ML20137T329
| ML20137T329 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 01/21/1986 |
| From: | Asselstine J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137T320 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8602180326 | |
| Download: ML20137T329 (2) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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cAssiNcTON. C.C. 20655 t,
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January 21, 1986 OFFICE OF THE COMMIST.lON E R MEMORAtlDUM FOR:
Victor Stello Acting Secutive Director for Operations FROM:
James K. Asselstine M i _
/
SUBJECT:
QI!Al.ITY ASSURAfiCE AT TVA Following are observations of NRC senior efficials regarding the TVA quality assurance prcgrar in 1975 at hearings before the Joint Cornnittee on Atomic Energy following the Rrewns Ferry fire:
Or. Hanauer.
"We turn now to the discuse.4er of the caps in the
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the failures that occurred at Brnwns Ferry.
lines er defense They included weaknesses in equipment design, operating procedures and quality control. The flRC must take its sttre of the responsibility for these failures.
Brown Ferry was licensed af ter review o' the oro)osed desier erd operation.
So the lessons are for liRC as well as the irdi'stry."
(Browns Ferry Nuclear Fire, Hearings before the Joint Comittee on Atomic Energy. Congress of the United States, Ninety-Fourth
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Congress *, First Session, September 16, 1975, p. 87)
Representative Price.
"Mr. Chairman, I just would like to say for years the Joint Comittee enphasized quality control.
I don't knew bcw rary hearings we have had on that.
Most of the equipn.ent in this particular plant should tr.ve benefited over the years. So there is a real tight c,uality control progran; yet we find here that one of the failures that occurred at Browns Ferry was in quality control. Would someone addrcs'. thernselves to that and teli us what type of equipment fell into that category?"
Dr. Knuth.
"Yes.
This is, of course, one of the issues that uc did highlight in our investigation report and our enferrerer,t corresponderce with TVA.
In the quality assurance system, adequate procedures for controllirrt work in vital areas such as the cable spreading rucra were not edecuately evaluated; and in our view, procedurer urc not detailed enough to exert quality control. There also was not sufficient indeper.dcree of the were doing in the work area." (g and witnessing what the people cuality control people observin Ibid, p. 92)
In the Report of tFe f,rocial Peview Group on Browns Ferry Fire (fl0 REG-0050, February 1976), the folicwing rre observed:
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" Quality assurance (QA) programs are intended to catch errors in design, construction, and operation, and to rectify such errnrs; QA is an essential component of defense-in-depth.
Many aspects of the Browns Ferry fire can be considered as lapses in OA."
(p. 6)
"The Feview Group believes that the causes, course, and consequences of the Browns Ferry fire are evidence of substantial inadequacies in the Crowns Ferry QA program. A revised 0A program has been adopted by TVA; the Group has not evaluated the details of the new program.
It should be evaluated in the light of experience.
The Review Group notes that flRC (and formerly AFC) licensing review and inspection also failed to uncover these lapses in QA." (p. 6)
"The description of the Browns Ferry QA progran fnr nperations is on pages 24-30 of Appendix 0, FSAR.
It was judged to be acceptrble then; it would not be acceptable by today's standards." (p. 49)
Taking 1976 as the starting point, I would like to learn for what periods of time through 1985 the staff believes TVA had and implemented an adequate OA program in their Headquarters Offices, at Browns Ferry, at Sequoyah and at Watts Bar.
cci Chaiman Palladino Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Bernthal Comissioner Zech OPE OGC SECY
f **%q UNITED STATES
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G NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O
W ASHINGToN, D.C. 20688
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C' bN December 12, 1985 C
)khe Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker of the United States L
h se of Representatives t
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
The NRC Authorization Act for fiscal years 1982/83 (P.L.97-415) directed the NRC to conduct a study of quality and quality assurance (QA) in the design and construction of nuclear power plants and to develop improvements to NRC's and the industry's programs for achieving and assuring quality in design and construction.
In April 1984, the NRC staff completed their study in response to that Congressional request.
The report of that study is entitled " Improving Quality and the Assurance of Quality in the Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants." The Commission transmitted that report to Congress on April 20, 1984, and it was subsequently published as an NRC staf f report, NUREG-1055.
In the transmittal letter, the Commission indicated that the staff report was complex and had several interrelated recommendations.
The Comission also indicated that it would need to take further time for analysis, including an i
opportunity for public comments, before informing Congress of its final actions or recomendations for legislation.
The Commission has completed that process and its staff is currently implementing a plan entitled " Programs to Improve Quality and the Assurance of Quality in the Design, Construction and Operation of Licensed Nuclear Activities." This plan, with minor exception, implements the recommendations of NUREG-1055.
l The Commission's conclusions and exceptions regarding the QA report, which was previously transmitted to Congress as a staff report, are contained in Attachment A.
As required by P.L.97-415, administrative actions that are underway or planned by the Commission as a direct consequence of the QA report are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 of Attachment A.
j To put its decisions into suitable context, the Commission wishes to make clear that licensees, not the NRC, are primarily responsible for achieving and assuring quality.
Substantive improvements in quality in the nuclear industry must come from the industry itself; they cannot be " inspected in" or " regulated in" by the NRC. The QA report found that the key to achieving quality and assuring' quality lies with utility management.
The focus of. NRC's and the industry s programs for improving quality in the nuclear industry should be oriented toward prevention and early detection of quality problems, and identi-fying and correcting root causes of those quality problems.
I The NRC has significantly increased its design and construction inspection l
effort for plants currently under construction, including such things as adding a second resident inspector at all single-unit construction sites.
The NRC has made a number of other improvements to its overall programs which have the
-f5 1.72 # H h?
The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill I effect of improving quality in the nuclear industry.
These improvements focus largely on the approximately ninety units presently licensed for operation and l
include such initiatives as improved training and requalification programs for plant operational staff; increased staff and industry attention to preventive and routine maintenance; a major new focus on the effectiveness and quality of plant activities related to plant outages; and a thorough reanalysis, for all operating plants, of the NRC-required technical specifications issued as conditions of operating licenses.
Since the introduction of the legislation that led to the QA study, the industry also has initiated a number of activities that should result in an overall improvement in the quality of nuclear plant construction and operations.
These include the Construction Project Evaluation Program of the Institute of Nuclear l
Power Operations (INPO); the establishment of a new senior-level industry group, the Nuclear Utility Management and Human Resources Committee (NUMARC), to address some of the difficult people-oriented issues f acing the industry, such as opera-tor training; and the voluntary use of third party management audits by some l
utilities.
In addition, two utilities have volunteered to undertake a pilot test of the readiness review concept identified by the QA report as an area for further analysis.
Georgia Power Company is applying the concept to their Vogtle l
l project and the Washington Public Power Supply System is employing the concept l
for the potential restart of their WNP-3 project.
Readiness Reviews are expected to lead to improvements in managing, licensing, and confirming the quality of nuclear construction projects, including the incremental acceptance l
by NRC of properly completed work.
These pilot tests are underway and are being closely followed by the Commission and the industry, l
As stated in its policy and planning guidance to the staff, the Commission believes that NRC's fundamental task is to ensure that existing nuclear i
facilities and those coming on-line operate safely.
Consequently, the highest l
priority will be given to assuring that operating facilities maintain adequate l
protection of public health and safety.
Following operating plants, in decreas-ing order of priority, are plants currently under construction and future plants 1
for which construction applications have not yet been received.
Budget and l
resource limitations preclude the extensive development of quality and quality assurance initiatives for the future generation of nuclear power plants.
i However, the Commission recognizes that the success of this future generation of plants is closely coupled to an aggressive and mature policy and implementation plan assuring quality and quality assurance in design and construction.
Therefore, the Commission intends to explore creative solutions to past design and construc-tion QA problems and to apply these solutions where opportunities are presented in the future. Where possible, the Commission will draw from the experience of l
activities underway at operating plants.
The Commission views the present hiatus in new plant orders as an opportune time to address innovative QA approaches l
I through such pilot programs.
Although the staff's program plan necessarily deals principally with NRC actions, we believe that it does embody the Commission's QA philosophy, which emphasizes the importance of the industry's role in improving nuclear quality.
The NRC directly controls only its own activities, but NRC actions can provide great leverage to foster or inhibit licensee actions.
The QA report made it clear that simple regulatory compliance is not enough to assure excellence in the l
l The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill l l
construction or Operation of nuclear power plants.
The planned NRC QA program i
revisions are intended to create an environment which maximi:es the incentives l
for and ability of utilities to achieve excellence while assuring compliance l
with the Commission's regulations.
At this time, no changes to NRC authorizing legislation are recommended.
Each l
I of the Commission's proposed administrative actions can be implemented within l
the NRC's current statutory authority.
However, after further analysis, some l
issues may result in legislative proposals at a future date.
Commissioner Asselstine adds the following comments.
I believe that the NRC staff report " Improving Quality and the Assurance of Quality in the Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-1055,"
provides many useful insights.
For example, the staff reported that the key to achieving and assuring quality lies with utility management.
The report highlights the fact that one of the greatest contributors to the risk associated with nuclear plants is the human component which plays a part in design, con-struction, operation and maintenance of nuclear facilities.
And, how the human j
element affects nuclear plants, whether for good or for ill, depends largely upon the quality of utility management.
However, the Commission seems to take this idea one step too far.
The Commission's letter states:
l To put its decisions into suitable context, the Commission l
wishes to make clear that Ilcansees, not the NRC, are primarily responsible for achieving and assuring quality.
Substantial improvements in quality in the nuclear industry must come from the industry itself; they cannot be " inspected in" or " regulated in" by the NRC.
l While I agree that the primary responsibility for achieving quality must lie with the industry, the Commission also has substantial responsibility for assuring quality.
The NRC must establish and enforce minimum standards to ensure quality in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of nuclear l
power plants.
The Commission cannot abdicate this responsibility and merely rely on the industry to regulate itself.
In my view, the Commission should do much more to ensure quality in operation and maintenance of plants than it does presently.
Instead, the Commission has chosen not to take aggressive action to ensure quality.
Specifically, the NRC's quality assurance plan, " Programs to Improve Quality and the Assurance of Quality in the Design, Construction, and Operation of Licensed Nuclear Activities,"
does not go far enough.
A fundamental premise of the plan is the idea that the l
NRC cannot regulate in quality.
The Commission has used this philosophy as an l
excuse to defer regulatory initiatives in tne area of plant operations, main-tenance, and management, and instead to rely upon voluntary industry programs in these essential areas.
l l
o The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill The Commission enould not take the most useful insight from the NRC staff report, that utility management and the human component are key to quality, misinterpret it, and then use it as a reason to step back from and do less in the area of operations and maintenance.
Rather, the Commission should use that insight as a springboard and get much more involved in working with the industry s
to ensure quality.
I also agree with Commissioner Bernthat's comments.
Ccemissioner Bernthal adds the following ccmments:
The Commission's letter leaves too much unsaid; its proposed actions will surely be judged inadequate to meet the challenges that lie ahead.
- Midland, Zimmer, Marble Hill and doubtless other plants which never approached the threshold of completion remain as monuments to abrogation of responsibility by government at all levels.
The public will and should demand better in the 1990's.
I do not believe the NRC will be prepared to offer better if the Commission contents itself to focus almost exclusively on operating plants for the forseeable future.
Serious consideration should be given now to the concept of third party QA audits during plant constructicn, and to the institutional framework that might be required to carry out such audit functions.
For example, NRC appears to know and care surprisingly little about the considerable success of the Technische Uberwachungs-Verein (TUV) third party audit program in Germany, a program that-deserves careful study by NRC to determine what an American analog may have to offer.
The " designated representative concept that has served the airline industry so ably deserves further exploration as well, at least to determine the level of utility interest, and to see whether utility volunteers for a pilot program might be found.
