ML20138J346

Forwards Comments Re Certification of USEC Two Gaseous Diffusion Plants

ML20138J346
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	09/28/1996
From:	Buckalew N AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Paperiello C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
References
CON-#197-17979 NUDOCS 9702070074
Download: ML20138J346 (6)

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Notice of Certification Decision for USEC Gaseous Diffusion Plants g

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• Petition for extended comment period to l

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• Objection to limitations on persons who may comment

• Petition to remove limitations on persons who may comment

• Petition for National public hearings to be held U

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• Obiection to FONSI

• Objection to tacit and unreviewed acceptance of DOE overseeing nuclear safety j

Carl J. Paperiello Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 September 28,1996

Dear Carl J. Paperiello,

Pleare f'md enclosed our comments to the notice in the Federal Register of September 19,1996 (V. 61, N.

183, pp 49360-49363) regarding the certification of the USEC's two gaseous diffusion plants. We ask that the NRC provide a detailed and documented response to our comments, objections and petitions for action.

Also, this document serves as a/n:

1.) Petition for extending the comment period regarding certification of the gaseous diffusion plants 2.) Objection to limiting persons who may comment based on a.) The APA's N553(e) which states "any" citizen or " interested nerson" has the right "to b.) petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."

Any taxpayer has the right to comment 3.) Petition to open up commenting to "any interested" person of the U.S. with no limitations 4.) Administrative petition for action to hold public hearings nationally regarding continued operation of the gaseous diffusion plants in Ohio and Kentucky 5.) Objection to the finding of no significant impact regarding USEC's compliance plan and that no adverse effects on the environment will occur from the continued operation of the gaseous diffusion plants in reaching compliance 6.) Objection to tacit and unreviewed acceptante of DOE overseeing nuclear safety currently and during the transition period to slated full privatization of the USEC y

Notwithstanding our objections to the limitations on those persons who may comment, we register that we have roper and legal standing to issue our petition and objections in accordance with the mquirements as stated in the Federal Register notice of September 19,1996 (V. 61, N.183, pp 49N9363).-As stated any person whose interest may be affected, and who submitted comments during any past of the certification l

process under Sec. 76.93 may file a petition. We are directly and collaboratively working with and supporting residents near the Ohio plants, as well as citizen and environmental groupsNvho have in an official capacity taken part in the commenting process under Sec. 76.93. This document is~ a supporting document for the people we are working with of whom we will allow to remain anonymous. In addition, we have filed numerous petitions for action to the DOE to halt the privatization of th' USBC and to hold l

e n:tional public hearings over the matter.

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COMMENTS SUBSTANTIATED MD EXPLAINED i

1.) PETITION FOR EXTENDING TIIE COS151ENT PERIOD REG ARDING CERTIFICATION The time period of 15 days to register comments and file a r etition is inadequate and unacceptable.

This is not a sufficient amount of time for citizens to obtain the necessary materials via mail or in person, and to thoroughly review and understand them. We respectfully and adamantly requests that the clock start again with no less than 30 days for review and to file comments / petitions. The continued operation of these 40 year old plants deserves full participation and rview by not only the citizens directly affected by their operation, I

but by all taxpaving citizens whose money will pay for the continued operation of these plants through i

maintenance, security, government oversight, etc.; and, will pay for the costs of decontamination.

l remediation. and decommissioning. Thus, by only hasing materials available at the NRC and at the two plants does not allow for full participation by the citizens of this country, demising notions and the practice of democracy.

3.) OB.lECTION TO LIS11 TING PERSONS WilO N1 AY COS151ENT HASED ON A.) APA #553(E) WlIICil STATES " ANY" CITIZEN OR "lNTERESTED PERSON" IIAS Tile RIGilT "TO PETITION FOR TIIE ISSUANCE, A%1ENDN1ENT, OR REPEAL OF A RULE."

f H.) ANY TAXPAYER ll AS Tile RIGIIT TO CO5151ENT 4.) PETITION TO OPEN UP COSIN1ENTING TO " ANY INTERESTED" PERSON OF Tile U.S. WITil NO LIS11TATIONS 2.) AD%1INISTRATIVE PETITION FOR ACTION TO IIOLD PUBLIC IIEARINGS NATIONALLY REGARDING CONTINUED OPERATION OF Tile G ASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS IN 01110 AND KENTUCKY l

The original legislation of 1992 Energy Policy Act nor any subseaven! legislation regarding the USEC does institute nor give directions to the NRC to create limitations on who ma.y comment during Notice and Comment proceedings regarding certification of the gaseous diffusion pants. The APA allows for all interested persons to comment during Notice and Comment procedures without limitations. Thus, NRC has gone beyond its statutory scope in limiting persons who can comment where such person's comments will become part of the official record deserving due notice by NRC as well as receiving returned comments by the NRC.

