ML20138J778
| ML20138J778 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/21/1985 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8510290469 | |
| Download: ML20138J778 (115) | |
Text
o ORIGINAL g-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of:
COMMISSION MEETING Discussion with EPA, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and Staff on EPA Standards for ELW (Public Meeting)
Docket No.
(
\\
l Location: Washington, D.
C.
Date: Monday, October 21, 1985 Pages:
1 - 66 i
i 8510290469 851021 PDR 10CFR PT9.7 PDR l
ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES Court Reporters L
b 1625 I St.,
N.W.
Suite 921 l
Washington, D.C.
20006 (202) 293-3950
s 7 -
N 1
D I S OLA I MER 2
3 4
5 6
ThIs is an unof f i c ia l transcript of a meeting of the 7
United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccemission held on ' Monday, 3
October 21,1985 in the Corwn l ss i on 's of f i ce at 1717 H Street, 9
N.W..
Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain 12 inaccuracies.
a 13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript g
17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Ccwn i s s i on in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may 21 authorire.
22 23 24 25
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA COMMISSION L
NUCLEAR REGULATORY 2
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 3
DISCUSSION WITH EPA, FOR HLW AND STAFF ON EPA STANDARDS 4
REACTOR SAFEGUARDS, 5
PUBLIC MEETING 6
7 Commission Regulatory 8
Nuclear 1130 9
Room Northwest 10 1717 H Street, D.C.
11 Washington, 12 21, 1985 October 13
- Monday, 14 to pursuant
- session, 15 met in open Commission the Honorable NUNZIO The 16 at 1:42 o' clock, p.m.,
- notice, presiding.
17 Commission, of the Chairman PALLADINO, J.
18 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
Commission of the Chairman 19 PALLADINO, NUNZIO J.
Commission of the 20 Member
- ROBERTS, THCMAS M.
Commission of the Member 21 ASSELSTINE, JAMES X.
Commission of the Member 22
- BERNTHAL, FREDERICK M.
Commission of the 23
- ZECH, JR.,
Member LANDO W.
24 25 i
- ~ - - -
s 2
1 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT THE COMMISSION TABLE:
2 3
S.
CHILK, SECY 4
H.
PLAINE, OGC 5
M.
MALSCH, OGC 6
P.
BOLLWERK, OGC 7
S.
MEYERS, EPA 8
T.
YOSIE, EPA 9
D.
EGAN, EPA 10 F.
GALPIN, EPA 11 D.
MOELLER, ACRS 12 D.
MAUSSHARDT, NRC Staff 13 R.
BROWNING, NRC' Staff 14 H.
MILLER, NRC Staff 15 W.
OLMSTEAD, NRC Staff 16 B.
PURCELL, DOE 17 R.
STEIN, DOE 18 19 AUDIENCE SPEAKERS:
20 D.
FEHRINGER, NRC Staff 21 22 23 24 25
s 3
1 P ROC EED I NO S 2
[1:42 p.m.)
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:.
Good afternoon, ladies and 4
gentlemen.
5 I am informed that two of our Commissioners have 6
been detained briefly, but they will be joining us shortly, 7
and they said we could start without them.
8 Recently on October 10th, we heard ACRS' views on 9'
the Environmental Protection Agency's standards for high-level 10 radioactive waste disposal, During that discussion and in a 11 subsequent letter, the ACRS indicated its concerns that the 12 published EPA standards are restrictive and contain serious 13 deficiencies that could present unnecessary obstacles later in 14 the licensing process.
15 Previous to the ACRS comments, the Commission was 16 provided with a Staff paper, SECY-85-272, which proposed 17 sending a letter to EPA on the high-level waste standards and 18 conforming changes to 10 CFR Part 60.
Before sending this 19 letter, the Commission decided to hear further views of the 20 ACRS, the Staff, and EPA on the matter.
21 After hearing ACRS' views on October 10th, the 22 Commission asked the Staff to meet with them to present its 23 views to the Commission and explain the basis for its support 24 for the EPA standards.
EPA and ACRS have also agreed to make 25 presentations at today's meeting.
s 4
1 We have allotted EPA and Dr. Moeller, representing 2
the ACRS, ten minutes each to present their views, followed by 3
fifteen minutes for NRC Staff views.
I understand that 4
representatives from DOE are also here to answer any questions 5
that may be more appropriately directed to them.
6 Unless other Commissioners wish to comment, I will 7
turn the meeting over to Mr. Sheldon Meyers for the first part 8
of the EPA presentation.
He will be followed by Terry Yosie, 9
representing the EPA Science Advisory Board.
10 Are there any other additional comments from 11 Commissioners.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
The only other comment I 13 would make, Joe, is that unfortunately I have a dental 14 appointment this afternoon, so I will have to leave at about a 15 quarter to three.
So if we're not finished by that point yet, 16 I will look at the rest of the transcript.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
And I should inform 18 the Commissioners, I have to leave by ten after three for a 19 3:30 meeting offsite.
20 Okay, then, let me turn the meeting over to 21 Mr. Meyers.
22 MR. MEYERS:
In addition to Dr. Yosie, who is on my 23 right, we also have Dan Egan, who is a Senior Engineer that 24 worked on the regulations and Floyd Galpin, who is the Branch 25 Chief for the Waste Management Branch.
4 5
l 1
We understand that the ACRS has emphasized two 2
issues regarding our final high-level waste standard that were 3
initially raised by the EPA Science Advisory Board.
4 The first was that the probablistic aspects of the 4
5 containment requirement may lead to serious impediments to the 6
licensing of a geologic repository,
,a n d secondly, that the 7
containment requirements for disposal are, and I quote now, 8
"far too restrictive," close quote, and should be relaxed by 9
at least a factor of ten.
10 With regard to the first point, in its comments on 11 the proposed rule, the Commission expressed concern that the 12 probablistic containment requirements could not be 13 implemented.
In response to this comment, a section was added 14 to the final rule, Section 191.13(b) in consultation with the 15 NRC Staff that we believe alleviated the previous concern, and 16 I would just like to read into the record that particular 17 section because I think it's quite important.
18
" Performance assessments need not provide complete 19 assurance that the requirements of Section 191 13(a) will be 20 met.
Because of the long time period involved and the nature 21 of the events and processes of interest, there will inevitably 22 be substantial uncertainties in projecting disposal system 23 performance.
Proof of the future performance of a disposal 24 system is not to be had in the ordinary sense of the word in 25 situations that deal with much shorter timeframes.
- Instead,
4 6
1 what is required is a reasonable expectation on the basis of 2
the record before the implementing agency that compliance with 3
191 13(a) will be achieved."
4 And we felt, as did your Staff, that that took care 5
of that problem.
6 With regard to t h.s second point EPA carefully 7
considered the recommendations for relaxation, which primarily 9
involve issues associated with policy and risk management, 9
rather than the technical aspects of risk assessment.
The 10 agency chose not to accept it, because our analysis continued 11 to indicate that the national program can reasonably achieve 12 the level of protection we chose.
13 That concludes my formal statement, and I'd like to 14 turn it over to Terry Yosie to bring the perspective of our 15 Science Advisory Board to you.
16 MR. YOSIE:
Thank you.
I'm Terry Yosie.
I direct 17 the Science Advisory Board at EPA.
I appreciate the 18 opportunity to present a summary of the Board's views and also 19 discuss in brief the Board's role in EPA's decision-making 20 process.
21 As you may know, the Science Advisory Board was 22 created by the Congress in 1978 to advise the EPA 23 Administrator, who reports directly, on essentially two 24 issues; the scientific quality of EPA's R&D efforts and also 25 the technical basis of EPA's regulatory programs.
7 i
The Board is independent.
It consists of scientist 2
and engineers who are not federal employees.
Most of those 3
individuals are with the university community, but also in the 4
private sector, public interest groups, et cetera.
The review 5
process takes place in public session, as consistent with the 6
Federal Advisory Committee Act.
SAB reports are not reviewed 7
by agency staff for their editorial or content aspects.
The 8
reports are submitted directly to the EPA Administrator 9
without that buffer of EPA staff.
10 The reports are advisory in nature; therefore, EPA 11 is not required by law to agree with every aspect of the 12 Board's advice, although the EPA Administrator in a memo as 13 recently as June 25, 1985 has set forth internal requirements 14 by which the agency should respond to Advisory Committee 15 Reports.
16 The Board's role in the agency addresses exclusively 17 the technical aspects of regulatory decision-making.
By that 18 I mean that the Board is asked to comment and provide its 19 expert opinions on those scientific issues that it and the 20 agency jointly agree upon.
The advice that is provided on authoritative,by EPA.
21 those technical tesues is regarded as 22 There are occasions when that process does not work 23 flawlessly.
One example was in the Board's report on 24 high-level radioactive waste disposal, where the Board offered 25 a comment on the relaxation of the societal objective by a
8 1
factor of ten.
That, strictly speaking, is not a scientific 2
opinion.
3 Some of you may be aware of this distinction that 4
we make at EPA between risk assessment, which deals with 5
hazard identification, dose exposure assessment, and 6
calculating the numerical estimates of risk we call that 7
risk assessment -- versus that process which the EPA 8
Administrator is accountable to the Congress, to the 9
President, and to the public for managing those risks.
And 10 the Board's comment on relaxation of the societal objective by 11 a factor of ten tended to gravitate more on the risk 12 management side of the ledger than the risk assessment.
And 13 consequently EPA took the position that the Board's opinion 14 was less authoritative in that particular arena, because not 15 only scientists -- scientists do not have exclusive expertise 16 in risk management, whereas they are far more technically 17 trained to provide their opinions on risk assessment.
18 That concludes my presentation, unless there are 19 subsequent questions.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay.
I guess we're open for 21 any questions.
22 Well, let me ask one, and I don't mean to imply a 23 decision by my question, but if the Commission were to request 24 EPA to reconsider its standards, or if it wished to make 25 comments at this late date, other than those that it has made,
9 1
is there a vehicle for handling such comments.
2 MR. MEYERS:
Well, I believe that once a regulation 3
is finally promulgated, any interested party can request a 4
reconsideration.
I believe that can happen.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
And then what happens in the 6
meanwhile?
The rule stands?
7 MR. MEYERS:
Well, the rule stays in place.
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
And such reconsideration might 9
be requested by a letter, if that were the outcome of our 10 deliberations?
11 MR. MEYERS:
That's correct.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay.
Do you feel that you 13 have responded to all of the Staff comments?
You pointed out 14 that you had added the one part to your rules in response to 15 NRC Staff comments.
16 MR. MEYERS:
I believe by and large we did respond 17 to essentially all of the NRC comments, and by and large, wo 18 responded to the lion's share of our own SAB comments as 19 well 20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Any other questions?
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Just a couple maybe.
22 Shelly, I gather that there is some overlap between 23 either members of the ACRS or their consultants and the 24 Science Advisory Board; is that right?
25 MR. MEYERS:
There are at least a couple of members i
10 1
that I am aware of that wear both hats.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSEuSTINE:
Okay.
At least on the two 3
points that the ACRS has commented to us on, were those points
(
4 fully ventilated throughout the review process by EPA?
5 MR. MEYERS:
Absolutely.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
The Science Advisory Board 7
and the subsequent consideration by the agency?
8 MR. MEYERS:
That is correct.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So this is not something 10 new that has come up now.
It*s an issue that really has been 11 fully considered throughout the process.
12 MR. MEYERS:
As a matter of fact, I would like to 13 leave for your record a February 4th memo signed by the 14 Assistant Administrator responsible for air and radiation, the 15 Assistant Administrator responsible for research and 16 development under which the health effects work gets done, and 17 signed by Terry Yoste, representing the Science Advisory 18 Board, that covers the kinds of things you've talked about.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
20 MR. MEYERS:
This was fully ventilated in all 21 arenas.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I will give it to our Secretary 23 so he can make copies.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I guess the other question 25 I had, I thought your point was a good one, and I think it was
1 I don't remember which of you made the point about the risk 1
2 assessment as opposed to risk management.
3 Could you give me an idea, though, for what the 4
effect would be of relaxing the societal cancer objectives by 5
a factor of ten?
What would that translate into in terms of 6
deaths or cancer fatalities that one would expect from 7
high-level waste disposal?
8 MR. MEYERS:
It would go from one-tenth a year to 9
one a year.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
So it would result 11 in one fatality per year, continuing throughout the course of 12 the operation.
13 MR. MEYERS:
Again, remember that these are 14 calculations made with computer models, and it's not very 15 likely at all for several thousand years that anybody would be 16 associated with a death from the repository.
But it's 17 aggregated over the 10,000 years.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Thank you.
That's all the 19 questions I had.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay.
Any other questions?
21 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
The only one I have, to make 22 sure I understand what the EPA position is, I presume that the 23 standards that have been presented are achievable?
24 MR. MEYERS:
Absolutely.
25 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
And also are they reasonable?
~ = _ _.. -
- _ _ _ - ~ _ - _ _.
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c 82 1
Are they, as far as you can determine, sensible and 2
appropriate, considering the public health and safety?
3 MR. MEYERS:
Absolutely again.
4 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
All right.
5 MR. MEYERS:
I want to make one point that I thought i
j 6
perhaps someone would ask.
One of our major reasons for not 7
going along with that particular recommendation of the Science i
8 Advisory Board 9
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Which one?
10 MR. MEYERS:
The one about 10,000 years and whether 11 or not it would be one death a year or a tenth of a death a i
12 year.
]
13 We analysed what a repository could do.
What would 9
14 a repository reasonably do, based upon its geology, cost, j
j 15 benefits, et cetera?
And it just didn't seem reasonable to 16 us, in light of the difficulty that the nation is going to 17 have in siting a repository, to relax a standard that was 18 achievable.
It just didn't make sense, l
19 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Well, this is the purpose of my 20 question, to make sure that I understood you clearly, and I i
21 thought I did, but I wanted to make sure that you put that in l
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22 the record for us.
t 23 As-far as the Scientific Advisory Board is 24 concerned, I understand that you are involved with scientific 25 and technical advice to the Administration.
The concern I i
13 t
1 might have is in your discussion of risk assessment and risk 2
management, and I appreciate the fact that you emphasize that 3
in giving those assessments, you are more involved in risk 4
management than in risk assessment 5
MR. YOSIE:
It's the latter.
6 MR, MEYERS:
It's the other way around.
7 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
But I mean in giving that 8
well, that's what I really wanted so ask you, Could you 9
elaborate on that and perhaps explain that just a little more 10 fully, please?
11 MR. YOSIE:
Sure.
I think we all realize that the 12 decision-making process is a very pluralistic one, and that at 13 one point in the process, we must engage the best minds of 14 this country and come to grips with the nature of the risks.
15 How serious a problem is this?
16 And then the other side, once we've identified the 17 risk, what kind of policies and procedures, working through 18 the Federal Government, the state and local governments, et 19 cetera, do we adopt to reduce and manage that risk, either 20 through regulations, economic incentives, et cetera?
21 We believe that it's really in the first part that 22 the scientists and engineers in this country have their 23 primary expertise.
24 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
The risk assessment?
25 MR. MEYERS:
Risk assessment.
14 1
COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Right.
2 MR. MEYERS:
In other words, identifying the nature 3
and degree of the problem.
4 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Right.
5 MR. MEYERS:
And we believe that while they are, of 6
course, entitled to express their views as citizens on how to 7
solve this problem, we believe that in terms of accepting 8
their advise to the Administrator of EPA, we ought to accord a 9
greater significance and a greater authoritativeness to their 10 views on risk assessment than we might on risk management, 11 because, again, talking about risk management, we, as an 12 agency, want to hear not only the views of the scientific 13 community, but also the views of the regulated industry, the i
14 environmental community, about not only policies but also i
15 social values and choices.
16 And we don't tend to think that scientists and 17 engineers, while they are qualified on risk assessment, have 18 any special expertise on selecting societal values as a 19 whole.
That's much more of a policy arena kind of discussion.
20 COMMISSIONER ZFCH:
I agree, and I appreciate your 21 clarification.
22 That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Can I ask one other question?
24 Have you received any comments from DOE about the standards 25 being too restrictive?
I know I can ask them, and I will,
15 1
but I thought while you're here, you might 2
MR. MEYERS:
On the final version?
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
- Yes, 4
MR. MEYERS:
We have heard nothing from DOE on the 5
final version of the standard, but they commented when there 6
was a proposal made, and as far as I know, they didn't object 7
to the societal goal of 1000 additional deaths in 10,000 8
years.