In short, I consider the Commission's commitment to the future to be insuf ficient.
As a minimum, the Commission should initiate, and Congress should fund the following:
A serious, in-depth study of the third party audit concept for future power plant construction.
A pilot program to test the third party audit concept on major plant modifications during planned outages.
This would allow the Commission and licensees to gain experience, on small scale, with one concept that shows promise for improved quality assurance, but which cannot and should not now be broadly implemented because of resource limitations and the current hiatus in new power plant orders.
A pilot program for volunteer utilities to test the designated representative concept.
).
l The Honorable Tho as P. O'N]ill These few specifje actions hardly constitute a tall order or a burdensome commitment; there are doubtless other concepts which deserve similar active exploration by the Commission.
t Chairman Palladino adds the following comment:
The Commission has expended significant resources on quality assurance.
The l
information provided in this letter and attachments thereto clearly attest to this fact.
Furthermore, the Commission has continued to authorize significant expenditures of funds for QA initiatives.
The most recent approval authorized
$1,500,000 for technical assistance contracts to help us develop and implement quality assurance programs.
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I believe that the Commission has afforded the correct priority and appropriate l
resources to quality assurance consistent with our budget constraints.
This letter is meant to describe how the NRC is meeting, and will continue to meet,
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its QA responsibilities.
Emphasis has been placed on operating plants and new plants coming on-line; we will continue to look at ways to improve our QA Program 4
for these plants.
These actions certainly do not lend credence to Commissioner i
Asselstine's assertion that the NRC's philosophy to not " regulate in quality" is
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"an excuse to defer further regulatory initiatives...and instead to rely upon i
l voluntary industry programs in these essential areas."
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j Regarding Commissioner Bernthal's comments about the Commission's involvement with future plants, we are considering, or have considered the initiatives he suggested.
However, we do not feel that attention to future construction should i
dilute our efforts to ensure high quality assurance for existing plants and those
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coming on-line.
Sincerely,
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j Nunzio J. Jall ino Chairman i
Enclosure:
l Attachment A, Commission Conclusions on the Staff QA Report to Congress i
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ATTACHMENT A COMMISSION CONCLUSIONS ON THE STAFF QA REPORT TO CONGRESS i
1 The Commission is in general agreement with the findings and conclusions of the j
QA report (which was previously forwarded to Congress as a staff report) and has approved the staff's action plan (which takes into account public comments i
received on the QA report and current budget limitations) to implement the findings of the report.
The Commission endorses the staff's earlier findings, i
conclusions and recommendations contained in the QA report, with the following i
modifications:
1)
We do not think, at this time, that construction permits (cps) for future nuclear power plant applicants need be conditioned on post-CP demonstration
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by the applicant of its capability and effectiveness in implementing its quality assurance program.
The NRC has ample authority within its current I
regulations to take appropriate action if a licensee does not capably and j
effectively implement its QA program.
Changes in the Commission's practices i
are being undertaken, however, to improve NRC and licensee ability to assess the effectiveness of QA programs at the earliest possible stage in the construction process.
Licensees should demonstrate the effectiveness' of their programs continually throughout the construction process, but the
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CP need not be conditioned on such demonstration.
I 2)
It is not clear that a new, special advisory board needs to be established to supplement staff advice on the qualifications of new applicants.
This is one alternative that would have to be further analyzed before imple-4 mentation to see if an additional source of advice is needed or whether an already existing body (e.g., the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards) j could perform that function.
Efforts by industry-sponsored groups such as j
the Nuclear Utility Management and Human Resources Committee (NUMARC) and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), having the effect of a "self-screening" process, will also affect any decision in this area.
Planned further analysis of the advisory board concept will not be undertaken J
at this time.
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3)
Other feasible alternatives to mandatory third party audits are available i
i to accomplish the QA program goals of improved management and increased prevention and detection capability.
Readiness reviews, now being tested l
and evaluated at the Vogtle nuclear plant and WNP-3, provide one possible t
i alternative.
Increased NRC use of team inspections and resident inspectors 1
and voluntary use of third parties by some utilities provide other alternatives.
i As a result of these considerations, the staf f has proposed, and the
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l Commission has agreed, to defer rulemaking activities to require periodic i
third party audits for plants under construction, pending results of the l
pilot Readiness Review Program tests.
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TABt.E 1.
Commission Ac2 ion on Staff Recommendations Contained in the QA Report to Congress (see NUREG-1055, Table 2.1)
QA Report Recommendation Commission Action 1.
Enhanced Pre-Construction Permit Seek opportunities to test concepts (CP) Review of Experience and with industry volunteers Managerial quality Establishment of an Advisory Dropped pending exploration of Board potential industry action on this topic 2.
Post-CP Demonstration of Oropped in favor of Readiness Review Management Effectiveness program 3.
QA Program Performance NRC inspection program being revised Objecti.*s to place more emphasis on performance 4.
Management Appraisals as an Oropped in favor of readiness reviews Adjunct to Construction and other management initiatives Appraisal Team (CAT)
Inspections 5.
Inspection Prioritization All plants currently under construction of Plants Currently Under are receiving a " graded" inspection Construction (Problem Plant approach.
Additional work planned Identification) in this area 6.
Improved Diagnostic Capability /
Implement as part of QA Performance Trend Analysis Objectives program 7.
Senior Management Meetings Being implemented 8.
Enhanced Vendor Program Being implemented 9.
Third-Party Audit / Interim Third-party rulemaking deferred CAT Inspections / Interim pending outcome of readiness review Independent Design Verification program; perform CAT inspections Program (IOVP) at 4/ year (no expansion in program);
continue 10VP on case-by-case basis 10.
Regional Team Inspections increasing use of team inspections.
Pilots under way in several NRC regions 6
2-i QA Report Recommendation Commission Action i
11.
Expanded Resident Program More residents being assigned to sites.
Pilot test under way in one NRC region to reduce regional inspections in favor of resident inspections 12.
Improved Licensee Detection Primary responsibility for improvement Capability remains with industry.
NRC inspection program revisions will cause greater NRC attention to this area i
13.
Independent Audits of NRC QA Being implemented Programs l
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l TABLE 2.
Commission Action on Staff Recommendations for Further Analysis Contained in the QA Report to Congress (see_NUREG-1055, Table 2.2)
Area Recommended For Further Analysis Corraission Action 1.
QA Report-Type Study for Plants Separate report not necessary--lessons in Operation from plants under construction also apply to operating plants 2.
Prioritization of QA Measures:
The Commission has a proposed rulemaking Guidance on " Safety-Related" vs.
under review "Important to Safety" 3.
Measuring Effectiveness of QA Further analysis conducted.
Results being used in revised NRC inspection program 4.
c.ssentially Complete Design Regulatory reform legislation has at CP Stage been proposed to Congress that addresses this issue 5.
Configuration Management Seek opportunities to test concepts with industry volunteers 6.
Readiness Reviews PilotprogramiatVogtleandWNP-3 underway 7.
Quality Engineering Further analysis and developmental work not planned due to budget priorities 8.
Alternate Ownership and Efforts redirected to explore improve-Management Arrangements ments within current arrangements in an all operating reactor environment 9.
Feasibility of Designated Further consideration deferred pending l
Representatives a licensee request for a pilot program 10.
Limiting Construction Permits Analysis of the problems faced by NRC in the event of resumption of nuclear plant construction is included as a possible contingency in the study described in 8., above
CUESTION 10.
WHAT IS THE COMMISSION'S RESPONSE TO THE OBSERVATION THAT THE DECEMBER 26 ACCIDENT AT RANCHO SECO WAS A CLOSE CALL WHICH EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR A REASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE NRC'S EFFORTS TO ASSURE THAT A PTS EVENT DOES NOT LEAD TO A CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENT?
RESPONSE
DURING DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK (PTS) RULE, THE STAFF TOOK INTO FULL ACCOUNT THE POSSIBLE RANGE OF PTS EVENTS.
THE MOST SEVERE EVENTS (THAT RESULT IN THE LOWEST TEMPERATURES) WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BASED ON THEORETICAL PREDICTION METHODS, SINCE THEY OCCUR AT A FREQUENCY SO LOW THAT NONE HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCED.
THE EIGHT MOST SEVERE EVENTS THAT HAD ACTUALLY OCCURRED WERE EXPLICITLY TAKEN INTO ACCCUNT, USING THE OBSERVED FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE AND THE LOWEST TEMPERATURES EXPERIENCED DURING THE EVENTS, WHICH RANGED FROM 225'F FCP THE MOST SEVERE TO 350*F FOR THE LEAST SEVERE EVENT.
NUMEROUS LESS SEVERE EVENTS THAT HAD OCCURRED, WITH LOWEST TEMPERATURES ABOVE 350*F, WERE ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
THESE EVENTS WERE OF NEGLIGIBLE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE DUE TO THE PELATIVELY WARM LOWEST TEMPERATURES REACHED:
THAT IS, THEY POSED NO SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO VESSEL INTEGPITY.
HOWEVER, THEY L
QUESTION 10. (CONT.)~ >
D0 OCCUR AT A HIGHER FREQUENCY THAN THE MORE SEVERE EVENTS, AND THEREFORE WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT ADDITIONAL FAILURES OR ERRORS COULD HAVE OCCURRED DURING-THE EVENTS, CAUSING PTS EVENTS OF MORE SEVERE PROPORTIONS.
IT WAS FULLY ANTIC: PATED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO TOTALLY ELIMINATE THE FUTURE OCCURRENCE OF ALL SUCH LESS SEVERE EVENTS, EVEN WITH THE TRAINING AND PROCEDURAL IMPROVEMENTS THAT HAVE NOW BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.
TAKING ALL OF THE ABOVE INTO ACCOUNT, THE STAFF CONCLUDED THAT PTS-RELATED RISK AT ANY PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR IS ACCEPTABLE S0 LONG AS THE VESSEL'S MAXIMUM RTNDT (A MEASURE OF DUCTILITY LOSS AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO BRITTLE FRACTURE) REMAINS BELOW LIMIT STATED IN THE PTS 270*F, WHICH'IS THEREFORE THE RTNDT PULE.
THE RECENT RANCHO SECO EVENT REACHED A LOWEST TEMPERATURE OF 386*F AND THUS FALLS INTO THE CATEGORY OF THE " NUMEROUS LESS SEVERE EVENTS" ALREADY DISCUSSED.
THE LICENSEE MUST PERFORM ANALYSES DEMONSTRATING LACK OF ANY SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO THE VESSEL'S INTEGPITY BEFORE PLANT RE-START WILL BE ALLOWED.
BASED ON PRIOR ANALYSES OF SIMILAR EVENTS, WE BELIEVE THOSE ANALYSES WILL SHOW THAT NO SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE TO VESSEL INTEGRITY OCCURRED, THIS EVENTS' OCCURRENCE THEREFORE DOES
QUESTION 10. (CONT.) NOT INVALIDATE OR CALL INTO QUESTION ANY OF THE BASES OF THE PTS RULE.
HENCE, NO REASSESSMENT OF THE PTS RULE IS PLANNED.
i
'HOWEVER, THE STAFF SENT AN INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM (!!T) TO
,l RANCHO SECO TO EXAMINE A NUMBER OF ISSUES, INCLUDING THE OCCURRENCE' RATE OF THESE LESS SEVERE CATEGORY PTS EVENTS AT RANCHO SECO.
THE STAFF ALSO HAS INITIATED ACTIONS TO ADDRESS THE SAME l
QUESTIONS AT ALL 0THER B&W PLANTS.
