ML20138A870
| ML20138A870 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/1986 |
| From: | Sherwin Turk NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#186-429 OL, NUDOCS 8603200165 | |
| Download: ML20138A870 (114) | |
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3/14/86 DOCKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR EEGULATORY COMMISSION 86 NAR 17 P3:26 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 0FFICC CF :I Cr H-00ChEimu a w.or.L BRANCri In the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
Docket Nos. 50-443 OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
)
50-444 OL
)
(Scabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO CONTENTIONS FILED BY TOWNS OF HAMPTON, HAMPTON FALLS, KENSINGTON, RYE AND SOUTH HAMPTON, AND BY THE MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL, NECNP AND SAPL i
Pursuant to the Licensing Board's Memorar.tum and Order of j
January 17,1986 (" Order"), contentions addressing h.'w Hampshire state and local offsite emergency plans have been timely filed by the Towns of EI Hampton, 1 Hampton Falls,
Kensington, 3,/ Rye, I and South 1/
" Contentions of the Town of Hampton to Radiological Emergency 1
Response Plan for the Town of Hampton, New Hampshire, November 1985" ("Hampton Contentions"), filed February 21, 1986.
-2/
Letter from Robert A.
Backus to Office of the Secretary (NRC),
attaching contentions for the Town of Hampton Falls ("Hampton Falls Contentions"), dated February 21, 1986.
~3/
" Contentions Filed by the Town of Kensington, NH Relative to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Town of Kensington Prepared by the New Hampshire State Civil Defense Agency"
("Kensington Contentions"), dated February 24, 1986.
4 4_/
" Contentions of Town of Rye Relative to Emergency Planning for New Hampshire and Town of Rye"
(" Rye Contentions"),
dated February 20, 1986.
[
G
O 6 Hampton, b and by the Massachusetts Attorney General, b New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP) b and Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL). -I Those contentions generally challenge the adequacy of the offsite emergency plans for the State of New Hampshire and various New Hampshire towns which were transmitted to the Licensing Board and parties by the NRC Staff (" Staff") on January 10, 1986. b In accordance with the Licensing Board's Order, the Staff hereby submits its response to the above-referenced contentions.
In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, in the balance of this memorandum, the Staff addresses the legal principles governing the admissibility of
-5/
Letter from Robert A.
Backus to Office of the Secretary (NRC),
attaching contentions for the Town of South Hampton
(" South Hampton Contentions"), dated February 21, 1986.
-6/
" Contention of Attorney General Francis X.
Bellotti Relative to Emergency Planning for the New Hampshire Beach Communities"
(" Mass. A.G. Contention"), dated February 21, 1986.
-7/
"NECNP Contentions on the New Hampshire State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans" ("NECNP Contentions"),
dated February 24, 1986.
-G/
" Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Second Supplemental Petition for Leave to Intervene" ("SAPL Contentions"), dated February 21, 1986.
-9/
Letter from Robert G.
Perlis, Esq. to the Licensing Board, dated January 10, 1986.
As set forth therein, the Staff transmitted three volumes of the State plan which pertain to the Seabrook Station (volumes 1, 2 and 4), 17 local town plans, and six host community plans.
Three other volumes of the New Hampshire State plan pertaining to Seabrook (volumes 5, 6 and 7), had not previously been provided to the Staff and were not transmitted to the Board and parties on January 10, 1986.
Subsequent to the filing of contentions, two of those volumes (volumes 5 and 7) and a preliminary version of ETE materials (which, when completed and approved, are to be filed as volume 6 of the State plan), were transmitted to the Board and parties.
See Letter from Wendell P.
Johnson (Vice President, PSNH) to H.R7enton (Director, NRR),
dated March 5,1986.
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g contentions.
The admissibility of each of the contentions filed by the Towns and Intervenors is then set forth seriatim, in the Attachment hereto.
DISCUSSION The principles governing the admissibility of contentions are well established.
Contentions may only be admitted in an NRC licensing proceeding if they fall within the scope of issues set forth in the Federal Register _ notice of opportunity for hearing and comply with the requirements of 10 C.F.R. I 2.714(b) and applicable Commission case law.
See, eg, Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 20 (1974); Duquesne Light Co.
(Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-109, 6 AEC 243, 245 (1973);
Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-107, 6 AEC 188, 194 (1973), affirmed sub nom.,
BPI v. Atomic Energy Commission, 502 F.2d 424, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
I 2.714(b), a petitioner (or intervenor) is required to file "a list of contentions which the petitioner seeks to have litigated in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity."
The degree of specificity with which the basis for a contention must be alleged initially, involves the exercise of judgment on a case-by-case basis.
Philadelphia Electric Co.
(Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 20 (1974). A contention must be rejected where:
(1) it constitutes an attack on applicable statutory requirements; (2) it challenges the basic structure of the Commission's regulatory process or is an attack on the regulations;
(3) it is nothing more than a generalization regarding the Intervenor's view of what applicable policies ought to be; (4) it seeks to raise an issue which is not proper for adjudication in the proceeding or does not apply to the facility in question; or (5) it seeks to raise an issue which is not concrete or litigable.
d.,
8 AEC at 20-21;
- accord, Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-76,16 NRC 1029,1035 (1982).
The purpose of the basis requirement of 10 C.F.R. 52.714(b) is:
(a) to assure that the matter sought to be put into question does not suffer from any of the infirmities set forth in Peach Bottom, supra; (b) to establish sufficient foundation to warrant further inquiry into the subject matter; and (c) to put the other parties sufficiently on notice "so that they will know at least generally what they will have to defend against or oppose. "
Peach Bottom, supra, 8 AEC at 20-21; accord, Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-20, 21 NRC
- 1732, 1742 (1985);
Kansas Gas & Electric Co.
(Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-1,19 NRC 29, 34 (1984).
In applying the " basis" and " specificity" requirements of 10 C.F.R.
S 2.714(b), it should be recognized that contentions are the means by which issues are framed for litigation in an NRC proceeding.
Wlille an intervenor must identify the basis (i.e., the reasons) for his contention, the admissibility of a contention is not to be determined by evaluating its merits.
This Board has previously summarized these principles as follows:
While the " basis with reasonable specificity" standard requires a contention to be stated with particularity, Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M.
Farley Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-183, 7 AEC 210, 216
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(1974), it does not require a petition to detail supporting evidence.
Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423, 426 (1973).
Nor should a licensing board address the merits of a contention when determining its admissibility. IIouston Lighting and Power Co.
(Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980).
What is required is that an intervenor state the
" reasons" for its concern.
_Id. at 548.
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Scabrook Station, Units I and 2),
LBP-82-106,16 NRC 1649,1654 (1982).
In accordance with these criteria, it has been held that contentions may not be dismissed at the pleading stage even if they are demonstrably insubstantial; E that whether or not a contention is true is to be left.to litigation on the merits following th'e contention's admission; E# and that yg a Licensing Board should not consider the safety significance of the matters stated in a contention, E or the qualifications or credibility of the expert who provided the basis for the contention. E Similarly, the
-10/ Washington Public Power Su.pply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No.
1), LBP-83-66, 18 NRC 7f 0, 789 (1983), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),
ALAB-590,11 NRC 542, 550 (1980).
-11/ Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No.
2), ALAB-722, -17 NRC 546, 551 n. 5 (1983), citing Allens Creek, supra.
i
-12/ Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian
- Point, Unit 3),
LBP-82-105,16 NRC 1629,1634 (1982).
-13/ Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-98, 16 NRC 1459, 1466 (1982), citing Allens Creek, supra. In Perry, the Board further noted (id_.):
[W]hile our procedures permit applicant to cite FSAR sections, thereby placing the burden of going forward on the intervenors to explain why those sections are not fully dispositive, applicant has not cited the FSAR or other available, authoritative material and it may not refute a contention by an unsupported ("Ipse dixit") statement of counsel.
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admissibility of a contention is not to be determined based upon the completeness of the facts offered in support of the contention; rather, following its admission, all parties will have an opportunity to develop their positions as to the merits of the contention with additional factual data gained through utilization of the discovery process.
This is not to say that insubstantial or unsubstantiated issues are necessarily to be allowed to proceed to an evidentiary hearing.
10 C.F.R.
S 2.749 provides a ready means whereby such issues may be summarily disposed of following discovery, without requiring an eviden-tiary hearing.
If an applicant believes that it can readily disprove a contention which is otherwise admissible, the proper course is for it to move for summary disposition following the contention's admission, not to assert a lack of specific basis at the pleading stage.
Allens Creek, supra, 11 NRC at 550-551; Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-119A, 16 NRC 2069, 2071 (1982). b
-14/ See,' le.
Commonwealth Edison Co.
(Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2),
LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 617 (1985);
Cleireland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-24,14 NRC 175,182 (1981).
_15 / The Staff notes that the Applicants' responses to the contentions at issue here, filed on March 5, 1986, generally do not address the basis and specificity requirements of 10 C.F.R. 52.714, but instead delineate certain legal standards whereby the merits of admitted emergency planning contentions have been judged in prior NRC proceedings.
With certain exceptions, the Staff does not here address the correctness of Applicants' recitation of those principles.
In our view, even if the Applicants' recitation is
- correct, i
consideration of the cited principles generally should be undertaken later in the proceeding, upon evaluating the merits of any admitted contentions.
- g It should be noted that a licensing board is not authorized "to admit conditionally for any reason, a contention that falls short of meeting the specificity requirements. "
Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-687, 16 NRC 460, 466 (1982), modified on other grounds, CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041 (1983).
The NRC's Rules of Practice do not permit "the filing of a vague, unparticularized contention, followed by an endeavor to flesh it out through discovery against the applicant or Staff."
Id.,16 NRC at 468.
Finally, a licensing board has no duty to recast proposed contentions to remedy infirmities of the type described in Peach Bottom, supra, in order to make inadmissible contentions meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. S2.714.
Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 406 (1974).
However, although a Board is not required to recast contentions to make them acceptable, it also is not precluded from doing so.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-6, 9 NRC 291, 295-96 (1979).
Should a board elect to rewrite inadmissible contentions so as to make them acceptable, the scope of the reworded contentions may be made no broader than the bases that were previously provided by the inter-venor in support of the inadmissible contentions.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-675, 15 NRC 1105,1115 (1982).
O It is against these standards that the contentions proffered by the Towns and Intervenors must be measured. b The Staff's views as to the admissibility of each of those contentions, based upon the foregoing principles, is set forth in the Attachment appended hereto.
CONCLUSION The Staff submits that the New Hampshire emergency planning contentions filed by the Towns and Intervenors should be admitted for litigation in this proceeding for the reasons and to the extent set forth in the Attachment hereto.
In all other respects,
the proffered contentions should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
&v Sherwin E. Turk Deputy Assistant Chief Hearing Counsel Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 14th day of March,1986
-16/ In addition to the general principles set forth above, certain additional principles of less general applicability are discussed in the Staff's response to particular contentions, in the Attachment hereto.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA USNRt NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'86 MAR 17 P3 :26 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD OFFICE Cr.. u.
00CMEllNG A de v;ct~
In the Matter of
)
BRANCH
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
Docket Nos. 50-443 OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et _al.
)
50-444 OL
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
ATTACHMENT TO NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO CONTENTIONS FILED BY TOWNS OF HAMPTON, HAMPTON FALLS, KENSINGTON, RYE AND SOUTH HAMPTON, AND BY THE MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL, NECNP AND SAPL Sherwin E. Turk Deputy Assistant Chief Hearing Counsel Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 14th day of March,1986
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Hampton Contention I l
The State of New Hampshire violated FEMA regulations by denying the Town of Hampton the opportunity to prepare its own Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP), by failing to engage in integrated emergency planning with affected local units of government, and by failing to address substantial safety concerns raised by town officials on the inadequacy of the Hampton RERP prepared by the State. NUREG - 0654/
i FEMA - REP - 1, Rev.1, pgs.19 - 24 (hereinaf ter
]
NUREG).
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds I
that it lacks basis and fails to raise an issue that is appropriate for 1
litigation in this proceeding.
At this stage of the proceeding, we accept as true the Town's assertions that the State of New Hampshire ignored the Town's concerns in developing the Town's emergency plan, failed to engage in integrated planning with the Town, and denied the Town the opportunity to develop its own emergency plan.
However, notwithstand-ing these assertions, the process by which the State developed an emergency plan for the Town of Hampton is not an appropriate issue for litigation in this proceeding.
Rather, the questions that must be addressed in litigation before this Board are whether the Town's plan (or some other, compensatory plan) is adequate, and whether there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented in a radiological emergency.
While the Town of Hampton
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- relies upon NUREG-0654 1_/ in asserting that " FEMA regulations" have been violated, NUREG-0654 does not support this assertion. 2_/
NUREG-0654 recognizes that the concept of Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) "necessarily implies mutually supportive emergency planning and preparedness arrangements by several levels of government:
Federal, State and local governments, including counties, townships and even villages."
(NUREG-0654, at 19).
NUREG-0654 further recognizes that " integrated emergency planning will benefit all of the communities within the Emergency Planning Zones" (Id.), and reflects the view that integrated planning and resource allocation among the various govern-mental bodies that have jurisdiction within the EPZs is preferred (Id., at 19-20).
NUREG-0654 recognizes that each of the various governmental bodies -- State, county, or municipal - "will control their own emergency response organizations and resources," and it indicates that:
1/
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0654/ FEMA-Rep-1, Rev.1 (November 1980).
2/
NUREG-0654 provides regulatory " guidance" for use by State, local and licensee organizations in the preparation of radiological emergency response plans, and for use by NRC and FEMA reviewers in - evaluating the adequacy of those organizations' emergency planning and preparedness.
Id. at 1-2.
NUREG-0654 provides
" specific acceptance criteria foF~ complying with the standards set forth in S 50.47 of 10 CFR Part 50."
Reg. Guide 1.101, Rev. 2 (October 1981), endorsing NUREG-0654 (copy attached).
While compliance with NUREG-0654 will establish compliance with NRC cmergency planning regulations, NUREG-0654,
- itself, does not establish regulatory requirements.
Accordingly, compliance with the provisions of NUREG-0654 is not required if the affected organizations can demonstrate that some other means exists whereby they are able to comply with Commission regulations.
See, eg.,
Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 709-10, aff'n LDP-85-14, 21 NRC 1219, 1228 (1985); Metropolitan Edison Co.--~dh ree Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), ALAD-698,16 NRC 1290,1298-99 (1982).
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. l In multi-jurisdictional situations like
- this, en integrated multi-county level emergency response plan is preferable.
The response organizations and resources of municipal or township governments can by mutual agreement -- into the be integrated overall multi-county emergency response plan.
Id., at 20.
In addition, NUREG-0654 states as follows:
NRC and FEMA have deliberately consolidated in this document guidance intended for use by State and local governments and that intended to guide the emergency planning and preparedness activities of NRC licensees because of a shared belief that an integrated approach to the development of response plans to radiological hazards is most likely to provide the best protection of the health and safety of the public.
NRC and FEMA recognize that plans of licensees, State and local governments should not be developed in a vacuum or in isolation from one another.
Should an accident occur, the public can be best protected when the response by all parties is fully integrated.
Each party involved must have a clear understanding of what the overall level of preparedness must be and what role it will play in the event of a nuclear accident.
This understanding can be achieved best if there is an integrated development and evaluation of plans. There must alac be an acceptance by the parties and a
clear recognition of the responsibility they share for safeguarding public health and safety.
Id., at 23-24. 3_/
Thus, NRC and FEMA guidance, as set forth in NUREG-0654, supports the view that an integrated approach to emergency planning and 3/
NUREG-0654 further provides that:
Findings by FEMA and - NRC with regard to the adequacy of emergency preparedness will be related to the capability of the facility licensee, State and local response organizations, to respond in a
coordinated manner to emergencies at or related to particular nuclear facilities.
Id., at 29.
, preparedness is preferred and is most likely to provide the best protection of the public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency.
Contrary to the Town's assertion, however, neither the NRC nor FEMA requires that each county or municipal government within the EPZ develop its own emergency plan or that each such government participate in an emergency response.
Rather, NUREG-0654 clearly provides as follows:
Although the guidance indicates that the criteria are applicable to one or more specific organizations, the intention throughout has been to provide for an adequate state of emergency preparedness around the facility.
If weaknesses in one organization are identified, but compensated for in another organiza-tion, the reviewers can still find that an adequate state of emergency preparedness exists.
Id., at 24; emphasis added.
In sum, Hampton Contention 1 fails to present an issue that is appropriate for litigation in this proceeding and should be rejected.
Hampton Contention II The State of New Hampshire violated State law by denying the Town of Hampton the right to prepare and submit its own RERP to FEMA and by denying the Town any substantial input into the llampton RERP prepared by the State.
New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated.107 - B(1).
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it lacks basis and fails to raise an issue that is appropriate for litigation in this proceeding.
As set forth in response to Hampton Contention 1,
supra, the questions which this Board should address generally involve the adequacy and implementability of offsite emergency
, plans for the Seabrook Station.
The Town of Hampton has neither asserted nor provided reason to believe that the emergency plan submitted for the Town is invalid or incapable of being implemented.
