ML20140C466

Requests Commission Approval of Proposed Methodology & Criteria for Evaluating Need for Core Research Capabilities, to Include Size & Composition

ML20140C466
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/02/1997
From:	Callan L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
References
SECY-97-075, SECY-97-075-R, SECY-97-75, SECY-97-75-R, NUDOCS 9704140057
Download: ML20140C466 (45)

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, , , , , ,e POLICY ISSUE April 2, 1997 (Notation Vote) sscy_,,_o,3 FOR: The Commissioners FROM: L. Joseph Callan Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING CORE RESEARCH CAPABILITIES PURPOSE:

To obtain Commission approval of a proposed methodology and criteria for evaluating the need for core research capabilities, to include their size and composition.

SUMMARY

In response to Direction Setting Issue No. 22, the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) has developed a proposed methodology and criteria as a guide for determining:

e the areas of research where core capabilities are needed; e the agency's regulatory functions that each core capability would support:

e the size of each core capability (FTE and contract support funds)'; and e the skills and experimental facilities needed to maintain each core capability.

This paper explains the pro)osed methodology and criteria and provides the results of having applied t1e methodology and criteria to two areas of O/

research. These two trial ap 11 cations are provided to help in the understanding of this proposa .

BACKGROUND:

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One of the general objectives of the draft NRC Strategic Plan is to " supply research needed to regulate effectively." The supporting strategy 'ar accomplishing this objective states that the NRC "will maintain a cc?e

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research capability required now and in the future to support NRC's regulatory j mission." This general objective and the sup)orting strategy are responsive '

to Direction Setting Issue (DSI) 22. "Researc1," in the Commission's Strategic Assessment and Rebaselining Initiative. The Commission's decision on DSI-22 states that the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) "should develop ,

criteria for determining core research capabilities for Commission approval"  !

prior.to ap) lying the criteria to programmatic areas of research. RES has  !

developed .tlese criteria which are embedded in a methodology for a) assessing j where core research capabilities will be needed in the foreseeable future and l b) to determine their size and composition.

l DISCUSSIONi l

The imoortance of identifyina core research caoabilities  :

i l NRC is a knowledge-based organization. The NRC Principles of Good Regulation f l

state, in part, that " final decisions must be based on objective, unbiased assessments of all information..." and that "the highest technical and  :

l managerial competence is required and must be a constant agency goal." and j i that " regulatory decisions should be made without undue delay." and finally  ;

i that " regulations should be based on the best available knowledge from l l research and operational ex RES makes an important technical

! contribution to the agency'perience."s ability to live up to these principles. To have:

a high degree of assurance that it will be able to continue to do so in the l future. RES must have access to expertise, data, analytical tools and/or ,

experimental facilities (either on its staff or in contractor organizations)  !

that can. provide informed, timely and independent' bases for making regulatory deci sior.s. l Within this context, there are at least two fundamentally different ways to ,

j define a core research capability: l l

e First, one can define' a core capability as a minimum cadre of experts I and some experimental facilities that the agency would want to have t l available independent of any known or highly probable workload demands ,

from the regulatory process. It would be an on-call capability that  !

could respond in a limited, but knowledgeable, timely and independent <

manner. This is referred to in this paper as an " expertise driven core

! capability "

• Second, one can define a core capability more broadly to be a capability  :

below which the agency cannot complete its " continuing, relatively '

steady state" regulatory work in a manner consistent with the principles of good regulation. This is referred to in this paper as a " workload .

driven core capability.." Peak and temporary workload; can influence the size'of the RES budget, but they would not be considered in determining the size of a workload driven core capability. Using this definition, the size of a particular core capability would be determined by the l amount and type of research that the staff believes will be needed on a continuing steady state basis over the foreseeable future. Using this l

definition, the agency could estimate what the NRC would need as a I

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The' Commissioners research baseline to provide day-to-day technical support to its >

licensing organizations (user needs), as well as to conduct any needed

'long term anticipatory research. This core would represent an alarm level. Going below this alarm. level would mean that the NRC's ability l to regulate effectively had been degraded. Going below this level could i be necessary under severe budget constraints but at least it would be '

readily apparent that this would be the case.  ;

The staff believes both definitions should be employed. The first definition  :

would be operative when +1e regulatory demands'on a particular area of

• o research (over the foreseeable future) are determined to be minimal. The second definition would be operative when the regulatory demands on a l particular area of research are determined to be sufficient to require a

capability above the "ex)ertise". level and these demands would be expected on l l a continuing basis for tie foreseeable future. However, the expertise level i l included in a workload driven core capability would be separately identified.

i Core capabilities would be revisited annually, so that appropriate adjustments .

could be made if earlier expectations proved to be incorrect. By maintaining l' a core capability. the NRC can be quite confident of having the baseline expertise needed to.either address any known or potential issues or to ' provide -

a nucleus around which an expanded capability can be constructed in a timely

! and efficient manner. It will also provide RES management with a visible baseline of skills and experimental facilities against which timely decisi'ons can be made to sustain the core capability. Without this focus, essential l l expertise and facilities might be lost though attrition or other circumstances.  :

Coordination with others

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l In the course of developing the methodology / criteria proposed in this paper.

RES held discussions with four different groups on our preliminary proposal. '

These groups were: j e . directors of NRC user offices (NRR. NMSS, and AE0D):

e NRC. program managers at DOE laboratories currently performing work for ,

RES.

e deans of the nuclear engineering departments at six universities; and i e representatives from industry organizations (vendor groups, utilities, i Electric Power Research Institute and Nuclear Energy Institute).  ;

!- 1 l Based on the exchanges we had with these groups, the methodology / criteria and 'l the areas to be assessed were refined to reflect the current proposal.

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t Guidina orincioles f

RES's approach to evaluating the need for core research capabilities is based on the following guiding principles

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i The Commissioners i e Core capabilities.will be determined using cur current understanding of  ;

the regulatory environment and we will not speculate about the future. ,

For example, we will not now assess core capabilities that might be  :

needed to support: a) applications for early site permits.' construction j permits or advanced design certifications beyond AP-600: b)-' regulation  :

of DOE activities: and, c) applications for use of MOX fuels.  !

e ,NRR, NMSS and AE00, as the primary users of research, will have a  !

significant input into the need for core research capabilities by i helping identify arojected workloads. The assessment of core  ;

capabilities, to 3e done later this year, will be limited to user office  :

participation. After Commission preliminary approval, a review by the-  !

NRC advisory committees, the Nuclear Safety Research Review Committee i and NRC's external stakeholders would closely follow. Commission final '

aaproval would be sought after these reviews are completed and any  :

clanges are made to the core capability evaluations.

e There can be two types of core research capability. Exoertise Driven:  ;

This would consist of a single skill or nucleus of skills, either on the >

RES staff or in contractor organizations or some combination of the two, and'in some cases a limited experimental capability. It would represent a minimum capability to provide expert support to the regulatory i process. Workload Driven: This is a core research capability that is l engaged in research to meet the continuing and relatively steady state '

demands of the regulatory process, largely driven by user office' needs.