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I'll ask this of DOE later, but 10 I thought I would ask you while you were here.
11 Any other questions?
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes, I have a question or 13 two, and if I'm being repetitious, please let me know.
I 14 apologize for being late.
15 I had a question related to the one that had already 16 been posed about the function and influence of your own 17 Scientific Advisory Board on this matter, and maybe you've 18 answered it, but I wasn't quite sure.
19 How does it happen that you would solicit their 20 opinion and ask them basically after your decision had been 21 made, rather than as a concomitant to the decision-making 22 process?
At least ! understand that you solicited the advice I don't know at which stage, but 23 from that Board after 24 basically you had already made a decision and promulgated, at 25 least in initial form, what your proposal was to be.
$6 1
Is that standard procedure, or 2
MR. MEYERS:
No, clearly not.
The situation you are 3
talking about, this standard was gotten underway about nino 4
years ago, and the formal mechanism of Science Advisory Board 5
review within the agency was not firmly in place, so there was s
6 information out at the time that we laid the work we had 7
before the current Science Advisory Board, which was ad hoc 8
group.
9 We have since put in place a permanent Radiation 10 Advisory Committee under the Science Advisory Board, with 11 which we work a little more closely in that we can now bring 12 to them things at their formulative stage, rather than when a 13 tot of work has been done.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
The information I have here it says also, in early 1983, the EPA 15 maybe it's wrong 16 formed a subcommittee of its Science Advisory Board to perform 17 a technical review of this proposed Part 91, and after a 18 series of public meetings, the SAB issued a final report that 19 was transmitted to EPA on February 17, 1984.
And then it says 20 EPA requested public comments on the 3AB report in May of 21 1984.
22 This sounds like they came a little earlier than 23 just the implication that they came in at the last minute.
24 MR. MEYERS:
No, the definitely didn't come in at 25 the last minute.
17 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
They what?
2 MR. MEYERS:
They definitely did not come in at the 3
last minute.
But if you recognize that we started the process 4
nine years ago, they could have been there earlier, had we set 5
one up earlier.
6 MR. YOSIE:
I might add that the Board itself 7
expressed a wish, following the transmittal of this report on 8
the high-level radioactive waste disposal issue, to be 9
involved earlier in the process, and the Administrator, Lee 10 Thomas, has since sent out a memo to EPA staff requiring that 11 that be done, and I can submit a copy of that memo for the 12 record as well.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I was curious also about the 15 thought process that went into a societal risk determination, 16 and I realize this is a policy decision.
'It's a policy 17 decision that I think we probably all agree that the Congress 18 ought to be making and not individual agencies, or at least 19 that's my opinion.
20 But given the fact that you have chosen what appears 21 to be a very conservative societal risk objective, was the 22 rational behind that related simply to the fact that it was 23 achievable, or was it somewhat related to this nice sounding objective that I guess I don't know how else to say it 24 25 the material should have no greater risk than an ore body l
18 1
might have over a long period of time, or what was the 2
rationale?
3 I can also imagine that probably there will be 4
lawsuits no matter what the number is, so we can ask the 5
question, if it had been times difference, how much difference 6
would it have really made?
But I'm curious as to how you 7
arrived at that policy determination.
8 MR. MEYERS:
It was definitely not the latter.
'J e 9
didn't decide that it should be equivalent to the ore body.
10 It just turned out that way.
11 The rationale we used was very simply looking at the 12 various geologic media that were being considered for 13 repositories, how well could they perform, and did a 14 cost / benefit analysis in terms of at what levels would you not 15 break the U.S.
Treasury.
16 So the concept of how well the repository would 17 perform, along with a cost / benefit analysis, put us in the 18 direction of that particular number.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
So it was basically a kind 20 of ALARA consideration, then, that given the overall expense 21 and given the fact that it was achievable, perhaps 22 incidentally given that the comparability to an ore body was a 23 nice comparison to make, that's sort of the way you made your 24 judgment.
25 MR. MEYERS:
Not quite ALARA, but there was a
19 1
cost / benefit analysis that looked at the performance of the 2
repository.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, I have no great 4
objection to that, I have to say, because my understanding is 5
that the very expensive part of this process, in fact, will be 6
the sinking of shafts and all of the preliminary work that 7
goes into it, and that, in fact, this is not an exceedingly 8
expensive standard to achieve, and therefore there is probably 9
no reason not to achieve it.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, you may want to hear some 11 of the others.
And since Commissioner Asselstine has to leave 12 at 2:45, and we have to adjourn by 3:10, I suggest we ask Dade 13 Moeller to join us, give his presentation, as a few brief 14 questions, and then I suggest we hear the Staff, and then we 15 can come back with further questions.
16 Thank you, gentlemen.
We appreciate your coming.
17 MR. MOELLER:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
18 Let me express my appreciation too for the 19 opportunity to represent the ACRS here this afternoon and to 20 summarize briefly some of the conclusions that we reached on 21 the basis of your review of this matter.
22 I would like also to say, of course, that I know all 23 of the people involved have worked hard on this not only the 24 EPA staff but the NRC staff as well as the DOE staff.
dkfficult task at best and I think 25 It has been a
20 1
what we will hear this afternoon is an honest difference of 2
opinion from a scientific point of view.
3 I have a summary here or some charts and let me pass 4
them around for you so that you can have them as I go through 5
my comments.
6 I would like to begin by quickly telling why the 7
ACRS became involved in this because many people might ask.
8 These are EPA standards.
Why should the ACRS be commenting on 9
EPA standards?
10 We felt that we of necessity needed to comment upon 11 them because the NRC must in turn develop criteria, of course, 12 to license the repository in accord with the EPA standards.
13 Upon examining the standards we noted what we 14 believe to be deficiencies and so that was another stimulus to 15 us to offer comment.
We also did not believe that EPA had 16 listened in adequate detail to the comments of the scientific 17 community on the standards and further we foresaw what we 18 feared to be major problems downstream which would best be 19 addressed today rather than delaying them until some future 20 time.
21 On a personal note I would like to comment and cite 22 two examples that have been a stimulus to me to give this 23 matter more attention than I might otherwise have done.
24 Let me cite the two.
On April 9,
1975 the ACRS 25 wrote a letter which is a report to the Commissioners and we
21 1
had at that time looked at emergency planning in the various 2
state, local and federal agencies within the United States and 3
I have given you a paragraph from that particular report.
4 Among the words that are contained in this paragraph 5
is that much work remains to be done."
6 I have often wondered if instead of just simply 7
having written that letter the ACRS had really followed up on 8
that, see this was four years prior to TMI, and if I had been 9
a little louder in my remarks or done my job better, maybe we 10 would have been in better shape when the TMI accident 11 occurred.
12 Another example is a letter of May 6,
1980 and I 13 have just selected two where we wrote a letter or a report 14 commenting on the emergency planning rule.
In that letter we 15 foresaw the situation in which a state or local government 16 authority could in essence veto the operation of a nuclear 17 power plant by refusing to cooperate in support of the 18 emergency plans for that-facility.
19 This again is five years ago and it is too bad we 20 didn't really shout a little louder because the very problem i
21 that we foresaw has come to pass.
i 22 Now let's move on to the standards as proposed by 23 the EPA.
We say they are overly conservative and not only 24 does the committee say that but I would add to it that it l
25 perpetuates the unnecessary cause and overemphasis that I
22 1
believe is frequently applied to radiation as contrasted to 2
other stresses or insults within our everyday environment.
3 I think this is born out by the fact that a number 4
of people have told me that the risk that would be associated 5
with these standards is much more conservative than the risk 6
compared to the standards that EPA has set for other problems 7
or stresses within our environment.
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Could you give an example of 9
that?
10 MR. MOELLER:
There is such a thing as toxic 11 chemical waste and I have more on it later but we could let 12 EPA obviously tell us whether the two are equal but according 13 to what I have been told they are not.
14 In terms of enforcing the standards, we have 15 concluded that this would be an extremely difficult task.
16 This would only be during early stages of a repository but 17 let's say you were going to go out and monitor the environment 18 to see if the facility is operating in a proper manner.
19 What sample would you collect?
How much would you 20 collect?
When would you collect it?
21 Let's assume you collected a perfect sample so that 22 there is no error in it and now someone takes it into the 23 laboratory and analyzes it.
Are we going to assume that there 24 is no uncertainty in the analysis?
Well, there is a lot of l
25 uncer,tainty.
23 1
I say that because in the second approach that you 2
would use for assessing the performance of the repository, I 3
believe would be a probabilistic approach and I have outlined 4
it here in my own thinking just to see how it might work.
5 I would presume that EPA would develop a series of 6
scenarios.
They would have I don't know whether it is ten, 20 7
or 100 scenarios that would model the performance of the 8
repository.
9 So we have selected those.
We haven't agreed upon 10 them but let's assume that they have been selected and we all 11 know what they are.
12 Then in order to find out what type of a release or 13 to quantify the release that occurs under a given scenario you 14 plug into it various numbers.
Let's~ assume that every number 15 is perfect, that'we know the leachability of the waste form, 16 we know the canister integrity, we know the porosity of the 17 soil, we know the transfer of all these radionuclides through 18 the environment.
19 Let's assume all of that is correct and we generate 20 then a series of releases from this repository.
These are all 21 computer estimates, I presume, and they are indeed that.
They 22 are estimates.
23 Now the EPA standard as I understand it requires 24 that not more than one in ten of these scenarios show releases 25 in excess of their release limits.
I am quoting from the
24 l
1 standard.
2 Now what does that mean?
That means in essence that
~
3
,90-percent of the scenarios must yield or yield estimates of l
4 releases less than the release limit.
Depending upon the 5
statistical distribution that you assume for these scenarios, 6
people tell me that it could require then the average release 7
for the average scenario to be about ten percent of the 8
release limit.
9 Now we started out at a 1,000 deaths in 10,000 10 years, so now we are down to about 100 deaths in 10,000 years.
11 Further, I might point out 12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I lost you, Dade.
How did you 13 get from 1,000 to 1007 14 MR. MOELLER:
The release limits that EPA has given 15 us are based upon the releases being taken or exposing the 16 public either internally and externally in producing not more 17 than 1,000 premature cancer deaths within the next 10,000 18 years.
i 19 Now when you develop these scenarios you also have 20 to comply with their requirement that there not be more than 21 one chance in ten that the release limits will be exceeded, no 22 more than one chance in ten that these release limits will be 23 exceeded.
24 If you have a range of scenarios and you do the 25 calculations again dependent upon the distribution that you
25 1
assume but you are down to ten percent on the average.
Then 2
the average scenario has to show a release of about ten 3
percent of their release limits.
4 Furthermore, their release limits now are based as 5
the ACRS pointed out to you in our letter on single organ 6
doses and a single organ dose ratio dose limit for a single 7
organ of three to one for the whole body.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
So you basically saying that 9
they have selected a value and then by a statement that less 10 than one chance in ten they have moved the value that they are 11 going to really establish out on the wing of what they really 12 feel somehow the value ought to be?
13 MR. MOELLER:
Yes, sir.
That is my impression.
If 14 you go further they have said that there shall not be more 15 than one chance in 1,000 that the release can be more than ten 16 times the limit.
That brings you down to ten deaths in 10,000 17 years.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I noticed that one.
You 19 clarified the first one.
20 MR. MOELLER:
Again, there can not be more than one 21 chance in 1,000 that the releases from the repository will 22 exceed ten times the release limit.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is that 10,000 deaths?
MR. MOELLER:
Which would be 10,000 deaths, so take 24 25 1,000th of 10,000 deaths and that is ten deaths.
36 i
A good analogy, good?
I am the world's worst on 2
analogies but flying down I tried to think through one and 3
let's look at the speed limit on our highways.
4 Now the Department of Transportation and the 5
Congress and our states have said that we shall drive no more 6
than 55 miles per hour and they have police out there to 7
enforce it.
8 EPA if you applied this standard, EPA would say that 9
not more than ten percent of the cars are permitted to exceed 10 that speed limit so therefore the average speed of the average 11 car will be 5.5 miles per hour and then if you further said 12 that there should not be more than one chance in 1,000 that 13 any car goes 550 miles per hour and of ocurse, that shows some 14 of the fallacy in my argument, but you are down to a half of 15 a mile per hour and you might as well get out and walk.
16 (Laughter.)
17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
What you are really saying 18 is that clearly if only ten percent of the cars are allowed to 19 exceed that then you have really imposed an average value that 20 is less than the value that you are really telling everybody 21 you are imposing.
22 MR. MOELLER:
Correct.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That is what they have done 24 here.
25 MR. MOELLER:
Right, and whether it is ten percent
27 1
or 20 percent or whatever it is, it is substantially lower 2
than the limit.
turn to the last page 3
We have already had mention 4
of the handout.
It is a chart.
It is a chart that I did not 5
develop.
It was developed by Culler, Catlin and Williams who 6
are with the Electric Power Research Institute and it was 7
taken from a paper presented at the 21st Annual Meeting of the 8
NCRP, the National Council on Radiation Protection and 9
Measurements in April of this year.
10 You gentlemen have worked very hard on a safety goal 11 for nuclear power plants and you know your safety goal is that 12 these operating units over their lifetime shall not impose 13 upon the public an increase in fatal cancers more than 14 one-tenth of one percent of what naturally or what normally 15 you would expect to occur.
16 Look to the right on it and go down to the third 17 box.
That is your proposed delayed mortality safety goal as 18 quoted in NUREG-0880.
19 Then look at where the EPA's high level radioactive 20 waste standard proposes to be and this chart shows that it is 21 four orders of magnitude less.
That is before we apply as 1 22 understand it this one chance in ten and so forth.
23 Let me then briefly summarise.
We believe the 24 standards are overly restrictive.
They have said earlier that 25 this was not in recognition of this fact but let's just say
28 1
that EPA proposes though that you only have a reasonable 2
expectation of complying with the standard.
3 Our conclusion was that an overly restrictive 4
standard loosely applied does not replace a properly set 5
standard that is designed to be enforced.
6 In essence they are as I heard them this afternoon 7
t! sy are attempting to legislate ALARA rather than to 8
legislate a standard which you then use in conjunction with 9
the ALARA criterion.
10 That is what we tried to do in most fields of 11 radiation protection.
We have a standard and we always say 12 that that is the upper limit and then in enforcing that 13 standard you use engineering judgment and so forth, apply the 14 ALAR) criterion and come below it but don't legislate the 15 ALARA into the standard.
16 Wrapping up the last couple of items, we believe 17 that the standard could severely and unnecessarily limit the 18 number of sites that prove acceptable.
Of course, we want it 19 to be a good site but we don't want what could be acceptable 20 sites to be unnecessarily scratched off the list and we 21 believe that it will unnecessarily delay the licensing 22 process.
23 Thank you.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Thank you, Dade.
Your 25 arguments sound so convincing.
Were they put forth to EPA in
39 1
the same manner as you presented here?
2 MR. MOELLER:
Not all of these arguments have been 3
put forth to EPA in this manner.
We did as y oit know through 4
our subcommittee and through the full committee have briefings S
by EPA representatives over the past certainly three or 6
four more years.
7 We brought up various points at various times.
I 8
cannot say that everything I have said here today was brought 9
to their attention because obviously we have given it a much 10 closer and a much tough scrutiny in the last month or so since 11 the standards came out.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Were these matters discussed in 13 your consultation with the NRC staff?
I gather the staff and 14 you have been working together.
15 MR. MOELLER:
Yes.
At most of the meetings that we 16 had the NRC staff was there anytime EPA would be there.
17 Again, let me clearly state that not every point I have made 18 here today has been fully aired with either staff but most of 19 them have been.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I would be interested in the 21 staff's comment and then later we may ask EPA for further 22 comment.
23 Any other questions by Commissioners?
24 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
I think it is interesting to 25 note that the ACRS is describing the standards written as
30 1
overly conservative and overly restrictive.
I presume that 2
you really don't have any public health and safety problem 3
with the standards as written?
4 MR. MOELLER:
No.
We just fear that it is going to 5
seriously hamper what is an important problem and one which 6
needs to be solved.
7 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
All right.
You made the 8
statement in the beginning I believe that in your opinion EPA 9
perhaps has not listened adequately to their Scientific 10 Advisory Board.
11 Maybe we need to hear again from those folks but it 12 is my understanding that they had listened to them perhaps in 13 your opinion not adequately but I think they told us that they 14 had listened to them.