While such a showing could, conceivably, have been made by demon-strating that a court of general jurisdiction has so ruled or by a prima facie showing that specific statutory provisions render the plan invalid, no such demonstration has been made by the Town.
Rather, the sole authority cited by the Town is a statutory provision which indicates that the State Civil Defense Agency "shall in cooperation with affected local units of government, initiate and carry out a nuclear emergency response plan".
This provision, on its face, simply does not provide support for the Town's assertion that the State has violated New Hampshire law or that the Town's emergency plan cannot be implemented under State law. O Accordingly, this contention should be rejected.
Hampton Contention III The Evacuation Time Study for the Hampton RERP is based upon faulty assumptions and inaccurate factual data and thereby fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective actions can be implemented, or that adequate facilities and equipment will be provided,
in the event of radiological emergency.
10 CFR, Section 50.47(8), (10).
4/
On the contrary, the Attorney General for the State of New
~
Hampshire, Environmental Protection Bureau, has cited authority for the proposition that the State's planning process is consistent with New Hampshire law.
See Vernet v.
Town of Exeter, Rockingham County Superior Court,70. 86-E-06 (Feb. 14, 1986), appended to "The State of New Hampshire's Response to Contentions Filed by NECNP, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Towns of Rye, Hampton, South Hampton, Kensington, and Hampton Falls on the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan" ("New Hampshire Response"), filed March 6,1986.
-G-Staff Response This contention satisfies the basis and specificity requirements of 10 C.F.R. 52.714 and, in other circumstances, would be admissible.
However, the Staff recommends that this contention be deferred for the present time, in light of the fact the State of New Hampshire has stated that it will soon submit a new evacuation time estimate (ETE) study,
prepared by KLD Associates, which it intends to incorporate in the offsite emergency plans in lieu of the ETE upon which it had previously relied. 5,/ The reasons for this recommendation are as follows.
10 C.F.R.
Il 50.33(g) and 50.34(b)(6)(v) require operating license applicants to submit radiological emergency response plans of their own, as well as those "of State and local governmental entities... that are wholly or partially within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)."
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(10), both the onsite and offsite emergency plans must meet the following standard:
(10) a range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public.
Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place....
10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix E I IV further provides that:
-5/
The Staff has been informed that the KLD study is expected to be completed this month, and that approval by the State of New Hampshire could be rendered soon thereafter.
The State has acknowledged that it intends to utilize the KLD materials "to supercede the previous ETE studies prepared by CLD," and that "the adoption of the KLD work by New Hampshire leads to some short-term inconsistencies in planning documents.... based upon the earlier CLD work."
Letter from Richard H. Strome (Director, New Hampshire Civil Defense A gency),
to Henry G.
Vickers (Regional Director, FEMA Region 1), dated February 18, 1986.
, The nuclear power reactor operating license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pa EPZ for transient and permanent populations. gway Guidance as to the means for complying with these regulatory requirements is contained in NUREG-0654.
Guidance criteria for compliance with planning standard (b)(10), recited above, are provided, in part, in NUREG-0654, Sections II.J.8 and II.J.10, as follows:
- 8. Each licensee's plan shall contain time estimates for evacuation within the plume exposure EPZ.
These shall be in accordance with Appendix 4.
- 10. The organization's plans to implement protective measures for the plume exposure pathway shall include:
(1)
Time estimates for evacuation of various sectors and distances based on a dynamic analysis (time-motion study under various conditions) for the plume exposure pathway pmergency planning zone 7
(See Appendix 4).
Responsibility for compliance with criterion II.J.8 is assigned to the licensee; however, responsibility for compliance with criterion II.J.10 is assigned to the State and local governments.
See NUREG-0654, at 61 and 63.
6)
With respect to construction permit applicants, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E,
6 II.G requires applicants to submit a " preliminary analysis" of the time required to conduct an evacuation, " noting major impediments to the evacuation or taking of protective actions."
7/
Appendix 4 to NUREG-0654, entitled " Evacuation Time Estimates Within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone,"
provides more specific guidance as to "what shall be included in an evacuation times assessment study and how it might be presented."
. These provisions make it clear that both the licensee's and the State and local plans are to contain an evacuation time estimate. While a single ETE is normally submitted by an applicant on behalf of itself and the offsite authorities, - the submittal of an ETE by an applicant as part of its onsite plan does not satisfy the provision that an ETE is also to be 1 ans, without providing some other submitted as part of the offsite l
means of satisfyin;; federal regulations.
This is no mere technicality. As noted in Appendix 4 to NUREG-0654 (at 4-1):
"... the evacuation time estimates will be used by those emergency response personnel charged with recommending and deciding on protective actions during an emergency...."
In sum, offsite authorities are expected to designate
~
an ETE because they (like the Applicant) are responsible for formulating appropriate protective action recommendations which, of necessity, would
. rely in part upon an ETE.
The Applicants note that Commission regulations (10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E) specifically require applicants to submit an ETE, and include no specific requirement that offsite authorities submit an ETE.
The Applicants argue that no such requirement exists, apparently relying on a principle of construction that "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" i
-8/
NUREG-0654, Appendix 4,
states that "[a] review of the draft submittal by the principal organizations (State and local) involved in emergency response for the site shall be solicited and comments
,resulting from such review included with the submittal."
Id., at 1
4-10.
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i 1 (expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). b However, that argument ignores the fact that 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(10) requires that a range of protective actior.s be developed, and that " guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance" be developed and in place.
As set forth in relevant Federal guidance (NUREG-0654, 5 II.J.(10)(1)), compliance with the regulatory requirement stated in 5 50.47(b)(10) may be demonstrated, in part, by the provision of an ETE in the offsite plans; in the absence of an ETE, the affected organizations must demonstrate some alternate means of
-9/
" Applicants' Response to Off-Site Contentions Submitted by Town of Hampton (New Hampshire State and Local Plans)"
(" Response to Hampton") dated March 5, 1986, at 13-14.
The Applicants contend that "while New Hampshire may determine to employ its own ETEs, this Board is limited to litigation of matters required by the Commission's regulations."
(Id., at 13. )
Further, they assert that they have already submitted an ETE as part of their on-site plan, and that the only ETE that is " fair game for litigation in these proceedings is the set that has already been litigated" (Id., at 15; emphasis added).
Two conclusions may be drawn from the Applicants' argument.
First, the Applicants apparently believe it doesn't matter that they and the State may rely on different ETEs in formulating protective action recommendations during an emergency; and, second, the Applicants apparently believe that the litigation of ETE issues in this proceeding need have no relation to the ETE which would actually be utilized in an emergency.
The first of these apparent beliefs ignores the fact that reliance by responsible authorities on different, possibly inconsistent, ETEs may result in inappropriate or untimely protective actions being taken during an emergency; this result is plainly inconsistent with NRC/ FEMA guidance that integrated emergency planning provides the best protection of the public health and safety in an emergency.
As to the Applicants' second apparent
- belief, plainly, this Board must look at the reality of the situation, and must consider the offsite authorities' ETE if it is different from the ETE to be utilized by the Applicants.
. compliance with the regulations. EI Accordingly, the Applicants' reliance i
on Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819, 829-33 (1984), is misplaced.1_1,/
While Hampton Contention III satisfies the basis and specificity i
requirements of 10 C.F.R. I 2.714 and otherwise sets forth an admissible issue for litigation, certain procedural questions arise in light of the l
State's avowed intention to submit a new ETE within the next few weeks, l
following its completion by KLD Associates.
Under normal NRC practice, I
)
contentions which challenge the current deficiency of an application (and which are otherwise admissible) should be admitted; the contentien need 1
j not anticipate the contents of a document that has not yet been filed.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-98, 16 NRC 1459, 1469 (1982).
If the application is 10/ It should be noted that the Commission's emergency planning regulations provide broad regulatory parameters, and do not purport to specify particular requirements as to which compliance must be demonstrated.
The adequacy of onsite and offsite emergency planning is evaluated in accordance with whether the more specific guidance contained in NUREG-0654 is satisfied; where NUREG-0654 is j
not satisfied, the affected organizations must demonstrate some 1
alternative means of compliance with the regulations.
i l
j
-11/ In addition, it may be argued that a contention is admissible as long as it asserts that the " reasonable assurance" standard established by 10 C.F.R.
I 50.47(a) has not been satisfied, for one or another specific reason.
Cf. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LIIP 82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1946 (1982) (contention i
j about a matter not addressed in a specific rule is admissible if it alleges a significant safety problem under 10 C.F.R.
I 50.57(a)(3)
(failure to provide reasonable assurance of safe operation)); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),
i j
LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1656 (1982), citin Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power tat on), ALAB-161, 6 AEC 1003 (1973) -(where the regulations are silent on a particular matter j
and that matter is in contention, c>mpliance with the regulations is r
j not by itself sufficient to satisfy an applicant's burden of proof).
i k
i
_ _ _. _ _. _., _ -. _ _., _ _. ~. _.. _... _., _. _ _ _ _,. -
j
, amended following the admission of a contention -- either by the submis-sion of a missing. document or by revision of an existing document -- the l
previously-admitted contention can be amended or promptly disposed of by summary disposition or stipulation.
Duke power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19,17 NRC 1041,1049-50 (1983).
In this case, however, the new ETE is expected to be submitted within a matter of weeks. The Staff believes it would be inappropriate to admit a contention for litigation (and to proceed to discovery on it), only to have that effort promptly negated by the submission of the new ETE.
Accordingly, the Staff suggests that a better, more efficient use of I
. resources would be provided by deferring the admission of this contention until the State submits its new ETE.
At that time, the Town should be afforded an opportunity to withdraw or revise its contention, in light of f
the new study.
In this way, any offsite ETE litigation would proceed in a more orderly and logical manner. E a
j 1_2 / The Staff does not suggest that litigation of the State's ETE must, 2
necessarily, take place as part of the offsite emergency planning litigation.
Such a determination would require the filing of admissible offsite ETE contentions and will depend in part, on what the Applicants do following the submission of the KLD time study.
I The Applicants may well adopt the KLD work as part of their on-site i
plan, although this is not certain.
If the Applicants should adopt the KLD ETE, the record in the onsite phase of this proceeding could, conceivably, be affected.
Alternatively, if the Applicants do not adopt the KLD ETE, and onsite and offsite officials plan to utilize different ' TEs in arriving at protective action recommen-3 j
dations during an emergency, other issues could, conceivably, arise l
for litigation. See.10 C.F.R. S 50.33(g).
l I
,.., _, - -. ~.,
.,.. -, -,.,, -. - -. -. -. -.. -...., - - ~ ~
. Hampton Contention IV l
The Hampton RERP fails to provide adequate emergency equipment to support an evacuation in the event of radiological emergency.
10 CFR, Section 50.47(8).
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, provided the phrase " emergency equipment" is limited to the matters set forth in the contention's " basis",
i.e.,
the availability of buses, vans or other vehicles for use in an evacuation.
Hampton Contention V The Hampton RERP fails to provide reasonable assurance that evacuation procedures appropriate to the locale can be implemented in the event of radio-logical emergency.
10 CFR, Section 50.47(10).
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent it asserts that the present road system does not permit a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be I3/
implemented in an emergency. -
However, to the extent that this
-13/ The ability to evacuate all or part of an EPZ in a timely manner, considering such local conditions as the existing road system, must be considered in the course of formulating protective action recommendations and in assessing whether adequate protective measures cE..
and. will be implemented.
The Appeal Board summarized this matter as follows:
The applicants are correct in their insistence that the Commission's emergency planning require-ments do not prescribe specific time limits governing the evacuation of plume EPZs.
The matter of the time (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
. contention relies upon the adequacy of the ETE contained in the offsite plans (see paragraphs 2 and 3 of the " basis"), it should be deferred, for the reasons set forth in response to Hampton Contention III, supra.14/
Finally, to the extent that the contention asserts that an " alternative
~
evacuation center" must be designated in lieu of Nashua, NH (which is over 30 miles from the plant) because of the risk posed by a radioactive
- plume, the contention lacks basis and constitutes an impermissible challenge to 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(c)(2) (establishing a plume exposure pathway EPZ with generally a 10 mile radius around the site).
(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) in which evacuation can be accomplished is left to be determined on a case-by-case basis upon consideration of all relevant conditions prevailing in the specific locality.
But it does not follow, as the applicants would have it, that a particular evacuation plan need not be concerned with the efficiency with.which evacuation might be accomplished given the conditions under which it must take place [n.16].
Indeed, the Commission guidelines suggest the contrary.
- n. 16/
Those conditions include, for example, the size and nature of the population, the available transportation facilities, the existing road network, topographical features and political boundaries.
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. II. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1) ALAB-727,17 NRC 760, 770 (1983).
14/ As noted above, the bases stated in support of this contention raise
~
ETE issues as well as issues concerning the implementability of an adequate protective response.
These issues are difficult to separate, and accordingly, it may be appropriate to defer the admission of this contention to the extent it relies upon these two bases, for the reasons set forth in response n contention III, supra.
a
. Hampton Contention VI The Hampton RERP fails to demonstrate that local personnel are available to respond and to augment their initial response on a continuous basis in the event of radiological emergency.
10 CFR, Section 50.47(b)(1).
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
Hampton Contention VII Hampton RERP exercises are inadequate to permit a reasonable evaluation of major portions of the Town of Hampton's emergency response capabilities.
10 CFR, Section 50.47(14).
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it lacks basis, is speculative, and is premature.
As the Board is aware, an exercise of the New Hampshicc State and local emergency plan was held on February 26-27,
- 1986, after the deadline for filing contentions had passed.
The extent, if any, to which that exercise may i
not have adequately tested the offsite plans is not addressed by the instant contention.
Accordingly, this contention should be rejected without prejudice to being subsequently refiled based upon the results of the February exercise.
4
. t Hampton Contention VIII J
The Hampton RERP fails to provide for adequate emergency facilities to support an emergency response.
10 CFR, Section 50.47(8).
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent it asserts that reasonable assurance has not been provided that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in an emergency, in that adequate provisions have not been made for the use of sheltering as a protective action for the beach population. E The Staff does not l
concur with the Applicants' view that this contention seeks to assert a requirement that "there will be no radiological injury even from an I
extremely unlikely rapid release event" ( Applicants' Response to Hampton, at 17-18).
Rather, we believe this contention addresses the adequacy of I
provisions for protective measures that may be recommended in an 5
f 15/ The availability of sheltering as a protective action is within the
~~
scope of 10 C.F.R. 650.47(b)(10) (protective response) and not, as i
asserted by the contention, $50.47(b)(8) (emergency facilities and equipment).
See NUREG-0654 SS II.H and II.J.
4
, emergency, and it does not appear to seek to impose a more stringent requirement than that which is imposed by Commission regulations.16/-
-16/ The Commission's emergency planning regulations do not establish any specific threshold as to a maximum acceptable dose in the event of a radiological accident.
In this regard, we agree with Applicants (Response to Hampton, at 2), that the Commission's emergency planning regulations "do not require, as a condition of licensure, a demonstration of absolute assurance of perfect safety."
Rather, as stated by the Commission, "[p]lanning for emergencies is required as a prudent risk reduction measure" for "offsite individuals [who] may become contaminated with radioactive material or may be exposed to dangerous levels of radiation or perhaps, both. "
Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983).
Accord, Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.
1),
ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983)
("[t]he basic goal of emergency planning is.
. the achievement of maximum dose savings in a radiological emergency.")
Nonetheless, the Staff disagrees with the Applicants' apparent belief that emergency plans need not be designed to respond to an accident
" involving a
prompt offsite release of radioactive effluent" (Applicants' Response to Hampton, at 2).
It is correct, as stated by the Applicants, that the Commission's emergency planning basis addresses a spectrum of accidents, and emergency plans need not address any particular accident sequence or any " worst case accident."
San Onofre, supra,17 NRC at 533.
However, accidents involving early releases of radioactivity are within the planning basis and, indeed, are part of the reason why Commission regulations require prompt notification capabilities.
See NUREG-0654 at 13-14; Statement of Consideration, " Emergency Planning," 45 Fed. Rg. 55402, 55410 (August 19, 1980).
I October 1981
/p m.,T U.S. NUCLEAR REEULAT7RY CEMMISSION
""'. en 2 s
. $ REGULATORY GU DE
%,...p OFRCE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH REGULATORY GUIDE 1.101 EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS A. INTRODUCTION B. DISCUSSION On August 19,1980, the Commission published amend-Revision I to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, " Criteria for ments to its regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, " Domestic Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency I.icensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," to Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear upgrade its emergency planning requirements (45 FR 55402).