Continuing in the same vein of reasoning stated above in point "1.)" for extending the comment period, it seems to have been assumed that only pers;ns located within the vicinity of the gaseous diffusion plants are the only persons affected in any particular manner by the continued operation of these plants. This is a patently false and negligent assumption. As stated, it is U.S. taxpaver dollars that have provided the capital for these plants to operate for the past 40 years and will continue to provide the necessary funds to maintain operation of these plants, even with the projected privatization of USEC. To illustrate this point:

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• It was U.S. taxpayer dollars used to create a 400,000,000 million dollar revolving fund for the USEC to operate from.

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• It is U.S. taxpayers dollars that now fund and will continue to fund clean-up of the facilities.

• Also and more importantly, it is U.S. taxpayer dollars that provided the 12 billion dollars to purchase weapons grade uranium from the former Soviet Union (supposedly down-blended to some degree in the former Soviet Union) to be converted at the two U.S. gaseous diffusion plants under USEC control into nuclear fuel for sale on the domestic and international commercial markets.

• The electric bill to run these two plants has been and will be footed by U.S. taxpayer dollars.

• ETC.

These are significant and substantial subsidizations provided by the U.S citizenry for the continued operation of these plants and for the profit of the USEC We take great issue with any fabricated and false limitations on those persons who may comment on the certification of these plants.

Moreover and importantly, the issues and concerns surrounding the continued operations of these plants are of not only National concern but of international as well due to the nature of USEC's primary function, that of converting Russian weapons grade uranium into nuclear fuel. It is projected by the USEC, i

G AO, DOE, and Congress that it will take 20-50 vears to convert the Russian fissile materials into fuel in addition to the conversion of U.S. HEU stockpiles. There should not and cannot be any limitations on those

1 persons allowed to comment on the certification of these plants. We demand that national hearings be held I

regarding the continued operation of these plants and certification of USEC as operator.

5.) OH.lECTION TO TIIE FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT REGARDING USEC'S COMPLIANCE PLAN AND TilAT NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ON TIIE ENVIRONMENT WILL OCCUR FROM Tile CONTINUED OPERATION OF Tile G ASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS IN REACIllNG COMPLIANCE.

n.) NOTICE DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR IMPACTS RESULTING FROM PRIVATIZATION OF USEC The finding of no significant impact does not review nor account for impacts, changes, and full ramifications on the operation of the two plants and environmental compliance post privatization of the USEC nor from the actual process of privatization. Inaccurately, the Federal Register notice of September 19,1996 (V. 61, N.183, pp 49360 49363) states that DOE retains and will maintain ownership of the plants. Privatization is a significant factor affecting the safety of the plants for workers, the pubhc, and environment and will affect environmental compliance as well. Government oversight could be severely inhibited once (and if) privatization occurs. In addition, USEC is a for-profit motivated company, not cafety. According to the 1992 Energy Policy Act itself, profit making is the USEC's highest and primary goal. Evidence of limits on public oversight of environmental compliance has already occurred where USEC refused to publish waste stream outputs stating that this is a " corporate secret." The effects of privatization on environmental compliance must be fully analyzed including the economic ability of USEC to fully comply with environmental standards ove the next projected 50 years of operation.

b.) FUGITIVE URANIUM DEPOSIT CLEAN-UP IS NOT COMPLETED POSING RISKS OF CRITICALrl Y Uranium deposits and the potential of critically is a well documented problem at the plants where clean-up began in 1991. Clean-up is not complete. (See National Academy of Sciences report Affordable Clean-un?) The potential increase of fugitive deposits from continued operation is high given the age of the plants, thus increasing the potential for criticality. Worker safety and the public health must not be put at risk. llntil clean-up is absolutely completed these plants should not receive certification.

c.) NRC HAS NOT REVIEWED SYNERGISTIC IMPACTS ON WORKERS NOR THE PUBLIC AND ENVIRONMENT FROM RELEASES ON AND OFF-SITE FROM ASBESTOS. LEAD. OTHER HEAVY METALS.