THESE EFFORTS-ARE TO DETERMINE THE CAUSES OF THESE EVENTS AND IDENTIFY ANY ACTIONS THAT SHOULD BE REQUIRED AT THESE PLANTS TO REDUCE THE FREQUENCY OF SUCH EVENTS.
THE INTENT IS TO REDUCE THE FREQUENCY OF THESE EVENTS, THEREBY REDUCING THE CHANCE OF A MORE SEVERE PTS EVENT THAT COULD OCCUR IF 3
ADDITIONAL FAILURES'OR ERRORS WERE TO HAPPEN AS PART OF SOME
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FUTURE EVENT OF THIS TYPE.
A COMMISSION MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IIT REPORT HAS BEEN SCHEDULED FOR LATE FEBRUAPY.
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Question 10 Comissioner Asselstine adds the following:
i While I approved the final PTS rule, I would have gone a step further by exploring the practicality of a requirement that would have led to the search for single failure vulnerabilities or comon cause events (including human error) that could lead to unacceptable PTS events..The December 26, 1985 accident at Rancho Seco suggests a value in reassessing the PTS hazard and the adequacy of the Comission's efforts to reduce it, to ensure that every practical step has been taken to avoid a reactor pressure failure.
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o QUESTION 11.
(A)
PLEASE PROVIDE A BRIEF STATEMENT DESCRIBING THE JANUARY 4 ACCIDENT AT KERP-MCGEE'S UF6 PLANT, THE CAUSES OF THIS EVENT, AND'THE NEED, IF.ANY, FOR REGULATORY CHANGES IN LIGHT OF THIS EVENT.
ANSWER.
ON JANUARY 4, 1986, THEPE WAS AN ACCIDENT AT THE KERR-MCGEE SEQUOYAH FACILITY, LOCATED NEAR GORE, OKLAHCMA. 'IT INVOLVED THE RELEASE OF.A LARGE QUANTITY OF URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE (UF6) FROM A SHIPPING CYLINDER.
UPON EXPOSURE TO AIR, UF6 RAPI9LY COMBINES WITH MOISTURE'TO FORM URANYL ~ FLUORIDE (UO2F2) AND HYDROGEN FLUORIDE (HF).
THE LATTER IS A'VERY REACTIVE (BUT NONRADI0 ACTIVE)
ACID THAT CAN BE LETHAL IF A PERSON IS. EXPOSED TO SUFFICIENT CONCENTRATIONS.
THE ONE DEATH RESULTING FROM THE KERR-MCGEE ACCIDENT REPORTEDLY WAS DUE TO INHALATION OF HF.
THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED WHILE THE CYLINDER WAS BEING HEATED BY STEAM WHICH APPARENTLY WAS NOT PROPER LICENSEE PROCEDURE.
WE ARE INVESTIGATING THE CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT, INCLUDING THE PHYSICAL CAUSE OF THE RUPTURE.
BASED ON VISUAL EXAMINATION OF THE CYLINDER, TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS PRELIMINARILY CONCLUDED THAT THE RUPTURE WAS CAUSED BY HYDRAULIC PRESSURE.
H0 WEVER, THE EXACT CAUSE.0F THE RUPTURE IS BEING CONFIRMED BY LABORATORY ANALYSIS AND CALCULATIONS.
THE STAFF WILL DETERMINE THE NEED, IF ANY', FOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND REGULATORY CHANGES UPON COMPLETION OF ITS INVESTIGATION.
QUESTION 11.
(B)
IS THERE A REGULATOF.Y GAP?
ANSWER.
'TO GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE REPONSIBILITIES AND PROGRAMS OF OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES RELATED TO FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES REGULATED BY THE NRC STAFF MET ON JANUARY 22, 1986 WITH
~ HEADQUARTERS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (OSHA) AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA).
SHOULD REGULATORY GAFS BE IDENTIFIED AS A RESULT OF THIS EFFORT, CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER TO ELIMINATE THEM.
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4 OUESTION 11.
(C)
WHAT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN OR ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION TO PREVENT SUCH ACCIDENTS IN THE FUTUPE?
ANSWER.
A LESSONS LEAPNED GROUP HAS BEEN FORMED AND WILL CONSIDER THE STEPS THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PREVENT SUCH ACCIDENTS FROM OCCURRING IN THE FUTURE.
IN THE MEANTIME, THE FEW OTHER NRC LICENSEES THAT'HAVE PROCESSES INVOLVING THIS MATERIAL ARE BEING KEPT INFORMED, AG IS DOE.
A' LESSONS LEARNED REPORT IS EXPECTED WITHIN ABOUT 8 WEEKS AT WHICH TIME ANY REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE i
. ACCIDENT PREVENTION WILL BE ASSESSED.
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i QUESTION 11.
(D)
WHY HAS THE COMMISSION NOT REQUIRED URANIUM PROCESSING FACILITIES AND SIMILAR MATERIALS LICENSEES T0 MAINTAIN FINANCIAL PROTECTION UNDER THE PRICE ANDERSON ACT ?
ANSWER.
SUBSECTION 170A 0F THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT ALLOWS NRC DISCRETION TO
' REQUIRE FINANCIAL PROTECTION AND TO EXTEND INDEMNITY COVERAGE TO ACTIVITIES NOT INVOLVING THE OPERATION OF PRODUCTION OR UTILIZATION FACILITIES.
SUBSEQUENT TO THE RENEWAL OF PRICE-ANDERSON IN 1975 THE COMMISSION CONSIDERED WHETHER IT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY AND REQUIRE FINANCIAL PROTECTION FOR MATERIAL LICENSEES IN GENERAL AND SPECIFICALLY A CERTAIN CLASS OF MATERIALS LICENSEES, I.E.,
THOSE POSSESSING OR USING PLUTONIUM IN PLUT0NIUM PRCCESSING AND FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS.
AFTER STUDYING THE ISSUE, THE NRC DECIDED IN 1977 TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY BY REQUIRING FINANCIAL PROTECTION OF AND EXTENDING INDEMNITY TO THOSE PLUTONIUM FR0 CESSING AND FUEL FABRICATION PLANT LICENSEES AUTHORIZED TO POSSESS PLUTONIUM IN AMOUNTS OF FIVE (5) KILOGRAMS'OR MORE, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHENEVER THE COMMISSION EXERCISES ITS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY AND REQUIRES A LICENSEE OTHER THAN A POWER REACTOR LICENSEE TO HAVE AND MAINTAIN FINANCIAL PROTECTION, THE RETROSPECTIVE PREMIUM LAYER OF FINANCIAL PROTECTION IS NOT APPLICABLE.
HOWEVER, THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT REQUIRES THAT THE CCMMISSION INDEMNIFY THE LICENSEE IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR y
, -, _ _. ~, _
'CUESTION 11(D). (CONT'D) -
INCIDENT INDEMNITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE LICENSED ACTIVITY.
THE AMOUNT OF GOVERNMENT INDEMNITY IS LIMITED'TO $500 MILLION; HOWEVER, WHERE THE FINANCIAL PROTECTION REQUIRED OF THE LICENSEE EXCEEDS $60 MILLION, GOVERNMENT INDEMNITY IS REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THIS EXCESS.
IT SHOULD ALSO BE EMPHASIZED THAT THESE FUNDS WOULD ONLY BE AVAILABLE TO PAY PUBLIC LIABILITY CLAIMS.RESULTING FROM A " NUCLEAR INCIDENT" AS THAT TERM IS DEFINED IN SUBSECTION 110. OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF'1954, AS AMENDED.
THIS MEANS THAT THE-PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE MUST ARISE OUT OF OR RESULT FROM "THE RADI0 ACTIVE, T0XIC, EXPLOSIVE, OR OTHER HAZARDOUS PROFEPTIES OF SOURCE, SPECIAL NUCLEAR, OR BYPRODUCT MATERIAL" BEING USED BY THE LICENSEE.
THUS, PRICE-ANDERSON FUNDS WOULD NOT COVER THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT THAT IS PURELY CHEMICAL IN NATURE AND NOT A RADI0 LOGICALLY RELATED ACCIDENT.
BASED OM WORK PERFORMED FOR THE NRC BY THE OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY AND AN IN-HOUSE STUDY OF THIS QUESTION, IN 1980 THE NRC STAFF ADVISED THE COMMISSION THAT NO APPARENT NEED EXISTED TO EXTEND PRICE-ANDERSON COVERAGE TO OTHER CLASSES OF MATERIALS LICENSEES.
AT THAT TIME THE INSURANCE THAT COULD BE PURCHASED THROUGH THE NUCLEAR INSURANCE POOLS OR PURCHASED FROM OTHER PRIVATE SOURCES EXCEEDED THE ESTIMATED COST OF ANY ACCIDENT THAT COULD OCCUR AT THESE FACILITIES.
THE INSURANCE CLIMATE APPEARS TO HAVE CHANGED.
IN CONJUNCTION WITH ITS REVIEW 0F THE COMMENTS ON THE ANPR NOTED BELOW, THE STAFF IS REASSESSING THE PRESENT AVAILABILITY OF PRIVATE INSURANCE FOR THESE ACTIVITIES.
' QUESTION 11(D). (CONT'D) THE COMMISSION STAFF IS PRESENTLY REVIEWING COMMENTS RECEIVED IN CONNECTION WITH AN ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (ANPR)
ON THE QUESTION OF REQUIRING INSURANCE OR OTHER GUARANTEES FROM MATERIALS LICENSEES TO COVER THE COSTS OF BOTH ONSITE AND OFFSITE CLEANUP.RESULTING FROM A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT.
IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT AFTER EVALUATION OF THESE COMMENTS AS WELL AS FURTHER STUDY OF TH.IS QUESTION, THE STAFF WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE.T0 THE COMMISSION ON WHETHER FINANCIAL ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON MATERIALS LICENSEES.
QUESTION 12.
(A)
PLEASE DESCRIBE THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'REGARDING REGULATION OF LOW-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL AND URANIUM MILL TAILINGS.
IF THE COMMISSION BELIEVES LEGISLATION IS NECESSARY TO CLARIFY' THE JURISDICTIONAL ROLES OF THE AGENCIES, SPECIFICALLY WHAT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES DOES THE COMMISSION RECOMMEND?
- ANSWER, ALTHOUGH THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT GAVE NRC EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER SOURCE, SPECIAL NUCLEAR AND BYPRODUCT MATERIAL, THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT (RCRA), EPA REGULATIONS AND HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL PERMIT REQUIREMENTS RAISE QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER RADIOACTIVE WASTES WHICH CONTAIN CHEMICAL CONSTITUENTS DEFINED AS HAZARDOUS UNDER EPA REGULATIONS ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO DIRECT EPA JUPISDICTION AND REGULATION.
LOW-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE flRC ISSUED ITS REGULATIONS FOR NEAR-SURFACE DISPOSAL OF LLW (10 CFR PART 61). IN DECEMBER OF 1982.
EPA MAINTAINED THAT PART 61 DID NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS DISPOSAL OF THE HAZARDOUS, NON-RADIOACTIVE CONSTITUENTS OF LLW AND COMMENTED THAT "AS A MINIMUM, PART 61 l
l l
CUESTION 12.(A)
(CON'T) REGULATIONS SHOULD INDICATE THAT THESE MATERIALS MUST BE HANDLED IN A MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH RCRA REQUIREMENTS."
NEGOTIATIONS ON AN MOU TO CLAPIFY THE REGULATION OF LLW SITES HAVE BEEN UNDERWAY SINCE THAT TIME.
DISCUSSIONS ON AN MOU WERE DEFERRED BY MUTUAL CONSENT IN 1984 PENDING COMPLETION OF NRC STUDIES TO ANALYZE COMMERCIAL LLW STREAMS TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF THE NON-RADI0 ACTIVE COMPONENTS AND TO RECOMMEND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO ENHANCE GROUNDWATER PROTECTION.
