ML20138G533
| ML20138G533 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1985 |
| From: | Hodgdon A NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138G537 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#485-492 OL, NUDOCS 8512160347 | |
| Download: ML20138G533 (13) | |
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c UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ceCMETED NUCLEAR REGillATORY COMMISSION
!!S M c BEFORE THE COMMISSION 5 0513 P2:00 In the Matter of
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
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Docket Nos. 50-352 (/
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50-353 U (Linerick Generating Station,
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Units 1 and 2)
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- p IIRC STAFF RESPONSE TO R. L. ANTHONY / FRIENDS OF THE EARTH'S MOTION TO RE0 PEN THE RECORD AND TO STAY OPERATION
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Ann P. Hodgdon Counsel for NRC Staff December. 13, 1985 G512160347 851213 g
{DR ADOCK 05000352
. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the ~ Matter of.
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
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Docket Nos. 50-352
)
50-353 (Limerick Generating Station,
)
Units-1 and 2)
)
NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO R. L. ANTHONY / FRIENDS OF THE EARTH'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE-RECORD AND TO STAY OPERATION i
Ann P. Hodgdon Counsel for NRC Staff December 13, 1985 s
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
)
' PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
Docket Nos. 50-352
)
50-353 (Limerick Generating Station,
)
Units-1 and 2)
')
- NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO R. L. ANTHONY / FRIENDS OF THE EARTH'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE RECORD AND TO STAY OPERATION I.
INTRODUCTION By letter of October 31, 1985 addressed to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (Appeal Board), Licensee Philadelphia Electric Company forwarded copies of Licensee Event Report (LER) No.85-080, which concerns the Licensee's discovery of the potential for loss of the Con-trol Structure Chilled k!ater Systems in the event of flooding resulting from, among other possible causes, a cooling tower basin break. The Licensee explained that it was forwarding the LER to_the Appeal Board because of its indirect relationship to Contentions _V-3a and V-3b.
These contentions as litigated involved, inter alia, the ability of safety related structures to withstand thr. effects of postulated detonations resulting from the assumed rupture 4f' petroleum and natural gas transmis-sion lines' running through and/or near the plant site. Contentions V-3a and V-3b were proposed by R. L. Anthony / Friends of the Earth in the Dela-ware Valley (F0E) and were decided in the Licensee's favor in
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LBP-84-31. II This decision was affinned in relevant part by the Appeal Board in ALAB-819, decided October'22, 1985. 2_/ The Licensee also stated
'that the deficiencies discussed in the LER had been corrected and that no l
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further consideration by the Appeal Board was necessary.
On November 12, 1985, F0E filed a motion to reopen the record before L
the Appeal Board on the matters discussed in the LER and to stay opera-tion of the Unit 1 reactor. I The Appeal Board directed F0E's motion to the Commission. SI
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For the reasons discussed below, the Staff believes that F0E's mo-tion should be denied.
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l II. BACKGROUND In LBP-84-31, the Licensing Board decided two contentions proposed
'by Intervenor F0E in favor of the Licensee. F0E's Contentions V-3a and V-3b, as rewritten by the Licensing Board, state:
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V-3a.
In developing its analysis of the worst case rupture l
of the ARC 0 pipeline [which carries gasoline through the L
site), the Applicant- [in its FSAR] provided no basis for l
excluding consideration of siphoning. Thus, the consequences of the worst case pipeline accident are understated.
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1/
Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-31, 20 NRC 446(1984).
2/
Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC
, October 22, 1985.
3/
- Motion by R. L. Anthony /F0E to the Appeal Board to Reopen the P.ecord on Our Contentions V-3a and V-3b in the Light of New Informa-i tion in PEC0's Letter of 10-31/85 to the Board, and Motion for a Stay of Operation of Unit 1 Reactor," November 17, 1985.
4/
Philadelphia Electric Company, Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-823, 22 NRC
, November 19, 1985.
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V-3b.
In discussing deflagration of gas and petroleum due to pipeline rupture [of the ARC 0 pipeline or of the Columbia Gas pipeline, which carries methane in a gasecus state near the site,] no specific consideration has been given [in the FSAR]
to the effect of radiant heat upon the diesel generators and associated diesel fuel storage facilities.
