containment isolation signal to the RNS containment ;
isolation valves prior to aligning the system for injection l 1
l l
O o \newproJ2 \2064w\rev3Ws12.wpf.Ib-061297 4 21 REVISION: 3
l STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES 1.2 l
l l
STEP 9 )
STEP: Check If CMT Injection Should Be Isolated PURPOSE: To isolate CMT injection if proper conditions exist BASIS: l The CMTs can be isolated if RCS inventory is being maintained by the CVS makeup pumps.
Adequate RCS inventory is confirmed by the existence of the combination of RCS subcooling and pressurizer level. The CVS makeup pumps are verified to be operable since a LOCA is in progress and they are needed to maintain RCS inventory when the CMT injection valves are closed.
ACTIONS:
Determine if RCS subcooling based on core exit thermocouples is greater than (S01)*F ((S02)*F for adverse containment]
Determine if pressurizer level is greater than (LOS)% [(L23)% for adverse containment]
= Close CMT injection valves INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
. Core exit thermocouples temperature
. RCS pressure
. Pressurizer level
. CMT valve position
. CVS makeup pump status CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Controls for CMT isolation valves KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
. (S01) Minimum RCS subcooling for normal containment conditions
. (S02) Minimum RCS subcooling for adverse containment conditions
. (LOS) Pressurizer low level setpoint for starting RCS makeup for normal containment conditions
. (L23) Pressurizer low level setpoint for starting RCS makeup for adverse containment conditions e
owwproj2\2064*\revhaes12 wpf Ib 061297 4 22 REVISION: 3
q l
1 STEP DESCRIITION TABLE FOR AES.I.2
)
STEP 12 NOTE NOTE RCPs I A and IB should be run to provide normal PRZR spray PURPOSE: To inform the operator that an RCP should be run in the loops which provide
{
pressurizer spray if possible BASIS:
Subsequent steps require operator actions to control RCS pressure. The preferred means of control is normal pressurizer spray since this conserves reactor coolant inventory. Since spray line connections are provided in only two loops, the RCPs should be run in those loops.
In addition, operation of either RCP 1 A or RCP IB precludes the possibility of developing reverse {
flow through the PRHR HX, which can potentially lead to the degradation of the PRHR as a heat sink. ,
When any RCP is operating, either RCP 1 A or IB shall be operating.
)
l ACTIONS l
l N/A l
INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A G C.ONTROL/EOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOW1 EDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A b
o wwpro32\2064wvev3\aes12.wpf.Ib-061297 4-25 REVislON: 3
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES 1.2 STEP 12 STEP: Qheck If RCPs Should Be Started PURPOSE: To establish forced coolant flow, if possible BASIS:
RCP operation is preferred to provide normal pressurizer spray and to provide homogeneous fluid temperatures and boron concentrations. This step establishes conditions for starting an RCP to prevent RCP damage and minimize any perturbations in RCS conditions. These conditions include RCS subcooling to prevent cavitation at the pump suction during startup, and pressurizer level to minimize changes in RCS pressure and to provide reactor coolant inventory trends. Normal RCP startup requirements, such as RCP cooling, should also be enforced to prevent pump damage.
Depressurization of the RCS may generate a steam bubble in the upper head region of the reactor vessel, if no RCP is running. This bubble could rapidly condense during pump startup, drawing liquid from the pressurizer and reducing reactor coolant subcooling. If pressurizer inventory is not sufficient, level may decrease offspan. In addition, local flashing of reactor coolant could occur if RCS subcooling is not adequate.
If all RCPs are stopped, and cannot be started, the operator should monitor system conditions to verify natural circulation flow. Conditions ir*~ttive of natural circulation are outlined in Attachment A and include RCS subcooling, stable or decaing core exit thennocouples, and cold leg temperatures in the active loops, approximately equal to saturation at the associated steam generator pressure.
ACTIONS:
Check RCP status
- Check RCS subcooling
- Check pressurizer level
=
Establish crudn!ons for starting an RCP
= Start RCP3 .
- Stop all but RCP 1 A and IB Increase steam flow from intact SGs INSTRUMEN'TATION:
Indication for-
. Pressurizer level
- RCS subcooling
- Core exit thermocouple temperature
= Wide range RCS pressure a RCS loop flow
= RCS hot leg temperature
- RCS cold leg temperature aw2064=%12.wpt:Ib-121796 4-26 Revision: 2
~ STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AES 1.2
/
STEP 17
-STEP: Check if Passive Containment Cooling Should Be Stopped PURPOSE: To stop passive containment cooling if operating and no longer needed BASIS:
Passive containment cooling (PCS) is actuated on the containment PCS actuation pressure (HI 2 containment pressure). In AE-0, AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, the operator verifies that PCS is operating if required. During a LOCA, this step monitors the need for continued operation of PCS. After containment pressure is reduced below the containment pressure to terminate PCS, PCS is reset so that it can be stopped to prevent passive containment cooling water storage tank depletion. If, after PCS reset, the containment pressure increases above the containment PCS actuation setpoint, PCS should automatically actuate. In addition, the ORANGE path of the Containment Status Tree sends the operator to AFR-Z.1, AP600 RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE.
AFR Z.1 checks the need for PCS and verifies that PCS is operational.
ACTIONS:
Determine if passive containment cooling is operating i a
Determine if containment pressure is less than (P10) psig l
Reset passive containment cooling signal l
Stop passive containment cooling and place in standby 1 INSTRUMENTATION:
= PCS valve position indication
. Containment pressure indication - .
]
- Passive containment cooling reset status indication CONTROL /EOUIPMENT: ;
Controls for:
- Passive containment cooling reset
- Passive containment cooling isolation valves KNOWLEDGE:
This step is a continuous action step. If PCS reactuates after it was stopped, the operator should leave
-it in service until the containment fan coolers are running and can maintain containment conditions.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
(P10) Containment pressure to terminate PCS O
oMewproj2\2064w\rev3%I 2.wpf.lb-061297 4-37 REVislON: 3
, STEP DESCRIFTION TABLE FOR AES 1.2 STEP 18 STEP: Check if Source Range Detectors Should Be Energized PURPOSE: To verify that source range detectors are energized when the core neutron flux is in the source range BASIS:
When intermediate range flux decreases below the intennediate range permissive to block source range high flux trip (P-6), the source range detectors should be automatically energized, and subsequent flux monitoring should use the source range indication.
