ML20137S756

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Forwards Summary of Results of Ruskin Damper Testing Program,Per 841224 Deficiency Rept & May 1985 Region I Fire Protection Audit.Affected Pages Which Will Be Incorporated Into FSAR Amend 14 Also Encl
ML20137S756
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek 
Issue date: 12/03/1985
From: Corbin McNeil
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Adensam E
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-PT21-85 NUDOCS 8512060304
Download: ML20137S756 (57)
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Text

{{#Wiki_filter:, _.. Public Service Electric and Gas Company ~Ctrbin A. McNeill, Jr. Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609339-4800 Vice President - Nuclear DEC' 3 1985 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bathesda, Maryland 20814 Attention: Ms. Elinor Adensam, Director Project Directorace 3 Division of BWR Licensing

Dear Ms. Adensam:

CORRECTION OF RUSKIN DAMPER DEFICIENCIES HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION -DOCKET NO. 50-354 The purpose of this correspondence is to present to the NRC 4 the results of Public Service Electric and Gas Company's (PSE&G) efforts to resolve the Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) plant specific implications brought to light as a l result of the 10CFR21 report issued on November 6, 1984 by Ruskin Manufacturing Company. In accordance with requirements of 10CFR 50.55(e), PSE&G subsequently filed a potentially significant construction deficiency report concerning the performance of the Ruskin fire dampers under airflow conditions. Verbal notification was made on December 24, 1984, with followup interim reports issued on January 25, April 1, July 23, and October 2, 1985. In addition, resolution of this issue is carried as unresolved item 85-24-08 from the May 1985 Region I fire protection audit. PSE&G has evaluated numerous methods of qualifying the subject dampers under maximum anticipated airflow conditions. The culmination of this effort is presented in Attachment I which summarizes the results of the Hope Creek Ruskin Damper Testing Program. Attachment II presents effected FSAR pages which will be incorporated into Amendment 14 of the Hope Creek FSAR. 8512060304 851203 PDR ADOCK 05000354 @/DO S PDR Il

-l i Director of Nuclear 2 Reactor Regulation In:the event-there are any questions with respect to this correspondence, do not hesitate to contact us. Sincerely, Attachments C D.H. Wagner -USNRC Licensing Project Manager R.W. Borchardt-USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

ATTACIIMENT I j l l I t

e RU6 KIN FIRE DAMPERS - RUSKIN MANUFACTURING COMPANY 10CFR21 REPORT - NOVEMBER 6, 1984 10CFR50.55E - DECEMBER 24, 1984 PSE&G has 692 Ruskin fire dampers throughout the Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) in various HVAC systems. Upon notification of Ruskin Manufacturing Co's 10CFR21 report, the HCGS fire dampers were reviewed for applicability of the Ruskin failures. The following summary explains how each grouping of dampers was qualified for closure under the air flows experienced in the HCGS applications. All of the vertical dampers have been qualified in their original configuration, in some cases by utilizing listed replacement springs and latches. The only remaining unqualified dampers are horizontal. Our review of this item was extensive and involved multiple aspects of potential corrective actions. The review included consideration of alternate dampers, damper modifications, replacement springs and latches, HVAC airflow modifications, administrative controls, fire area boundary redefinition, fire rated ductwork wraps, in-place testing programs, additio'nal.Ruskin testing programs, the use of coordinated electro-thermal link (ETL): closures on multi-section dampers, independent alarm ~ systems, and automatic HVAC system shutdown. Each individual damper was evaluated against the design airflows, taking all acceptance testing performed by Ruskin into account. The particular solution chosen for each damper reflects the most appropriate resolution while considering the varying designs and operational parameters in each case. Dampers identified below as unqualified will still be left: in place to supplement the acceptance of the particular solution for each case. This is based on the potential to at least partially close upon an actual fire initiated release. An FSAR markup is presented ( Attachment II) and reflects the explan- .ations, deviation identification, and additional exemption requests which result from this damper qualification program. PSE&G is confident that the results and resolutions of this program adequately address the doubts raised by the Ruskin 10CFR21 report. Plant-fire safety is maintained at an equivalent or better level to that which would be' attained with qualified dampers. This submittal documents the corrective actions taken for each damper. The attached pages expand upon the following summary of dampers. I 1 4 e -<-1 ,,.--+m .--ry -+w-

e I' Item No. of Dampers Method 1 456 Acceptable as is. 2 37 Accepted based on in-place testing after spring and latch changes and ETL closure coordination.. 3 104 Automatic HVAC shutdown. 4 7 Administrative HVAC shutdown 5 56 Radwaste and Turbine Building Dampers. 6 22 Fire area redefinition and Non-fire barrier dampers. 7 4 Duct Wrap /3 hour barrier (variation of fire area redefinition). 8 6 Exemption Request 692

l s Item No. 1 Dampers Acceptable as is i .Six HVAC systems do not have air velocities high enough to exceed the maximum tested velocity as determined by the manufacturer. Twenty-eight (28) dampers are included in these systems. The acceptance is based on a conservative assessment of the Ruskin test data against the flope Creek duct layout and velocities. No dampers were modified in these groupings. An. additional 42R dampers in.26 other HVAC systems are also acceptable in their present configuration under design airflow. This results in a total of 456 dampers which are qualified to close under the design airflows.

4 Item No. 2 In-Place Testing PSE&G implemented an in-place testing program in order to ascertain limiting airflow conditions for specific damper applications. Dampers were grouped according to airflow and size, with the worst damper in each grouping tested in-place under design airflow conditions. Seventeen (17) dampers were tested with all five (5) of the vertical dampers passing. Unfortunately, only three (3) of the twelve (12) horizontal dampers passed the testing. The results are summarized as follows: Vertical Dampers Tested 5 Vertical Dampers Passed 5 Vertical Dampers Enveloped as Acceptable 31 Horizontal Dampers Tested 12 Horizontal Dampers Passed 3 Horizontal Dampers Enveloped as Acceptable _6 Total Acceptable based on In-place Testing 37 Please note that the strongest listed springs, modified latch mechanisms, and Electro-Thermal Link (ETL) closure coordination (multiple section dampers) were added to all tested. The stronger springs and latches will be retained on the nonqualified dampers, but ETL's will not be installed. Regular fusible links will be retained on unqualified dampers to add to the probability of at least partial closure during an actual fire initiated release. J

