ML20137N770

Rev 2 to Administrative Order AO-4-7, Procedure Generation Package for Emergency Operating Procedures

ML20137N770
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	01/13/1986
From:	PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20137N767	List: ML20137N762 ML20137N770
References
AO-4-7, TAC-44344, NUDOCS 8602040242
Download: ML20137N770 (47)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:O Trojan Nuclear Plant ?!r. S. A. Varga Docket 50-344 Attachment B license NPF-1 January 31, 1986 a PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANI January 13, 1986 UTY RMTQ Revision 2* ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER - A0-4-7 Procedures Ceneration Package for Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) '!/5/b APPROVED BY DATE / PURPOSE This order outlines the method to be used to develop and implement new or revised Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). This procedure is applicable beginning with E0Ps that are based on Revision 1 to the Westinghouse Owners P Group (WOG) Emergency Response Guidelines. REFERENCES 1. NUREG-0899, Guidelines For the Prsparation of E0Ps, August 1982. 2. INPO 82-013, E0P Implementation Assistance Program. 3. INPO 82-016, EOP Implementation Guideline. 4. INPO 82-017, E0P Writir g Guideline. 5. INPO 83-004, EOP Verification Guideline. 6. INPO 83-005, E0P Validation Guideline. 7. INPO 83-007, EOP Generation Package Guideline. 8. WOG Emergency Response Guidelines Executive Volume Administration and Application, Revision 1, September 1983. 9. Draft Safety Evaluation for Trojan Nuclear Plant Procedures Generation Package, June 1985.

• This procedure has been A0-4-7 Page 1 of 47 extensively revised.

Revision 2 8602040242 h44 PDR ADOCK PDR t

ORDERS 1. INTRODUCTION The Trojan Procedures Generation Package for E0Ps has been developed to provide administrative and technical guidance on the preparation and implementation of E0Ps. It is applicable to the preparation of new E0Ps and the revision of old E0Ps. Anyone involved in EOP preparation should be familiar with the Procedure Generation Package to ensure its concepts are consistently applied. The Procedures Generation Package describes methods for the preparation, validation / verification, training, and revision of Trojan E0Ps. It discusses the generic guidelines developed for Westinghouse plants and Trojan's program to develop Plant-specific procedures from these guidelines. The package details the format and writing principles to be utilized in preparing Trojan E0Ps. A sample E0P is included as Appendix B to demon-strate the format and style adopted for use. The Procedures Generation Package is issued by the Plant General Manager. Any proposed revisions to the guide will be treated in accordance with applicable Trojan Administrative Orders and will be implemented with the approval of the Trojan Plant General Manager withcot prior NRC approval. 7 A copy of any substantiative revision shall be transmitted to the Manager, Nuclear Safety and Regulation after implementation for a determination as to whether submittal to the NRC is required. This order contains the following sections: I. ITIRODUCTION II. WOG GENERIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE PROGRAM III. TROJAN E0P PROGRAM IV. TORMAT AND WRITING PRINCIPLES V. VALIDATION / VERIFICATION PROGRAM VI. TRAINING PROGRAM VII. E0P REVISION II. WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP GENERIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE PROGRAM As a result of NUREG-0737 requirements to upgrade emergency operating procedures, the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) initiated a program to develop generic Emergency Response Guidelines. The output of this program is a set of Emergency Response Guidelines, related background information, analytical bases, and training information. The program output is intended to provide the basis for development of new plant-specific emergency operating procedures by utilities with Westinghouse plants. A0-4-7 Page 2 of 47 Revision 2

A guideline structure which encompasses two distinct types of procedures has been defined. The overall guideline set is called the Emergency Res' onse Guidelines (ERGS) and is composed of the following: p e Optimal Recovery Guidelines. e Critical Safety Function Status Trees and Functional Restoration Guidelines. The Optimal Recovery Guidelines are event-specific and provide guidance in recovering from a broad spectrum of predefined event sequences including both design-basis events and evente writch go beyond the design basis. The Functional Restoration Guidelines are intended for use with the Critical Safety Function Status Trees. Together they provide a systematic means for addressing challenges to plant critical safety functions. The Critical Safety Function Status Trees provide a method of systematically monitoring the status of selected functions: A. Suberiticality (S). B. Core Cooling (C). C. Heat Sink (H). 7 D. "CS Integrity (P). E. Containment Integrity (Z). F. RCS Inventory (1). If, through monitoring the status trees, a safety function is found to be under challenge, the user is directed to the appropriate Functional Restoration Guideline. Use of the Functional Restoration Guidelines is independent of initiating event or plant state. The availability of both types of guidelines ensures procedural coverage for virtually any plant upset condition, including nondiagnosed events, multiple-failure conditions, and failures subsequent to initial event diagnosis. If diagnosis of the event is possible, the Optimal Recovery Guidelines specify actions for plant recovery. During recovery from a known event, the critical aafety functions can be continually monitored to assure continued plant safety. If a challenge to a critical safety function occurs during the recovery, the statue trees will direct use of a specific Function Restorr. ion Guideline to restore the challenged safety function. The Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines have been constructed to be generic and applicable to all Westinghouse-designed commercial PWR plants. A0-4-7 Page 3 of 47 Revision 2

When certain areas of guidelines required definition of specific plant design features, the Westinghouse standard 4-loop, 3425-MWt plant design was used. The guidelines address major steps in the emergency response and provide a framework for the preparation of detailed, plant-specific emergency procedures. As a check on their accuracy and usefulness, the guidelines were subjected to an extensive verification and validation program at a Westinghouse plant simulator. III. TROJAN EOP PROGRAM The development of Emergency Operating Procedures is a dynamic process. Although approved procedures are always in place, they are constantly subject to change as a result of improved analytical techniques, operating experience, system changes, etc. There is also a competing need to maintain continuity in the E0Ps so that operators are not contincally subjected to a retraining process. Thus, the E0P program must balance these needs by providing a measure of continuity while providing for change. To achieve these enis, a method is prescribed for developing both new and revised E0Ps, using a consistent set of guidelines. A method for maintaining the E0Ps, together with their supporting documentation and proposed changes, is also described. Trojan E0Ps will be modeled af ter and closely parallel the generic WOG p guidelines. Emergency Instructions, Event Specific Emergency Instructions, and Emergency Contingency Actions will be developed from the WOG Optimal Recovery Guidelines. Critical Safety Function Status Trees and Functional Restoration Instructions will parallel those developed by the WOG. A. E0P Development Trojan E0Ps will be developed using the principles from the format guidelines in Section IV and appropriate technical guidelines. Knowledge gained from previous operational experience and human factors considerations will be incorporated into the precedures. In some instances, the E0Ps will also include actions based upon specific licensing commitments that have been made to the NRC. The Trojan technical guidelines will be made up of two sources. The first source is the WOG generic technical guidelines. The second source is a documented comparison of the significant design differences between Trojan and the reference plant used to develop the WOG guidelines. The comparison identifies instances where Trojan E0P steps may need to differ from the WOG guideline steps to comply with the intent of the step. It is not necessary to physically incorporate the Trojan-specific items into the WOG guidelines prior to actual E0P writing. A0-4-7 Page 4 of 47 Revision 2