ACTIONS:
= Check intermediate range flux
= Energize source range detectors INSTRUMENTATION:
l
- Intermediate range flux
- Source range count rate .
l CONTROUEOUIPMENT:
Source range high voltage control KNOWLEDGE:
1 N/A l l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ;
(V02) Intermediate range permissive to block source range high flux trip (P-6)
O mMr6002064wWs t-2.wpf:lb 1217% 4 38 REVisloN: 2
O l
I l
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE 1
AE-3 l l
AP600 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev.3 1
i
- May 31,1997
^
i s
4
- O m\ap6000064ww 3 wpf.lb-061297 REVISION: 3
l STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 3 in I( ,I STEP 3 STEP: Check Ruptured SGs Level PURPOSE:
operator to use feedwater flow later in the recovery I l
To establish and maintain a water level in the ruptured SGs above the top of the U-tubes in order to promote thermal stratification to prevent ruptured SG depressurization BASIS:
Following a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), primary-to-secondary leakage into the affected SG will exceed steam flow and lead to an accumulation of water in the SG. Automatic isolation of feedwater How occurs when the SG narrow range level reaches the HI-2 setpoint (note that CVS flow !
is also isolated on this signal). Manually isolating feedwater flow before the SG level reaches the HI-2 setpoint will make it easier for the operator to use feedwater flow later in the recovery to refill the ruptured SG (during the backfill process), to maintain level in the intact SG, and to control pressurizer level using the CVS pumps. If water leve' reaches the HI-2 setpoint, SFW and CVS flow isolation is verified.
It is important to maintain the water level in the ruptured SG above the top of the U-tubes. When
.Q the primary system is cooled in subsequent steps, the SG tubes in the ruptured SG will approach the V temperature of the reactor coolant. If the steam space in the ruptured SG expands to contact these colder tubes, condensation will occur which would decrease the ruptured SG pressure. As previously demonstrated, this would reduce the reactor coolant subcooling margin and/or increase primary-to-secondary leakage, possibly delaying safety injection termination or causing safety injection reinitiation. Consequently, the water level must be maintained above the top of the tubes to insulate the steam space. In addition to insulating the steam space, this ensures a secondary side heat sink in the event that no intact SG is available and also provides protection against misdiagnosis of the ruptured SG due to an imbalance of feedwater flow.
ACTIONS:
. Check ruptured SG narrow range level
- Close feedwater flow control valves
= Verify CVS makeup pumps are stopped
- Verify CVS. makeup line isolated INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
. SG narrow range level
. Feedwater flow
- Feedwater flow control valves position
( ) . CVS makeup pump status U'
- CVS makeup valve position mtp600\2064w\ae 3.wpf.Ib-061297 4.I1 REVisloN: 3
I STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 3 l
STEP 3 (Cont.)
CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
l Controls for:
- Feedwater flow control valves
- CVS makeup pumps
- CVS makeup valves KNOWLEDGE:
The operator should stop feedwater flow as early as permitted to minimize the potential for a HI-2 SG level signal.
- In most cases, the ruptured SG level will continue to increase even after feedwater flow has been completely terminated. However, for some multiple failure events, such as an unisolable SGTR (i.e., ruptured SG cannot be isolated from any intact SG), level may decrease during RCS cooldown due to steaming. Consequently, level in the ruptured SG should be monitored periodically to ensure that it remains above the tubes unless the ruptured SG is also faulted. In addition to ensuring heat sink if no intact SG is available, radiological releases are also minimized.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
(LO3) SG level above U-tubes for normal containment conditions (LO4) SG level above U-tubes for adverse containment conditions
{
e i
m:Wo64 sae.3 wpr:ib.061397 4-12 REVISION: 3
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE.3 O
STEP 6 STEP: Check If PRHR Should Be Isolated PURPOSE: To isolate PRHR if proper conditions exist BASIS:
If PRHR is in operation, it can be isolated if a heat sink is available. Startup feedwater in operation and narrow range level in the intact SG ensures that a secondary heat sink is available.
ACTIONS:
Determine if startup feedwater is in operation Determine if intact SG narrow range level greater than (LO3)% ((LO4]) for adverse containment Close PRHR isolation valves INSTRUMENTATION:
Startup feedwater pump status indication
- Narrow range level indication for each SG e
PRHR isolation valves position indication O
'd CONTROUEOUIPMENT:
PRHR isolation valves controls KNOWLEDGE:
N/A 6DDITIONAL INFORMATION:
(F01) Feedwater flow to remove decay heat at 10 minutes (LO3) SG level above U-tubes fv normal containment conditions (LO4) SG level above U-tubes for adverse containment conditions Section 3 of the Adverse Systems Interaction report (WCAP 14477) should be referred to for additional insights when writing EOPs 1
J m\ap6000064w\ac 3*pf:Ib-061397 4 19 REVISION: 3
STEP DESCRII' TION TABLE FOR AE 3 STEP 7 STEP: Check intact SG Levels PURPOSE:
. To maintain an adequate secondary side heat sink ,
1
. To identify a previously undetected SG tube failure which could potentially result in SG overfill l BASIS:
In most cases, feedwater flow will exceed steam flow from the intact SGs resulting in an accumulation of water in the SGs. This excess feedwater flow will also result in a cocidown of the RCS at a rate dependent upon the feedwater flow rate and heat generation rate in the primary system.
Consequently, feedwater flow must be adjusted to control SG level and reactor coolant temperature, j This step also provides for monitoring level in the intact SGs to detect multiple or subsequent tube j failures. In that case, the operator is retumed to Step I to isolate the affected SG and repeat the i recovery actions. i If reactor trip occurs from a high power level, the water level may shrink below the narrow range so i i
that temporarily no reliable indication of SG water level is available. 'During this time, feedwater flow should be maintained greater than (F01) to ensure an adequate secondary side heat sink. This minimum feedwater flow requirement satisfies the feedwater flow requirement of the Heat Sink Status Tree until level in at least one SG is restored into the narrow range. The control range ensures i adequate inventory with level readings on span. )
l ACTIONS: I
- Check narmw range levels of intact SGs l
- Throttle feedwater flow control valves INSTRUMENTATlON:
Indication for:
- SG narrow range level
- Feedwater flow
- Feedwater flow control valves position CONTROL /EOUTPMENT:
Feedwater flow control valves O
msgoom.e.3xpt:lb.t:iwa 4 20 REVis!ON: 2
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 3 STEP 12 STEP: Depressurize RCS To Refill PRZR PURPOSE: To restore pressurizer level l BASIS:
Following a loss of reactor coolant event pressurizer level will most likely be offscale low. To restore the level, which provides a direct indication of mactor coolant inventory trends when used in combination with RCS subcooling, one must decrease RCS pressure using pressurizer pressure control. Auxiliary spray is the preferred means for decreasing RCS pressure since it provides the best pressure control. If auxiliary spray is not available. the pressurizer first stage ADS valves provide an altemative means to decrease RCS pressure. When level retums on span. RCS depressurization is stopped to prevent filling the pressurizer with water.