Attachment 1 contains a more detailed description of these two types of i core capabilities and shows their relationship to the budget.' A  :

workload driven core capability would have the inherent. ability to also .

perform the functions of an expertise driven core capability.  !

e Core ca abilities will not have the capacity to perform unanticipated work un ess some activities in the core program are deferred. Thus, such work will usually be performed using resources that are above core'. ,

e Factors such as new legislation, new regulatory approaches changes in f technology, changes in the availability of contractor expertise / 4 facilities, operational events, or a perceived change in the continuing,

, relatively steady state demands from the regulatory process could either point to the need for new core capabilities or indicate the need  ;

l to change the scope and magnitude of existing core ca) abilities. Annual reassessments of core capabilities will be performed ay RES in coordination with user offices to keep the core capability requirements from becoming outdated.  !

e It is not practical to project core capability needs beyond the time horizon of NRC's Strategic Plan because of the considerable  !

t i uncertainties associated with such long-range projections. This horizon is referred to in this paper as the foreseeable future.  :

j e One cannot develop criteria that will determine the size of a core  !

capability. These determinations must be based on judgment taking into  ;

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The Commissioners l L account past experience, the staff's best estimate about future continuing demands from the regulatory environment and/or the need for a minimum nucleus of skills and experimental facilities to support the l regulatory process.

• RES will enter into cost-effective cooperative research programs with domestic and foreign organizations to obtain needed research and to maintain needed facilities.

e RES will ensure that NRC research does not unnecessarily _ duplicate industry programs and that NRC does not perform research that is properly the responsibility of industry. RES will take advantage of the research performed by industry, but will perform confirmatory research necessary to ensure-the independence of NRC's technical positions.

e RES will. consider the state of the existing technology / knowledge base when determining the need for core capabilities.

e RES will consider the regulatory alternatives, such as use of greater conservatism, to maintaining a core capability as one means of determining if a core is needed. In making this determination, it will be assumed that, if RES were to have no core capability, no other NRC office would have that capability.

e Core cababilities can provide both confirmatory and anticipatory researc1, as appropriate.

e "Non-research" functions currently within RES will not be assessed for ,

core research capabilities. These are rulemaking activities and IPE/IPEEE reviews.

e RES staff that will support core capabilities (overhead) will not be included in the core capability resource estimates.

- Acoroach-The approach used by RES to develop a methodology and criteria for assessing l core research capabilities involves five sequential steps.

Steo 1: Defining what would constitute a core research capability.

Steo 2: Identifying the regulatory functions where support from a core research capability might be needed. These functions are: i i

e provide the technical bases for agency decisions on {

regulatory or safety issues (including the resolution of GSIs) stemming from power plant operations, events, i materials uses, and license amendment requests; i i  ;

!~ e provide the technical bases for agency decisions on i

regulatory or safety issues (including the resolution of i I j 5

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'The Commissioners GSIs) stemming from new or evolving technologies and/or research results:

e develop, maintain, and apply analytical tools / databases --

maintain the NRC's institutional technical knowledge base:

e provide the technical bases for improvements to the regulatory framework (i.e., regulations, regulatory guides, codes and standards, new initiatives);

e improve the technical bases of regulation through involvement in research with domestic and foreign organizations: and, e respond to oversight groups (Commission. Congress. public.

• ACRS. ACNW, NSRRC).

The definition of each of these functions is in Attachment 3.

Steo 3: Developing criteria to indicate, in a qualitative sense, a) the amount of support that might be needed for each of the regulatory functions identified in Step 2. and b) the importance of that support to the regulatory mission of the agency. Fourteen criteria were developed. These. criteria can be seen in Attachment 4, which is a core capabilities assessment form. This form requires a "high." " medium." " low." or "none" rating for each criterion and the rationale for each rating. " Low" and "none" ratings would indicate the need for either a small core'or perhaps that no core capability is needed. " Medium" and "high" ratings would indicate the need for a.more robust core capability.

Metrics were developed (Attachment 5) to guide the assignment of "high." " medium." and " low" ratings to the 14 criteria on the core capability assessment form. These metrics were developed to define what is meant by each rating and to help ensure a reasonable degree of consistency among the ratings for all areas of research. It is recognized that there is a degree of judgment required in applying these metrics.

Steo 4: Developing a way to document the resources needed for each core capability. Attachment 6 shows how these resources will be documented and cross referenced to the regulatory functions needing core capability support. The format distinguishes between in-house needs and those RES would expect to obtain from contractors (expertise and experimental facility support.) The estimated cost of contractor support is also to be identified on l the form. When all the areas of research have been assessed. RES will aggregate the results into a listing of in-house and contractor skills and ex)erimental facilities that will need to be sustained as a core capa)ility. RES will also sum up the contract support funds to identify a " core capabilities budget."

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The Commissioners Steo 5: Identifying all the areas of research that the staff believes need to be assessed for core capabilities. Attachment 7 shows.the 39

, areas of research that the staff alans to assess. If necessary.

the number of areas that need to )e assessed will be adjusted du-ing the process of conducting the assessments.

Other sunoortino documentation In the course of. developing the above methodology / criteria, it became apparent j that other relevant information would need to be addressed to do a thorough i assessment. Attachment 8 shows the types of supporting information that will l accompany each core capability evaluation.

Trial aoolications Attachments 9 and 10 are the results of applying the methodology and criteria j to two areas of research. These are provided to help in the understanding of 1 this proposal. Attachment 9 addressing Hydrogen Distribution and Combustion. l; documents the need for an exoertise driven core capability. Attachment 10 addressing Fuel Behavior, documents the need for a workload driven core capability.

l Relationshio of the core caoability assessments to other taskinos from the Commission / Chairman There is a relationshi) between the core ca) ability assessments that will be  !

performed and three otler assessments that lave either been requested by the  ;

Chairman or are being contemplated as a part of the Commission s Strategic l Assessment and Rebaselining Initiative (DSI No. 20. International Activities).

These are:

l e criteria for prioritizing RES contributions to international cooperative

! research activities "e sunsetting criteria that can be applied to determine when a research program should be brought to closure i l e a systematic way to search for unanticipated or emerging safety issues ,

so that RES does not a) prematurely terminate efforts or b) once  ;

terminated, fail to reconstitute them in a timely manner. -

Prioritizino international efforts: RES plans to use the "high." " medium." i

" low" and "none" ratings for criteria 10.11 and 12 on the core capabilities i assessment form (Attachment 4) to determine the relative priority of each of its international cooperative research efforts. While these ratings are not L numerically weighted. RES believes that the criteria ratings, along with

, professional judgment. will permit a credible prioritized list to be

developed. This list will be provided along with the core capability l l evaluations.

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The Commissioners Proaram sunsettina (closure) criteria: Two definitions are necessary at the outset to have a common frame of reference to " programs" and " closure" points, as they are discussed within this paper. These definitions are:

Program: A research area that is focused on a well defined issue and is a body of research that is narrow enough in scope to make the application of sunsetting criteria practical, i.e., the 39 areas of research listed in Attachment 7 are consistent this definition. They are not uniform in size, but they are well focused and issue oriented.

Closure: The point at which the NRC decides to not fund any more work (in-house or elsewhere) or NRC decides to retain only an " expertise driven" core capability in a given research area. This expertise driven capability might include some limited research to respond to unanticipated issues or to attract and retain high caliber expertise or to have access to critical facilities that would otherwise not be readily available.

Both of these definitions are different from those used in the past.