AND URANIUM CONTAMINATION.

Also according to the National Academy of Sciences report Affordable Clean-up?. in addition to fugitive uranium deposits, contamination of asbestos is highly prevalent at the two plants where asbestos covers miles of copper piping, in addition to " smaller" amounts of heavy metals and more pervasively lead paint. There is no analysis of the synergistic affects of these contaminations on worker health nor on the health of the public and the environment from releases. No certification should be issued until these impacts are fully documented and analyzed.

We would also like to know how the USEC and NRC propose to meet OSHA regulations regarding exposure to workers from asbestos, lead paint, and industrial chemeials as well as radioactive exposure given that fact that on-site contaminiation exists?

d.) AGING OF BUILDINGS POSES SIGNIFICANT RISKS TO PUBLIC HEALTH. WORKER SAFETY. AND THE ENVIRONMENT INCLUDING MAJOR BODIES OF WATER According to the same National Academy of Sciences repon, the age of these gaseous diffusion plants - 40 years - poses significant risks to public health, worker safety, and the environment unless full decommissionine and decontamination commence immediately. Interestingly and as stated, it is projected by the USEC, GAO, DOE, and Congress that it will take 20-50 years to conven the Russian nssile materials into fuel in addition to the conversion of U.S. HEU stock 7iles.

These two plants do not have another 50 years of life in them. The economics of maintaining t' hem is prohibitive in addition to the health and safety risks. NRC must demand clear decisions on the part of the USEC, DOE, and Congress as to when full decommissioning and decontamination will begin with an accompanying agenda. Predictably, each certification process will drag out such a decision regarding decommissioning and decontamination, where also standards for operation will be lowered over the years under pressure to keep the plants in production, thus putting at increased risk the public, workers, and environment. In the very least. an acenda on full decommissionine and

decontamination should be demanded and submitted nog with this very certification process, and no later.

More anoropriatelv no certification should be issued and decommissioning and decontamination of the two nlants begin now before the costs become impossible and the risks unbearable.

In particular, the Portsmouth plant is located directly above a maior aquifer and underground river, called the Teys River. In fact this is the largest aquifer in the midwest. Significant underground water contamination is highly possible and has not been thoroughly and adequatelv investigated.

Also, this plant is surrounded by major surface-water bodies including the Scioto River which feeds directly into the Ohio River. The Ohio River is a major source of water drawn by Municipalities along the river including Cincinatti, Ohio. In the least, to allow these plants to continue under non-compliance for any length of time is to put at great risk these water bodies. At best the plants should be shut down completely and decommissioning anJ decontamination begin immediately.

e.) DECOMMISSIONING AND DECONTAMINATION BUDGET CUTS POSE RISKS TO PUBLIC HEALTH.

WORKER S AFETY. AND THE ENVIRONMENT If these plants centinue to operate they willinevitably contribute to on-site contamination which is prevalent and significant. Recent D&D budget cuts for these plants pose major risks to public health, worker safety, and the environment. These plants must r 3t be allowed to continue without secure financial resources for clean-un of these olants.

f.) SERIOUS ADVERSE HEALTH EFFECTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED FROM OFFSITE HISTORICAL AND i

CURRENT RELEASES (INCLUDING SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS FROM NEIGHBORING INDUSTRIES) HAS NOT HEEN THOROUGHLY AND ADEOUATELY ADDRESSED BY DOE. USEC NOR NRC A very recent report as of July 1996 completed by 10 health planning agencies in the state of Ohio including Cincinnati based CORVA, and the Health Planning and Resource Development Association of the Central Ohio River Valley found significant elevated cancer rates in nine contiguous counties in southwest Ohio. Six of these counties lie along the Ohio River including Hamilton, Clermont, Brown, and Adams, of which the GDP of Portsmouth is located in the latter counties. According to the report 152-165 people out of 100,000 persons die of cancer. The study raised more questions than answers as to the causes of the elevation in cancer.