THE FIRST STUDY IDENTIFYING THE NON-PADI0 ACTIVE HAZARDOUS COMPONENT IN LLW WAS COMPLETED IN DECEMBER, 1985, AND THE REPORT ON MANAGEMENT OPTIONS IS DUE TO BE ISSUED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT IN FEBRUARY 1986.
NRC WILL DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF MIXED LOW-LEVEL WASTES AFTER REVIEWING THE COMMENTS ON THAT DOCUMENT.
THE COMMISSION IS CONCERNED THAT CONTINUING UNCERTAINTIES MAY BE AN OBSTACLE TO SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECENT LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1985.
LEGISLATION CLARIFYING THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF THE EPA, NRC, AND THE STATES IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED.
THE COMMISSION SUPPORTS THE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TAKEN IN SECTION 15 0F H.R. 1083 AS REPORTED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, ALTHOUGH WE ARE RECOMMENDING SOME MODIFICATIONS TO THAT PROPOSAL.
' QUESTION 12.(A)
(CON'T) '
FIRST, THE BILL DID NOT CLEARLY SPECIFY THAT THE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR MIXED WASTES FROM EPA TO NRC WOULD SUPERSEDE ANY PRIOR DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY BY EPA TO STATES TO ISSUE PERMITS AS THEY WOULD APPLY TO'NRC-LICENSED DISPOSAL FACILITIES.
WITHOUT SUCH CLARIFICATION, SECTION 15 MAY BE CONSTRUED TO PROVIDE THAT NRC IS TO BE DELEGATED AUTHORITY IN ADDITION TO SUCH STATES, AND NRC-LICENSED FACILITIES WITHIN THESE STATES COULD BE SUBJECT TO.
DUAL NRC-STATE AGENCY REGULATION UNDER RCRA.
SECOND, SECTION 15 IS SILENT REGARDING WHETHER PURSUANT TO THE EPA-NPC AGREEMENT MANDATED UNDER THAT SECITON, THE NRC COULD REDELEGATE ITS RCRA AUTHORITY FOR MIXED-WASTE REGULATION TO ITS l
AGREEMENT STATES.
IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO CLARIFY THAT THE NRC COULD' DELEGATE ITS RCRA AUTHORITY TO AGREEMENT STATES AUTHORIZED TO REGULATE LOW-LEVEL DISPOSAL FACILITIES UNDER SECTION 274B. OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT.
IT SHOULD ALSO BE MADE. CLEAR THAT THIS AUTHORITY WOULD BE CARRIED OUT UNDER NRC OVERSIGHT PURSUANT TO ITS AGREEMENT WITH EPA.
URANIUM MILL TAILINGS EPA'S MILL TAILINGS STANDARDS INCORPORATE GROUNDWATER PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR TAILINGS CONSTITUENTS DEFINED AS HAZARDOUS UNDER RCRA.
THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH REQUIREMENTS
=_
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e.
QUESTION 12 (A)
(CON'T),
PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED BY NRC FOR PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH EPA WERE INITIATED S0ON AFTER THE EPA STANDARDS WERE ISSUED IN OCTOBER OF 1983, TO FACILITATE NRC IMPLEMENTATION, TO REDUCE INCONSISTENCIES, AND TO CLARIFY RESPONSIBILITIES.
MANY
~
OF THE ORIGINAL ISSUES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.
THE KEY ISSUE REMAINING.IS HOW NRC WILL DECIDE ON SITE-SPECIFIC APPLI~ CATIONS FOR ALTERNATE CONCENTRATION LIMITS (ACL'S) AND TO WHAT EXTENT EPA WILL BE INVOLVED IN THOSE DECISIONS.
RECENT EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD DEVELOPMENT OF A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE GENERIC METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING ACL APPLICATIONS.
TOWARDS THAT END, NRC AND' EPA-STAFFS HAVE EXCHANGED INITIAL DRAFT ACL GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS.
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS ARE UNDER PREPAPATION BY EPA AND WILL BE REVIEWED WHEN COMPLETED. NRC BELIEVES THAT USE OF AN EPA-ACCEPTED GENERIC METHODOLOGY WILL RESOLVE THIS ISSUE, THEREFORE, NRC DOES NOT RECOMMEND FURTHER LEGISLATIVE CHANGES FOR MILL TAILINGS AT THIS TIME.
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i QUESTION 12.
(B)
PLEASE PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH AN OVERVIEW OF ANY ONGOING LITIGATION CONCERNING NRC'S ROLE IN THE REGULATION OF URANIUM MILL TAILINGS, AND A DESCRIPTION OF THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROT $CTION AGENCY REGARDING MILL TAILINGS REGULATION.
ANSWER.
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'0VERVIEW OF ONGOING LITIGATION 1.
NRC-REGULATIONS IN 10 CFR PART 40 l
A. KERR-MCGEE CORP. AND OTHERS v. NRC (10TH CIR, NO. 80-2043, l
80-2271,-80-2269, 80-2043)
ON OCTOBER 3, 1980, KERR-MCGEE, ET AL., PETITIONED THE TENTH CIRCUIT TO REVIEW THE COMMISSION'S URANIUM MILL LICENSING REQUIREMENTS IN 10 CFR PART 40. SEE 45 FED. REG. 65521 (OCT 3,
1980).
THE INDUSTRY CHALLENGED THE COMMISSION'S REGULATIONS ON A NUMBER OF GROUNDS, INCLUDING ALLEGED INSIGNIFICANCE OF THE RADON RISK, EXCESSIVE COST OF COMPLYING WITH THE REGULATIONS AND THE NRC'S FAILURE TO AWAIT PROMULGATION OF EPA STANDARDS.
IN 1982 A PANEL OF THE COURT UPHELD THE REGULATIONS BUT REHEARING EN BANC WAS GRANTED.
THIS CASE REMAINS IN ABEYANCE PENDING THE COMPLETION OF
I
-QUESTION 12 (B) (CONT'D) RULEMAKING CONFORMING NRC. REQUIREMENTS TO EPA STANDARDS PROMULGATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1983.
NRC CONFORMED ITS RULES TO SOME OF'THE EPA STANDARDS ON OCTOBER 16, 1985 (50 FR 41852) BUT RULEMAKING WITH RESPECT TO EPA'S GROUNDWATER STANDARDS HAS.NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED.
B. 0UIVIRA MINING CO., ET AL.-V. NRC, (10TH CIR NO. 85-2853)
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, ET AL. V.ENRC (D.C. CIR NO. 85-1817)
ON DECEMBER 13, 1985, Quiv!RA ET AL, FIL'ED SUIT CHALLENGING NRC FINAL RULE CHANGES TO 10 CFR PART 40.
50 FED. REG. 41852 (OCTOBER 16, 1985).
THESE AMENDMENT'i CONFORM NRC REQUIREMEN TS TO THE STABILITY AND RADON RELEASE PROVISIONS OF EPA STANDARDS FOR URANIUM AND THORIUM MILL TAILINGS (40 CFR-PART-192).
ON JANUARY 31, 1986, QUIVIRA AND NRC JOINTLY MOVED THE COURT TO HOLD THIS CASE IN ABEYANCE'PENDING SUPREME C00RT ACTION ON THE PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI, FI' LED ON JANUARY 28, 1986, IN AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS, ET AL. v. THOMts, 772 F. 20 640 (10TH CIR 1985)
AND AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS, ET AL, V. THOMAS, 772 F. 2D 617 (10TH CIR. 1985).
IN THESE CASES THE 10TH CIRCUIT UPHELD EPA'S STANDARDS.
ON JANUARY 24, 1986, NRC MOVED THE D.C. CIRCUIT TO TRANSFER THE EDF CASE, WHICH CHALLENGES THE SAME RULE, TO THE 10TH CIRCUIT.
QUESTION 12.(B) (CONT'D).
2.
NRC REGULATIONS IN 10 CFR PART 20 AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS V. U.S.A. (10TH CIR, NO. 81-1566) 1 KERR-MCGEE NUCLEAR CORP., ET AL. v. NRC (10TH CIR, NO.
'81-1569)
On MAY 22, 1981 KERR-MCGEE NUCLEAR CORPORATION, HOMESTAKE MINING COMPANY AND AMC FILED PETITIONS TO REVIEW THE AMENDMENT TO 10 CFR PART 20 WHICH INCORPORATED EXPLICITLY 40 CFR PART 190, THE EPA's GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS FOR URANIUM FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES INCLUDING URANIUM MILLS.
SEE 46 FR 18525 (MARCH 25, 1981).
PETIT.IONERS ALSO SOUGHT REVIEW 0F THE COMMISSION'S MARCH 26, 1981 DENIAL OF THEIR MOTION TO RECONSIDER OR DEFER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EPA REGULATIONS AT URANIUM MILLS PENDI.NG A FINAL DECISION ON THEIR MOTION TO EPA TO RECONSIDER THE REGULATIONS.
THE LAWSUITS HAVE BEEN HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING EPA'S RESOLUTION OF AMC'S PETITION TO REOPEN THE RECORD AND RECONSIDER THE GENERAL STANDARDS.
3.
HEARING REQUESTS ON NRC IMPLEMENTATION OF 40 CFR PART 192 HEARING REQUEST (ADMINISTRATIVELY BEFORE COMMISSION; NOT IN COURTS)
THE NRC ISSUED ORDERS IMPLEMENTING DETECTION MONITORING REQUIREMENTS IN EPA'S MILL TAILINGS STANDARDS ON JULY 19,1985.
QUESTION 12.(B) (CONT'D) LICENSES WERE AMENDED BY ADDING CONDITIONS REQUIRING LICENSEES TO IMPLEMENT A GROUND-WATER DETECTION MONITORING PROGRAM TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 40 CFR 192.
OF THE 13 LICENSEES ORDERED TO COMPLY, 11 REQUESTED HEARINGS.
AS A RESULT OF CONSIDERATION OF LICENSEE COMMENTS, A REVISION OF JRDERS TO MODIFY LICENSES WAS PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER NOVEMBER 7, 1985 (50 FR 46370).
THE ORDERS WERE REVISED TO WITHDRAW THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS.
FOLLOWING THIS NOTICE THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND REQUESTED PARTICIPATION IN THE HEARING IN A LETTER DATED DECEMBER 2, 1985.
4.
RELATED CASES A. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO., AND OTHER MILLING COMPANIES V. U.S.A.
( U.S. CLAIMS COURT NO. 576-84-C, 580-84-C, 143-84-C, 581-84-C, 144-84-C,579-84-C, 565-84-C, 281-83-C)
THESE CASES WERE FILED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES TO RECOVER ANTICIPATED EXPENSES OF CLEANING UP TAILINGS PILES GENERATED IN CARRYING OUT UPANIUM MINING AND MILLING OPERATIONS UNDER CONTRACT WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERMENT.
PLAINTIFFS FILED SUIT IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS INVOKING THE DOCTRINE OF " MUTUAL MISTAKE" TO ASK THE COURT 1
TO REFORM THEIR CONTRACTS TO PROVIDE REIMBURSEMENT TO THE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE COSTS OF ITS MILL TAILINGS CLEANUP.
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS FILED MOTIONS ASKING THE COURT TO DISMISS EACH OF.THESE CASES.
THE COURT HAS NOT YET RULED ON THE MOTIONS.
-o QUESTION 12.(B) (CONT'D) l B..AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS AND OTHERS v. EPA (10TH CIR, NO.