Power Plants," was published in November 1980 to provide specific acceptance criteria for complying with the standards Paragraph (aXI) of 50.47, " Emergency Plans," of set forth in @ 50.47 of 10 CFR Part 50. These criteria 10 CFR Part 50 states that no operating license for a nuclear provide a basis for NRC licensees and State and local power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by governments to develop acceptable radiological emergency NRC that the state of onsite and offsite emergency prepared-plans and improve emergency preparedness. NUREG-0654/
ness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective FEMA-REP-1 is the product of the joint FEMA /NRC measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological Steering Committee established to coordinate the agencies' emergency. For operating power reactors, paragraph (sX2) work in emergency preparedness associated with nuclear of 50.4 requires that the licensee, State, and local emer-power plants.
gency response plans shall be implemented by April 1, 1981, except as provided in Section IV.D.3 of Appendix E The staff is not publishing this Revision 2 to Regulatory to Part 50. If, after April 1,1981, the NRC finds that the Guide 1.101 for public comment because of the unique state of emergency preparedness does not provide reason.
developmental process used for NUREG-0654/ FEM A-REP-1.
able assurance that adequate protective measures can and The interim version of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 was
[
will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, the published for interim use in January 1980, and public Commission will determine whether the reactor must be comment was invited in a notice published in the Federal shut down until such deficiencies are remedied or whether Register on February 13, 1980 (44 FR 9768). Almost other enforcement action is appropriate. In both cases, the 100 comment letters were received, reviewed, and evaluated NRC will base its finding on a review of the Federal Emer-prior to the development of a final version of the document.
gency Management Agency (FEM A) findings and determina-The staff's evaluation of the comments is contained in tions as to whether State and local emergency plans are NUREG-0742/ FEMA-REP-4. The interim version was also adequate and capable of being implemented, and on the reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards NRC assessment as to whether the licensee's emergency and the Commission in the course of the rulemaking that plans are adequate and capable of being implemented.
resulted in the emergency preparedness amendments cited above. Comments were also received from the Interorgani-Section 50.47 also establishes standards that must be zational Advisory Committee (made up of State and local met by the onsite and offsite emergency response plans in representatives) and from other State officials later at a order for the staff to make a positive finding that there is September 1980 workshop sponsored by FEMA specifically reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures to review and discuss the interim version of NUREG-0654/
can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emer-FEM A-REP-1.
gency.
Based on all the comments received, a final version of This regulatory guide provides guidance to licensees and NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 was published in November applicants on methods acceptable to the NRC staff for 1980 as Revision 1. Therefore, because this Revision 2 of complying with the Commission's regulations for emer-Regulatory Guide 1.101 endorses Revision I of NURI'G-0654/
gency response plans and preparedness at nuclear power FEMA REP-1, the staff believes that a formal public com-reactors.
ment period is not warranted.
USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commiss on, U.$. Nuclear Regulatory Comrniss6on, wasnington, D.C.
- 20555, Asgulatory Guides are issued to desCrebe and make avaltable to the Attention: DoCheting and Service Branch.
pu bilC met h ods aC C ept a ble to the NRC staff of im plemen t 6ng speClf aC parts of the Commission's regulations, to delineate tech.
The guides are issued 6n the following ten broad divisions.
AlQues used by the staff in evaluateng spec 8flC problems or postu-lit ed aCC 6 den t s of to provede guidante to applicants. Regulatory I Powe, Reactors
- 6. Products Guides are nof substitutes for regulations, and Compliance with 2 ResearCn and Test Reactors
- 7. Transportation 8
them as not required. Methods and soluteons different from those set
- 3. F uels and Materials FaC elities
- 8. Occupational Healt h out in the guides well be Acceptable if they provide a basis for the 4 Invironmental and $ sting
- 9. Antitrust and F inanceal Review findings reQuesste to the issua7Ce or Continuance of a permit or
- s. Materials and Plant Protection 10. Gener al llCensa by the Commission.
Copies of essued quedes may be purchased at the Current Government This guide was issued af ter Consideration ofComments recesved f rom Pontang Of f ne prec e. A subscriptron service f or future quedes en soe-the publ6C. Comments and suqqestsons for emprovements en these Cef >C divisions is avariable through the Government Pr in ting Of f eC e.
guides are encouraged at all times. ano guedes will be revesed, as information on the subscription serveCe and current GPO prKes may appropriate,10 accommodate Comments 49d to reflect new informa-be obtained by westing the U $. Nuclear Regula t or y C om m i s sion, inon or em perience.
Washington, D.C. 2055b, Atiention: Publications $ates Manager.
C. REGULATORY POSITION D. IMPLEMENTATION The criteria and recommendations contained in Revi-sion I of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 are considered by The purpose of this section is to provide information to the NRC staff to be generally acceptable methods for com-applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for plying with the standards in @ 50.47 of 10 CFR Part 50 using this regulatory guide. This guide reflects current NRC that must be met in onsite and offsite emergency response staff practice. Except in those cases in which the applicant plans. Furthermore, FEMA, NRC, and other involved or licensee proposes acceptable alternative practices or Federal agencies intend to use the guidance contained in methods for complying with specified portions of the Revision 1 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP 1 in their indi-Commission's regulations, the practices or methods described vidual and joint reviews of the radiological emergency herein will be used as a basis for evaluating the adequacy response plans and preparedness of State and local govern-of the emergency plans and preparedness of applicants for a ments and the plans and preparedness of applicants for and license to operate a nuclear power reactor as well as the holders of a license to operate a nuclear power reactor.
plans and preparedness at currently operating plants.
i i
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i NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO CONTENTIONS FILED BY i
TOWN OF HAMPTON FALLS J
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TOWN OF HAMPTON FALLS Hampton Falls Contention 1 The Hampton Falls RERP fails to provide reasonable assurance or to comply with 10 C.F.R. 650.47(a)(2) because it is not a local pisn, but is a plan prepared for the town by New Hampshire Civil Defense, or its contractor, and which will not be implemented.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent it asserts that the Town of Hampton Falls will not implement its emergency plan.
In our view, this assertion raises an appropriate issue for litigation in this proceeding. O However, the Staff opposes the admission of that part of the contention which asserts the plan is invalid because it was not prepared
.or approved by the Town.
While FEffA and Commission guidance recognize that integrated emergency planning affords the best protection for the health and safety of the public (NUREG-0654 at 23), NRC regulations do not require that the emergency plans for towns within the plume exposure pathway EPZ be developed by, concurred in, or submitted by the town itself.
In sum, the adequacy and implementability of the plan are matters which can be assessed without regard to the identity of the plan's sponsor.
Accordingly, the Staff opposes the admission of this
-1/
This is not to say that the Applicants will be unable to demonstrate, on summary disposition or at hearing, that the Town's plan or some other compensatory plan can and will be implemented, thus providing the reasonable assurance required by 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a).
4 I
. part of the contention on the grounds that it lacks basis and fails to provide an appropriate issue for litigation in this proceeding.
Hampton Falls Contention 2 The plan designated as Hampton Falls fails to provide reasonable assurance since it cannot provide for continuous 24-hour operation for a protracted period, of local responsibilities, as required by NUREG-0654, A.4.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
The availability of emergency response personnel is a matter addressed in 10 C.F.R.
ISO.47(b)(1).
In addition, NUREG-0654, III. A.1.e states that each emergency response organization, including local organizations, are to " provide for 24-hour per day manning of communications links"; and III. A.4 states that "each principal organization shall be capable of continuous (24-hour) operations for a protracted period.
The extent to which State authorities may be " aware of" a need to supplement the Town's 24-hour manning capability and may have arranged for compensatory measures -
are matters which may be addressed by the i
Applicants in litigating the merits of this contention.
Ilampton Falls Contention 3 The RERP developed for (not by) the Town of flampton Falls fails to meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1) and
$50.47(b)(8) and NUREG-0654 Planning Standard II, II 11.3. and II
-2/
See " Applicants' Response to Offsite EP Contentions Submitted by Ifainpton Falls (New flampshire State and Local Plans)" (" Response to llampton Falls"), filed March 5,1986, at 14-16.
. H.4.
because the location of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) designated in the Hampton Falls' plan, that is, the Fire Station, is not that recognized by the town as the location of the EOC.
The Fire Station is not deemed adequate as an EOC by the town and therefore it will not be activated and staffed as described in the plan.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
10 C.F.R.
ISO.47(b)(8) requires that " adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response' are provided and maintained. " -
NUREG-0654, III.4.3 provides that each organization, including local organizations, are to " establish an emergency operations center for use in directing and controlling response functions. "
NUREG-0654, III.H.4 states that each organization is to " provide for timely activation and staffing of the facilities and centers described in the plan. "
The adequacy of the EOC, the availability of necessary equipment and the ability to activate and staff the EOC in a timely manner, are appropriate issues for litigation.
The questions of whether an alternative EOC may be designated by the State and whether necessary equipment will be supplied to the EOC, 3_/ are matters which may be addressed by the Appilcants during subsequent litigation on the merits of this contention.
Hampton Falls Contention 4 The Hampton Falls RERP does not adequately meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1), 550.47(b)(5),
550.47(b)(6) and NUREG-0654 planning standard E because there are no mutually agreeable bases 3_/
See Applicants' Response to Hampton Falls, at 18-10.
l l
l l
l l
4-for notification of response organizations and much of the communications equipment referred to in the Hampton Falls RERP is nonexistent.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
10 C.F.R.
I 50.47(b)(5) requires, inter alia, that procedures be "estab-lished for notification, by the licensee, of State.and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by all organi-zations
." NUREG-0654, 5 II. E.1 states that each organization, including local organizations, is to
" establish procedures which describe mutually agreeable bases for notification of response organi-zations The effect which the Town's non-agreement to the designated notification scheme may have on the adequacy of notification, and the extent of any compensatory measures taken by the State, are appropriate issues for litigation in this proceeding.
The Town need
' not plead in its contention the extent to which "a preferable means of notification" may be available. b Similarly, as set forth in response to llampton Falls Contention 2,
supra, the availability of designated emergency response personnel on a 24-hour basis is an appropriate issue for litigation, as is the availability of necessary communications equipment for use in notifying emergency response personnel.
4_/
See Applicants' Response to llampton Falls, at 10-20.
NRC STAFF RESPOMSE TO CONTENTIONS FILED BY TOWN OF KENSINGTON i
i 1
TOWN OF KENSINGTON Kensington Contention 1 The December, 1985 draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not assure that "each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis, as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(1),
because there are not alternates in several of the key emergency response positions and other departments are inadequately staffed to respond to an emergency as outlined in the plan.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, concerning the availability of emergency response personnel.
As set forth in the Staff's response to llampton Falls Contention 2,
the availability of emergency response personnel is addressed by 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(b)(1) and NUREG-0654 S II. A.
The extent to which the currently designated officials and organizations will be available to perform the various functions assigned to them by the Kensington emergency plan 1 is a matter which may be addressed in litigation on the merits of this contention.
Kensington Contention 2 The Kensington emergency response plan does not provide for adequate " notification, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency response personnel by organizations, as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(5).
Provision for notification of the town emergency
-1/
See " Applicants' Response to Offsite EP Contentions Submitted by Town of Kensington (New llampshire State and Local Plans", dated March 5,1986, (" Response to Kensington"), at 12-16.
J
-.---.---.---.-,,y-
- - - - ~. -. - - -., -,
. response organization is inadequate in that it depends upon notification through the Rockingham County dispatch and does not assure that the contact person will be available or can be reached in the event of a nuclear emergency.
In each instance, there must be direct contact between the site and the town, and there must be a dedicated telephone line to a location where an individual will always be on duty to receive the communication and then take action.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
Kensington Contention 3 The December, 1985. draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook
- Station, as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(1), because there is no provision for alternative evacuation routes.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent it raises an issue concerning the ability to accomplish an evacua-tion of Kensington using only the designated routes.
However, the Staff believes that this matter is best addressed in connection with ETE issues.
Accordingly, the Staff recommends that admission of this contention be deferred for the present for the reasons set forth in the Staff's response to Hampton Contention III, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein. 2_/
2_/
The Staff does not perceive this contention to assert that additional roads must be constructed.
If that was the thrust of the contention, the Staff would have opposed its admission.
. Kensington Contention 4 The December, 1985 draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station,
as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(1), because there are no maps showing adequate shelter areas, and some existing structures which are proposed shelters provide inadequate radiological protection.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
Kensington Contention 5 The December, 1985 draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook
- Station, as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(1), because principal organizations (State and Local) involved in emergency response for the site have not seen or reviewed the Evacuation Time Estimates Within the Plume Exposure Pathway.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, concerning the ETE, but suggests that it be deferred for the present time for the reasons set forth in the Staff's response to llampton Contention III, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.
Kensington Contention 6 The December, 1985 draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not provide adequate arrangements for effectively using assistance and resources as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(3) because there are not appropriate letters of agreement to identify and support organizations and other facilities which are to provide assistance.
i
. Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent it asserts that letters of agreement are required for private towing and transportation resources
(" wrecker companies" and " bus drivers").
See NUREG-0654, 9 II.C.4.
Further, the Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention to the extent that it asserts that letters of agreement are required for State organizations or officials, within the context of established Federal guidance.
Thus, NUREG-0654 provides for written agreements between " Federal, State and local agencies and other support organizations having an emergency response role within the Emergency Planning Zones."
NUREG-0654, S II. A.3.
The extent to which such agreements exist, and the adequacy of the commitments provided thereby, are matters which may be addressed during litigation on the merits of this contention. 3_/
Ilowever, the Staff opposes the admission of this contention to the extent it asserts that agreements with " teachers" are required.
It is unclear what role the Town believes that individual teachers are required to perform, or why individual agreements are necessary in lieu of school disaster plans or agreements with school systems or school principals.
Accordingly, this aspect of the contention is vague and lacks basis, and should be rejected.
-3/
The Staff notes that various letters of agreement were recently transmitted to the Board and parties.
See Letter from Wendell P.
Johnson (Vice President, PSNH) to li. R. Denton (Director, NRR),
dated March 5,1986.
. Kensington Contention 7 The
- December, 1985 draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective actions have been developed for emergency workers and the
- public, as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(10), because there are no provisions for the use of radioprotective drugs or respiratory equipment for emergency workers or other persons within the plume exposure.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent it addresses emergency workers and institutionalized persons within the EPZ. O Kensington Contention 8 The December, 1985 draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook
- Station, as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(1),
because evacuation time estimates are based on mean peak populations as opposed to peak populations.
i 4_/
This contention addresses emergency workers and institutionalized persons, as well as the general public, and raises questions related both to respiratory equipment and the distribution of potassium fodide (KI).
In this last respect, the Staff notes that the distri-bution of KI to the general public entails certain problems, and is not required by either the Commission or FEMA.
The Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee has indicated that the determination as to whether KI chould be made available to the general public is a matter within the State's discretion.
See
" Federal Policy on Distribution of Potassium lodido Around Nuclear Power Sites for Use as a Thyroidal Blocking Agent," 50 Fed. Reg. 30258 (July 24,1985).
This determination, however, does not apply to emergency workers, nor does it provide authority to preclude litigation of an otherwise admissible contention which asserts with specificity that the provisions of NUREG-0654 have not been satisfied.
, Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, 4
concerning the adequacy of the ETE included in the offsite plans, but recommends that.its admission be deferred at present for the reasons set 4
forth in the Staffra response to Hampton Contention III, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.
Kensington Contention 9 The December, 1985 draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Scabrook Station,
as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(1), because notifica-tion sirens are set at such a high level they will cause potential damage to the hearing of those closest to them.
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention, on the grounds l
that it lacks basis and fails to raise an issue that is appropriate for litigation in this proceeding. U l
Kensington Contention 10 The December, 1985 draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not provide for' communications with contiguous State / local governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47 App.E. E.(9)(a),
because provisions for communications with the State government are inadequate.
S/
Applicants' assertion that siren decibel ratings diminish with distance
~
is a matter which may be addressed during litigation on the merits of this contention.
See Applicants' Response to Kensington, at 24.
4 J
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- l Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent it is limited to the specific " basis" provided in its support.
Kensington Contention 11 The December, 1985 draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not provide for communications with Federal emergency response organizations as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47 App.E E(9)(b), because there are no provisions for communications with Federal emergency response organizations.
i Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds i
that it lacks basis.
The Town asserts that a communications link is required between Kensington officials and Federal emergency response organizations, on the grounds that such communications would be of benefit "in the event of communications problems with the State emergency response organizations."
(Kensington Contentions at p.11).
- However, the Town has not asserted or provided any reason to believe that its communications with the State may be disrupted.
Moreover, the Town I
does not contest the adequacy of the communications link that has been i
established between the Town and Stato emergency response organiza-i tions.
Accordingly, this contention is without basis and should bc rejected.
i j
Kensington Contention 12 1
l
)
The December, 1985 draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 4
_g_
radiological emergency at Seabrook Station,
as i
required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(1), because there is no description of means for registering and monitoring of evacuees at relocation centers in host areas.
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it lacks basis.
Kensington is located within the 10 mile EPZ, and does not contain any facility designated as a relocation center.
- Further, the contention falls to address any deficiencies which may be contained in the host community plan for relocation centers.
Accordingly, the adequacy of relocation center facilities is not a proper issue for litigation in connection with the Kensington emergency plan.