20 NRC at 465..
The Licensing Board decided not only the matters raised by F0E, namely the effects of siphoning and the effects of radiant heat on the
- diesel generators and associated diesel fuel storage facilities, but also matters on which the Licensee and the Staff supplemented their testimony at.the Licensing Board's request, namely the ability of safety-related structures to withstand the effects of postulated detonations resulting from the' assumed ruptures of the ARCO and Columbia Gas transmission pipe-lines. See.20.NRC at 482-93,11 B B-90.
Considering a worst-case collapse of the cooling towers, which are not safety related, the Licens-ing Board concluded that such a failure would result in four feet of water in the turhine building if that building's north wall doors were open, but that.the ' water would not enter the s cactor building or control structure as the walls of these Category I structures are water and steam tight to above that level. Therefore, a detonation resulting in a worst-case cooling tewer collapse would not adversely impact the Licensee's j
ability to safely shut down the reactor.
S e, 20 NRC at 491,1 B-84..
In ALAB-819, the Appeal Board affinned the Licensing Board's deci-I e
sion regarding the lack of radiological safety significance of a leak in the Columbia Gas or ARC 0 pipeline. See, ALAB-819, slip op. at 78-100.
LER 85-080, reported on October 31, 1985 and forwarded to the Appeal Board on that same date, concerns an " event" that occurred on
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October 8, 1985. On that date,-the Licensee discovered that the poten-tial existed for the loss ~of both redundant Control Structure Chilled Water Systems j due to flooding of the chillers or circulating pumps S
caused by, among other things, a cooling tower basin break, with the
-resultant entry of water into the lower elevations of the plant Control Structure.
Entry of water into the Control Structure would have been possible on that date because of the continuing incomplete construction status of Unit 2 and the deferral of final site grading.
The Licensee states in its LER that it has responded to the postu-lated loss in two ways:
- 1) by taking corrective measures to preclude the loss of the Control Structure Chilled Water Systems and 2) by developing a procedure to specifically respond to the loss of Control Structure cooling. LER 85-080 at A-1, A-5.
Further, the Licensee states that loss of the Control Structure Chilled Water Systems would not have prevented the safe shutdown of the plant. LER 85-080 at A-2.
III. DISCUSSION A.
The Commission's standards for reopening a closed record are well established.
The legal standards governing the consideration of motions to reopen are well defined. The Appeal Board has observed that "[a]fter a decision 5]
The Control Structure Chilled Water System (CSCWS) consists of water chiller units, circulating pumps and tanks. The system provides chilled water to the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems for the control room, auxiliary equipment room, emer-gency switchgear compartment, battery room and standby gas treatment system compartment and access areas. FSA,R at 9.2.10.
. has been rendered, 'a dissatisfied litigant who seeks to persuade us -- or
- any tribunal for that matter -- to reopen a record and reconsider 'be-cause some new circumstances has arisen, some new trend has been observed or some new fact. discovered,' nas a difficult burden to bear."
! Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-359, 4 NRC 619, 620 (1976).
For a motion to reopen to succeed, the movant must demonstrate that such a result is warranted upon a consideration of three factors:
(1) whether the motion is timely; (2) whether the motion addresses a significant safety or environmental issue; and (3) whether a different result might have been reached had the newly proffered material been considered initially. Louisiana Power and Light Company (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-753, 18 NRC 1321, 1324 (1983);
Metropolitan' Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1),
ALAB-738, 18 NRC 177, 180 (1983).
Further, a motion to reopen based on bare allegations cannot suc-ceed; rather, the motion must be supported by "significant new evidence."
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-5, 13 NRC 361, 362-63 (1981).
Finally, it should be noted that in ruling on a motion to reopen, the Commission may take into account affidavits and other evidentiary material as if ruling on a motion for summary disposition, and the motion should not' be granted "if the undisputed facts establish that the appar-ently significant... issue does not exist, has been resolved, or for some other reason will have no effect upon.the outcome of the licensing o
a proceeding." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear
~ Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 523 (1973).
8.
F0E's motion to reopen on Contentions V-3a and V-3b should be denied.
