ML20140D892
| ML20140D892 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1986 |
| From: | Glasspiegel H CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#186-904 OL, NUDOCS 8602030136 | |
| Download: ML20140D892 (14) | |
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xi'. i i U UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of
)
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
)
Docket Nos. 50-4400b-ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL.
)
50-441
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
APPLICANTS' MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO APPEAL BOARD MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (JANUARY 3, 1986)
In its Memorandum and Order dated January 3, 1986, the Ap-peal Board directed the parties (other than Sunflower Alliance Inc., et al.) to address two questions, set forth in the Memo-randum and Order at pages 2-4, relating to Issue No. 8 (hydro-gen control).
The Appeal Board's questions, and Applicants' responses, are set forth below.
Question 1:
Effective February 25, 1985, the Com-mission amended its hydrogen control rule to re-quire, among other things, improved hydrogen con-trol capability for boiling water reactors with a Mark III containment (e.g. Perry).
In the case of such a facility, the amount of hy-drogen to be controlled must be equivalent to the quantity generated by a metal-water reaction involving 75 percent of the cladding surrounding the active fuel region (excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume).
No accident sce-g narios that would result in such hydrogen produc-tion are specified, but the rule states that sce-narios accepted by the NRC staff "must be 8602030136BhQO 40 PDR ADOCK O PDR g)
t o accompanied by sufficient supporting justification to show that they describe the behavior of the re-actor system during and following an accident re-sulting in a degraded core." 10 CFR 50.44(c)(3)(vi)(B)(3). In light of this directive, was it proper for the Licensing Board, in connection with its assessment of the appli-cants' preliminary hydrogen control analysis, to admit and to consider evidence concerning assump-tions related to specific details of the accident, such as containment spray availability, station blackout, and the operability of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System? If not, does the rule nevertheless require the applicants' final analy-sis to include a determination with respect to the appropriateness of such assumptions?
Response
For the reasons discussed below, the answer to both parts of Que'stion 1 is "no." The hydrogen rule requires Applicants to " provide its nuclear power reactor with a hydrogen control system justified by a suitable program of experiment and analysis." 10 C.F.R. S 50.44(c)(3)(iv)(A). The rule also provides that: Completed final analyses are not necessary for a staff determination that a plant is safe to operate at full power provided that prior to such operation an applicant has provided a preliminary analysis which the staff has determined provides a satisfac-tory basis for a decision to support inter-im operation at full power until the final analysis has been completed. 10 C.F.R. S 50.44(c)(3)(vii)(B). Although the hydrogen rule does not further define the scope of a preliminary analysis, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("ASLB") properly con-cluded that the scope is limited to the following " basic ques-tions":.
i w whether an igniter system has been in-stalled, whether it will function as de-signed, whether hydrogen will burn as pre-dicted, and whether the containment and essential equipment will retain their in-tegrity under the pressures and tempera-tures predicted. LBP-85-35, 22 N.R.C. 514, 548 (1985). The ASLB also properly concluded that "[t]he hydrogen rule for Mark III containments is not the vehicle by which we test the comprehensive safety analyses of other systems that are performed by Appli-cants and Staff," and that "[e]ven though linkages exist we do not believe that an analysis of hydrogen control raises each and every other aspect of the Applicants' overall safety analy-sis." Id. In discussing the scope of the preliminary analysis, the ASLB correctly held (1) "that the issue of hydrogen control does not raise the question of containment spray availability during a hydrogen event," and (2) that "the broad issue of sta-tion blackout, while important, is not raised by the hydrogen rule, even though linkages exist for which the Staff may re-quire additional analysis." See 22 N.R.C. at 542, 548-49 (em-phasis added). For these reasons, the ASLB's admission and consideration of evidence concerning specific details about containment spray availability,1/ station blackout,2/ and the operability of the 1/
- See, e.g.,
22 N.R.C. at 542, 580 (Finding 154) (and evi-dence cited therein). 2/ See e.g., 22 N.R.C. at 537-38, 578-79 (Findings 144-46) (and evidence cited therein). O Reactor Core Isolation Cooling ("RCIC") System,3/ exceeded the limited scope of the hydrogen rule's preliminary analysis requirements.4/ The Appeal Board specifically refers in Question 1 to 10 C.F.R. S 50.44(c)(3)(vi)(B)(3), which requires that Applicants' analysis must: Use accident scenarios that are ac-cepted by the NRC Staff. These scenarios must be accompanied by sufficient sup-porting justification to show that they de-scribe the behavior of the reactor system during and following an acci4ent resulting in a degraded core. Id. In explaining the intent of this paragraph, the Commission has stated, among other things, that "a base sequence will be identified by the licensee or applicant based on the hydrogen threat to containment." See 50 Fed. Reg. at 3501-02 (Supple-mentary Information section discussing 5 50.44(c)(3)(vi)). The Commission has further suggested, in discussing previously ac-cepted scenarios for the Sequoyah and McGuire cases, that the analysis of scenarios must be " sufficient to assure that the hydrogen associated with a representative group of degraded 3/
- See, e.g.,
id., 22 N.R.C. at 538, 579 (Finding 146); Tr. 3455-56, 3461, 3660-62. 4/ The ASLB has itself acknowledged that, over the objections of Applicants and Staff, it permitted OCRE " considerable latitude" to address "many subjects in its cross-examination that may well have gone beyond the bounds of a reasonable preliminary anlaysis on the compar-atively narrow safety issue of hydrogen control." See 22 N.R.C. at 548.
