ML20138E476
| ML20138E476 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138E468 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-97-01, 50-313-97-1, 50-368-97-01, 50-368-97-1, NUDOCS 9705020239 | |
| Download: ML20138E476 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1997001
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ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.:
50-313;50-368
License Nos.:
7
Report No.:
50-313/97-01; 50-368/97-01
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2
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Location:
Junction of Hwy. 64W and Hwy. 333 South
Russellville, Arkansas -
Dates:
February 2 through March 15,1997
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Inspectors:
K. Kennedy, Senior Resident inspector
J. Melfi, Resident inspector
S. Burton, Resident inspector
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Approved By:
Elmo E. Collins, Chief, Project Branch C
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Division of Reactor Projects
ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information
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9705020239 970429
ADOCK 05000313
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-313/97-01; 50-368/97-01
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This routine announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering,
maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Operations
The conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Evolutions such
as surveillances and plant power changes were well controlled, deliberate, and
performed in accordance with procedures. Shift turnover briefs were
comprehensive and were typicall! attended by a chemistry technician, a health
physics technician, and a representative from system engineering. Housekeeping
was generally good and discrepancies were promptly corrected. Safety systems
were found to be properly aligned. The implementation of hold card controls was in
accordance with procedures (Section 01.1).
The licensee's administrative controls were effective in maintaining containment
penetration isolation valves locked in their proper position (Section 01.2).
The licensee effectively controlled the number and age of temporary alterations
(Section 01.3).
Unit 2 operators performed very well during the performance of a semiannual test of
the emergency diesel generator (Section 04.1).
Maintenance
Observed maintenance activities were performed well and in accordance with
procedures (Section M1).
Unit 2 instrumentation and control technicians demonstrated a lack of attention to
detail during the performance of two excore safety channel calibration surveillances
which resulted in the failure to identify and correct measured readings which were
out of tolerance. This is a violation (Section M1.4).
The licensee identified that they had failed to perform periodic testing of
safety-related backup air accumulators associated with dampers in the control room
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emergency ventilation system. This item is unresolved pending further review of a
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similar finding identified in 1990 (Section M2.1).
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Enaineerina
The licensee performed proper inspections and took appropriate radiological surveys
during the receipt of new fuel for Unit 2 (Section E1.1).
Plant Support
Locked high radiation areas were properly locked, areas were properly posted, and
personnel demonstrated proper radiological work practices (Section R1.1).
The licensee implemented proper physical security measures associated with the
integrity of protected area barriers, personnel and package access, and personnel
searches (Section S1.1).
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Report Details
Summarv of Plant Status
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On February 7,1997, Unit 1
operators decreased power to 86 percent to replace a circuit board in the main turbine
electrohydraulic control system. Power was returned to 100 percent on the same day. On
March 1, power was reduced at the request of the system dispatcher due to extensive
tornado damage to offsite transmission lines. This damage was not in the vicinity of the
plant. By March 2, reactor power was at 53 percent. On March 5, power was reduced to
40 percent to perform maintenance on the main feedwater pumps. Power was raised to
56 percent on March 6. Over the remainder of the period, the system dispatcher allowed
Unit 1 operators to incrementally increase power. By the end of the inspection period,
Ur.it 1 was at approximately 86 percent power.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 97 percent power, where it remained throughout the
inspection period.
l. Operations
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Conduct of Operations
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01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors observed various aspects of plant operations, including compliance
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with Technical Specifications; conformance with plant procedures and the safety
analysis report; shift manning; communications; management oversight; proper
system configuration and configuration control; housekeeping; and operator
performance during routine plant operations, the conduct of surveillances, and plant
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The conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Evolutions such
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as surveillances and plant power changes were well controlled, deliberate, and
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performed in accordance with procedures. Shift turnover briefs were
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comprehensive and were typically attended by a chemistry technician, a health
physics technician, and a representative from system engineering. Housekeeping
was generally good and discrepancies were promptly corrected. Safety systems
were found to be properly aligned and the implementation of hold card controls was
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in accordance with procedures. Specific events and noteworthy observations are
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detailed below.