15 MR. MOELLER:
Right.
My statement should probably 16 be modified.
They did listen.
Perhaps we would have liked to 17 have seen then respond more fully or more in accord with the 18 recommendations that had been made.
19 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
The only last comment I would 20 make, Mr. Chairman, is that I appreciate Dr. Moe11er's 21 examples he has given us here when the ACRS perhaps could have 22 been a little bit stronger in their presentations to us, the l
23 example to used in 1975 and again in 1980 and I just want to 24 say with my great respect for the ACRS I think that is a very 25 forthright thing to say and it does and I think it should give
31 1
us all pause to give your recommendations very serious 2
consideration.
3 MR. MOELLER:
Thank you, sir.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I don't mean to demean from the 5
ACRS but like all prognosticators, you always point to your 6
successes.
7 MR. MOELLER:
Correct.
There are certainly an equal 8
number of bad ones.
9 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
There is nothing wrong to 10 pointing to your successes though.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I didn't mean to imply there 12 was anything wrong in that.
Any other questions?
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes.
I have a question and 14 a concern that I would like to hear DOE answer since they feel 15 they can live with this and I guess our own staff feel that 16 such a standard is licensable.
17 It sounds to me and I have been trying to find in 18 the Register Notice the exact language but my understanding is 19 that this is not an "or" requirement, it is an "and" 20 requirement when they say less than one chance in ten of 21 exceeding those release limits and you are exactly right in 22 your analysis.
They are basically saying that is the l
23 standard, less than one chance in 1,000.that releases ten 24 times higher will be exceeded.
25 That says "and" as I understand it and basically
9 33 1
that means you are slipping it still another order of 2
magnitude.
So that in fact for purposes of regulation and 3
building the repository, why haven't you set a standard 100 4
times higher than that which appears before us?
5 I know that you are not the one that has to answer 6
this but DOE certainly does and our staff certainly does and 7
EPA does, it seems to me.
8 If I read the language correctly the determinative 9
phrase here is "and less than one chance in 1,000 that 10 releases ten times higher will be exceeded."
11 MR. MOELLER:
I would agree that they should be 12 given the opportunity.
Perhaps there is a ready explanation.
13 I don' know.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Thank you.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Any other questions?
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I had a question but I 17 agree with Fred that it would be useful I think particularly 18 at some point during the next few minutes to let EPA talk 19 about that very point, that is why these additive 20 restrictions, is this in essence reducing the standard by two 21 orders of magnitude below what appears to be the target level.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I am going to suggest that we 23 ask the staff to come up and listen to their presentation and 24 we can ask them and then I would propose to go back to EPA for 25 any comments they may have.
o 33 o
1 Thank you very much, Dade.
2 MR. MAUSSHARDT:
Mr. Chairman, I am Don Mausshardt, 3
deputy director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safeguards.
4 I have accompanying me here H.
Miller, Bob Browning and our 5
counsel, Bill Olmstead.
6 I think to answer two of your questions, first of 7
all the staff has consulted extensively with the Environmental 8
Protection Agency on this particular standard since 9
approximately 1976 and it has been a long, long process.
10 Our principal concern has been assuring that the 11 standard would be implemented in our licensing procedures.
12 With regard to the probabilistic features of the proposed 13 standards, we raise the same concerns as identified by the 14 ACRS in our consultations and commented to EPA on this 15 particular point in the standard.
16 We believe that the revisions that have been made by 17 EPA have been responsive to our comments and have hopefully 18 adequately resolved these concerns.
19 I would like to call on Bob Browning here who will 20 with members of his staff review with you the chronology and 21 the background I think which will resolve the questions that 22 you have raised here today.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
It sounds like we don't have 24 a lot of time for chronologies and reviews, Mr. Chairman, if 25 we have 15 minutes here.
There are a few questions and I
34 1
would just urge that we have chronologies be brief.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
3 MR. BROWNING:
Why don't we just go right into 4
whatever questions you might have.
I think you have seen the 5
briefing charts and there may not be anything of particular 6
interest there.
7 I would like to point out that I have members of my 8
staff that have worked with EPA and the Department of Energy 9
on this process for the last nine years.
It is not a matter 10 of being concerned over the last couple of months.
It has 11 been a matter of concern over the last couple of years about 12 the implementability of the EPA standard.
13 As you are aware we went through out own rule-making 14 process ahead of the EPA standard setting which probably if it 15 were a perfect rule it would have gone the other way around.
16 The standard would have come out first and then our rules but 17 because our rule was slightly ahead of the EPA standard 18 setting we were very concerned throughout the whole process as 19 to what the impact of the EPA standard setting would be on our 20 rule and our ability to bring this thing to a 1toonsing 21 hearing that would be productive and efficient.
22 I have with me today Hub Miller who is my branch 23 chief in this area, Dr. Bell, my deputy, Dr. Xnapp who is the 24 head of the geotechnical branch and Dr. Dan Fehringer who is t
25 in the audience who had the dubious distinction of being the
~ - _. _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, - _ _. _ _ _. _ _...
35 1
prime interface in working out the compromises that the 2
Commission asked us to reach with the EPA on the assurance 3
provisions of the rule which as you probably remember was the 4
main focal point of the NRC's concern at the point that you 5
asked us to start an active negotiation with EPA on the area 6
that was considered to be a matter of our area of 7
implementation as opposed to EPA standard setting area.
8 I think the SECY paper which you have before you 9
lays out where we came out on that particular process.
It did 10 not specifically address the other question that the ACRS has 11 raised which is the stringency or the conservatism that is 12 built into the standard.
13 I guess at this point perhaps the best thing to do 14 is just react to whatever questions you may have.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Could you address the question 16 that was raised by Commissioner Bernthat with regard to the 17 reduction by a factor of 100 in essence of the proposed 18 standard?
19 MR. MILLER:
I can't give you a short answer on 20 that It is very complex.
You are right.
It is an additive 21 thing.
It is both a one chance in ten of meeting the table 22 and one chance in 1,000 of not exceeding ten times it.
It is 23 a cumulative thing.
24 Perhaps Dan Fehringer can answer that.
25 MR. BROWNING:
I would like to point out that
36 1
throughout this whole process we have had independent 2
technical studies which have addressed this point all of which 3
concluded that the standard is achievable even with the 4
probabilistic nature of the standard and the current numbers I
5 that have been set in the EPA standard.
6 EPA has in fact incorporated all of the comments and 7
changes we proposed to make it a workable document.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL; I would just point out that well, not 9
we are several years away here from even sinking 10 several years but we haven't sunk the first shaft yet.
l l
11 MR. BROWNING:
That is a very important point, too, 1
{
12 that I would like to build on because the law built into the I
13 whole process 14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Saying it is achievable a system of pre-licensing 15 MR. BROWNING:
16 consultation between the Department of Energy and NRC.
We are 17 involved in that process right now and one of the things that 18 would be done during that period of time is to determine where 19 in fact the probabilistic nature of this standard can in fact i
20 he dealt with and areas where it can't 21 We believe the words that have been included in the 22 EPA standard give us the flexibility for those cases where it 23 can't It is a moot point.
It doesn't need to be.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Can you read that statement?
25 Do you have it handy?
I remember reading it.
37 1
MR. BROWNING:
There are two places in which it 2
occurs.
Part is in the rule itself and part is in the 3
statement of considerations itself.
4
" Performance assessments need not provide complete 5
assurance that the requirements of 191.13(a) will be met."
6 That paragraph refers to tne specific probability numbers.
7 "Because of the long time period involved in the 8
nature of the events and processes of interest there will 9
inevitably be substantial uncertainties in projecting disposal 10 system performance.
Proof of the future performance of a 11 disposal system is not to be had in the ordinary sense of the 12 word in situations that deal with much shorter time frames.
13 Instead w h t.t is required is a reasonable expectation on the 14 basis of the record before the implementing agency that 4
15 compliance with 191.13(a) will be achieved."
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That is good.
When you get 17 in front of a court what is a reasonable expectation, a factor 18 of ten?
19 MR. BROWNING:
It would depend on the specific case 20 at point.
A lot of these questions probably will not be 21 answered until site specific investigations are done and the 22 data is there to support a particular assessment.
23 MR. MILLER:
Perhaps ! oan give you an example.
I 24 think the implementation of the standard is going to be very 25 site specific and what we are doing in fact right now as
38 1
envisioned by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is consulting with 2
DOE on specific sites to determine what are reasonable 3
processes to be worrying about, what kind of events can 4
disrupt the repository very specifically at each site, then 5
next getting agreement on what are reasonable models to 6
represent those processes and events and then thirdly, what 7
kind of data are going to be needed in those models to provide 8
the evidence for licensing.
9 The law calls for the Department of Energy to submit to to us site characterisation plans at the beginning of their 11 site characterisation work and that is the time when we will 12 start the process of getting agreement on specific models that 13 will be used in implementing that standard.
14 None of this is couched in terms of you need a 15 confidence level of a certain percent as you are questioning, 16 Commissioner, but I think that through this process we will 17 have nailed down quite specifically what are reasonable models 18 and methods of implementation.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Could I follow up on that?
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Certainly, go ahead.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Mr. Moeller indicated that in 22 effect we have a requirement of an average cancers, additional 23 cancers, ten over a 10,000 year period.
Did I understand him 24 correctly?
Is that correct?
25 MR. BROWNING:
The standard is actually in terms of f
39 1
releases from the repository.
That translates back to the 2
societal objectives.
3 CHA!RMAN PALLADINO:
Let me take that as the base.
4 Is that the correct base?
5 MR. BROWNING:
Yes.
6 CHA!RMAN PALLADINO:
Ten cancers, additional 7
cancers, nationwide over 10,000 years when you consider the 8
1arge number of cancers that are going to take place in that 9
sounds like something that would be impossible to say whether 10 you comply with or not.
It sounds like it is well in the 11 noise.
Is that what you mean?
Have you been looking at it 12 from that standpoint when you that it is implementable?
13
! think you could not predict within ten the number 14 of cancers in the next 10,000 years in this country at all.
15 MR. BROWNING:
One of the things that makes the 16 standard implementable is a feature of the standard which both 17 we and the EPA Science Advisory Board both agreed with, which 18 is the standard is in terms of release, releases from the 19 repositories, so in making the case before the Hearing Board 20 one does not have to translate that into dose effects for 21 health effects.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Are the dose effects so clear 23 that you can distinguish that kind of effect?
24 MR. MILLER:
! think these are all projected and as 25 Sheldon Meyers said they are all calculated health effects.
40 1
MR. OLMSTEAD:
Not calculated health effects.
2 MR. MILLER:
They are all projected or estimated 3
health effects because obviously we are projecting over 10,000 4
years.
5 The point is that the EPA has done us a favor in a 6
sense as far as licensing is concerned by casting the 7
regulation in terms of allowable releases and all of the work 8
that involves making estimates of doses from those releases 9
and then health effects has been done by EPA already and that 10 is embodied already into the standard.
11 So we won't be faced with what would be an 12 impossible task of trying to specific site make projects of 13 health offects.
Rather we will focus on releases in terms of 14 curies to the accessible environment 15 1 think there is one other point if 1 might that wo 16 should reapond to because I think part of the impression that 17 has been left here might be a wrong one.
The figure that 18 shows where the EPA standard comes out in terms of risk 19 related to what is in the proposed safety goal ! think is 20 something that you have to be very careful with.
21 It is our understanding that these estimates or this 22 characterisation of the EPA limit as being 10 to the -10 is 23 done by averaging those exposures over a much wider region 24 than the region of actual exposure on the part of people 25 living near a repository.
41 1
We haven't been able to go back and check these 2
figures completely but our estimates of what the risk from the 3
repository would translate to to a nearby population is much 4
closer to the 10 to the
-6 than is estimated here than is 5
shown on this figure.
6 You can change the assumptions in a lot of different 7
ways to make these charts show what you want to show.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
How in the world can ACRS 9
disagree with you by four orders of magnitude on what the 10 actual risk is?
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
This is an EPRI chart.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, ACRS has included it 13 in their briefing so ! presume they agree with it.
14 MR. MILLER:
You have to ask them but I think it is 15 a pretty simple proposition of taking the number of health 16 effects from the EPA standard and then spreading that out over 17 a reasonable population near the repository.
10 It is clear that the effects from the repository 19 will be local.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
21 MR. MILLER:
The exposure pathway is a groundwater 22 pathway and you are not talking about gaseous effluents.
So 23 the only reasonable way to look at health risk to individuals 24 is to look at them locally and not spread them out over a 25 wide, wide areas.
42 1
COMMISSICNER BERNTHAL:
I guess ! don't see first of 2
all, it will be very diffleult to predict what the local 3
population will be and secondly, none of what you are saying 4.
about calculating health effects, that is a separate question 5
from this question of how do we deal with the fact that to 6
go back to the 55 miles per hour speed limit here.
7 It sounds like what you are saying is it is okay to 8
have the 55 mile per hour speed limit because trust us, there 9
is enough flex in this thing that you will really be able to 10 go anywhere between ten and 90 miles per hour when EPA's 11 standard in fact says because there is so much flex in this 12 thing we are really expecting you to go 30 miles per hour and 13 there should be only a chance in 1,000 or whatever it is that 14 you exceed 55 miles per hour.
15 1 am drawing a very qualitative analogy because ! do 1et me say that the strength of the whole 16 not understand 17 argument here is apparently that this is achievable and 18 achievable without great difficulty.
Maybe that in fact 19 carries the day, but I do not understand how you come up with 20 things that say less than one chance in ten of exceeding the 21 release limits, less than one chance in 1,000 that releases 22 ten times higher will be exceeded without saying anything 23 about confidence that you attach to that sort of limit.
That 24 is meaningless.
25 The most restrictive number then becomes your
43 4
1 standard and the most restrictive number as ACRS points out is 2
the less than one chance in 1,000 that releases ten times 3
higher will be exceeded.
Is that wrong?
Am I 4
misinterpreting?
5 MR. MILLER:
I have trouble because I think of these 6
in terms of the charts that we have developed in the technical 7
studies that we have done and it is my recollection that the 8
second part of it, one chance in 100 of exceeding ten times is 9
in' addition to the limit and the allowable releases or the 10 releases that are allowed under the first part.
11 In other words, you don't have a tightening down of 12 the standard.
It is an additive thing.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I don't see the logic at 14 all.
If you could show me the language in the Federal 15 Register maybe I would understand it better.
I am reading 16 from a summary here but as I understand it, it says, "and,"
17 "and " "and" in effect and therefore since there are no 14 confidence limits there is no statistically meaningful number 19 that I can see here.
20 You are not attaching this to a statistical analysis 21 particularly.
The most restrictive requirement becomes the 22 standard it seems to me and as ACRS points out it looks to me 23 like the most restrictive number that is given here is ten 24 deaths in 10,000 years.
Is that wrong?
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That is what I concluded.
I am
44 1
supporting your question.
I need the answer, also.
2 MR. MILLER:
I think to explain it I have to have a 3
diagram.
I understand what you are saying.
4 MR. FEHRINGER:
My name is Dan Fehringer and I am 5
with the NRC staff.
I would like to try to take a shot at 6
explaining this.
7 When one evaluates the expected performance of a 8
repository there will be uncertainties and one will come up 9
with a whole range of estimated consequences.
There will be a 10 certain likelihood that consequences will be "x,"
another 11 likelihood that they will be twice "x"
and another likelihood 12 that the will three times "x."
13 The EPA standard puts two points on that range.
If 14 the consequences are the values listed in the table, the 15 likelihood must be nc greater than one in ten and if the 16 consequences are ten times the table, there must be no greater 17 likelihood than one in 1,000.
18 Keep in mind that there is a corresponding 19 likelihood with every size of release that one can cateulate 20 and when one adds up the expected values for each of those 21 releases, then you come back to the 1,000 health effects that 22 the EPA standard is based on.
23 There is a certain probability associated with each 24 size of release that might occur and it is the summation of 25 the expected values that gives one the 1,000 health effects
45 1
that is the basis for the standard.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Let me try again.
It seems 3
to me that what you have done or I gather what has been 4
attempted here is to define a distribution curve in a sense.
5 I mean you are trying to define by these numbers, I guess, the 6
shape of a distribution curve that is fixed.
7 Yet on the other hand you are telling us "but 8
never mind, there is a loophole and we can have a much larger 9
distribution curve if circumstances warrant."