a core situations could be managed acceptably using the ignition systems." Id. In accordance with these requirements, Applicants' prelim-inary evaluation analyzed two scenarios: (1) a transient with a stuck-open valve ("SORV") with extended ECCS failure and (2) a small steam line break accident in the drywell with extended ECCS failure. Recovery of coolant flow was assumed for both scenarios so as to result in a 75% metal-water reaction, recov-erable degraded core accident. The selection of these two sce-narios was based on prior NRC and industry considerations of accident event initiators. The combr.ation of mass and energy releases from these postulated events is representative of a wide variety of postulated degraded core situations in which hydrogen is a factor.5/ The NRC Staff has reviewed and accept-ed Applicants' scenarios.6/ Thus, Applicants chose two scenarios which complied with the requirements of the hydrogen rule. There is no logical end to the alternative scenarios an intervenor might wish to ex-plore if granted sufficient latitude to do so during a hearing 5/ See Applicants' Direct Testimony of Eileen M.
- Buzzelli, John D.
Richardson, Kevin W. Holtzclaw, Roger W.
- Alley, Bernard Lewis, Bela Karlovitz and G.
Martin Fuls on the i Preliminary Evaluation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Hydrogen Control System (Issue No. 8), ff. Tr. 3241 (" App. Testimony") at 37-39; Applicants' Exhibit 8-1 (Preliminary Evaluation), ff. Tr. 3243, at 18-19. 6/ See 22 N.R.C. at 575 (Finding 118) (and evidence cited therein). on hydrogen control. A reasonable construction of the hydrogen rule does not appear to Applicants to permit an intervenor to explore alternative scenarios absent some compelling reason to do so.7/ OCRE has failed to demonstrate any deficiency in Applicants' selection and analysis of accident scenarios in the preliminary evaluation. In its cross-examination regarding Applicants' chosen scenarios, OCRE failed to show that Appli-cants' scenarios are not reasonably representative of likely events that might lead to recoverable degraded core accidents involving hydrogen generation, or that the scenarios fall to describe the behavior of the reactor system during and follow-ing a degraded core accident.8/ In the absence of such a showing, the ASLB should not have permitted OCRE to inquire about the details of alternative scenarios and systems. Neither the hydrogen rule, nor Applicants' preliminary analysis, nor OCRE's contention, provided a basis for the ASLB to admit and consider detailed evidence on station blackout as an alternative scenario to the scenarios considered by 7/ This conclusion is reinforced in this case by the fact that the section of the hydrogen rule setting forth the preliminary analysis requirements, 10 C.F.R. 9 50.44(c)(3)(vii)(B), does not refer to accident scenario requirements and does not cross reference that section of the rule, 10 C.F.R. 5 50.44(c)(3)(vi)(B)(3), which estab-lishes the requirement for specifying accident scenarios. 8/
- See, e.g.,
Applicants' Brief in Opposition to Intervenors' Appeals From the Concluding Partial Initial Decision (December 2, 1985) (" App. Appellate Brief") at 43, 46; App. Reply at 26-29 (addressing specific station blackout issuas raised by OCRF). Applicants. The ASLB's consideration of detailed evidence con-cerning station blackout and RCIC,9/ 22 N.R.C. at 537-38, 578-79 (Findings 144-146), was contrary to its own conclusion that station blackout "is not raised by the hydrogen rule." 22 N.R.C. at 549. As noted above, Applicants are not required to examine every possible scenario. Indeed, the supplementary information to the hydrogen rule, 50 Fed. Reg. at 3502, states that "(p]rovision of a backup power supply is not required by this rule."lOf It follows, therefore, that Applicants' hydro-gen control analysis is not required to assume loss of all power supplies, as would occur in a station blackout scenario. OCRE also seeks to challenge Applicants' containment spray availability assumption, but does not suggest how or why the sprays might become unavailable as a result of a hydrogen event. OCRE makes only the unsupported assertion that contain-ment spray unavailability can be deduced from the scenarios used by Applicants that postulated loss of core cooling. See 22 N.R.C. at 542, 580 (Finding 154).11/ OCRE, although given 9/ Details about the RCIC system are not relevant to the two l hydrogen generation scenarios analyzed by Applicants, and l were pursued by OCRE in the context of a hypothetical sta-tion blackout event. See supra note 3 (and citations therein). 10/ Although the statement follows a discussion of scenarios examined at Sequoyah and McGuire, the statement itself is unqualified and is not limited to these plants. See Applicants' Reply to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclu-sions of Law FiJed By The Other Parties (Hydrogen Control) (" App. Reply") (July 1, 1985) at 27-28. 11/ OCRE's argument is not related to the survivability of the containment spray system, under 10 C.F.R. (Continued next page).-