83-2226,1014,1352,1482,1908,1041,1206,1300,1602C,2277,2227, 2504,2524,1349)
ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1983, THE. EPA PROMULGATED STANDARDS FOR l
REGULATING MILL TAILINGS PILES AT ACTIVE (TITLE II) AND INACTIVE (TITLE 1) URANIUM PROCESSING SITES, CASE No. 83-2226 OPPOSED THE l
EPA STANDARDS FOR ACTIVE MILLS AND CASE NO. 83-1014 OPPOSED EPA STANDARDS FOR INACTIVE MILLS.
OTHER CASES RAISED PROCEDURAL ISSUES.
THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS OF SEPTEMBER 3, 1985 UPHELD EPA STANDARDS FOR TITLE I AND TITLE 11 SITES WITH'THE EXCEPTION OF TITLE I GROUND WATER STANDARDS.
GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION REGULATIONS FOR INACTIVE URANIUM MILL SITES WERE REMANDED TO THE AGENCY FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION..THE TENTH CIRCUIT DENIED A PETITION FOR REHEARING BUT A PETITION OF CERTIORARI WAS SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME COURT ON JANUARY 28, 1986.
STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NRC AND EPA i
l THE RESPONSE TO THIS PART OF THE QUESTION IS CONTAINED IN THE RESPONSE TO QUESTION 12.(A).
I
.0UESTION 12.
(C)
ARE THE AMOUNTS CURRENTLY HELD IN SURETY ARPANGEMENTS FOR ACTIVE UPANIUM PROCESSING SITES ADEQUATE TO ENSURE RECLAMATION ACCORDING TO THE EXISTING STANDARDS?
IF NOT, WHY NOT?
DOES NRC INTEND TO MODIFY ITS SURETY REQUIREMENTS TO COMPENSATE FOR ANY DIFFERENCE?
- ANSWER, THE-MAJORITY OF THE SURETY ARRANGEMENTS AT NRC-AND' AGREEMENT STATE-LICENSED URANIUM RECOVERY FACILITIES WERE ESTABLISHED PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTING THE EPA STANDARDS AND DO NOT COVER FUNDING FOR GROUNDWATER RESTORATION, THESE SURETY ARRANGEMENTS NEED TO BE RE-EVALUATED IN LIGHT OF THE EPA GROUNDWATER STANDARDS (40 CFR PART 192).
THE NRC LICENSING STAFF IS IN THE PROCESS OF REQUIRING LICENSEES TO UPDATE THEIR RECLAMATION PLANS TO INCLUDE GROUNDWATER RESTORATION, WHEN APPLICABLE, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT, IN THE CASE OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO WHICH IS AN AG'REEMENT STATE, THE STATE DOES NOT BELIEVE ITS CURRENT SURETY ARRANGEMENTS FOR TAILINGS STABILIZATION TO BE ADEQUATE SINCE THEY WERE BASED ON STATE REGULATIONS WHICH ARE LESS STRINGENT THAN THOSE OF NRC OR
~
- EPA, EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY IN NEW MEXICO TO CHANGE THESE STATE REGULATIONS TO,MAKE THEM COMPATIBLE WITH APPLICAB' I FEDEPAL STANDARDS,
CUESTION 13.
(A)
WHAT DOES THE COMMISSION VIEW AS THE MAJOR LEGAL,-TECHNICAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES FACING THE NRC CONCERNING THE CIVILIAN RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM?.
ANSWER.
i I
L 1.
IDENTIFY AND IMPLEMENT EFFICIENCIES IN THE LICENSING PROCESS THAT WOULD ENABLE THE NRC TO MEET THE THREE-YEAR STATUTORY MANDATE FOR A CONSTRUCTION. AUTHORIZATION DECISION.
2.
IDENTIFY AND IMPLEMENT ACTION TO PROVIDE. TECHNICAL CONTINUITY I
AND' AVOID CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN NRC'S TECHNICAL CONTRACT SUPPORT WORK OVER THE LONG DURATION OF THE PROGRAM (20 +
I YEARS).
1 3.
DEVELOP TECHNICAL CONSENSUS ON METHODOLOGIES FOR DEMONSTRATING COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 60 REQUIREMENTS.
4.
DEVELOP A CONSENSUS ON THE QA PROGRAM NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE LICENSING PROCESS AND AVOID PROBLEMS SUCH AS HAVN OCCURRED IN CERTAIN REACTOR PLANTS.
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QUESTION 13. (CONT'D) 5.
ENSURE EFFECTIVE AND TIMELY INVOLVEMENT BY HOST STATES AND AFFECTED INDIAN TRIBES IN ITEMS 3~AND 4 AB0VE.
l 6.
DEVELOP A COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT NRC'S ROLE IS LIMITED TO NRC ACTIONS SPECIFIED IN THE NWPA (AS NRC IS PLANNING AND BUDGETING) RATHER THAN ALSO CONSISTING OF A BROAD OVERSIGHT i
OVER DOE'S GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TOTAL ACT, 1
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I
s QUESTION 13.
(B)
PLEASE PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF NRC'S ROLE WITH REGARD TO'0VERSEEING THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HIGH-LEVEL WASTE PROGRAM.
WHAT SPECIFICALLY WILL BE THE COMMISSION'S RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING THE
' PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF A MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE FACILITY?
ANSWER.
THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IS THE INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCY HAVING PRIME REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT OF 1982.
THE NRC HAS THE REGULATORY AUTHORITY TO OVERSEE AND CONFIRM THAT DOE'S ACTIONS UNDER THE NWPA ADEQUATELY PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT.
DOE CANNOT BUILD OR OPERATE A GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY FOR HIGH-LEVEL RADI0 ACTIVE WASTES WITHOUT THE COMMISSION'S AUTHORIZATION.
SIMILARLY, THE STORAGE OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL PRIOR TO DISPOSAL IS UNDER NRC REGULATORY AUTHORITY, FOR THE NATIONAL WASTE PROGRAM, DOE HAS OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY -- PLANNING, SITING, CONSTRUCTING, OPERATING, AND CLOSING THE FACILITIES.
NRC FOCUSES ON THE HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ASPECTS OF THE PP0 GRAM.
OVESTION 13.(B) (CONTINUED) 2-IF THE MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE (MRS) FACILITY ~IS AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS, NRC HAS LICENSING AUTHORITY OVER THE FACILITY ON THE BASIS OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS.
BOTH THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REVIEW AND THE SAFETY EVALUATION REVIEW PROCEDURES OF THE NRC WOULD AFFORD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AGENCIES AND THE PUBLIC TO OBTAIN INF0PMATION AND COMMENT ON THE l
MRS FACILITY.
INSPECTIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED DURING CONSTRUCTION AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATION.
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o QUESTION 13,.
(C)
NRC COMMENTS ON THE DEPARTMENT'S MISSION PLAN AND DRAFT PROJECT DECISION SCHEDULE ARE CRITICAL OF DOE'S NINE MONTH REDUCTION IN THE AMOUNT OF TIME' ALLOTTED FOR NRC REVIEW 0F A REPOSITORY LICENSE APPLICATION.
BY LETTER OF OCTOBER 24, 1985, CHAIRMAN PALLADINO IDENTIFIED SIX ACTIONS WHICH, TOGETHER, MIGHT ALLOW THE COMMISSION TO COMPLY WITH DOE'S
- SCHEDULE, TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE SUBSEQUENT DOE ACTIONS OR COMMUNICATIONS INDICATED DOE'S INTENT TO ACT ON ANY OR ALL ASPECTS OF THE SIX-POINT PROGRAM?
CALL FOR A 27-MONTH PERIOD FOR NRC REVIEW OF A REPOSITORY LICENSE APPLICATION AS COMPARED TO THE 36-MONTH PERIOD (EXTENDABLE TO 48 MONTHS) SPECIFIED IN THE NWPA.
THE OCTOBER 24, 1985 LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN PALLADINO COMMENTING ON THE DRAFT PDS STATES THAT MEETING THE 36 MONTH REVIEW PERIOD MIGHT BE POSSIBLE !F DOE CCMPLETES, IN A TIMELY AND EXEMPLARY FASHION, SIX KEY ACTIONS.
IN ADDITION, THE ADEQUACY OF A 36-MONTH REVIEW PERIOD IS STATED TO BE DEPENDENT ON THE SUBMITTAL BY DOE OF A COMPLETE AND HIGH-QUALITY APPLICATION FOR A REPOSITORY LICENSE, THE NRC IS COMMITTED TO MAKING THE LICENSING
I I"
' QUESTION 13(C). (CONT'D) REVIEW AS EFFICIENT AS POSSIBLE BUT CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE 36 MONTHS PROVIDED IN SECTION 114(D) 0F THE NWPA IS A VERY
~
OPTIMISTIC ESTIMATE FOR THE TIME REQUIRED T0' REACH A LICENSING
' DECISION ON REPOSITORY' CONSTRUCTION.
DOE HAS INDICATED ITS INTENT TO ACT ON EACH OF THE SIX KEY ACTIONS IDENTIFIED.
HOWEVER, IT IS PREMATURE TO JUDGE THE DEGREE TO WHICH DOE WILL BE ABLE TO IMPLEMENT THE SIX KEY ACTIONS IN A TIMELY FASHION.
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I Question 13.
Camissioner Asselstine believes that the Ccmnission's response to your question is irWlate. He believes that the response requires a nuch nere thorough Ma,2ssion of the legal, technical and administrative issues facing the Ctenission. He will provide you with his response to this question separately.
e h
QUESTION 14.
USER FEES.
PLEASE PROVIDE A STATEMENT OF THE COMMISSION'S VIEWS ON SECTION 7601 OC THE CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE CONSOLIDATED OMNIBUS RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1985 (131 CONG. REC. H13114
'(DEC. 19, 1985)], WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE NRC TO COLLECT 33 PERCENT OF ITS ANNUAL BUDGET FROM ITS LICENSEES THROUGH ANNUAL FEES.
ANSWER l
IF THE INTENT OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION IS TO RECEIVE REVENUES THAT WOULD ACCOUNT FOR A LARGE PERCENT OF THE NRC BUDGET, THE COMMISSION HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE CONCEPT.
THE COMMISSION HAS STRONG FEELINGS, HOWEVER,'CONCERNING THE METHOD TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE.
THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION IS A VERY BROAD LEGISLATIVE DELEG'ATION OF FEE-SETTING AUTHORITY WITH FEW CONTROLLING STANDARDS.
THIS KIND OF BROAD DELEGATION RESEMBLES AN r
AUTHORIZATION TO LEVY A TAX ON COMMISSION LICENSEES, WHICH COULD RAISE A SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.
SEE NATIONAL CABLE l
TELEVISION V. UNITED STATES, 415 U.S. 336 (1974), AND EEDERAL POWER COMPAflY V. NEW ENGLAND POWER COMPANY, 415 U.S. 345 (1974).
L THE PROF 0 SED LEGISLATION WOULD ALSO IMPOSE A SEVERE ADMINISTRATIVE WORKLOAD THAT WOULD RESULT IN AN UNACCEPTABLY LARGE AMOUNT OF RESOURCES THAT SHOULD BE ALLOCATED TO PROGRAMS BEING SPENT ON EVALUATING, ASSESSING, ALLOCATING, COLLECTING, ACCOUNTING FOR l
lu
'0UESTION 14. (CONT'D) FEES.
THE COMMISSION STRONGLY URGES THAT IN THE EVENT THE CONGRESS DECIDES TO SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE REVENUE FOR NRC SERVICES AS INDICATED IN THE REFERENCED ACT, THE MEANS FOR SO DOING SHOULD BE EASY TO DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT, BE HANDLED BY CONGRESSIONAL LEGIS-LATION RATHER THAN BY COMMISSION RULE AND BE RELATIVELY STABLE.