. s S Item'No. 3 Automatic HVAC Shutdown -The following ten (10) HVAC systems have.been equipped with automatic HVAC fan shutdown circuitry and in-duct smoke detection or area thermal detection as the initiating signal: -10 Systems to be Automatically Shutdown TOTAL UNQUALIFIED SYSTEM DAMPERS TYPE OF DETECTION Diesel Generator Room 16 Area Thermal Recirculation (DRR) Radwaste Supply (RWS) 22 Duct Smoke l Service Area 1 Exhaust (SAE) 2 Duct Smoke-Service Area Supply (SAS) 12 Duct Smoke Solid Radwaste Exhaust (SRW3) 6 Duct Smoke Solid Radwaste Supply (SRWS) 2 Duct Smoke Wing Area Exhaust (WAE) 11 Duct Smoke Wing Area Supply (WAS) 8 Duct Smoke Administration Facility (ADM) 11 Duct Smoke 4 Guardhouse (GRDH) 14 Duct Smoke f TOTAL 104 By tripping'the HVAC fans, the air velocities obviously decrease to zero, enabling the dampers to close upon adequate heat to release their respective fusible links. The sensitivity of the in-duct ionization detectors to smoke generated in the' incipient stages of a fire results in HVAC shutdown before a fire could challenge fire barriers. 1 As a result, this automatic shutdown eliminates these 104 dampers as concerns. 4 i

Item No. 4 Administrative HVAC Shutdown Administrative (manual) shutdown of HVAC fans was chosen as a last resort. option due to the obvious undesirability of tripping HVAC on a regular basis. However, three HVAC systems will require manual fan shutdown, affecting 7 dampers. These systems are: Unqualified System Dampers Shutdown Indication Control Room Supply 2 Area Smoke Detection Control Room Exhaust 4 Area Smoke Detection Control Area Exhaust 1 Area Smoke Detection The specific detection zones for each area on both sides of unqualified fire dampers will be identified via the alarm response procedures. For systems to be shutdown based on an area smoke detection alarm,' Control Room personnel will allow a seven minute response time for a fire brigade assessment of potential barrier challenges. If no response is received within seven minutes, or if the fire brigade indicates a working fire in any area prior to seven minutes after alarm receipt, the HVAC will be manually shutdown. The basis of this delay is the fact that smoke detection will react in the early stages of a fire. In order for a fire to challenge a fire barrier's integrity, it would have to burn through the ductwork and through the barrier within seven minutes of an alarm, an improbable event. As a result, the delay time allows further operator flexibility. Please note that the fire brigades response time is normally considerably less than the seven minutes identified herein. In addition,4 the PSE&G fire brigade is staffed with full . time, professional fire fighters who have no other station operating responsibilities and have been trained to assess the extent of fire risk.

E-1 Item-No. 5 Radwaste and Turbine Building Dampers A total of 56 unqualified dampers have been identified as deviations in the attached FSAR markup. The dampers are all located in fire barriers internal to the radwaste and turbine building fire area boundaries and as a result, the deletion of the dampers does not impact safe shutdown divisional separation..In addition, the barriers in which the dampers are located are not a BTP-CMEB 9.5-1 requirement. As a result, we are using these dampers as is. Please note that replacement springs and latches have been installed on some of these dampers.

Item No. 6 Redefinition of Fire Area Boundaries A total of fifteen (15) unqualified fire dampers have been eliminated from consideration by redefining fire area boundaries. Safe shutdown separation is maintained in all cases and there is no other BTP-CMEB 9.5-1 requirement to retain the dampers. Additionally, seven dampers have been provided in slabs which are no longer considered as fire barriers due to other design changes which have occurred previously. As-a result, they have also been eliminated from consideration. I

Item No. 7 Ductwork Wrapped as Three Hour Barrier Four dampers located in the slab at Elevation 178', Diesel Building, separating fire areas containing redundant safe shutdown equipment cannot be qualified to close under the design airflow conditions. As a result, the ductwork from each.nonqualified damper will be wrapped with a mat material from the floor penetration sleeve to the next qualified damper in the area boundary, which in this case is a vertical damper. The total length of duct to be wrapped is approximately 150 linear feet. The wrap material will be the 10 layer 3M E-50A mat system or the five layer 3M E-60A mat system. The E-50A mat has been tested as a three hour cable tray wrap, and an analysis of the fire test indicates that utilization of this wrap system on HVAC ductwork will yield the same acceptable results, considering the lack of combustibles internal to the duct and the zero airflow once the qualified vertical damper has closed. The 3M test report number is R10125-3. The test adequately proves that the 3M E-50A 10 layer mat system will perform as a three hour fire barrier, and limit cold side temperatures to 325*F or less. The E-60A mat system is scheduled to be tested in December, 1985, by 3M. If it passes, the three hour fire test, we may consider using it for this application, pending test results review. This is in compliance with the requirements of BTP-CMEB 9.5-1 for separation of redundant safe shutdown divisions. The four unacceptable horizontal fire dampers will be left in place since they will partially close and provide some restriction to the passage of fire.

4 Item No. 8 FSAR Exemptions The attached FSAR markup identifies the entire Ruskin damper -acceptance program. FSAR exemptions and deviations are identified. Exemptions for five unqualified dampers have been requested based on the fact that the dampers are located between a Unit 1 HVAC room and an unoccupied Unit 2 area. The ductwork is continuous through the unoccupied Unit 2 room to the next . qualified vertical fire damper. The exemption is requested due to the lack of combustibles and abandoned status of the room. PSE&G's evaluation has shown that there is no safe shutdown separation concerns. The exemption is based on lack of three hour separation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 areas. An exemption for one other unqualified damper is requested based on physical separation of safe shutdown divisions. See the PSAR markup, insert B for page 9A-50 (attached). This results in a total of six dampers for which FSAR exemptions have been requested.