In writing an E0P from its WOG guideline, it is not necessary to utilize the exact same wording or ordering of information as the generic guidelines. Nor is it necessary that action steps be con-ducted exactly as listed in the generic guidelines. Equivalent actions that accomplish the purpose or intent of the generic guideline steps are considered to follow the generic guideline. In cases where the guidelines are not followed due to plant specific differences, prior operational experience, etc., the exceptions will be justified and documented as described in Section III.B. Conversion of a WOG guideline into a Trojan procedure typically involves expanding the WOG guideline steps to include more details and plant specific information. The format and writing conventions from Section IV of this document are utilized to aid in converting a guideline to a procedure. The sample EOP of Appendix B will be a useful aid in constructing a new proecedure. During the procedure development phase, the E0P writer will incorporate human factor principles to structure procedure steps most efficiently. These principles include verification that control room and plant hardware are available, use the same designation, use the same units of measurement, and operate as specified in the procedures. While these items will also be checked during the validation process p described in Section V, they should be considered at the earliest stages of procedure development. The WOG guideline background information identifies the characteristics of instrumentation needed to implement the E0Ps. PGE-1043, " Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Review for the Trojan Nuclear Plant", describes the program which ensures the availability of instrumenta-tion to monitor variables and sve*ess following an accident. This document should be referenced dating the E0P writing process for characteristics of the required f.nstrumentation. Af ter development by this process, E0Ps will be further evaluated via a verification and validation sequence. This process (described in Section V) performs a detailed examination of the E0Ps to ensure that the concepts of the WOG Guidel*nes and Procedures Generation Package have been incorporated and that the procedure fulfills its purpose. Training on new EOPs (described in Section VI) will also be conducted to ensure plant operators can ef fectively use the E0Ps to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Development of an EOP in the manner described here providee assurance that the procedure is technically correct, is administrativ:1; sound and can be performed as written in the Trojan Control Room. A0-4-7 Page 5 of 47 Revision 2

= B. EOP Development Documentation The Trojan E0P development program is de**gned to address the require-ments of Reference 1 with guidance ftor ,Ierences 2-9. The principle NRC objective in EOP review has been t, ainimize the amount of plant specific procedure review and approval by concentrating their staf f review efforts on the generic WOG guidelines.' Therefore, any sig-nific ant deviation which changes the intent of the WOG guidelines could constitute an unreviewed safety question under 10CFR50.59, requiring specific NRC approval prior to implementation. All Trojan E0P deviations from the WOG Guidelines shall be identified, including deviations in both step sequencing and step content. Technical justification of all deviations must be provided. Justifiestion involves an explanation of the reason for the deviation and an indication of the safety significance if applicable. The justification should ensure that the actions proposed for the Trojan procedure produces results equivalent to those of the WOG Guidelines. While many minor deviations have been made and justified, there are no significant procedure deviations requiring NRC approval in the Trojan EOPs upgraded to the WOG Revision 1 Guidelines. In order to prevent having safety-related deviations which alter the intent of the WOG Guidelines and to minimize other dif ferences i between Trojan E0Ps and the WOG guidelines, Trojan E0Ps will be carefully written to correspond to the WOG Guidelines to the extent that design and operational differences allow. This correspondence will be ensured by maintaining an updated set of the following five support documents: 1. Trojan - WOG Reference Plant Comparison. This is a comparison made to identify the dif ferences between the Trojan plant design and the reference plant design used to generate the WOG Guidelines. These design differences justify certain ainor differences in the Trojan procedures from the WOG Guidelines and will be documented in Appendix C. 2. Step Sequencing Comparison. This document compares the ordering of each step in the WOG Guidelines with the sequence of steps in the Trojan procedures. Each Trojan procedure must be verified to be within the step i sequence variation allowed in the WOG Guideline background documents. Any dif ferences must be justified and verified to be insig d'icant. Documentation shall be provided on Appendix D. l 3. Step serification Document. This document compares each Trojan procedure step with the corresponding WOG guideline step to verify compatibility of A0-4-7 Page 6 of 47 Ravision 2 ( i l l

f step content. Again, justification must be offered for any differences, typically resulting from operating experience or design differences. All step comparisons shall be documented on Appendix E. 4. Step Background Document. In this document, a purpose and basis for each step, note, and caution in every Trojan E0P is provided. This helps ensure that there are no steps which do not belong in the procedure. It also helps prevent removal of procedure steps in subsequent revisions due to inadequately documented justification for each step. The hackground information also enhances the training process described in Section VI. Step background documentation shall be provided on Appendix F. 5. Values and Setpoints Document. Every value or setpoint used in Trojan E0Ps must be justified by a reference or calculation. Proper conversion of WOG Guideline footnotes into Trojan values must be ensured by documenting on Appendix G the following information: footnote requirement for each process variable, corresponding Trojan value, instrumentst used, references / calculations, and procedures in which each footnote is used. Trojan setpoints not specifically addressed by WOG guideline footnotes shcIl be documented on Appendix H. IV. FORMAT AND WRITING PRINCIPLES The style and format of a procedure can have significant impact on how useful it is when needed in an emergency. A procedure that is confusing or hard to follow can severely hamper an operator responding in a stressful situation. Likewise, a well-written procedure that is clearly written and simple to follow can be a valuable operator aid. Thus, it is important that a standard format be adopted and consistently used for all EOPs and that good writing practices be defined and followed. Trojan E0P format is patterned af ter that described in the Writers Guide and Users Guide sections of Reference 8. This reference should be consulted for additional general instruction on format and writing principles. A. E0P Designation and Numbering E0Ps are procedures that govern the plant operation during emergency conditions and specify operator actions to return the plant to a stable condition. The E0Ps are made up of Emergency Instructions (EIs), Event Specific Emergency Instructions (ESs), Emergency Con-tingency Actions (ECAs), and Function Restoration Instructions (FRs). A0-4-7 Page 7 of 47 Revision 2

~ Els (including their ES subprocedures) and ECAs are event-specific (ie, they assume the operator has identified the casualty). FRs are nonevent-specific and are based on protecting certain critical safety functions. EOF designations are discussed further in A0-4-1. Plant Operating Manual Description. Each planc procedure shall be uniquely identified. This identifi-cation permits easy administration of the process of procedure preparation, review, revision distribution, and operator use. 1. Procedure Identification. The first page of every EOF shall contain the following minimum information: e Descriptive Title. e Procedure Number. e Revision Number. e Approval Signature and Date. 9 e Number of Pages. i This information serves to identify the procedure, identify the authorized revision, and define the scope of the procedure. 2. Procedure Numbering. 3 Emergency Operating Procedures shall be labeled with the following designators: EI - Emergency Instructions ES - Event Specific Emergency Instructions ECA - Emergency Contingency Actions l FR - Functional Restoration Instructions A sequential number (or letter in the case of FRs) will follow .the designator to uniquely identify each procedure. The sequential numbers reflect four major categories: 0 - Non-Accident 1 - Loss of Reactor Coolant l 2 - Loss of Secondary Coolant 3 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture i A0-4-7 Page 8 of 47 Revision 2

s Subprocedures or related procedures will be designated by the use of decimals. Example: EI Steam Generator Tube Rupture ES-3.1 - Post SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill 3. Revision Numbering and Designation. The revision number of an E0P is indicated on every page. To identify revisions to the text, a change bar located in the left margin alongside the text change will be used to indicate a change in the left column. A bar in the right margin will indicate a text change in the right column. 4. Page Identification and Numbering. Each page of the procedure will be identified by (1) the procedure designator and number, (2) the revision number, and (3) the page number specified as "Page of ". This information will be located at the bottom right-hand side of each page. t 5. Table of Contents. A table of contents will be utilized to provide quick reference to the E0Ps. All E0Ps and their subprocedures will be identified by number, title, and relative location. B. Format A unique format will be used for Trojan E0Ps from that used in normal operating procedures. This format is intended to help the operator quickly move from step to step with minimes confusion and need to become entangled in nonapplicable contingency steps. The format adopted for use is demonstrated in Appendix B. 1. Page Format. The E0Ps will be written in a two-column, dual-level format. The lef t-hand column is labeled " Action / Expected Response". Each step consists of a high-level action step which may be followed by indented substeps to detail the method of performing the high-level steps. Expected responses to the action steps are also shown in the lef t-hand column. The right-hand column is labeled " Response Not Obtained", and contains contingency j actions and transitions to other guidelines. When the expected response in the lef t-hand column is not obtained, the user moves l to the right-hand column for contingency instructions. i 4 A0-4-7 Page 9 of 47 Revision 2 ~