Application of the foregoing principles to F0E's motion to reopen the record on Contentions V-3a and V-3b demonstrates that the motion should be denied.
In this regard, the Staff addresses each of the three standards seriatim.
1.
Timeliness The letter forwarding LER 85-080 to the Appeal Board is dated October 31, 1985, which is also the date of the LER.
F0E's motion is dated November 12, 1985.
Thus, upon receiving a copy of the LER, F0E
. appears to.have proceeded in a timely fashion to prepare and submit its
-motion. Therefore, the Staff believes that F0E's motion is timely filed.
2.
Safety significance F0E states in its motion that the " cooling system equipment" is
" essential for safe shutdown." Motion at 1.
The Licensee states in LER 85-080 that "The loss of the CSCWS would not have prevented the safe shutdown of the plant." The Staff agrees with the Licensee that the CSCWS is not required to shut the plant down. 5/ However, the system 6/
As stated supra ~at 4, n.5, the CSCWS provides chilled water to the HVAC systems for certain areas of the plant so as to maintain the stipulated ambient air temperatures in those areas. FSAR at 9.2.10.
Prior to the Licensee's discovery of the " event" reported in LER 85-080, the loss of the chillers with no corrective action by the plant staff would have resulted in a gradual rise in the temper-
.(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
, does have safety significance within the meaning of the second standard for reopening. Nevertheless, even though the issue on which F0E seeks to reopen has safety significance, the attached affidavits of Rex G. Wescott and Peter' C. Hearn : establish that the issue has been resolved ~to the Staff's-satisfaction and that the " event" of October 8,1985 is no longer an issue. Mr. Wescott states-in his Affidavit that the barriers installed by the Licensee will protect the Unit 2 turbine building from entrance of water up.to el 220 feet and' that the Probable Maximum Precip-
-itation (PMP) event or a cooling tower basin failure would result in a
- peak water level of el 218.3 feet. Wescott Affidavit, t 6.
Thus, nei-ther the PMP event or a cooling tower basin failure would result in water intrusion in the Unit 2 turbine building or the Control Structure in quantities sufficient to cause significant flooding. Wescott Affidavit, 1 10. Mr. Heern'- Affidavit describes the measures taken by the Licensee to protect the Unit 2 turbine building and the Control Structure from the intrusion of water: namely, (i) the sealing of the rolling steel door on the east wall of the Unit 2 turbine building by means of a 3-foot-high l
barrier consisting of 8-in. I-Beams on 18-in. centers with ' corrugated steel sheathing; (ii) installation of similar barriers in the turbine building behind the three temporary construction openings and the two (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) atures of the affected areas of the plant, particularly under as-sumed design basis meteorological conditions..The Licensee states that it has taken corrective action to prevent loss of the CSCWS and, as a further measure of assurance, has formulated procedures that address the loss of the Control Structure cooling.
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rolling doors in the north wall to prevent water leaking through the construction openings and rolling doors from reaching the Control Struc-ture; (iii) sealing of the steam line blow out panels by barriers con-sisting of 8-in. I-Beams on 18-in. centers with steel sheathing; and (iv) installation of a 3-in. high concrete grout ramp on the interior side of each of the two personnel doors to minimize inleakage through the doors, liearn Affidavit, 11 3-6.
Mr.11 earn concludes that plant safety related equipment will remain functional after the design basis flooding event described in the Limerick FSAR. licarn Affidavit, 1 7.
As Vermont Yankee, supra, makes clear, reopening need not take place on an issue that has been resolved.
F0E has not, therefore, prevailed on the second standard for-determining whether a closed record should be reopened.
3.
Likelihood of a different result The third standard that a petitioner for reopening must address is whether a different result iright have been reached if the newly prof-fered material had been considered initially. F0E argues that LBP-84-31 is no longer valid as the Licensing Board had found in that decision that flooding of the Control Structure was not a possibility. Motion at 1.
In fact, however, the Licensing Board's findings are valid for the long-term configuration of the facility once final grading is achieved. U In U
The Licensing Board found that even with the north wall turbine building doors open so as to pemit 4 feet of water on the floor of the turbine building, there would be no entrance of water into the reactor building or the Control Structure, as those Category 1 structures ~are water-and steam-tight to above that level.