01.2 Walkdown of Unit 2 Containment Penetration Isolation Valves
a.
Insoection Scope (71707)
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During this inspection period, the inspectors performed a thorough walkdown of the
Unit 2 containment penetration isolation valves to verify that they were in the
correct position and properly locked. References used to perform this walkdown
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included system drawings and Procedure 1015.034, Revision 2, " Containment
Penetration Administrative Controls," Supplement 1, "Outside Containment
Penetration Checklist."
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors found that all accessible valves were in their proper position and
locked.
c.
Conclusions
The licensee effectively maintained containment penetration isolation valves locked
in their proper position.
01.3 Unit 1 - Review of Temocrary Alterations
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a.
Inspection Scone (71707)
The inspectors reviewed Unit 1 temporary alterations to verify that the
modifications were appropriately controlled,
b.
Observations and Findings
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The inspectors found that the licensee appropriately tracked the status of temporary
alterations and had performed 10 CFR 50.59 reviews in accordance with
Procedure 1000.028, Revision 19, " Control of Temporary Alterations."
The inspectors found that the licensee had 12 active temporary alterations,8 of
which were less than 12 months old, 2 were between 12 and 24 months old, and
2 were older than 24 months. The older temporary alterations were on
nonsafety-related systems and were controlled in accordance with the licensee's
procedures.
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c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the number of active temporary alterations was not
excessive, the licensee followed procedural requirements, and temporary alterations
were apprcpriatc!y reviewed.
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04
Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1
Unit 2 - EDG Surveillance
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a.
Inspection _Scooe (71707)
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On March 5-7,1997, the inspectors observed Unit 2 operators conduct
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Procedure 2104.036, Revision 41, " Emergency Diesel Generator Operations,"
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Supplement 1C, "2DG1 Semi-annual Test (Fast Start)."
b.
Observations and Findinas
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On March 5, Unit 2 operators began a semiannual surveillance test of Emergency
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Diesel Generator (EDG) 2DG1. An offshift reactor operator was assigned to
coordinate the performance of this test. The prejob brief was professional,
comprehensive, and included a review of the procedural steps, communications,
duties of personnel participating in the test, lessons learned from previous tests,
and the results from the last test.
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The inspectors observed test preparations performed by an auxiliary operator in the
EDG room. The operator demonstrated good knowledge of the EDG a '.d supporting
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systems. Prior to the actual start of the EDG, the Unit 2 shift superintendent
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suspended the performance of the test while Unit 1 operators reduced power to
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perform maintenance on the main feedwater pumps. The surveillance test was
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recommenced and completed on March 7. Operators demonstrated very good
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communications, system knowledge, and proper use of the test procedure.
c.
Conclusions
Unit 2 operators performed very well during the performance of the semiannual test
of the EDG.
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Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)
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08.1 (Closed) Violation 50-313/9407-01. "Feedwater Reactor Buildina Isolation Valve
Found Not Locked"
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The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response
letter, dated November 4,1994, to be reasonable and, with one exception,
complete. Although the licensee had implemented administrative controls to
maintain vents and drains on piping which penetrates the reactor building locked,
they had not yet developed permanent administrative controls for these valves.
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This action remains incomplete pending the development of an Entergy-wide
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process for the control of these vent and drain line valves. The results will be
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reviewed during a future inspection (Inspection Followup Item 50-313/9701-01).
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11. Maintenance
M1
Conduct of Maintenance
M 1.1 General Comments (62707)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance activities:
Units 1 and 2 - Job Order 00960060, " Cleaning of 2VE-14, Control Room
Condenser," performed on March 13,1997.
Unit 1 - Job Order 00960808, Repair of Jacket Cooling Water Heat
Exchanger E20A-2, performed on March 12.
Unit 2 - Job Order 00958991, Replacement of Card A1 in the Excore
Channel A Safety Drawer, performed on March 6.
Observed maintenance activities were performed well and in accordance with
procedures. In addition, see the specific discussions of maintenance observed
under Section M1.2 below:
M 1.2 Unit 1 - Repair EDG A Jacket Coolina Water Heat Exchanaer E20A-2
a.