Sometimes, all the research conducted by the NRC has been referred to as the research " program". In other instances, broad areas of research such as Aging and Severe Accidents have been called research "Drograms". Moreover, smaller i segments of research have been called programs,'e.g.. The Steam Generator

" program" or the Human Factors " program" or the Fuel Behavior " program". Some ;

of these programs are programs within programs. To have a common set of  !

criteria for sunsetting that can be applied both practically and consistently, i a more uniform and workable definition of " program" was deemed necessary. RES .

believes a workable level to apply sunsetting criteria is at the level defined I by the 39 areas of research in Attachment 7. l Closure has traditionally been thought of as the point at which the agency )

concludes that all issues are resolved and does no more work. Actually, the  !

question is more complex. The need for valuable core research capabilities (either in-house or elsewhere) is now being addressed. One important aspect ,

of the current assessment is that of an " expertise driven" core capability. l This is a capability that is small, but recognizes that there are many instances where you cannot eliminate all resources in a given area of research, even if the demands for research from user needs and/or ex)loratory research are either very low or non-existent. One has to ask: Has tie program l been sunset, if we still have expertise and may be conducting a small amount j l of research to sustain that expertise? RES believes that under these 1 l conditions the program has, for all practical reasons, been sunset.

The NRC should not consider sunsetting programs only with respect to what has been accomplished, but also with respect to what, in the best judgment of the staff, will need to be accomplished. As proposed the future assessments of core capabilities will provide a best judgment as to when the sunsetting point will be reached. This will be accomplished by annually applying the fourteen criteria in Attachment 4 and by considering the other supporting documentation i

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The Commissioners in Attachment 8. By doing so, a judgment will be made with respect to the level of program activity that will be needed to support the regulatory processes of the agency. All the relevant questions pertinent to sunsetting a program will be considered. These are:

Is there a known or expected need. over the foreseeable future.

for RES to provide the technical bases for agency decisions on a continuing number of safety or regulatory issues stemming from power plant operations, events, materials uses, and licensee amendment requests?

Is there a known or expected need, over the foreseeable future, for RES to provide the technical bases for agency decisions on a continuing number of safety or regulatory issues stemming from new or evolving technologies and/or research results?

Is there a known or expected need, over the foreseeable future, for RES to develop and maintain analytical tools and/or databases?

Is there a known or expected need. over the foreseeable future, for RES to provide the technical bases for improvements to the regulatory framework? and Is there a known or expected need. over the foreseeable future, for RES to improve the technical bases for regulation through involvement in research with domestic and foreign organizations?

Creatina a systematic way to search for unanticioated or emeroina safety issues: RES believes that the annual core capability reassessments will provide this mechanism. Unanticipated or emerging safety issues can stem from four primary sources. These sources are:

e operational experience e licensee initiatives e changing technology e new research results These four sources are addressed in the first two functional areas on the core capability assessment form (Attachment 4). To be more systematic in our search for unanticipated or emerging safety issues, in the annual reassessment of core capabilities. RES will meet with NRR, NMSS, and AEOD to examine the prior year's assessment to see if there are any new developments in the four areas identified above that would warrant a change in research activities.

i While a new issue might not effect the core, it could justify the need for j additional resources "above core." This annual reassessment would be in

i The Commissioners addition to issues that would be identified on an on-going basis by either user offices or RES.

RECOMMENDATION-l That the Commission ap3 rove the recommended core capabilities methodology and l criteria and provide t1e staff with sufficient time to apply this methodology )

to the 39 areas of research. RES believes that it will need six months

following Commission approval of the methodology and criteria to complete the i evaluations and coordinate them with NRR, NMSS and~AEOD. Also, that RES be given the flexibility to make minor modifications to methodology and criteria if, during their application, it finds the need to do so. Any changes will be l i

highlighted to the Commission in the paper forwarding the core capability j L assessments themselves.

l COORDINATION:

l The Office of the General Council has no legal objection to the proposed methodology and criteria.

l The Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this paper and has no objection, but note that the Acting CFO believes that developing the '" workload driven capability" is not necessarily needed to define a minimum core research

. capability.

voseph Callan Executive Director for Operations Attachments: l As stated i Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the office of the Secretary by COB Friday, April 18, 1997. ,

l Commission Staff office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT April 11, 1997, with an info _mation copy to the office of the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected. ,

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners oCA oGC CFo oCAA EDo oIG SECY i oPA-

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ATTACHMENT 1 l-TWO TYPES OF CORE RESEARCH CAPABILITIES

.AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO "AB0VE CORE" NEEDS A RES staff.-RES contractors and collaborative B efforts to conduct research (analyses and experiments) 0 to respond to peak / temporary workloads that cannot be V accommodated by the core capability, e.g.,

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i. e some aspects of the AP-600 review C e some significant unanticipated requirements 0

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B C W Analyses and experiments conducted by RES staff. RES U 0 0 contractors and collaborative efforts to respond to a '

D R R continuing, relatively steady state workload demand over G- E K the foreseeable future, which would be based largely on E L user needs. These demands could stem from:

T R 0 E A e new regulatory approaches S D e operational events findings l E o new technologies A D e new issues R R e license amendment requests L C I e new legislation l H V e new research E

C N A

P A __ _____________________________

g I E RES staff provides expertise to:

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l I- P e stay _ current with the state of the art--new and l T E evolving nuclear related technologies _. new research I R and other related developments and understand the l E T safety and regulatory significance of this work.

S I e provide a level of expertise and interaction such  !

S that there is ready access to experts worldwide E o understand and maintain NRC's technical knowledge base and analytical tools D e provide a nucleus around which a larger capability R can be built if needed I e - provide an "on-call" resource to help respond to V any technical issues that may arise.

. E o conduct or cooperate in joint research efforts of a

) N limited nature in support of retaining expertise or

access to facilities l

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ATTACHMENT 2 CORE RESEARCH CAPABILITY DEFINITION RES has defined a core capability as a minimum resource that RES should maintain into the foreseeable future to support the regulatory mission of the agency.

A core capability can consist of either NRC staff, or NRC contractor staff, or the use of experimental facilities, or a mix of these capabilities. It is a resource that provides a credible technical base that is free from challenges of organizational bias. It also represents resources that cannot readily be acquired on an ad-hoc basis from non-NRC sources. It does not include work that can and should be performed by industry, but may include collaborative efforts with domestic and foreign organizations. It can perform both confirmatory and exploratory research, as warrar..a vy the regulatory environment. It provides an adequate bas: to expand a program if the need arises, by being current in the field and knowing the expert; worldwide.

There are two types of core capability:

Exoertise Driven: This is a resource, that would: stay current with the state of art (new and evolving nuclear related technologies, new research and other related developments) and understand the safety and regulatory sigr.ificance of this work: provide a level of expertise and interaction such that there is ready access to experts worldwide: understand and maintain NRC's technical knowledge base and analytical tools: provide a nucleus around which a larger capability'could be built, if needed; provide an "on-call" resource to help respond to unanticipated technical issues; and, conduct or cooperate in joint research efforts of a limited nature needed to retain needed expertise or to have access to facilities. This minimum capability is not based on workload.

However meaningful, challenging work is necessary to attract and retain high caliber expertise, both at the NRC and at contractor organizations. Core funding may also be needed to support work at critical or unique facilities, so thos.e facilities are available when needed.

Workload Driven: This is a resource to conduct research in response to recurring demands from the regulatory 3rocess, largely from user needs, but it could also include exploratory researca. The resource level is determined based on past experience and the staff's expectation of what wo"ld be continuing, relatively steady state workload demands for the foreseeable future. It is not based on temporary or peak workloads that currently exist nor does it anticipate any in the foreseeable future. Peak or temporary work would be accomplished with above core resources provided as part of the RES budget. The functions described above under " expertise driven." will also be performed within a " workload driven" core capability.