10 It doesn't look to me like those two requirements 11 are compatible.
12 MR. MILLER:
Short of the diagram that we use, it is 13 hard in words to describe this.
There is in fact two plateaus 14 in this standard and if you imagine a diagram with 15 probabilities on the one side of the curve and the amount of 16 release on the "x"
axis of the curve, as you add up as Dan 17 said all of the expected releases cumulatively, you cannot go 18 above this one chance in ten for releases up to what is 19 allowed by table "A"
and then cannot exceed one chance in 20 1,000 of exceeding ten times it.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That is exactly what I am 22 saying.
Haven't you defined the curve in a sense?
How are 23 you going to get out of it?
24 MR. MILLER:
This diagram here and maybe Dan you can 25 explain that diagram.
46 1
MR. BROWNING:
He is putting the charts on.
He will 2
be back in a minute.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What is that?
4 MR. BROWNING:
We have the diagram that we think 5
will be helpful.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Who is going to explain it?
7 MR, BROWNING:
Dr. Fehringer.
8 MR, FEHRINGER:
EPA is asking to have a curve 9
constructed of the type that is shown where you have 10 probability on the vertical axis and size of release or 11 magnitude of release on the horizontal axis, 12 This is a cumulative likelihood of releases being 13 greater than or equal to the value on the horizontal axis and 14 it is the type of curve that was used to display the results 15 of the reactor safety standard.
16 The standards that EPA has put in place essentially 17 translate into the stair step function that bounds that 18 curve.
If the likelihood and the magnitude combined push the 19 curve to the upper right sufficiently so that it exceeds that 20 stair step function then one does not comply with the 21 standard.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Where is the loophole?
You 23 have defined the distribution in regulation.
How can you then 24 say that there is enough leeway here that we go out and find 25 out that it is not easy to do this, it is okay?
47 1
MR. MILLER:
I do not think that the loophole and 2
the concern that some people have had about implementability 3
has been so much with respect to the absolute value here but 4
it has been with respect to can you estimate probabilities at 5
all.
6 The question has been can you even construct that 7
smooth curve there and because people are saying and the 8
Science Advisory Board as we said in our comments on the 9
proposed rule, it is going to be very difficult to come up 10 with estimates of probability for geologic events.
11 What the EPA has said is that you don't have to come 12 up with a quantitative estimate of probability for each and 13 every parameter that you have to consider, that where it is 14 not meaningful and this is also reading from their rule and 15 statement of considerations that a qualitative judgment or a 16 qualitative estimate would suffice.
17 The flexibility and the question over flexibility 18 and the concerns that the ACRS and SAB raised was over can you 19 construct that curve and it is our belief that we can make 20 that construction.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I am going to interrupt for a 22~
moment.
Commissioner Asselstine has to leave but we were 23 interested in any comments EPA might have on Commissioner 24 Bernthat's question.
25 MR. EGAN:
Dan Egan.
I am the chosen warrior.
48 1
(Laughter.)
l 2
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You are what?
3 MR. EGAN:
The chosen warrior of the moment.
If the 4
projectionist would just leave the fabled graph up there, I 5
would probably find that useful.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That was a bad word to use 7
there about that graph.
8 (Laughter.)
9 MR. EGAN:
I think a point that may help you 10 understand what we were doing here is that graph and indeed 11 the purpose of the section we are talking about regulates not 12 ju'st any normal releases you would expect from a repository, 13 some of them may not expect any.
14 What we had to address here is that over these time 15 frames in particular maybe accidental things that happen.
16 Probably the biggest threat to the people around a repository 17 is not have it behave like it is supposed to behave but it 18 behaves like you don't think it is going to behave. like if 19 you have a fault that happens to intersect a repository 20 unexpectedly.
21 The probabilities of all that are also regulated in 22 a sense by this section and taken into account when you view 23 these analyses.
24 So that when we say that you can't exceed ten times 1
25 the release limits with a certain probability, that is setting
~
49 1
a boundary on releases from unlikely events either be it 2
natural or man-made that may occur.
3 I wanted to add that additional point to the other 4
points and endorse the points that NRC staff has made.
That 5
is not a way of saying okay, we start with 1,000 health 6
effects and then we use these probabilities to ratchet you 7
back to something that is substantially less than that.
8 Instead, what we are trying to do is reflect that 9
for events with relatively low probabilities, it is 10 appropriate to have a higher release limit and that below the 11 second point on that curve that probability of 10 to the
-3 12 over 10,000 years, that there are certain types of events that 13 it is not appropriate to regulate at all 14 There are no release limits for such incredibly 15 unlikely events.
That is the structure of the rule as such.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But when you put these 17 additional restrictions on the most extreme, aren't you really 18 effecting the average?
19 MR. EGAN:
No, because there is nothing in the rule 20 that regulates the average.
Maybe that is another way of 21 attacking the problem.
There is nothing in the rule that says 22 that the average risk is the release limits multiplied times 23 the probabilities.
That product is nothing we ever use in the 24 rule.
25 A repository which could be the case that had
50 i
expected releases with a probability of one can in fact 2
release up to the release limits and not be in~ violation of 3
the standard.
4 That same repository in addition could have 5
accidental releases say of faulting or the like with a 6
relatively low probability that were greater than the release 7
limits but less than ten times the release limits.
That would 8
also be in compliance with no reduction of the " allowed 9
releases" if you will from the expected performance.
10 So what I am sensing is the concern with the 11 probabilistic structure is not a way to further ratchet a 12 limit that we thought was reasonable to choose on the face 13 of it to begin with.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Tell me why the statement 15 less than one chance in 1,000 that releases ten times higher 16 will be exceeded does not translate into an absolute 17 requirement more or less we haven't defined yet how the court 18 will be view reasonable, but does not translate into an 19 absolute requirement, a number appearing in regulation of ten i
20 deaths in 10,000 years?
I don't know how you escape that.
21 MR. EGAN:
I guess I would have to understand how 22 you got to the ten.
Did you multiply the numbers?
t 23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I think it comes from your 24 one chance in 1,000 that releases ten times higher will be 25 exceeded.
I think that is in your regulation.
b
O 51 o
1 MR. EGAN:
The language is in the regulation.
What 2
I am not understanding and I apologize for that is how the 3
release limits and the table equate to 1,000 health effects 4
over 10,000 years for a typical repository.
Ten times those 5
release limits are 10,000 health effects over 10,000 years.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Then you get one chance in 7
1,000.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Then one chance in 1,000 9
translates to ten.
10 MR. EGAN:
But why the multiple?
That is what I 11 don't understand.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Because you have set a 13 standard that there is less than one chance in 1,000.
14 MR. EGAN:
But that is not a multiplicative factor 15 if I understand it.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Why not?
17 MR. EGAN:
Because there is no requirement for it to 18 be and it would not be appropriately applied so.
You do not 19 multiply a consequence --
2 20
.COMMISSIGNER BERNTHAL:
How am I going to apply the 21 standard then?
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Yes.
23 MR. EGAN:
What one will do again as stated by that 24 curve is one would estimate the probabilities of various 25 releases as the chart has indicated up there.
Nowhere in
t G2 b
1 preparing that chart that the NRC staff has up there is that 2
the probability ie multiplied by the consequences.
It is not 3
a part of implementing the standard.
4 MR. MILLER:
There is a cumulative effect of 5
releases which would completely fill up that area onto the 6
curve there.
The cumulative effect of all those releases 7
would be on the order of about 1,000 deaths over 10,000 8
years.
It is not any one part of the curve.
9 You have to integrate under the curve.
My problem 10 in not being able to give you an answer before is that I have 11 been having a difficult time understanding the analogy of the 12 car driving down the road.
13 You have to understand that it is a cumulative 14 effect.
15 Mr. OLMSTEAD:
I think to interpret that regulation 16 you have to go into the table and get the value and bring it 17 back before you apply the "and."
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I am just wondering if this 19 thing is worded right then.
You are telling me that what this 20 really means is that the total integrated death rate from 21 events of all probability large and small in 10,000 years, 22 that the total from any event of any probability is 1,000 23 deaths in 10,000 years.
Is that what you are saying?
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
From all events.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
From all events, yes.
S3 1
MR. MILLER:
Of those events which are governed 2
here, yes.
There are certain class of events which are less 3
likely than one in 1,000 over 10,000 years that are completely 4
ignored.
You don't even consider those.
5 MR. EGAN:
That is essentially correct.
6 MR. MILLER:
EPA has said that below a certain point 7
it is so speculative that it is inconsequential but for events 8
up to that lower cut-off and probability, that is correct.
9 The total integrated release that is being regulated and that 10 release is what the 1,000 health effects relates to.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Can I ask if Mr. Moeller agrees 12 with that?
Where is Dade?
13 MR. MOELLER:
Mr. Chairman, I think as I listen that 14 apparently there is a need to re-word the standard to clarify 15 it.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I think you are right.
17 MR. MOELLER:
I certainly did not follow it the way 18 it has been explained.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
In other words as I 20 understand what is being said here is that the. thing does not 21 become pathological because they cut it off and they don't 22 integrate for all events of any probability.
That sounds like 23 what you are saying.
24 MR. MILLER:
That is correct.
I think also you have 25 to understand again that the limit is on releases and not
O G4 1
directly on the health effects.
2 To make this connection you have to read EPA 3
supporting documentation which explains what assumptions they 4
made with respect to how many people were around, what the 5
dosimetry factors are that they assumed but that connection 6
between health effects and these release limits is laid out, 7
isn't it Dan, in your documents?
8 MR. EGAN:
Yes.
It is discussed in the preamble to 9
the rule in some extent and it is laid out in more detail 10 later.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But most people do not get the 12 opportunity to read the supporting documents.
Is there 13 anything that can or should be done to clarify the intent in 14 the basic rule or basic standards?
15 MR. EGAN:
There are two points there.
One in terms 16 of the relationship of the health effects to the release 17 limit, that does not appear to have been a major area of 18 concern here or confusion.
I will have to go back and look 19 myself at the preamble to the rule to see if the question or 20 the fact that the release limits apply to the expected 21 consequences of all events are not adequately pointed out.
22 That is an issue that was of particular importance 23 to the discussion back more for the proposed rule.
In fact, 24 you may find a more detailed explanation of that aspect of the 25 standard in the preamble to the proposed rule rather than the
SG 1
preamble to the final rule because it was not an area where we 2
had a great deal of public comment that we had to distinguish 3
on it.
4 MR. MILLER:
I might just add one thing.
The 5
Commission did take a position on this in commenting on the 6
rule.
In fact, the Commission endorsed the approach of not 7
getting into dosimetry and health effects, endorsed the 8
approach that the. EPA had taken of keeping it just to release 9
limits.
10 That means that in the hearing process you don't 11 have to get into all those issues.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That is a separate issue 13 though, at least I don't know if that is your problem here but 14 it is not mine.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
No.
My problem is the same 16 ones you are having.
17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That is a diversion from the 18 central issue here and that is these standards that appear to 19 me to be mutually incompatible, on the one hand saying from 20 what the words say at least to me saying that reasonableness 21 is the criterion and on the other hand setting rather rigid 22 numbers.
23 That didn't sound to me like there was some cut-off 24 which in effect says that for events that are beyond lowering 25 probability, I guess, than this ten deaths in 10,000 years, we
96 1
don't consider those any more.
I guess that is what you are 2
saying but it is not very clear.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What they are saying is that 4
they are looking for the integration under the curve.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Then they cut it off.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Right.
7 MR. EGAN:
If that is where we lost you, I first 8
apologise as the drafter of much of the preamble.
If it would 9
help any the Agency can certainly submit something for the 13 record here that would kind of walk through exactly what this 11 applies to again.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I was wondering whether we 13 couldn't do something a little more public. I mean that has 14 more permanent in the public record, such as requesting a 15 clarification and your giving it or you giving it as a result 16 of this meeting in some published form.
17 MR. MILLER:
Mr. Chairman, I might suggest one other 18 one and that is that we are proceeding to submit to you an 19 amendment to Part 60 which would incorporate these rules and 20 in that amendment we can clear up any question on how we are 21 going to implement it in a consistent fashion and make that 22 clear.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Losing to us doesn't matter, 24 it is losing in the court that matters and I am just afraid 25 you will lose the court.
97 I
1 CHAIRMAN PALLADfNO:
Z think we reached an important 2
point of understanding that we had lost somewhere along the 3
line or maybe we never had.
Somehow I am looking for a way we 4
might more permanently document it and maybe this is something 5
both of us ought to consider and not rush it in this meeting.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Are we going to hear from 7
DOE?
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let's see.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Since the licensee here is 10 convinced that this achievable, I was just wondering if we 11 were going to hear from DOE.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Yes.
Why don't we have DOE 13 come up to the table.
14 MR. PURCELL:
Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, it is l
15 a pleasure to be here to offer some brief ccaments on the EPA 16 standard.
With me today is Mr. Ralph Stein who is the acting 17 director of our licensing and regulatory division.
18 At the outset I would like to note that the 19 Department has been interacting with the EPA on the standard 20 since 1978 and nearly so as long with the NRC staff.
In all, 21 we are aware of some 30 different drafts that EPA produced 22 leading to the establishment of the final standard.
23 We commend the EPA for their dedication in producing 24 a document that we believe achieves a reasonable balance 25 between protecting the health and safety of the public and
98 1
still enables the repository siting and development to go 2
forth.
3 We are indeed very pleased that the standard is now 4
final.
5 In regard to the provisions of the standard we are 6
aware of the concern that the Department will not be able to 7
show compliance with the requirements.
In response to these 8
concerns, I can only say that it will not be an easy task to 9
predict performance for 10,000 years.
10 Nevertheless, we believe there is sufficient 11 flexibility offered in the EPA standard se that by the time we 12 complete site characterization the Department will with 13 reasonable assurance be able to demonstrate compliance with 14 the long-term predictions of the disposal system performance.
15 Some of the specific wording in the standard has 16 already been reviewed for you and I won't repeat that.
Over 17 the next four to five years the Department and the NRC staff 18 will continue to work together over every aspect of site 19 characterization.
20 We expect the NRC staff will provide us with l
l 21 appropriate guidance on our performance assessment models and 22 methodology.
We anticipate that the NRC as the implementing l
23 agency will as noted in the EPA standard be prepared and i
24 willing to consider and accept the qualitative judgments which 25 surely are a necessary part of demonstrating the long-term l
\\
l
59 1
performance of a repository.
2 As I noted earlier, we are pleased that the final 3
EPA standard is in place.
We believe that the Department will 4
be able to show compliance with the standard and look forward 5
to working with the Commission in its implementation.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Do I gather than that the EPA 7
standards do not appear to restrictive to you?
8 MR. PURCELL:
We feel that if we are given 9
sufficient flexibility in their application as indicated in 10 the standard we should be able to comply with them, in essence 11 that the scenarios that are postulated, the models that are 12 used and the data that we use in the models are realistic and 13 more average or mean type performance and not the extremes of 14 probability.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is it your understanding that 16 it is the cumulative effect of cancers that is limited to 17 1,000 over 10,000 years?
18 MR. PURCELL:
Yes.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
So you had no question on that 20 in your mind?
21 MR. PURCELL:
No.
We understood that from attr 22 discussions.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Our staff seemed to understand 24 it.
It is only a few of us who didn't have access to all the 25 record or didn't take access to all the record that don't
60 1
understand i' t.
2 MR. PURCELL:
It may well be that the wording should 3
he changed but we did have an understanding of that nature as 4
a result of our discussions with EPA.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is that understanding written 6
down anywhere?
7 MR. PURCELL:
Do you know, Ralph?
8 MR. STEIN:
No.
I don't think it is written down in 9
any of the interactions that we have had for the record with 10 EPA.
There may be some internal record that the EPA has 11 itself that writes this down and as Mr. Purcell says we would 12 look forward to having some clarification of that wording.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Any other questions or 14 comments?
15 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
I guess DOE is saying that as 16 far as you are concerned the standards that have been arrived 17 at are reasonable and are achievable?
18-MR. PURCELL:
Yes.
19 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
You have heard our ACRS state 20 that they thought that perhaps they were unduly restrictive 21 and quite conservative and give the thought that it might be 22 difficult as far as site selection goes and when we get into 23 specific areas like that you may be excluding certain sites.
24 Have you thought about that and does that give you 25 any concern?
61 1
MR. PURCELL:
No.
I think again getting back to the 2
application of the reasonableness in the use of the standard I 3
think Ive are satisfied that we can use it.