2. Procedure Organization. Each procedure will be organized as shown in Appendix B. The first information given is the procedure title and approval data. This is followed by a section containing procedure purpose, a brief description of the intent of the procedure. Next is an entry conditions section, which lists indications or conditions to assist the operator in verifying he is in the appropriate E0P. The entry conditions section is followed by operator action steps. Immediate operator actions, if any, will be designated by a NOTE at the beginning of the procedure. Immediate actions apply to steps which may be performed by the operator, based on his memory, without reference to the written procedure. These steps should be limited to verifications if possible. Procedure format (page size, margins, blocking, spacing, and general layout) will be as shown in Appendix B and is maintained by the Office Supervisor, If a page needs to be rotated, the top of the page with rotated print is the normal lef t-hand edge. The page margins, identification, and numbering will not be rotated. P A reference page may be used with an E0P if necessary to provide easy access to important information which is applicable throughout the procedure. The reference page will be printed on the back side of each procedure page for easy reference. The reference page is used to summarize information which the operator should have continuously available. Support material such as graphs, charts, tables, and figures which cannot be included in the body of a procedure should be presented as attachments at the end of the procedure. Section IV.B.8 provides specific instructions for support mateial. 3. Numbering and Indentation. Arabic numerals will be used for numbering high-level action steps of each procedure. Detailed action steps will be indented and identified by small letters. If further subdivision is needed, arabic numerals with partial parentheses will be used. Example: 9. Check if RHR Can Be Placed in Service a. Check the following:

1) RCS temperature - < 350*F.

2) RCS pressure - < 425 psig.

b. Place RHR in service using 01-4-1. l AQ-4-7 Page 10 of 47 Revision 2

Bullets may be used in procedure substeps in place of letters or numbers if the order in which the substeps are performed is not important. Example: 7. Verify Secondary Integrity Check pressures in all S/Gs. a. o No S/G pressure decr<ssing in an uncontrolled manner. n No S/G completely depressurized. Parallel construction of steps in each column will be used, with the step numbers appearing on the left-hand side of the page. The numbering scheme lends itself well to use as a place-keeping aid. The operator can cross off the number of each step as it is completed. C. Writing Instructions 1. Action Step Length and Content. 7 a. Action steps should deal with only one idea, b. Instructions written in short sentence fragments are preferrable to long, compound, or complex sentences. c. Complex evolutions should be prescribed in a series of steps, with each step made as simple sa practicable. d. An action step should be completed on the same page where it began. However, if one or more CAUTIONS apply to the step, the step should start on the same page as the CAL'TIONS and continue on the following page if necesst y, to ensure that the CAUTIONS are on the same page as the step they apply to. e. Actions required in a particular step should not be expected to be complete before the next step is begun. If a particular step must be completed prior to continuation, this condition must be stated clearly in that step or in a NOTE or CAUTION preceeding the step. It should also be clearly stated if actions steps must be performed at the same time. f. The number of action verbs and objects per step should be minimized. A step should normally contain only a single-action verb. A0-4-7 Page 11 of 47 Revision 2

g. Limits should be expressed quantitatively whenever possible. h. Identification of components and parts should be complete. i. Expected results of routine tasks need not be stated. j. Where appropriate, verification steps should be used to determine whether the objective of a task or sequence of actions has been achieved. An example of this is verifying flow following valve lineup changes. k. When system response dictates a time frame within which the instruction must be accomplished, prescribe such time frame. If possible, however, avoid using time to initiate operator action. Operator actions should be related to plant parameters. 1. When additional confirmation of system response is considered necessary, prescribe the backup readings to be made. m. When requiring resetting or restoration of an alarm or trip, list the expected results immediately following the resetting or restoration if it would be beneficial. P n. Describe the system response time associated with per-formance of the instruction if it would enhance the user's understanding and performance. The unique action words "try", " monitor", " control", and o. " maintain" denote actions to be performed continuously until directed otherwise. p. When the action verb in a step has three or more objects (for instance, valves to be operated), the objects should be listed separately from the written text to reduce the potential of overlooking one of the objects. For example, use this format: Verify CIS Phase B Valves - CLOSED MO-3294 - CLOSED MO-3296 - CLOSED MO-3300 - CLOSED M0-3320 - CLOSED q. Action steps must be structured so that they can be executed by the minimum shift staffing and minimum control rooo staffing required by Technical Specifications. A0-4-7 Page 12 of 47 Revision 2

r. Action steps should be consistent with the roles and responsibilities of the operators. s. Action steps should be structured to minimize physical conflicts between personnel and amount of movement needed to carry out the steps. t. Action steps should be structured to avoid unintentional duplication of tasks. u. Action step column structure shall be as follows: 1) Action / Expected Response Column. The left-hand column of the dual-column format will contain the operator instructional steps. In addition, this column presents indicaticas the operator should expect to receive. This column should contain actions consistent with expected indications vice contingency actions or supplementary information. High-level action steps are underlined and expected responses are capitalized for added emphasis. t 2) Response-Not-Obtained Column. Contingency actions will be presented in the right-hand column of the dual-column format. Contingency actions are operator actions that should be taken in the event a stated condition, event, or task does not represent or achieve the expected result. Contingency actions should be specified for circum-stances in which the expected results or actions might not be achieved. The contingency actiens will typically identify directions to override automatic controls, to manually initiate functions which are normally initiated automatically, or directions to go to another procedure. 2. Use of Logic Terms. J The logic terms AND, OR, NOT, IF, IF NOT, WE N, and THEN are of ten necessary to describe precisely a set of conditions or sequence of actions. When logic statements are used, the logic terms should be highlighted by capitalization so that all conditions are clear. The following general guidelines apply to the use of logic terms: A0-4-7 Page 13 of 47 Revision 2