ONE METHOD IS TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF REVENUE THAT IS DESIPED TO BE RECEIVED AND CALCULATE, ON THE BASIS OF COST PER DESIGN OR INSTALLED KILOWATT, AN ANNUAL ASSESSMENT FOR ALL OPERATING REACTORS IN THE COUNTRY.
SUCH A SYSTEM SHOULD REPLACE THE LICENSE FEES CHARGED OPERATING REACTORS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT OFFICES APPROPRIATION ACT OF 1952 (31 U.S.C.
SEC. 9701).
LICENSE FEES FOR ALL REACTORS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND ALL NON-REACTOR LICENSEES COULD CONTINUE AS IS.
ESTABLISHING A FEE FOR OPERATING REACTORS BASED ON DESIGN / INSTALLED POWER HAS THE ADVANTAGES OF BEING EASY TO UNDERSTAND, IS READILY CALCULATED, AND REQUIRES VERY LITTLE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS.
COMMISSIONER ROBERTS FEELS THAT FOR THE REGULATED TO FUND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE REGULATOR IS AN INIMICAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
QUESTION 15.
PRICE-ANDERSON (A)
PLEASE COMMENT ON PROPOSALS TO ALLOW UTILITIES PAYING DEFERRED PREMIUMS UNDER 1
SECTION 1708 0F THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT TO RECOVER THE AMOUNT OF SUCH PREMIUMS FROM ANY
-PERSON THAT MAY HAVE BEEN LIABLE FOR THE ACCIDENT.
IN PARTICULAR, WHAT IMPACT WOULD ADOPTION OF THIS PROPOSAL HAVE ON: (A) THE ABILITY OF THE PUBLIC TO RECOVER PROMPTLY AND d
EFFICIENTLY IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT; (B) THE AVAILABILITY OF INSURANCE COVERAGE i
FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY ACTIVITIES; (C) THE SAFETY CONSCIOUSNESS OF UTILITIES, VENDORS, PART SUPPLIERS, AND OTHER PERSONS WHO MIGHT BE LIABLE UNDER THE PROPOSAL?
q 1
ANSWER.
(A)
AN IMPORTANT FEATURE OF THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT HAS ALWAYS i
BEEN THE "0MNIBUS COVERAGE" PROVISION WHEREBY THE SYSTEM PROVIDES LIABILITY PROTECTION NOT ONLY FOR THE UTILITIES NAMED IN THE I-INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS AND INSURANCE POLICIES BUT ALSO FOR ALL PERSONS WHO MAY BE LIABLE FOR THE NUCLEAR INCIDENT.
PROPOSALS TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF PREMIUf1S FROM ANY PERSON LIABLE FOR THE
?
4
QUESTION 15(A). (CONT'D) ACCIDENT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE G0AL OF FULL AND PROMPT RECOVERY BY 4
INJURED MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC FOR THEIR LEGITIMATE CLAIMS REGARDLESS 0F WHO MAY BE LIABLE AND THE SIZE OF THEIR ASSETS.
~
THESE SUBROGATION PROPOSALS, WHICH WOULD COME INTO PLAY AFTER.THE RECOVERY BY THE PUBLIC OF THEIR CLAIMS, WOULD PRESENT A SIGNIFICANT, NEW EXPOSURE, HOWEVER, TO PERSONS WHO MAY BE LIABLE FOR A NUCLEAR INCIDENT AND THIS EXPOSURE WOULD NOT BE PROTECTED BY PRICE-ANDERSON.
(B)
WE UNDERSTAND FROM CUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY THAT IT COULD AFFECT INSURANCE COVERAGE.
OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT IF THE PERSON WHO COULD BE SUED FOR THE DEFERRED PREMIUMS WERE ABLE TO CALL ON OTHER (NON-PRICE-ANDERSON FINANCIAL PROTECTION) INSURANCE, THEN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DETERMINE IN ADVANCE THE LIMITS OF THEIR INSURANCE EXPOSURE FOR A PARTICULAR ACCIDENT.
IS'A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY COUPLED WITH THE INSURANCE COMPANIES' PARTICIPATION EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH PRICE-ANDERSON FINANCIAL PROTECTION, THE COMPANIES KNOW THAT THEIR EXPOSURE, REGARDLESS OF WHO IS LIABLE, IS LIMITED TO THE AMOUNT OF CAPACITY THAT IS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE NUCLEAR. INSURANCE P0OLS.
' QUESTION 15(A). (CONT'D) (C). A SIMILAR ARGUMENT HAS BEEN RAISED FROM TIME TO TIME ABOUT WHETHER THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY PROVISION IN THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT ACTS AS A DISINCENTIVE TO THE SAFE OPERATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.
A NUMBER OF THE REBUTTALS MADE TO THAT PROPOSITION ARE EQUALLY VALID IN CONNECTION WITH THIS PRESENT i
PROPOSAL.
.FIRST, THE DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS RESTS IN PART UPON A STRINGENT FEDERAL REGULATION SYSTEM.
LICENSEES ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH COMPREHENSIVE SAFETY STANDARDS.
VIOLATIONS OF THESE STANDARDS MAY RESULT IN THE IMPOSITION OF CIVIL MONETARY FINES AND, IN SERIOUS. CASES, EVEN REVOCATION OF A LICENSE.
SECOND, IN RESPONSE TO'THE THPEE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT, THE INDUSTRY ESTABLISHED THE INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS (INP0) TO IMPROVE THE OPERATIONS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND PROVIDE FOR GREATER COORDINATION WITHIN THE INDUSTRY.
FURTHER, AS POINTED OUT IN THE JANUARY 1984 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND STUDY:
l "0NE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISES UNDERLYING THE IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT ACTS AT COMMON LAW WAS THAT THE THREAT OF INCURRING SUCH LIABILITY WOULD ACT AS A DETERRENT TO NEGLIGENT BEHAVIOR.
ON THE BASIS OF THIS PREMISE, EARLY LIABILITY INSURANCE PLANS'WERE ATTACKED, AND IN A FEW CASES ACTUALLY HELD VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY BECAUSE THEY
'0UESTION 15(A), (CONT'D) WERE THOUGHT TO REMOVE THIS DETERRENT EFFECT BY SHIELDING THE INSURED FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS BEHAVIOR.. AS EXPERIENCE WITH LIABILITY INSURANCE GREW, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THIS FEAR WAS UNFOUNDED, BUT, WHILE THE ARGUMENT AGAINST PROVIDING PROTECTION FROM TORT LIABILITY HAS LONG SINCE BEEN DISCREDITED IN OTHER AREAS, IT CONTINUES TO BE RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROBLEM OF PROVIDING FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST THE NUCLEAR RISK, SPECIFICALLY, THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT CONTINUES TO BE CRITICIZED AS REMOVING AN IMPORTANT MOTIVATION FOR DIRECTING THE ATTENTION OF INDUSTRY TO THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS."
THE COLUMBIA STUDY FURTHER POINTS OUT THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES ON THE UTILITY INDUSTRY TO PREVENT THE OCCURRENCE OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT.
IF A NUCL-EAR PLANT SUFFERS AN ACCIDENT, IN ADDITION TO THE DAMAGE TO THE REACTOR ITSELF, WHICH COULD VERY WELL EXCEED THE AMOUNT OF THE INSURANCE A UTILITY IS ABLE TO PURCHASE, THE COSTS OF PURCHASING REPLACEMENT POWER AND THE LOSS OF THE PLANT FROM THE UTILITY'S RATE BASE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL, lN ADDITION, THE STUDY STATES THAT THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT DEMONSTRATED THAT MANUFACTURERS, ARCHITECT-ENGINEERS AND VENDORS ARE ALL POTENTIALLY EXPOSED TO LIABILITY FOR LOSSES OF THE UTILITY OTHER THAN THE COSTS OF THIRD PARTY LIABILITY CLAIMS COVERED UNDER THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT.
QUESTION 15.
PRICE-ANDERSON (B)
PLEASE COMMENT ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF PEDEFINING "PUBLIC L-IABILITY" UNDER SECTION llW 0F THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT SO AS'TO EXCLUDE.
CLAIMS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
- ANSWER, THE COMMISSION IS ON RECORD AS SUPPORTING MODIFICATION OF THE PRICE-ANDERSON SYSTEM TO EXPLICITLY EXCLUDE COVERAGE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
IN THE COMMISSION'S VIEW, THE PUNITIVE EFFECT OF SUCH.
AWARDS IS LOST IF A DEFENDANT CAN INSURE ITSELF AGAINST SUCH LIABILITY UNDER THE PRICE-ANDERSON SYSTEM.
FURTHER, IN ANY EVENT, AT THE VERY LEAST PAYMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DISPLACE PAYMENT FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES.
S0 LONG-AS THERE IS A CAP OR A PRACTICAL LIMIT ON THE AMOUNT OF LIABILITY PER ACCIDENT, ULTIMATE COMPENSATORY PAYMENT FOR DAMAGES OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT COULD BE JEOPARDIZED BY EARLIER ASSESSMENTS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
i Q15 Commissioner Asselstine Adds:
I am not opposed to proposals to allow utilities paying deferred premiums under section 170B of the AEA to recover the amount of such premiums.from any person who may have been responsible for the accident.
The proposal would not have an adverse effect on the public's ability to recover quickly because the deferred premiums would be available.
On the other hand, it would help to address the fairness problem -- that a licensee has to pay for'an accident which it did not cause.
As. a practical matter in the case of a large consequence accident, the utility experiencing the event is likely to be in very pocr financial shape and will not be very real source of funds.
However, a provision to allow recovery from anyone responsible would enable utilities to seek recovery of their premiums from other responsible entities such as vendors, parts suppliers, etc., and may in turn create an increased safety consciousness in those persons.
y
s QUESTION 16.
ROLE OF INTERVENORS PLEASE IDENTIFY MAJOR INSTANCES IN WHICH SIGNIFICANT SAFETY ISSUES HAVE COME TO LIGHT AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY LICENSEES' EMPLOYEES OR CONTRACTORS WHO~ BYPASSED THE LICENSEES' ESTABLISHED REPORTING SYSTEM,'OR BY PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS, INTERVENORS, INPO, OR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE?
WHY WAS THE NRC UNABLE ~TO UNCOVER THESE PROBLEMS THROUGH ESTABLISHED REPORTING AND INSPECTION PROCEDURES?
ANSWER OUR ANSWER IS PRESENTED IN TERMS OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS IDENTIFIED IN THE QUESTION WITH EXAMPLES THAT CHARACTERIZE THE TYPES OF CONCERNS RAISED BY EACH GROUP.
LICENSEE EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS HAVE FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF ON-SITE. ACTIVITIES THEY PARTICIPATED IN OR OBSERVED, AND OFTEN ARE THE MAJOR SOURCE FOR IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS -
BOTH.THOSE WHICH COME TO LIGHT THROUGH THE ESTABLISHED REPORTING SYSTEMS AND THOSE WHICH DO NOT.
INTERVENOR GROUPS MAY RAISE ISSUES INDEPENDENTLY OR MAY RAISE SAFETY ISSUES ON BEHALF OF LICENSEE EMPLOYEES OR CONTRACTORS.