ATTACHMENT II i i

HCGS FSAR 09/85 SYSTEM FSAR SECTION l Diesel Generator Room Recirculation (DRR) 9.4.6 (Shutdown HVAC fins on CO, system actuation prior to ETL release) Radwaste Supply (RWS) 9.4.3 l Service Area Exhaust (SAE) 9.4.3 l Service Area Supply (SAS) 9.4.3 l Solid Radwaste Exhaust (SRWE) 9.4.3 l Solid Radwaste Supply (SRWS) 9.4.3 l Wing Area Exhaust (WAE) 9.4.1 l Wing Area Supply (WAS) 9.4.1 l Administration Facility N/A l Guard house N/A l s 4yg In addition to the systems that automatically shut down ITV4> systems _are manually shut _down_ based on area smoke eEectorsjqr duct LGL tempcraturc alarm @ These systems are: Control Room Return (CRR) ControlRoomSupplyJCRS) ',t0 S:t Vouti1=Livu snGV) R:duc t; Exhaust (RRE)~ , T"fjlig; OuiIding _Cea.pa_rtment E::haust ( T3C-E+ /hllOLTO b eid [E EAh (Mg{ 1 b. Smoke Removal - The normal building ventilation systems or separate smoke removal systems are provided-to remove products of combustion. For areas where smoke can not be removed via the permanent plant ventilation systems as described below, portable blowers for use as smoke ejectors will be provided by the fire brigade. Refer to Section 9.4 for a complete description of the air conditioning, heating, cooling and ventilation systems. 1. Control Area - A separate smoke removal system is provided for the control area to remove the 9.5-12 Amendment 12 O ( _

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HCGS FSAR 09/85 s 9.5.1.6.3.2 Paragraph C.5.a.(4) l Paragraph C.5.a.(4) states that penetration openings for ventilation systems should be protected by fire dampers having a rating equivalent to that required of the barrier.. At HCGS, fire barriers that separate safe shutdown areas are provided with fire dampers of equivalent fire rating in penetection openings for ventilation systems, except as noted in Appendix 9A. Miscellaneous fire barriers in the turbine building, auxiliary building-radwaste service area, and yard buildings that do not separate safe shutdown areas are provided with fire dampers of equivalent fire rating in penetration openings for ventilation systems, except as noted below, l a. Turbine building P 1. Two openings through 3 hour rated floor of steam fgggg7({) seal evaporator room 1508 at elevation 137 feet. t l b. Auxiliary building-radwaste service area l 1. Two openings through 2 hour rated floor of elevator-machine room 3701 at elevation 174 feet. One opening through 2 hour wall between janitor's 2. room 3304 and men's toilet room 3303 at elevation /A/ JOLT Since the openings listed above are not in fire barriers that separate safe shutdown areas, fire involving areas located on either side of the fire barriers will not affect safe shutdown of the plant. 9.5.1.6.4 Paragraph C.5.a.(5) Paragraph C.5.a.(5) require door openings in fire barriers be protected with equivalently rated doors, frame, and hardware that 9.5-42 Amendment 12 d On -e e er --y --e~ w,+ -.vv-, y,r9- .--------r--.

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HCGS FSAR 4/84 HCGS design for fire detection and fire suppression capability in the fuel oil storage tank rooms will ensure that a fire in one of the four will not prevent a safe shutdown of the plant from being achieved. 9.5.1.6.32 Paragraph C.7.k Paragraph C.7.k requires that pump housing and rooms housing ~ redundant safety-related pump trains be separated from each other and from other areas of the plant by a 3-hour fire barrier. At HCGS, 3-hour fire barriers are provided to separate redundant safety-related pump trains to the extent noted in Appendix 9A. Separation of safety-related pumps from other areas of the plant was done only if the fire hazard analysis indicated that it was cequired to ensure safe shutdown of the plant. See Appendix 9A for details of the HCGS fire hazard analysis. HCGS's design of fire barriers and fire suppression provides a reasonable assurance that a fire in any one safety-related pump area will not prevent safe shutdown of the plant. I f 9.5.1.6.33 Paragraph C.7.n Paragraph C.7.n requires that fire barriers, automatic fire suppression and detection be provided for the radwaste and decontamination areas. In general, HCGS radwaste and decontamination areas are provided with fire barriers, as indicated by the fire hazard analysis, to separate them from other areas of the plant. See Figures 9.5-1 j through 9.5-5 and 9.5-8. In addition, fire barriers are provided between floor elevations in the radwaste area and between the solid radwaste areas and other areas within the radwaste area. l /NMT& i Automatic fire water suppression and detection systems are provided for the clean storage room at floor elevation 87 feet, the restricted and unrestricted machine shop areas at floor elevation 102 feet, the solid radwaste areas at floor elevations 102, 124 and 137 feet and the controlled and uncontrolled locker areas and decontamination areas at floor elevation 137 feet of the radwaste area. An automatic water spray system has been provided for the two radwaste tank vent charcoal filters at elevation 54 feet. Also fire detection has been provided for most areas in the radwaste area. See Figures 9.5-1 through 9.5-5 9.5-62 Amendment 5 i

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=.-- _- i HCGS FSAR 09/85 l The. alternate shutdown capability provides assurance that one train of equipment necessary to achieve hot and subsequent cold shutdown is free of fire damage. There are negligable combustibles in this area. l Therefore,.,the addition of a fixed fire suppression 4 system required by III.G.3 will not enhance fire protection safety above that provfded by the existing configuration. d. An exemption from the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G.3 for a fixed suppression system or cadIcerre,dn Section III.G.2 for separation plus suppression is / s requested for the HVAC equipment roomL' fire area CD60.%$#,) and*5604(Ts at elevation ~ 5620, 5611'ary building diesel area. This area, room g 163 ft-6 in. of the auxili o JL f 7g pp This fire area is defined by 3-hour fire, barrier walls, floor and ceiling and an unrated exterior wall in 5620 and 3-hour walls and unrated floor and ceiling in the corridors. This area contains both divisions of air handling units for the equipment on elevation 163 ft-6 in. and their associated control panels (AVH408, BVH408, AC486 and (' BC486). The corridors also include cable for the ( chiller pumps which cool these air handling units. The only IE equipment required for safe shutdown located on elevation 163 ft-6 in. are the switchgear room unit ); coolers (rooms 5606 and 5629) and the IE panels in room j 5605. The switchgear room unit coolers do not rely on AVH408 or BVH408 for cooling. Loss of the IE panel room is backed up by use of the remote shutdown panel. See deviation 9A.6.5.1.c. I The air handling units are approximately 14 feet apart and are metal construction. The in situ combustibles are contained in two Division II cable trays. These could contain a maximum of 2257 lbs of insulation or less than 3 minutes of equivalent burn time. The corridors could contain a maximum of 12,240 lbs. of insulation or less than 25 minutes of equivalent burn time. Both ionization and photoelectric detection is used in this area and suppression can be by water hose or portable extinguishers. The congestion is light and the addition of a fixed suppression system will not enchance fire fighting capabilities. l.( 9A-45 Amendment 12 l l ---.c ,m__ ~,.... _ _ _ _ _. - _, _ _ _,..., _, _, _ _ _.,., _, _. _ _ _.. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _.

