ML20138E693
| ML20138E693 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/18/1985 |
| From: | Roberts J NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Rouse L NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| REF-PROJ-M-37 NUDOCS 8510250083 | |
| Download: ML20138E693 (3) | |
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Docket Noi M-37 KMSS R/F C.771 E r-R'AF R/F FBrown (LA File)
Beveridge/ Cornell 1-23 PDR JPRoberts MEMORANDUM FOR:
Leland C. Rouse, Chief Advanced Fuel and Spent Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety FROM:
John P. Roberts Advanced Fuel and Spent Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety
SUBJECT:
MEETINGS WITH BUNDESANSTALT FOR MATERIAL PRUFUNG (BAM)
DATE AND TIME:
October 3-4, 1985; 9:00am LOCATION:
BAM, 87 Unter den Eichen, Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
ATTENDEES:
See Enclosure 1 PURPOSES:
- 1) To discuss final arrangements for NRC to rely on BAM as an agent for inspection for dry storage casks produced in the FRG;
- 2) To discuss problems and actions to be taken with regard to damage to a CASTOR V/21, dry storage cask.
DISCUSSIONS:
The meeting on October 3, 1985 regarding BAM acting as an agent for NRC in the inspection of dry cask fabrication went ahead with no disagreement.
The mechanism for the actions, which are to be initiated on a case by case basis, would be the submittal to the Quality Assurance Branch (QUAB), Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement, of a Quality Assurance Topical Report by a cask vendor.
Such a report would be reviewed by both BAM and NRC. A full report of this meeting is being prepared by G.T. Ankrum Chief, QUAB.
Subsequent to this meeting I received word by telephone from NRC headquarters in Washington that during the cask demonstration of the CASTOR V/21 at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), the basket of the cask had sustained possible damage. Cracks in, or in the immediate vicinity of, weld positions had been observed at up to eight locations at the top of basket.
At this time only Karol Wieser and I remained, since the original meeting had ended. We examined the drawing of the basket and discussed basket fabrication with Gesellschaft fur Nuklear - Service mbH (GNS) by telephone.
R. Bittner of GNS had remained at BAM, and was contacted. We agreed to meet with General Nuclear Service, Inc. and GNS personnel to discuss the matter the next day, i
8510250083 851018 PDR PRDJ M-37 PDR
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i On October 4, 1985, a second meeting was held with Messrs. Ankrum and Rodel not present.
It was agreed that the incident at INEL needed to be investigated and analyzed prior to cask certification of the CASTOR V/21 by BAM in the FRG or any license for storage to be issued by the NRC in the United States. A report to both BAM and NRC fron GNS/GNSI on this incident clarifying reasons for the occurrence of the crack and tying this to the cask safety analysis report is expected to be suppliea by GNS/GNSI.
4 From information received by telephone from NRC, it appeared that the cask in question at INEL had been operated at a thermal load exceeding the design limit of 21kW and that fuel handling and loading were also conducted under different conditions than those specified in the GNSI topical safety analysis report.
Additionally, a fill gas other than helium as specified in the TSAR, i.e.,
nitrogen, was reported to have been used.
Thus the GNS/GNSI report to BAM and NRC is expected to cover operational procedures to resolve whether these were a problem as well as to provide calculations on the thermal load conditions.
It should be noted that BAM/NRC examinations of the inspection documentation for the cask basket welds showed that inspection of the welds suspected of being damaged had been made at the time of basket fabrication and then checked independently. The welds were found to be intact at that time.
In summary, information as to what occurred with respect to the cask needs to be obtained and analyzed. Other steps, as may be determined, may be required for the vendor to adequately report on this incident.
Full cooperation was received from GNS/GNSI personnel during our meetings. While both BAM and NRC must operate under their own national systems with respect to their separate authorities for licensing, there was also full cocoeration between BAM and NRC staff. We had the same safety concerns, and we worked together to satisfy them.
Origina101c::cd By John P. Roberts Advanced Fuel and Spent Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety l
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NAME:JFydberts d.
DATE:10/;g/85 i n /l? /pn
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY I
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I ATTACHMENT 1 1
Attendees j
K. Wieser B6M R. R0 del TUV A. Bonifaccio GNSI/ Chem-Nuclear K. Kingsley GNSI/ Chem Nuclear R. Bittner GNSI/GNS G.T. Ankrum NRC/IE J. Roberts NRC/NMSS j
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