The tube rupture analyses have demonstrated that pressurizer level will continue to increase after the depressurization is stopped due to backfill from the ruptured SG. Therefore,if auxiliary spray is used to restore level, it will be automatically isolated once pressurizer level maches 20% if the CVS pumps are in automatic control.
ACTIONS:
- Open the pressurizer ADS valves Spray pressurizer with auxiliary spray Detemiine if pressurizer level is on span INSTRUMENTATION-Indication for:
- Pressurizer level Pressurizer ADS valve position Auxiliary spray valve position
. CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Pressurizer ADS valves Auxiliary spray valves KNOWLEDGE:
Auxiliary spray may still be used (i.e., the CVS pump would be operated in manual mode) if pressurizer level is above 20% if letdown is available, l
i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
O'
+
(LO7) Pressurizer level just on span l *
(LO9) Pressurizer level just on span with adverse containment errors mMp60CW*lwwe.3.wpf:lb 12th 4 37 REV!slON: 2
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 3 STEP 13 STEP: Check If ADS Should Be Actuated PURPOSE: To determine if ADS should be actuated based on prevailing plant conditions BASIS:
ADS is required if CMT level cannot be maintained above the first stcge ADS actuation setpoint or if RCS hot leg level is low. If ADS is required, then the operator verifies that the first three ADS stages have operated successfully. The second and third stage ADS are actuated after the first stage after a time delay.
If ADS is actuated, the operator is directed to verify that the normal residual heat removal system is aligned to inject the IRWST to the RCS to prevent, if possible, founh stage ADS actuation. The normal residual heat removal system provides injection into the RCS from the IRWST at about 100 psig. This injection stops the CMT injection and prevents the fourth stage ADS valves from being actuated. This feature prevents containment pressurization and flooding. Therefore, at this time if ADS is actuated, the normal residual heat removal system is verified that its aligned from the IRWST to inject into the RCS.
If ADS is actuated, the operators will go to AP600 AE-1, loss of reactor or secondary coolant for further recovery since the primary system will be depressurized.
ACTIONS:
. Determine if ADS should be actuated Determine if CMT level is less than (L01)c/c
= Determine if RCS hot leg level is greater than (L32)
- Determine if (T01) seconds have elapsed from first stage ADS signal
. Determine if (T02) seconds have elapsed from second stage ADS signal
. Verify actuation of first three ADS stages was successful l
- Manually open first, second and third stage ADS valves :
. Verify normal residual heat removal system aligned to inject into RCS
= Establish normal residual heat removal system injection into RCS !
= Manually align valves as necessary j INSTRUMENTATION: j Indication for:
. CMT level e RCS hot leg level
- ADS actuation
. ADS isolation valve position
. Normal residual heat removal system valves position
. Normal residual heat removal system pumps status O
m.up6000064*be-3 wpf Ib-061297 4 38 REVislON: 3
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 3 y STEP 13 (Cont.)
CONTROllEOUIPMENT:
- Manual ADS valve controls l
- Controls for normal residual heat removal system valves Normal residual heat removal system pump controls i- KNOWLEDGE:
)
N/A '
l l
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: !
(
(L01) CMT low level ADS actuation (T01) Time delay for second stage ADS actuation j
- (T02) Time delay for third stage ADS actuation (L32) RCS hot leg level greater than bottom of hot legs for normal containment conditions (L33) RCS hot leg level greater than bottom of hot legs for adverse containment conditions e
include additional details for valve alignments in EOPs such as verifying the closure of ADS discharge header drain isolation valves The operator must manually block the containment isolation signal to the RNS containment isolation valves prior to aligning the system for injection 1
I l
lO l m-\ap600Ct064w\ae 3 wpf:lb-061297 4 39 REVISION: 3 '
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AEo3 STEP 14 STEF : Check 11 CMT Injection Should Be Isolated PURPOSE: To isolate CMT injection if proper conditions exist BASIS:
For a nonnal tube rupture. primary-to-secondary leakage should be terminated by this point of the recovery. The CMTs tend to hamper additional recovery actions by unnecessarily adding inventory to the RCS. The addition of this inventory will limit the backfill of the ruptured SG (which also adds inventory to the RCS) since the only means of removing this inventory is by letdown and shrinkage due to couldown.
If the RCS is subcooled and pressurizer level is on span, the CMTs are no longer required and can be isolated. Note that if a failure occurs after the CMTs are isolated that requires CMT flow to be reestablished the outlet valves will automatically open on a pressurizer level signal. Also, the next step in this guideline provides criteria for reestablishing CMT injection if subcooling is lost or the pressurizer level falls offscale low.
l l
ACTIONS:
Detennine if ADS is actuated Detennine if RCS subcooling based on core exit thermocouples is greater tha'n (S01)'F [(S02) F for adverse contairunent]
O Detennine if pressurizer level is greater than (LOS)% [(L23)% for adverse containment]
. Close CMT injection valves INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
ADS valve position
. RCS subcooling
- Pressurizer level
. CMT valve position CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
CMT isolation valves controls KNOWLEDGE:
N/A O
mAapNMCINuw 1.wpf.Ilw121796 4-40 REVisloN: 2
STEP DESCRIPTION TAllLE FOR AE.3 O
STEP 18 - NOTE L40IE: RCPs I A and IB should be run to provide normal PRZR spray I 1
PURPOSE: To inform the operator that an RCP should be run in loops l A and IB to provide pressurizer spray l
BASIS: l Subsequent steps require operator actions to control RCS pressure. The preferred means of control is ,
normal pressurizer spray since this conserves reactor coolant inventory. An RCP should be run in one of the loops with spray line connections, if possible. )
l In addition, operation of either RCP 1 A or RCP IB precludes the possibility of developing reverse flow through the PRHR HX, which can potentially lead to the degradation of the PRHR as a heat ;
sink. When any RCP is operating, either RCP 1 A or IB shall be operating.
1 I
ACTIONS: 1 N/A INSTRUMENTATION:
j N/A o CONTROL >EOUIPMENT.
i i
N/A l
KNOWLEDGE:
If an RCP in a loop with a ruptured SG is started, steam flow from that SG via a secondary side l break will increase. Although this may increase radiological releases due to steam relief, it will also reduce accumulation of water in the SG and decrease the possibility of overfill. Consequently, for j such multiple failure events in which SG ovedill appears imminent, starting an RCP in the affected l loop may be beneficial.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Which RCPs can provide spray and the preferred order of operation v
l mAap6000064wue.) wpf Ib-061297 4 47 REvlslON: 3 l
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 3 STEP 18 STEP: Check if An RCP Should Be Started PURPOSE: To establish forced coolant flow, if possible
,B ASIS:
RCP operation is preferred to pnwide nonnal pressurizer spray and to ensure homogeneous fluid temperatures and boron concentrations. This step provides guidance on establishing conditions for I
staning an RCP to prevent RCP damage and minimize any perturtiations in RCS conditiors. These include RCS subcooling to prevent cavitation at the pump suction during startup and pressurizer level I to minimize changes in RCS pressure and provide reactor coolant inventory trends. Normal RCP startup requirements. such as RCP cooling, should also be enforced to prevent pump damage. I 1
If all RCPs are stopped and none can be started, the operator should monitor system conditions to l verify natural circulation tiow. The conditions indicative of natural circulation are provided as l Attachment A and include RCS subcooling, stable or decreasing core exit thermocouples, and cold leg temperatures in the active loops approximately equal to saturation at the associated SG pressure.