the opportunity, adduced no evidence suggesting that the re-lease and combustion of hydrogen might impact the availability of the spray systems, or of other independent safety-grade sys-tems. The rule does not require Applicants to re-verify the availability of such systems in addition to its hydrogen con-trol analysis.12/ Applicants thus concur in the ASLB's deter-mination that "OCRE's assertion concerning spray unavailability is without merit and outside the scope of a test of compliance with the Commission's new rule on hydrogen control." See 22 N.R.C. at 542, 548-49.13/ (Continued) $ 50.44(c)(3)(vi)(B)(5)(ii). Applicants' preliminary analysis does evaluate the survivability of the systems and components, including containment spray system compo-nents, necessary to establish and maintain safe shutdown and to maintain containment integrity.
- See, e.g.,
Appli-cants Exhibit 8-1 (Preliminary Evaluation), Section 4.4 and Table 5.6-2 (discussing applicable equipment survivability preliminary analysis of containment spray and other safety systems). 12/ The containment spray system is part of the Residual Heat Removal ("RHR") system, which is designed to meet the sin-gle failure criterion and other NRC-approved safety design bases. See Applicants' Exhibit 8-1 (Preliminary Evalua-tion) at 25-26. The hydrogen rule does not vacate the single failure criterion or other applicable design bases, after the initial assumptions are made to meet the hydro-gen generation requirements of the rule. Thus, other than the survivability analyses that Applicants are conducting pursuant to 10 C.F.R. $ 50.44(c)(3)(vi)(B)(5)(ii), no ad-ditional analyses of engineered systems such as RHR are required under the rule. See 22 N.R.C. at 548-49. 13/ See App. Appellate Brief at 49; App. Reply at 44 (address-ing OCRE's arguments regarding containment sprays). i l
Nor do Applicants believe that the hydrogen rule requires the final analysis to include assumptions of station blackout, the response of RCIC to station blackout, or unavailability of containment sprays.14/ As discussed above, the preliminary analysis is based on reasonable, representative degraded core hydrogen release scenarios. Station blackout, and the response of the RCIC system to station blackout,15/ are not relevant to Applicants' scenarios or to the rule. Thus, they require no further consideration as part of the final analysis. Nonetheless, Applicants through the generic Hydrogen Control Owners Group ('!HC,0G") have agreed to provide further justifica-tion to the Staff demonstrating that station blackout need not be analyzed. See 22 N.R.C. at 580 (Finding 158). Similarly, the hydrogen rule requires no further analysis (other than survivability analyses, see supra note 11) of the availability of independent safety systems, such as the containment spray system, when these systems during and after a hydrogen genera-tion event are not called into question by the scenarios ana-lyzed to date by Applicants. See 22 N.R.C. at 549 (the 14/ The rule's final analysis requirements are, in any case, beyond the scope of the issues presented on appeal. 10 C.F.R. S 50.44(c)(3)(vii)(B) clearly provides that com-pleted final analysis are not necessary to support the de- ' termination that a plant is safe to operate at full power, provided that a satisfactory preliminary analysis is sub-mitted by Applicants and approved by the NRC Staff. Thus the only issue before the Appeal Board is the adequacy of Applicants' preliminary analysis. 15/ See supra note 9. _ __
E reliability of separate engineered safety systems should not be treated as collateral to the hydrogen control issue).16/ Question 2: Taking into account your answer to Question 1, as well as the requirement of section 50.44(c)(3)(vi)(B)(5)(i) that containment struc-tural integrity must be maintained throughout the hydrogen generation and control scenario, what is the justification for the applicants' and the staff's reliance on an analysis that apparently requires the operation of the containment spray system as a heat removal device in order to main-tain containment integrity? Given this require-ment, does not the containment spray become a nec-essary part of the hydrogen control system and hence fall within the scope of the new hydrogen rule? See LBP-85-35, 22 NRC 514, 542 (1985).