As of yet no thorough and satisfactory study has been completed on the causes for elevations in. cancer and the links to the GDP in Portsmouth. The studies conducted by ASTDR on off-site health effects were negligently narrow in scope where the results served only the interests of the Federal Government. Any further studies must be conducted by a non-partisan, unbiased entity.

Also, no thorough investigation has been done on the synergistic effects and impacts from the various industries located in this area combined with the GDP of Portsmouth. This year, based on lab analysis EPA conceded that svnergism from enemicals combining in the environment and in living organisms can increase adverse impacts by 16.000 times! This is a serious admittance by the EPA.

EPA further admitted that past methods analysis of the impacts of toxic and hazardous chemicals on living organisms - one toxin or chemical at a time - may be irrelevant and obsolete necessitating a total revamp in analyzing the effects of toxic and hazardous chemicals. Indeed, analysis of one toxin or chemical at a time is a superannuated and diseased method of investigation. It is time for agencies such as the NRC to step up to the times creating standards that protect the health of the public.

workers. and environment that include synergistic impacts. and demanding that such standards be met.

g.) INNACCURATTI ASSESMENT OF WORKER DEATHS AND OFFSITE R A FASES The compliance evaluation of the Paducah GDP (Docket 70-7001, August 1996) asserts that "no incidents at any of the GDP's have caused death or serious injuries to plant personnel from exposure to radioactive materials or radiation nor have there been any incidents that have resulted in off-site releases of radiation or radioactive materials" causing doses in " excess of established limits."

This entire statement is false. According to a document released in.125.1. by Leo Goodman, Secretary of the Atomic Energy Technical Committee (IUD-AFL-CIO),12 deaths from cancer of workers at the Portsmouth GDP were affirmed to be linked to occunational exoosure at the olants.

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Currently employed workers at the Portsmouth GDP stated that in the mid 1970's a significant release of hexaflouride gas dispersed off-site. These and numerous other incidents have been hidden and denied by the overseeing agency the DOE. DOE has a history of covering up

1 environmental contamination and releases at all its falsities throughout the nation. Before any certification takes place a through investigation of environmental releases and there cumulative impacts off-site must be conducted. This investigation must be a joint and cooperative endeavor th includes the direction and participation of the local peoples and workers at the plant who have been and continue to be directly affected. Given the above mentioned health report in comment "f.)" such an investigation is vitally necessary. Avoidance of such an investigation is to neglect NRC's duty to protect the health of the people and the environment.

h.) HORIZONTAL & VERTICAL BEDROCK FRACTURES NOTWELL UNDERSTOOD AN A MIGRATION PATHWAY In EPA's Environmental. Safety and Health Compliance Assessment of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant of April 1990, there findings include concerns about horizontal and vertical bedrock fractures underneath the GDP in Ohio that " represent a potential contamination migration pathway in which the directions of groundwater flow may be markedly different than that determined by the existing monitoring well network. Further, the evaluation states that a full assessment "of this potential pathway has not been completed." This is still true as of today. Such an evaluation is dire and utmost for this certification process given that fact that, as stated, the largest aquifer in the midwest lies beneath the Portsmouth GDP.

i,) CONNECTION TO '.ACK OF DISPOS AL FOR HIGH-LEVEL WASTE MUST BE FULLY CONSIDERED The continuco operation and output as well as the decontamination and decommissioning of these plants has direct bearing, effect, and links to the dilemma of high-level radioactive waste disposal in this country. To begin, the two plants will continue to create nuclear fuel in high volumes for the commercial nuclear industry domestically and internationally. High-level radioactive wastes will result from the use of the nuclear fuel by the commercial nuclear industry. At the current moment the domestic nuclear industry is back-logged with spent fuel rods and with no final repository. It is quite known to the NRC the full ramifications and issues surrounding " disposal" of high-level wastes, starting with the highly volatile and politicized nature of finding a repository, and the fact that there is no known safe method of dirposal.

The NRC's action to certify the continued operation of these olants is to also condone the continual creation of high-level radioactive wastes. Disconnected thinking is outmoded and gravely endangers the vitality and the true national security of this country - a clean and thriving environment. We as a country cannot afford to maintain any processes that contributes to the creation of high level radioactive wastes. In addition concerns and impacts of high-level waste " disposal" are not only environmental but economical as well where more money has been devoted to the political process with no real results. Simply and realistically, the HEU from the former Soviet Union should be committed to long term storage until a better solution for high-level waste is found that protects the health of the public and environment.

