ML20138Q981

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Informs That Mod Re Rod Control Cluster Change Fixture Per Util 841130 Response to IE Bulletin 84-03, Refueling Cavity Water Seal, Will Not Be Met During 1986 Refueling Outage. Listed Changes Unaffected
ML20138Q981
Person / Time
Site: Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date: 12/12/1985
From: Withers B
PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To: Martin J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8512300163
Download: ML20138Q981 (2)


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-g ESSDiC16 P,t ums p 73 (W1 D Wms Vre Presxht 9f6/Cliyn December 12, 1985 Trojan Nuclear Plant Docket 50-344 License NPF-1 Mr. John B. Martin Regional Administrator, Region V U.S. Nuc1 car Regulatory Commission

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1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek CA 94596-5368

Dear Sir:

IE Bulletin 84-03. Refuelinr. Cavity Water Seal In our November 30, 1984 response to IE Bulletin 84-03, Refueling Cavity Water Seal, Portland Ceneral Electric (PGE) Company committed to lower the rod control cluster (RCC) change fixture in the refueling cavity at the Trojan Nuclear Plant during the 1986 refueling outage to preclude uncovering fuel assemblies during a postulated loss of refueling cavity water seal.

Due to unforeseen complexities in the design change required to lower the RCC change fixture, this modification will not be completed during the 1986 outage. Since the job must be performed during an outage, this means that thu modification cannot be completed until the 1987 outage.

It should be noted, however, that the other changes to which PCE committed in the November 30, 1984 letter are not affected:

1.

Plant procedures have been modified to instruct plant personnel on recognizing and mitigating the consequences of a refueling cavity water seal failure.

2.

A low-level alarm will be installed in the refueling cavity during the 1986 outogo.

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PDrillN1d W BOChiCC0f143Bily Mr. John B. Martin December 12, 1985 Page 2 The above changes, plus the fact that failure of the refueling cavity seal is a highly unlikely event due to the seal's design, ensure that this delay in modifying the RCC change fixture will not have any safety significance.

Sincerely, hf Bart D. Withers Vice President Nuclear c:

Mr. Lynn Frank State of Oregon Department of Energy