s t HCGS FSAR 09/85 l 1 I If loss of both air handling units is assumed due to a transient fire in this area, it will not have an immediate effect~on safe shutdown logic or instrumentation in the 1E panel room. If the IE panel logic is eventually affected by high ambient temperatures, the unaffected instrumentation and/or controls on the RSP can be utilized. Temperature indication is provided in the 1E panel room in order to monitor room ambient temperature. The RSP provides assurance that one train of equipment necessary to achieve hot and subsequent cold shutdown is free of fire damage. There are very few combustibles in this area. Therefore, separation of the equipment or addition of a fixed fire suppression system will not enchance fire protection safety above that provided by the existing configuration. e. An exemption from the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G.2 for separation plus suppression and Section III.G.3 for fixed suppression is requested for the diesel area HVAC equipment room, fire area CD84, elevation 170 ft-0 in. This fire area encompasses 'N rooms 5704 4ndl5704 This fire area is defined by a 3-i f/6aJ)" hour lifei barrie'r ivall, floor and ceiling and unrated ~ ~ 960/ exterior we)11s. Refer to Figure; 9.5-7.

9. 5-1, 9 5-6 ad The Air Handling Units AVH407 and BV YH are enclosed in metal casing, are connected by both HVAC supply and return duct, and are physically separated by 6 ft.

Loss of these VH407 units would cause a loss of air conditioning to the Control Room HVAC rooms 5602 and f 5630, electrical access area 5501, control equipment j mezz. 5403, control equipment room 5302, cable spread room 5202, battery and equipment rooms 5105, 5128, 5102, 5103, 5104, 5126, and corridors 5525, 5404, 5303. The Diesel Generator HVAC panels provide control and instrumentation for the D-G air handling units at elevation 77 ft of the diesel area and the switchgear room coolers. There are 20 ft of separation between the divisionalized DG HVAC panels B&DC483 and AECC483 and their associated conduit with negligable intervening combustibles. In addition, a partial height wall of 1-hour fire barrier construction is installed with a wing section. This barrier is jg 9A-46 Amendment 12 l e u- . = - -.. - . ~ ~ ~ -.

HCGS FSAR.. 09/85 l installed as a radiation shield to protect at least one Division of panels from a single fire. The chillers (K403) supply chilled water to the air l handling units in room 5620, the Technical Support 4 Center (TSC) air handling unit and the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) room air handling unit. There is 4 ft between chiller skid pl? S7 Fire area CD84 i M y large room, 8300 fta, with 4 very low congestion. The maximum in situ cable loading could be 2580 lbs in two non-1E cable trays with an equivalent fire burn time of 1.0 minute. The area is monitored by both ionization and photoelectric detection. Suppression can be by water hose or portable extinguishers. All walls, floor or ceiling are either 3-hour fire barriers or adjacent to the outside. All cables are routed in conduit, except for I the non-1E cable trays as stated above. There are no other combustibles on this floor. Transient combustibles are administrative 1y controlled to limit access to this area. There are no maintenance activities which involve more than small quantities of -( ~ There are no oil bath lubrication systems which would hand held grease or oil lubrication in this area. require transit of oil changes at this elevation. tynA as Conservative assumptions were used in analyzing the effects of a postulated fire on safe shutdown and/or radioactive release.

1. Transient combustibles of sufficient quantity are temporarily stationed there which when ignited could affect equipment on this floor.
2. No fire watch.
3. Off-site power lost or available, whichever is worse.

l

4. High outside ambient air temperature.

( l f l l 9A-47 Amendment 12 l l

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HCGS FSAR 09/85 l There are no combustibles present in the zone where the temperature exceeds 3250F. In addition, if the duct collapsed into the diesel generator room proper, the sealant will not pull out. There is a structural support plate imbedded in the. wall which holds the bus /MRr bars and the sealant in place. 9A.6.5.2 Shutdown Method l The shutdown method used for each of the fire areas in the cuxiliary control and diesel area is listed in Table 9A-254. 9A.6.6 REACTOR BUILDING DRYWELL, FIRE AREA RB7 l The drywell and wetwell together form one fire area. The boundaries of this fire area are defined by the drywell wall and the torus and connecting piping. These walls are not rated by UL ) cs a fire barrier. The drywell boundary is sealed, however, to maintain the primary pressure boundary in case of accidents. Since the drywell is inerted, a fire in the drywell is not postulated. l t 9A.6.6.1 Exemption Request l An exemption from Appendix R, Section III.G.2. is requested for drywell penetrations. Drywell penetrations are sealed for containment of radiation and pressure but not fire. Since the containment is inerted during normal operation, a fire is not postulated to spread to the containment or start inside containment. 9A.6.6.2 Shutdown Method l No fires are postulated during normal operation in the drywell. Therefore, both Shutdown Method I or II can be used. 9A.6.7 REACTOR BUILDING ELEVATION 132 AND ABOVE, FIRE AREA RB5 l The reactor building, all rooms at elevation 132 and above, are considered as one fire area RB5, except the stairwells. This l fire area is defined by the drywell wall on the inside, the ) i 9A-50 Amendment 12 l

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=... HCGS FSAR ) TABLE 9A-5 CONTROL AND DIESEL FIRE AREAS AND' ASSOCIATED SHUTDOWN METHODS Page 1 of 2 Aux. Bldg Control and Diesel Shu tdown Area Fire Areas by Room Number Method Area No. Room No(s) CD 1 5101 1 2 5102 I 3 5103 I or II 4 [5,1_Q4 5 4 II 1 105 " 7; 5 1 6 1 7 5108 I 8 5109 II 9 5110 II 10 5111, 5112, 5121, 5215, 5217, 5233, 5308, -l__ y 5315, 5316, 5409, 5536, 5537 _l 11 5126 I or II 12 5128 I (c.. 13 5129 II 14 5130 I ~ 15 5201 I 16 5202 RSP 17 5203, 5323, 5331, 5405, 5419, 5531 I 18 5204, 5324, 5332, 5406, 5420, 5532 I 19 5205, 5325, 5333, 5407, 5421, 5533 II 20 5206, 5326, 5334, 5408, 5422, 5534 II 21 5208 I 22