ATTACHMENT 3 O

DEFINITIONS OF REGULATORY FUNCTIONS THAT A CON RESARCH CAPABILITY MIGHT SUPPORT

1. Provide the technical bases for aaency decisions on reaulatory or safety issues (includina the resolution of GSIs) stemmina from oower olant ooerations. materials uses or license amendment reauests:

RES examines "off normal" conditions identified primarily through incidents, events and inspections to understand their safety implications relative to prior, on-going and potential new areas of research. RES often provides the 'echnical bases for resolving safety issues, including GSIs, associatec with these' conditions and licensee requests to amend their licenses. The frequency and significance of these conditions indicate the level of support that may be needed from a core research capability and its importance to the regulatory mission of the agency.

2. Provide the technical bases for aaency decisions on reaulatory or safety issues (includina the resolution of GSIs) stemmina from new or evolvina technolooies and/or research results:

RES is the NRC focal point for assessing new technology and its impact on NRC's regulatory posture. New technology can take the form of nuc, lear industry initiatives such as higher fuel burnups and the thermal annealing of RPVs. It can also be technology employed in other industries having relevance to nuclear safety. It can also take the form of new measurement / analytical techniques such as NDE of materials properties. NRC research results and the results produced by others are also evaluated for their safety or regulatory implications. The extent to which a) technologies evolve or are introduced, and b) new research results are produced, and the safety' or regulatory significance of these changes, indicate the level of support that may be needed from a core research capability and its importance to the regulatory mission of the agency.

3. Develoo. maintain. and acolv analytical tools / databases--maintain institutional technical knowledae base:

RES has a primary role in developing and maintaining the technical tools and databases used by the NRC to make highly technical regulatory decisions. RES also maintains a technical knowledge base for the NRC which allows past research results and ongoing work to be brought to bear on the regulatory decisions of the agency. How often these tools / data are used, the breadth of their application, their condition arid their value to users indicate the level of support that may be needed from a core research capability and its .importance to the regulatory mission of the agency.

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4. Provide the technical bases for imorovements to the reaulatory framework l

(reaulations. reaulatory auides. codes and standards. new initiatives): l RES conducts research to su) port improvements to regulations and regulatory guides. Researca results and RES staff involvement with codes and standards setting bodies, also help improve the regulatory framework. RES also supports new regulatory initiatives, such as risk informed - performance based regulation. The nature and extent of the changes needed indicate the level of support that may be needed from a core research capability and its importance to the regulatory mission of the agency.

5. Imorove the technical bases of reaulation throuah involvement in research with domestic and foreian oraanizations:

• RES participates with cthers to conduct research in support of NRC's regulatory needs. Cooperative ventures reduce overall research costs.

The level of NRC's commitment, the value of the contribution to the regulatory process and the magnitude of the resource savings to the NRC.

indicate the level of support that may be needed from a core research capability and its importance to the regulatory mission of the agency.

6. Respond to oversicht/ advisory arouos (Commission. Conaress. Dublic.

ACRS. ACNW. NSRRC):

1 RES responds to general information requests and technical inquiries l pertaining to the resolution of safety issues and the content'and focus l of NRC's research program from various oversight / advisory groups. In i some cases these inquiries result in the need to perform additional i research. The frequency of these requests and their complexity /

l significance indicate the level of support that may be needed from a l core research capability and its importance to the regulatory mission of l the agency.

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- I ATTACHMENT 4 CORE CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT FORM .

P (CORE CAPABILITY AREA) l Regulatory support functions and 14 criteria that Rating indicate the level of support that may be needed and the Rationale for each rating importance of that support High Med Low None  ;

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on regulatory or safety issues (including the .s ,) . . s-l - s7 s.- 3 resolution of GSis) stemming from power plant

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operations, events, materials uses or license > : 's amendment requests g-. .d N4 1IN

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1. Frequency of occurrence

2. Safety or regulatory significance, if they occur .. ,, , j y'v s>

s x Provide the technical bases for agency decisions x

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on regulatory or safety issues (including the .'s

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i resolution of GSis) stemming from new or evolving .j -

technologies and/or research results  : ..:  : .; 'N- ve 3

3. Likelihood of change

4. Safety or regulatory significance, if they occur .. I Develop, maintain, and apply analytical 's r tools / databases - maintain institutional technical knowledge base k) f. 'y

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5. Breadth and frequency of application of tools / data l

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Regulatory support functions and 14 criteria that Rating -

indicate the level of support that may be needed and the Rationale for each rating -

importance of that support High Med Low None

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6. Degree of improvement needed in tools / data

7. Value of tools / data / knowledge base to the regulatory process '

t Provide the technical bases for improvements to -

regulatory framework (i.e., regulatior i, regulatory E.E_

5_  :

s . .

guides, codes and standards, new ini atives) gsu [ -

[

8. Need to improve requirements and/or guidance

9. Need to support new NRC regulatory initiative and/or approach improve the technical bases of regulation through :s h0i Y involvem n n research with domestic and foreign + s

10. NRC's commitment i

11. Value of contribution to regulatory program

12. Leverage factor for NRC resources  :

.,y.

w g ys'sg y' Respond to oversight groups (Commission, '

. W '

~

,s Congress, public, ACRS, ACNW, NSRRC) . . .;

.. L....... ... .: m x .x. .. . ....

. . L . . . Ne. ' -

13. Likelihood of occurrence  ;

14. Complexity and significance of subject matter  ;

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r ATTACHMENT 5 -

l l METRICS ,

SUPPORT AREA NO. 1: PROVIDE THE TECHNICAL BASES FOR REGULATORY DECISIONS ON REGULATORY OR SAFETY ISSUES (INCLUDING THE RESOLUTION OF GSIs) STEMMING FROM POWER PLANT l

OPERATIONS. EVENTS. MATERIALS USES AND LICENSE

, AMENDMENT REQUESTS Criterion No.1: Freauency of occurrence:  !

HIGH - Issues stemming from power plant operations, events, materials ,

uses and license amendment requests are expected to arise one or -

more times per year.  !

MEDIUM - Issues stemming from power plant operations, events, materials uses and license amendment requests are expected to arise in the foreseeable future, but at a frequency of less than HICH (above).

LOW - Issues stemming from power plant operations. events, materials uses and license amendment requests are not expected to arise in the foreseeable future.

Criterion No. 2: Safety or reaulatory sionificance if thev occur:

HIGH - The issues stemming from power plant operations, events, materials uses and license amendment requests are likely to raise significant doubt regarding the ability of the licensee's safety measures, such as systems. structures. components, procedures, or programs to maintain acceptable safety margins (e.g., in preventing core damage, off-site release, morbidity, or mortality), or identifies a major gap in the scope of NRC's regulations or regulatory guidance.

MEDIUM - The issues stemming from power plant operations, events, materials uses and license amendment requests are likely to raise moderate doubt regarding the ability of the licensee's safety measures.

such as systems, structures components, procedures, or programs to maintain acceptable safety margins (e.g. , in preventing core damage, off-site release, morbidity. or mortality), or identifies a moderate gap in the scope of NRC's regulations or regulatory guidance.

LOW - The issues stemming from power plant operations, events materials uses and license amendment requests are likely to raise little doubt regarding the ability of the licensee's safety measures, i such as systems, structures, components, procedures. or programs to maintain acceptable sa fety margins (e.g. . in preventing core damage, off-site release, morbidity, or mortality). or identifies a small gap in the scope of NRC's regulations or regulatory guidance.

SUPPORT AREA NO. 2: PROVIDE THE TECHNICAL BASES FOR REGULATORY DECISIONS ON REGULATORY OR SAFETY ISSUES (INCLUDING THE RESOLUTION OF GSIs) STEMMING FROM NEW OR EVOLVING TECHNOLOGIES AND/0R RESEARCH RESULTS Criterion No. 3: Likelihood of chanae:

HIGH - The technology is evolving at a rapid rate and is expected to .

continue at that rate for the foreseeable future, or a significant amount of new results is expected from ongoing or planned research activities.