4 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
You think that there is enough 5
flexibility in the standards that have been arrived at to 6
allow you to determine a number of sites?
7 MR. PURCELL:
Yes.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Let me just set an unlikely 9
scenario before you.
Suppose that science makes great 10 advances in the next five years and it turns out that you can 11 calculate these things and the scientific community agrees 12 with 95 percent agreement, let's say, that you really have a 13 good number and that you are really nailed down on this.
How 14 would you feel then about having to meet the statement that 15 less than one chance in 1,000 that releases ten times higher 16 would be exceeded?
17 MR. PURCELL:
I guess I can't foresee anything 18 developing that would --
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Nor can I but how would you l
20 feel about that standard if were it not for the large 21 uncertainties that you foresee?
22 MR. PURCELL:
It is hard to project what my reaction 23 might be to a situation like that.
If we were able to define 24 it mo.r e precisely and had to consider all elements of 25 probability, I would be a little concerned, I guess, wouldn't
62 1
you?
2 MR. STEIN:
I guess that if we use the scenario that 3
you are suggesting then I assume that we will have enough 4
precision to be able to demonstrate compliance with the 5
standard the way it is.
6 We expect our sites to be good sites.
We expect 7
that all of them are going to be able to at least at this 8
point, all of them are going to be able to meet the 9
requirements of the standard and the requirements of the 10 regulations.
11 The purpose of the site characterization of course I
f 12 is to give us the specific data we need to tell us how good 13 these sites are.
I anticipate that we should be able to meet 14 all of the provisions of the standard at each one of the sites 15 as we see it today.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I clearly need-some tutoring 17 on exactly what these words mean.
The plain reading of the 18 words to me indicates and I am looking at what I gather agrees 19 with your estimated. range of repository performance, in the I-i 20 range of 10 to the
-12, 10 to the
-14.
The plain reading of i
21 the numbers and let's assume that we get very good at this l-22 determination in five years, suggest 10 to the-13 and that 23 suggests to me that you could find yourselves coming up short i
24 by a factor of ten.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let me interrupt this i
m e-e~..
~
~
63 1
discussion.
You can continue it in just a moment.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I think that is probably it.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I really have to leave now.
I 4
wanted to make a coupl+ of comments and suggestions and then I
5 you can continue the discussion.
6 For my thinking purposes this slide with the curve 7
would be very helpful even though it is conceptual, it is 8
important and I would like to have a copy and I think all 9
Commissioners would benefit from a copy.
10 The next statement I wanted to make was that we have 11 had various Commissioner comments on SECY-85-272, I believe is 12 the number, and I am going to suggest that each Commissioner 13 reexamine his position and either confirm what he has 14 previously sent to SECY on this or if there is a changed 15 position to indicate the changed position.
16 We may have comments on the question of 17 clarification but assuming that the clarification would come 18 about if that is a necessary part of your vote I think we 19 might be prepared to take a position.
I would encourage to 20 try to address this this week if at all possible.
I know 21 everybody has a lot of things to do but I will set it as a 22 target.
23 Now if there are any other questions you would like 24 to pursue, I can turn the gavel over to Tom Roberts and let 25 him continue.
64 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
f guess 7 just need to 2
understand exactly what they have done here and we aren't 3
going to do that here.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
No, I am not going to try to 5
do that here.
I think I want to do a little cogitation on my 6
own.
7
.MR.
PLAINE:
Mr. Chairman, would that clarification
-8 take the form of our asking for reconsideration as suggested 9
by the EPA?
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I don't know what form it might 11 take and I am not implying that we are asking for 12 reconsideration.
If we believe the standards are okay and it 13 is a question of clarifying the basis from which they were 14 derived, I think that could be done without having the 15 standard reconsidered.
16 I would like to think about what option we have with 17 regard to getting any clarification.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Is there any precedent for 19 our putting a comment in with the final promulgation of a rule 20 of this type?
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I remember that is what the 22 staff said but I think if,there is agreement that this 23 represents a cumulative effect that we are talking about and 24 can proceed on that basis on the assumption that somewhere it
/
25 is written down or if it isn't to our satisfaction we will
65 1
try to get it written down, then I think we could make our 2
decision as to how we want to proceed with 272.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Or at least we can say what 4
we understand it to mean in advance.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Or we can say what we 6
understand and then maybe we want to put that in the letter or 7
some reference to it or in an attachment to the letter that 8
says this is the basis on which we are giving our comments on s
9 this.
10 MR. MALSCH:
Let me just suggest that the most 11 straight forward thing to do would probably be to incorporate 12 in our rule-making to implement the EPA standards an agreement 13 with EPA as to how the EPA standards are understood to mean 14 and that accordingly that is reflected into our own 15 rule-making and that would nail it down.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That would have to be developed 17 jointly.
18 MR. MALSCH:
Yes.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That sounds like the best 20 idea yet.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That might be a good one for 22 one of us to suggest in our vote sheets and then we can piggy 23 back on that.
Anything more that should come before us this 24 afternoon?
25 (No response.)
66
~
1 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Thank you very much all of you 2
for joining us today.
It has been very productive.
We stand 3
adjourned.
4
[Whereupon, the Commission meeting was adjourned at 3:11 o' clock p.m.,
to reconvene at the Call of the Chair.3 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
I 1
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 2
3 4
5 This is to certify that the attached proceedings 6
before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the 7
matter of:
COMMISSION MEETING S
9 Name of Proceeding: Discussion with EPA, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and Staff on EPA 10 Standards for HLW (Public Meeting) 11 Docket No.
12 Place: Washington, D. C.
13 Date:
Monday, October 21, 1985 14 15 were held as herein appears and that this is the original i
16 transcript thereof for 'he file of the United States Nuclear 17 Regulatory Commission.
13 (Signature) g g g]y
,g (Typed Name of Report 4r) Marilynn Nations 20 21 22 23 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltc.
24 25
10/21/85
- SCHEDULING NOTES TITLE:
DISCUSSION WITH EPA, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS, AND STAFF ON EPA STANDARDS FOR HLW i
SCHEDULED:
1:30 P.M., MONDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1985 (OPEN)
DURATION:
APPROX 1-1/2 HRS SPEAKERS:
SHELDON MEYERS, DIRECTOR (5 MIN) 0FFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS EPA t
TERRY YOSIE, DIRECTOR (5 MIN)
EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD DADE MOELLER (10 MIN)
NRC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS NRC STAFF (15 MIN)
A REPRESENTATIVE OF DOE WILL BE IN ATTENDANCE AND WILL RESPOND TO COMMISSION QUESTIONS, IF NEEDED, DOCUMENTS:
VIEWGRAPHS 10/16/85 LETTER FROM D. WARD TO CHAIRMAN PALLADINO 10/16/85 OGC MEMO 1
rw
_.y.-_
c--
y--,,
,-r,-,--,,. - - - -
1 NRC STAFF VIEWS REGARDING THE FINAL EPA HIGH-LEVEL WASTE STANDARDS OCTOBER 21, 1985
2 EPA HIGH-LEVEL WASTE STANDARDS ISSUES 1,
ARE THE EPA STANDARDS OVERLY CONSERVATIVE, ESPECIALLY COMPARED WITH STANDARDS IN OTHER AREAS?
4 g
CAN THE PROBABILISTIC FEATURES OF THE STANDARDS BE IMPLEMENTED IN A FORMAL LICENSING REVIEW?
4 f
4 J
4
)
1
3
SUMMARY
NRC WAS INTENSELY INVOLVED FOR NINE YEARS IN REVIEWING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EPA HIGH-LEVEL WASTE STANDARDS.
INDEPENDENT NRC STUDIES HAVE SHOWN THE STANDARDS TO BE ACHIEVABLE.
EPA SIGNIFICANTLY MODIFIED THE STANDARDS TO ALLOW QUALITATIVE JUDGMENTS IN LICENSING REVIEWS.
AS NOTED IN SECY-85-272, EPA HAS BEEN RESPONSIVE TO NRC'S CONCERNS REGARDING THE ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT THE STANDARDS.
SINCE SECY-85-272, NO NEW ISSUES HAVE ARISEN WHICH WOULD ALTER THE CONCLUSIONS OF THAT PAPER.
i
4 WHO HAS REVIEWED THE STANDARDS NRC -- REVIEWED THROUGHOUT EPA'S DEVELOPMENT.
COMMISSION REVIEWED AND REVISED STAFF COMMENTS ON PROPOSED STANDARDS.
DOE -- INTERACTED WITH EPA, PARALLEL TO THE NRC'S REVIEWS.
STATES AND TRIBES -- INTENSE SCRUTINY FO'LLOWING PUBLICATION OF PROPOSED STANDARDS.
OMB -- SIGNIFICANT SCRUTINY OF THE PROPOSED STANDARDS PRIOR TO PUBLICATION.
LESS INVOLVEMENT PRIOR TO FINAL PUBLICATION.
EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD -- SUBCOMMITTEE WAS FORMED TO REVIEW PROPOSED STANDARDS.
SAB REPORT REVIEWED BY NRC STAFF, AND COMMENTS FORWARDED TO COMMISSION (SECY-84-320).
ACRS -- ACRS AND ITS WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBCOMMITTEE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON STANDARDS.
5 BASES FOR NRC STAFF POSITIONS CONSERVATISM
- EPA'HAS LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY TO DETERMINE ALLOWABLE LEVEL OF HEALTH EFFECTS.
- NRC STAFF CONSIDERS STANDARDS TO BE ACHIEVABLE BASED ON NUREG/CR-3235.
- STANDARDS CAN BE VIEWED AS A QUANTIFICATION OF "AS LOW AS REASONABLY ACHIEVABLE," GIVEN CURRENT UNCERTAINTIES.
PROBABILISTIC FEATURES
- NRC STAFF PROPOSED WORDING TO PERMIT QUALITATIVE LICENSING FINDINGS WHERE NECESSARY.
EPA INCORPORATED WORDING IN STANDARDS.
WORDING IS NOT VIEWED AS COMPENSATION FOR EXCESS CONSERVATISM IN THE STANDARDS.
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,x 10/21/85 Discussion with EPA, ACRS and Staff on EPA Standards for HLW.
- 1. Remarks by D.W. Moeller, 10/21/85.
- 2. Additional ACRS comments, 10/21/85.
- 3. Memo from H. Plaine to the Comissioners, 10/16/85.
- 4. Memo-from J. Cannon, B. Goldstein, T. Yosie to the Acting Commissioner,2/4/85.
- 5. Memo from EPA Administrator to Assistant Administrators, 6/25/85.
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY g
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WASHINGTON, 6.C. 20460 June 25, 1985
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Assistant Administrators Staff Office Directors THE AouiN sTRATon
Subject:
Improvirg the Agency's dse of the Science Advisory Board h e concern over the quality of the Agency's technical analyses used in the ragulatory development process has resulted in an expanded use of various formal and informal medianisms of peer review. One of the princi-pal means of carrying out peer review is to silbnit issues to the Science Advisory Board.
In general, I believe that the Board and Agency staff offices work productively to address arx] resolve a host of critical scientific issues involved in rulemaking. Were are, however, three areas in whicn EPA /SAB interactions can be improved. %ese include:
o developing a nore formal process for selecting whidi issues the Agency should subnit for SAB review; e establishing more uniform " rules of the road" for the SAB's participation in the Agency's decision making processes, and developing a nore consistent approadt to the form and content of the scientific analyses which the SAB will review; e streamlining the SAB review process to avoid unnecessary delays in meetirg Agency regulatory and other planniry cownitments.
I. EPA /SAB Selection of Issues for SAB Review he SAB's review agenda has usually resulted from the use of three medianisms. %ese included 1) due to a Coryressional requirenent:
- 2) as a direct request from the Administrator, Deputy Administrator or Assistant Administrators; ard 3) as the result of a SAB reques.t. A key
~
issue is how to make nore effective use of these channels in order to facilitate orderly identification and planniry of priority issues for SAB review and conmit resources.
Corgress has required specific SAB review of such issues as the scientific. bases of National Ambient Air Quality Standards and the National Buission StaMards for Hazardous Air Pollutants. We Corgress has also nundated, under Section 8 (e) of the Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act (ERDDAA) of 1978 that the Agency make available for SAB review "any proposed criteria doctrnent, starriard, limitation or regulation." Separate guidance will be forthconirg to enhance the Agency's previous and current coupliance with this Act.
1 J
s The recently published Executive Order' 12498, " Reg'ulatory Plannity process," establishes requirenents for the Agency to state its policies and objectives for new regulatory actions and scientific assessments in the caning year, along with information on significant regulatory actions already in progress. On February 15 I directed that you utilize the designated list of significant rulanakirgs and scientific assessments to identify scientifically based candidate issues for SAB review since this process lends itself as -a screening tool for this purpose. W e use of Executive Order 12498 should supplement the existing process that your office already utilizes for reconmending SAB review of issues. You should provide advance notification to the Deputy Administrator, SAB Director ard myself regarding any issues you plan to designate for SAB review. We SAB Director will discuss these issues with Jim Barnes and myself, as well as the SAB Executive Committee, to ensure that requests for SAB reviews are consistent with overall Agency needs and conmitments.
In addition to those issues that the Agency selects for SAB review, the Board should retain the authority to initiate requests for partici-pation in the decision makiry process. We SAB should make such requests in writing after appropriate consultation with Agency staff to determine the desirability, feasibility and timeliness of SAB involvement and to ensure that SAB participation does not duplicate other forms of peer review obtained by the Agency.
Several general criteria should be met in assessity whether to submit a particular issue for SAB review. W ese include:
e Were are widespread population exposures to a pollutant and/or the pollutant is associated with adverse effects to humans or the environnent.
e The issm~ affects.several progran of fices or includes more than one environmental media.
e he issue involves only the risk assessment phase of the regulatory process. Risk assessment is defined as including hazard identifi-cation, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and. risk and uncertainty characterization.
e The issue is scientifically controversial.
The total number of issues submitted for SAB review by all Agency offices should not exceed 50-55 per fiscal year, II. Rules of the Road for EPA /SAB Reviews A major factor that enhances the Agency's use of the Science Advisory Board is to initiate the Board's participation as early as possible in the decision making process. Wo advantages of earlier involvement that l
I f
s i
er are not present at later stages include 1) it is easier to separate risk assessment and risk management issues (SAB should limit its reviews to risk assessment related issues), and 2) there is usually greater flexi-bility in addressing and resolving tedinical issues before the Agency has formally proposed a particular regulatory action.
Assuming the desirability of early SAB involvment, the Board should have the cpportunity to provide its advice prior to the proposal in the Federal Register of a regulation or standard, or before the final issuance of criteria, technical support or guidance documents. Program offices can also reconnend SAB review at the time a Start Action Request is approved.
We SAB functions most effectively when the Agency staff have synthesized the relevant scientific data and defined specific issues in an " issues paper." This enables both the staff and SAB members to address the critical scientific questions more efficiently because it represents a means to guide the SAB ard inform it of the Agency's scientific review needs.
In addition, the developnent of an issues paper should save time for both the program office (s) ard the SAB by identifying the issues and accanpanying documentation whidi are most essential to the review and to subsequent rulanakirg. Many staff offices, including the Office of Air Ouality Planning and Standards, the office of Health and Environnental Assessment and the Office of Solid Wastes have successfully used issue papers in working with the SAB. To ensure a consistent process, all staff offices should prepare issue papers when seeking a SAB review.
An issues paper should include the following elements:
e A summary of the Agency's technical analyses and its purpose in the decision making process.
e An identification and interpretation of the key studies or models or other scientific information which support the Agency's major technical conclusions.
e a delineation of the critical scientific issues to be addressed by the SAB.
These issue papers should be concise, although I recognize that their length and conplexity will mirror the conplexity of the scientific infor-mation undergoing evaluation.
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_4-III. Streamlining the SAB Review Process I believe it is possible to expedite the scientific review process while maintaining a high level of quality for both the preparation and review of technical documents. Consistent with this belief, EPA /SAB should implement the following objectives:
e Where possible, the SAB should prepare its report on the adequacy of Agency scientific documents after its initial review meeting, asstruing that it has already received all of the relevant technical data frtxn the Agency. Wis practice is currently followed in the review process for ORD health assessment documents and in the Board's review of the proposed Risk Assessment Guidelines. We Agency will also include SAB reviews in the Action Tracking System.
e Upon receiving a SAB report, the Assistant Administrator or Staff Of fice Director should cbcide whether SAB suggested changes are of such a magnitude to warrant revision and resubmission of the scientific documents for another round of review. I recognize that in som instances it will be necessary to go back to the SAB for additional aivice as, for example, Wien new and significant data beca:e available which alter the cx>nclusions of technical doojments, e he progran office which is the recipient of a SAB report shoald provide a formal res;x>nse to the Board discussing the degree to which its a!vice will be accepted or not accepted.