  • 5209 I

23 5210 II 24 5211 II 25 5216 I or II 26 5302 RSP 27 5303, 5316 I or II 28 5304 I 29 5305 I 30 5306 II 31 5307 II 32 5335 I or II 33 5336 I 34 5402 I or II 35 5403, 5449 RSP 36 540 h ^ I,or II 37 44t0, 5411 * /V/i1

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HCGS FSAR TABLE 9A-5 CONTROL AND DIESEL FIRE AREAS dnJA AND ASSOCIATED SHUTDOWN METHODS Page 2 of 2 Aux. Bldg Control and Diesel Shu tdown 4 Area Fire Areas by Room Number Method Area No. . Room No(s) CD 43 5448 I 44 5502 II 45 5503,.5504, 5505, 5507, 5508, 5512, 5513, l-- I or II 5514, 5515, 5520, 5521, 5522, 5523 -l 46 5509, 5510, 5511 47 5525 EtJ' 48 5535 TF 49 5538 I 50. 5539 I 51 5540 I 52 5541 I 53 5542 II 54 5543 II 55 5544 II 56 5545 II 57 5546 I or II (" 58 5601 I or II (E' 59 5602 II -~ 60 5604, 5611, 562 5702 RSP 61 5605 ~u _vj RSP 560{,7SVic, Wil, Wiz, N1 ? )r-62 I ,63 5607 4 I 64 5608 I or II 65 5609 I 66 5610 I or II 67 5612 II 68 5613 II 69 5614 II 70 5615 I (6 J II I 73 56T8' I 74 5621 I 75 5622 I 76 5623 I 77 5624 I or II 78 5625 I or II 79 5626 I or II 80 5627 I or II 81 5628 -Amm I or II 5.62h4'%[Y#[1_ II I 82 83 5 @ 63 0,e27 5703, 5704,/5706$ f/of,% I (' 84 51/7 N RSP '~ ~ ( v 85 5705 I or II K7 6/8

t/C C, 5 ridd TABlG 9A - 77 glJ L g Q Th BVL ATION 3UMMIS KY flRC IM2 r} / O AN A L Y S15

SUMMARY

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HCGS FSAR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS TABUIATION TABLE 9A-4t* 77 gg 3g 09/85 ROON: SDG Control Room / Class 1E SWGR Room Fire Areas CD(1 e ROO4 NO. 5410 & 5411 BLDG. Auxiliary Diesel Area ELEV. 130 FIRE DETECTION TYPE: FIRE SUPPRESSION TYPE: N.CH Ioniz a tion CD2 hose OHO 404 SHUTDOWN SAFE SHUTDOWN BQUIPNENT AND CABLE: Pho toelectric H O hose ICHR401 2 DIVISION Portable Extinquisher II 1. 4.16 KV SWGR 10A404 EM E RI. LIQtTS: 2. 480 V Unit Substations 108440 and 10B480 5410 - Yes 5411 - Yes 3. MCCs 108441 and 10B481 CONSTRJCTION: FIRE RATING: 4. 125 Vdc Inad Ctr 10D440 Walls: 3 hour 5. 125 Vdc Distribution Panel 1DD417 North 6. Diesel Control Panel IDC423 East 7. Generator Control Panel 1DC422 South 8. SDG Imad Sequencer Panel IDC428 West v 9. Cable (CH. D) Floor: 3 hour EFFECTS OF FIRE ON SAFE SHUTDOWN AND OR RADIOACTIVE RELEASE: Ceilina: 3 hour None. Redundant Division I equipment with III.G.2.a separation Doors and Hatches: 3 hour would be used for shutdown. Reference Drawings: Elec. Drawings - E-1675-1 Fire Drawings - Figures 9.5-4 and 9.5-10 4 COM BUSTIBLES : EQUIV. FIRE MATERIAL: QUANTITY SEVERITY (MIN.)I a. Cable insula t ion 10,204 lbs 21.8 b. Lube oil O c. Other 0 DEVIATION REQUEST: None d. Trans ient 0 AREA = 1,455 + 300 TOTAL 22 min. 1,755 ft2 = FHAT 2/2-2 Amendment 12

HCGS FSAR FINAI SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIRE HAIARD ANALYSIS TABUIATION TABLE 9A,69 77 ROOM: SDG Cbntrol Room / Class IE SWGR Room Fire Areat In ROOM NOS. 5412 6 5413 BLDG. Auxiliary Diesel Area ELEV. 130 FIRE IETECTION TYPE: FIRE SUPPRESSION TYPE: MECH Ioniza tion CO2 hose OHO 404 SHUTDOWN, SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT AND CABLE: Photoelectric H O hose ITHR401 & ICH R401 2 DIVISION Portable Extinguisher II 1. 4.16 KV SWGR 10 A402 EMEIC. LIGHTS: 2. 480 V Unit Substations 10B420 and 10B460 5412 - Yes 5413 - Yes 3. MCCs 108421 and 10B461 CONSTIEJCTION: FIRE RATING 4. 125 Vdc load Ctr 10D420 Walls: 3 hour 5. 125 Vdc Distribution Panel IBD417 North 6. Diesel Control Panel IBC423 East 7. Generator Control Panel IBC422 South 8. SDG Inad Sequencer Panel IBC428 West v 9. Cable (CH. B) Floor 3 hour EFFECTS OF FIRE ON SAFE Sh0TDouN AND OR RADIOACTIVE RELEASE: Ceilina: 3 hour None. Redundant Division I equipment with III.G.2.a separation Doors and Hatches: 3 hour woJ1d be used for shutdown. Reference Drawinos Elec. Drawings - E-1675-1 Fire Drawings - Figures 9.5-4 and 9.5-10 COMBUSTIBLES : EQUIV. FIRE MATERIAL: QUANTITY SEVERITY (MIN.) a. Cable insula t ion 10,204 lbs 21.8 b. Lube oil 0 c. Other 0 DLVIATION MuguEs t: None d. Transient 0 AREA = 1.775 f t2 TOTAL 22 min. l FHAT 2/2-3 \\