20 NRC 491, i R-84.
This finding is valid for the configuration of (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
A
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-9 the interim, the safety related equipment in the Control Structure will be protected from flooding by other methods not explicitly considered'by the Licensing' Board. See, Hearn Affidavit at 11 3-6, and discussion supra. Thus, the result reached in LBP-84-31 regarding the effect on safety related equipment due to failure of the cooling towers would not have ~been different had the information in LER 85-080 been considered initially. 8_/ Accordingly, F0E has not prevailed on the third standard governing motions to reopen.
4.
Summary Although F0E's motion is timely, it does not raise an issue of current safety significance. Further, consideration of the matters raised by F0E would not change the result as reached in LBP-84-31 and (F0OTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) the facility once final grading is achieved.
In the interim, the intrusion of water into the Control Structure is prevented by seal-ing certain openings in the turbine building, as explained in the attached affidavits.
In any event, the validity of the concluding statement in Finding B-84. is not affected by the LER and its resolu-tion.
In the event of a 50-foot breach in the cooling tower basin wall, there would be "no adverse impact on the ability to safely shut down the reactor."
I_d.; Hearn Affidavit, 1 7.
8/
In its Motion F0E also makes reference to NRC Inspection Report No. 050-352/85-30, 050-353/85-07, which concerns the inadvertent draining of water from a Unit 1 equipment drain collection tank through a manual vent valve to the Unit 2 pipe tunnel and access room.
F0E provides no information showing a nexus between the In-spection Report item and the event described in LER 85-080, which is the basis for F0E's motion, nor does the Staff perceive a nexus between the subject of the Inspection Report, leakage of water through the manual vent valve, and that of the LER, the potential for flooding from external sources sufficient to flood the CSCWS.
I af firmed in ALAB-819. Thus, the motion fails to satisfy the reopening standards and should be denied. EI C.
F0E has failed to provide support for its motion to stay operation.
F0E has failed to address the criteria applicable to motions for stays. pursuant to the Commission's regulations in 10 C.F.R. % 2.788.
F0E's sole attempt to address the need for a stay is based on the mistak-en belief that the equipment addressed in LER 85-080 is essential to shut the reactor down safely. 10/ See, Motion at 1.
As discussed above and in the accompanying affidavits, the equipment of concern performs a func-tion different from that envisioned by F0E:
its inoperability does not
~9/
The Licensee argues that F0E's motion should be denied because it does not address the five factors for considering the admissibility of new late-filed contentions. Licensee's Answer at 5.
In support of this argument, the Licensee cites to Appeal Board dicta that the Licensing Board's findings on V-3a and V-3b " extended well beyond the four corners of Contentions V-3a and V-3b."
See, ALAB-819 at 79.
In the Staff's view, this argument lacks merit even if the Appeal Board's characterization of the Licensing Board's findings is valid.
The Licensing Board carried F0E's contentions regarding the radiological safety effects of a pipeline break to a very conserva-tive bounding conclusion. No party appealed on any issue concerning the extent of the Licensing Board's consideration of the concerns raised in F0E's contentions.
The matters on which F0E now seeks to reopen are related to mr cters that were litigated. Therefore, F0E should not now be required to make the showing required of interve-nors seeking to raise new, late-filed contentions by means of a motion to reopen.
10/ On December 11, 1985, the Staff received a copy of F0E's " Opposition to the Extention [ sic] of Time for NRC Staff to Answer Our Petition to Reopen the Record on Contentions V-3a and V-3b," dated December 4, 1985.
In its " Opposition," F0E requests the Commission to impose a temporary stay of Limerick Unit 1 operation without waiting for the Staff's response.
F0E's " Opposition" adds nothing to the stay request that it has already put before the Commission as a part of its motion to reopen.
preclude taking the reactor to a shutdown condition. Thus, F0E has shown no basis for staying operation of the Unit I reactor.
IV. CONCLUSION As discussed above, F0E has~ failed to make the showings required of a party seeking to reopen the record and to stay operation. Accordingly, F0E's motion should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
~ 7. A 1 L>~
3 Ann _P. Hodgdon Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 13th day of December, 1985 I
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