Kensington Contention 13, The December, 1985 draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook
- Station, as d
required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(1), because there are inadequate provisions for notifying and locating all segments of the transient and resident populations.
l Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention to the extent that it challenges the " level of detail" provided in the Town's plan for " compiling a list of Kensington residents requiring evacuation by special vehicle or requiring physical help."
See Radiological Emergency Response Plan Town of Kensington, Nil," at II 11-29.
Ilowever, the Staff opposes the admission of the balance of this j
contention on the grounds that it lacks basis and constitutes nothing more than a generalization of the Town's view of what Commission regulations i
i
1
_g_
should require. The Town cites NUREG-0654, 8 II.J.10.C., in support of its argument that a " running log" must be maintained of "all transients within the town borders at any given moment," and that details must be provided as to how the Civil Defense Director will "round up" all transients in the town.
These actions are not required by NUREG-0654, which provides only that the emergency plan shall identify "means for notifying all segments of the transient and resident population."
Id.,
I II.J.10.c.
The Town's contention altogether falls to address the measures that are provided in the plan for notifying the transient population (see Kensington Plan, at II II-8) and, as to this matter, should be rejected on the grounds that it lacks basis.
Kensington Contention 14 The December, 1985 draft radiological emergency response p'an for the Town of Kensington does not provide arrangements for requesting and effectively l
using assistance resources regarding the transpor-tation of contaminated victims to medical support facilities as required by 10 C.F.R.
[50.47](b)(3).
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it lacks basis and is overly vague.
It is unclear whether the 1
contention addresses the availability of emergency vehicles (or some other vehicles) or the method by which a determination will be made to send an j
affected individual to be decontaminated.
Moreover, no basis is provided to support the Town's apparent belief that special vehicles are required I
i
. to transport contaminated individuals to a decontamination facility.
In sum, the contention lacks basis and should be rejected. U Kensington Contention 15 The December, 1985 draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not contain accurate or adequate emergency equipment to support the emergency response as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(8).
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it lacks basis and is overly vague.
It is not clear whether the i
contention's reference to " emergency equipment" is limited to " telephones, radios, and radiological exposure instruments," nor is it clear why this equipment is contended to be " inaccurate" or " inadequate."
Further, it does not explain the reasons for its broad assertion that "there are insufficient numbers of telephones, radios, and radiological exposure instruments" in the EOC.
4 Kensington Contention 16 The Town of Kensington joins the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League in the following contentions filed by them and incorporatcs them herein by reference:
Seacoast Anti-Pollution contention numbers 1,2,3, 4,5,7,11,12,13,15,16,17,10,20,21,23,24,25.
i I
6/
The Staff generally concurs with Applicantn' observation that the
]
regulatory authority cited by the Town (10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(3))
does not provide support for this contention.
See NUREG-0654,
$ !!.C.
. Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it fails to assert any matter not already contained in the identified SAPL Contentions, and is inappropriate for admission as a separate litigable contention.
Nonetheless, the Staff does not oppose Kensington's stated desire to co-sponsor the identified SAPL contentions, provided it is bound by the results of any litigation on thoso contentions in the same manner and to the same extent as SAPL, itself.
-.-_.,..c.
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8 e
NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO CONTENTIONS FILED BY TOWN OF RYE I
I
a O
o TOWN OF RYE Rye Contention 1 The Draft Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Town of Rye does not provide reasonable I
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the Seabrook Station, as required by 10 C.F.R.
S50.47(a)(1), because in the event of an accident that would release a radioactive plume on Rye, the plan fails to reasonably recognize or provide for typical situations of increased transient population and traffic conditions in Rye between May I and September 1 every year, when Rye's beach and shore roads are jammed with people and traffic that frequently moves at a snail's pace; and because the plan fails to reasonably recognize or provide for typical situations of hazardous driving conditions in and all around Rye between December 1 and April 15 every year, when the width of roadways are narrowed by snow, icy conditions can occur instantaneously, fog can reduce j
visability to inches, and traffic predictably moves at a snail's pace.
I Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention, concerning impediments to an evacuation of Ryo and the time in which an evacuation might be accomplished, on the grounds that the contention lacks basis, j
and is vague and overly broad. While the Staff elsewhere has recommended i
that ETE contentions should be deferred until the State submits its new KLD time study, O n this instance a deferral of the contention would be i
I inappropriate, in that the contention falls properly to put the parties on notice as to what the Town wishes to litigate.
In essence, Rye Contention 1 is a " kitchen sink" of evacuation concerns, none of which 4
i J_/
See, eg., Staff Response to llampton Contention Ill.
i I
l
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, has been articulated with any degree of specificity (with the possible exception of a reference to the General Sullivan Bridge (Rye Contentions, at 3)). Accordingly, this contention should be rejected.
Rye Contention 2 The proposed Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Rye is unworkable because of the lack of provisions for any means of protecting the safety of Rye's special needs populations.
Rye has at least four (4) major special needs groups, not including special needs people living at home, for which no provisions are made in the plan; and, while the plan attempts to make provision for Rye's special needs facilities (5 schools), nevertheless, those provisions are inadequate particularly with regard to trans-portation and sheltering.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention to the extent it addresses the needs of the "Rannie Webster nursing and elderly home" (Rye Contentions, at 4).
- However, with respect to the other matters asserted by this contention, it lacks basis and should be rejected.
In particular, the Staff notes that no reason has been proffered as to why the Town asserts that arrangements for transporting and sheltering school children are inadequate why further arrangements are necessary for the " commercial fishing industry, and transient pleasure boaters"; why letters of agree-ment with teachers and school bus drivers are required; or why the Isle l
\\
, of Shoals requires treatment as a "special needs" population. 2,/ gg,gj,,3,
7 the Town offers no reason to believe that there are "special needs" individuals living at home, contrary to the statement contained in the Town's emergency plan (at II-30).
Rye Contention 3 The proposed plan for Rye violates the most basic state and federal constitutional rights of all its citizens and was prepared contrary to the State of New Hampshire's enabling statutes.
Selectmen sworn to the duties of their offices are required to uphold the constitution of this State and that of this great country of America.
One half of the first twelve articles of New Hampshire's consti-tution speak in one fashion or another to every member of a communities [ sic] right to be protected by it, in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property.
Those constitutional "right s" are not considered to have been
" bestowed" by those provisions, but rather are recognized as "among the natural and inherent rights of all humankind."
Furthermore, New Hampshire's enabling Legislation requires that emergency response plans be prepared in cooperation with the local communities knowledgeable participation and even if that had been
- done, such legislation is subsequent and subordinate to constitutional rights and is rightfully limited thereby.
For these reasons the entire emergency response plan proposed for Rye is invalid and should be declared void and of no effect.
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it falls to raise an issue that is appropriate for litigation in this 2/
The Applicants note that the " Isle of Shoals" is "more than 10 miles from Seabrook Station, [and is] outside the Seabrook plume EPZ."
" Applicants' Response to Off-Site EP Contentions submitted by Rye l
(New llampshire State and Local Plans)," dated March 5, 1986, at 17.
Accordingly, a proper contention concerning the Isle of Shoals I
should have addressed the need to include that area within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
See 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(c)(2).
. proceeding.
See Staff Response to Hampton Cententions I and II, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.
Rye Contention 4 The emergency response plan proposed for Rye makes no provisions for adequate protective measures that would reasonably assure the health, welfare and safety of all Rye citizens who may be exposed to radioactive releases emminating
[ sic]
from the Seabrook Station in situations not regarded as major disasters requiring evacuation, or in situations of major disaster where evacuation procedures are activated but which for any reasons are either not sufficiently implemented or kre prevented from expected completion.
Rye has no hospitalization or decontamination facilities and is served solely by a small, voluntary ambulance corp which does not have sufficient equipment or medical aid supplies that would be necessary to render emergency medical treatment to any more than a handful of people.
Staff Response f
The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds q
that it lacks basis, and is vague and overly broad.
It is unclear whether j
this contention seeks to assert (a) that provisions should be made for j
distributing radioprotective drugs to the general public; (b) that additional ambulances are required; (c) that the Town's ambulance corps i
is inadequate; (d) that hospital and/or decontamination facilities are inadequate; or (e) that additional unspecified " equipment or medical aid i
supplies" are required.
Accordingly, the contention does not put the other parties sufficiently on notice as to the issues which they would be i
j required to litigate within the scope of this contention.
Moreover, the
{
contention falls to provide a reasonably specific articulation of the reasons offered in its support, and should be rejected as lacking in basis.
l 1
l
o NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO CONTENTIONS FILED BY TOWN OF SOUTH HAMPTON
TOWN OF SOUTH HAMPTON South Hampton Contention 1 The RERP for South Hampton fails to provide
" reasonable assurance" because, contrary to NUREG-0654 A.3, the plan includes no written agreements referring to the concept of operations or signatures of local agencies.
Staff Response 1
The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent that it relates to the South Hampton plan's lack of written agreements or signature pages for " local agencies having an emergency response role" within the EPZ, as specified in NUREG-0654, I II. A.3.
Various letters of agreement were recently forwarded to the Board and parties, presumably constituting Volume 4 of the State plan; O the extent to which those agreements sat!sfy the Town's concern may be explored by Applicants in discovery b and addressed during litigation on the merits of this contention.
i flowever, the Staff opposes the admission of this contention to the extent that the contention's basis addresses the need for agreements with individual " teachers, or voluntary town workers."
That assertion lacks basis, in that no reason is provided to believe that agreements with " local agencies and other support organizations having an emergency response 1/
Letter from Wendell P.
Johnson (Vice President, PSNII) to it. R.
~
Denton (Director, NRR), dated March 5,1986.
I 2/
See " Applicants' Response to Off-Site EP Contentions Submitted by j
Fouth flampton (New flampshire State and Local Plans)" (" Response to South flampton"), dated March 5,1986, at 12.
i l
4
. role" will be insufficient to satisfy the requirements of 10 C.F.R.
I 50.47(b)(1) or the regulatory guidance of NUREG-0654, 6 II. A.
South Hampton Contention 2 The RERP for South Hampton fails to provide reasonable assurance
- because, contrary to NUREG-0654 A.4, the town lacks the capacity for twenty-four hour continuous operation for a
protracted period.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, con-cerning the availability of emergency response personnel for necessary periods.
See Staff Response to Hampton Contention VI, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.
South flampton Contention 3 The RERP for South flampton falls to provide reasonable assurance because, contrary to NUREG-0654 C.4, it contains no letters of agreement from voluntary police officers, voluntary firemen, other emergency workers, school teachers, transportation companies and bus drivers.
It also contains no agreements from Midway Excavators and personnel at the Tewksbury Pond Campground.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, in its assertion that letters of agreement should be provided for " facilities,
organizations or individuals which can be relied upon in an emergency to provide assistance," as stated in NUREG-0654, 6 II.C.4.
The extent to which existing letters of agreement, recent!y provided to the Doard and
, parties or otherwise included in the State's emergency plan, II may satisfy the Town's concern, is a matter that may be explored by Applicants during discovery and addressed during litigation on the merits of this contention.
Nor does the Staff oppose the admission of the "Tewksbury Pond Campground" assertions.
Unlike the Applicants, I the Staff understands this assertion to relate to a need for agreements for emergency response personnel to be located at that facility.
In our view, these matters satisfy 10 C.F.R. S 2.714 and are appropriate for litigation.
South Hampton Contention 4 The RERP for South Hampton fails to provide reasonable sssurance because, contrary to NUREG-0654 E.5, reliance on a commercial FM radio station WOKQ, for follow-up information, is inadequate.
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it lacks basis.
Contrary to the Town's assertion, the plan provides that "WOKQ (97.5 FM) and five satellite radio stations have been selected for inclusion in the emergency information network." 5_/
Accordingly, this contention lacks basis and should be rejected. 6_/
3_/
Applicants' Response to South Hampton, at 14-17.
4/
Id., at 17.
-5/
See Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Town of South Hampton, at II-7 ; New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan, at 2.1 2.1-13.
6/
Neither the Town plan nor the State plan identifies the stations which are, in fact, to carry EBS messages.
Rather, the Town plan states (at p. II-7) that "a more detailed description and a listing of (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
. South Hampton Contention 5 The RERP for South Hampton fails to provide reasonable assurance because contrary to NUREG-0654 E.7, the plan does not contain draft public messages.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention to the extent that it relies on NTTREG-0654, 5 II.E.7 for the assertion that
" written messages intended for the public" are to be included in local emergency response plans.
The extent to which the Town's concern may be satisfied by the inclusion of draft messages in the State plan U s a i
matter that may be explored by Applicants during discovery and addressed during litigation on the merits of this contention.
Ilowever, the Staff opposes admission of this contention to the extent its basis addresses (a) the need for " communication instruction," and (b) the need for such " communication instruction" to "be available from the-special facilities, Barnard School and Tewksbury Pond Campground."
It is altogether unclear what is meant by the phrase
" communication instruction", and no basis whatsoever is offered in support of the assertion that the identified special facilities must be able hi (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROB1 PREVIOUS PAGE) stations are contained in Section 2.1.5 of the NHRERP," while the State plan indicates (at p. 2-1-13) that "the satellite stations and their frequencies will be identified in the Emergency Public Information Booklet to be distributed to the public." While the omission of this information from the plans might be asserted to be a deficiency (see NUREG-0654, 6 II.E.5, and Appendix 3 at 3-4), the Town's contention does not appear to address this matter.
7/
Applicants' Response to South Hampton, at 19.
i l
. to issue any such instruction.
This aspect of the contention lacks basis and is overly vague, and should be rejected.
South Hampton Contention 6 The RERP for South Hampton fails to provide reasonable assurance
- because, contrary to NUREG-0654 11.3, the town of South Hampton does not have an EOC capable for use in directing and controlling response functions.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
The extent to which the Town's EOC is adequate, and the availability of necessary emergency response equipment at the EOC b are matters that may be explored by Applicants during discovery and addressed during litigation on the merits of this contention.
South Hampton Contention 7 The RERP for South Hampton fails to provide reasonable assurance because contrary to NUREG-0654 J.10.a, there has been no provision made for sheltering residents at the Tewksbury Pond Campground, despite a peak population of 1,500.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
l 8/
Id., at 20-21.
. South Hampton Contention 8 The RERP ' for South Hampton fails to provide reasonable assurance because, contrary to NUREG-0654 J.10,d. it fails to provide for protection of those persons whose mobility may be impaired due to such factors as institutional or other confinement.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent it asserts (a) that adequate transportation arrangements have not been unde for the evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals (subject to institutional or other confinement),
as provided in NUREG-0654, S II.J.10.d., and (b) that adequate arrangements have not been made to identify and transport persons who do not own an automobile.
However, the Staff opposes the admission of this contention to the extent that it asserts (a) that there is a need "to locate the non auto-owning residents and pick them up in a single pass through the town before traveling to Nashua"; (b) that there is a need to " find citizens of South Hampton"; and (c) that "the phone system may not be available to request assistance in transportation" (South Hampton Contentions, at 3).
As to items (a) and (b), these assertions are altogether lacking in regulatory and factual basis; as to item (c),
the Town has not provided any reason to believe that the telephone system "may not" be available.
Accordingly, these issues should be rejected.
South Hampton Contention 9 The South Hampton RERP lacks reasonable assurance because, contrary to NUREG-0654 J.10.h and J.12.,
I the Nashua Public Works facility will lack adequate shelter for all potential evacuees, and will lack adequate medical and decontamination facilities.
-7_
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it lacks basis and is impermissibly vague.
No reason has been provided to support the assertion that the Nashua relocation center will be inadequate.
Further, no basis has been provided for -- and it is altogether unclear what is meant by -- the assertion that the " State DPHS
[ Department of Public Health Service] may be inaccessible, lack necessary personnel, and South Hampton personnel who have not been trained in DPHS procedures" (South Hampton Contentions, at 4).
In addition, the To.vn's concern as to the adequacy of the Nashua relocation center is inappropriate for litigation in connection with the South Hampton town plan. Accordingly, this contention should be rejected.
South Hampton Contention 10 The South Hampton RERP fails to provide " reasonable assurance" in that, contrary to NUREG-0654 0.1. on page 75, local personnel have not received adequate training.
This is based on lack of staff to fill posi-tions, lack of equipment, and other considerations.
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it lacks basis and is impermissibly vague in the extreme. EI
~9/
Notwithstanding our conclusion that this contention is not admissible, we note that 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(b)(16) requires radiological 1
emergency response training to be "provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency."
Responsibility for providing this required training is assigned to licensee, State and local emergency response organizations.
See NUREG-0654, 6 II.O.
The adequacy of training received by local personnel is a matter that can be addressed by FEf.1A outside the scope of this litigation.
_~
W g
NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO CONTENTIONS FILED BY STATE OF MASSACllUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI
i MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL Mass. A.G. Contention The - draft radiological emergency response plans for the Towns of - Seabrook, Hampton, North Hampton, and Rye do not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the Seabrook Station,
as required by 10 C.F.R.