Inspection Scone (62707)
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On February 16,1997, the licensee identified that a 1/2 gallon per day leak existed
in the EDG A jacket cooling water heat exchanger, allowing the jacket cooling water
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to leak to the service water system. The inspectors observed a portion < the
maintenance activity to repair this leak.
b.
Observations and Findinas
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The licensee found a damaged gasket on Jacket Cooling Water Heat
Exchanger E20A-2, which allowed leakage into the service water system. The
licensee replaced the gasket and restored the system to service.
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The inspectors observed that the licensee followed their procedures and were
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knowledgeable on the task. Due to a degraded petcock vent valve on the hea*.
exchanger, the licensee initiated a scope addition to Job Order 00960808 ano
replaced the heat exchanger petcock valves with a newer ball valve.
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c.
Conclusions
The repair of the jacket cooling water heat exchanger was performed well and in
accordance with the procedure.
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M1.3 General Comments on Surveillance Activities
a.
Inspection Scope (61726)
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The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
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Unit 1 - Procedure 1607.012, Revision 5, " Sampling of the Borated Water
Storage Tank (BWST)," on February 11,1997.
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Unit 1 - Procedure 1304.076, Revision 14, " Unit 1 Channel Test of
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Containment Purge Rx 9820 (SPING 1)," on February 20.
Unit 1 - Procedure 1304.128, Revision 11, " Unit 1 RPS-D CRD Breaker Trip
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Test," on March 13.
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Unit 2 - Procedure 2304.104, Revision 17, " Unit 2 Excores Safety Channel A
Calibration," Supplement 2, " Refueling Interval Calibration," performed on
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March 6.
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The inspectors found that, with one exception, the surveillances were correctly
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performed in accordance with the applicable procedures. Personnel were
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knowledgeable and generally demonstrated effective communications, self-
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checking, and peer-checking. When conducted, prejob briefs were comprehensive.
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in addition, see the specific discussion of maintenance observed under
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Section M1.4, below.
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M 1.4 Unit 2 - Excores Safety Channel Calibration
a.
Inspection Scope (61726)
The inspectors observed Unit 2 intrumentation and control (l&C) technicians
perform Procedure 2304.104, Revision 17, " Unit 2 Excores Safety Channel A
Calibration," Supplement 2, " Refueling Interval Calibration," on March 6,1997.
b.
Observations and Findined
The inspectors observed that the prerequisites and initial conditions described in
Procedure 2304.104, Supplement 2, were properly established for the performance
of the surveillance. Control room operators entered the appropriate Technical
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Specification during the performance of the test. The inspectors observed
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technicians make adjustments to place the measured parameter in the center of the
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tolerance band, even if the parameter did not initially fall outside of the band.
The inspectors observed two errors during this test. Step 8.4.2.G directed the
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technicians to measure and record a voltage and to adjust Potentiometer R18 as
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necessary. Although the measured reading fell within the required tolerance, the
technicians chose to adjust the potentiometer to place the reading in the middle of
the tolerance band. The technicians found that the potentiometer was not labelled
on the circuit board. The technicians appropriately called the I&C shop to determine
the location of Potentiometer R18 on the circuit board; however, the shop personnel
made an error in reading the schematic diagram for that circuit and provided the
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incorrect location of the potentiometer to the technicians. When the technicians
adjusted the incorrect potentiometer, they recognized that they were not gettir;g the
desired results. The technicians identified the correct potentiometer and properly
recovered from the adjustments made to the wrong potentiometer. The inspectors
noted that Procedure 2304.104 did not provide any information to assist the
technicians in locating the correct potentiometer. The technicians later submitted a
procedure improvement form to add a picture of the circuit card with the
potentiometers labelled to Procedure 2304.104.