a. AND and OR used together can produce an ambiguous logic statement. Avoid using the tra logic words within the same action statement when pos,1ble. b. The dual-column format equates to the logic, IF NOT the action in the left-hand column THEN follow the action specified in the right-hand column. c. When attention should be called to combinations of conditions, the word AND should be placed between the description of each condition. If four or more conditions need to be joined, consider using a list format. d. When a number of alternative actions are equally acceptable, those actions should be separately listed and separated by the word OR. e. The use of OR for conditions should be in the inclusive sense, indicating any or all conditicns may be present. For example: Check If SI Is In Service 9 e SI pumps - ANY RUNNING - OR - e BIT - NOT ISOLATED. OR should be used in the exclusive sense for alternative actions that are equally acceptable, indicating that only one alternative should be performed. For example: Go To Appropriate Post-SGTR Cooldown Method a. Go to ES-3.1, Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill, Step 1. - OR - b. Go to ES-3.2, Post-SGTR Cooldown Using SGBD, Step 1. - OR - c. Go to ES-3.3, Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Steam Dump, Step 1. f. Conditional statements should be written so that the description of the condition appears first, followed by the action instruction. WHEN is used for an expected condition. IF is used for an unexpected, but possible condition. A0-4-7 Page 14 of 47 Revision 2

g. l? NOT is used when the operator must respond to the second of two possible conditions. IF is used to specify the first condition. h. THEN should not be used at the end of an action step to instruct the operator to perform the next step because it runs actions together. i. All letters of logic terms should be capitalized to lend emphasis. 3. Use of Cautionary Information and Notes. Cautions are used to alert an operator to conditions that could result in health hazards, or equipment or Plant damage. Cautions should describe the hazardous conditions and consequences of actions. Notes are a means for providing descriptive or explanatory information intended to aid the operator. Notes can be used to provide additional information without encumbering the instructional steps. 9 The following guidelines apply to cautions and notes: a. Cautions should be placed directly ahead of the steps to which they apply, unless they apply to the entire procedure. f In this case, place them at the beginning of the procedure. b. The entire text of a caution or note should be on one page. A caution should normally be on the same page as the first step to which it applies. J c. The words CAUTION and NOTE are capitalized, and the caution or note is framed to lend emphasis. Examples are shown in Appendix B. d. Information in notes should be presented in the order in which it is needed. If the information is intended to aid in the performance of a step, place it ahead of the step. If it pertains to the results of a step, place it af ter the step. Notes and cautions should extend across both columns of e. the dual-column format. f. Notes and cautions should not normally contain action steps. f kV~ s on i

4. Calculations. Mathematical calculations should be avoided in E0Ps. If a value has to be determined to perform a procedural step, a chart or graph should be used whenever possible. It may be preferable to provide a chart or graph as an attachment to the procedure. If a calculation is needed, provide enough space in the procedure for the operator to perform the calculations and record the results. Provide conversion factors or other guidance so that the answer can be obtained in the correct units. 5. Referencing and Branching to Other Procedures or Steps. Referencing implies that an additional procedure or additional steps will be used as a supplement to the procedure presently being used. Referencing another procedure or excessive backward and forward referencing within the same procedure can be confusing and can lead to skipping of steps, particularly since the referenced steps may not return the operator to the directing step. Referencing should therefore be minimized. When only a few steps need to be referenced, the steps should be stated in the procedure wherever they are needed. When referencing is P used, directions should be clear as to when and where the original procedure should be reentered. The words " refer to" are used to direct an operator to perform steps in another procedure. Referencing of another procedure is best utilized when the procedure referenced can be performed in parallel with the existing procedure. In that case, the phrase " refer to...while continuing with this procedure" should be used. If only a portion of another procedure is to be used, the applicable l procedure section should be referenced. Branching signifies that the operator is to exit the procedure presently being used and use another procedure in its entirety. Branching eliminates most of the problems associated with referencing, since the operator does not continually need to move back and forth between procedures. The words "go to" are used to direct an operator to leave one procedure or step and not return unless directed. 6. Component Identification. Equipment, controls, and displays will be identified in common usage terms. These terms may not always match names engraved on panels but will be complete. Approved abbreviations from Appendix A may also be used in referring to equipment. When needed for clarity, valve numbers should be included with valve When specific annunciator alarms are referenced, the names. title should normally be spelled out exactly as engraved. go-g-{ [ age 16 of 47 l

7. Level of Detail. The level of detail of an E0P should be that which a newly trained and licensed operator would desire during an emergency condition. Avoiding too much detail is an important considera-tion, however, because of the need for timely response and to minimize errors. The E0P action steps are written using a tier approach, with both a higher and lower degree of detail. The upper-level task is followed by subtasks with a higher degree of detail. This approach should satisfy the information needs of both experienced and inexperienced operators. Any information which an operator is required to know based on his traning and experience, such as equipment locations, should not be included. 8. Printed Operator Aids. When information is presented using graphs, charts, tables, and figures, these aids should be self-explanatory, legible, and readable under the expected conditions of use and within the reading precision of the operator. Printed operator aids can be presented as attachments to E0Ps. A reference page may be used with an E0P as described in Section IV.B.2. The reference page i is the only operator aid which should be presented on the back side of procedure pages. The following guidelines are established for the use of graphs, figures, and tables: a. Graphs, tables, and figures which are on a separate page from the procedural text should be presented as attachments at the end of the procedure. b. Graphs, tables, and figures should be clearly labeled. If not on a separate page from procedural text, they should be clearly separated from the text for easy identification. c. The axes of graphs should be clearly labeled, including units. d. An underlined heading should be entered for each column of a table. D. Writing Style l E0Ps should be written in a style that presents information in a simple, familiar, and unambiguous manner. The most familiar and most specific words that accurately convey the intended meaning should be l used. EOP steps should be written in short sentences and sentence fragments to keep their content as simple and easily understood as l possible. l l A0-4-7 Page 17 of 47 j Revision 2 l t {

Punctuation and capitalization should normally conform to standard American English usage. Abbreviations listed in Appendix A may be utilized in E0Ps, but should be used sparir. gly. Units of measure should be familiar to the operator and should relate to those referenced cn plant instrumentation without conversion. The symbols "<" and ">" should be used instead of the words "less than" and " greater than" to eliminate unnecessary words from E0P steps. Arabic numerals will be used throughout the E0Ps unless equipment is commonly referred to by another means. When presenting instrument values, utilize a conservative value within the precision of operator readability vice giving a tolerance band, unless the tolerance band is critical. Acceptance values should be specified in such a way that addition and subtraction by the user is avoided. This can generally be done by stating acceptance values as limits. Examples: 510*F maximum, 300 psig minimum, 580* to 600*F, etc. Avoid using + to specify acceptance bands. Whenever possible, round of f values to an easily readable number for human factor considerations (eg, round off 49.7% pressurizer level to 50%). V. VALIDATION /VERIPICATION PROGRAM P Prior to E0P implementation, they must undergo a process of validation / verification. This is a process by which the procedures are evaluated against a set of objectives which address whether the procedures are prepared properly and are usable from a technical and human factor stand-point. Elements of the validation and verification process overlap and complement each other significantly. However, each separate process will be described here to clarify how the overall program objectives will be met. A. Verification EOP verification is the evaluation performed to confirm the written correctness of the procedure and to ensure that applicable generic and Trojan-specific technical information has been incorporated properly. Discrepancies between the E0Ps and their source documents are identified, evaluated, resolved, and documented. The following objectives will be met by the Trojan E0P verification process: 1. The E0Ps are technically correct, ie, they accurately reflect the WOG Guidelines and other E0P source documents. 2. The E0Ps are written correctly, ie, they accurately reflect this administrative order. A0-4-7 Fage 18 of 47 Revision 2