S50.47(a)(1),
because in the event of a severe accident on a summer weekend some or all of the beach area transient populations within those communities cannot under many plausible meteorological conditions be protected by means of evacuation even from early death and because there are not adequate plans or provisions for sheltering the beach area transients within those communities.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, limited to the extent it asserts that adequate plans and provisions for shelter-ing of coastal beach populations (in Scabrook, Hampton, North Hampton I
and Rye), have not been provided. -
However, the Staff opposes the 1/
In Applicant's response to this contention, they note that the contention cites an "as yet undisclosed study performed at the request of Mass AG," and they complain "it would be mani-festly unfair to permit Mass AG to use the study for the purpose of challenging the New Hampshire officials' efforts. "
" Applican ts' Response to Off-Site EP Contentions Submitted by Massachusetts Attorney General (New Hampshire State and Local Plan s ), " dated March 5, 1986, at 13 n. 2.
However, it should be noted that if the referenced " study" relates to an admitted issue within the scope of the contention -- which is not clear at this time -- the existence, identity and contents of that "s tu d y" are matters which may be f
explored during discovery in the course of litigation en the merits.
The present lack of information concerning the study does not, by
- itself, preclude the admission of this contention.
- See, e.g.,
Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
LD P-82-75, 16 NRC 986, 900 (1982).
. admission of this contention to the' extent that it seeks to - litigate (a) the dose consequences of radiological accidents or of any specific accident sequences (including the " site-specific accident consequence analysis" referred to in the contention's " basis") ; (b) the assertion that emergency planning must assure any particular level of dose pro-tection for the general public; or (c) accident sequences contained in the Applicants' probabilistic safety assessment.
These assertions lack regulatory basis and are inappropriate for litigation, for the following reasons.
As the Licensing Board is aware, the Commission began a formal reconsideration of the role of emergency planning in protecting the public health and safety in recognization of the need for more effective emergency planning following the TMI accident.
Statement of Consid-eration, " Emergency Planning", 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 ( August 19, 1980).
In adopting its emergency planning regulations in 1980, the Commis-sion recognized that "the protection provided by siting and en gi-neered design features must be bolstered by the ability to take protective measures during the course of an accident."
Id., at 55403.
The Commission's regulations reflect its determination to ensure that
" proper means and procedures will be in place to assess the course of an accident and its potential severity, that NRC and other appropriate authorities and the public will be notified prom ptly, and that adequate protective actions in response to actual or anticipated conditions can and will be taken."
Id.
The Commission's regulations require that "[elmergency plans must be developed that will have the flexibility to ensure response to a wide l
l
. spectrum of accidents."
Id.,
at 55407.
In this regard, NUREG-0654 provides as follows:
The overall objective of emergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate life saving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite u3ses in excess of Protective Action Guides (PAGs).
No single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan be-cause each accident could have different conse-quences, both in nature and degree.
Further, the range of possible selection for a planning basis is very large, starting with a zero point of requiring no planning at all because significant offsite radiological accident consequences are unlikely to occur, to planning for the worst possible accident, regardless of its extremely low likelibcod.
The NRC/ EPA Task Force did not attempt to define a single accident sequence or even a limited number of sequences.
Rather, it identified the bounds of the parameters for which planning is recommended, based upon know-ledge of the potential consequences, timing, and release characteristics of a spectrum of accidents.
Although the selected planning basis is independent of specific accident sequences, a number of accident descriptions were considered in the development of the guidance, including the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study [ WASH-1400].
Id., at 6-7.
Accord, Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CL1-83-10, 17 MEC 528, 533 (1983).
In sum, the consequences of particular postulated accidents are inappropriate for litigation under the Commission's emergency planning regulations.
- Further, neither the Commission's regulations nor i
NUREG-0654 requires that absolute assurance of radiological safety be provided in the event of an emergency or that evacuations be completed in any particular time frame.
As stated by the Appeal Board, "the basic goal of emergency planning is.
the achievement of maximum dose
. _ ~.
. savings in a radiological emergency." EI Toward this end, the Commis-sion requires that reasonable estimates be provided as to the time in which an evacuation may be accomplished under different conditions, for use by responsible authorities in formulating their protective action recommendations.
There is no regulatory basis, however, to support the Mass AG's apparent belief that protective actions must be developed which assure that any particular level of radiological dose -consequences do not occur in the event of an accident.
Accordingly, this aspect of the
~ contention should be rejected.1 J
2/
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. II. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.
1),
ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983).
- Accord, NUREG-0654, et 6.
-3/
As the Board is aware, this contention was previously filed by the Mass AG on September 9,1983. ~ In the Staff's prior response to this contention, we noted as follows:
[N]o threshold number of unacceptable deaths or injuries has been established by the Commission for use in assessing the adequacy of emergency plans.
Thus, an assertion to the effect that an emergency response plan must be deemed inadequate if evacuation is not able to prevent the occurrence of early deaths, would be without regulatory basis.
See also, " Planning Basis for Emergency Responses to Nuclear Power Reactors" 44 Fed. Reg. 61123 (October 23, 1979).
"NRC Staff Response to ' Contention of Attorney General Francis X.
Dellotti Relative to Emergency Planning for the New Hampshire Beach Communities,'" dated September 26,1983, at 5 n.1.
i
e S
0 0
q I
i NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO CONTENTIONS FILED BY NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION j
i
i j
NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION NECNP Contention RERP-1 The New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan
("RERP")
does not support the " reasonable assurance" finding required by 10 C.F.R.
I 50.47(a)(1) in that it relies for implementation of the plans on local governments that have not approved.or adopted the plans and that have refused to participate in the testing of the plans.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent it asserts that local governments which are relied upon te implement the plans have indicated that they will not do so.
In our view, this assertion raises an issue as to whether there is reasonable assurance that reasonable protective measures can and will be implemented in an emergency; the extent to which there may be other, compensatory measures or plans is a matter which may be addressed during litigation on the merits of this contention.
However, the Staff opposes admission of this contention to the extent it asserts (a) that various Town plans are invalid because the Towns have not " adopted or approved the plans", or have declared the plans are unacceptable; and (b) that reasonable assurance is lacking because certain Towns
h ave refused to participate" in the February 1986 exercise.
First, as set forth in the Staff's response to llampton Contention I, incorporated by reference herein,
FEf.1A and Commission guidance recognize that integrated emergency planning affords the best protection for the health and safety of the public (NUREG-0654, at 23).
- However,
_3_
NRC regulations do not require that the emergency plans for towns within the plume exposure pathway EPZ be developed, approved, or adopted by the town itself.
As noted in the Staff's response to Hampton Falls 2
Contention. I, the adequacy and implementability of the plan are matters which can be assessed without regard to the identity of the plan's sponsor.
Secondly, this contention merely speculates as to what may have been the effect of the refusal of various towns to participate in the emergency planning exercise held on February 26, 1986.
10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(14) requires the conduct of " periodic exercises to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities NUREG-0654, 5 II.N.
assigns responsibility for the conduct of such exercises both to the licensee and to State and locel organizations.
Whatever effect the Town's non-participation may have had upon the i
adequacy of the February exercise is a question of fact which is outside the scope of this contention.
NECNP Contention RERP-2 The New Ilampshire RERP violates 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(b)(3) as implemented by NUREG-0654 at 5 II. C.1.b in that the state has not specifically identified ell areas in which it requires federal assistance or the extent of its needs; nor has it made arrangements to obtain that assistance; nor has it stated the expected time of arrival of Federal assistance at the Seabrook site or EPZ.
i i
1
_ -. - _ _ ~. - -. - - -, _,. _ - - - - - -
. Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
10 C.F.R.
I 50.47(b)(3) requires that "[alrrangements for requesting and effectively using resources have been made.
NUREG-0654, 5 II.C.I.
describes the means by which this requirement may be satisfied, with respect to the arrangements for Federal resources and essistance in an emergency.
The extent to which the State plan satisfics these provisions, and the extent to which the State may subsequently revise its plan to provide more specific information as to any required Federal assistance, O are matters that may be addressed in litigation on the merits of this contention.
NECNP Contention RERP-3 The State of New Hampshire RERP does not satisfy the requirements of 10 C.F.R.
I 50.47(b)(7),
Appendix E, 5 IV.D.2, and NUREG-0654 in that it does not adequately provide that information will be made available to the adult transient population within the EPZ regarding how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent it relies upon basis items (c) (durable posters) and (d) (French language pre-emergency information).
We note that a package of caergency information materials,
including some French language materials, was forwarded to the Board and parties after the time for filing i
1/
See " Applicants' Response to Off-Site EP Contentions submitted By New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (New flampshire State and Local Plans)"
(" Response to NECNP"), dated March 5, 1986, at 16-19.
. 2,/
The extent to which these materials are contentions had passed.
sufficient to dispose of NECNP's concern may be addressed in litigation on the merits of this contention.
However, the Staff opposes the admission of this contention in all other respects, on the grounds that it lacks basis and constitutes nothing more than a generalization of the Intervenor's view of what applicable policies ought to be.
No reason has been provided as to why the provisions made for disseminating pre-emergency information materials for display in State parks and recreation areas, public buildings, hotels and motels, and other locations (See New Hampshire plan, at 2.3 2.3-13) will be inadequate.
Similarly, no reason has been provided to support NECNP's apparent belief that posters will not be displayed unless the
- State, itself, undertakes to display them or otherwise makes it
" mandatory" for private merchants and proprietors to do so.
ECNP Contention RERP-4 The New Hampshire RERP violates 10 C.F.R.
! 50.47(b)(5) in that it fails to establish adequate means to provide early notification and clear instruc-tions to the populace within the plume exposure EPZ.
In this respect, the RERP also violates Part IV.D.2 and 3 of Appendix E to Part 50, NUREG-0654 Sections E.5, 6, and 7.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
The Staff notes that an alert and notification system study was provided to
-2/
See Letter from William B.
Derrickson (Senior Vice President,
j PYNH) to H.R. Denton (Director, NRR), dated Pinrch 4,1986.
4
. the Board and parties after the time for filing contentions had passed. 3_/
concern b may be The extent to which this. study satisfies NECNP's addressed in litigation on the merits of this contention. 5,/
NFCNP Contention RERP-5 The New Hampshire state and local emergency response plans do not comply with the requirements of 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(5), 5 IV.D.3 of Appendix E to Part 50, or NUREG-0654 5 II.E.6, in that the audible alert systems on which they rely cannot be depended upon to provide prompt notification to the public in an emergency.
l Staff Response j
The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds j
that it lacks basis.
Essentially, this contention asserts that the means relied upon for prompt notification of the public (identified as sirens,
NOAA tone-alert weather radio and mobile public-address units (NECNP Contentions, at 8)) are unreliable.
The sole basis offered in support of
~3/
See Letter from Wendell P. Johnson (Vice President, PSNil) to II.R.
Denton (Director, NRR), dated March 5,1986.
The Applicants, in their response to this contention, suggest that 4/
1 the contention he excluded at this time, "without prejudice to its reassertion within ten days after the ' siren study' has been made available to the intervenors, and provided that NECNP proffers at that time an admissible contention." Applicants' Response to NECNP, at 23.
The Staff generally would not oppose the timely filing of new contentions addressing the specifics of the new siren study, flowever, we believe that the instant contention is nonetheless admissible, in that it challenges a purported deficiency in the existing plan, upon which contentions were required to be filed.
l 5/
The Staff notes its disagreement with Applicants' apparent belief that effective coordination and integrated planning between the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the State of New llampshire is 4
not necessary or required (Applicants' Response to NECNP, at 25).
See Staff Response to Hampton Contention I.
i
. this assertion is that, "[t]o the extent that any of these systems depend upon offsite power sources to operate, they cannot be relied upon to function during an accident at Seabrook" (Id.; emphasis added). NECNP then cites a probab!!!stic safety assessment for the Seabrook Station which purportedly shows that over half of the accidents at Seabrook leading to a significant radioactive release would involve a loss of offsite power (ld., at 8-9).
These assertions, however, fail to recognize that a loss of "offsite power" at the Seabrook Station is not necessarily equivalent to a loss of electrical power at other locations in the 10-mile EPZ, much less throughout the EPZ.
Further, no reason has been provided as to why a notification system employing sirens and NOAA tone-alert radios,
4 approved in NURFG-0654, Appendix 3,
is any less reliable for the Seabrook EPZ than for EPZs surrounding other nuclear plants.
Accordingly, this contention should be rejected.
NECNP Contention RERP-G The siren system relied on by the New Ilampshire PERP for early notification will not provide adequato night-time warning to many indhiduals who are asleep indoors and who will not be able to hear the sirens.
- Thus, the state cannot provide the reasonabic assurance of prompt notification that is required by 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(5) and 5 IV.D.3 of Appendix E to Part 50.
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention, concerning the adequacy of night-time stren coverage, on the ground that it lacks basis.
4 IJECNP has provided no reason to believe that the sirens will be ineffective at night, but asserts only that "it le not clear" whether the I
_7_
sirens (set considerably higher than those at Shearon Harris) will be 6/
heard at night.
Further, there is no regulatory or factual basis to support NECNP's assertion that "the Board should order a night-time test of sirens to determine their effectiveness."
NECNP Contention RERP-7 The New Ilampshire RERP violates 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(1) in that it does not adequately demoa-strate that "each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis."
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it lacks basis, is impermissibly vague, and fails to put the other parties on notice as to what they must litigate within the scope of this contention.
NECNP refers only generally to "many emergency response organizations" and "many agencies", without identifying which organiza-tion or agencies, in its view, are inadequately staffed.
Further, NECNP does not provide any reason to support its belief that the affected agencies are inadequately staffed, but asserts only that "it is unclear" I
whether adequete staffing has been provided.
Accordingly, the contention is both vague and unsupported, and should be rejected.
i 6,/
The Staff notes that FT'"EG-0654 recites FEPIA's criterion on sirens to be 10dB above average daytime ambient background at most loca-tions.
NUREG-0654, Appendix 3,
"Means for Providing Prompt Alerting and Notification of
Response
Organizations and the Population," at 3-8.
l 1
. _ _... _ _. ~.
. HECNP Contention RERP-8 The New Hampshire RERP does not provide a
" reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency," as required by 10 C.F.R.
I 50.47(a)(1), in that the plan does not provide reasonable assurance that sheltering is an " adequate protective measure" for Seabrook, Nor does the plan provide adequate criteria for the choice between protective measures, as required by 9 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654, I II.J.10.m.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
10 C.F.R.
$ 50.47(b)(10) requires that "a
range of protective actions have been developed" and that " guidelines for the choice of protective nctions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place NUREG-0654, 5 J 10.m. provides that i
the State plan is to indicate "the bases for the choice of recommended protective actions," which "shall include expected local protection afforded in residential units or other shelter for direct and inhalation exposure."
The extent to which the State plan satisfies NECNP's concern as to these matters 7/ can be addressed in litigation on the merits of this contention.
NECNP Contention RERP-9 The New Hampshire RERP violates 10 C.F.R.
I 50.47(a)(1),
50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654, 6 II.J.10 because it does not include evacuation time estimates.
1 7/
See Applicants' Response to NECNP. at 31.
_g-Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, but recommends it be deferred at the present for the reasons set forth in the Staff's response to llampton Contention III, hereby incorporated by reference herein.
NECNP Contention RERP-10 The New IIampshire RERP violates 10 C. F. R.
f 50.47(b)(9) in that it fails to demonstrate that
" adequate methods,
systems,
and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use."
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent it relies upon basis items (a) (number and identity of monitoring teams); (b) (monitoring locaHons); (d) (time for deployment of monitoring teams); and (e) (availability of laboratories).
The extent to which the State plans resolve these concerns may be addressed in litigation on the merits of this contention, j
However, the Staff opposes the admission of this contention to the i
extent that it relies upon basis items (c) (identification of the Incident 1
Field Office), and (f) (capacity to monitor the aerial plume).
As noted i
by the Applicants, the IFO has been identified to be located at the Applicants' Newington Station; 8,/ basis item (c) accordingly lacks basis and should be rejected.
With respect to basis item (f), the contention
)
-8/
Applicants' Response to NECNP, at 37; see New Hampshire Plan,
Vol. 4, Part 3, App. E.
. fails to indicate why NECMP believes that the State lacks the capacity to conduct aerial monitoring, and it fails to address the Civil Air Patrol arrangements described in the State Plan.
Accordingly,. this assertion lacks basis and is overly vague, and should be rejected.
NECNP Contention RERP-11 The New Hampshire RERP violates 10 C. F. R.
50.47(b)(12) in that it does not provide adequate arrangements for medical services for contaminated injured individuals.
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention, concerning j
arrangements for medical services for contaminated injured members of the general public, except to the extent it may be read to assert that the Applicants have not complied with the Commission's recent policy statement with respect to 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(12). S 10 C.F.R.
I 50.47(b)(12) requires that " arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals".
Clarification of this provision was provided by the Commission on two occasions.
Initially, the Commission determined (a) that this provision applies to both onsite and offsite individuals; (b) that " contaminated injured individuals" includes seriously irradiated members of the public; and (c) that the requirement for adequate medical arrangements for such individuals would be satisfied by providing a list of area facilities for i
treatment of such individuals.