The cold leg temperature may be less than the saturation at the associated SG pressure due to PIGIR operation or due to colder CVS tiow entering the cold leg loop upstream of the temperature instrumentation.
ACTIONS:
. Check RCP status
- Check RCS subcooling
= Check pressurizer level
. Establish conditions for staning an RCP l
. Stan one RCP
Indication for: I
- Pressurizer level
= RCP status l
- RCP suppon conditions status
- RCS subcooling Core exit thennocouples
=
Wide range RCS pressure
l m w w a m m w.; wrt:ns.1 i w 4 48 REV!slON: 2
. _. . ___ .__. _ ,_ _ ._. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ . _ . _ . _ . . ...- . _ ._ _ . _ ~ _
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE 3 0
STEP 21 STEP. Check if Passive Containment Cooling Should Be Stopped PURPOSE: To stop passive containment cooling if operating and no longer needed BASIS:
Passive containment cooling sptem (PCS) is actuated on the containment PCS actuation pressure (HI-2 containment pressure). In AE-0. AP600 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, the operator verifies that PCS is operating if required. During a LOCA, the need for continued operation of PCS is monitored by this step. After containment pressure is reduced below the containment l pressure to terminate PCS, PCS is reset so that PCS can be stopped to prevent PCS water storage tank depletion. If, after PCS reset, at any time the containment pressure increases above the l
containment PCS actuation setpoint, PCS should again automatically actuate. In addition, the ORANGE path of the Containment Status Tree sends the operator to AFR Z.1, AP600 RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE. Step 3 of AFR Z.1 checks the need for PCS and verifies that PCS is operational if it's required. .
ACTIONS:
I Determine if passive containment cooling is operating Determine if containment pressure is less than (P10) psig l = Reset passive containment cooling signal
- Stop passive containment cooling and place in standby INSTRUMENTATION:
. PCS valve position indication
. Containment pressure indication e Passive containment cooling reset status indication CONTROJEOUIPMENT:
Controls for:
- Passive containment cooling reset l
- Passive containment cooling isolation valves KNOWLEDGE:
I This step is a continuous action step. If PCS reactuates after it was stopped, the operator should leave it in service until the containment fan coolers are running and can maintain containment conditions.
h ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
.(P10) Containment pressure to terminate PCS r
L 4 m up6000064wbe 3 wpf Ib-061297 4 57 REVISION: 3
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE-3 STEP 22 EIEE Minimize Secondary System Contamination PURPOSE: To minimize the spread of contamination throughout the secondary system
}) ASIS:
Prior to isolation of the ruptured SG, steam flow from that SG may have contaminated the secondary including the condenser hot well and the blowdown system. Additional steps to minimize the spread of this contamination should be considered, including isolating recirculation from the hot well to the condensate storage tank, bypassing the condensate polishing demineralizers, and transferring auxiliary steam to the auxiliary boiler.
ACTlQNS-Specific actions to minimize secondary system contamination INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Specific controls and equipment to minimize secondary system contamination O KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Specific details regards means to reduce secondary system of contamination I
O 1 m$ap6000064ww.3 wpf:lb-010797 4 58 REVISION: 2
(
AP600 Emergency Response Guidelines
/~V Background Information U.
l List of Affected Pages for Revision 3 Background Book 2 l
l-Document Page Section(s)
AFR-S.1 2-7' _
editorial change, top of page 2-8, 2-9 page rollovers AFR-C.! 4 10 Actions 4-11 Additional Information l AFR-C.2 4-10 Actions L 4-11 Additional Information AFR-H. l ' 4-27 Actions
- - 4-28 Additional Infomwion i
l AFR-H.3 47 Step, Purpose, Actions
- AFR-1.1 4-3 page deleted l
(- 4-4 4-5 Purpose, Basis, Actions, Instrumentation, Knowledge Basis 4-9 Step, Basis, Actions, Instrumentation, Control / Equipment l-l
~
I-l l
L
- ( -
f)N ,
- l
)
i
!O i AP600 i Emergency Response Guidelines i
i i
i AP600 Document Number GW-GJR-100
.)
j Background Information j Book 2 O
i I Revision 3 l 4
i May 31,1997 1
1 5
1 d
a i
!O
1 l
e BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR AP600 EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE AFR-S.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION /ATWS Rev.3 May 31,1997 O
ohwproj2\2064wVevhfr sl.wpf lb-061397 REVISION: 3
l l~
i Case I assumes that DAS only is used to mitigate an A'IWS event. PRHR is automatically actuated on low SG wide range level, and after 10 minutes, the operator manually actuates the CMTs via the l DAS. Ten minutes is a reasonable time for the operator to initiate actions to achieve suberiticality and is consistent with time frames used for previous Westinghouse designs. The major assumptions for Case 1 are as follows: 3 1
- 1. The transient is initialized from nominal full power conditions. I
- 2. A range of condit ons i was considered, and it s .is determined that the physics parameters at l the beginning of life for the equilibrium cycle were the most limiting with respect to
]
achieving suberitMality. The critical parameters are the high init61 RCS boron concentration (1611 ppm) and the low boron worth, ne effects of these two parameters on minimizing i shutdown margin outweigh the effect that a more negative moderator temperature coefficient i
j (MTC) at end of life conditions has on increasing positive reactivity insertion during the l cooldown phase.
l
- 3. The MTC used in the analysis is -7.3 pcm/*F. This value gives a peak RCS pressure of approximately 3200 psig during the ATWS. This value was determined for the analysis in Reference 1, wbich was performed at beginning of life Cycle 1 conditions (limiting for the short term piessi.re transient). Due to the difference in physics parameters at beginning of l life for the equihbrium cycle, the peak RCS pressure is somewhat less than 3200 psig for this case,
- 4. The ANS-5.1-1979 decay heat model (+ 2 sigma) is used.
- 5. Both pressurizer safety valves'are available. De relief model assumes 3 percent and 10 percent pressure accumulation for steam and water relief. De AP600 does not have pressurizer power-operated relief valves.