• MEDIUM - The technology is evolving at a moderate rate and is expected to continue at that rate for the foreseeable future, or a moderate ,

amount of new results is expected from ongoing or planned research activities.

LOW - The technology is evolving at a slow rate and is expected to continue at that rate for the foreseeable future, or a limited amount of new results is expected from ongoing or planned research activities.

Criterion No. 4: Safety or reaulatory sianificance. i f the chanae occurs:

HIGH - The new or evolving technologies and/or research results are likely to raise significant doubt regarding the ability of the licensee's safety measures, such as systems, structures.

components, procedures, or programs to maintain acceptable safety margins (e.g., in preventing core damage, off-site release, morbidity, or mortality), or identify a major gap in the scope of NRC's regulations or regulatory guidance.

MEDIUM - The new or evolving technologies and/or research results are likely to raise moderate doubt regarding the ability of the licensee's safety measures, such as systems, structures.

components, procedures. or programs to maintain acceptable safety margins (e.g., in preventing core damage off-sita release, morbidity, or mortality). or identify a moderate gap in the scope of NRC's regulations or regulatory guidance.

l LOW - The new or evolving. technologies and/or research results are likely to raise little doubt regarding the ability of the ,

licensee's safety measures, such as systems, structures, components, procedures, or programs to maintain acceptable safety margins (e.g., in preventing core damage, off-site release. I morbidity, or mortality), or identify a small gap in the scope of ,

NRC's regulations or regulatory guidance. i i

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SUPPORT AREA NO. 3: DEVELOP. MAINTAIN, AND APPLY ANALYTICAL TOOLS / DATABASES--MAINTAIN. INSTITUTIONAL TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE BASE-Criterion No. 5: Breadth and freauency of aoolicati6n of tools / databases:

HIGH - Tools / data are expected to be used many times each year and/or they apply to a wide range of applications: e.g., multiple reactor types, phenomena, issues, events.

MED - Tools / data are expected to be used several times each year and/or they apply to a few broad-based applications.

LOW - Tools / data are expected to be used only occasionally and/or they apply to a few narrowly focused applications.

Criterion No. 6:

Dearee of imorovement needed in tools / databases:

HIGH - Major deficiencies exist in tools / data that will prevent their use in addressing expected safety or regulatory issues, or tools are highly inefficient to use.

MED - Deficiencies exist in tools / data that will detract from their usefulness in. effectively addressing expected safety or regulat'ory issues, or tools are moderately inefficient to use.

LOW - Deficiencies exist in tools / data that should be corrected to optimize their value, but there are no significant deficiencies, or tools have minor inefficiencies that could be eliminated.

Criterion No. 7: Value of tools / databases /knowledce base to the reculatory orocess:

HIGH .

Tools / databases / knowledge are expected to be highly effective and effi with.cient in makingalternative no reasonable significantbeing safety or regulatory available, and/ordecisions knowledge base is highly complex and limited to a single person or very limited number of people.

MED - Tools / databases / knowledge are expected to be effective on ,

efficient in making safety or regulatory decisions and alternatives would be time consuming and costly, and/or knowledge base is relatively complex and limited to a single person or very limited number of people.

LOW - Tools / databases / knowledge are ex)ected to be useful in making safety or regulatory decisions, Jut there are other alternatives that could be employed at little additional cost, and/or knowledge base is common and rather widely understood.

SUPPORT AREA NO. 4: PROVIDE THE TECHNICAL BASES FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (i.e.. REGULATIONS. REGULATORY L GUIDES, CODES AND STANDARDS NEW INITIATIVES) l

. Criterion No. 8: Need to improve reauirements and/or cuidance: ,

I

! HIGH - The regulatory improvement is needed for adequate safety; or it 1

will have a significant impact on regulatory efficiency or

l. regulatory flexibility for a majority of licensees or applicants j in any category (i.e., there is a major' gap in NRC's regulations).

I l MEDIUM - The regulatory improvement is needed as a safety enhancement: or '

l it could have a significant impact on regulatory efficiency or l l regulatory flexibility for a significant number of licensees or applicants in any category.

LOW - The regulatory improvement could have an impact on regulatory efficiency or regulatory flexibility for a significant number of l iicensees " applicants in any category, l

Criterion No. 9: Need to succort new NRC regulatory initiative and/or aooroach:

l HIGH - A significant contribution will be made to support a new NRC I l regulatory framework or approach such as risk-informed, j l

performance-based regulation,  !

l MEDIUM - A moderate contribution will be made to support a new NRC regulatory framework or approach such as risk-informed, performance-based regulation.

! LOW - A small contribution will be made to support a new NRC regulatory l l framework or approach such as risk-informed. performance-based i regulation. -

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SUPPORT AREA NO 5: IMPROVE THE TECHNICAL BASES OF REGULATION THROUGH INVOLVEMENT IN RESEARCH WITH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ORGANIZATIONS Criterion No.10: NRC's commitment:

HIGH - There is or will be a formal agreement between the NRC and one or more organizations for cooperative research or the cooperative effort is a U.S. Government-mandated program or the cooperative effort is a major contributor to the regulatory program of another country.

MEDIUM - There is no formal agreement, but NRC maintains ongoing participation in research-related activities with organizations such as DOE. EPRI. IAEA. and NEA.

LOW - There is no formal agreement, but NRC participates in research-related activities on an ad hoc basis.

Criterion No. 11: Value of contribution to reaulatorv oroarams:

HIGH - The results from cooperative programs directly support. resolution of safety or r egulatory issues and are not otherwise available, or the cooperative program is vital for.NRC to sustain a core research capability.

MEDIUM - The results from cooperative programs provide information immediately useful for code assessment, confirmatory information, or expanded databases, but are not essential to resolution of safety or regulatory issues.

LOW - The results from cooperative arograms help maintain awareness and have potential for use over tie long term.

4 Criterion No.12: Leveraae factor for NRC resources:

HIGH - 67% or more of the work on cooperative efforts is done by or paid for by others.

MEDIUM - 33-66% of the work on cooperative efforts is done by or paid for by others.

LOW - Less than one-third of the work on cooperative efforts is done by or paid for by others.

. - -- . _ = . _- .- - - .-. . . - -

l SUPPORT AREAS NO.6: RESPOND TO OVERSIGHT GROUPS'(COMMISSION. CONGRESS. 1 PUBLIC, ACRS. ACN'.l. NSRRC) I

l. Criterion No.13: Likelihood of occurrence:

l HIGH - The subject matter is sufficiently important to oversight groups that future requests for status reports nr insights are expected to occur several times a year, as results are available.

MEDIUM - The subject matter is of moderate interest or the pace of new developments is such that oversight groups are likely to request status reports or insights about twice a year.

LOW - The subject matter is usually addressed on an annual frequency (or l less often), which suggests that the issue does not require immediate resolution, the technical progress is slow due to the complexity of the problem. and/or it is a recurrent topic.

Criterion No.14- Comolexity and sianificance of sub.iect matter:

J i

l HIGH - The oversight groups need to be in the position to give guidance l and direction in this area and to incorporate current findings

, into policy decisions. It is a national or international issue of l

high regulatory or safety significance that requires prompt action. This would be the case in an abnormal incident involving potential significant risk to the public or in the resolution of a l complex design issue relating to a license application.

l MEDIUM - Technical issues under consideration are those in which there are diverse opinions regarding the means to resolve differences among the licensee, staff, or interested technical community. These l differences may arise from lack of data or technical knowledge from conflicting data and opinions. or from several alternative approaches to address the perceived issue.