3. A correspondence exists between the procedures and the control room / plant hardware. 4. The language and level of information presented in the EOPs are compatible with the qualifications, training, and experience of the operating staf f. The major thrust of the verification process is maintenance of the five support documents described in Section III.B. These documents are the Trojan-WOG Reference Plant Comparison, Step Sequencing Comparison, Step Verification document, Step Background document, and the Values and Setpoints document. These documents ensure that objective 1) is met and they provide significant input for meeting objectives 2) and 3). See Section 111.5 for more detailed discussion of these documents. An independent technical review required to be performed on all new or revised E0Ps serves to ensure all four of the above verification objectives are met. The technical review is performed by a person other than the procedure writer who is experienced in the EOP writing or who is a licensed senior reactor operator. The technical review shall be completed and documented in accordance with the requirements of A0-4-4, Plant Operating Manual Changes. t Another independent review of all new or revised E0Ps is performed by the Nuclear Safety and Regulation Department (NSRD). The NSRD procedure review condentrates on ensuring that objectives 1) and 3) are met. The results of this review are documented by a meno from NSRD to the Trojan Operations Department. The above verification process will be performed in its entirety for any EOF change whether it involves a new E0P or a minor E0P revision. Problems identified will be resolved and incorporated into the E0P as applicable. B. Validation E0P validation is the evaluation performed to determine that the actions specified in the procedure can be performed by the operator to manage the emergency conditions effectively. The following objectives will be met by the Trojan EOF validation process: 1. The EOPs are usable, ie, they can be understood and followed without confusion, delays, and errors. 2. A correspondence exists between the procedures and the control room / plant hardware. A0-4-7 Page 19 of 47 Revision 2 I

3. The instructions presented in the E0Ps are compatible with the shif t aanpower, qualifications, training, and experience of the operating staff. 4. A high level of assurance exists that the procedures will work, ie, the procedures guide the operator in mitigating transients and accidents. The WOG Emergency Response Guideline development program provides for simulator validation of the generic guidelines. This generic validation program, in conjunction with the Trojan EOF verification process, forms the framework for meeting the above objectives. Simulator validation of Trojan EOPs, Trojan control room walkthroughs, detailed Control Room Design Review (CRDR), NSRD procedure review, and Trojan 50P Job and Task Analysis all supplement the generic WOG validation program to meet the above objectives. The extent that the above methods are used depend on the significance of the E0P changes as determined by the Operations Supervisor. He will ensure that the above objectives are met by the validation methods chosen. In general, a major change such as E0P upgrade to revision 1 of the WOG Guidelines requires use of all of the above methods. A simulator validation exercise will be performed for new E0Ps or 7 significant additions / deviations from WOG Guidelines prior to imple-mentation at the discretion of the Operations Supervisor. Staulator validation alone will ensure that all four validation objectives are either fully or partially met. The simulator exercise consists of accident scenarios which should be constructed to ensure a majority of the E0Ps are exercised. Single, sequential, and concurrent failures must be included in the scenarios and documented on Appendix I. Expected procedure transitions based on the scenario should be predicted by the slaulator validation director prior to the exercise. Expected transitions can be compared with actual transitions to identify potential problems. Accident scenario results must be representative of the generic WOG simulator validation results to take credit for the extensive conclusions of generic validation. EOPs which are not exercised during the accident scenarios must undergo a walk-through or talk-through at the simulator to ensure all EOFs are included in the simulator validation. The simulator validation team should consist of two groups - an observation team and an operations team. The observation team should include a validation director (procedure writer or licensed SRO) and a human factors expert to record comments. The operations team should include one licensed SRO, two licensed Ros, and one STA. No more than the minimum operating staf f required by Technical Specifi-cations may be included on the operations team. The validation criteria in Appendix J should be used by all participants to prompt comments and s+2sgested improvements. All comments and resolutions must be documented on Appendix K. A0-4-7 Page 20 of 47 Revision 2

j. A Trojan control room walkthrough should be performed for those procedures which cannot be fully exercised due to the limitations of the simulator. An example of this cree includes the " Loss of All AC l Power" procedures. Minor procedure changes which do not warrant a complete simulator exercise may also be subjected to a control room walkthrough at the diacretion of the Operations Supervisor. The l' control room walkthrough should ensure that all validation objectives y are met'with input from Appendix J. Esikthrough documentation must i be provided on Appendix K. { A detailed control room design review (CRDR) should be performed for all new E0Ps. This review is performed to ensure objective 2) is met by verifying the procedures reflect actual control room / plant hardware, ) instruments, controls, indications, and use the same designation and ] units of measurement. The CRDR may include control room walkthroughs i as described above and may supplement or replace those walkthroughs l st the discretion of the Operations Supervisor. This process is more ] fully described in PGE-1041, " Detailed Control Room Design Review Suasary Report". CRDR documentation will normally be provided by MD. J The Training Department should conduct a job and task analysis of new E0Ps in accordance with the Training Administration Manual to ensurep the operators are adequately qualified and trained to carry out the actions of the E0Ps. This helps ensure that objective 3) is set. i The job and task analysis does not need to be fully completed prior to EOP implementation. l Any deficiencies found in an EOF during the validation process must l be documented and resolved to the satisfaction of the Operations i Supervisor prior to implementration. If major rework of the EOF is required, it shall be subjected to the validation process again at i the discretion of the Operations Supervisor. VI. TRAINING PROGRAM It is imperative that operators be fully cognizant of the content of E0Ps. i This section describes the methods that will be used to ensure each i operator remains up to date when new EOPs are introduced and old E0Ps are l changed. Operator knowledge and performance will be evaluated following l E0P training and appropriate followup training will be conducted in j deficient areas as described in the Training Administration Manual. t l The goals of the EOF training program are as follows: 1. Enable the operators to understand the structure of the E0Ps. I i 2. Enable the operators to understand the technical bases of the i E0Ps. i i A0-4-7 Page 21 of 47 i Revision 2

3. Enable the operators to have a working knowledge of the technical content of the E0Ps. 4. Enable the operators to use the E0Ps under operational conditions. A. New EOPs New E0Ps are defined as ECTt which have significantly changed as determined by the Operatiens Sepervisor. For example, the package of E0Ps upgraded to the WOG Revision 1 Guidelines are considered new E0Ps. Operator training on new EOPs should be completed prior to their implementation. The scope of training required for new E0Ps etli be determined by the Operations Supervisor and Training Supervisor based on the magnitude of changes in the naw E0Ps to ensure the above objectives are met. The training program for the new E0Ps will be composed of a combination of the following: o Classroom training e Simulator exercises 7 e Operator self-study e Control room walkthroughs e Crew talk-throughs New E0Ps will be presented to all licensed operators in the classroom during the continuous retraining program described in the Training Administration Manual. Study material should include the procedure background information and related technical information to ensure the principles behind the procedures are clearly understood. Classroom instruction should also include the philosophy behind the E0Ps, procedure usage, and terminology unique to E0Ps. All licensed operators will exercise a majority of new E0Ps at a generic simulator. Accident scenarios will encompass a wide variety of transients and as a minimum will include those described in the Training Administration Manual. Operators will perform as a team and will be trained in the roles they would be expected to take in case of an actual emergency. Additional training can be conducted where the members of a crew alternate responsibilities to enhance under-standing of other roles and improve control room communications. Scenarios will be discussed following the simu'.ator exercise to critique operator actions and discuss potential dif ferences in actual plant response due to the limitations of the generic simulator. A0-4-7 Page 22 of 47 Revision 2

