ML20137Q245

Insp Rept 50-267/85-17 on 850617-0816.Violation Noted: Failure to Rept Nine Circulator Trips in 1984 & Seven Trips in 1985 & No Differential Helium Pressure Maintained When Pcrv Pressure Above 100 Psia

ML20137Q245
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	09/13/1985
From:	Farrell R, Jaudon J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137Q215	List: IR 05000267/1985017 IR 05000617/2008016 ML20137Q210 ML20137Q245
References
50-267-85-17, NUDOCS 8509200089
Download: ML20137Q245 (5)

See also: IR 05000267/1985017

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  :

1 REGION IV

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NRC Inspection Report: 50-267/85-17 License: DPR-34

' Docket: 50-267

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Licenste: Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)

P. O. Box 840

i Denver, Colorado 80201

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Facility Name: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station

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] Inspection At: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station, Platteville,

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Colorado

Inspection Conducted: June 17 - August 16, 1985

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j Inspectors: bD - ILlJC

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W . E. Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) ,

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Approved: N IS E

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p#p J. P. Reactor Jaudon, Projects Chief, Project Section A

Branch

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! Inspection Summary

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l Inspection Conducted June 17 - August 16, 1985 (Report 50-267/85-17)

l Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety

} verification and prestressed concrete reactor vessel interspace helium

i pressure (LC0 4.2.7). The inspection involved 111 inspector-hours onsite by

I one NRC inspector,

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Results: Within the two areas inspected,3one violation was identified in each

i area (paragraph 2 and 3).

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8509200009 850916

PDR ADOCM 05000267

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

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Principal Licensee Employees

i D. Alps, Security Supervisor

, ^T. Borst, Support Services Manager / Radiation Protection Manager

j ~*R. Burchfield, Superintendent, Nuclear Betterment

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M. Deniston, Shift Supervisor

• D. Evans, Superintendent, Operations-

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J. Eggebroten, Technical Services Engineering

• M. Ferris, QA Operations Manager

W. Franek, Superintendent Operations

C. Fuller, Station Manager

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• J. Gahm, Manager Nuclear Production

! *S. Hofstetter, Nuclear Licensing & Fuels

i *J. Johns, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing - Engineering

! *D. Mangan, Consultant, Nuclear Licensing - Engineering

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J. McCauley, Results Engineering Supervisor

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• F. Novachek, Technical / Administrative Services Manager

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J. Petera, Electrical Supervisor

• L. Singleton, Manager QA

H. Starner, Coordinator Nuclear Site Construction.

i J. Van Dyke, Shift Supervisor

j *D. Warembourg, Manager Nuclear Engineering

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The SRI also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the '

inspection.

• Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2. Operational Safety Verification

The SRI reviewed licensee activities'to ascertain that the facility'is

being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements and

that the licensee's management control system is effectively discharging

its responsibilities for continued safe operation.

c The review was conducted by direct observation of activities, tours of

j' the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel,'inde-

l pendent verifications of safety system status and limiting conditions for

' operations, and review of facility . records.

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Logs and records reviewed included:

. Shift supervisor Logs

. Reactor Operator Logs

. Equipment Operator Logs

. Auxiliary Operator Logs

At approximately 10:30 a.m. August 11, 1985, the SRI received a call that

a helium circulator had tripped at the plant. The shift supervisor

making the call informed the SRI that the headquarters duty officer had

been notified via the ENS line and that he was also advising the SRI,

even though this event was not reportable.

Subsequently, the SRI reviewed the licensee's FSAR, Section 7.1, which

identifies circulator trips as a function of the reactor plant protective

system. The plant protective system, is defined in the Technical

Specifications as, "The plant protective system is the reactor protective

circuitry and the circuitry oriented towards protecting various plant

components from major damage. This system includes (1) scram (2) loop

shutdown, (3) circulator trip, and (4) rod withdrawal prohibit." Thus, a

circulator trip is a function of what is commonly referred to as the

reactor protection system as in 10 CFR 50.72 immediate notification

requirement for operating nuclear power reactors (b) non-emergency events

(2) four-hour reports, (ii) "any event or condition that results in

manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF),

including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)." Consequently, any

actuation of the reactor protection system, or as referred to at Fort St.