- 6. Main feedwater supply to both SGs falls to zero in 4 seconds, with no main feedwater afterwards, 1
- 7. The DAS actuxes PRHR on the wide-range SG low-level signal. He analysis setpoint is l assumed to be conservatively low, and, therefore, delays actuation.
! the PMS function to actuate. Since a conservatively low DAS wide-range SG level setpoint I ,
t is assumed for this analysis, no additional delay on this signsi is assumed. q I
l 9. The turbine trips 4.0 seconds after the wide range SG low level DAS setpoint is reached, j l
l i I
1 o%ewproj2\2064 w\rev 3\afr-s l . wpf. l b-061397 2-7 REVISION: 3 I'
i
- 10. The PRHR valves are assumed to be fully opened 10 seconds after the low wide-range SG level setpoint is reached. The PRHR heat exchanger is assumed operable, and nominal heat transfer is assumed.
- 11. The design value of 40 percent steam dump to the condenser is modeled for conservatism.
- 12. Steam line isolation, which would actuate on the low steam line pressure "S" signal, is conservatively assumed unavailable due to the common mode failure in the PMS. Steam line isolation has a negligible effect on the longterm trarnient. ;
- 13. Startup feedwater is unavailable. !
l 1
- 14. Following turbine trip, steam relief through the spring-loaded steam line safety valves is l assumed if the steam line pressure exceeds the safety-valve setpoint (1100 psia) with l a 3 percent allowance for accumulation.
1
- 15. Automatic CMT actuation is not modeled for this case. During the transient, the low steam l line pressure "S" signal is generated by PMS, but the resulting CMT actuation and reactor l
coolant pump (RCP) trip signals are assumed to fait due to the common mode electrical failure. Instead, the operator is assumed to manually actuate the CMTs after 10 minutes via the DAS. Both CMTs are assumed operable; nominal values are assumed for initial CMT boron concentration (3300 ppm), enthalpy (69.0 Btu /lbm), and flow resistances.
If the reactor trip failure is due to either a mechanical failure or an electrical failure of the reactor trip l portion of the PMS, the PMS provides additional protection features. Specifically, one feature which would still be available is automatic CMT actuation /RCP trip on the low steam line pressure "S" signal. For Case 2, only the CMT actusion/RCP trip function is credited from the PMS. All other I assumptions for Case 2 are identical to that of Case 1. This case demonstrates the differences in plant behavior if the PMS functions properly. Turbine trip and steam line isolation would also be provided by the PMS before the DAS signalis reached. These functions have a significant beneficial effect on the short term pressure transient, but have a negligible effect on the long term transient.
Thus, these analyses do not focus on the effects of earlier CMT actuation /RCP trip.
2.4.4 Results Case 1
! Transient plou of interest include RCS pressure (Figure 2-1), pressurizer water volume (Figure 2-2),
! RCS temperature (Figure 2-3) and total core reactivity (Figure 2-4). The sequence of events for Case 1 is providea in Table 2-1. For this case, a common-mode failure of the entire PMS is g l assumed, so only tige DAS is credited. The DAS provides turbine trip at 76 seconds and PRHR W owwproj2\2064w\rev3\afr si wpf.lb-0^1397 28 REVISION: 3
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( actuation at 82 seconds on the low SG level (wide-range) signal. The CMTs are assumed to be manually actuated by the operator via DAS 10 minutes after initiation of the event. l l
The RCS pressure for Case 1 is shown in Figure 2-1. As shown in Figures 2-1 and 2 3. the RCS initially heats up and pressurizes due to loss of normal feedwater. The turbine trip, PRHR actuation.
and inherent reactivity feedback effects prevent the RCS from overpressurizing in the short term. For )
this case, pressure reaches 3079 psia shortly before secondary dryout occurs. Note that for the Reference I short term ATWS analysis, which uses beginning of life cycle I fuel data, RCS pressure reaches a maximum value of 3198 psia. The reactivity feedback (Figure 2-4) reduces the power level significantly, and within the first few minutes, the heat removal from actuation of the PRHR exceeds the core heat flux. Actuation of the PRHR continues to cool the RCS which produces positive reactivity insertion. The RCS begins to heat up again and repressurize. The heatup process generates ;
negative reactivity feedback, which reduces power, and this oscillatory process continues until the CMTs are manually actuated after 10 minutes via the DAS.
The steam dump functions of the main steam system and plant control system maintains no-load l T 4va, by removing steam and reducing secondary side pressure significantly during the initial heatup )
phase. The RCPs are automatically tripped upon CMT actuation, and flow is reduced to natural circulation conditions.
O l 1
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TABLE 2-1 O
i TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR THE LONG TERM LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM EVENT CASE 1: CORE MAKEUP TANKS MANUALLY ACTUATED AFTER TEN MIhVrES VIA DIVERSE ACTUATION SYSTEM Time (Sec)
Event Main feedwater supply to all SGs is termmatM 0-4 l Low SG water level (narrow range) reactor trip PMS setpoint reached (failure of rod insertion 45 assumed) low steam line pressure "S' PMS setpoint reached (signal ignored for Case 1) 60 Pressuruer safety valves open 63 Low SG water level (wide range) DAS setpoint reached 72 SG tubes uncovered 74 Turbine trip assumed to occur on DAS generated signal 76 Passive residual heat exchanger valves opened on DAS generated signal 82 1 Pressunzer fills with uster 97 l Peak RCS pressure is reached (3079 psia) 115 SG dryout 147 Pressutaer safety valves rescat 182 Pressurizer regains steam space 249 Reactor is brought suberitical for remainder of transient 548 CMTs are assumed to be manually actuated via the DAS 600 RCP: tripped automatically upon CMT actuation 603 Pressunzer safety valves reopen 3396 Pressurizer fills with uster 6656 Transient terrnma M 7200 4
0 m:hp600\2064wufr-s1.wpf:1b121796 2-10 Ralsta 2
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION
! FOR AP600 i
! EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE 5
AFR C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING O Rev.3 i
{ May 31,1997 l
i
'w) owwproj2\2064w\r:v3\ aft-cl.wpf Ib-061397 REVISION: 3
STEP DESCR'MION TABLE FOR AFR C.1 v STEP 8 - CAUTION CAUTION: If IRWST level decreases to less than (Lil), normal residual heat removal system alignment to the containment sump should be verified PURPOSE: To ensure coolant flow to the core by switching to normal residual heat removal
, system recirculation if the IRWST level decreases below the switchover setpoint l
j 16.l!E:
l If the switchover level in the IRWST is reached, the operator should verify that passive core cooling has transferred to passive recirculation to maintain coolant flow to the core, When IRWST level l ' decreases to (L11), the isolation valves in the passive core cooling system recirculation lines open to provide a continuous supply of injection. The recirculation lines provide safety-related long term core cooling. If available, the normal residual heat removal system pumps can also take suction from the recirculation lines and supplement passive recirculation core cooling.