Southern California Edison Co.
(San i
9/
Statement of Policy,
" Emergency Planning," 50 Fed.
Reg. 20892 (May 21,1985).
, Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), C LI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 536-37 (1983).
Subsequently, in Guard v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
the Court of Appeals vacated a portion of the Commission's interpretation of this provision, to the extent the Commission had ruled that providing a list of treatment facilities constitutes adequate " arrangements" for medical services for offsite individuals exposed to dangerous levels of radiation, d.,
at 1146, 1150.
The Court afforded the NRC substantial flexibility in its reconsideration of this matter, to pursue any rational course which might range from reconsideration of the scope of the phrase " contaminated injured individuals" to imposition of " genuine" arrangements for members of the public exposed to dangerous levels of radiation.
Id., at 1146.
In response to the Guard decision,
the Commission issued a
" Statement of Policy" providing interim guidance to Licensing Boards and the Staff, for use until the Commission " determines how it will respond to the Court's remand."
Statement of Policy, supra, 50 Fed.
Reg., at 20893.
As set forth in the Commission's Statement of Policy, "until the Commission concludes its Guard remand and instructs its boards and its staff differently," it is reasonable to limit contentions on this subject "to issues which could have been heard before the Court's decision in Guard v.
NRC".
Id.,
at 20894.
In sum, litigation is to be limited to the question of whether the plans provide a list ev.isting medical facilities identified for treatment of contaminated injured individuals.
To this
. extent, the Staff does not oppose the admission of NECNP Contention RERP-11. b I
NECNP Contention RERP-12 The New Ilampshire RERP does not provide for radio-protective drugs for institutionalized persons within the EPZ, as required by NUREG-0654, I II.J.10.e.
Nor does it consider the circumstances under which radioprotective drugs should be administered to the general public, as required by 5 II.J.10.f.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent it addresses the provision of radioprotective drugs to institutionalized persons.
See Staff response to Kensington Contention 7, incorporated by reference herein.
NECNP Contention NHLP-1 There is no reasonable assurgnce that the New I!ampshire local emergency plans can and will be implemented during a radiological emergency because the plans have not been formally adopted by the local governments and because a number of communities have objected to the contents of the plans and have refused to participate in an exercise of the plans.
-10/ A second issue which nau be acceptable for litigatio'n under the Commission's Policy Statement is whether the applicants have commited to
" full compliance" with the Commission's upcoming response to the Guard remand.
See Philadelphia Electric Co.
i (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-85-15, 22 NRC 184, 186 (1985).
See also, Union of Concerned Scientists v.
- NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (an issue which is material to a Commission licensing decision may not be removed from required Section 189(a) hearings).
. Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it is duplicative of NECNP Contention RERP-1 and fails to raise a separate admissible issue for litigation.
In addition, the Staff opposes portions of this contention for the reasons set forth in the Staff's response to NECNP Contentien RERP-1, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.
i NECNP Contention NHLP-2 The local emergency response plans for New IIampshire communities within the plume exposure emergency planning zone do not assure that "each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous j
basis," 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(b)(1), in the following i
respects:
1 a.
The police forces for the towns surrounding j
Seabrook do not have sufficient personnel or resources to carry out their responsibilities under the plan.
b.
There is no assurance that necessary police and fire departnent personnel will be reachable or i
capable of responding promptly in the event of a j
radiological emergency, c.
There is no assurance that emergency response personnel can be relied on to fulfill their responsibilities under the emergency planc.
d.
The plane contain no demonstration that private companies or individuals who will be depended on to assist in an emergency will actually be able, committed and willing to perform those functions.
)
c.
All members of each emergency response organi-zation should be surveyed to determine whether they intend to stay in the EPZ to implement the plan during an emergency.
f.
Under the local plans, the highway departments are responsible for assuring a successful, smooth
. evacuation by clearing roads of snow, stalled cars, and accidents and otherwise assuring that the roadways remain open for evacuation.
The local highway departments do not have sufficient personnel or resources to fulfill these responsi-bilities, and the common arrangements for ad hoc assistance by private contractors are insufficient 3
to assure that these responsibilities will be met.
g.
Under the plans, the local fire departments are responsible for such tasks as assisting in monitoring the evacuation, for decontamination of affected individuals, operating and maintaining the EOC or the public alert system (PAS), ' and i
assessing emergency transportation needs.
The local fire departments do not have sufficient personnel or resources to fulfill these responsibilities.
h.
There is no assurance that local emergency response personnel will be reachable or that they will be able to respond soon enough to assure protection of the public health and safety, i.
The local plans do not provide for adequate backups or alternates for important positions in the event that assigned personnel are not available.
l J.
Many of the posts crucial to en effective i
emergency response have not yet been filled.
Staff Response i
The Staff does not oppose the edmission of this contention, to the extent that it relies upon basis items (a) (police force personnel resources); (b) (availability of police and fire personnel); (c) (role conflict); (d) (school buses and tow trucks); (f) (highway department l
personnel); (g) (fire department personnel resources and availability);
Ch)
(availability of, and communications with,
emergency response 4
)
personnel); (i) (designation of alternates for key individuals); and (j) 1 (unfilled positions).
. liowever, the Staff opposes the admission of this contention to the extent it relies upon basis item (e) (need for surveys of ' emergency workers), on the grounds that it lacks basis and constitutes nothing more than a generalization of NECNP's view as to what applicable policy ought to be.
Further, the extent to which emergency personnel may be available is a matter which has been raised by, and is litigable under, i
other. proffered contentions.
1 i
HECNP Contention NIILP-3 The local emergency response plans for the New Hampchire towns surrounding Seabrook do not adequately provide for " notification, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency response personnel by all j
organizations,"
as required by 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(b)(5), in the following respects:
a.
Provision for notification and communication by Public Service Co.
with the town emergency response organizations is inadequate in that it depends upon notification through the county j
dispatch and does not assure that the contact perron will be available or can be reached in the event of a nuclear ernergency.
In each instance, there must be a dedicated telephone line to a j
location where an individual will always be on duty to receive the communication and take I
further action.
j b.
The means for notification of local governments 1
that an emergency has occurred is unreliable because it calls for action by plant operators.
i Notification of any plant malfunction should be I
mechanically communicated to an offsite entity.
1 Staff Response 1
i The Staff does not oppose the admission of subpart (a) of this con tention (means of communication with local energency organizations).
f
~.
. _... ~ _ _ _ _... - _ -., _., _ _ _. - _ -. - _. _
-_-.m.
, However, the Staff opposes the admission of subpart (b) of this contention (unreliability of notification by plant operators) on the grounds that it lacks basis and constitutes an impermissible' challenge to NRC l
regulations.
10 C. F. R. S 50.47(b)(5) requires that means be provided for the -licensee to notify State and local response organizations.
See also, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E,
S IV.
NUREG-0654, S II. E provides further specifics as to how these requirements may be satisfied, and clearly assigns responsibility to the licensee for notification of offsite authorities.
NECNP has not alleged any reason to believe that these provisions should not apply. to the Seabrook Station and, accordingly, this contention should be rejected.
NECNP Contentien NHLP-4 Procedures to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ,10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(5), are inadequate.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the extent that it relies upon basis item (e) (notification of persons with special notification needs).
IlowcVer, the Staff opposes the admission of other portions of this contention, to the extent that it relies upon basis items (a)-(d), on the grounds that it lacks basis, is impermissibly vague, and is duplicative of other contentions filed by NECNP.
Basis iten (a) (lack of a siren design study) is addressed in NECNP Contentions RERP-4, RERP-5 and RERP-6, and this contention does not provide any additional issues which require 1
i
. litigation.
Basis item (c) (time required to notify the public) b acks l
basis and is overly vague.
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, requires responsible offsite emergency organizations. to be capable of providing prompt notification to the public within 15 minutes after receiving notification from the licensee.
NECNP has not asserted that this capability is lacking, nor has it provided any reason to support its view that offsite organizations must ~ " attempt to determine or establish the time. required" to notify the public.
Basis item (d) is unnecessarily duplicctive of NECNP Contention NHLP-5 (to which it refers) and does not provide any additional issues which require litigation.
NECNP Contention NHLP-5 The local plans do not adequately assure protection of the public health and safety in that they make no provision for dealing with the serious language barrier faced by the large numbers of non-English speaking people often in the area and the difficulties that arise from that language barrir.
The language barrier creates behavior problems thet would seriously hamper the ernergency response, rendering an orderly and safe evacuation impossible.
At a minimum, all relevant communicatiens and infor-national material must be in both English and French.
Emergency response personnel who may have to deal with non-English speaking people must be fluent in Trench, and cll such personnel must be trained in handling the behavioral difficulties that may arise as a result of the language barrier.
_1_1/ The contention does not include a basis item (b).
,+ M+.
g Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the
'k\\
g.
extent it asserts that. French-language emergency communications and information must'bel made available to the' public.
.y1 However, the Staff cpposcs the admission of those portions of the a
contention which assert that,. in the absence of French-language emergency communications 'and information, some unspecified "behtivioral problens" or " behavioral difficulties" will result.
This assertion is speculative, lacking in basic, and is overly vague.
NECNP's example of an. unfrientified " French Canadian family that was unable to understand simple directions from a store to a campground, and had to be guided to the campground," does not support an assertion that behavioral problems or difficulties will result in the absence of French-language materials.
Similarly, NECNP's example of an unidentified French-speaking family that locked themselves out of their car and then " locked themselves in their hotel room and refused to come out until a French speaker was found,"
dcos not provide a reasonable representation of what might occur in the event of a radiological emergency.
Accordingly, this aspect of the contention' lacks basis and is overly vague, and should be rejected.
NECNP Contention NHLP-6 The local emergency plans do not provide for an adequate range of protective actions,
10 C.F.R. 550.4 7( b)(10), because they contain inadequate means of relocation or other protection for there with special needs, those without private transportation, school children,
or persons confined to institutions or 1
elsewhere for health or other reasons. f.loreover, the 1
resources available to the towns for these purposes are inadequate to provide a reasonable assurance that the public will be protected in the event of an accident.
e
+
1
. Gtaff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
NECNP Contention NHLP-7 The state and local plans do not contain adequate guidelines for the choice of protective actions or information on which the choice of protective actions could be based in the event of an ~ emergency.
10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(10).
Staff Response The Staff oppcees the admission of this contention on the grounds that it lacks basis and is unnecessarily duplicative of NECNP Contention R FR P-8, to which its " basis" refers.
Accordingly, this contention does not present a separate admissible issue for litigation and should be rejected.
NECNP Contention NHLP-8 The local plans fail to meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(10) in that:
n.
The local plans do not adequately provide for the use of radioprotective drugs for emergency workers or institutionalized persons whose immediate evacuation may not be feasible.
b.
The plans do not include a description of the methods by which decisions for administrating
[ sic]
radioprotective drugs to the general population are made during an emergency and the predetermined conditions under which such drugs may be used.
c.
They do not contain adequate provisions for notifying and providing follow-up information to those segments of the population that are in recreation areas or otherwise without easy access to television or radio.
,r-
,,,w.,,
.v
-,-,-e, mew __.,,_,.
- v. --- _,- -
--..---..--,-,,.---ow--
. Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of subparts (a) and (b) of this contention, concerning provisions for the distribution of radio-protective drugs to emergency workers, institutionalized persons, and the general public. b The extent to which the State and local plans satisfactorily address these concerns, is a matter that may be addressed in litigation on the merits of this contention.
Ilowever, the Staff opposes subpart (c) of this contention, on the grounds that it is overly vague and lacks basis.
NECNP fails to explain g/ NUREO-0654, 5 II.J.10(e) and (f) assigns responsibility to State and local organizations to include in their plans:
e.
Provisions for the use of radioprotective dru gs, particularly for emergency workers and institutionalized persons within the plume exposure EPZ whose immediate evacuation may be infeasible or very difficult, including quantities, storage, and means of distribution, f.
State and local organizations' plans should include the method by which decisions by the State IIcalth Departrient for administering radio-i protective drugs to the general population are l
made during an emergency and the predeter-mined conditions under which such drugs may be used by offsite emergency workers.
The Staff notes that the distribution of potassium iodide (KI) to the general public entails certain p roblems, and is not required by either the Commission or FEMA.
The NRC and FEMA have indicated that the determination as to whether KI should be made available to the public is a matter within the State's discretion.
See, eg,
" Federal Policy on Distribution of Potassium Iodide Around Nuclear Power Sites for Use as a Thyroidal Blocking Agent," 50 Fed. Reg. 30258 (July 24, 1985).
This determination, however, does not apply to emergency workers or institutionalized persons.
Also, this determination does not provide authority to preclude litigation on an otherwise admissible contention which asserts with specificity that the provisions of NURFG-0654 have not been satisfied.
- 21'-
why it believes that sufficient " follow-up" information will not be provided to persons in recreation areas or to persons who do not have access to televisions or radios.
The " basis" supplied by NECNP to support this contention addresses only subparts (a) (KI for energency workers and institutionalized persons), and (b) (K1 for the general public) and does not provide any information which would make subpart (c) an admissible issue.
Accordingly, this subpart of the contention should be rejected.
NECNP Contention NHLP-9 The current state of emergency planning and pre-paredness does not permit a finding of reasonable assurance that if an evacuation is necessary, it can be carried out in a manner that will assure protection of the public health and safety in that:
a.
The consequences of an accident at Seabrook are such that evacuation must be completed promptly in order to avoid unacceptable damage to the public health and safety.
b.
Both local conditions and aspects of the emergency plans will result in families being scattered in various areas.
The families will clog the evacuation routes and disrupt the evacuation by attempting to reunite before proceeding to evacuate.
c.
There is no assurance that those responsible for driving the various busses and other forms of mass transportation will actually do so, rather j
than first assuring the safety of their own families or leaving the area altogether, d.
Many of the primary potential evacuation routes are prone to serious floodin g, which has not been taken into account in the local plans or in the evacuation time estimates contained within those plans.
c.
The local plans do not adequately account for the crowds at the Seabrool: dog track.
. f.
Many of the evacuation routes are narrow and would be blocked by an accident or a stalled car, and those roads and the available traffic control personnel cannot handle both the traffic that will come from surrounding towns as well as the ' traffic ' generated by the town itself.
g.
Gasoline supplies and availability are limited such that many of the vehicles that run low can be expected to run out, thereby clogging the narrow evacuation routes and hindering the evacuation.
h.
In order to assure a safe, prompt, and orderly evacuation in case one is ultimately called for, the emergency plans must provide for notification of all emergency response personnel and imple-mentation of traffic control measures before or coincident with any public announcement of an event at the reactor that falls into any of the emergency action levels, f;taff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of subparts (b) (attempts by families to reunite, causing road congestion); (c) role conflict for bus drivers) ; (d) (road flooding); (c) (dog track crowds; (f) (impediments to evacuation); and (g) (gasoline shortages causing road congestion).
We note that basis items (b), (d), (e), (f), and (g) essentially raise ETE issues, the admission of which might appropriately be deferred at present for the reasons set forth in the Staff's response to llampton Contention III.
Ilowever, the Staff opposes the admission of subparts (a) (accident dose effects and need for prompt evacuation);
(h)
(need for pre-notification of emergency workers); and (i) poor driving habits).
Subpart (a) of this contention seeks to litigate the consequences of specific accident sequences, and argues that an evacuation must be completed within a short period of time in order to avoid " unacceptable" exposure to radiation.
These assertions, however, lack regulatory basis
. and are inappropriate for litigation.
The Commission has stated that
"[e]mergency plans must be developed that will have the flexibility - to ensure response to a ' wide spectrum of' accidents."
Statement of Consideration, " Emergency Planning," 45 Fed. R_e_g. 55402 (1980.
In this regard, NUREG-0654 provides as follows:
The overall objective of emergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate life saving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of Protective Action Guides (PAGs).
No single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan be-cause each accident could have different conse-quences, both in nature and degree.
Further, the range of possible selection for a planning basis is very large, starting with a zero point of requiring no planning at all because significant offsite radiological accident consequences are unlikely to occur, to planning for the worst possible accident, regardless of its extremely low likelihood.
The NRC/ EPA Task Force did not attempt to define a single accident sequence or even a limited number of sequences.
Rather, it identified the bounds of the parameters for which planning is recommended, based upon know-ledge of the potential consequences, timing, and release characteristics of a spectrum of accidents.
. Although the selected planning basis is independent of specific accident sequences, a number of accident descriptions were considered in the development of the guidance, including the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400].
Id., at 6-7.
Accord, Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 MRC 528, 533 (1983).
In sum, the consequences of particular postulated accidents are inappropriate for litigation under the Commission's emergency planning regulations.
Further,
neither the Commission's regulations nor NUREG-0654 requires that absolute assurance of radiological safety be provided in the event of an emergency or that evacuations be completed in any particular time frame.