CCCS FSAR FINAL SAFETY ANALY21S CPORT FICE HAIAID ANALYSIS TABULATION TABLE 9A-77 ROON: HVAC Equip. Room Fire Areat CD62 dE ROON NO. 5606 SLDC. Auxiliary / Diesel ELEV. 163'-6* FIRE DETECTION TYPE: FIRE SUPPRESSION TYPE: NECH H O hose IXHR400 and 2 SHUTDOWN SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT AND CABLE: 1EHR401 DIVISION Portable ext. Photoelectric II 1. SDC Area battery rm exhaust f ans Inv406 and IDV406 ENERG. LIGHTS: 2. SWGR room unit coolers IBVH401 and IDVH401. Yes 3. Power cables for CONSTRUCTION: FIRE RATING: a. IBVH401 and IDVH401 h. IBV406 and IDV406 Walls: 3 hour c. Channel B and D uninterruptible power supply inverters for BOP computer North d. Channel D uninterruptible power supply inverters for NSSS computer. Ea st South West EFFECTS OF FIRE ON SAFE SHUTDOWN AND/OR RADIOACTIVE RELEASE Floors 3 hour ceiling: 3 hour None. An exposure fire in this area would not prevent safe shutdown of the plant. If the B and D switchgear room cooling Doors and Hatches 3 hour and B and D battery room exhaust are lost, the redundant Division I equipment is protected by III.G.2.a separation, shutdown would be accomplished using HPCI and main control room. Reference Drawings: Elec. Drawings - E-1677-1 Fire Drawings - Fig. 9.5-6 and 9.5-10 COMBUSTIBLES: EQUIV. FIRE NATERIAL: QUANTITY SEVERITY (NIN.) a. Cable insulation 0 b. Lube oil O c. Other 0 DEVIATION REQUEST: None d. Transient 0 AREA = 1020 ft2 TOTAL 0 FHAT/3-27 Amendment 31 l j

HC Gs FS Arf TABLE 9 ;) Sz TKble Alo f Lis + Ale 9A 73)

t/CG > rsWee TABlG 9 A - 71 SLJ L ,j f TA But< ATION DUMMAcY fIRC IIA 2 Ago AN ALY5Is

SUMMARY

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HCGS FSAR FINAL SA LYSIS REPORT FIRE HA2ARD ANALYSIS TABULATION T I ROOM: SDG Control Room / Class IE SWGR Room Fire Areat C / ROOM NOS. 5414 6 5415 BLDG. Auxiliary Diesel Area ELEV. 130 FIRE DETECTION TYPE: FIRE SUPPRESSION TYPE: MECH Ionization CO2 hose OHO 403 SHUTDOWN SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT AND CABLE: Photoelectric H O hose ITHR401 & ISHR400 2 DIVISION Portable Extinguisher m I 1. 4.16 KV SWGR 10A403 EMERG. LIGHTS: 2. 480 V Unit Substations 10B430 and 108470 5414 - Yes 5415 - Yes 3. MCCs 108431 and 108471 CONSTRUCTION: FIRE RATING: 4. 125 Vdc Load Ctr 10D430 Walls: 3 hour 5. 125 Vdc Distribution Panel ICD 417 North 6. Diesel Control Panel ICC423 Ea st 7. Generator Control Panel ICC422 South 8. SDG Load Sequencer Panel ICC428 West v 9. Cable (CH. C) Floor: 3 hour EFFECTS OF FIRE ON SAFE SHUTDOWN AND OR RADIOACTIVE RELEASE: Ceiling: 3 hour Mone. Redundant Division II equipment with III.G.2.a separation Doors and Hatches: 3 hour would be used for shutdown. Reference Drawings: Elec. Drawings - E-1685-1 Fire Drawings - Figures 9.5-4 and 9.5-10 COMBUSTIBLES: EQUIV. ' FIRE MATERIAL: QUANTITY SEVERITY (NIN.) a. Cable insulation 10,204 lbs 21.8 b. Lube oil 0 c. Other 0 DEVIATION REQUEST: None d. Transient 0 AREA = 1,755 f t2 TOTAL 22 min. I I FHAT 2/2-4 Amendment 12

l4 C Gu 5 F S tHf TABLE 9 /) 5 3 Thle klo4 lA s'E (AL43 fAlt 9A - 7 7)

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1 HCGS FSAR FINAL SA LYSIS REPORT FIRE HAIARD ANALYSIS TABULATION TAptE ROON: SDG 0%t.o1 Room / Class IE SWGR Roo's Fire Areat CD s ROON NOS. 5414 & 5415 BLDC. Auxiliary Diesel Area ELEV. 130 FIRE DETECTION TYPE: FIRE SUPPRESSION TYPE: MECH Ionization CO2 hose OHO 403 SHUTDOWN SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPNENT AND CABLE: Photoelectric H O hose 1THR401 & ISHR400 2 DIVISION Portable Extinguisher I 1. 4.16 KV SWGR 10A403 EMERG. LIGHTS: 2. 480 V Unit Substations 108430 and 10B470 5414 - Yes $415 - Yes 3. NCCs 108431 and 108471 CONSTRUCTION: FIRE RATING 4. 125 Vdc Load Ctr 10D430 Walls: 3 hour 5. 125 Vdc Distribution Panel 1CD417 North 6. Diesel Control Panet ICC423 Ea st 7. Generator Control Panel 1CC422 South 8. SDG Load Sequencer Panel 1CC428 West v 9. Cable (CH. C) Floors 3 hour EFFECTS OF FIRE ON SAFE SHUTDOWN AND OR RADIOACTIVE RELEASE: Ceiling: 3 hour pone. Redundant Division II equipment with III.G.2.a separation Doors and Hatches: 3 hour would be~used for shutdown. Reference Drawings: Elec. Drawings - E-1685-1 Fire Drawings - Figures 9.5-4 and 9.5-10 o 9 l' CONBUSTIBLES: EQUIV. FIRE NATERIAL: QUANTITY SEVERITY (NIN.) a. Cable insulation 10,204 lbs 21.8 b. Lube oil 0 c. Other 0 DEVI ATION REQUEST: None d. Transient 0 AREA = 1,755 ft2 TOTAL 22 min. l I Amendment 12 FHAT 2/2-4