All operators will review new E0Ps on a self-study basis in accordance with A0-3-4, Plant Operating Manual Revision Notification. Control room walkthroughs and/or crew talk-throughs can be performed on new E0Ps as a substitute for or supplement to simulator exercises. Walkthroughs and talk-throughs may be used when generic simulator exercises and classroom instruction are inadquate to meet all objec-tives of the training program. B. E0P Changes Training for all EOP changes will be conducted and documented in accordance with AO-3-4, Plant Operating Manual Revision Notification. This consists of self-study of the E0P changes by all operators. The classroom retraining program and annual simulator training described in the Training Administration Manual supplements operator self-study of minor changes. Por major EOP changes, the Operations Supervisor may direct that training be conducted consistent with that required for new E0Ps. VII. E0P REVISION The number of revisions to the E0Ps should be minimized to avoid the need for operator retraining and to minimize the possibility of confusicn. When required, EOF revisions will be initiated in accordance with applicable Trojan Administrative Orders. E0P change recommendations will be screened by the Operations Supervisor to determine the urgency of the change. If deemed necessary, the change will be implemented promptly. Changes of a nonurgent nature (minor action step changes, sinor improvement in wording or format, corrections, spelling, etc.) should be consolidated and implemented on an annual basis. A corrections copy of each EOF will be maintained by the Operations Engineer for this purpose. If urgent revisions are required at any point, proposed minor changes can be incorporated at the same time. The E0P development documentation described in Section III.B shall be updated following any revision. l Suggested changes will be encouraged from all sources and promptly evaluated to ensure EOPs are maintained as useful and up-to-date as possible. The j following sources are examples of inputs used for revision of E0Ps: A. WOG ERG revisions. B. WOG ERG feedback items. l C. Plant / control room design changes. f D. Industry events. I A0-4-7 Page 23 of 47 Revision 2 L

E. Operational experience. F. Simulator training feedback. 4 G. Clasroom training feedback. H. Two-year technical reviews. I. Instrument accuracy changes. J. Technical Specification changes. K. Human factors reviews. 9 WON A0-4-7 Page 24 of 47 Revision 2 _y_-- .er w.'--m----- -w -,--W

APPhnOfX A Standard List of Abbreviations For Control Board Labels and Procedures Abbreviation Definition ABDT Auxiliary Building Drain Tank ABP Aa-Built Package ABS Auxiliary Building Sump j ABPS Auxiliary Building Passageway Sump AC Alternating Current A/C Air Compressor ACB Air Circuit Breaker ACC Accumulator ACO Assistant Control Operator AFB Auxiliary Fuel Building AFD Axial Flux Difference AFP Auxiliary Feed Pump AFW Auxiliary Feedwater AGA Automatic Gas Analyzer 7 ALT Alternate AMP Ampere ANI American Nuclear Insurers ANS American Nuclear Society ANSI American National Standards Institute AD Administrative Order / Auxiliary Operator ARI All Rods In ARM Area Radiation Monitor ARO All Rods Out ASME Americal Society of Mechanical Engineers AST Assistant Shift Supervisor AT Accumulator Tank ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram RA Boric Acid BAE Boric Acid Evaporator BAST Boric Acid Storage Tank BATPP Boric Acid Transfer Pump BCW Bearing Cooling Water BFR Before BIST Boron Injection Surge Tank BIT Boron Injection Tank BOL Beginning of Life BKR Breaker BLDG Building BNG Bearing BPRA Burnable Poison Rod Assembly A0-4-7 Page 25 of 47 pgenpixA9 Revision 2 l r L.

Abbreviation De finition BTV Bleeder Trip Valve BURP Containment Pressure Reduction via the Hydrogen Vent System BYP Bypass CAC Containment Air Cooler CAL Calibration CAS Central Alara Station CCP Centrifugal Charging Pump CCW Component Cooling Water C/D Cooldown CHG Charge / Charging CHWDT Chemical Waste Drain Tank CIS Containment Isolation Signal CIV Combined Intercept Valve CKT Circuit CL Cold Leg CLNG Cooling CNDSR Condenser C!frRL Control 00 Control Operator COM Common COND Condensate 00NN Connect CONT Containment CR Control Room CRDM Control Rod Drive Mechanise CRDS Control Rod Drive Shaft CROCTRM Control Room Operating Curves and Tables Reference Manual CRT Cathode Ray Tube (T.V. Screen) CS Containment Spray C/S Control Switch CSAS Containment Spray Actuation Signal CSD Cold Shutdown CSF Critical Safety Function CSFST Critical Safety Function Status Tree CSR Cable Spreading Room CST Condensate Storage Tank l CV Control Valve i CVCS Chemical and Volume Control Jystes CVIS Containment Ventilation Isolation Signal l CWRT Clean Waste Receiver Tank AT or Delta Temperature Delta-T i 4P or Delta Pressure Delta-P DBA Design Basis Accident dB Decibel l Appendix A A0-4-7 Page 26 of 47 Page 2 of 9 Revision 2 t

4 Abbreviation Definition DBE Design Basis Earthquake DC Direct Current DCP Detailed Construction Package DCN Design Change Notice DEMIN Domineralizer D&DS Discharge and Dilution Structure DDT Diesel Day Tank DF0 Diesel Fuel Oil DISCH Discharge DRPI Digital Rod Position Indication DRW Dirty Radioactive Waste UTO Danger Tagged Out DWDT Dirty Waste Drain Tank DWMT Dirty Waste Monitor Tank DWST Desin Water Storage Tank EBOP Emergency Bearing Oil Pump _ECA Energency Contingency Action ECC Eccentricity ECCS Emergency Core Cooling Systen ECP Estimated Critical Position ECR Emergency Coolant Recirculation p EDG Energency Diesel Generator EHC Electro Hydraulic Control Systen EI Emergency Instruction ELD Extraction Line Drain EMGY Emergency EOL End of Life E0P Emergency Operating Procedure EP Emergency Procedure EPRI Electric Power Research Institute EQUIP Fquipment ER Event Report ERG Energency Response Guideline ES Event Specific Emergency Instruction ESF Engineered Safeguards Features ETS Environmental Technical Specifications EX Excess EXH Exhaust FCN Field Change Notice FCV Flow Control Valve FD Feed FDR Feeder FEMA Federal Energency Management Agency FI Flow Indicator FIS Flow Indicating Switch FIT Flow Indicating Transmitter i Appendix A A0-4-7 Page 27 of 47 Page 3 of 9 Revision 2 i ~

Abbreviation Definition F/L Full Length FR Functional Restoration Instruction FRM From FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report FT Flow Transmitter FW Feedwater FWIS Feedwater Isolation Signal FWIV Feedwater Isolation Valve FWRV Feedwater Regulating Valve CAL Gallon GPM Gallons Per Minute GCH Gas Collection Header GOI General Operating Instruction H2 Hydrogen HK Heat Exchanger HCV Hand Control Valve HDP Heater Drain Pump HDR Header HDT Heater Drain Tank HED Human Engineering Deficiency NEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air i HFP Hot Full Power HL Hot Les HP High Pressure HS Hand Switch HSB Hot Standby HSD Hot Shutdown HTR Hester H/U Heatup HUT Hold-Up Tank H&V Heating and Ventilation HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning HK Heat Exchanger HYD Hydraulic HZ Herts HZP Hot Zero Power LAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICC Inadequate Core Cooling IDCN Interim Design Change Notice ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test IMB Inside Missile Barrier INJ Injection INTLK Interlock INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations LR Intermediate Range ISI Inservice Inspection Appendix A A0-4-7 Page 28 of 47 Page 4 of 9 Revision 2