During the calibration of the rate calibrate circuitry, the technician f ailed to
recognize that the "as-found" voltage recorded in Step 8.4.2.P.1 was not within the
minimum and maximum voltage tolerances as stated in the same step. The
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technician placed a check mark in the "as-left" column, indicating that no
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adjustment was necessary, and proceeded on to the next step. When questioned
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by the inspectors, the technician realized the error, reperformed the step, and made
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the required adjustment to return the value to within the tolerance band. The
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inspectors noted that, at the end of the procedure, Step 9.13 requires the cognizant
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supervisor to check all setpoints and tolerances and verify that they are within the
limits specified or to note any exceptions on Form 1025.009B, " List of Equipment
Found Out of Tolerance." This was an independent review of the data taken during
the test, which provided a barrier that the inspectors concluded could have
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identified this error.
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The licensee identified additional examples in which !&C technicians f ailed to
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idcntify readings which were out of tolerance and, as a result, did not make the
necessary adjustments. Technicians commenced Procedure 2304.105,
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Revision 16, " Unit 2 Excores Safety Channel B Calibration," on February 14. As a
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result of problems with the procedure, the procedure was only partially completed,
and completion of the test was delayed until the next Channel B work week,
scheduled fo March 10. On March 7, during a review of the partially completed
test, the licensee identified that voltages measured in Steps 8.3.4.A and 8.3.5.8 of
Procedure 2304.105, Supplement 2, were out of tolerance and had not been
identified by the I&C technicians who performed the test. As a result, adjustments
required by the procedure were not made to return the readings to within the proper
tolerances. Channel B was subsequently returned to service. The inspectors noted
that, since the procedure had not been completed, the supervisory review required
by the procedure had not been performed. The licensee did not have controls to
ensure that supervisory reviews of partially completed test procedures were
performed. The licensee also identified that some steps which had been completed
had not been initialed by the technician. The licensee initiated Condition
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Report 2-97-0077 to document the f ailure to identify the out-of-tolerance readings
and determined that the equipment remained operable since the out-of-tolerance
readings did not cause the accuracy of the instrumentation to be outside the
acceptable range allowed by Technical Specifications. The failure of the l&C
technicians to identify the out-of-tolerance readings and make the required
adjustments, as required by Procedure 2304.105, was determined to be a violation
of Technical Specification 6.8.1 (50-368/9701-02).
In response to these findings, the licensee met with l&C supervisors and technicians
on March 10 to discuss the errors and the lack of attention to detail. The licensee
implemented new guidelines for supervisory review of completed and partially
completed procedures and planned to evaluate further corrective actions to address
improvements in peer reviews, self checking, and supervisory review of activities,
c.
Conclusions
Unit 2 l&C technicians demonstrated a lack of attention to detail during the
performance of two excore safety channel calibration surveillances, which resulted
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in the failure to identify and correct measured readings which were out of tolerance.
M 1.5 Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance
Maintenance activities were performed well and in accordance with procedures.
With one exception, surveillances were correctly performed in accordance with the
apolicable procedures. Personnel were knowledgeable and generally demonstrated
effective communications, self-checking, and peer-checking. When conducted,
prejob briefs were comprehensive. Unit 2 l&C technicians demonstrated a lack of
attention to detail during the performance of excore safety channel calibration
surveillances, which resulted in the f ailure to identify and correct measured readings
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which were out of tolerance.
M2
Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M 2.1 Units 1 and 2 - Failure to Test Safetv-Related Accumulators
a.
Insoection Scope (61726, 62707)
On February 5,1997, the licensee discovered that they had not been performing a
procedurally required 18-month test of the control room emergency ventilation
external ali dampers to verify that backup air bottles would maintain these dampers
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shut upon a loss uf instrument air. Subsequent testing revealed excessive leakage
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from one of the backup air supplies. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
response to the excessive leakage, the reasons why the 18-month test had not
been performed, and the basis for performing the test.
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b.