Response
As discussed in response to Question 1, the containment spray system is part of engineered safety systems in the Perry Plant, and would be available to provide decay heat removal after the generation and ignition of hydrogen.17/ The spray system, which existed prior to the addition of Appli-cants' hydrogen igniter system, is clearly not part of the ig-niter system. See 22 N.R.C. at 568-70 (Findings 69-84) (and evidence cited therein). 16/ Although not required by the hydrogen rule, Applicants through HCOG do plan to provide further information to the Staff regarding sensitivity of parameters, including con-tainment sprays, used in the hydrogen control analysis. 17/ See 22 N.R.C. at 548-49, 580 (Finding 155) (and evidence cited therein); Applicants' Exhibit 8-1 (Preliminary Eval-uation), ff. Tr. 3243, at 3; App. Testimony at 10-14 (dis-cussing inherent BWR 6/ Mark II design features)...
6 Question 2 refers to the ASLB's response to containment spray availability arguments raised by OCRE. See 22 N.R.C. at 542. The ASLB was correct in rejecting OCRE's postulation of a failure of containment sprays on top of the postulated 75% metal-water reactor, for the reasons stated by the ASLB. See App. Appellate Brief at 49. As noted by the ASLB in the portion of LBP-85-35 cited by Appeal Board (22 N.R.C. at 542), Applicants' containment re-sponse analysis (CLASIX-3) assumes that containment sprays are actuated after the first burn, and that the sprays would then be available as a heat transfer mechanism. Id. CLASIX-3 also models the response of other engineered safety systems in the s plant that would be available in addition to the hydrogen igni-tion system, e.g., the combustible gas control system ("CGCS"). See App. Testimony at 42-43. This does not mean that every safety system in the plant that would operate fol-lowing hydrogen burning is therefore "a necessary part of the hydrogen control system and hence . within the scope of the new hydrogen rule," as posited in Question 2. Such an inter-pretation finds no support anywhere in the hydrogen rule. The l I l 1
more reasonable interpretation of the scope of the hydrogen rule is that set out by the ASLB (22 N.R.C. at 548-49), dis-cussed in Applicants' response to Question 1. Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 7 d rry (A+5 Jay E. S
- berg, P.C.
67 Harry H Glasspiegel Counsel for Applicants 1800 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000 I Dated: January 29, 1986 i I f I t ? + l
s -O!/ L l_, 3 j~r U S J g,' _, T January 29, 1986 % q5"?c. 2 ENi' bu ;h /)Gi i t r3;cQ' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of ) ) THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-441 ) (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, ) Units 1 and 2) ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that copies of the foregoing "Appli-cants' Memorandum In Response To Appeal Board Memorandum And Order (January 3, 1986)" were served by deposit in the United States Mail, First Class, postage prepaid, this 29th day of January, 1986, to all those on'the attached Service List. k(( HARRYH.[LASSPIEGELf V DATED: January 29, 1986
4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of ) ) THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-441 ) (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, ) Units 1 and 2) ) SERVICE LIST Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Dr. W. Reed Johnson' Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Secretary Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Howard A. Wilbe: Colleen Woodhead, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Executive Legal Appeal Board Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 James P..Gleason, Chairman Terry Lodge, Esquire 513 Gilmoure Drive Suite 105 Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 618 N. Michigan Street Toledo, Ohio 43624 Jerry R. Kline Ms. Susan L. Hiatt Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 8275 Munson Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mentor, Ohio 44060 Washington, D.C. 20555 Glenn O. Bright Donald T. Ezzone, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Assistant Prosecuting Attorney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Lake County Administration Center i Washington, D.C. 20555 105 Center Street Painesville, Ohio 44077 Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 John G. Cardinal, Esquire Prosecuting Attorney Ashtabula County Courthouse Jefferson, Ohio 44047 _ _ _.}}