QUESTION 16 (CONT'D) MAJOR INSTANCES OF SAFETY ~ ISSUES COMING TO LIGHT AS A RESULT OF ACTION TAKEN BY LICENSEES' EMPLOYEES OR. CONTRACTORS, bHERE THE LICENSEES' ESTABLISHED REPORTING SYSTEM WAS BYPASSED, ARE EXEMPLIFIED BY (1) ANONYMOUS CONCERNS REPORTED TO THE NRC AND A LICENSEE CONTRACTOR INVOLVING A TVA FACILITY (ISSUES REGARDING THE GENERAL ADEQUACY OF WELDING, CABLING, AND MANAGEMENT) AND (2)
ISSUES SUCH AS THOSE RAISED BY PIPE SUPPORT DESIGNERS ON-THE COMANCHE PEAK FACILITY INVOLVING SPECIFIC DESIGN ISSUES ON SAFETY RELATED PIPE SUPPORTS, EACH OF THESE EXAMPLES ACTED AS A CATALYST LEADING TO MAJOR SAFETY REVIEWS BY LICENSEES AND THE NRC STAFF FOR THE AFFECTED FACILITIES.
IT APPEARS THAT IN SUCH CASES THE EMPLOYEES OR CONTRACTORS PERCEIVED THAT THEIR CONCERNS WERE BEING IGNORED BY LICENSEE MANAGEMENT OR THAT SOME DEGREE OF FEAR OF REPRISAL EXISTED SUCH THAT THEY DID NOT FEEL COMFORTABLE TAKING SUCH ISSUES TO THEIR MANAGEMENT.
AS A RESULT, NORMAL LICENSEE CHANNELS WERE NOT EFFECTIVE IN IDENTIFYING AND RESOLVING THE CONCERNS.
INTERVENORS HAVE RECENTLY BROUGHT SIGNIFICANT SAFETY ISSUES TO LIGHT.
INTERVENORS IN THE COMANCHE PEAK CASE RAISED QA AND PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORT CONTENTIONS AS A RESULT OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM ALLEGERS.
INTERVENORS IN THE SHEARON HARRIS i
QUESTION 16. (CONT'D) CASE RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER EMERGENCY SIRENS COULD BE HEARD AT NIGHT IN THE SUMMERTIME.
AS A RESULT, THE APPLICANT HAS DECIDED TO DISTRIBUTE TONE ALERT RADIOS TO RESIDENTS IN THE AREAS WHERE NIGHTTIME AROUSAL WAS QUESTIONABLE.
W'ITH RESPECT TO NRC'S ABILITY TO UNCOVER'SUCH PROBLEMS, IT IS IMPOR-TANT TO NOTE THAT THE. PURPOSE,0F THE NRC'S INSPECTION PROGRAM IS TO ENSURE, BY MEANS OF INSPECTIONS DONE ON A SAMPLING BASIS, i' HAT LICENSEES HAV.E ESTABLISHED AND IMPLEMENTED PROCEDURES TO ENSURE THAT NUCLEAR FACILITIES ARE CONSTRUCTED AND OPERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NRC REQUIREMENTS AND LICENSEE COMMITMENTS.
THE KEYSTONE OF THE NRC'S INSPECTION PROGRAM IS VERIFICATION THAT THE APPLICANT HAS AN ADEQUATE QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM THAT IS BEING EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED.
THE NRC PROGRAM CONSISTS OF (1) REVIEW OF THE APPLICANT'S OA PROGRAM, INCLUDIN'G THE PROGRAMS OF.THE VARIOUS SITE CONTRACTORS;
1 QUESTION 16. (CONT'D) (2) OBSERVATION ~, ON A SAMPLING BASIS, OF THE ACTUAL WORK AND INSPECTION ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD; AND (3) REVIEW, AGAIN ON A' SAMPLING BASIS, OF THE RECORDS AND LICENSEE ACTIONS WHICH DOCUMENT BOTH THE WORK ACCOMPLISHED AND THE RESULTS OF THE LICENSEE'S SELF INSPECTIONS AND AUDITS.
DURING THE DESIGN AftD CONSTRUCTION OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IT IS NEITHER UNUSUAL NOR UNEXPECTED THAT DESIGN ERRORS OR EQUIPMENT MAL-FUNCTIONS ARE DETECTED AND CORRECTED BY THE CONTRACTOR.
THE NRC REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT THE LICENSEE MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM THAT FOLLOWS UP EACH ASPECT OF THE PLANT'S CONSTRUCTION TO ASSURE THAT THE FACILITY AND ITS CONSTITUENT SYSTEMS ARE CONSTRUCTED AS DESIGNED AND ARE PROPERLY INSPECTED AND TESTED TO DETECT DESIGN OR CONSTRUCTION ERRORS.
THE INTENT OF NRC INSPECTIONS IS NOT TO IDENTIFY EVERY DEFICIENCY IN MATERIALS OR WORKMANSHIP (WHICH IS NOT PRACTICABLE CONSIDERING THE RESOURCE LIMITATIONS OF THE NRC), BUT RATHER TO ENSURE THAT THE LICENSEE IS DISCHARGING ITS RESPONSIBILITY BY IDENTIFYING AND REQUIRING CORPECTIONS OF SAFETY RELATED DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES.
THIS APPROACH, COUPLED WITH THE MULTIPLE LEVELS ~OF SAFETY WHICH ARE DESIGNED INTO THE PLANT THROUGH REDUNDANCY OF SAFETY SYSTEMS AND CONTAINMENTS AND THE MARGINS OF SAFETY IN STRUCTURAL DESIGN, IS MEANT TO ENSURE THAT ANY UNIDENTIFIED' DEFICIENCIES IN CONSTRUCTION WILL NOT BE OF A SIGNIFICANCE, TYPE, OR QUANTITY WHICH WILL COMPROMISE THE OVERALL SAFETY OF THE PLANT DURING FUTURE OPERATIONS.
CUESTION 17.
LEGAL 0FFICES PLEASE DESCRIBE-THE COMMISSION'S PLANS FOR COMBINING ITS OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL WITH THE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR.
WHAT IS THE' PURPOSE OF THIS ACTION?
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ACTION?
ANSWER.
THE COMMISSION DECIDED DURING RECENT DELIBERATIONS ON THE FY.1987 BUDGET TO COMBINE THE TWO OFFICES INTO A SINGLE LEGAL.0FFICE REPORTING TO THE COMMISSION.
THE STAFF HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO DEVELOP A-REORGANIZATION PLAN FOR COMMISSION CONSIDERATION BY APRIL 15.
THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE ACTION IS TO BETTER REFLECT THE' CHANGING WORKLOAD ~0F THE AGENCY AND TO REDUCE UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION OF EFFORT, THEREBY ACHIEVING A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF POSITIONS NOW AUTHORIZED FOR THE TWO EXISTING OFFICES.
SAVINGS SHOULD BE ACHIEVABLE THROUGH THE ELIMINATION OF DUPLICATION IN SUPPORT SERVICES (FOR EXAMPLE, ONE RATHER THAN TWO LAW LIBRARIES), AND IN SOME LEGAL REVIEWS, SUCH AS RULEMAKINGS.
D.
____.--a
O QUESTION 18.
OPEN COMMISSION MEETINGS (A) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE COMMISSION'S-RULE REVISING ITS FORMEP GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT REGULATIONS?
ANSWER.
ON JANUARY 17, 1986, THE COMMISSION RECEIVED A BRIEFING FROM ITS GENERAL COUNSEL ON THE SUNSHINE ACT RULE.
THE BRIEFING COVERED THE COMMENTS WHICH WERE~ SUBMITTED ON THE MAY 21, 1985 INTERIM RULE, AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S PROPOSED REVISION OF THE RULE IN LIGHT OF THOSE COMMENTS.
THE GENERAL COUNSEL ALSO DESCRIBED TO THE COMMISSION THE EFFORT NOW UNDERWAY BY A TASK FORCE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SECTION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TO STUDY A VARIETY OF SUNSHINE ACT ISSUES.
THE TASK FORCE IS EXAMINING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION'IN THE ITT CASE AND'ITS IMPLICATIONS; THE NRC'S MAY 21 RULE AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S SUGGESTED REVISIONS OF THE RULE; AND THE PROBLEM 0F' DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN THE TYPES OF DISCUSSIONS WHICH MAY LEGALLY BE HELD IN A NON-SUNSHINE ACT CONTEXT AND THOSE WHICH BRING THE SUNSHINE A'CT'S REQUIREMENTS INTO PLAY.
IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT TASK FORCE'S INCUIRY IS SO DIRECTLY GERMANE TO THE COMMISSION'S CONSIDERATION OF ITS SUNSHINE ACT RULE, AND THAT ITS SCHEDULE CALLS FOR A FINAL REPORT IN APRIL,
QUESTION 18(A). (CONTINUED) -
5 1986, THE COMMISSION DECIDED UNANIMOUSLY TO DEFER ACTION ON THE SUNSHINE ACT RULE UNTIL AFTER IT HAS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE BRIEFED ON THE TASK FORCE'S REPORT,
QUESTION 18, OPEN COMMISSION MEETINGS (B) WHAT BENEFITS DOES THE COMMISSION EXPECT FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RULE THAT ARE NOT PROVIDED BY THE FORMER REGULATIONS?
- ANSWER, THE NRC'S SUNSHINE ACT REGULATIONS AS ADOPTED INITIALLY, ARE l
PERHAPS THE MOST RESTRICTIVE OF ANY AGENCY IN GOVERNMENT, GOING I
WELL BEYOND THE LAW'S REQUIREMENTS.
THE SUPREME COURT, IN A UNANIMOUS 1984 DECISION, FCC v, ITT WORLD COMMUNICATIONS,.104 S.CT, 1936, EMPHASIZED THAT INFORMAL BACKGROUND DISCUSSIONS WHICH CLARIFY ISSUES AND EXPOSE VARYING VIEWS WERE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF AN AGENCY'S FUNCTIONING, AND WERE NEVER INTENDED BY CONGRESS TO FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE SUNSHINE ACT, ALSO IN 1984, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE, A BODY WHICH BY STATUTE HAS.A SPECIAL ROLE IN THE INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUNSHINE l
ACT, STATED IN RECOMMENDATION 84-3 THAT ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT. EFFECTS OF THE SUNSHINE ACT HAD BEEN ITS DIMINUTION OF AGENCY COLLEGIALITY.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDED THAT CONGRESS CONSIDER AMENDING THE SUNSHINE ACT TO CORRECT THIS PROBLEM, THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSED SUNSHINE ACT RULE WAS DESIGNED TO ALLOW THE COMMISSION TO USE THE FLEXIBILITY PROVIDED UNDER EXISTING LAW TO HOLD INFORMAL BACKGROUND DISCUSSIONS THAT CLARIFY ISSUES AND EXPOSE VARYING VIEWS, IT WAS DESIGNED TO BRING.THE AGENCY'S REGULATIONS INTO LINE WITH THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY THE SUPREME l
l
-QUESTION 18(B), (CONTINUED) COURT, SINCE THE COURT'S DECISION MADE CLEAR THAT THE EXISTING PEGULATIONS WERE UNDULY RESTRICTIVE.
IT WAS DESIGNED TO HELP BUILD COLLEGIAllTY IN THE COMMISSION'S DECISIONAL PROCESS, AND TO HELP PERMIT THE COMMISSIONERS TO ENGAGE IN LONG-RANGE, " BIG PICTURE" THINKING ABOUT THE AGENCY'S PRESENT AND FUTURE ROLE, AND TO HOLD " BRAINSTORMING SESSIONS" IN WHICH IDEAS ARE GENERATED.
GUESTION 18.
OPEN COMMISSION MEETINGS (C) WHAT TYPES OF COMMISSION DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE CLOSED TO THE PUBLIC UNDER THE NEW RULE?
ANSWER.
WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF WHAT TYPES OF DISCUSSIONS COULD BE HELD UNDER THE NEW RULE, AN ANSWER IS PREMATURE, SINCE WE MAY WELL OBTAIN CLARIFICATION OF THAT ISSUE FROM THE TASK FORCE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SECTION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION.