Observations and Findinos
The control room emergency ventilation system includes Units 1 and 2 Emergency
Fan and Filters VSF-9 and 2VSF-9, respectively. Dampers CV-7010
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and 2PCD-8607B are external air dampers for Emergency Fan Filters VSF-9
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and 2VSF-9, respectively, which control a filtered air supply path for pressurizing
the control rooms during emergency ventilation system operation. The air supplied
by these dampers makes up for air leakage out of the control room. Unit 1
instrument air supplies the motive force for these dampers. In the event that a
recirculation fan fails, the associated outside air damper must be closed to prevent a
loss of control room pressurization. Each damper which fails open on a loss of
instrument air has a reserve bottle of carbon dioxide (Accumulators VRA-1 A
and 2VRA-1B) to provide a closing force for the damper in the event that Unit 1
instrument air is lost. The backup air bottles are designed to maintain the dampers
closed for a minimum of 30 days if their associated emergency fan filter unit is not
in operation. A three-way solenoid valve associated with Dampers SV-7910
and 2SV-8607B-1 controls the source of air provided to the damper.
An operational safety team inspection conducted by the NRC in September 1990
(NRC inspection Report 50-313/90-24; 50-368/90-24) and a subsequent followup
inspection conducted in October 1990 (NRC Inspection Report 50-313/90-38;
50-368/90-38) identified that the licensee failed to test certain safety-related
instrument air check valves in the control room heating, ventilat'cn, and air
conditioning system and did not provide an accurate response to Generic Letter 88-14, " Instrument Air Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-Related
Equipment." NRC Inspection Report 50-313/90 24; 50-368/90-24 indicated that
the licensee's response to Generic Letter 88-14 stated that the surveillances
conducted at ANO on "Q" (i.e., safety related) components verified the operability
of air-operated, instrument air systems. The report identified four instrument air
check valves that were not being tested, as well as Solenoid-Operated
Valves SV-7910 and 2SV-86078-1. On December 17,1990, a Severity Level 111
violation was issued to the licensee for providing inaccurate information regarding
the testing of air-operated, safety-related components and a failure to identify a
significant condition adverse to quality.
In response to the findings of these inspections, the licensee wrote Condition
Report C-90-0089 on September 22,1990, to document the fact that they were
not performing tests to verify that Dampers CV-7910 and 2PCD-86078 could be
maintained closed for 30 days upon a loss of instrument air. The licensee wrote
Work Plan 1409.282 to test Accumulators VRA-1 A and 2VRA-18. The as-found
condition of the accumulator and damper assemblies satisfied the acceptance
criteria of the test to maintain the dampers closed for 12 days, and Emergency Fan
Filters VSF-9 and 2VSF-9 were determined to be operable.
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One of the condition report corrective actions was to provide a procedure for the
periodic testing of the damper air consumption for Accumulators VRA-1 A
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and 2VRA-1B to verify that system integrity was maintained. The periodicity was
specified to be a maximum of 18 months. Procedure 1304.175, "ANO-1 Damper
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Air Consumption Test of VRA-1 A and 2VRA-1B," was written and became effective
on October 15,1991. The procedure indicated that the test was to be performed
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at 18-month intervals.
On February 5,1997, the licensee discovered that an 18-month test contained in
Procedure 1304.175, Revision 0, "ANO-1 Damper Air Consumption Test of VRA-1 A
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and 2VRA-18," was not being performed. Procedure 1304.175 isolates the
instrument air to the damper, aligns the backup bottle to close the damper, and
measures the leakage from Accumulators VRA-1 A and 2VRA-1B to verify the ability
to maintain Dampers CV-7910 and 2PCD-86078 closed upon a loss of instrument
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air. The acceptance criteria for this test is that the leakage rate over any 6-hour
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period shall be equal to or less than 1.68 psig/ hour for a total of 10 psig in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
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On February 7 the licensee performed the 18 month test on each of the
accumulators in accordance with Procedure 1304.175. The results of the test
revealed that Damper CV 7910 met the acceptance criteria and
Damper 2PCD-8607B exceeded the acceptance criteria. The pressure drop in the
accumulator associated with Damper 2PCD-8607B was 11.3 psig in the first hour
of the test. The operators installed a blocking plate in the inlet path to Emergency
Filter Fan 2VSF-9 to provide control room isolation. This action rendered one train
of control room emergency air filtration inoperable and operators entered the
associated Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications. On Februsry 7, the licensee
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replaced Solenoid Valve 2SV-86078-1, reperformed the leakage test satisfactorily,
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removed the blocking plate, and declared the system opercole.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's past-operability evaluation for
Accumulator 2VRA-1B, which determined that, given the leakage measured during
the test performed on February 7, Damper 2PCD-8607B would remain shut for
2.71 days. The evaluation concluded that this was a sufficient duration to identify
the condition and restore the Unit 1 instrument air system to service. The
inspectors verified that the licensee had alarms to identify a loss of instrument air,
procedural guidance for shifting the damper air supply to the backup carbon dioxide
bottle and monitoring the bottle pressure, and procedural guidance to take
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compensatory actions if bottle pressure decreased to 100 psig.