LOW - Technical issues are reasonably well understood and the path to l their resolution is relatively straightforward and agreed upon.

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Core Capability Area)

CORE CAPABILITY RESOURCES FTE CONTRACTOR TYPE OF EXPERTISE NEEDED STAFF CONTRACTOR TYPE OF FACILITY SUPPORT NEEDED TOTALS RATIONALE Staff FTE --

Contractor Support --

IMPLICATIONS OF HAVING ONLY A CORE CAPABILITY OR NO CORE CAPABILITY REGULATORY FUNCTIONS *

1. Provide technical bases for agency decisions on regulatory or safety issues (including the resolution of GSIs) stemming from power plant operations, events, materials uses. and license amendment requests.

2. Provide the technical bases for agency decisions on regulatory or safety issues (including the resolution of GSIs) stemming from new or evolving technologies and/or research results

3. Develop. maintain, and a3 ply analytical tools / databases -- maintain institutional technical (nowledge base .

4. Provide the technical bases for improvements to regulatory framework (i.e.. regulations. regulatory guides, codes and standards)

S. Improve the technical bases of regulation through involvement in research with domestic and foreign organizations

6. Respond to oversight groups (Commission. Congress, public. ACRS. ACNW.

NSRRC)

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ATTACHMENT 7  !

l THIRTY NINE AREAS OF RESEARCH WHERE THE NEED FOR '

CORE CAPABILITIES WILL BE ASSESSED Thermal Hydraulics l .

Plant Transient Analysis 1.

2. Code Development. Validation, and Maintenance Reactor Physics

.3. Core Transient Analysis

4. Code Development. Validation, and Maintenance  ;

! 5. Fuel Design and Behavior Advanced Instrumentation and Controls

6. Digital I&C Systems Performance

7. Software and Hardware Reliability and Qualification Human Factors and Organizational Performance .

8. Human Reliability ,

9. Training. Staffing, and Qualifications

10. Human-System Interface and Procedures

11. Organizational Performance

12. Fire Protection and Sa'fety Reactor Vessel Integr'ty i

13. Radiation Damage / Annealing

14. NDE Procedures and Techniques

15. Fracture Mechanics

16. Environmentally Assisted Cracking

17. Structural Integrity 18.' Behavior of Structures and Components in Response to Seismic and External Events

19. Steam Generator Integrity Mechanical / Electrical Components and Piping l

l 20. Mechanical i 21. Electrical i 22. Piping m , v"

2-Severe Accident Risk

23. Fuel-Coolant Interactions Core Degradation

24.  :

25. Core Concrete Interaction and Debris Coolability

26. Hydrogen Distribution and Combustion '

27. . Lower Head Integrity  :

28. ' Fission Product Chemistry. Release and Transport

29. Code Development Validation, and Maintenance l Probabilistic Risk / Safety Analysis

- 30. Methods Development for Assessment  :

31. Regulatory Analyses i

32. Guidance and Standards Development 1

33. Decision-making Under Uncertainty  ;

Radiation Protection i

34. Radiation Dosimetry i

35. Radiation Effects (relationship between dose and risk)

36. Fuel Fabrication. .

i

37. . Radionuclide Transport and Behavior in the Environment -

Spent Fuel  !

38. Storage f

39. Decommissioning and Decontamination s

i ATTACHMENT 8 SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION What is the research area defined to include?

What assumptions were made when making the core capability assessment?

What is the status of the technology / knowledge base in this area?

What are the different disciplines that need to be supported? Which of these I disciplines should be at NRC and which should be at contractor organizations? l Which would disappear if not supported by the NRC?

What facilities are needed, if any. Why should they be supported? Will they j be used frequently enough to justify their expense? If the facility was i abandoned, would the cost to reassemble or construct a new facility, if i needed, be prohibitive? j What portion of the core capability, if any. can be obtained from other than l NRC funded sources? Can it be obtained in a timely manner and with 1 independence?

If this area were at the core level today. what work could not be performed?  !

What is the regulatory alternative, if there was no core capability in this j research area?  ;

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ATTACHMENT 9 HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION AND COMBUSTION Definition of research area:

This research addresses issues involving experimental data and methods related i to hydrogen distribution and combustion following severe accidents. The deflagration of hydrogen is one of the primary challenges to containment

! intcgrity and equipment survivability following a severe accident.

Assumotions made when assessino the need for a core capability:

The likelihood of a severe accident is low and ongoing international research in this area will not raise significant new ssues involving hydrogen combustion challenges to containment integrity.

State of the technoloav/knowledae:

The state of knowledge of hydrogen distribution and combustion has been suffici nt to resolve the significant safety issues. However. some issues remain

, related to a better understanding of scaling and the likelihood of occurrence of various modes of combustion at high temperature in the presence of large quantities of stedm.

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CORE CAPABIL;TY ASSESSMENT FORM HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION AND COMBUSTION ,

Regulatory support functions and 14 criteria that Rating indicate the level of support that may be needed and the Rationale for each rating importance of that support High Med Low None Provide the technical bases for agen y decisions .

on regulatory or safety issues (incluc ng the resolution of GSis) stemming from pc ver plant  ;

operations, events, materials uses or license '

amendment requests. .

1. Frequency of occurrence X New issues are not expected to arise since the likelihood of severe accidents is expected to be >

low.

2. Safety or regulatory significance,'if they occur X lt is not expected that fundamentally different issues would arise that would challenge our understanding of the distribution or combustion of hydrogen.

ec o le n s t

3. Likelihood of change }X Research results from intemational research are expected to provide an improved understanding of i issues involving hydrogen distribution and combustion, however, they are expected to i produce only small to medium increases to our current krtowledge. >

I

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- -- u v,----

Regulatory support functions and 14 criteria that Rating Rationale for each rating indicate the level of support that may be needed and the importance of that support Hi9h Med Low None

4. Safety or regulatory significance, if they occur X Ongoing large scale tests are likely to raise little doubt about licensees being able to meet acceptable safety margins.

too da a a es mainta n inst t i nal technical  ;  ;

5. Breadth and frequency of application of tools / data ~X Tools are expected to be used only occasionally since issues involving hydrogen distribution and combustion occur infrequently.

6. Degree of improvement needed in tools / data X The ability to modelissues of hydrogen distribution is limited, as is the validatiori of current assumptions of hydrogen combustion modes at high temperatures and at large scale.

7. Value of tools / data / knowledge base to the regulatory X lt is important that NRC be in a position to .

process effectively evaluate issues which may arise from international research.

-(;sg 'W,\h 'Q Support improvements to regulatory framework . . . .;9;g 4:  ; .. , 1 ' '

(i.e., regulations, regulatory guides, codes and standards)

[.  !

.,g" W s J L'*

['g- Q E

8. Need to improve requirements and/or guidance X Currently, there is no need to revise current regulatory requirements / guidance.

9. Need to support new NRC regulatory initiative and/or X Hydrogen distribution and combustion will have to ,

approach l be properly addressed in NRC's initiative to expand risk-informed, performance based b_ regulation.

- - - _ _ _ _ _ - . - . - . - _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - . - - - - - - - . . . - - - - . _ _ - _ - - - w - - - - - - - - --.

