ML20138H365

Intervenor Exhibit I-CCANP-82,consisting of Quadrex Findings Previously Reported Under 10CFR50.55(e)

ML20138H365
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	07/15/1985
From:	AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
References
OL-I-CCANP-082, OL-I-CCANP-82, NUDOCS 8510290020
Download: ML20138H365 (4)

Text

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QUADREX FINDINGS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED d

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UNDER 10 CFR 50.55(e) 3 i

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SIN QUADREX FINDING m

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The AFW pump motors to be located at (Jpj(r Report #67 3

,s low elevation in the IVC may not be

" Aux. Feedwater Pump Motor N %'.

3.1(1)(2)

)W qualified for the currently postulated Qualification"

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accident environment. No accident lt environmental analysis has been per-For forted for outside containment.

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ESF system components, this situation

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Incident Review Co r.ittee el. '? f 7 is not adequate.

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"Underdesigned Beem Con-

',,, g SER assum tions regarding MAB dead loads Report #12 may not be representative of actual condi-4.1.2.1(g) 1 l' 5 ys (

in reviewing the design of the nections for Category 1 v' 2 g

Structural Steel"

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tions, floor ele-ents in the MA8 and EAB, it was determined that although the final hg sid design may be adequate, there were areas

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where the calculations were hard to U'

follow and there was evidence the amp 11ffcation effects of vertical sef smic were not properly considered.

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See extensive Ht49 respense The coneon instrument air line, as depfcted toNRCtioestloh211.4re-in FSAR drawing 9.4.2-2 attached to Question 4.3.2.1(s) garding SB 5-1 R-5 does not meet the single failure criterton x

attach 279-1971 and 10 CFR 50 (see qg required by IEEE The occurrence of this de-(agdLdd Question E-lS). sign error in the late 1970's in concert withh 6

the BAR response to other single fatlure criterion questions suggests that B&R is r.ot 6

sufficiently experienced in the pertonrance of a Failure Mode and Effects Agglysis that

!!4 crosses discipline boundaries. OJ 4

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QUADREX FINDING HL&P REPORT

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's In most crganfrations, the !&C dis-cip1fne would detect and insnediately correct this type of design error by perfoming a rigomus examination of the separation provided between redundant divisions in the safety-related pcrtions of the plant for all involved disciplines.

4.3.2.3(g) SAR requires the vendor to interpret and

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implement applicable portions of indastry "J G Report (71) " Electrical standards (seeQuestionE-5).

It would Equip ent-Vendor Surveillance be more appropriate for BAR to provide Breakdown"

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detailed guidance to vendors,

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{49) " Breakdown in Quality

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Program Procurement Cycle

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Purchased Materials"

1. IC 4.5.5.lle) Althcugh vendor desfgn calculations and data submittals were receiving a techni-cal review by Brown and Root staff, there g,'.p are concerns about the adequacy of B&R's review (see Qaestions M-30, M-49. M-50 and M-51), and the general lack of docu-mentation regarding the depth ar.d fir. dings I

i of such reviews (see Question M-41).

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IJ 4.3.2./.(t).'lo formal procedures for the vendor docu-gg sentation review process exist (see Question 6,.!

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E-3). For example, the assignment and procedures for reviewing approving reliability

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evaluations within these disciplines was not l

made clear, yet vendors were being requested

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to subtit such evaluations (see STP document 3h099ES071-E. Section 3.4. and Question E-5).

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QUADREX FINDING o

9 Incident Review Committee M oo 4.4.2.4(r) Refinement of the reactor cavity f

Report #78 cooling system pressure drop g" (o

" Cooling of Primary Shield calculation appears to be neces-Penetrations" sary(seeQuestionH-15).

Incident Review Consnittee 4.1.2.3() Potential overconservatism was observed y4 Report #81 in the containment structure and cable tray areas (see Questions C-4 and C-18).

(A. 5 Cable Tray Support Design" The cable tray and conduit supports area was evaluated because of its potential impact on engineering and design manhours.

It is also an area that is frequently a bottle neck because of interfacing pro-h-

blems between Engineering and Construction.

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The syste s and procedures developed by 3rown and Root for cable tray and conduf t support designieem tG u ull-organized and utilized sound methodology for standardization. Ecw-ever, it is our judgment that the " standard" support system deve'oped by Brown and Root is overly conservative, and may cause increased construction cost and conclexities as compared with other industry designs. There seemed to be excessive longitudinal ecnnections between supports.

The division of responsibilities'for similar Incident Review Comittee 4.6.4.5(k)

1. 23 Report flow and beat transfer analyses between

" Safety Injection System Heavy Civil Nuclear Analymis, and Mechanical Emargency Sump Piping Design" l

Malysis of the compor.ziifccoifng water (CCW),

(ECW) and the essential awrflency cooling)wate[the potential to cause e

cooltngpend(ECP hat design interface protylems in these systems i

(see Question N-16)/

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