ML20140C642

Special Rept:On 840430,fire Damper FD-50,on Wall Between Control Bldg Electrical Switchgear Battery Rooms,Found Missing Ul Label & Excessive Gaps Found Between Damper & Wall.Caused by Improper Installation.Fire Watch Established

ML20140C642
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	06/07/1984
From:	Yundt C PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
CPY-559-84, NUDOCS 8406190397
Download: ML20140C642 (2)

Text

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• m = { 13': 1 r T, Portland General Electric Company I. , , ! ,  ! J'u'e n 7, 1984 Trojan Nuclear Plant CPY-559-84 P.O. Box 439 Rainier, Oregon 97048 (503)556-3713 Mr. John B. Martin Regional Administrator - V U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368

Dear Sir:

Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.9 of the Trojan Technical Specifications requires that a Special Report be provided if certain fire barrier penetrations become nonfunctional and cannot be returned to functional status within seven days. This report identifies fire barriers required by this specification which have been inoperable for greater than seven days as a result of degraded fire dampers.

During a routine 18-month visual inspection of safety related pene-tration fire barriers on April 30, 1984, the fire damper on the wall between the Control Building Electrical Switchgear Battery Rooms, FD-50, was found to be missing the Underwriter's Laboratory (UL) label.

The UL label identifies a penetration with its applicable fire rating.

Without this label the fire damper could not be verified as having a three-hour fire rating as required by Technical Specifications. This degrades the fire barrier and makes it nonfunctional.

A second problem was identified on April 30, 1984, on fire damper FD-64, located in the south wall of the Control Building Electrical Switchgear Room. The routine inspection found gaps between the damper and the wall that exceeded the size allowed by the applicable fire pro-tection code. The presence of excessive gaps degrades the fire barrier and may make it nonfunctional.

Both deficiencies appear to be the result of improper installation.

These areas were already in compliance with the Technical Specification 3.7.9 action statement requirement of establishing a hourly fire watch patrol and verifying fire detector operability. The required fire pro-tection surveillance will be maintained until these deficiencies are corrected. It is expected that by September 1, 1984, FD-50 will be replaced and FD-64 will be repaired.

I 0406190397 840607 PDR ADOCK 05000344 S PDR

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- o June 70 1984

, CPY-559-84 Page Two Several other fire penetration barriers have been found to be non-functional during this 18-month inspection. Since the inspecticn is not yet complete, all additional nonfunctional barriers will be summarized in a future Special Report.

Sincerely, 1 ,, -

h H

[ C. P. Yundt General Manager 1

CPY/GGB/WOI c: LER Distribution File 93.24a File 103.X l

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