I ? HCGS FSAR FINAL SAFETY Aal4 LYSIS REPORT FIRE HAIARD ANALYSIS TABUIATION TA_BLE __ %ACWT Q i DS ROON: SDG O>ntrol sk>om/ class IE SWGR Room Fire Area: 4841Y"" ROOT NOS. 5416 & 5417 BLDG. Auxiliary Diesel Area ELEV. 130 FIRE LETECTION TYPE : FIRE SUPPRESSION TYPE: IECH Ioniza t ion CD2 hose OHO 403 SHUTDOWN SAFE SHUTDOWN IQUIPMENT AND CABLE: Photoelectr ic H O hose ITHR401 & ISHR400 2 DIVISION Portable Extinguisher l I 1. 4.16 KV SWGR 10A401 i Ett EIG. L10tTS: 2. 480 V Unit Substations 10B410 and 10B450 5416 - Yes 5417 - Yes j 3. NCCs 108411 and 10B451 1 CONSTRJCTION: FIRE RATING: I l 4. 125 Vdc road Ctr 200410 I Walls: 3 hour 1 5. 125 Vdc Distribution Panel 1AD417 North 1 6. Diesel Control Panel 1AC423 East I 7. Generator Control Panel 1AC422 Sou t h 8. SDG Ioad Sequencer Panel 1AC428 West v 9. Cable (CH. A) i Floors 3 hour j l EFFECTS OF FIRE ON SAFE SHUTDOWN AND OR RADIOACTIVE RELEASE: Ceilinos 3 hour i None. Redundant Division II equipment with III.G.2.a separation is Doors and Hatches 3 hour l used for shutdown. l l Reference Drawinost l Elec. Drawings - E-1685-1 l Fire Drawings - Figure 9.5-4 and 9.5-10 I COM BUSTIBLES : EQUIV. FIRE NATERIAL: QUANTITY SEVERITY (NIN.)I a. Cable insula t ion 10,204 lbs 21.8 b. Lube oil O c. Other 0 DEVIAf10N R10UEST: None d. Trans ient 0 ) AREA = 1,775 f t2 TOTAL 22 min. I FHAT 2/2-5 Amendment 12 l

NCGS FEAR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSID REPORT FIRE MAIARD ANALYSI3 TABULATION TAar e am_e7 l DOON: MVAC Equipment Room Fir 7 Areat CD82 ROON NO. 5629 BLDG. Auxiliary / Diesel ELEV. 163 FIRE DETECTION TYPE: FIRE SUPPRESSION TYPE: NECW Ionization H O hose INHR400 2 SHUTDOees SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT AND CABLE: Photoelectric Portable Extinguishers DIVISION 0 e I 1. SDG Area Battery boom Exhaust Fans IAV406 and icv 406 ENERG. LIGHTS: 2. SWR hoom Unit Coolers I AVH401 and ICVH401 Yes 3. Power Cables fort CONSTRUCTION: FIRE RATING: a. lAVH401 and ICvH401 Walls: 3 hour b. lAV406 and ICV 406 North Ea s t South 4 Nest EFFECTS OF FIRE ON SAFE SHUTDONN AND/OR RADIOACTIVE RELEASE: Floor: 3 hour None. Redundant Division II equipment which has III.G.2.a ceilinos 3 hour separation ould be used for safe shutdown. Doors and Hatches 3 huur Reference Drawings: Elec. Drawings - E-1687-1 r Fire Drawings - Figures 9.5-6 and 9.5-10 6 COMBUSTIBLES: EQUIV. FIRE NATERIAL: QUANTITY S EVERITY (NIN.) a. Cable insulation 423 lbs 1.3 b. Lube oil O c. Other 0 DEVIATION REQUEST: None d. Transient 0 l AREA = 1,229 f t2 TOTAL 1 min. l Amendment 12 ,,3

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i l 1 HCGS FSAR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS TABULATION TABLE 9A-99 Sheet I of J 09/85 ROOM: Diesel Area HVAC Equipment Room Fire Areas, CD84 jl g" ROOM NOS. 5704 & 5703 BLDG. Auxiliary / Diesel ELEV. 178 FIRE DETECTION TYPE: FIRE SUPPRESSION TYPE: MECH Ionization H O hose IMHR401 and lOHR401 2 SHUTDOWN SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT AND CABLE: Photoelectric Portable Extinguishers DIVISION I 1 A & CC483 D-G Area HVAC Panel IAK403 Control Area Water Chiller EMERG. LIGHTS: lAVH407 Control Equipment Room Supply Unit IAP414 Class IE Panel Room Chilled Water Pump Yes IAV410 Control Area Battery Room Exhaust Fan CONSTRUCTION: FIRE RATING: II IB & DC 483 D-G Area HVAC Panel IBK403 Control Area Water Chiller Walls: IBVH407 Control Equipment Room Supply Unit IBP414 Class IE panel Room Chilled Water Pump North 3 hour IBV410 Control Area Battery Room Exhaust Fan Ea s t 3 hour South Unrated (outside) West Unrated (outside) EFFECTS OF FIRE ON SAFE SHUTDOWN AND/OR RADIOACTIVE RELEASE: None Floor: 3 hour The Air Handling Units AVH407 and BVH407 are enclosed in metal Ceiling: Unrated (outside) casings, are connected by an HVAC duct, and are physically separated by 6 ft. Loss of these VH407 units would cause a loss of air Doors and Hatcher conditioning to the Control Room HV7C rooms 5602 and 5630, Electrical Access Areas 5501, control equipment mezz. 5403, Control Equipment Doors: 3 hour, North wall room 5302, cable spread room 5202, Battery and Equipment rooms 5105 Opening in floor for HVAC duct ( Ea s twall ) extends 5128, 5102, 5103, 5104, 5126, and Corridors $525, 5404, 5303. down to el. 54, the RPS MG sets room 5105 There is more than 20 f t separation between the DG HVAC panels Reference Drawings: h6tr48 3 arul A6CC4R1 anet thei s a s sne i.s t m1 re w1.s i t wie b sIirable in-tervening combustibles. Therefore, a transient fire an th s area Elec. Drawings - E-1680-1 and E-1690-1 would not jeopordize both divisions of DG-HVAC. One division of LG is therefore assured for shutdown and the other division DGs may ope-rate for sometime without HVAC, since jacket water cooling is still Fire Drawings - Figures 9.5-7 and 9.5-10 available The chillers (K403) supply chilled water to the air handling units in 5620, the TSC Air handling unit, and the RSP air handling unit. There is 4 f t between chiller skids. COMBUSTIBLES: EQUIV. FIRE MATERIAL: QUANTITY SEVERITY (MIN.) l There are negligible combustibles on this floor, since all cable is routed in conduit with the exception of short lengths of non-lE a. Cable insulation 2,508 lbs 1.0 i cable trays. Administrative controls will be used to prevent tran-(in metal covered tray) f sient combustibles in this area. b. Lube oil 0 In addition a partial height barrier of I hour construction is c. Other 0 installed with a wing section to protect at least one division of , panel _s from a single fire. (cont'd on next page) d. Transient 0 DEVI A TION REQUEST: 111.G.2 separation requirements AREA = 9,300 ft2 TOTAL 1 min. FHAT 2/3-12