IT IS WORTH NOTING, HOWEVER, THAT THE GENERAL COUNSEL HAS ADVISED US THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, DISCUSSIONS OF THE LICENSING OF A PARTICULAR PLANT, INCLUDING DISCUSSIONS OF ANY NRC LICENSING PROCEEDING, WOULD NEVER BE APPROPRIATE FOR NON-SUNSHINE ACT DISCUSSIONS.
MORE0VER, UNDER THE PROPOSAL FORWARDED TO THE COMMISSION BY THE GENERAL COUNSEL, TECHNICAL BRIEFINGS ON ISSUES OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY WOULD, AS A MATTER OF COMMISSION DISCRETION, BE TREATED AT ALL TIMES AS SUNSHINE ACT MEETINGS.
I HAVE RECENTLY SENT A MEMORANDUM TO THE GENERAL COUNSEL ASKING HIM TO CONSIDER A LIST OF VARIOUS TYPES OF MEETINGS AND TO PROVIDE HIS VIEWS AS TO WHICH OF THEM WOULD AND WOULD NOT BRING THE SUNSHINE ACT'S REQUIREMENTS INTO FLAY.
OVESTION 18.
OPEN COMMISSION MEETINGS (D) WHAT SAFEGUARDS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THAT THE PUBLIC WILL HAVE ACCESS TO ALL DISCUSSIONS TO WHICH IT IS ENTITLED UNDER THE SUNSHINE ACT?
ANSWER.
THE DECISION TO DEFER FINAL' ACTION ON THE SUNSHINE ACT RULE THEREFORE CONTINUES THE STATUS 000 IN PLACE.
THAT STATUS QUO, AS DESCRIBED IN CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY ON MAY 21, 1985, AND IN LETTERS TO CONGRESSMAN MARKEY, MOORHEAD, DINGELL, AND BROYHILL ON JUNE 6, 1985, PROVIDES THAT UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES ARE DEVELOPED, APPROVED, AND PROVIDED TO THE CONGRESS, THE COMMISSION WILL:
MAINTAIN A RECORD OF ALL INFORMAL GATHERINGS NOT SUBJECT TO THE SUNSHINE ACT KEEP THE CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC INFORMED ON A MONTHLY BASIS OF THE NATURE OF SUCH GATHERINGS; AND RECORD AND MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE CONGRESS THE DATE, PARTICIPANTS, AND SUBJECT OF EACH SUCH DISCUSSION, TOGETHER WITH A LIST OF ANY DOCUMENTS DISCUSSED.
IN ADDITION, A LAWYER WILL BE PRESENT TO ASSURE THAT ANY NON-SUNSHINE ACT DISCUSSION PEMAINS WITHIN THE CONFINES OF WHAT IS PROPER.
Udall Q18 Comissioner Asselstine Adds:
I do not support the Comission's new Sunshine rule for several reasons.
First, the standard for determining whether the Commission may hold a
" gathering" - whether the discussions are sufficiently focused as to cause individual comissioners to form reasonably firm positions on issues - is vague and subjective.
The rule contains no explanation of this standard and no examples of what kinds of things the Comission thinks it will discuss in these gatherings. Without such guidance, there is clearly a potential for abuse, either intentional or inadvertent. And, should the Comission abuse the rule, there is no effective remedy, because for non-meetings there will be no transcript, no notice, and no minutes.
Second, I question the usefulness of holding such gatherings.
If the discussions at gatherings are limited, as they should be, only to very preliminary discussions, such discussions will not be very beneficial.
The Comission argues, however, that holding gaderings to discuss agency business is needed to improve the agency's efficiency and to enhance collegiality.
Put simply, the argument is that individual comissioners are more comfortable in expressing their views and exchanging ideas if they can do so in private. While a preference for privacy may be understandable, it is fundamentally at odds with a purpose of the Sunshine Act -- the need to ensure the accountability of senior government officials.
Finally, in publishing and defending the Comission's new rule, the Comission has given the public the impression that it would rather do business behind closed doors and off-the-record. This impression can only adversely affect public confidence in the workings of this agency.
Instead of limiting public access to the Comission's decisionmaking process, the Comission should be increasing public participation.
That is the only way to restore and maintain public confidence.
[r I
l o l
QUESTION 19.
BUILDING CONSOLIDATION l
WHAT IS THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE BUILDING CONSOLIDATION?
IN THE EVENT THE NRC'S OFFICES ARS CONSOLIDATED OUTS!DE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WILL THE l
COMMISSION MAINTAIN A PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM WITHIN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA?
l ANSWER.
OF CONTINUING INTEREST TO THE COMMISSION AND TO YOUR COMMITTEE IS THE MATTER OF NRC BUILDING CONSOLIDATION.
AS YOU KNOW, THE NRC STAFF HAS BEEN HOUSED IN TEN BUILDINGS IN ROCKVILLE, BETHESDA, SILVER SPRING, AND THE DISTRICT.
WE FINALLY HAVE THE GLIMMER OF HOPE THAT CONSOLIDATION PLANS ARE IN THE OFFING.
RECENTLY GSA HAS SUBMITTED FOR OMB APPROVAL A PLAN FOR NRC CONSOLIDATION WITH POSSIBLE OPTIONS.
GSA DESIRES THAT THE t
DETAILS NOT BE DISCUSSED IN PUBLIC AT THE PRESENT TIME TO PERMIT THEM FLEXIBILITY IN NEGOTIATIONS ON VARIOUS APPROACHES.
WE APPRECIATE THE COMMITTEE'S CONTINUED SUPPORT IN OUR QUEST TO CONSOLIDATE AND HOPE OUR EFFORTS WILL BEAR FRUIT.
l
(
QUESTION 19.
(CONTINUED)
THE COMMISSION DESIRES TO MOVE THE PDR TO THE CONSOLIDATED SITE WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE COMMISSION BECAUSE IT BELIEVES THAT THE PDR CAN PROVIDE THE BEST SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM THAT LOCATION.
AT THIS STAGE OF PLANNING FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NRC ELEMENTS, THERE IS INSUFFICIENT SPACE INITIALLY TO ACCOMMODATE l
THE PDR IN ADDITION TO ThE OPERATIONAL AND NECESSARY SUPPORT UNITS OF THE AGENCY.
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS THE INTENTION OF THE COMMISSION TO LEAVE THE PDR IN WASHINGTON, D.
C.
l i
l
e STATEMENT OF COPMISSIONER JAMES K. ASSELSTINE PEFORE THE Sl'RCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY Af>0 THE ENVIRONMENT COMf1TTTEE OfJ IPTEPIOR All0 If45ULAR AFFAIRS FEBRtlARY 6, 1986 Mr. Chairman, I would 'ike to add a few brief coments on the Administration's FY 1987 budget request for the NRC. The Comission's testimony has identi'ied a rumber of flRC programs that will have to be scaled back or eliminated altogether as a result of the reductions to our budget request irresed ty Ci'B.
As the Comission's testimony notes, many of flRC's forward-looking programs will he either rec'uced substantially or terminated. This will leave us with little in the way of change from the reactive approach to regulation that we have erricyed in the past.
It will also hinder our ability to recrerd cffectively to serious operating events r
when they do occur.
The consequence of this reactive approach to reculation is, I think, clear.
Sy the end of 1985, eight operating reactors -- Davis-Resse, Rancho Seco, San Onofre Unit 1, and TVA's Sequoyah and Browns Ferry plants -- were shut down as a result o' serious operating events or a Freckdown in the licensee's rana.gerent so severe that neither we nor the licensee had confidence that its plants could he operated safely.
Thi'; gioup of plants l
15 equal to the runber cf plants that received new full-power operating licenses last year, and represents about 8 percent of 'Fe total nunber of plants with operatino license.
The Comission's original FY 1987 budget t
9 proposal contained a few modest efforts to improve our ability to identify such problem cases before they result in serious operating events that pose a potential hazard to the public.
These efforts included the exparded use n# tecn inspections to review plant operations, maintenance and surveillance activities and modification work at the plants.
They rMe included efforts to take a more integrated look at safety at a few plants.
These were steps toward a rore proactive approach to regulation that is occded if we are to improve the performance of the existing plants and reduce the number of serious operating events.
In addition, the Commission had begun senn regulatory review work on advanced reactor concepts such as the high-temperature gas cooled reactor and the PIUS Ilght-veter reactor that hold the prenise of greater simplicity, higher margins of safety and ease of construction when compared with existing reactorc.
I believe that the consecuence of rcducirg or eliminating these more forward-looking prograns will be that we will see more serious operation events of the type experienced this past year. As the number of operating plants continues to increase, as the existing plants grow older, rrd as we see continued i
ovidence of the complexities and tidden vulnerabilities in these p ants, we shcutd be doing more rather than less 'omerd ! coking work.
Like my colleacue' cr the Comission, I, too, recognize the need 'or budget austerity.
But rather than eliminate theso r4cced rrcorams. I would prefer to explore some more creative rci,wres tu ubtain the necessary fundleg.
An alternative, which appears to havn the terport of the Administratice and Nt, is tn obtain additional fordirg from the industry.
I would reconnend,
that the Congress consider two optione Fere.
3-The first is funding the NRC's high-level radioactive waste disposal I
program from the Nuclear Waste Fund established by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Our high-level waste program is focused on the licensing of the high-level waste repository. Just as with DOE's repository development program, our repository licensing program is required to support the use of commercial power. rectors.
The costs of the repository prooram --
regulatory es well as developmental -- should be paid by those who benefit from the use of nuclear power.
This could be accomplished in a variety of ways, including direct reimbursement to NRC from the Nuclear Waste Fund for the annual costs of our high-level waste licensing ard research expenses or i
by means of an annual license fee to be paid by 00E and recovered from the i
Fund. Whatever means is used, it seems to me that the utilities through the Fund, rather thao the taxpayers, should pay for the regulatory costs of the repository that are attributable to the cccrerrial industry.
4 The second optior that I believe the Congress should consider is the imposition of annual charges on our licensees to recover a creater portion l
of the costs of our reactor safety research program from the industry.
At present, we charge license fees to cover the coste. of our licensinq and
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inspection activitiet that can be attributed to a particular facility.
f flowever, we do not take that approach with our e,a ety research programs.
r Many of these progrars provide a direct benefit to the industry.
For example, as the Conenission's budget testimony and our Fore detailed budget description note, some of cur research programs are aimed at deternining the acceptability of plant operations with dearaded safety equiprmnt such I
as cracked pipes in boiling water reactors and weakened steam generators in i
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pressurized water reactors. These ard other conditions constitute reductions in the quality and condition of safety systems from what was expected when the plants were licensed. Other fiRC research programs are aimed at reducing the level of conservatism in our existing safety regulations -- actions which can reduce plant operating, maintenance and surveillance costs, and which could result'in higher power levels for the plants. Because it has been difficult to cuantify and assign such benefits to individual plants, we have rot attempted to impose the costs of these research programs on the industry. While the industry has voluntarily participated in sone safety research programs, the lion's share of the cost has been paid over the years by the taxpayer.
I believe that a greater portion of the costs of these programs should be recovered from tha industry.
There are several ways of accoeplishing this. One neans is the imposition of annual charges as proposed in the Consolidated Omnibus Pudget Reconciliation Act of 1985. Whatever the means used, recovery of a greater portion of the costs of cor safety research program from the industry, reupled with payment of the repository regulatory costs from the Nuclear Waste Fund, would provide the funds needed to carry out a set of aggressive, forward-lock f og regulatory initiatives to in' prove the performance of our comercial rever reactors without increasing, and perhaps even by reducing somewhat, the firancial burden on the federal taxpayer.
I believe that rou i'. the time to consider such a croative approach for Arding flRC's regulatory programs.
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