ML20137N134
| ML20137N134 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/23/1986 |
| From: | Bradford L AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| CON-#186-843 CLI-85-19, RA-EW, NUDOCS 8601290168 | |
| Download: ML20137N134 (7) | |
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BEFORE THE COMMISSION q.mr JMi 2 b 7f$
In the Matter of
)
)
GPU Nuclear
)
50-289RA
)
50-239EW (Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
(Sp clal Proceeding)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
CO.'C1EMTS ON CLI-85-19 On December 19, 1935, the Commission invited the parties to the TMI-l restart proceeding, and other interested persons, to comment on the culpability of Pobert Arnold and Edward Wallace in connection with the material false statement contained in GPU's December 5, 1979 resnonse to the NRC's October 25, 1979 Notice of Violation (NOV).
In July of 1984, the NRC staff released Suoplement 5 to NUREG-0690.
The staff came to the followinc conclusions regarding licensee's response to the October 25, 1979 NOV:
1.
The staff concludes that the licensee did willfully violate the certinent emergency procedure and that statements were nade by the licensee in its response
- .o the NOV that were neither accurate nor complete and that vere contrary to other information in the cessession of the licensee.
2.
The licensee also stated in its resronse to the NOV that there is "no indication that this crocedure or the historr of the PORV B601290160 860123 PDR ADOCK 05000289 Q $(33 0
discharge line temoeratures delayed recog-nition that the PORV had stuck open during the course of the accident."
The staff's review of the lawsuit documents led it to call into question the validity of this statement.
Supp.
5, 8-19.
3.
On the basis of the information from the GPU v. B&W lawsuit documents and from OI's investigation, the staff concludes that the licensee's resconse to the NOV Section 4A was inaccurate and incomplete.
Supp.
5, 8-21.
The Commission encouraged commentors to respond to three questions:
(1)
Does any part of the following statements in licensee's December 5, 1979 NOV response constitute a material false statement:
Metropolitan Edison believes that Emergency Procedure 2202-1.5, " Pres-surizer System Failure",
[ sic) was not violated during the ceriod from October 1978 through March 28, 1979 notwithstanding the temperatures of the discharge line from the cilot oper-ated (electromatic) relief valve ("PORV").
Although this procedure was understood by the plant staff, it is not clearly written and does not reflect actual plant conditions.
It will be chanaed.
However, although Metropolitan Edison is concerned about the issue, there is no indication that this procedure or the history of the PORV discharge line temperatures delayed recognition that the PORV had stuck open during the course of the accident.
(2)
If there was a material false statement, what knowledge and involvement, if any, did Arnold and Wallace have in making that statement?
(3)
If Arnold or '.:allace knew of or ucre involved in making a material false statement, does tha t knowledge or involvement indicate willful or reckless conduct by either of them.
CLI-85-19 at 5. _-
In resconse to the Commission's order, the undersigned submits the following comments.
On Acril 23, 1978,
"'iI-2 exoerienced a transient.
During the transient the POPN was cycled about 50 times in a 24-hour period.
GoU v.
B&W, Heaton dep. at on. 171-176.
In April 1973, orior to the Acril 23 transient, the PORV tailoipe temocratures ranged from 127.38F - 132.9'P.
GPU v. B&W Exh. 4040; Tr. 5846-47 (Sieglitz).
The plant was brouaht to cold shutdown followinc the Acril 23, 1978 transient and remained in that condition until Scotember 1978.
GuU v. B&W Tr. 5848-49 (Sieglitz).
Phen the plant was restarted in Scotember 1972, elevated PORV tailoice temperatures were immediately obvious.
Id.
';o maintenance was nerformed on the PORV, either during the four-month cold shutdown or at any tine after the Anril 23, 1979 incident and before the March 20, 1979 accident.
GDU v. BEM Tr. at 5791-93 (Sieglitz).
From October 1978 through the March 1979 accident, the plant operated with PCRV tailnine temoeratures reading in the 1703F - 190*P rance, desoite the fact that olant procedures stated that tailoice tenceratures above 130"P were syntomatic of a leaking PORV.
A task force consisting of GPU 9ervice Comoany emulayces nlus one ' Met-Ed emuloyee was assembled on Anril 24, 1979.
They were tasked with investigatino the Anril 23 transient.. __
The olant was aoain shu t down in January 1979 for ueneral maintenance.
No caintenance was nerformed on the PORV, nor was it examined to determine whether the severe challenae it had suffered at the time of the 7.oril 23, I?7o incident had damaged the valve, and was resoonsible for the elevated tailoipe temocratures.