Abbreviation Definition ISO Isolation IST Inservice Testing IX Ion Exchanger KIP Key Issue Post LC Locked Closed LCC Load Control Center LCO Limiting Condition for Operation LCR License Change Request LER License Event Report LI Level Indicator LIS Level Indicating Switch LIT Level Indicating Transmitter LLRT Local Leak Rate Test LN Line ID Incked Open L/0 Locked Out LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LOSC Loss of Secondary Coolant LP Low Pressure LS Level Switch LT Level Transmitter L.T. Locked Throttled LTDN Letdown LVL Level M Middle MCC Motor Control Center MFP Main Peedwater Pump HFW Main reedwater MG Motor Generator MLO M2in Lube Oil M0 Motor Operated MON Monitor MOV Motor Operated Valve MP Maintenance Procedure MR Maintenance Request MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve MSLI Main Steae Line Isolation MSP Motor Suction Pump MSR Moisture Separator Rehester MSSS Main Steam Support Structure M/U Makeup MUPP Makeup Pai; HWe Megawatt. Electric y N2 Nitrogen NA Not Applicable NAR Narrow A0-4-7 Page 29 of 47 Appendix A Revision 2 Page 5 of 9 4

Abbreviation Definition NCR Non-Conformance Report N.E. Northeast NIS Nuclear Instrumentation System NOB Nuclear Operations Board NOR Normal NPSH Net Positive Suction Head NR Narrow Range NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System N.W. Northwest 02 Oxygen OBE Operating Basis Earthquake OC Overeurrent DCB Oil Circuit Breaker ODOE Oregon Department of Energ7 OI Operating Instruction OMB Outside Missile Barrier ONI Off-Normal Instruction 00S Out of Service OPAT Overpower Delta T OSC Operational Support Center p OSP Oregon State Patrol DTAT Overtemperature Delta T OWS 011y Waste Separator PAARM Post-Accident Airborne Radiation Monitor PASS Post-Accident Sampling System P&ID Piping and Instrument Diagram PCV P' re Control Valve PCB s Controlled Circuit Breaker FDP Positive Displacement Pump PEP Plant Engineering Procedure PET Periodic Engineering Test PI Pressure Indicator PIC Pocket Ionization Chamber PICT Periodic Instrument and Control Test PIS Pressure Indicating Switch PIT Pressure Indicating Transmitter PMG Permanent Motor Generator PMW Primary Makeup Water FNL Panel POM Plant Operating Manual POR Power-Operated Relief PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve POT Periodic Operating Test PP Pump PPM Parts Per Million Appendix A A0-4-7 Page 30 of 47 Page 6 of 9 Revision 2

Abbreviation Definition PRB Plant Review Board PRESS Pressure PRM or Process Radiation Monitor or PERM Process and Effluent Monitor PROT Protection PRT Pressurizer Relief Tank PR Power Range PS Pressure Switch PSC Plant Setpoint Change PSIA Pounds Per Square Inch Atmosphere PSIG Pounds Per Square Inch Cauge PT Pressure Transmitter PTL Pull To Lock PTS Pressurized Thermal Shock PWST Primary Water Storage Tank PZR Pressurizer QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control QN Quality Notice R Rem i RCCA Rod Control Cluster Assembly RCDT Reactor Coolant Drain Tank RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactnr Coolant System RDC Request for Design Change RDMG Rod Drive Motor Generator RECIRC Recirculation RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan RETS Radiological Ef fluent Technical Specifications RPE Request For Evaluation RHR Residual Heat Removal RIL Rod Insertion Limit RNO Response Not Obtained RO Reactor Operator RPS Reactor Protection System RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel RTD Resistance Temperature Detector RTRN Return RTV Silicone Sealing Compound RVL Reactor Vessel Level RVLIS Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System RWE Radweste Evaporator RWP Radiation Work Permit RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank RX Reactor SALP Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Appendix A A0-4-7 tage 31 of 47 Page 7 of 9 Revision 2

Abbreviation Definition SAS Secondary Alara Station SC Seismic Category S/D or SD Shutdown S.E. Southeast SEL Selector SEL. Selec t SFP Spent Fuel Pool SFPCS Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System S/C Steam Generator SGBD Steam Generator Blowdown SCFP Stese Generator Feed Pump SGTR Steam Generator Tube Rupture SGWLC Steam Generator Water Level Control SI Safety Injection SIPP Safety Injection Pump SIS Safety Injection Signal SL Seal SLIS Steam Line Isolation Signal SMPL Sample SOL Shaft Oil Pump SR Source Range t SRO Senior Reactor Operator SRST Spent Resin Storage Tank SRW Solid Radweste SS Shif t Supervisor SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSPS Solid-State Protection System STA Shift Technical Advisor STAT Stator STRY Standby STG Stage STM Steam STP Sewage Treatment Plant STFr Setpoint STS Standard Technical Specifications S/U or SU Startup SUCT Suction SUP Supply SUR Startup Rate SV Stop Valve SW Service Water S.W. Southwest SWBP Service Water Booster Pump SWS Service Water System, Security Watch Supervisor SYS System TAVE Average RCS Temperature Appendix A A0-4-7 Page 32 of 47 Page 8 of 9 Revision 2

4 Abbreviation Definition TBCW Turbine Building Cooling Water T/C or TC Thermocouple Te RCS Cold Leg Temperature TGOP Turning Gear Oil Pump Th RCS Hot Leg Temperature TNK Tank Tg,g RCS Reference Temperature TSC Technical Support Center TSI Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation TURB Turbine WMT Treated Waste Monitor Tank UC Undercurrent UF Underfrequency UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report US Unit Substation UV Undervoltage VAC Vacuus VACP Vital Area Control Point VCH Vent Collection Header VCT Volume Control Tank VIC Visitor Information Center i VLV Valve W Westinghouse WG Waste Gas WGC Waste Gas Compressor WGDT Waste Gas Decay Tank W/ With W/0 Without WPT Water Pretreatement WGST Waste Gas Surge Tank WOG Westinghouse Owners Group WR Wide-Range WTR Water X-AROUND Cross-Around X-CONN Cross-Connect XFMR Transforuer KFR Transfer Appendix A A0-4-7 Page 33 of 47 Page 9 of 9 Revision 2

. -. m~ u ~ ~ ~ ~.. ~ ~. -..... - ~ ~.. - ~. - - - - -. -. ..~.. l APPENDIX B 1 SAMPLE PROCEDURE WCONTHOLLED MT UP6ATER PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANT TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT Nov-der 13, 1985 QUALITY RELATED Revision 11* EMERGENCY INSTRUCTION - EI-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation //!Jf APPROVED BY DATE / / A. PURPOSE l This procedure provides actions to identify and isolate a faulted steam generator. f B. ENTRY CONDITIONS I This procedure is entered from: 1 1. EI-0, Reactor Trip, Safety Injection, and Diagnosis, Step 16, with any of the following symptoms. 4 a. Any S/G pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner. j b. Any S/G completely depressurized. i j 2. EI-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step 3. EI-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Step 7. i ECA-3.1, SGTR with IACA - Subcooled Recovery Desired, Step 7. i j ECA-3.2, SCTR with 14CA - Saturated Recovery Desired, Step 3 with the following symptoms and/or conditions. Any S/G pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner. a. i b. Any S/G completely depressurized. I Paulted S/G isolation not verified. c.

