ML20138M690
| ML20138M690 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 02/14/1997 |
| From: | Mccoy C GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| LCV-0961-A, LCV-961-A, NUDOCS 9702250487 | |
| Download: ML20138M690 (3) | |
Text
N 1
Georgia Powtr Company 40jnvimess Csntir Parkway Post offk:e Box 1295
' Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Telephone 205 992-7122 GeorgiaPower C.K.McCoy the southern extre system vice President, Nuclear February 14, 1997 Vogtle Project LCV-0961-A Docket No.
50-424 50-425 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Ladies and Gentlemen:
.VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT REPLY TO AN EXERCISE WEAKNESS As requested in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter dated January 6,1997, Georgia Power Company (GPC) submits the enclosed information for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant in response to an Inspector Follow Up Item (IFI). This IFI was identified as an exercise weakness in NRC Inspection Reports 50-424;425/ 96-13, from an inspection conducted from November 18-22,1996. In the enclosure, a transcription of the weakness precedes GPC's response.
Should you have any questions feel free to contact this office.
SincerelW C. K. McCoy CKM/CTT
Enclosure:
Reply to IFI 50-424;425/ 96-13 cc: Georgia Power Company Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.
Mr. M. Sheibani NORMS I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
/
j j
Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator Mr. L. L. Wheeler, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. C. L. Ogle, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle 9702250487 970214 PDR ADOCK 05000424 0
ENCLOSURE VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT-UNITS 1 & 2 REPLY TO AN EXERCISE WEAKNESS NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-424: 425/96-13 During the NRC inspection conducted on November 18 - 22,1996, the following exercise weakness was identified and is transcribed below from the inspection report:
"P4.2 Onsite Emergency Organization
- a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the functioning of the onsite emergency organization to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were defined and whether adequate stalling was available to respond to the simulated emergency,
- b. Observations and Findings The inspectors noted that the responsibilities for emergency response were clearly defined.
The Shift Superintendent assumed the responsibilities of the Emergency Director (ED) and other personnel assumed pre-established emergency responsibilities. The ED declared the Alert emergency declaration and approved the notification message to the offsite government agencies. Following the classification of the Alert, the ED also directed the call-out of the emergency response organization to staff the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). Suflicient trained personnel then promptly responded to staff and then activate the ERFs. There was one exception to the execution ofdefined responsibilities.
At approximately 9:00 a.m., the ED ordered the early dismissal of non-essential personnel.
At approximately 9:40 a.m., the ED learned that the early dismissal did not occur. At this point the ED ordered site evacuation to the relocation center; however, controller intervention directed that the early dismissal be conducted. The inspector identified this failure of the emergency organization to implement the protective measures for onsite personnel as ordered by the Emergency Director as an exercise weakness.
Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-424, 425/96-13-01: Exercise Weakness--The onsite emergency organization failed to implement the protective actions for non-essential onsite personnel when directed to do so by the ED.
- c. Conclusions The initial on-duty Simulator staff and augmented call-out staff were suflicient to respond and perform defined emergency responsibilities with the exception noted above."
VEGP's Response to the NRC Exercise Weakness Vogtle Electric Generating Plant agrees that the above weakness existed.
x
ENCLOSURE VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT-UNITS 1 & 2 REPLY TO AN EXERCISE WEAKNESS NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-424: 425/96-13 1
During exercises / drills, plant management normally assumes the responsibilities of the ED from the Shift Superintendent at the Simulator. Prior to plant management leaving the Simulator to travel to the TSC, the responsibilities of the ED are transferred to the TSC Manager. The early dismissal declaration during this exercise was made by the ED prior to him leaving the Simulator.
The TSC Manager, who had assumed the responsibilities of the ED, failed to implement the early dismissal. This was an oversight by the TSC Manager and was due in part to other exercise events in progress including the upgrade to a Site Area Emergency. The cause of this exercise weakness was due to personnel error. The following are corrective actions to prevent recurrence:
Corrective Actions Which Ilave been Taken and the Results Achieved:
1.
During the exercise critique process, this weakness was discussed with the emergency facility managers.
2.
The TSC Manager was counseled regarding the failure to implement the early dismissal.
Corrective Actions Which Will Be Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
1.
The emergency director training will be enhanced to emphasize the importance of tlie early dismissal actions. All emergency directors will complete this training by May 9,1997.
2.
The security coordinators training will be enhanced to emphasize the importance of the early dismissal actions. All security coordinators will complete this training by May 15, 1997.
3.
The clerical personnel that support emergency facility managers will take part in a table top training session that will focus on tracking required activities to completion. All facility managers clerical support personnel will complete this training by May 30,1997.
i l
2 N.
-