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The inspectors noted that Calculation 90-E-0072-02, " Calculation for ANO-1
Control Room Dampers CV-7910 and 2PCD-8607B Allowable Leakage Form High
Pressure Accumulators," was used as a reference in the development of
Procedure 1304.175. The inspectors found that an assumption made in the leakage
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calculation was that the dampers would remain closed for 30 days. The calculation
revealed that the allowable leakage rate to maintain the damper closed for 30 days
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_ as 0.67 psig/hr. The calculation results also included an acceptable pressure
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decay of 1.68 psig/ hour to maintain the damper closed for 12 days. The inspectors
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noted that the acceptance criteria contained in Procedure 1304.175,1.68 psig/hr,
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corresponded to the acceptable pressure decay to maintain the damper closed for
12 days. However, it appeared to the inspectors that the design basis for the
backup bottles was to maintain the dampers closed for 30 days. As a result,
Procedure 1304.175 did not provide the correct acceptance criteria to ensure that
the backup bottles satisfied their design requirement. This issue remained open at
the conclusion of the inspection period.
The failure of the licensee to test safety related backup air accumulators remains
unresolved pending further review of a similar finding in 1990 and resolution of the
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basis for the test acceptance criteria contained in Procedura 1304.175 (Unresolved
Item (URl) 50-313/9701-03; 50-368/9701-03).
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The licensee's discovery that they had not been performing an 18-month
surveillance of control room emergency ventilation system damper backup
accumulators was unresolved pending further inspection.
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M8
Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
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M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-368/9405-00." Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 Due to Two Channels of the Plant Protective System (PPS)
Beina Simultaneousiv Inocerable as a Result of Personnel Error"
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This LER documented an event in which an I&C technician, while performing the
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PPS Channel B monthly surveillance test, inadvertently reset the variable setpoint
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for Channel A of the low steam generator prescure trip, causing the Channel A trip
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setpoints to be below the minimum allowable Technical Specification value. Since
Channel B was already in bypass for testing, two channels of PPS were inoperable
and the Unit 2 operators entered Technical Specification 3.0.3. The technician and
a control room operator recognized the error and took actions to restore both
channels to an operable status. -The licensee determined that the root cause of the
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event was personnel error on the part of the l&C technician, involving inattention to
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detail and lack of adequate self checking. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
corrective actions identified in the LER and found them to be appropriate and
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complete.
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The surveillance was being conducted in accordance with Procedure 2304.038,
Revision 19, " Plant Protection System Channel B Test." The f ailure to follow this
procedure is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1. This licensee-identified
problem was promptly corrected and the licensee's corrective actions were
appropriate. Based on the above, this is being treated as a noncited violation,
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consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-368/9701-04).
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60-313/9602-03, " Technicians Performed Steos Out of Seauence
M8.2 (Closed) Violation
1304.145. Revision 14, ' Unit 1
and Failed to Perf orm Steps of Procedure
Emeraencv Feedwater Initiation and Control Channel A Monthly Test'"
The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response
letter, dated June 20,1996, to be reasonable and complete.
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Ill. Enaineerina
E1
Conduct of Engineering
E1.1
Unit 2 - New Fuel Receiot
Insoection Scoce_(717071
a.