If the latter case applies, the program office should state its reasoning. We response to the SAB will be included within the AX correspondence control system and in the decision package prepared for internal Agency review.
I believe that implenentation of this memorandum will further strerythen what is already a very productive EPA /SAB relationship.
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Ice M. W anas h.
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gb i j)_NITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
- gj w AsHINGTON, D.C. 20460 ge FEB 4 GS5 ME G R'.T S'Ch;ECT : Reselution of epa Science Advisory Board Comments en t e Ace-:,.'s
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'cactive Waste Analvsis csepn A. Cannon / mh
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j Kisistant Adr.inistrator for Air anc Raciation (ASR-a43)
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for esear h Develops t (RD-672)
Te yYst Exec e S eqetary Scie..e Ad it,sry Board (A-101)
TO:
The Acting Administrator (A-100)
THRL':
Acting Deputy Administrator (A-101)
On November 27, 1984, we met with the Deputy Administrator and representatives of the Office of General Counsel and the Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation to discuss the appropriate course of action to deal with comments of the EPA Science Advisory Beard (SAPT on the bish-level radioactive waste (HLV) rule.
The issues ard optiens the meeting.
are described in the attached materials that were used at an SAB recommendation to make the final The basic issue was how to treat HLW stanoards' societal" objective ten times less stringent than ir the proposeo standards.
This recommendation was made apart frem those on the The options considered were: 1) to cerclude technical analysis methodology.
this SAB recommendation is outside their basic charge and, therefere.
thatnecessary to be followed; 2) to conclude that the recommendatier shccle not an overriding consideration in formulating the final standare; ane 3) beconvene another scientific group to review the technical analysis under-gircing the final stancards.
The following conclusions were reached unanimously:
appropriate to make a final decision on the protectien 1.
It was not level of the standards at this meeting.
A recommendation for such a dertfier should await the final clearance of the Steering Committee and Red Berder review process.
1
2 2.
The Science Advisory Board's recommendation for a less stringent societal objective than that in the EPA proposed standards, is a risk management matter and the Board's view should not be an overriding consideration in choosing the final level of the standards.
This conclusien was based on two factors.
First, the SAB report stated that the less strangen:
societal objective would be appropriate in addition to changes that would result from following technical recommendations.
Second, the Subcommittee Chairman said in the report transmittal letter that this recommendation illustrated the Committee's inability to separate scientific and technical evaluations from matters of policy.
The report also notes that SAB participation in the rulemaking process occurred after proposal of the standard, when a tentative risk asnagement decision had already been made.
3.
There is no need to establish any other scientific review body to evaluate the High-Level Radioactive Waste Standards.
Rather, the responses to all Science Advisory Board comments and other facets of the technical analysis should be reviewed by the Steering Committee.*
Attachment ec:
Ms. Barbara Wauchope (A-101)
Mr. Jack M. Campbell (PM-219)
Mr. William F. Pedersen (LE-132A) l l
I
- It was determined at the initial Steering Committee review of the Final High-Level Radioactive Waste Standards that further considers-tion by the Committee can be limited to participation by the Offices of Air and Radiation; Research and Development; Policy, Planning, and Evaluation, and General Counsel.
NLV BRIETING MATIRI AL - MEETINC OF 11/ 7/84 5UBJECT: 1& solution of Science Advisory Board Review of Environce-tal Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fue!,
Nigh-Lavel and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes RAcxCROUNO The next radiation regulations that will be coming to you as a finsi rule are those for the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level and transuranic radi, active wastes (NLW) (40 CTR Part 191).
We have already missed the Nucles. Waste policy Act deadline of January 7, 1964, for promulgating this rule. Similar delays in the Department of Energy's (DOE) siting program have thus far prevented our tardiness from becoming a major probles.
Nevertheless, DOE will probably face many legal challenges if it proceeds to make its first site selection decisions in early 1985 without our rule (40 CTR Part 191) having been promulgated.
Recent experience in developing radionuclide standards under the authority of the Clean Air Act has heightened our awareness of the significance that science Advisory Board (SAB) comments any have. We believe that the SAS comments on the proposed rule and associated technical analyses have all been adequately resolved, ascept for the one recommenda-tion that the SA3 chose to highlight. This issue requires your consideration now to reduce 'tne chances for further delays in developing 40 CFR Part 191.
The final SAB report on the WLW standards was submitted to you on February 17, 1984.
In general, the SAB was supportive of many facets of the EPA risk analysis and the formulation of the proposed standards. They agreed with the standards' basic structure--including the 10,000-year time frame of applicability and the focus en limits of total releases of radie-activity and their subsequent population risks rather than on individual risks.
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For those areas of the risk assessments where the SAB had critical recommendations we believe we have complied with their recommendations a-d 1
resolved these issues.
For emaaple, we are now using less conservative factors in 'that part of the analysis which relates releases of radios:tivity to long-tere population risks.
This has resulted in an average factor of seven relaxation in the radionuclide release limits from the release lieits in the proposed rule--while retainint the societal risk objectives' ef the proposed standards (no more than 1,000 extra health effects over 10,000 years, an average of one per decade).
Bowever, the key comment by the SA3 requires your personal consideration. We believe that both the proposed and the revised release limits are attainable without incremental cost increases, and certainly without increases observable within the uncertainties in the cost estimates themselves. At the same time, our studies show that this societal risk objective presents risks small enough that they are comparable to the risks that future generations would have been exposed to if the uranium ora used to produce the high-level wastes had act been mined to begin with.
Thus, we believe that the risk objective in the proposed rule is both " acceptably omall" (supported by a broad consensus in the public comment record) and presents no significant economic impacts. We recognise that the risk i
objective is quite stringent relative to other types of risk; however, we believe that the unusually long time frene involved and the extraordinary public concern regarding high-level waste disposal justify our choice.
Bowever, the primary SAB comment criticises this societal risk objective.
Specifically, the SAB stated: "The Subcommittee recommends that the release limits specified in Table 2 of the proposed standards be increased by a f actor of ten, thereby causina a related tenfold relaxation of the proposed socsetal objective (pooulation risk of cancer)." This was not a waanimous decision by the SAS Subcommittee; two of the seabers chose to formally dissent in favor of our proposed societal objective.
The SAS Subcommittee gave three reasons for its recommendation.
- First, it asserted that the proposed societal objective was considerably more stringent than those standards generally required or adopted in today's s ocie ty.
Second, it noted that some of these cancer deaths would have resulted, at least in part, from the vamined ore from which the wastes were subsequently generated, and thus would be substitutional rather than additional in nature.
Third, it judged that the compounding of conservatise in our risk assessments was not warranted. Bowever, in a subsequent note relative to this third reason, the SAS Subcommittee indicated that any j
changes in the release limits due to changes in our technical analyses would he separate from the " tenfold relamation" recommended for the proposed release limits. To clarify this further, the note stated: "The Subc ommit t ee believes that the changes in the release limits, resulting from the changes to the predictive models, are independent of and would not lead to additional modification to the proposed societal objective beyond the j
tenfold increase discussed above."
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These mates seenso clarify that it is the SAB's recomendation to increase the re.leasedimits by a factor of ten based on their judgment of risk managearut. Tarkr than circumstances of the analysis.
Indeed, in the
&&B report's.transminal letter to the Administrator, the Subcommit tee Chai.rama, Er. Earman E Collie r, s ta t e s "... given the timing o f i t s rev i ew in the rulemahas presse. the Subcommittee found it virtually impossib.e te separate scientific amt technical evaluations from natters of policy, since they are so interdepamLent. Our consideration of and reconnendation to relas the asciatal s%ctive (1000 cancer deaths in 10,000 years) by a f actor of tan ammg1Ees this point.
In any event, as responsible scientists med sensamd citisens, we feel it is essential that we provide you with a camyrabeasre report of our findings."
Public Review of 543mport en assy 5.199&,e announced that this SAE Report was available for public review and seasnt.
The recosusendation to increase the release limits sud the sociant risk objective by a factor of ten received by far the greatest suspensa. Of the 35 comenters on this issue, 28 opposed the 3
increase in release Waits--including the Governors' Offices of Nevada.
Texas, and stississipp.
Notable among those against increasing the release limits was the helear Reguistory Commission (IWtC), which indicated its belief that the prepasd release limits could be schieved.
The Department of Energy (EDE) did at submit coments on the SAB report.
- Wowever, Ebelden stayers ed aest Office of Radiation Programs staf f have recently set with semier EEE esff to hear their comments on the epa draft of the final ruta. Alt W Dot raised several objections to this draft, the idea of increasing the sense limits was never sentioned.
CDNSTUERATIOW OF WWIS Prorres Secommanded broach lasse the hiMel radioactive waste standards' release limits and societal objectivas a they are in current draf ts of the final rule--i.e.,
as they have beas umEfied (an average factor of seven increase in release i
limits from the scoped rule) based upon the technical recomendations of the Science Advisoryhard.
i Other Options Consthed j
1.
taerease therelease limits and societal objectives by another factor of tea.
4 2.
thuvene masAer group of experts to review the standards and the i
feasibility of theithplementation.
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Rationale for Recouammistion Here appears tele no technical or scientific basis for increasing the release limits. Se enclear Regulatory Commission has based its own regulations on ser ymposed release limits and believes they can be achieved.
The States that have been very active in following and comenting on these rules are vesy much against any inc.rease in the release limits. We cannot determine any est dif ferentist at the more stringent level within the considerable cost estimate uncertainties for high-level radioactive waste repositories.
l One of the most erucial issues in successfully siting and building a repository for these nstes will be its public and State acceptability.
To further increase the atlease limits (beyond the increases associated with i
responding to the SAFs technical comments) and the associated societal
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objective could be voy deleterious to the confidence needed for such acceptability.
FROS l
l All technied and implementation considerations would be met at no e
discarmable aos t.
De present draft release limits and their societal objective 4
o (1,000 aarla cancer fatalities over 10,000 years) have been largely accepted by the Federal agencies, the public, and the States.
To weakes the societal objective could cause a loss of public e
sesfidence h the sational high-level waste repository program with subsequent Ef ficulties in siting and development.
CDNS his action sould not comply with a recommendation of the Agency's o
Science Advisory Board.
i Some af ght me this as a precedent for overly conservative risk l
e j
management.
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Rationale for Alterusive Ootion 1:
Increase the release limits and l
i societal objectives 43 another f actor of ten.
Sls option wouM show that we have complied with the Science Advisory Board's Jodgment es as appropriate risk.
It could also be shown to have some elementa of commiatency with other Agency risk management judgments.
i FRCS His would dew conformance with the SA3 judgment of an appropriate e
risk.
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rish mana emissioma.gesment judgments, such as those for arsenic and other Agen:y groups that acamented favorably on this SA o
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t:y ation.
W Such as iac.twase in release limits would prob bl e
for the Esclear Regulatory Commission's regulation a
y create probler.s i
s, public interest groups.his actiam would be opposed by num o
nments and Administrator's prerogatives to make the Age e
i of the decisions.
s risk management Die acties sould create a loss of confidence in the o
high-Irwel unste progras and subsequent difficulties i nations 1 to alte and tuild a repository.
n its effort Rationale for Alternarive Option 2:
review the standards and the feasibility of their implementatiConv on.
representative to the Work Group and Steering Com e
y an CRD controversy that asists over radiation matters.
, could be the falsastion of the causdardspointed out that utile the EPA Science For instacce it could be reviewed the estismal progra,m, questioned whether the standar e a i
adequately protectium of individuals and whether they addressed a ficiently less period of time.
ere suf-focused evaluaties of the feasibilWe would indicate that we were seeking a aid in the decisiseeking process.ity of the standards' implementation to U
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Die actiam sould assist the Administrator to make e
decision.
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i his acties sould enhance the perspective that the Admini e
attaches grunt importance to science.
strator that the Agusey's technical analyses and espe
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S With two scientific reviews having already developed somewhat o
opposing views, there is no certainty as to what view a third group might develop or that it would agree with either of the other twe (i.e., this action may not be helpful in resolving the proble=2 This action could be interpreted as the Agency's having turned its o
risk management function over to the judgments of science review groups, a perception contrary to many public statements of the Agency management.
o it may be difficult implementation issue independently.to find a group of experts who ca Most of the experts available to evaluate this issue have been included in major efforts sponsored by RRC and DOE to study implementability.
Therefore, the ef fort may be duplicative since we already have those points of view.
I This acties would delay the process of finalizing our standards and e
l may, therefore, create Ferturbations in the overall national repository program.
DATE:
AFFROVE PROCRAM RtmMMENDED AFFROACH:
DISAFFROVE PROGRAN RECOMMENDED AFFROACH:
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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October 16, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech FROM:
Herzel H. E. Plaine
/
General Counsel
SUBJECT:
OPTIONS FOR COMMISSION RESPONSE TO CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S FINAL RULE ON STANDARDS FOR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL On September 19, 1985, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), published in the Federal Register (50 Fed. Reg. 38065) its final rule establishing environmental standards for the management and disposal of high-level radioactive waste.
In SECY-85-272, the NRC staff provided the Commission with a final draft of EPA's rule.
In addition, the staff proposed that the Commission transmit a letter to EPA documenting the Commission's intent to pursue an NRC rulemaking to conform NRC's high-level waste repository regulations in 10 CFR Part 60 to the EPA stan-dards, as required by section 121(b) (2) of Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 5 10141 (b) (2).
However, at a public meeting with the Commission on October 10, 1985, members of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) expressed concerns about certain of the standards contained in the EPA final rule.
These concerns were further outlined in a letter to the Chairman dated October 16, 1985.
At the agenda planning session on October 10, the Commission scheduled a meeting for October 21, 1985, to allow the NRC staff to address the ACRS concerns and requested that OGC provide a discussion of the Commission's existing legal options for further action regarding the EPA standards.
After reviewing the background to this controversy, we have concluded that if, after hearing the NRC staff's October 21 presentation, the Commission agrees with the ACRS concerns, the most viable option is for the Commission to act to inform the Administrator of EPA of the ACRS views.
How the Commission does this, and the substantive content of that contact, will depend
Contact:
Paul Bollwerk, OGC, 43224
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2 a
t upon'the Commission's technical assessment of the seriousness of the ACRS's conce'rns and the Commission's assessment of the i
impact any Commission action may have upon the ongoing federal program for the licensing of a high-level waste repository.
j I.
General Background i '
EPA's high-level radioactive waste standards, 40 CFR Part 191, l
were first published for public comment on December 29, 1982 (42 j
Fed. Reg. 58196), just one-week before the NWPA, 42 U.S.C.
l
-S 10101 et seq., was signed into law.
Among the eighty-three j
commentors on the rule was the NRC.
See SECY-85-272,.
Also, in early 1983 the EPA formed a subcommittee j.
-of its Science Advisory Board (SAB) to perform a technical f
review of its proposed Part 191.
After a series of public meetings, the SAB issued a final report that was transmitted to EPA on February 17, 1984.
EPA requested public comments on the SAB report in May 1984 (49 Fed. Reg. 19604).
Among the j
commentors was the NRC staff.
See SECY-84-320.
Under section 121(a) of the NWPA, 42 U.S.C.
5 10141(a), EPA was-to promulgate its final standards by January 7, 1984.
EPA f
failed to meet that deadline.
On February 8, 1985, the National Resources Defense Council and four other environmental groups filed suit in the United States District Court for the District i
of Columbia seeking EPA compliance with the directive of section 121(a).
NRDC v. Thomas, No. 85-0518 (D.D.C.).
This litigation I
was settled, however, when EPA entered into a consent order requiring it to promulgate a final rule by no later than August 15, 1985.
Although the final rule was signed by the EPA Administrator on August 15, 1985, the Federal Register notice
. publishing the final rule declares that the rule is to be considered promulgated for the purpose of judicial review on i
l October 3, 1985, and that the rule is to become effective on
]
November 18, 1985.
II.