ACTIONS:
Determine if IRWST level decreases to less than (L)1)
INSTRUMENTATION:
IRWST level indication CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
N/A l KNOWLEDGE:
The operator is expected to know the attemate functions of the normal residual heat removal system. l passive core cooling system recirculation alignment in this case, as it applies to this caution. l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
(L1!) Enter specific value corresponding to IRWST recirculation line alignment setpoints.
O mWo6w fr.cl.wpf: b.121:96 4-9 REvlslON: 2
i STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR-C.1 l
STEP 8 STEP: Depressurize RCS To inject IRWST PURPOSE: To depressurize the RCS using ADS so that IRWST injection can take place to provide core cooling BASIS:
The IRWST provides safety related low pressure injection into the RCS for emergency core cooling purposes. At this point in AFR-C.l. the higher pressure injection sources are inadequate for i l
mitigating the inadequate core cooling condition. Therefore, the RCS is depressurized using ADS which provides controlled RCS depressurization, allowing passive IRWST injection to occur.
l The normal residual heat removal system has alignment capability for injecting the IRWST into the RCS. This action supplements the safety-related passive IRWST injection as described in the previous paragraph. Also, the CAUTION for this step alerts the operator to switch over the normal residual heat removal system to recirculation if/when the switchover setpoint is reached in the IRWST.
ACTIONS:
- Actuate ADS
- Manually open first stage ADS valves if necessary Check if second stage ADS valves are open When (T01) seconds has elapsed after first stage valve opening, manually open second stage valves Check if third stage ADS valves are open When (T02) seconds have elapsed after second stage valve opening, manually open third stage valves
- Align normal residual heat removal system to inject into RCS a
Actuate fourth stage ADS if normal residual heat removal system injection cannot be established
= Manually align valves as necessary INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
=
ADS actuation status (PMS and DAS)
- ADS isolation valves position
- Normal residual heat removal system valve position a Normal residual heat removal system RNS status CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Manual ADS actuation (PMS and DAS)
- Normal residual heat removal system valves controls
- Normal residual heat removal system pumps controls o \newpro;M064w\rev3\afr cl.wpf Ib-061397 4-10 REvlSloN: 3
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR C.1
[ STEP 8 (Cont.)
KNOWLEDGE:
If the " normal" protection system is unsuccessful in actuating or opening the ADS isolation valves, the operator should be aware that DAS contains provisions for manually actuating ADS or opening the ADS isolation valves from the DAS panel.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
. (T01) Enter time delay for second stage ADS actuation
= (T02) Enter time delay for thid stage ADS actuation
-e include additional details for valve alignments in EOPs such as verifying the closure of ADS discharge header drain isolation valves The operator must manually block the containment isolation signal to the RNS containment isolation valves prior to aligning the system for injection
(
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STEP DESCRIITION TABLE FOR AFR.C.1 STEP 9 STEP: Check Core Exit TCs PURPOSE: To check if core exit thermocouple temperatures still indicate an inadequate core cooling condition BASIS:
The trend in core exit thermocouple temperatures is used to check the effectiveness of emergency core cooling on restoring adequate core cooling, if temperature is decreasing, no further action may be necessary.
If core exit thermocouple temperatures are less than 900 F plus adverse containment errors or 1200 F, whichever is greater, emergency core cooling has been successful. This step will transfer the operator to the guideline and step in effect.
l l
If core exit thermocouple temperatures are greater than 900 F plus adverse containment errors or 1200'F, whichever is greater, and not decreasing, then this guideline must be continued to perform the alternat;ic actions for restoring adequate core cooling.
ACTIONS:
Determine if core exit thermocouple temperatures are less than 900 F plus adverse containment errors or 1200*F, whichever is greater i
Determine if core exit thermocouple temperatures are decreasing Retum to guideline and step in effect INSTRUMENTATION:
Core exit thermocouple temperature indication and trending CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
The temperatures discussed in the BASIS section above may change depending on specific post accident transmitter ermrs.
O mwmowwc13pt:th-12 8% 4 12 REVISION: 2
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i
- BACKGROUND INFORMATION 4
FOR l
! AP600 i
EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE j AFR-C.2 AP600 RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING SHOCK f Rev.3
! May 31,1997 l
i j
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o Vwwproj2\2064w\rev3\afr-c2 wpf Ib-061397 REVISION: 3
STEP DESCRIITION TABLE FOR AFR C.2 l
O V STEP 6 - CAUTION CAUT!ON: If IRWST level decreases to less than (L11). RNS alignment to the containment sump should be verified.
PURPOSE: To ensure coolant flow to the core by switching to normal residual heat removal system recirculation if the IRWST level decreases below the switchover setpoint BASIS:
If the switchover level in the IRWST is reached, which could happen at any time during the course of -
guideline AFR C.2 depending upon the amount of RCS inventory losses, the operator should immediately verify that passive core cooling has transferTed to passive recirculation to maintain coolant flow to the core. When IRWST level decreases to (L11), there should be sufficient water available in ,
the safety injection recirculation sump to switch the suction supply of the nonnal residual heat removal j system to the containment sump to supplement passive recirculation core cooling to the core. '
ACTIONS:
i Determine if IRWST level decreases to less than (L11)
INSTRUMENTATION:
IRWST level indication CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
N/A l
KNOWLEDGE:
1 The operator is expected to know the attemate functions of the normal residual heat removal system l (i.e., safety injection recirculation alignment in this case) as it applies to this caution step. l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
1 (L11) Enter specific value corresponding to IRWST switchover setpoint in plant specific units.
1
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mwo64.wr.c2.wpt:ib.12is96 49 REVlsloN: 2
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR C.2 STEP 6 STEP: Depressurize RCS To Inject IRWST PURPOSE: To depressurize the RCS using ADS so that IRWST injection can take place to provide core cooling BASIS:
The IRWST provides low pressure injection into the RCS for emergency core cooling purposes. At this point in AFR-C.2, the higher pressure injection sources have been determined to be inadequate for mitigating the inadequate core cooling condition. Therefore the RCS is depressurized using ADS which provides controlled RCS depressurization thereby allowing passive IRWST injection to occur.
The normal residual heat removal system has alignment capability for injecting the IRWST into the RCS. This action supplements the safety-related passive IRWST injection as described in the previous paragraph. Also, the CAUTION for this step alerts the operator to switch over the normal residual heat removal system to recirculation if/when the switchover setpoint is reached in the IRWST.