The inspectors observed portions of the licensee's activities associated with the
receipt of new fuel,
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors found that the licensee effectively implemented
2503.002, " Fresh Fuel inspection and Storage," during the receipt of
Procedure
new fuel for Unit 2. Proper radiological controls were implemented and the new
fuel was properly inspected in accordance with procedures.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensee performed proper inspections and took
appropriate radiological surveys during the receipt of new fuel for Unit 2.
E8
Miscellaneous Engineering issues
Comoliance with the Reauirements of 10 CFR 70.24, " Criticality Accident
E8.1
Reauirements"
Insoection Scope (92903)
a.
in 1996, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation conducted a servey of all
operating commercial power reactors to determine if licensees had criticality
monitors which satisfied the criticality rnonitoring requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.
This inspection was conducted to follow up on the results of that survey as they
applied to ANO.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
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The results of the survey revealed that Unit 2 did not have criticality monitors that
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satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. Specifically, the licensee did not have a
monitoring system in the vicinity of the new fuel storage rack which would satisfy
the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1). This regulation states that the monitoring
system shall be capable of detecting a criticality that produces an absorbed dose in
soft tissue of 20 rads of combined neutron and gamma radiation at an unshielded
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distance of 2 meters trom the reacting material within 1 minute. The licensee
indicated that, although there were two area radiation monitors installed in the
vicinity of the new fuel storage rack and spent fuel pool, the limitations of the
detectors and the attenuation of radiation due to the location of the detectors would
limit the detectors' ability to detect enticality as required by the regulation. At the
conclusion of the inspection, the NRC was reviewing its position with respect to the
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conduct of drills and the enforcement of 10 CFR 70.24 requirements. This item is
unresolved pending completion of that review (50-313/9701-05; 50-368/9701-05).
For those plants licensed prior to December 6,1974 (e.g., Unit 1),
10 CFR 70.24(a)(2) states that the criticality monitoring system must be " capable
of detecting a criticality which generates radiation levels of 300 rems per hour
)
1 foot from the source of the radiation. The monitoring devices shall have a preset
alarm point of not less than 5 millirems per hour . . . nor more than 20 millirems per
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hour in no event may any such device be farther than 120 feet from the special
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nuclear material being handled, used, or stored; lesser distances may be necessary
to meet the requirements of this paragraph (a)(2) on account of intervening shielding
or other pertinent factors."
The inspectors reviewed the criticality monitoring system for Unit 1 and found that
an area radiation monitor was located within 120 feet of the new fuel storage rack
and that the preset alarm setpoint was between 5 millirems per hour and
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20 millirems per hour as required by 10 CFR 72.24(a)(2). The technical manual
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associated with the area radiation monitor stated that it was capable of fulfilling the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 70. The licensee stated that the radiation monitor
would detect an inadvertent criticality as described in the regulation. However, the
inspectors found that, prior to August 1996, the licensee's emergency procedures
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for the new fuel area did not include the conduct of drills to familiarize personnel
with the evacuation plan. This will be reviewed as part of the above unresolved
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item (50-313/9701-05; 50-368/9701-05).
At the time of the inspection, the inspectors found that there was no fuel being
stored in either units' new fuel storage racks. However, the licensee received new
fuel for Unit 2 in early March. Prior to the receipt of the fuel, the licensee obtained
two portable detectors, which they determined satisfied the requirements of
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10 CFR Part 70. In addition, they revised their procedures to implement the
performance of personnel evacuation drills.
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E8.2 (Closed) LER 313/95-001, " Increase in Calculated Peak Fuel Claddina Temperature
Resultina from Loss of Coolant Accident Evaluation Model Errors Due to Human
Error and Computer Code Data Handlina (92700)"
This LER documented two errors related to the large break loss-of-coolant accident
evaluation model calculations which, when corrected, resulted in a peak cladding
temperature change in excess of 50 F to a value greater than 2200oF. This was
reported to the licensee in January 1995 by Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear
Technologies. These errors were attributed to the nonconservative input of core
flood tank initial conditions due to human error and nonconservative data handling
due to the use of a computer code that was unsophisticated by current standards.