Background on ACRS Concerns In developing its standards for geologic repositories, EPA decided to set limitations on permissible releases from such 7
repositories -- which in turn would be used to establish the i
standard for acceptable repository performance -- in terms of j
allowable releases of radioactivity to the accessible environment over the initial 10,000 years of repository i
operation based upon cumulative estimated premature cancer deaths over the same interval.
50 Fed. Reg. at 38070.
After assessing the estimated performance of a number of models of 4
I
3 geologic repositories similar to those being considered by the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as the health risks associated with exposure to the uranium ore needed to produce nuclear fuel if that ore is not even mined to begin with, the agency made a' judgment about the acceptable health risk.
Id. at 38071.
Under the final rule, the figure used is an estimated 1,000 premature cancer deaths over the first 10,000 years from disposal of wastes from 100,000 metric' tons of heavy metal.
Id.
The agency then estimated how many curies of each radionuclide-would cause that number of premature deaths if released to the environment and converted that figure into permissible release levels per 1000 metric tons of reactor fuel.
-Id.
These permissible release levels are then to be used to assess the performance of a repository based upon whether cumulative releases from the repository from all significant processes or events that are expected to occur or are likely to occur will exceed the permissible releases.
Id.
In the final rule, these releases were those having a probability of occurrence of one in ten or greater than one in ten over the initial 10,000 years of operation.
10 CFR S 191.13 (a) (1).
In. addition, the. final rule addresses less likely releases that may occur by providing a higher release limit (i.e.,
ten times higher) for those releases with a probability of-between one in ten and one in one thousand over 10,000 years.
Id. (a) (2).
As we understand their allegations, the ACRS has two general concerns with the scheme established in the EPA's final rule, which are based upon concerns raised by the EPA's SAB:
1.
EPA's assessment of the level of protection to be afforded by the repository containment is too stringent, thereby making its limitations on releases from the repository containment to the environment too strict.
2.
The use of quantitative probabilities as the basis for setting limitations on containment release requirements should be dependent upon EPA providing convincing evidence that use of such probabilities is practical and will not lead to serious impediments to the licensing of high-level waste repositories.
According to the ACRS, these deficiencies in the standard undoubtedly will introduce unnecessary obstacles into the licensing process for a high-level waste repository, with only minimal benefit to the public.
4 From its October 16 letter and the October 10 meeting, it is apparent that the ACRS has a grave concern about these issues.
Nonetheless, it also is apparent that its concerns are not new ones in the context of this rulemaking.
In its May 1983 comments on the EPA proposed rule, the NRC questioned the use of the EPA quantitative probabilistic scheme as possibly requiring a degree of precision that would not be attainable by the agency in evaluating a waste disposal system.
While the NRC suggested that utiliring such probabilistic analysis is a useful tool for measuring disposal system performance, it also noted that any attempt to limit NRC's licensing judgment only to the consideration of whether certain statistical quantifications were met would be impractical and could cause considerable unnecessary delay in the licensing process.
Accordingly, the NRC suggested that repository performance be made subject to standards that allow for a substantial measure of qualitative assessment by the agency.
In addition, as the ACRS October 16 Jetter indicates, reservations almost identical to those now championed by the ACRS were raised quite pointedly by L'PA's own GAB.
Utilizing the opportunity offered by EPA, the Nhc staff commented on these-SAB concerns, declaring that if staff concerns regarding the use of qualitative assessments was met, the proposed release limits would be acceptable quantitative measurements.
For its part, EPA acknowledged and responded to the concerns of both the NRC staff and the SAB in the supplementary information statement accompanying its final rule.
50 Fed. Reg. at 38070-71, 38075-77.
Although EPA declined to revise its proposed level of protection or to uniformly increase its proposed release limits as suggested by its SAB, EPA did modify its final rule in several respects in response to the NRC staff concern about the need for qualitative judgment in the licensing NRC staff advised EPA informally that it considers the p rocess.
final rule acceptable, DOE does not object to the final rule, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review process was completed without any OMB policy objection to the final rule.
In SECY-85-272, the staff has indicated that it finds these revisions are adequate and that it believes the standards can be implemented in a licensing review.
III. Commission Action Regardina the ACRS Concerns Although the Commission might opt not to take any action on the ACRS concerns, the ACRS public presentation at the October 10
~
5 meeting and its October 16 letter to the Chairman have made its concerns and its desire that those concerns be made kncwn to EPA a matter of public record.
While the Commission need not adopt the ACRS views, the standing of the ACRS as a scientific advisory body argues for at least some official Commission response to the ACRS.
1.
The NRC staff is scheduled to brief the Commission on the EPA rule and ACRS concerns on October 21, 1985.
In the event this briefing should convince the Commission that the ACRS concerns likely would not have the serious effect predicted by the ACRS, then an indication to that ef fect by a Commission majority at the close of the meeting would offer a suitable public Commission response.
Alternatively, the Commission response could be by notation vote after the meeting, followed by a suitable public letter to the ACRS from the Chairman.
2.
If, on the other hand, the Commission desires to take any direct action supportive of the ACRS concerns after hearing from the NRC staff, there appears to us to be only one
+
viable option existing at this time.
This would be for the Commission to make the ACRS views kncwn to the Administrator of EPA by way of a telephone call or a visit by a Commission representative or through a written message from the Commission that could either be separate from or in conjunction with the letter proposed by the staff in SECY-85-272.
The form and content this contact should take depends, we believe, on the importance the Commission assigns the ACRS concerns, an well as the Commission's assessment of the risk of further delay in the repository licensing process that might accrue from any Commission action.
If the Commission believes that the ACRS concerns are vitally important and should be dealt with immediately, then a demand for EPA action to reconsider or revise the rule by means of a strongly worded letter or a personal visit might be considered appropriate.
On the other hand, the Commission may find that simply a letter forwarding those views, or a telephone call that brings them to the attention of the Administrator, without Commission endorsement, is appropria te.'
1 Mention also has been nade of the possibility of the NRC (Footnote Continuedl
.1 6
In this regard, we believe the Commission must bear in mind that not only is it not drawing on a clean regulatory slate, but that the slate is one that is in motion and must comply with a statutorily-mandated schedule that already has been the subject of litigation.
We consider it very unlikely that EPA would even consider withdrawing the final rule given the apparent ccncurrence (or at least nonobjection) from the NRC staff, DOE, and OMB and the need for compliance with the lawsuit settlement agreement.
Thus, the most that NRC action could reasonably be expected to produce would be EPA agreement to respond to the ACRS concerns and to make changes in the standards, if necessary, at some future date.
However, any EPA action that
[ Footnote Continued]
instituting a lawsuit to challenge the EPA rulemaking on the basis of the particular matters of concern to the ACRS.
We believe this option is, as a practical matter, foreclosed to the Commission.
Under 5 U.S.C 5 516, absent legislative authorization to the contrary, authority is given only to the Attorney General and the Justice Department for the conduct of any litigation in which the United States or any agency is a party or is interested.
While the NRC dcas have independent litigating authority, at least as to the conduct of cases i
brought before the United States Courts of Appeals challenging NRC's final orders, that authority would not extend to instituting or intervening in a lawsuit challenging another agency's rule, absent Justice Department approval.
Such approval is highly unlikely in this instance.
The two main issues about which the ACRS appears concerned -- the strictness of the release limitations and the use of quantitative probabilistic measurements -- previously were the subject of comments by the NRC staff and the SAB and were substantially addressed by EPA in promulgating its final standards.
While ACRS questions about risk criteria for individual body organs and about conformance with the health risk standards for hazardous toxic chemicals raised in its October 16 letter do not appear to have been addressed in the EPA final rule, neither is it apparent that they were ever formally raised in the context of the EPA rulemaking proceeding so as to require EPA response.
Thus, it is problematic whether the NRC can point to any obvious legal deficiency that presents a compelling reason for the Justice Department to allow the NRC to launch a judicial challenge to EPA's rule.
?
)
i i
7 even hints at a reopening of this matter.vould likely institute an entirely new round of public and intragovernmental comment and create an uncertainty about what standards the DOE repository program should aim to implement.
Thus, under the circumstances, if the Commission contemplates any act' ion, such as requesting a new rulemaking to change the standards, that goes beyond simply forwarding the ACRS concerns to EDA without comment, it would be well served to consult informally with EPA and DOE first to minimize the potential such action may have for further delaying the federal repository licensing program.
Finally, we understand that the ACRS considers the flaws in these standards for the licensing program to be so fundamental that correcting them now is the only way to avoid the waste of resources and time that will occur if, as the ACRS apparently postulates, the EPA licensing standards cannot be met by DOE.
One possible correction the ACRS has suggested is the development now by EPA of an alternative set of determinative standards that would be available for use in the event DOE cannot satisfactorily demonstrate compliance with EPAfs present probabilistic standards.
The NRC staff believes, on the other
- hand, that the EPA standards are not fundamentally flawed and that questions of implementation can be handled and resolved in the prelicensing consultation process established in 10 CFR Part 60 and the NWPA or by rulemaking amendments to 10 CFR Part 60.
Moreover, if it becomes clear at some point those standards cannot be implemented, an eventuality the staff believes is remote at best, it is staff's judgment that the matter could still be handled by requesting revisions of the EPA standards at that time.
Commission assessment of these positions also must, we think, play a large role in any decision regarding action on the ACRS concerns.
Since we believe that the proper course of Commission action on the ACRS concerns is governed by the policy and technical issues we have described rather than any strictly legal considerations, we make no recommendation on how the Commission should proceed, other than that it should not act without hearing from the NRC staff and fully assessing all the factors we have described.
Attachment:
10/16/85 ltr, Ward, ACRS to Chmn Palladino cc:
\\
.\\
[ ann
'o, UNITED STATES
' 7, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 8,
g W ASHING TON. O. C. 20666 4 * * " * $,
October 16, 1985 Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman U. S. N clear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Dr. Palladino:
SUBJECT:
ADDITIONAL ACRS COMMENTS ON THE EPA STANDARDS FOR A HIGH-LEVEL RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE REPOSITORY Ouring its 306th meeting, October 10-12, 1985, the Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards met with you and the other Commissioners *o offer comments regarding the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Standards for a High-Level Radioactive Waste (HLW) Repository, which was the subject of our report to you dated July 17, 1985.
In response to the request made during this treeting, we are pleased to submit the following additional coments on the EPA standards ~which were pubitshed as a final.
rule on September 19, 1985.
These standards will apply to the facili-ties being proposed by the Department of Energy and must be met in the associated licensing review conducted by the NRC.
Our purpose in writing you at this time is to highlight the fact that the standards being promulgated by the EPA are unreasonably restrictive and contain serious deficiencies.
This will undoubtedly introduce unnecessary obstacles into the licensing process for an HLW repository, with only minimal benefit to the public health and safety. Our justifi-cations for these coments are outlined below.
Development of these standards Fas been under way within the EPA since December 1976.
During this period, the ACRS and its.Subcomittee on waste management were briefed periodically by EPA representatives, and at each such meeting coments and suggestions here discussed on an informal basis. In early 1983 the EPA submitted the then-current draft of the proposed standards to its Science Advisory Board (SAB) for review.
Detailed coments by the High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Subcomittee of the SA8 included the following:
The Subcomittee recomended "that the release limits specified in the proposed standards be increased by a factor of ten, thereby causing a related tenfold relaxation of the proposed soci-etal objective (population risk of cancer)."
The Subcomittee recomended "that use of a quantitative probabi-listic condition on the... release limits be made dependent on EPA's ability to provide convincing evidence that such a condition is practical to meet and will not lead to serious impediments, legal or otherwise, to the licensing of high-level-waste geologic
i Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino October 16, 1985 repositories.
If such evidence cannot be provided, we recomend that EPA adopt qualitative criteria, such as those suggested by the NRC."
Of particular concern to the SAB Subcommittee, in tenns of meeting the conditions of the standards, was the fact that containment requirements should be such that the cumulative releases of radionuclides from a repository to the accessible environment for 10,000 years after dis-posal, from all significant processes and events that may affect the disposal system, shall:
"have a likelihood of less than one chance in 10 of exceeding" the quantities (given in an accompanying Table); and "have a likelihood of less than one chance in 1,000 of exceeding ten times" these same quantities.
The SAB Subcomittee also recomended specific changes in the probabi-listic aspects of the draft standards to help make it more practical for an applicant to make a case that the quantitative probabilistic criterig*
had been met.
Although the wording in the standards includes the statement that
" performance assessments need not provida complete assurance" that these requirements will be met, there remains the basic fact that the stan-dards, as published, are far too restrictive.
In our opinion, the establishment of overly restrictive standards, relieved by leniency in their implementation, is not an appropria te approach.
The proper.
approach would have been to develop reasonable standards that could have been more definitively enforced.
The problems cited above were but a few of those observed and comented upon by the SA8 Subcomittee.
Additional problems in Worktng Draft No.
6 of the EPA standards were discussed with an EPA representative during a meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on waste management on June 18 and 19, 1985.
These included the following:
The standards, as published, do not appear to be internally consis-tent.
Although the latest data were used for estimating the biological effects of various radionuclides, the associated dose limits for individual body organs were not based on appropriate risk criteria.
The health risks associated with the release limits specified in the standards are much lower (by factors of a thousand or more) than the risks considered acceptable by the EPA for other environ-mental stresses, such as hazardous toxic chemicals.
The overly restrictive standards may result in the rejection of some sites proposed for an HLW repository that otherwise might be acceptable.
-=
i Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino October 16, 1985
\\
Asr. indicated above, the standards will definitely complicate the processes, both technical and legal, of demonstrating that a given site is acceptable.
We realize that both the NRC Staff and the DOE Staff have accepted the EPA standards. Although we can understand, to some degree, the desires of both staffs to complete this step, we are troubled by the serious deficiencies that exist in the standards.
The compromises that have been made at this stage will lead to extended delays and an uncertain outcome in the licensing process for an HLW repository, with only slight benefit to the public health and safety.
Although the ACRS could undertake a more detailed review and critique of the EPA standards, we believe that the SAB Subcomittee has already done this in a professional manner. A copy of the Executive Sumary of their report is attached for your information.
We hope this letter is helpful.
Although we realize that the EPA 4
standards have been published, we believe.that they contain such serious i
deficiencies that the NRC should take prompt action to voice these con **
cerns.
Sincerely, David A. Ward Chairman
)
Attachment:
Section II, " Executive Sumary" of Report on the review of Proposed Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes (40 CFR 191) by the SAB, EPA, dated January 1984
References:
1.
Letter from Herman E. Collier, Jr., Chairman, EPA High-Level Radio-active Waste Disposal Subcomittee, to Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, EPA, dated February 17, 1984 transmitting Report on the review of Proposed Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes by the High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Subcomittee, Science Advisory Board, EPA, dated Janaury 1984 i
2.
SECY-84-320, "NRC Staff Coments to EPA on the SAB Report on Pro-posed EPA Standard for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Waste (40 CFR Part 191)," dated August 9, 1984, including Working Draft No. 8. Final 40 CFR 191, Subchapter F - Radiation Protection Programs, dated July 19, 1985 i
~
Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino 4-October 16, 1985 3.- SECY-85-272, " Report on the EPA's Environmental Standards for High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal," dated August 13, 1985 4.
Memorandum from R. E. Browning, Director, Division of Waste Management, to R. F. Fraley, ACRS,
Subject:
NRC Staff Views on Implementation of the EPA HLW Standards, dated September 11, 1985 1
e e
Fron Report on the review of Proposed Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Trans-uranic Radioactive Wastes by the SAB, EPA, dated January 1984 SECTION II EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Subcomad ttee (HLRW) of the Executive Committee of the Science Advisory Board (SAB) has com-pleted an extensive review of the scientific and tecnnical basis for eda's proposed rule for the disposal of high level radioactive wastes, the highlights of which are presented in this summary.
Technologies now exist for tha disposal of such wastes, and stan-dards adopted for them should strike an appropriate balance between conservatism and practicality.
Overall, the Subcommittee is confident that, consistent with the intent of this standard-setting program, the job of disposing of high-level radioactive waste can be achieved with reasonable assurance for the well-being of present and future genera-tions.
The Subcommittee supports the general form of the proposed stan-dards, including (a) the use of a societal objective as an upper bound of acceptable health (cancer and genetic) effects, (b) the focus on performance standards in terms of release limits rather than individual exposures, (c) the reference level of the initial 10,000 year time frame applicable to both the societal objective and the release 111mits,.
(d) the use of a probahilistic approach, and (e) the use of qualitative assurance requirements, as modified by the Subcommittee, but issued as Federal Radiation Drotection Guidance to other Federal agencies in lieu of inclution in the_ proposed rule.