GPU v. B&F Tr. 5815-5826.
When the olant restarted after the January shutdovn, 'ORV tailpipe tenceratures were acain in the 1908 F range.
Desnite the fact that olant management refused to recognize the oossibility that the PCRV vas leakinc, the majority of the plant staff believed that the PORV had been leaking since October 197P.
Suco.
5, 8-17.
Both Arnold and Mallace stood at the center of the revelations of crobable danaae to the Poo.V.
Sinilarly, the infornation regarding the elevated tailoice tenocratures was readily available to then when they vere nrenarinc their resconse to the MOV.
It acocars that Arnold and allace ~.ade a conscious decision to 'eithhold information from the ""C in making their resconse to the NOV.
Furthernore, in his resoonse, Arnold asserted that the emergency orocedure was not clearly written.
The er.ercency orocedure states in olain lancuate that the, "electrcnatic relier iso la ti.on valve DC-P2 he closed if, amonc ether thinas, the valvo discharue line temocruture exceeds the normal 130*F."
Oct. 25, 1979 '0V at 4.
Dessibi, Arnold's _ _ _..
t reference to lack of clarity certained to the fact that hich tailoine temocratures is only one symotom of a leakina PO?N.
Any resnonsible coroorate manager should and m.us t know that when a symotom, albeit a single symotom, oersists over a ceriod of several months, that svmotom alone is indicative of a problem and should triacer the emergency urocedure.
Arnold's i
'l averment to the contrary is simoly an attemot to cover un Met-rd's negligence.
The company had been charged with serious violations, 4
and Arnold and k'allace had a resoonsibility to agoressively ferret out all of the facts surrounding the failure of the PORV on March 28, 1979.
The NOV carried the risk not onlv of high fines, but of loss of license.
If Arnold and wallace did not know about the damace to the PCRV and the subseauent 1
high tailoine temocratures, it can only be because they 8
]
recklessly disregarded the circumstances (and therchy the truth of their reoresentations) or willfully withheld the i
infornation.
i It is not mere soeculation, on the basis of the record, to ascribe to them the knowledoc for which, as t
corocrate officers and emolovees, they were fornally and saliently resoonsible in a hichly oublicized matter of alleged safety violations.
- hey cannot nou cortrav them-scl"es as naive bvetanders in order to regain corocrate canacity and oublic trust.
3 r
9 -. -. _, -
Additional Comment and Obiection CLI-85-19 enumerates four issues involvinq Arnold which potentially reflect negatively on his integrity and character:
1) involvenent in TMI-2 leak rate falsifications.
2) involvement with regard to the f alse certifi-cation of Floyd.
3) involvenent in the discrimination against Darks.
4) involvement in the naterial false statement in connection with licensee's resconse to the I:ny.
The Corxnission has stated that no hearinas will be held on issues 1, 2 and 3.
The undersigned objects to the Commission's dismissing issues 1, 2 and 3 without a hearinc. 'The Com-nission's dismissal of these issues deorives the oublic of ?
full and fair consideration of Arnold's integrity and char-acter, which is the basic issue and essential to the safety of the oublic.
All four of the issues enumerated in CLI-35-19 go to the integrity and character of Arnold.
A hearing on the fourth issue, even if it were to clear Arnold, should not result in his reinstatement at T!1I as lona as issuce 1,
2 and 3 are onen.
Fesocctfully submitted, eGs-
/
LOUISP BRAO'CnD January 23, 1983
-n-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
)
50-289RA GPU Nuclear
)
50-239EW
)
(Special Droceeding)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of COMMENTS ON CLI-85-19 were served on the persons listed below by deposit in the U. S. mail, first class, on this, the 23rd day of January 1986.
The Nuclear Reculatory Commission Washington D.
C.
20555 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.
Harmon & Weiss 2001 S Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20009 Docketing and Service Section Thomas Y. Au Office of the Secretary Assistant Counsel Commonwealth U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission of Pennsylvania Washington, D.C..
20555 Dept. of Environmental Resources Bureau of Regulatory Counsel Room 505 Executive House P. O. Box 2357 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Jack Goldberg, Esq.
Office of Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge j
1800 M.
- Street, N.W.
Nicholas Fevnolds, Escuire Washington, D. C.
20036 Bishop, Licherman, Cook, Durcell
& Reynolds 1200 17th Street N.N.
t Washincton, D. C.
20036 Michael Himmel, Escuire P.
O. Box 6600 Woodbridae, New Jersey 07095
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