ML20138H602
| ML20138H602 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1985 |
| From: | BROWN & ROOT, INC. (SUBS. OF HALLIBURTON CO.) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-I-CCANP-075, OL-I-CCANP-75, NUDOCS 8510290096 | |
| Download: ML20138H602 (3) | |
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tw a y" ASSESSMENT OF THE QUADREX LT DESIGN REVIEW OF THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT J
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Engineers e Constructors HOUSTON, T EX AS 8510290096 050715
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1 QUADREX FINDING NO. 4.1.2.1(b)
CIVIL / STRUCTURAL TECHNICAL ADEQUACY ASSESSMENT 1
In the Civil / Structural Discipline, the following findings are expected to seriously impact plant licensability:
(b) "There was no evidence of Civil / Structural T
evaluation of the reasonableness of postu-lated internal missiles or that the criteria for internal missiles presented in TRD 1N209RQO13-A had been implemented in the design (see Question C-9)."
i BROWN t, ROOT RESPONSE Brown r, Root disagrees with the above finding.
STMr f The first part of the finding alleges that the Civil / Structural Dis-cipline did not question the reasonableness of postulated missiles. The criteria for internal missiles in effect at STP were originally issued in January, 1975 as report A369RD002, " Internal Missiles". This document j
was revised and reissue /as TRD IN209RQ013-A in September, d
1975, and Srct'_aga.in, in
- April, 1919 Each time the document was issued, it was reviewed bV the Civil / Structural Discipline.
in performing a formal review of the document, the Civil / Structural Discipline evaluated the criteria, including the reasonableness of postulated missiles.
i i
Moreover, the reasonableness of postulated internal missiles is clearly i
demonstrated in the TRD and is based on design criteria requirements, as well as design philosophy. In the TRD, it is emphasized that, where possible, component and system design will preclude the generation of missiles.
This is achieved by suitable choice of materials, considera-i tion of normal and faulted stress levels, and definition of system and component characteristics that avoid missile-producing effects even under i'
faulted conditions, i
The TRD also gives the design requirements for internal missile protect-ion.
Potential missile sources and targets are to be determined after a review of the layout of safety related structures, systems, and compon-i ents has been completed. This determination will be accomplished through j
the use of Safety System Hazard Analysis drawings, which will identify missile sources and unacceptable targets, as well as other hazards.
l Protection devices will be designed where damage evaluation confirms the need for them.
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BROWN & ROOT RESPONSE 4.1.2.1(b) - CONT.
Prevention of pump impeller missiles is one example of the implementation of the TRD criteria. Motor driven pumps and compressors are driven by AC induction motors that cannot overspeed, thus decreasing the risk of generating a missile.
r it should also be noted that Quadrox's assessment of the Brown & Root response to Question C-9, cited in the above finding, does not in fact support the finding. In that assessment, Quadrex stated:
"It is evident that the Structural Discipline was handling the missile penetration problem in accor.
dance with industry practice and the state-of-the-art.
TRD IN209RQO13-A was reviewed and found to contain comprehensive design criteria for determining and protecting against internally generated missiles."
$TblT
-y Quadrex also alleges in the above finding that there was no evidence that the internal missile criteria had been implemented into the design.
This part of the finding is also clearly unfounded. A careful review of the project design records would have disclosed that the internal missile criteria have been incorporated into various aspects of the STP design minimize missile generation potentiabg Final incorporation of the 6p.g' tomissile' EritFria' into 'the des 7 n wouTd~have been accomplished based on
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9 the Safety Systems Hazards Program.
The timing of this activity is consistent with industry practice.
Given the above facts, it is clear that Brown L Root has adequately ad-dressed the problem of postulated internal missiles.
Accordingly, the above Quadrex finding is erroneous and will not impact plant licens-r ability.
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