Finally, the fact that USEC will also sell the nuclear fuel on international markets runs directly counter to the original reason for purchasing Soviet weapons grade material. The original intent of purchasing Russian fissile material is to prevent proliferation of nuclear capacities. Yet, plutonium is the byproduct of commercial nuclear reactions and can be used to fashion nuclear war-heads, albeit unsophisticated. Does the U.S. also plan to purchase all the plutonium that will result from USEC's sales? Although these issues are seemingly more political in nature than regulatory, these considerations should and must weigh heavily on NRC's decisions regarding nuclear safety and the USEC.

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6.) OB.IECTION TO TACIT AND UNREVIEWED ACCEPTANCE OF DOE OVERSFFING NUCI FAR SAFETY CURRENTLY AND DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD TO SLATED FULL PRIVATIZATION OF THE USEC Our concerns with the tacit and unreviewed acceptance of DOE overseeing nuclear safety currently and during the transition period to slated full privatization of the USEC are based on general concerns with DOE's regulatory abilities, or rather lack thereof. DOE is plagued with historic and current failures regarding oversight and managing nuclear materials as well as protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the public, workers and environment.

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i Our contentions are well supported. The conclusions of the report Barriers to Science: Technical

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Management of the Department of Energy Environmental Remediation Program, written by the research branch of the National Academy of Sciences asserts that the " DOE has an enormous pool of highly talented.

dedicated and experienced people working to meet [the technical] challenges" of environmental remediation.

but " fall short of not only of the ideal but of the standard of reasonable elTectiveness set by other organizations" with similar missions. Emphasis added. This highly respectable and credible report summarizes the " obstacles" faced by the Department in managing nuclear safety, environmental remediation 3

l in particular:

. An inability to look at more than one alternative at a time; Priorities driven by narrow interpretations of regulations, rather than the regulation's purpose of protecting health and the environment; Production of documents as an end in itself, rather than as a means to achieve a goal;

. Lack of organizational coordination;

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. Use of technical problems as excuses to obtain funding, rather than as obstacles to be overcome;

. Cleanup commitments that are made without consideration of technical feasibility, cost and j

schedule.

Reprintedfrom BNA Environmental Reporter 1-26-96 The DOE's response to the report is classic: writing an implementation plan to address the recommendations in 30 to 60 days. Following the habitual patterns the report criticized, DOE failed to hear or incorporate the Council's recommendations of not using documents as an end itself, examine multiple alternatives at the same time, etc. The conclusions formed by the Council and the DOE's typical reaction to this report, gives cause for great concern overall. The report suggested the need for " fundamental rethinking of the DOE Environmental Remediation structure" basing this suggestion on the Galvin Commission report j

of 1995. This conclusion is applicable to the entire scheme and structures of the DOE. Review of DOE i

oversight of the two gaseous plants must be addressed during the certification process and the potential cumulative negative impacts on the environment, and worker and public health / safety that will result from DOE continuing oversight of nuclear safety. To not include such an evaluation is irresponsible, resulting in a faulty and incomplete analysis of the certifiability of the two plants.

FINAL COMMENTS / REQUEST j

The exact role and responsibilities of the NRC and DOE as overseers of the two GDP's,in addition to any other agencies who have a role and/or hold responsibility for oversight of any and all aspects of the 1

two GDP's, is unclear at best. We respectfully request for the NRC to clearly explain the role and responsibility of any and all agencies involved with the two GDP's and the USEC. Along with this explanation, we would like exact cites to legislative authority that authorizes such agencies roles and responsibilites in regard to the two GDP's.

Also, we would like to know who is responsible for any releases in terms of liability, clean-up and i

4 costs of clean-up from the two GDP's? Who is responsible for waste disposal of any and all wastes from the two GDP's in terms of finances e.nd execution? Who is responsible for environmental monitoring and compliance enforcement?

Thank You, 4

Neilly Buckalew, MSEL Executive Director i

l cc: P.R.E.S.S., Woody Shurwood, Senator Glen, OH State Attorney General Patricia Paine, Dianna Salisbury, Military Production Network