ACTIONS:
. Actuate ADS Manually open first stage ADS valves if necessary Check if second stage ADS valves are open When (T01) seconds has elapsed after first stage valve opening, manually open second stage valves Check if third stage ADS valves are open When (T02) seconds has elapsed after second stage valve opening, manually open third stage valves Align normal residual heat removal system to inject into RCS
=
Actuate fourth stage ADS if normal residual heat removal system cannot be aligned to inject
=
Manually align valves as necessary INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
ADS actuation status (PMS and DAS)
- ADS isolation valves position a Normal residual heat removal system valve position
- Normal residual heat removal system status CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Manual ADS actuation (PMS and DAS)
- . Normal residual heat removal system valves controls
. Normal residual heat removal system pumps controls owwproj2\2064w\rev3ufr c2*pf Ib 061397 4 10 REVlslON: 3
s STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR C.2 i
4
')
STEP 6 (Cont.)
KNOWLEDGE:
If the " normal" protection system is unsuccessful in actuating or opening the ADS isolation valves the operator should be aware that the DAS has provisions for manually actuating ADS or manually opening the ADS isolation valves from the DAS panel.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
(T01) Enter specific time delay for second stage ADS actuation
- (T02) Enter specific time delay for third stage ADS actuation Include additional details for valve alignments in EOPs such as verifying the closure of ADS discharge header drain isolation valves The operator must manually block the containment isolation signal to the RNS containment isolation valves prior to aligning the system for injection.
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STEP DESCRIITION TABLE FOR AFR C.2 STEP 7 SEP: Check Core Cooling PURPOSE: To check if core cooling has been restored BASIS:
The trends in core exit thermocouple temperatures and RN hot leg level are used to check the effectiveness of RCS makeup and/or emergency core cooit 'CMTs, accumulators and IRWST) in restoring core cooling. If the trend in core exit thermocot emperatures is decreasing and RCS hot leg level is increasing, then no further action may be nece o e.y. The operator is instrucad to retum to Step I and repeat the initial guideline steps until the core exit thermocouple ti mperatures are less than 670 F plus adverse containment errors or 700 F, whichever is greater, and & t leg level is greater than the bottom of the RCS hot legs.
if core exit thermocouple temperatures are less than 670 F plus adverse containment errors or 700 F, l whichever is greater, and RCS hot leg level is greater than the bottom of the hot leg, then RCS
? makeup and/or emergency core cooling (CMTs, accumulators and IRWST) has been successful in restoring RCS inventory and core cooling. This step will transfer the operator to the guideline and step in effect.
If core exit thermocouple temperatures are greater than 670*F plus adverse containment errors or 700*F whichever is greater, and not decreasing, and hot RCS leg level is less than the bottom of the hot leg, then the operator must continue with this guideline to perform the attemative actions for restoring core cooling.
ACTIONS:
Determine if core exit thermocouple temperatures are less than 670'F plus adverse containment errors or 700 F, whichever is greater
=
Determine if core exit thermocouple temperatures are decreasing
=
Determine if RCS hot leg level is greater than (L32) [(L33) for adverse containment]
Retum to guideline and step in effect Retum to Step 1 if inadequate core cooling indicated INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for-
. Core exit thermocouple temperature
- RCS hot leg level O
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION 1 l
FOR l l
AP600 EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE AFR-H.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF HEAT SINK O .
Rev.3 May 31,1997 l
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l STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR H.1 l
(~
t, STEP 12 i SIF2: Establish RCS Bleed Path l
PURPOSE: To verify that an effective high pressure bleed path is established after establishing i the high pressure RCS feed path BASIS:
For the bleed path to be effective, the operator should ensure that the ADS actuation valves are properly aligned. The operator should manually align valves, if necessary, to establish an effective RCS bleed path, The operator should attempt to maximize RCS feed flow as this will maximize RCS bleed and feed heat removal effectiveness.
ACTIONS:
- Actuate ADS
- Manually open first stage ADS actuation valves if necessary
- Check if second stage ADS actuation valves are open When (T01) seconds has elapsed after first stage valve opening, manually open second stage valves
- Check if third stage ADS actuation valves are open a
When (T02) seconds has elapsed after second stage valve opening, manually open third stage valves
- Align normal residual heat removal system to inject into the RCS Actuate fourth stage ADS if normal residual heat removal system injection cannot be established
- Manually align valves as necessary INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
ADS actuation status (PMS and DAS)
- ADS actuation isolation valves position
- Normal residual heat removal system valve position
- Normal residual heat removal system status CONTROLS; Manual ADS actuation (PMS and DAS)
- Normal residual heat removal system valves controls a Normal residual heat removal system pumps controls KNOWLEDGE:
l If the " normal" protection system is unsuccessful in actuating or opening the ADS actuation isolation y/ valves, the operator should be aware that the DAS has provisions for manually actuating ADS actuation or manually opening the ADS actuation isolation valves from the DAS panel.
owwproj2\2064 wirev 3\afr-h t .wpfl b -061397 4 27 REvislON: 3
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR il.1 i
l l STEP 12 (Cont.)
I t
- ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
l (T01) Enter specific time delay for second stage ADS actuation.
= (T02) Enter specific time delay for third stage ADS actuation.
Include additional details for valve alignments in EOPs such as verifying the closure of ADS discharge header drain isolation valves The operator must manually block the containment isolation signal to the RNS containment isolation valves prior to aligning the system for injection l
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION I
- FOR .
l t i
) AP600 EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE l i
l AFR-H.3 l AP600 RESPONSE TO STEAM GENERATOR HIGH LEVEL i
\ Rev.3 May 31,1997 l
u 1
l 1
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o \newpro)2\2064wvev34fr h3*pf Ib-06139; REVISION: 3
- . . -. -. . . - - . . . . ~ . ~ _ . . _ . _ . . . . . . - . . . - - . - - . . - . - .
i STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR H.3 l l
STEP 3 STEP Verify SFW Flow To Affected SG(s) Isolated 1
l l PURPOSE: To verify isolation of stanup feedwater now which is a potential source of water
! overfilling the affected SGs i i
l BAflS: .
Startup feedwater flow isolation to the affected SGs allows the operator to minimize further level 1
l increases. Startup feedwater flow can still be maintained to the unaffected SGs to control plant )
l conditions.