HCGS FINAL SAFETY ANALYSID REPORT FIRE HAZAR~2 ANALYSIS TABULATION TABLE (A-99 ) 7 Sheet KWJf 09/85 3 5 Effects of fire (cont'd) Assuming a fire did start in this room however 1. If the fire took out both air handling units power cable, temperature would start to rise and may eventually affect the control equipment room panels at elevation 102. No effect on cabling or use of batteries is postulated since the cable is not temperature sensitive and the batteries will cease to be required after the Diesel Generators start (assuming LOP). The heat load into 5630 is very small and therefore loss of Control Room use is not postulated. The option also exists for control and instrumentation from the remote shutdown facilities to aid the main control room operators. 2. A fire which takes out both chillers will af fect cooling to el 163'-6* HVAC, TSC HVAC and the RSP HVC. The most sensitive equipment on 163 f t-6 in. is the IE panel room. 5605. Temperature may rise to the point where HCR instrumentation logic is affected. The instrumentation and controls in the RSP can be used. The RSP INAC utilizes 20% outside air and maintains the RSP room at less than 76*F. The RSP and equipment is qualified to 104'F. Calculations predict that with no HVAC at all, greater than 24 hours will elapse before the qualification limit is reached on the highest outside ambient temperature day. With ventilation this qualification limit may never be reached. 3. Loss of two DG HVAC panels C483 due to 20-f t diameter fire. HVAC panels for alternate Division have III.G.2.b separations however, no automatic sprinkler exists. 4. The two worst 20 ft diameter transient fires which were analyzed could effects a. cabling to both air handling units, and both chillers or b. cabling to the *A* chillers, both air handling units and the *D* DG HVAC panel f 5. Based on: a. zero in situ fire loading, i.e., all cable in conduit and enclosed trays, b. administrative controls to limit transient combustibles in this area, c. physical separation between backup equipment with metal enclosures on HVAC units and chillers, and d. Use of RSP equipment as backup. l There will be time for fire brigade action following detection and therefore, there will be no effect on safe shutdown or radiation release due to a fire in this area. FHAT 2/3-13 Amendment 12 s

HCCS FSAR FINAL SAFET YSIS REPORT FIRE HAIARD ANALYSIS TABUIATION TAB A 99 BOON: RPS sc Set Room Fire Area s - ROON 900. 5105 BLDG. Auxiliary / Control ELEV. 54 FIRE EETECTION TYPE: FIRE SUPPRESSIOtt TYPE: SECH Photoelect ric H O hose IENR400 SHUTDOWN SAFE SHUTDOWN MUIPMENT AND CABLE: Ioniza tion 2 DIVISION Portable Ext. I Division I Cabling EN E RG. LIQtTS: Yes CONSTRJCTION: FIRE RATIIGG Walls: All walls are 3-hour rated except for 2-hour North rated stairwell enclosure. East South West EFFECTS T FIRE ON SAFE SHUTDOWN AND/OR RADIOACTIVE RELEASE: Floor Unrated (basemat) None. Redundant D. vision II cabling, tetich has III.G.2.a Ceiling: 3 hour separation, will be used for shutdown.' Doors and Hatches: 3 hour Reference Drawinos Elec. Drawings - E-1661-1 Fire Drawings - Figure 9.5-1 g Figure 9.5.9 COMBUSTIBLES : EQUIV. FIRE MATERIAL: QUANTITY SEVERITY (NIN.)I a. Cable insulation l 275 lbs 10.4 j b. Lube oil 0 c. Other 0 a DEVI ATION REUEST: None d. Transient 0 AREA = 4 60 f t2 TOTAL 10 min. I I HlAT 1/1-5 Amendment 12 w ---

. - - = - - - - 9 i e i HCGS FSAR FINAL SAFETY "" LYSIS REPORT i TDM y"g FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS TABULATION ROON: Electrical Access Area Fire Areas D --_ s ROON NO. 5617 BLDG. Auxiliary / Diesel ELEV. 163'7 " FIRE DETECTION TYPE: FIRE SUPPRESSION TYPE: 6 H O hose IXP.R400 l NECH Ionization 2 SHUTDOWN SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPNENT AND CABLE: Thotoelectric Portable Extinguishers DIVISION l II Power to IBK403 chiller (roon 5704) and control and instrumentation to chiller. Cable f rom GK-FSL-9600 ENERG. LIGHTS: 81 and B2. No l CONSTRUCTION: FIRE RATING: l Wells: l l North 2 hour East 3 hour South 2 hour West 3 hour EFFECTS OF FIRE ON SAFE SHUTDOWN AND/OR RADIOACTIVE RELEASE: Floors 3 hour None. Redundant Division I equipment has III.G.2.a separation Colling: 3 hour and will be used for safe shutdown. Doors and Hatches: i Reference Drawings: Elec. Drawings - E-1677 Fire Drawings - Figures 9.5-6 and 9.5-10 CONBUSTIBLES: EQUIV. FIRE NATERIAL: QUANTITY SEVERITY (NIN.) a. Cable insulation 0 b. Lube oil 0 c. Other 0 DEVIATION REQUEST: None d. Transient 0 AREA = NS TOTAL 0 min.

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