Regulatory support functions and 14 criteria that Rating indicate the level of support that raay be needed and the importance of that support High Med Low None

- qv y W "T k.

si v;($4Y >

Improve the technical bases of regulation through involvement in research with domestic and foreign l

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10. NRC's commitment X The NRC is participating in two intemational cooperative research prograrr.s. The high temperature hydrogen combustion program being performed in cooperation with Japan is nearing completion. A cooperatively funded research program (with France and Germany) in Russia is ongoing.

11. Value of contribution to regulatory program X Participation in these intemational programs wi!I provide information that will be useful in improving our understanding of various hydrogen combustion modes and provide access to additional research being performed by the international partners.

12. Leverage factor for NRC resources X NRC has funded approximately one half of the high temperature research program and is funding one third of the research program in Russia.

Cong ess p b ic CRS, A N ,NSR ) l f y

13. Likelihood of occurrence X Oversight review of this area is infrequent (once a year).

14. Complexity and significarce of subject matter X Sufficient understanding of area exits to address significant issues in this area.

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4 HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION AND COMBUSTION t

What portion of the core capability, if any, can be obtained from other than NRC funded sources, and if so, can it be obtained in a timely manner and with independence?  ;

General expertise in the area of hydrogen combustion can be obtained from experts outside of the NRC. However. NRC's work requires an understanding of the  !

distribution and combustion of hydrogen in a severe accident. In this context, the ability to obtain needed expertise in a timely manner is limited. -

What are the different disciplines that need to be supported? Which of these disciplines should be at NRC and which should be at contractor ~ organizations?

Which would disappear if not supported by the NRC? ,

NRC should reta.n farailiarity with distribution and combustion of hydrogen during i

! severe accidents and obtain detailed combustion expertise from a contractor.

The specific combustion discipline would not disappear, or become completely .

unavailable, if not supported by NRC. However. without a core capability the level of staff expertise would necessarily become limited. to the point that the <

ability to be-aware of and respond to issues would be compromised. .

What facilities are needed, if any? Why should they be supported? Will they be used frequently enough to justify their expense? If the facility was abandoned, .

l would the . cost to reassemble or construct the facility, if needed, be l prohibitive?

There are no unique facilities that are essential to this core capability. ,

Large-scale testing facilities, currently available through cooperative programs.

are providing important insights for our understanding of scaling effects and 1 should be continued. Support of a small scale combustion facility, at small l cost is required to sustain contractor expertise to support RES needs. l l

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1 HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION AND COMBUSTION CORE CAPABILITY RESOURCES

! FTE CONTRACTOR TYPE OF EXPERTISE NEEDED STAFF CONTRACTOR Combustion (1, 2, 3. 5. 6)* 1.0 0.1 25 TYPE OF FACILITY SUP' PORT NEEDED Small Scale Combustion (3)* 0.5 125 TOTALS 1.0 0.6 150 RATIONAL E Staff FTE -- RES would maintain a small in-house capability to: 1) support improvements in analytical tools: 2) follow international and domestic research performance by others: 3) maintain the institutional technical knowledge base, and 4) be available to respond to issues that may arise froni regulatory actions or from other sources.

Contractor Suocort -- RES should sustain a small amount of contract support to: 1) support improvements in the analytical capabilities and database: 2) support international and domestic research performance by others; and 3) maintain access to world class expertise that would help NRC respond to future issues that may arise.

IMPLICATIONS OF HAVING ONLY A CORE CAPABILITY OR NO CORE CAPABILITY If this area was at the core level today. what current work would not be done?

Work on high temperature hydrogen combustion could not be performed and research on large scale hydrogen combustion in steam environments would not be conducted. The ongoing work on testing passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARS) in support of the AP-600 design would not be performed.

f Reaulatory alternative if there was no core research caoability:

The NRC would have to rely on outside expertise if any new issues were identi fied. This expertise, although generally familiar with the issues of hydrogen combustion, is usually not familiar with the issues involving the distribution and combustion of hydrogen in severe accidents.

I .

l REGULATORY FUNCTIONS

• j

)

1. Provide technical bases for agency decisions on regulatory or safety issues (including the resolution of GSIs) stemming from power plant operations. events, materials uses. and license amendment requests.

2. Provide the technical bases for agency decisions on regulatory or safety issues (including the resolution of GSIs) stemming from new or evolving  :

technologies and/or research results

3. . Develop.. maintain, and aaply analytical tools / databases -- maintain institutional technical (nowledge base

4. Provide the technical bases for improvements to regulatory framework (i .e. , regulations, regulatory guides, codes and standards)

5. Improve the technical bases of regulation through involvement in research with domestic and foreign organizations

6. Res3ond to oversight groups (Commission. Congress, public. ACRS. ACNW, l i

NSRRC) 1 1

)

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ATTACHMENT 10 FUEL DESIGN AND BEHAVIOR Definition of research core area:

A number of fuel damage criteria are used as operating limits in alant and core-reioad licensing. The adequacy of these criteria. and the a)ility to calculate luel behavior in relation to these criteria, must be reestablished from time to time as new fuel designs, materials, and new operating regimes are introduced to ensure that the underlying safety objectives are satisfied.

Experimental work is performed to provide the basis for these criteria, for understanding related performance phenomena, and for modeling. Two fuel i behavior codes are maintained for fuel rod analysis: FRAPCON (steady state) and FPAPTP\N (transient). J Assumotions made when assessina the need for a core caoability:

It is assumed that new fuel designs will continue to be introduced as cladding alloys are refined and that longer operating evcles and higher burnups will be sought to improve operating economics.

1 State of the technoloav/knowledae: l l

A basic understanding of the behavior of oxide fuel and metal cladding, along with analytical modeling, is well developed. However, much of the quantitative description is empirical, and large extrapolations have not worked well. Particularly at high burnup, there are new phenomena and limitations on available data, especially under transient conditions related to safety.

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CORE CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT FORM FUEL DESIGN AND BEHAVIOR Regulatory support functions and 14 criteria that Rating indicate the level of support that may be needed and the Rationale for each rating importance of that support High Med Low Nona

,_. 'f ?

~

,g .3 Provide the technical bases for agency decisions 's on regulatory or safety issues (including the, .

~..

% ~. ( %

$ N h'

ss resolution of GSis) stemming from power plant operations, events, materials uses or license

.- ug amendment requests y

1. Frequency of occurrence X . Issues stemming from licensee amendment requests will continue to arise several times par year.

2. Safety or regulatory significance, if they occur X issues related to the new designs, materials, and regimes of operation are likely to raise significant ,

doubts about licensees ability to maintain acceptable safety margins. ___

Provide the technical bases for agency decisions hk kT l ,

.,d N.-

'N

}

on regulatory or safety issues (including the i.

! s N

& s resolution of GSis) stemming from new or evolving i ib4 - I '

. P,  : h. s\q technologies andIor research results L k:N  !!  ! ! 1 . -

3. Likelihood of change X Technologies related to new cladding materials are expected to keep evolving at a rapid pace both domestically and internationally to operate more economically.

_ _ _ _ _ .__________.__ _ ___ ___.______-_._m __ _ -__ v

Regulatory support functions and 14 criteria that Rating indicate the level of support that may be needed and the i Rationale for each rating importance of that support High Med Low None

4. Safety or regulatory significance, if they occur X The fuel damage criteria determine the continued coolability of the core after a postulated accident and the quantity of fission products released from the first barrier, the cladding.

tool d abases - ainta n in ti i r, I technical .

5. Breadth and frequency of application of tools / data X FRAPCON is used by NRR for 3 or 4 analysis campaigns (multiple runs) per year in connection with licensing reviews. Continued use is expected to assess licensee amendment requests.