ACTIONS:
Verify isolation of startup feedwater flow to affected SGs l
l INSTRUMENTATION:
l Startup feedwater flow indication l CONTROlJEOUIPMENT:
Startup feedwater flow valve controls KNOWLEDGE: I N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A f
I t
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ohwproj2\2064wVev3\afr h3 wpf.lb.061397 47 REVISION: 3
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l STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR H.3 STEP 4 SIEE: Check Affected SG Level PURPOSE: To evaluate the effects of main FW and SFW isolation actions BASIS:
He operator should continue to monitor affected SG narrow-range level to determine if level is decreasing. If level is less than the value corresponding to SG level at the upper tap and decreasing, operator actions have been successful. The operator then controls startup feedwater flow to maintain narrow-range level in the normal operating band and transfers back to the guideline in effect to continue plant recovery. If level is still above the upper tap value or level is not decreasing, the operator is directed to Steps 6 through 8 where the affected SGs are isolated and evaluated for a possible tube failure.
l ACTIONS:
l
- Determine if affected SG narrow range level is less than (L27)% [(L28)% for adverse containment)
Determine if affected SG narrow range level is decreasing l
Control startup feedwater flow to maintain narrow range level between (LO3)% [(L04)% for i adverse containment} and 50%
- Return to guideline and step in effect INSTRUMENTATION:
- SG narrow range level indication
- Startup feedwater flow indication CDNTROL/EOUTPMENT:
Startup feedwater flow control valve controls l KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDTTIONAL INFORMATION:
(L27) Enter specific value corresponding to SG level at the upper tap, including allowances for normal channel accuracy.
- (L28) Enter specific value corresponding to SG level at the upper tap, including allowances for l
normal channel accuracy, post accident transmitter errors, and refe ence leg process errors.
j * (LO3) Enter specific value showing SG level in the narrow range, including allowances for normal channel accuracy.
- (LO4) Enter specific value showing SG level in the narrow range, including allowances for normal channel ac::uracy, post accident transmitter errors, and reference leg process errors, not to exceed 50 %
l m:up600no64.urr-h3nt:tb-121796 4-8 REVisloN: 2
O BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR AP600 EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE I
AFR-I.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO HIGII PRESSURIZER LEVEL Rev.3 l
May 31,1997 l
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- STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR I.1 i
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THIS PAGE WAS DELETED FOR REVISION 3 i
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0 **Proj200b4wVev3kfr.il wpf.lb 061397 4,3 REVISION: 3
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR-1.1 STEP 2 STEP: Check RCS Makeup Status l
PURPOSE: To determine if RCS makeup pumps have stopped BASIS: 1 The RCS makeup pumps receive a "stop" signal on high pressurizer level. The operator should check that they have stopped and, if not, stop them.
ACTIONS:
1
= Determine if RCS makeup pumps are stopped
- Stop all makeup pump INSTRUMENTATION: l l
Indications for: l l
= Makeup pumps status l l
CONTROL /EOUIPMENT: I Makeup pump controls O
KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A l
i O
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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR.I.1 1
-( STEP 3 STEP. Check Letdown - IN SERVICE PURPOSE: To determine whether letdown is in service and, if not, to establish a controlled bleed path from the RCS B ASIS.
l Letdown provides a controlled mechanism for offsetting RCS inventory additions through the makeup system, it also supplies high temperature RCS water for heating the normal makeup flow in the i regenerative heat exchanger. To establish stable conditions and control pressurizer level in subsequent steps, letdown should be established. To establish letdown cooling to the regenerative ;
heat exchanger must be established. This can be done by running RCPs or starting RCS makeup. 1 The preferred method should be inserted in the EOPs.
Establishing RCS makeup is not desired since pressurizer level is high and the makeup pumps are automatically stopped. If no cooling to the regenerative heat exchanger can be established then normal letdown should not be established. Reactor head vent flow should be established to provide a bleed path to aid in responding to high pressurizer level conditions.
ACTIONS:
=
l Determine if letdown is in service
}-
Determine if letdown cannot be established l
- Establish letdown Establish reactor head vent flow INSTRUMENTATION:
Instrumentation for tablishing:
Letdown (valve position indication for letdown isolation valves and letdown flow indication)
=
Reactor head vent flow (reactor head vent isolation valve position indication)
CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
L ' Controls for establishing:
Letdown (letdown isolation valve)
Reactor head vent flow (reactor head vent isolation valve)
KNOWLEDGE:
If excessive activity levels in the RCS are suspected, then an evaluation of the consequences of establishing letdown should be made prior to taking that action.
f ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
i g
- Preferred sequence of actions for establishing letdown
- Preferred sequence of actions for establishing reactor head vent flow I
[ ohwproj2\2064w\rev3\afr-il.wpf.lb 061397 45 REVISION: 3
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR I.1 STEP 4 SIEE: Check PRZR Pressure PURPOSE- To verify that pressurizer pressure is below the normal spray setpoint pressure BASIS:
It is necessary to reduce the pressurizer pressure below the normal spray setpoint so that in later steps when pressurizer heaters are energized any possible increase in pressure will not actuate pressurizer spray.
ACTIONS:
Determine if pressurizer pressure is less than (P02) psig Control makeup and letdown flow as necessary to decrease pressurizer pressure to less than (P02) psig INSTRUMENTATION:
Indications for:
- Pressurizer pressure
- Makeup flow
- Letdown flow CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Controls for:
- Makeup flow
- Letdown flow '
KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
(P02) Pressurizer spray valve closure setpoint i
e!
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l STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR.L1 i f
r
! \- STEP 7 l
1 STEP: Control Letdown As Necessary To Maintain RCS Pressure Stable l PUREgjE: To hold RCS pressure constant while pressurizer heaters increase the pressurizer fluid temperature l BASIS:
l Letdown is adjusted as required to maintain a constant RCS pressure. This action together with the energized pressurizer heaters will cause a steam bubble to form and/or grow in the pressurizer.
ACTIONS:
Control letdown flow as necessary to maintain stable RCS pressure i INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
l
= RCS pressure
. Letdown flow
\
f (s CONTROL /EOUIPMENT: ,
! Controls for: )
- Letdown flow i
KNOWLEDGE: l l
N/A l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
1 N/A l l
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l o \newprojN064w\rev3\afr il.wpf Ib.061397 49 REVislON: 3
STEP DESCRIFFION TABLE FOR AFR-I.1 ;
STEP 8 O
SIEE. Check PRZR Level - LESS THAN (L241%
PURPOSE: To determine from pressurizer level indication that a bubble is present in the pressurizer ,
BASIS:
Once the pressurizer level is below the high level reactor trip setpoint, the pressurizer bubble has ;
been reestablished and the pressurizer level is considered to be in the acceptable range. The operator i is instructed to continue to tnaintain the RCS pressure stable and the pressurizer heaters energized '
4 until pressurizer level is less than the high level reactor trip setpoint.
l
! ACTIONS:
1 Determine if pressurizer level is less than (L24)%
INSTRUMENTATION:
Pressurizer level indication CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
(L24) Pressurizer high level reactor trip setpoint O
m:\ap600\2064w\afr-il.wpf;1b 121796 4-10 Rmm2