As stated by the Appeal Board, "the basic l
l
. goal of emergency planning is the achievement of maximum dose savings in a radiological emergency. "
Toward this end, the Commission requires that reasonable estimates be provided as to the time in which an evacuation may be accomplished under different conditions, for use by responsible authorities in formulating their protective action recommendations. -
NECNP's assertion that an evacuation must be accomplished "promptly" in order to cope with the accident sequence presented in this contention fails to raise an issue that is appropriate for litigation under the Commission's regulations.
Accordingly, it should be rejected.
Subpart (h) of the contention (need to notify emergency personnel before notifying the public), lacks basis and appears to present an 1
impermissible challenge to Commission regulations.
,10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E.
S IV.D.3., requires that a licensee have "the capability to notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declarinc an emergency," and that an offsite prompt notification systen be installed with the " capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes." The regulation further states as follows:
The use of this notification capability will range from immediate notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the State and local governmental officials to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public notification system....
13/ Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Statien, Unit No.
1),
ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983).
Acc crd,
l NUREG-0654, at 6.
i
---,--,.,,-----~----.-------,--r,----,
. These regulatory provisions reflect the Commission's determination that the capability to promptly notify the public of an emergency is of paramount importance for effective emergency planning.
NECNP's assertion, which would require that emergency workers be in their assigned locations before any public notification occurs, poses an unacceptable potential for delay in accomplishing a prompt notification of the public as required by Commission regulations.
- Further, no regulatory basis has been provided which would support this assertion.
Accordingly, this subpart of the contention (which essentially constitutes a generalization of NECNP's views of what applicable policy ought to be),
i should be rejected on the grounds that it lacks basis and poses an impermissible challenge to Commission regulations.
Subpart (i) of the contention (concerning poor driver habits),
should also be rejected, on the grounds that it lacks basis.
While this issue might be interpreted as raising an ETE issue, no such assertion is presented here.
Rather, although the thrust of this subpart is not entirely clear, it would appear that NECNP seeks to litigate whether drivers in the Seabrook EPZ (particularly those from Boston) are so much worse than drivers in the EPZs for other nuclear plants that an evacuation could not be successful.
NECNP has failed to support this apparent belief, and this part of the contention should be rejected.
NECNP Contention NHLP-10 The local plans do not contain adequate arrangement for medical services for contaminated injured indi-viduals.
10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(b)(12) and NUREG-0654, 5 II.L.
...=..
- ps -
a.
.The towns within the EPZ do not have sufficient
' ambulances or - emergency medical-equipment to care for contaminated injured individuals.
b.
In addition ' to' contaminated injured individuals, the. towns must evacuate hospitals, convalescent homes and the nonambulatory residential popula-tion, many of which must be transported by emergency medical vehicles.
The plans do not demonstrate that there are sufficient numbers of emergency vehicles to meet the needs of the communities.
Gtnff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it constitutes an impermissible challente to Commission regulations.
While the basis for this contention asserts there is. an inadequate number of ambulances and other emergency vehicles, it seeks to do so within the context of 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(b)(12), concerning " arrangements for contr.minated injured individuals."
As set forth in the Staff's response to NECNP Contention RERP-11, which is hereby incorporated by reference, the only issues presently litigable under that regulation are (a) whether a i
list of hospitals and medical facilities has been provided, and (arguably) i (b) whether the applicants have committed to full compliance with the Commission's upcoming post-Guard review of this matter.
Accordingly, the Staff opposes the admission of this contention. b l
-14/ Notwithstanding our conclusion as to the inadmissibility of this con tention, the Staff would not oppose the contention if it is rewritten to delete any reference to 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(12) and
" contaminated injured individuals,"
and instead addressed the availability of ambulances and other emergency vehicles to conduct an evacuation of
" hospitals,
convalescent homes and the non-ambulatory residential population" in the identified towns.
4 i
l
..m_
-. -, -. ~ _ _... _, _ - - -, _,. - _,., -, _,,., _., _. _.... _ _ _ _ _ _ _, _ _ _. - _ _
, NECNP Contention NHLP-11 The New Hampshire local plans fail to take into consideration the effects of loss of offsite power on the ability of local governments to take adequate protective measures in the event of an emergency.
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it lacks basis, and is vague and overly broad. While this contention asserts that a " loss of offsite power" has a "high correlation" with core melt accidents, no reason is provided to support NECNP's apparent belief that a loss of offsite power at the Seabrook Station will be accompanied by a loss of electrical power in various locations around the site boundary 1
or,
- indeed, throughout the ten-mile plume exposure pathway EpZ.
Further, the contention provides no basis for NECNP's apparent belief thet a loss of electrical power could cover so large an area of the EPZ as to preclude the taking of adequate protective measures.
NECNP Contention NHLP-12 The host plans are insufficient to provide for the registering and monitoring of evacuees at relocation centers.
I Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention,
concerning the adequacy of the host community plans, provided it is limited to the specific basis supplied in support of the contention -- i.e.,
the adequacy of relocation centers in Nashua, PH as to the specific matters discussed in the contention.
i t
NECNP Contention NHLP-13 The host plans do not provide assurance that evacuees from the Seabrook EPZ will be monitored and will be decontaminated if necessary.
The plans thus pose a threat that evacuees will carry radiological contamination into other areas of the state and even into other states and Canada.
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it lacks basis, poses an impermissible challenge to Commission regulations, and constitutes nothing more than generalization of NECNP's i
view of what applicable policy ought to be.
Essentially, this contention asserts that all evacuees should be required to go to relocation centers to be monitored and decontaminated, if necessary, in order to prevent the spread of re.dioactive contamination.
However, neither the Commission's regulations nor regulatory guidance mandate such universal usage of I
relocation centers.
Rather, NUREG-0654, S II.J.12, provides as follows:
Each organization shall describe the means for registering and monitoring of evacuees at relocation centers in host areas.
The personnel and equipment available should be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centern.
(Id.; emphasis added).
NECNP does not challenge the ability of the relocation centers to satisfy this standard and, accordingly, it fails to raise an appropriate issue for litigation.
1 i
l k
l
MRC STAFF RESPONSE TO CONTENTIONS FILED BY THE SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE
SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE SAPL Contention 1 The New Hampshire state and local radiological eraergency response plans fail to provide " reasonable assurance" because they do not set out how emer-gency vehicles (buses, vans and EMS vehicles) will be able to make their way into the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) to their respective destinations against a
potential outgoing flow of evacuating vehicles.
No route maps are provided from the loca-tions from which the buses, etc. are traveling to their destinations in the EPZ.
Therefore, these plans do not meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1), 550.47(b)(3) and NUREG-0654 II.J.10.K.
Staff Response O i
The Staff does not oppose the admission of this con ten tion,
concerning the time required for buses, vans and other emergency vehicles (which are to be used in evacuating portions of the population) to enter the plume exposure pathway EPZ during an emergency.
We j
note, however, that this concern er,sentially raises an ETE issue and, accordingly, we recommend that it be deferred at present for the reasons j
set forth in the Staff's response to Ilanpton Contention III, incorporated
)
by reference herein.
l l
1 1/
SAP L's contentions were filed as an attachment to a 2-page cover i
memorandum, in which SAPL states "[t]he following contentions apply to the New Hampshire State plan and to all seventeen of the i
i submitted [ town] plans except where noted."
Id., at 1.
The Staff 1
opposes this cttempt to broaden the bases for TAPL's contentions to include these 18 plans, as being overly vague and lacking in basis.
l SAPL's contentions set forth specific bases which should govern the j
l admissibility of its contentions.
It is simply insufficient for a contention to allege entire plans to be inadequate, without specifying in some reasons way why each plan or portion of a plan is alleged to l
be inadequate.
- See, e.g.,
Long Island Lighting Co.
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LHP-82-75, 16 NRC 986, 993 (1982).
j l
.n, e---
o
' However, the Staff opposes the admission of that. portion of the contention which asserts that " route maps" for these vehicles are required.
This aspect of the contention lacks regulatory and factual basis and should be excluded from the contention.
l l
SAPL Contention 2 l
1 Contrary to the reouirements of 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(1), 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Sections IV. A.8. and IV.D.3., and NUREG-0654 II. A.2.a and b,
II. A.3 and II. E.1 and 3.,
the responsibilities, authorities and concept of operations between the State of New Hampshire and the State of Massachusetts in ordering any protective action have a
not been sufficiently defined nor set forth in a written agreement.
j Staff Response l
The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
4 NUREG-0654 recognizes that the 10-mile EPZ for a nuclear plant may include more than one State, "mak[ing) it necessary to have contiguous State energency planning within the EpZ, involving cooperative planning at a higher level of government."
Id.,
at :' 1.
Further, NUREG-0054 i
provides generally that:
NRC and FEMA have a shared belief that an i
i integrated approach to the development of response plans to radiological hazards is most likely to provide j
the best protection of the health and safety of the public.
NRC and FEMA rccognize that plans of i
licen sees, State and local governments should not be developed in a vacuum or in isolation from one another.
Should an accident occur, the public can be best protected when the response by all parties is fully integrated.
Each party involved must have a clear understanding of what the overall level of preparednest must be and what role it will play in the event of a nuclear accident.
This understanding can be achieved best if there is an integrated development and evaluation of plans.
There must also l
4 i
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i 5
be an acceptance by the parties and a
clear
~!
recognition of -the responsibility they share for-safeguarding public health and safety.
NUREG-0654, at 23-24.
See also Staff's Response to Hampton Contention 2_/
Accordingly, this contention. raises an appropriate issue for I.
i i
litigation and should be admitted.
However, notwithstanding the Staff's j
conclusion as to the admissibility of this contention, the Staff suggests i
that litigation of-the contention be deferred - at present, to await 4
developments in the preparation and submission of emergency plans by l
the Commonwcalth of Massachusetts.
CAPL Contention 3 The New IIampshire State and host community plans do not provide for sufficient capacity in the New Ilampshire community reception centers for registra-tion and monitoring within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> all residents and transients arriving at the relocation centers.
Therefore, the New Ilampshire State, local j
and host plans do not meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1), 650.47(b)(8), 650.47(b)(D),
I 550.4 7( b)(10),
$50.47(b)(12) and NUREG-0054
]
II. J.12.
Staff Ilesponse l
The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, to the I
extent it questions the adequacy of the relocation centers for evacuees who choose to utilize them. 3_/
i l
2_/
The Applicants assert there is no regulatory requirement for agreements between the Commonwealth of Pfassachusetts and the State j
of New IIampshire.
While such agreements do not appear to be 1
required (except where the States are to provide support to each other, NUREG-0G54, 6 II. A.3), the contention appears to include a i
i more general concern as to a " definition" of responsibilities for the l
States. This issue is appropriate for litigation.
j l
3/
We note, however, that there is no requirement that the relocation l
centern he able to accommodate all evacuees from the EP2, or that all 1
i evacuees go to the relocation centers.
See NUllEG-0654, S II.J.12.
t
\\
i L
a
. i SAPL Contention 4 I
The New Ilampshire, State, local and host community plans fail to meet in adequate fashion the require-ments that provisions be made for medical treatment of contaminated injured individuals as set forth at 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(12) and NUREG-0654 II.L.1. at L. 3.
i j
Staff Response i
The Staff opposes the admission of this contention, except to the extent that it may be read to assert that the Applicants have not complied with the Commission's recent policy statement with respect to 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(b)(12). O See Staff Response to NECNP Contention RERP-11, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.
j S APL Contention 5 i
l The New llampshire State and local plans are deficient in that they do not ensure that there will be adequate perscnnel or the timely arrival of personnel trained in radiological monitoring in the plume exposure EPZ following a release of radiation from Seabrook Station.
Neither is there assurance that monitoring can be carried on for the *equired time frame.
Th erefore, the requirements of 10 C.F.R.
S50.47(a)(1),
S50.47(b)(1),
S50.47(b)(8),
550.47(b)(D),
and FL* REG-0654 II.I.7, I.8 and I.11 and II. A.4. are not met.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
i f
t 4_/
Statement of Policy,
" Emergency Planning," 50 Fcg.
Reg. 20892 l
(May 21,1985).
i
.--n
. SAPL Contention 6 The New Hampshire State and local plans do not meet the requirement that there be maps showing populatien distribution around the nuclear facility as required at NUREG-0654 J.10.b.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
4 SAPL Contention 7 l
The New Hampshire State and local plans fail to meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R.
S50.47(b)(11) and I
NUREG-0054 K.5.b.
because there has been no showing that the means of radiological decontamination i
of emergency personnel, wounds, supplies and equip-ment have been established.
Further, there has not been a clear showing that adequate means for waste disposal exist.
)
Staff Response i
The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, except to the extent that it improperly relies upon 10 C.F.R.
S50.47(b)(11) and j
NUREG-0654 K.S.6 (both of which relate to emergency personnel and not i
members of the general public) to support what appearn to be an otherwise admissible contention. -
I f
5_/
Blore appropriate citations might be 10 C.F. R.
S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654, S II. J.12.
A review of SAP L's other contentions reveals that SAPL frequently identifies incorrect regulatory and guidance provisions in support of otherwise admissible contentions.
The Staff has not undertaken to review each of SAPL's contentions at this time, to verify or correct SAPL's regulatory citations.
Our i
response to SAPL's contentions reflects our determination as to the admissibility of these contentions, without regard to whether SAPL correctly identified the proper regulatory standard within which consideration of the contention should proceed.
I
. SAPL Contention 8 l-The New Hampshire State and local plans fail to meet the requirements that there be adequate manpower and 24-hour per day emergency response, including 24-hour per day manning of communications links, as required by 10 C.F.R. 950.47(a)(1), $50.47(b)(1),
S50.47(b)(2), and NUREG-0654 II. A.I.e, II. A.4. and II. F.1. a.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
SAPL Contention 9 The New Hampshire State plan and the local plans for
- Seabrook, E;:eter and Kingston fall to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a l
radiological emergency because these plans are incomplete.
Therefore, they do not satisfy the i
requirement of 10 C.F.R. 650.47(a)(1), NUREG-0654 II.J.8 and II.J.10,1.
Staff Response i
The Staff does not oppose the admission of this con tention, but recommends that it be deferred for the reasons set forth in the Staff's
)
response to !!ampton Contention III, which is hereby incorporated by i
reference herein.
i 4
SAPL Contention 10 The New Ilampshire State plan fails to meet the requirements set out at 10 C.F.R. $50.47(b)(16) and NUREG-0654
!!.P.3, II. P.4.,
II. P. S. and II. P.10.
because all of the lists of rames for the Seabrook Station EP7 local communities Ifsted in Appendix K of the state plan are seriously outdated.
]
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
1 I
i I
' SAPL Contention 11 The New Hampshire State and local radiological emergency response plans fall to meet the require-ments of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1), $50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 II.J.9.
in that the Protective Action Guides shown in Table 4 of each of the local plans have no clear technical bases, fitaff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds j
thnt it lacks basis,
poses an impermissible challenge to the basic structure of the Commission's emergency planning regulations, and constitutes nothing more than a generalization of SAPL's views of what applicable policy ought to be.
10 C.F.R.
S 50,47(b)(10) requires thnt "a
range of protective acticns" are developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ, and that 4
" guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal
- guidance, are developed and in place."
NUREG-0654 states that "[tlhe overall objective of emergency response i
plann is to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate life saving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excese of Protective Action Guides (PAGs)." 6_/
NUREG-0654, S II. J. 9, further 4
states ce follows:
Each State and local organization shall establish a capability for implementing protective measures based l
upon protective action guides and other criteria.
This shall be consistent with the recommendations of EPA regarding exposure resulting from passage of radioactive airborne plumes, (EPA-520/1-75-001).
-6/
NUREG-0054, at 6, citing "Afanual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents,"
EPA-520/1-75-001 (September 1975).
. The Commission har employed the PAGs in developing a planning basis for its emergency planning regulations.
However, the PAGs have not been adopted as binding criteria for radiological dose protection in the event of an accident.
In this regard, Commission guidance provides a
as follows:
[ A]cceptable values for emergency doses to the public under the actual conditions of a nuclear accident j
cannot be predetermined.
The emergency actions taken in any individual case must be based on the
]
actual conditions that exist and are projected at the time of an accident.
For very serious accidents, predetermined protective actions would be taken if projected doses, at any place and time during an actual accident, appeared to be at or above the applicable proposed Protective Action Guides (PAGs),
based on information readily available in the reactor control room, i.e., et pradetermined emergency action levels.
Of course, ad hoc actions, based on plant or environmental measurements, could be taken at any time.
The concept of Protective Action Guides was introduced to radiological energency response planning to assist public health and other govern-mental authorities in deciding how much of a radiation hazard in the environment constitutes a basis for initiating emergency protective actions.
These guides (PAGs) are expressed in units of radiation dose (rem) and represent trigger or initiation levels, which warrant pre-selected protective actions for the public if the projected (future) dose received by an individual in the absence of a protective action
(
exceeds the PAG.
PAGs are defined or definable for j
all pathways of radiation exposure to man and are proposed as guidance to be used as a basis for taking 4
action to minimize the impact on individuals.
i i
The nature of PAGs is such that they cannot be used i
to assure that a given level of exposure to individuals in the population is prevented.