Vrain, the plant protective system or reactor protective system, is

reportable under 10 CFR 50.72,as a 4-hour report, and also a 30-day report

under 10 CFR 50.73.

Because the shift supervisor, who reported the event had stated to the

SRI that the event was not reportable, the SRI interviewed plant personnel

to determine if other circulator trips had occurred and not been reported.

The licensee, at the SRI's request, reviewed plant logs. The review

indicated that there had been 7 circulator trips in 1984 and 9 circulator

trips in 1985, including the trip that occurred August 11, 1985. The

plant management has identified to the SRI that of the 16 circulator

trips, the only trip that was reported via the ENS, was the trip on the

August 11, 1985. This failure to report a reactor protective system

actuationisanapparentviolation(8517-01).

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3. Prestressed Concrete Reactor Vessel (PCRV) Interspace Helium Pressure

(LC0 4.2.7)

On August 14, 1985, the FSV operations superintendent identified to the

SRI that the plant was making notification to the headquarters duty

officer via the ENS that a review of their records indicated that from

July 30, 1985, when PCRV pressure went above 100 psia through August 10,

1985, the plant had been in violation of LCO 4.2.7. This LCO requires

that a positive helium pressure be maintained in the interspace of PCdV

penetrations. Specifically, the LCO requires that, "The PCRV shall not

be pressurized to more than 100 pisa unless: . . . c) The interspaces

between the primary and secondary penetration closures are maintained at

a pressure greater than primary system pressure with purified helium gas,

with the exception of all or some of the steam generator penetrations.

The interspaces between the primary and secondary steam generator penetra-

-tion closures for either or both loops may be maintained at a pressure

greater than cold reheat eteam pressure, but less than primary coolant

pressure, with purified he, . 4n gas. "

The SRI found that from July 30, 1985, through August 10, 1985, the PCRV

was maintained at a pressure above 100 pounds with no positive helium .

pressure in two penetration interspaces, specifically, interspaces B21 l

and 823. The helium pressure in these two interspaces is controlled by [

one valve which apparently malfunctioned and stuck. On August 10 the

valve spontaneously began functioning and again provided positive helium

pressure to these interspaces. The turbine equipment operator is required  !

to read and record the pressure in these interspaces on his equipment log

sheet. A review of these log sheets shows a preprinted minimum required

value of 5 for this pressure differential. Instructions to the equipment s .

operators are to identify to their supervisors or the control room any

value outside the preprinted acceptance values. During the period from

July 30 through August 10, 1985, the equipment operators consistently

recorded a value of 0 for this interspace pressure differential, although

the form had a preprinted minimum acceptance value of S.

These logs are reviewed on the night shift by the west end reactor

operator to verify plant compliance with Technical Specifications.

Additionally, the night shift supervisor reviews these logs for plant

compliance wit h Technical Specifications. Both the shift supervisor and

the reactor operator certify that the plant is in compliance with

Technical Specifications.

The operations superintendent reviewed rosters to determine how many

plant operators, equipment operators, and shift supervisors were on duty

while the LCO violation existed and, of these, how many were licensed.

The operations superintendent's review indicated the following: eight

different equipment operators were on duty during this period, of the

eight, four hold a reactor operator license. During_the period there

were six individuals holding a senior reactor operator license and five

individuals holding a reactor operator license on duty in the control

room. Additionally, four different shift supervisors, all holding a

senior reactor operator license, were on duty during the period that the

LCO was violated.

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Although the licensee self identified the LC0 violation, it was not until

4 days after the violation ceased to exist. There were a large number of

individuals holding operator and senior operator licenses, who had the

opportunity to detect this violation over the 11-day period which existed.

This is an apparent violation (8517-02).

4. Exit Interview

The SRI conducted a exit interview on August 16, 1985, with the licensee

indicated in paragraph 1. At this time the SRI reviewed the scope and

findings of the inspection.