It was determined that a reduction in the loss-of-coolant accident linear heat rate
limit of 1.3 kw/ft at the 2-foot core elevation would ensure that peak cladding
temperatures would not exceed 2200 F. In response to this, Unit 1
administratively reduced the loss-of-coolant linear heat rate alarm limits on the plant
computer and revised the Unit 1 Cycle 13 reload report and the core operating limits
report. The licensee determined that, due to the margin between the actual core
operating limits (which are more conservative) and the loss-of-coolant accident
analysis limits, Unit 1 never operated, and could not have operated, in a condition
that would have placed the core at risk of sxceeding 2200 F peak cladding
temperature due to this condition.
Personnel from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation reviewed the LER and the
licensee's corrective actions, as described in the LER, and found that they were
appropriate.
IV Plant Support
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Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R 1.1
General Comments (71750)
During routine tours of the plant and observations of plant activities, the inspectors
found that access doors to locked high radiation areas were properly locked, areas
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were properly posted, and personnel demonstrated proper radiological work
practices.
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Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
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S1.1 General Comments (71750)
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During this inspection period, the inspectors observed the licensee implement proper
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physical security measures associated with the integrity of protected area barriers,
personnel and package access, and personnel searches.
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Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S 1.1
General Comments (71750)
During this inspection period, the inspectors observed the licensee implement proper
physical security measures associated with the integrity of protected area barriers,
personnel and package access, and personnel searches.
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ATTACHMENT
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
LLcensee
B. Allen, Maintenance Manager, Unit 2
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D. Bentley, Coordinator, Unit 2 I&C Maintenance Support
M. Bishop, Manager, Support
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A. Clinkingbeard, Operations Shift Superintendent, Unit 1
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S. Cotton, Manager, Training and Emergency Planning
B. Day, Acting Director, Design Engineering
P. Dietrich, Mechanical Maintenance Manager, Unit 1
R. Hutchinson, Vice President, Operations
D. McKinney, Acting Operations Manager, Unit 2
D. Mims, Director, Licensing
T. Mitchell, Manager, Unit 2 System Engineering
S. Pyle, Licensing Specialist
D. Scheide, Licensing
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D. Sealock, Supervisor, Simulator Training and Support
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A. South, Licensing
J. Vandergrift, Director, Quality
J. Veglia, Supervisor, Modifications
H. Williams, Jr., Superintendent, Plant Security
C. Zimmerman, Plant Manager, Unit 1
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
61726
Surveillance Observations
62707
Maintenance Observations
71707
Plant Operations
71750
Plant Support Activities
92700
Onsite Followup of LERs
92902
. Followup - Maintenance
92903
Followup - Engineering
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ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Ooened
50-313/9701-01
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Control of Vent and Drain Line Valves (Section 08.1)
50-368/9701-02
Failure to Follow I&C Procedure (Section M1.4)
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50-313:368/9701-03
Failure to Test Safety-Related Accumulators
(Section M2.1)
50-368/9701-04
NCV Failure to Follow l&C Procedure (Section M8.1)
50-313:368/9701-05
10 CFR 70.24 Requirements (Section E8.1)
Closed
50-368/9405-00
LER
Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 Due to Two Channels
of the PPS Being Simultaneously Inoperable as a Result of
Personnel Error (Section M8.1)
50-313/9407-01
Feedwater Reactor Building isolation Valve Found Not Locked
(Section 08.1)
50-313/95-001
LER
Increase in Calculated Peak Fuel Cladding Temperature
Resulting from Loss-of-Coolant Accident Evaluation Model
Errors due to Human Error and Computer Code Data Handling
(Section E8.2)
50-313/9602-03
Technicians Performed Steps Out of Sequence and Failed to
Perform Steps of Procedure 1304.145, Revision 14, ' Unit 1
Emergency Feedwater initiation and Control Channel A
Monthly Test (Section M8.2)
50-368/9701-04
NCV Failure to Follow l&C Procedure (Section M8.1)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
Arkansas Nuclear One
instrumentation and control
LER
licensee event report
plant protective system
special nuclear rnaterial
unresolved item
violation
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