ML20137W912
| ML20137W912 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1985 |
| From: | Shell R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8512100376 | |
| Download: ML20137W912 (3) | |
Text
DAS 6
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 LP SN 157B Lookout Place 35 DEC 3 QAg{r26,1985 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II ATTN:
Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
Dear Dr. Grace:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/85-32 AND 50-328/85 RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS Enclosed is our response to D. M. Verrelli's October 30, -1985 letter to H. G. Parris transmitting IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-327/85-32 and 50-328/85-32 for our Sequoyah Nuclear Plant which cited TVA with one Severity Level V Violation.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. E. Alsup at FTS 858-2725.
To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY R. H. Shell Nuclear Engineer Enclosure ec:
Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
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ENCLOSURE RESPONSE - NRC-OIE INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-327/85-32 AND 50-328/85-32 DAVID M. VERRELLI'S LETTER TO H. G. PARRIS'
- DA'TED OCTOBER 30, 1985 Violation 50-327/85-32-01 and 50-328/SS-32-01 Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be implemented covering safety-related activities stated in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, which includes the use of surveillance procedures. The licensee eatablished Surveillance Instruction (SI) 240, Functional Test of Control Room Air Intake chlorine Detection System, to comply with Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.3.3.6.
Contrary to the above. SI-240 was not implemented in that, on August 27, 1985 a technician failed-to place switch HS-43-205B in the test position prior to introducing chlorine fumes into the control Room Air Intake Chlorine Detection System.
This resulted in an engineered safety feature actuation (control room isolation).
This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I).
This violation applies to both units.
1.
Admission or Denial of Alleged Violation TVA admits that the violation oc:urred as stated.
2.
Reason for the Violation The violation occurred due to personnel error in that the instrument maintenance technician did not place the chlorine detector handswitch in the test position as required by SI-240.
We disagree with the statement in paragraph 10.a. of the inspection report, that the technician continued the performance of the surveillance after the control room isolation (CRI) without notifying operations personnel. An investigation of the incident revealed that the technician did place the detector handswitch in the test position before notifying operations; however, he did not continue the surveillance until after notifying operations personnel that he had caused the CRI.
This disagreement has been discussed with SQN's senior resident inspector, and he confirmed that his intention was to identify that the technician operated the detector handswitch prior to notifying operations and not to imply that the technician continued to perform the SI without notifying operations of the CRI.
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e 3.
Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved A.
Appropriate disciplinary action was taken against the individual involved in the violation.
B.
The control room voittilation system was returned to normal per System Operating Instruction (SOI)-30.1, " Control Building and
.. Control Room Heating, Air conditioning, and Ventilation System."
4.
Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Future Violations The need to follow established procedur2s has been reemphasized to
-instrument maintenance personnel.
5.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance was achieved on August 27, 1985.
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