• This procedure has been EI-2 Page 1 of 5 extensively revised.

Revision 11 i. j i i A0-4-7 Page 34 of 47 PhnixB A of 5 Revision 2 e

SAMPLE PROCEDURE Faulted Steam Generator Isolation 3. FR-R.5, Reponse to S/G Low Level, Step 3, when the affected S/C is identified as faulted. 4. Other procedures whenever a faulted S/G is identified. 1 t i l t EI-2 Page 2 of 5 Revision 11 pggnfigg5 A0-4-7 Page 35 of 47 5 Revision 2 l l 1

f-SAMPLE PROCEDURE Faulted Steam Generator Isolation Step Action / Expected Response Response Not Obtained CAUTION: Initiatu the RERP. Carry out RERP actions in parallel with this procedure. In the event of a loss of off-site power, refer to ONI-50 for restoration of power to instrumentation Laportant for accident deter-mination. CAUTION: At least one S/G aust be main-tained available for RCS cool-down. i i CAUTION: Any faulted S/G or secondary break should remain isolated t during subsequent recovery ? actions unless needed for RCS cooldown. 1 Perform Immediate Action Steps of l EI-0, Reactor Trip, Safety Injection, and Diagnosis 2 Verify Main Steamline Isolation Manually close valves. e MSIVs - CLOSED. i l; e MSIV bypasses - CLOSED. e Main secam line drains - CLOSED. 3 Verify Secondary Integrity of Any S/G a. Check pressures in all S/Gs - a. IF all S/G pressures de-ANY STABLE or INCREASING. creasing in an uncontrolled manner, THEN go to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressuri-zation of All Steam Generators, Step 1. l EI-2 Page 3 of 5 Revision 11 i Appendix B A0-4-7 Page 36 of 47 Page 3 of 5 Revision 2 i'

o SAMPLE PROCEDURE Faulted Steam Generator Isolation i Step Action / Expected Response Response Not Obtained 4 Identify Faulted S/Gs a. Check pressures in all S/Gs. a. Search for initiating break.

1) Any pressure decreasing in e Main steaalir.as.

an uncontrolled manner. 3 e Main feedlines. - OR - e Other secondary piping.

2) Any S/G completely depres-surized.

Go to Step 6. 5 Isolate Faulted S/Gs Manually close valves. IF valves can NOT be closed. THEN dispatch a. Isolate main feedline. an operator to locally close valves or block valves. b. Isolate AFW to affected S/G. P c. Close steam supply valve to turbine AFF from affected S/G. d. Verify affected S/G PORVs - ! l CIASED. Isolate other secondary piping i e. l from affected S/G. 1 CAUTION: WHEN CST level decreases to 70%, STOP one AFP AND PLACE the AFP control switch in FIL. Verify adequate AFW flow as specified in this procedure. Run only one AFP between 70% and 9% CST level. t 6 Check CST Level - > 9% Switch to alternate supply to AFW pumps by opening SW cross-connects MO-3045A/B. i I EI-2 Page 4 of 5 Revision 11 Appendix B A0-4-7 Page 37 of 47 Page 4 of 5 Revision 2 l

s SAMPLE PROCEDURE Faulted Steam Generator Isolation Step Action / Expected Response Response Not Obtained j 7 Check Secondary Radiation a. Requast periodic activity samples on all S/Gs. b. Verify secondary radiation b. Manually open valves. monitors - UNISOLATED. l e. Check secondary radiation. c. Go to EI-3, Steam Generator, Tube Rupture, Step 1.

1) PRM NORMAL.

2) PRM NORMAL.

1 i

3) PRM NORMAL.

i' 8 Co to EI-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step i p t I i 1 I I i I-8 t i t i WON EI-2 Page 5 of 5 Revision 11 Appendix B A0-4-7 Page 38 of 47 Page 5 of 5 Revision 2 ,,,,a m-, -w , -, -, + m

APPENDIX C MAJOR TROJAN /WOG REFERENCE PLANT DESIGN DIFFERENCES WOG REFERENCE PLANT TROJAN t Appendix C A0-4-7 Page 39 of 47 Page 1 of 1 Revision 2

O e APPENDIX D STEP SEQUENCING (Procedure f) STEP TITLE GUIDELINE PROCEDURE 9 Justification of Differences: Appendix D A0-4-7 Page 40 of 47 Page 1 of 1 Revision 2

s APPENDIX E STEP VERIFICATION (Procedure f) Guideline Step / Note / Caution Procedure Step / Note / Caution 7 1 L 1 i Justification of Differences i i l i l l Appendix E A0-4-7 Page 41 of 47 Page 1 of 1 Revision 2 l l l l I

t APPENDIX F BACKGROUND INFORMATION (Procedure f) Step / Note / Caution PURPOSE: 7 BASIS: l i l '1 t 4 4 ) Appendix F A0-4-7 Page 42 of 47 l Page 1 of 1 Revision 2 --+----mw

s' APPENDIX G WOG GUIDELINE FOOTNOTES (process variable) 1. Requirements 2. Values P 3. Instruments 4. References / Calculations 5. Used In Procedures Appendix G A0-4-7 Page 43 of 47 Page 1 of 1 Revision 2

+ APPENDIX H I TROJAN SETPOINTS 4 Item Value Required Value References i 4 I I f, 1 i 1 7 r 6 i i 2 F I i i l Appendix H A0-4-7 Page 44 of 47 Page 1 of 1 Revision 2 i i I

.s APPENDIX I SIMULATOR TEST SCENARIO OUTLINE Scenario # Purpose i Initial Conditions Description l Expected Procedure Transitions l l Appendix I A0-4-7 Page 45 of 47 Page 1 of 1 Revision 2 L

e APPENDIX J EOP VALIDATION CRITERIA 1. Does each step contain sufficient information? 2. Are alternative actions explicit (use of OR)? 3. Are contingency actions sufficient (RNO)? 4. Are procedures easily identified? 5. Are transitions easily made within a procedure or to another procedure? 6. Are CAUTIONS and NOTES easily recognized and understood? 7. Are internal procedure loops easily performed? 8. Are the LOGICAL statements easily understood (IF - THEN)? 9. Is the reference page easy to use? ? 10. Are the values on figures and tables easy to determine? 11. Are CSF status trees easy to monitor to control procedure (FR) implementation? 12. It the procedure easy to read? 13. Can procedure action steps be performed with the minimum shif t compliment of eight operators? 14. Can procedure action steps be performed within designated time intervals? l l 15. Are the procedure entry conditions appropriate for the plant symptoms? l l 16. Do E0P action steps correspond to actual control room and plant hardware? 17. Are units of measurerent used in the procedure the same as that on control room meters? I I 1 l Appendix J A0-4-7 Page 46 of 47 Page 1 of 1 Revision 2 l

F .o APPENDIX K EOP COMMENT / CRITIQUE SHEET SCENARIO # E0P # STEP COME!fr/ SUGGESTED RESOLUTION FINAL RESOLUTION r Appendix K A0-4-7 Page 47 of 47 Page 1 of 1 Revision 2 _..., _..}}