The Subcommittee, while accepting the general form of the proposed standards, recommends several changes in the standards and improvements in the supporting nethodology. The principal recompendations are high-lighted in the following summation.
A more comprehensive and detailed presentation of these and other major recompendations can be found in Section IV, Major Findings and Recommendations.
A.
The Standard 1.
The Subcommittee recommends that the release limits specified in Table 2 of the proposed standards ne increased by a factor of ten. tnereny causing a related ten fold relaxation of the proposed societal oojective (population risk of cancer).*
Two memners of the Subcommittee, Dr. Lash and Dr. Giletti, dissent from this view. They believe that the Office of Radiation Programs' more stringent standard is justified and can be met by sufficient numbers of proposed disposal f
- sites, j
l 2
~
The Subcemittee notes that the proposed release limits are direct-ly related to the societal objective of not exceeding 1,000 deaths in 10,000 years. and thus, emp11ance with this recommendation carries with it a related ten fold increase in the societal objective.
The relaxation of-the release limits 15 in the Subcommittee's opininn, justified for the following reasons. First, the proposed release limits l
in Table 2, and therefore the proposed societal objective, are consider-aaly more stringent than those standards generally required or adopted in today's society (see for instance Table A on page 12 of this report).
Second, in addition to the fact that some of the cancer deaths dich might result from these releases are calculated using conservative assumptions that probably overestimate the number, some of these deaths would have resulted at least in part from the unmined ore from which the wastes were subsequently' generated, and thus are substitutional rather than additional in nature.
Third, the Subcommittee believes that the compounding of conservatism by EPA in the choice of probabili-ties and specific model parameters used throughout the analysis is not l
warranted.
EPA should also clarify the analytical framework that forws the basis for the limits in Table 2 of the proposed standards.
The Sub-committee believes that such cla ri fication will help to establish r
clearly the relationship between the release limits and the societal will facilitate future amendments to the standard as objective,and knowledge increases regarding radiation health effects or radionuclide migration in the biosphere.
Note:
In Section IV. 47(Wodels) and 813(Geochemical nata), the Suhecemittee has recommanded that EPA make certain specific changes and corrections to their predictive models.
Some of these changes will result in changes to the release limits for individual radionu-clides given in Table 2 of the proposed standards, and will he separate from the ten-fold change in the release limits recommended above. The Subcemittee helieves that the changes in the release limits, resulting from the changes to the predictive models, are independent of and would not lead to additional endification to the proposed societal objective beyond the ten fold increase discussed above.
j 8.
Ilmcertainty and the Standard 1.
We reconnend that the probabilistic release criteria in the draft standard be modified to read " analysis of repository perfor-mance shall demonstrate that there is less than a 50% chance of exceeding tne Taole 2 limits, modified as is apprnpriate. Eveits wnose median frequency is les' tnan one in one-tnousand in 10,000 years need not be considere2 t
2.
We recomend that use of a cuantitative probabilistic condi-tion on the modified Taele Z release limits be made dependant on EPA's ability to provide convincing evidence that such a condition i
3 t
, - - - - - _. ~ -
~
4 is practical to meet and will not lead to serious impediments. le.
Gal or otherwise. to the licensinq of hiQh-level-waste geologic re-oositories.
If such evidence cannot be provided, we recorrend that EPA adopt qualitative criteria. such as those suggested by the NRC.
The SubcDamittee believes that the modified probabilistic criteria will make the proposed standards more practical to apply without undue, time-consuming disagreements. Further risk studies need to be performed and subjected to systematic. critical evaluaon in order to establish a more acceptable probabilistic basis for the standard.
C.
The Time Frame - 10,000 years and 9eyond 1.
We recommend that EPA retain the 10,000-year time peri;d as the basis for determining the adequacy of repository performance.
We believe that use of formal numerical criteria limited to this approximate time period is a scientifically acceptable re9ulatory apDreach.
2.
We recommend that the process of selection of sites for dis-posal systems also take into account potential releases of radio-activity somewnat beyond 10,n00 years. Particular attention should he focused on potential releases of long-lived alpha-emitting radionuclides and their decay products.
Although the selection of a time frame is in large part achitrary, we endorse EPA's choice of 10,n00 years. %deling and risk assessmentse -
for the time periods involved in radioactive waste disposal require ex-tension of such developing techniques mell beyond usual extrapnlations; however, the extension for 10,000 years can be made with reasonable confidence. Also, the period of 10,000 years is likely to be free of major geologic changes, such as volcanism or renewed glaciation, and with proper site selection the risk from such changes can be made neg-ligible. Potenti al radionuclide releases will not stop with 10,000 years, bewever, but may continue in amounts equal to or exceeding those estimated for the initial period.
The degree of confidence with which impacts can be modeled smch further in the future is much less certain.
We do not recommend de-modeling calculations regarding post-10,000 year releases, but tailed estimates should be made, and should be considered as factors in dis-posal site selection.
I D.
Population vs. Individual Risk 1
We recommend that EPA retain the use of a coeulation risk cri-terion as tne measure of performance for the proposed standards.
We find that an approach employing individual dose limits, i.e..
conf dering soma " maximally exposed individual" or alternatively some i
" average exposed indi vidual" would, in practice, make the standa rd 4
=-
1 difficult to meet with high assurance for very long times, and that use of a population risk approach is mor<s practical.
In our view, however, it is.important that for the first several hundred years residents of the region surrounding a repository have very great assurance that.1 hey will suffer no, or. negligible, ill effects from the repository.
For longer periods, we believe that EPA should rely on the existence of con-tinuing requirements similar to its current drinking water standards to protect groups of individuals.
E.
Coordination of Policies and Standards 1.
We recommend that EPA initiate action within the Federal Gov-ernment for the establishment of an interagency council to coor-dinate the 41evelopment of high-level radioactive waste disposal Dolicy, standards, and regulatory practices and to serve as a forum for exenance of scientific and technological information.
Several Federal agencies are involved in the process of establish-ing radiation protection policies, standards and operational require-ments governing the disposal of high-level radioactive wastes, including EPA, NRC, 00E and D00, together with states, appropriate entities of Congress and the judiciary.
Overlapping and independent authorities and responsibilities exist under present laws.. Conflicting terminology and standards exist, e.g., the definitions of high-level and other ra-dioactive wastes.
Coordination of Federal policies and practices is essential to the U.S. high-level radioactive waste disposal programs Success of the program will depend on extensive interaction and agree-ment among the appropriate Federal agencies.
While the lead in coor-dination could be appropriate for the NRC or 00E, the Subcomunittee feels that the obligation for achieving mutual interaction more appro-priately belongs to the EPA under its authority to issue environmental standards and Federal Radiation Protection Guidance.
F.
Research Needs - A Matter of Priority 1.
We recommend that EPA supoort, or encourage other agencies to support, continuing research in technical areas where major uncer-tainties still exist, particularly in the biological effects of radiation, the geochemical trartpirt of radionuclides, and the characterization of rock-mass diformation.
The Subconsnittee strongly endorses support of' research aimed at
^
diminishing or clarifying as many of these uncertainties as can be attacked with some hope of resolution.
The research, although expen-sive, could bring about a substantial reduction in the overall cost of the disposal system.
G.
Responses to Original Subcomittee Charge At the time of the Subcommittee's formation, it was directed, by the Executive Comittee of the Science Advisory Board, to address six 3
5
m._..,
f f
a (6) principal issues.
Although a brief response to each charge is presented here, the charges are broad in scope and the Subcosuittee's review of them generated a number of more explicit and specific issues which are addressed in detail in the body of this report 1.
The scientific and technical rationale behind the choice of a 10,000 year time period as the basis for assessment of disposal facility performance.
This issue has been addressed in C above.
j 2.
The technical basis for the selection of the proposed perform-ance requirements, including risk-assessment methodology, uncer-tainties in the data and in the analytical methods, and the esti-mation of premature deaths.
These aspects of the analysis form the basis for the proposed stan-dards and were areas most carefully and critically evaluated by the Subcommi ttee. Although the Subcommittee makes a number of recommenda-tions regarding risk assessment, pathway and health modeling and the need for improved documentation, we believe,that Office of Radiation Programs, EPA, has handled these subjects well and, furthermore, has been positively responsive to the recommendations of the Subcommittee.
We think, however, that EPA has" made ' overly conservative choices and-decisions throughout the development of the technical bases supporting the standards, leading to overestimation of the long-term effect of l
disposal, and hence that the proposed standards are too restrictive and compliance may be difficult to verify.
3.
The scientific appropriateness of concentrating on disposal in geologic media.
This part of the charge needed no consideration by the Subcommit-tee, since disposal in geologic media is mandated for at least the first two sites by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (PL S7-425),
l enacted after the charge was prepared.
No moder of the Subcommittee, however, disagrees with this initial approach.
i 4
The validity of the conclusion that, under the proposed rule, the risks to future generations will be no greater than the risks from equivalent amounts of naturally occurring uranium ore bodies.
In reviewing this conclusion, we found, and EPA acknowledged.
l that the comparison is uncertain because of the extreme variability of urenium ore bodies.
The Subcommittee thinks that the conclusion is l
valid in a very general way, if suitably qualified, but feels that it is unwise and not scientifically defensible to use the unmined ore as the only reference for comparison. We recommend that the comparison be f
extended to include the radioactivity of natural waters and the ambient radiation in the natural environment.
6
i The adequacy of the economic analysis.
5.
The Subcommittee considers there are significant shortcomings in Since the man-the economic. analyses supporting the proposed standards.
gement, storage, and disposal of high-level waste is a multi-billion the shortcomings are important and dollar venture, we believe that should be remedied.
It is noteworthy that, even though the savings associated with individual choices may seem relatively insignificant, the absolut'e costs are so large that even small percentage sa worthwhil e.
ent of the proposed standard, and simply reflect the decision to use Thus, ap-deep mined geologic disposal sites with multiple barriers.
preciable savings are not Itkely to be realized in terms of basic costHow of the standards.
by relaxationcompliance may be very high, and cost reductions that may be ach by sophisticated compliance demonstrati6ns could be substantial.
We recognize the need for cost /berefit analyses, using the best available data, but we note that a precise economic analysis will not be possible or meaningful until it is performed upon an actual repository at a specific site.
The ability of the analytical methods /models used in the anal _-
ysis to predict potential releases from the disposal facility and 6.
Included would be an their resultant ef f ects on human health.-
evaluation of the model's ability to deal with uncertainty and the confidence, in a statistical sense, that the model predictions are adequate to support selection of projectsd performance requirements.
In general, epa's analytical methodology and modeling used through-out the development of the generic repository's performance, including releases and subsequent career deaths, are deemed to be conservative.
suggestions for specific improvements The Subcommittee makes severalWe emphasize that modeling, including th uncertainty and confidence therein, is an emerging and developing tech-and updating.
Adding to the uncertainties implicit in a techique that is.still under development are the multitude of poorly known factors associated nique.
with the extrapolation in time to 10,000 years and beyond, and the prob-We believe, never-lem of securing public acceptance of the standard.
theless, that the EPA's effort, modified as recommended by this report, Nuclear Weste Policy Act of 1982.
will fulfill the intent of the i
e I
7
i
(
REMARKS PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION AT A MEETING 0F THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE O.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC October 21, 1985 4
Dade W. Moeller Chairman Subcommittee on Waste Management Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 1
i i
.i
,___...mm.
THE ROLE OF THE ACRS 1.
NRC Must Develop Criteria to Implement the EPA Standards 2.
The Standards Have Deficiencies 3.
EPA Has Apparently Not Heard the Concerns Expressed by the Scientific Community 4.
Major Problems Could Occur Downstream --
It Will Be Better to Face Them Now LEARNING FROM THE PAST 1.
ACRS Letter of April 9, 1975, Pertaining to Emergency Planning On the basis of its evaluations, the Comittee has concluded that an effective emergency plan can play a significant role in the protection of the nearby population in the unlikely event of a major. accidental release of radioactive material for a nuclear installation. Reviews by the Comittee, however, of emergency plans for nuclear power plants currently..
in operation, or nearing completion of construction, show that much work remains to be done.
2.
ACRS Letter of May 6, 1980, on the Emergency Planning Rule (10 CFR Part 50)
As written, the Proposed Rule will require in-depth discussion and subsequent concurrence in the emergency preparedness program by the applicant and the NRC, as well as by State and local governmental authorities. The ACRS is concerned that l
this could constitute a third-part veto of the operation of a nuclear power plant based on considerations that may be unrelated to health and safety. The ACRS believes that such a requirement should not be included in the Rule without some safeguards against such action by a third party.
Furthennore, a de facto veto power on operation appears to exist wit.h each local government entity within ten miles of a nuclear power plant if it chooses not to permit establishment of the warning facilities required to meet the criteria.
DEFICIENCIES IN THE EPA STANDARDS 1.
They Are O'verly Conservative -- Perpetuating the Unnecessary Caution and Over-Emphasis on Radiation 2.
They Are Not Consistent With EPA Standards for Other Environmental Stresses 3.
They May be Impossible to Enforce a.
Absolutely so if dependent on environmental monitoring b.
Extremely difficult if assessment is probabilistic ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE PROBABILISTICALLY 1.
Select a Range of Scenarios 2.
Input Various Parameters Into the Models 3.
Generate Release Estimates 4.
Compliance Requires That Not More Than One in Ten of the Scenarios ~Show Releases In Excess of the Standards SIGNIFICANCE OF ASSESSMENT 1.
If 90% of the Scenarios Must' Comply, Average Releases for All Scenarios Must be About 10%
of the Limits 2.
Therefore a Repository, on the Average, Must Produce No More Than 100 Premature Cancer Deaths Within 10,000 Years 3.
The Standards Are Thus Ten Times More Restrictive Than is First Apparent
RISK AVERSION IMPLICATIONS 1.
The EPA Standards Also Require That There Not Be More Than One Chance in One Thousand That Releases from a Repository Will Exceed Ten Times the Release Liraits 2.
This Would Result in Average Releases That Produce No More Than 10 Premature Cancer Deaths Within 10,000 Years 3.
Thus, for Larger (Accidental) Releases, the EPA has Included a Risk Aversion Factor of Ten within the Standards COMMENTARY 1.
The EPA Standards Are Overly Restrictive --
For Perspective, See the Accompanying Figure 2.
Recognizing This, EPA Proposes to Require Only " Reasonable Assurance" of Compliance An Overly Restrictive Standard Loosely Applied Does Not Replace a Properly Set Standard That Is Designed to be Enforced 3.
Endorsement of the Standards by State Authorities Is Not A Good Measure of the Appropriateness of the Standards 4.
A More Stringent Standard Will Not Lead to a Better Repository a.
It may severely and unnecessarily limi't the number of sites that prove acceptable b.
It will unnecessarily delay the licensing process
From:
Culler, F.
E.,
Catlin, R.
J.,
and Williams, R.
F.,
t
" Objectives in High-Level Wastes / Spent Fuel Disposal,"
Paper Presented at the Twenty-First Annual Meeting of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measure-ments, Washington, DC (April 3-4, 1985).
Experience and expecta,tions 10-2 Safety goals and standards C.nce, oe.,n,a,e U S population (1981)
(Amer. Cancer Soc.)
10-3 Cigarette smoking j
(cancer only) 10-4 NRC annual dose hmit (general public); draft Natural background red-10 CFR part 20 rev.
U S population
- 10-5 gpgennueidosesimit Medicat X-rays
- (general pubhe) U fust U.S. popuistion*
/
cycle (40 CFR part 190)
Nuclear power plants - normal 10-6 %
propo,ed deiayed mortahty effluents.10 mi radius dose
- safety goal (Nureg-0880)
Consumer products'eidg.
NRC nuclear power plants materials - reo cose*
10-7 e,fivent i,mits.10 CFR 50 app. I One transcontinental thght/yr 10-8 Nuclear operations. normal l
avg U S population dose
- l 10-9 EPA high level red weste disposat hmit (draft) 10-10
+
1 0-11 EPA hmit adjusted for conservatisms in derivation 4
10-12 Estimated range of repository performance 10-13
.+
10-14 Risk / year bossces (1) EPmi presentation ENSAB San Francoco Merch 24.1983 (2) Wilson. Richard. Testirnony for OSHA heenngs on loaic suestances. February.1973 ese m Figure 2. Individual annual risk of cancer.
...