In any particular response situation, a
range of doses may be experienced, principally depending on the distance from the point of release.
Some of these doses may be well in excess of the PAG levels and clearly warrant the initiation of any feasible protective actions.
This does not mean, however, that doses j
above PAG levels can be prevented or that emergency 1
l l
s
. response plans should have as their objective preventing doses above PAG Ievels.
Furthermore, PAGs represent only trigger levels and are not intended to represent acceptable dose levels.
PAGs are tools to be used as a decision aid in the actual response situation.
Methods for the implementation of Protective Action Guides are an essential element of emergency planning. These include the predetermina-tion of emergency conditions for which planned protective actions such as shelter and/or evacuation would be implemented offsite....
NUREG-0306, EPA 520/1-78-016, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants" (December 1978), at 2-4.
4 In sun, SAPL incorrectly assumes that the Commission's emergency planning regulations establish the PAGs as minimum dose criteria in the event of an accident.
SAPL's attempt to litigate this issue is based upon nisunderstanding of the Commission's intent in utilizing the PAGs in a
t developing its energency planning basis.
As set forth in the Staff's response to the Mass AG's contention, supra, the Commission has not established any threshold dose which is deemed to be " safe" in the event I
of an accident, and it would be inappropriate to litigate the consequences j
of particular accidents in this proceeding.
SAPL's contention constitutes a challenge to the basic structure of the Commission's emergency planning i
regulations, and should be rejected, i
t i
SAPL Contentien 12 The plans are insufficient to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and l
will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency.
Specifically the plans do not analyze or account for behavioral variations among members of the public in the event of a radiological emergency.
Such considerations are required by 10 C.F.R.
)
$50.47(a)(1) as interpreted by NUREG-0654 App. 4 IV J
B. (p.4-10).
l
-___,,.____..-_s,_.,.
m____..._____._,,,-__,_._______,_
, Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention. U I
i SAPL Contention 13 1
The plans are insufficient to provide reasonable v
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency as required by 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1).
Specifically, 3
the plans neither discuss nor account for behavioral j
variations among designated emergency personnel that would impair or extinguish the ability to implement 4
j the plans, l
Str.ff Response The Stafi does not oppose the admission of this contention, within the context of the specific basis provided in support of the contention s
i (i.e., school bus drivers, firemen, teachers and principals).
i r
i SAPL Contention 14 i
Procedures to provide early notification and clear i
instruction to the populace within the plume exposure i
pathway EPZ required by 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(5) are inadequate in that the plans do not provide for i
bilingual messages for the large numbers of l
French-speaking individuals who are often in the area l
in large numbers.
4 i
t i
I I
7/
Applicants point to determinations in other proceedings where it was
[
j determined as a matter of fact (after admission of the contention)
~
that untoward human conduct would not affect an evacuation.
These i
l rulings do not have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in this l
proceeding, involving different parties and different facts. Further, these were determinations of fact, not of law, in those proceedings:
the admission of those matters for factual resolution indicates that j
the 13oards in those proceedings had determined that the contentions j
raised legally admissible issues.
I i
l 1
l
, Staff Response 1
The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, except to the extent it asserts that " behavioral difficulties may arise as a result of the language barrier."
This assertion lacks basis and is overly vague, and should be excluded from the contention.
1 SAPL Contention 15 J
Because there are no specific letters of agreement i
included in either the New Hampshire State plan or I
the local plans, the plans fall to meet the require-ments of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(n)(1), $50.47(b)(3) and NUREG-0054 II. A.3 and II.B.9.
l Staff Response 1
j The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
i.
SAPL Contention 16 i
I The New flampshire State and local plans do not make l
adequate provisions for the sheltering of various segments of the populace in the EPZ and therefore the plans fall to meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1),
650.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 II.J.10.a. and m.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
l l
SAPL Contention 17 The New Ilampshire State and local plans fa!! to make j
adequate provisions for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency
+
i personnel and to the public.
Therefore, the plans do not meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(1),
l 550.47(b)(5) and (b)(6) and NUREG-0654 Planning
]
Standard F.
I i
l l
, Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
SAPI, Contention 18 i
The local New Hampshire community plans of Brentwood, Exeter, Portsmouth, Seabrook and New Castle significantbr miscalculated the numbers of l
non-auto owning population based on the percentages of non-auto owning population given in each of the i
above-stated plans.
No buses are provided in the plans for the individuals who are not accounted for due to these miscalculations.
Therefore, these plans fail to meet the requirements of 10 C. F. R.
f50.47(a)(1),
ISO.47(b)(8),
NUREG-0654 II.J.10. g i
and NUREG-0654 Appendix 4, p. 4-3.
Staff Response f
The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
i i
i SAPI, Contention 19
.f j
The plans are inadequate because they fail to address j
the impacts of egress route flooding, excessive snow accumulation, fog, rain and icing of roadways upon an orderly evacuation.
The plans cannot reasonably assure that adequate measures can and will be taken I
in the event of a radiological emergency, as required by 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1), without addressing the excessive
- snow, fog,
flooding and icing issues.
NUREG-0654 II.J 10.K requires that the identification of and means for dealing with potential impediments to use of evacuation routes be addressed.
I Staff Response l
1 The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
j flowever, inasmuch as it essentially raises ETE issues, we recommend that j
it be deferred at present for the reasons set forth in the Staff't response to llampton Contention III, incorporated by reference herein.
)
. SAPL Contention 20 The State and local plans fall to assure that adequate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency as mandated by 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1) and NUREG-0654 II.J.10.k.
Specifically, the plans fall to address the impact of limited gasoline supplies within the EPZ upon an orderly evacuation.
NUREG-0654 II. J.10. k. requires that contingency measures for dealing with impediments to use of the evacuation routes be developed.
S_taff Response i
j The Staff does not oppoac the admission of this contention, to the extent it addresses a need for agreements for tow trucks.
1 In addition, the Staff does not oppose the other aspect of this contention (effect of stalled cars on evacuation timea).
flot'ever, because 1
j this is essentially an ETE issue, we recommend that this aspect of the contention be deferred at present, for the reasons set forth in the Staff's response to llampton Contention !!I, incorporated by reference herein.
i l
SAPL Contention 21 he plans do not provide for the equipping of the 4
evacuation vehicles with two-way radios so that the emergency personnel involved are kept completely informed of changing conditions.
The plans do not designate alternate evacuation routes to be used by contracted transportation companies in the event that i
reasonably forseeable occurrences (i. e. wind shift,
4 precipitation, traffic breakdowns) necessitate a
J ehange in the primary evacuation route during an evacuation.
The plans, therefore, do not meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 150.47(a)(1),
(h)(5),
j (h)(6) and NUREG-0654 F.1.e and E.2.
i l
Staff Response a
The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
I i
k 1
}
l
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_ - - ~...
--m.._,-,,___
~. _ - -
SAPL Contention 22 The Seabrook Station 10 mile EPZ radius is not sufficiently large to provide reasonable assurance that the public can and will be protected in the event of a radiological emergency. Onshore winds are frequently strong enough to cause a drifting effect which could expose people outside ~ the present EPZ to a radio-active plume.
Yet, individuals beyond 10 miles would receive no warning to shelter and would not be in a position to effect a timely evacuation given the likelihood that evacuation routes (I-95, Route 1) would be filled to capacity. There has been no study of traffic geographics beyond the 10-mile zone.
i Therefore, the New Hampshire State and local RERP's a
do not meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R.
$50.47(a)(1) and ISO.47(c)(2).
Staff Response The Staff opposes the admission of this contention on the grounds that it constitutes an impermissible challenge to Commission regulations.
10 C.F.R. I 50.47(c) provides:
Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 Km) in radius.
The exact size and i
configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as j
they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristieg access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries..
l I
8/
The establishment of 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ was
~
recommended by a joint NRC/ EPA tank force, as reported in NUREG-0396 The purpose of the task force in establishing this EPZ was to designate "the areas for which planning is recommended to 4
assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident."
Id., at 11.
The size of the T
EP7, was determined in consideration of a full spectrum of accidents i
and corresponding consequences tempered by probability considerations."
Id., at 15.
The task force determined that:
[E]mergency plans could be based upon a generic distance out to which predetermined actions would (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
.-m----_
_-_,~-,-,,,--m
-__.,_,.---_m--
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NECNP asserts that the EPZ should extend up to 20 miles from the plant. 8I However, this contention presents an impermissible attack on the Commission's regulations.
A similar issue srose in Pacific Gas i
and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819, 830-31 (1984), where the Appeal Board stated as follows:
Contrary to the argument of the joint intervenors and the
- Governor, the Licensing Board's focus on 4
emerFency planning within the EPZs set forth in i
10 C.F.R. 50.47(c)(2) was correct.
That regulation evidences the commission's considered expert judgment as to the necessary size of the plume exposure pathway EPZ and the ingestion pathway EPZ for light water commercial nuclear power plants.
Although the regulations provide that the exact size and configuration of a particular EPZ is to be 1
determined with reference to site-specific factors, the 4
wholesale enlargement of the Commission-prescribed FPZs by the State cannot preclude a licensing decision based upon the requirements of the NRC (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROf f PREVIOUS PAGE) provide dose savings for any such accidents.
Beyond this generic distance it was concluded that actions could be taken on an ad hoc basis using the same considerations that went into the initial action determinations.
The NRC/EPZ tash force recommendation to establish a plume exposure pathway EPZ of generally 10 miles was subsequently accepted by a joint FEf,lA/NRC steering committee (See NUREG-0654),
}
and was then adopted by the Commission in its emergency planning regulations.
The Commission stated that the 10-mile radius for the plume exposure pathway EPZ is " considered large enough to provide a response base that would support activity outside the planning zone should this ever be needed."
Statement of Consideration,
" Emergency Planning," 45 Fed. Reg. 55402, 55406 ( Aug.19,1980).
9/
The Staff notes that the plume exposure pathway EPZ for Seabrook is
~
contiguous with various jurisdictional boundaries, and comprises an Irregularly shaped area that generally extends beyond 10 miles from l
the Seabrook plant, i
l
(
. regulations.
As the Licensing Board concluded in considering the same type of expanded state EPZs in Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-39, 15 NRC 1163,1181 (1982), affd, ALAB-717,17 NRC 346 (1983), the Commission's regulations " clearly allow leeway for a mile or two in either direction, based on local factors.
But it.
. clearly precludes a plume EPZ radius of, say 20 or more miles."
The same i
~
Board then correctly determined that a party seeking to impose such a
radical departure from the Commission's prescribed EPZs should seek an exception to the rule pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.758.
(Footnotes omitted)
Accord, Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-30,16 NRC 1163,1177-84 (1982), aff'd, 1
ALAB-717,17 HP.C 346 (1983).
SAPL Contention 22 thus constitutes an attack of a Commission regulation, which is impermissible under 10 C.F.R. I 2.758(a) without the party's having filed a petition that the regulation be waived or an exception made for this proceeding on the grounds of "special circumst ances."
See 10 C.F.R. I 2.758(b).
SAPL has failed to file any such petition, and its attempt to challenge the Commission's regulation establishing generally a 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ nust be
- rejected, i
S APL Contention 23 l
The New Ilampshire State and local RERP's do not 1
meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 950.47(a)(1),
l 150.47(b)(7) and Nt' REG-0654 11.G.1 and its sub-i sections because no samples of the material that is to be disseminated to the public to inform them of how they will be notified and what their actions should be i
in an emergency are provided in the plans.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention, although we note that a package of sample informational materials was recently 3
L-.. --.
- W.
v.
, 1 distributed to the Board and parties, after the time for filing contentions
~ " '-' '
had passed.
The extent to which these materials satisfy SAPL's concern may be addressed in litigation on the merits of the contention.
SAPL Contention 24 The State and local RERP's do not adequately address s
the methods for protecting the public from consump-tion of contaminated food and water which originate within the 50 mile ingestion pathway EPZ.
Therefore,
the State and local plans fall to. meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 850.47(a)(1), ISO.47(c)(2) and NUREG-0654 II.J.11.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention. While it is not clear what is meant by the phrase " cross-referencing" (SAPL Contentions, at 29), Commission and FEMA guidance provide that the emergency plans of contiguous states within the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ should be integrated with each other. E As set forth in the Staff's response to SAPL Content 4n 2,
supra, the NRC and FEMA have recognized a need for there to be " contiguous State emergency planning within the EPZ, involving cooperative planning at a higher level of government. " NUREG-0654, at 21.1_1,/
H/ See Applicants' Response to SAPL, at 33.
-11/ Notwithstanding our conclusion as to the admissibility of this portion of the contention, we recommend that its litigation be deferred at present, to await developments in the preparation and submission of emergency plans by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
s 18 -
SAPL Contention 25 The New IIampshire State and local radiological emergency responce plans do not reasonably assure that the public health and safety will adequately be protected because the provisions for protecting those persons whose mon 11ty may be impaired due to such factors as institutional or other confinement are patently lacking.
Therefore, the plans do not meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 950.47(a)(1),
550.47(b)(8) and NUREG-0654 II.J.10.d.
Staff Response The Staff does not oppose the admission of this contention.
I
DOCKETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA USNRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'86 MR 17 P3 :26 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD OFFICE OF.=L ugt.,.
00CMETING A 3D.vtr in the Matter of
)
BRANCH
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
Docket Nos. 50-443 OL NEW HAflPSHIRE, et al.
)
50-444 OL
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO CONTENTIONS FILED BY TOWNS OF HAMPTON, HAMPTON FALLS, KENSINGTON, RYE AND SOUTII HAMPTON, AND BY THE MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL, NECNP AND SAPL" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class or, as indi-
.cated by an asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, or as indicated by a double asterisk, delivered by express mail, this 14th day of March,1986.
Helen Hoyt,- Esq., Chairman
- Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke*
Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Jerry Harbour
- Jo Ann Shotwell **
Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One Ashburton Place,19th Floor Washington, D.C.
20555 Boston, MA 02108 Beverly Hollingworth Stephen E. Merrill**
209 Winnecunnet Road Attorney General llampton, NH 03842 George Dana Bisbee Assistant Attorney General Sandra Gavutis, Chairman **
Office of the Attorney General Board of Selectmen 25 Capitol Street RFD 1 Box 1154 Concord, NH 03301-6397 Kensington, NH 03827 Richard A. Hampe, Esq.**
New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency 107 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301
f e Calvin A. Canney, City Manager Allen Lampert City Hall Civil Defense Director 126 Daniel Street Town of Brentwood Portsmouth, NH 03801 20 Franklin Street Exeter, NI! 03833 Roberta C. Pevear**
State Representative Angie Machiros, Chairman Town of Hampton Falls Board of Selectmen Drinkwater Road 25 High Road Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Newbury, MA 09150 Mr. Robert J. Ilarrison Jerard A. Croteau, Constable President and Chief Executive Officer 82 Beach Road, P.O. Box 5501 Public Service Co. of New Hampshire Salisbury, MA 01950 P.O. Box 330 Manchester, NH 03105 Diane Curran, Esq.**
Harmon & Weiss Robert A. Backus, Esq.**
2001 S Street, N.W.
Backus, Meyer & Solomon Suite 430 110 Lowell Street Washington, D.C.
20009 Manchester, NH 03100 Edward A. Thomas **
Philip Ahrens, Esq.
Federal Emergency Management Agency Assistant Attorney General 442 J.W. McCormack (POCII)
Office of the Attorney General Boston, MA 02109 State House Station, #G Augusta, MF 04333 H.J. Flynn, Esq.
Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esq.**
Assistant General Counsel Ropes & Gray Federal Emergency Management Agency 225 Franklin Street 500 C Street, S.W.
Boston, MA 02110 Washington, D.C.
20472 Jane Doughty **
Atomic Safety and Licensing Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Board
- 5 Market Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Portsmouth, NH 03801 Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Paul McEachern, Esq.**
Appeal Panel
- Matthew T. Brock, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cunmission Shaines & McEachern Washington, D.C.
20555 25 Maplewood Avenue P.O. Box 360 Portsn;outh, NH 03801
E g Docketing and Service Section*
' William Armstrong Office of the Secretary Civil Defense Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Town of Exeter Washington, D.C.
20555 10 Front Street Exeter, NH 03833
?!aynard L. Young, Chairman" Board of Selectmen Peter J. Matthews, Mayor 10 Central Road City IIall Rye,NH 03870 Newburyport, MA 09150 f.11chael Santosuosso, Chairman **
William S. Lord Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen South IIempton, NH 03827 Town Hall - Friend Street Amesbury. MA 01913 Stanley W. Knowles, Chairman P. Irs. Anne E. Goodman, Chairman Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen P.O. Box 710 13-15 Newmarket Road North Hampton, NH 03862 Durham, NH 03824 R. K. Gad III, Esq.
Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
Hopes & Gray Holmes & Ellis 225 Franklin Street 47 Winnacunnet Road Boston, fiA 02110 Hampton, NH 03842 g
p k(IA Sherwin E. Turk Deputy Assitant Chief Hearing Counsel l
<