FRAPTRAN and its precurscr FRAP-T have been used rather extensively in the past year trying to understand in more deta;i the RfA tests performed in France, Japan, and Russia.

6. Degree of improvement needed in tools / data X Major deficiencies exist in existing tools in the areas of mechanical properties and cladding alloys at high burnup. Test results to assess fuel damage regulatory criteria are also not available for many fuel types and bumups.

7. Value of tools / data / knowledge base to the regulatory X The improvements to existing tools are needed to process give NRR the ability to effectively evaluate future licensee amendment requests, e.g., new fuel designs.

Support improvements to regulatory framework  !.

I ~

(i.e., regulations, regulatory guides, codes and j M:  :  ?

standards)  :

_ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . - _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ - - _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . - _ - _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ ~ - - . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _

====:-

Regulatory support functions and 14 criteria that Rating Rationale for each rating indicate the level of support that may be needed ano the

( High Med Low None importance of that support l

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8. Need to improve requirements rind /or guidance X Fuel darnage criteria appear in many places in the regulations, regulatory guides, and the SRP.

Recent experiments indicate that these criteria I

may not be adequate for review of new fuel .

designs and new cladding types.

9. Need to support new NRC regulatory initiative and/or X The current framework appears to be adeq'uate.

f approach so no new approaches are needed.

l Improve the technical bases of regulation through mvolvement ,m research with domestic and foreign l

Y ~f'.

' ^ ' N- <

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h k" g . , g [ g (Ug organizations [. } "

E. NRC's commitment X International agreements exist with France, Japan, Russia, and Norway, we aro participating in activities in OECD; and we have one informal activity with Finland. We are currently negotia' ng MOUs with EPRI and DOE, and expect active participation from both in our experimental program.

11.' Value of contribution to regulatory program X All four international agreements are providing test reactor data on high-burnup fuel. The Halden Project in Norway provides steady-state data for code development, while the others provide RIA data for revising regulatory criteria. Foreign programs have been our primary source of data.

12. Leverage factor for NRC resources X More than two thirds of our cooperative work with others is funded by others.

S O

Regulatory support functions and 14 criteria ti.at Rating indicate the level of support that tray be needed and the Rationale for each rating importance of that support High Med Low None h

Respond to oversight groups (Commission,  :

hd3 Congress, public, ACRS, ACNW, NSRRC) h"4khhf

& v:: $;b M ggg1 'h % Ahh

13. Likelihood of occurrence X This area has received high visibility in the last couple years with several briefings from Commissioners, ACRS, and NSRRC. A full Commission briefing is scheduled for late March 1997, and ACRS has requested a subcommittee meeting shortly thereafter.

14. Complexity and significance of subject matter X The metallurgical and performance concepts involved are relatively easy to understand.

However, the significance is rather high as the fuel damage limits distinguish between acceptacle and unacceptable behavior (e.g., loss of coolat a geometry) during transients and design-basis accidents.

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9 FUEL DESIGN AND BEHAVIOR What portiori of the core capability, if any, can be obtained from other than NRC funded sources, and if so, can it be obtained in a timely manner and with-independence?

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There is no practical non-NRC source for fuel rod analysis (codes). All such ,

codes in the U.S. have been developed by the vendors or EPRI. They are proprietary and would not give NRC a capability that is independent of the regulated industry. A few foreign government codes might be made available,

but they are generally not open for public scrutiny. Experimental data needed for code development and regulatory criteria can be obtained, ir, part, from foreign government programs for a price. In general, safety-related research (i.e., investigations of transients and accidents) is not. performed by the

, industry, so data available from industry sources would be limited to basic steady-state information.

What are the'different disciplines that need to be supported? Which of these disciplines should be at NRC and which should be at' contractor organizations?

Which would disappear if not supported by the NRC?

Two different disciplines are needed: (1) materials science, covering zirconium metallurgy, ceramic engineering, and including experimental procedures and (2) analytical modeling, including code running skills. Some of each is required at NRC to define needed work and apply the results.

Experimental programs require the use of contractors. In principle, the analytical work could be done entirely at NRC: however the present contractor arrangement provides a larger group of skilled personnel. While international efforts in this area would likely continue; domestically, the materials science discipline, as applied to transients and accidents would be diminished without NRC support. The analytical modeling discipline would be maintained by the industry, which we regulate, but NRC's independent capability would be lost if not supported by the NRC.

What facilities are needed, in any? Why should they be supported? Will they be used frequently enough to justify their expense? If the facility was abandoned, would the cost to reassemble or construct the facility, if needed, be prohibitive?  ;

Provided that major foreign programs continue to operate key test reactors and cooperate with the NRC we can probably meet our needs by maintaining the good analytical hot cells at ANL. In these cells, we can examine irradiated fuel from U.S; power reactors, measure cladding properties, and simulate some transients and accidents.

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i CORE CAPABILITY RESOURCES FUEL DESIGN AND BEHAVIOR FTE CONTRACTOR TYPE OF EXPERTISE NEEDED '

l STAFF CONTRACTOR Materials Science (1-7)* 1.0 2.0 500 l Analytical Modeling (1-7)* 1.0 2.0 450 l

l TYPE OF FACILITY SUPPORT NEEDED Analytical Hot Cells (5)2 2.0 1.000 l TOTALS 2.0 6.0 1.950 j Excluding cost of participation in foreign program.

RATT2NALE Staff FTE -- Ex)erience has shown that it takes 1 FTE to manage the contracts and perform in-louse code calculations, and it takes 1 FTE to keep up with 4 foreign agreements, planning of experiments, and assessment of experimental results. While more rapid progress could be made with more FTEs. a reduction blow 2 FTEs would result in the dropping of important activities like the in-house analysis capability.

Contractor. Support -- We estimate that it takes a minimum of $1M (about 4 FTE equivalsnts) to sustain a hot-cell program that includes salaries for trained operators of remote manipulators. construction of test equipment, design of test procedures, and analysis of results. This assumes that other sources of funds are available to share support of basic hot-cell requirements like health physics. maintenance, and safety. The analysis budget of $450K supports 2 FTE modeler/ code-developers. A single FTE working in isolation would not be effective.

IMPLICATIONS OF HAVING ONLY A CORE CAPABILITY OR NO CORE CAPABILITY l

If this area was at the core level today. what current work would not be done?

l This research area is at its core level today.

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! l Reculatory alternEtive if there was no' core research capability: i i

Traditionally. NRC has developed its own fuel damage regulatory criteria based on its own research. Absent an experimental program. staff would have to rely-on largely conservative criteria to make licensing decisions e.g., decisions related to new designs for high burnup fuel. Without the ability to develop J

analytical models and to perform calculations for accident analyses the NRC l would lose most of its technical capability. and thus its independence in this area.

1 REGULATORY FUNCTIONS *

1. Provide technical bases for agency decisions on regulatory or safety issues (including the resolution of GSIs) stemming from power plant operations, events, materials uses. and license amendment requests.

2. Provide the technical bases for agency decisions on regulatory or safety issues (including the resoluticn of GSIs) stemming from new or evolving technologies and/or research results

3. Develop. maintain, and apply analytical tools / databases -- maintain institutional technical knowledge base l

4. Provide the technical bases'for improvements to regulatory framework (i.e. . regulations, regulatory guides, codes and standards)

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5. Improve the technical bases of regulation through involvement in research with domestic and foreign organizations

6. Respond to oversight groups (Commission. Congress, public. ACRS. ACNW.

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