ML20137L799
| ML20137L799 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1985 |
| From: | Farrar D COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| 0650K, 650K, NUDOCS 8601280091 | |
| Download: ML20137L799 (5) | |
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.EN Commonwealth Edison f
N) ons Fir;t N; tion 11 Pen. Chcago, fthnois G 7 Address Reply to: Post Othee Box 767 Chicago, tilinois 60690 September 20, 1985 Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
Subject:
Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 Response to Inspection Report Nos.
50-254/85-017 and 50-265/85-019 NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265
Reference:
Letter from C. E. Norelius to Cordell Reed dated August 21, 1985.
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Dear Mr. Keppler:
)
This letter is in response to the inspection conducted by Messrs.
A. L. Madison and A. D. Morrongiello on June 1 through July 31,1985, of activities at Quad Cities Station. The referenced letter indicated that certain activities appeared to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements.
The Commonwealth Edison Company response to the Notice of Violation is provided in the enclosure. The response also addresses the concern identified in the cover letter regarding the refueling floor monitor and spurious actuations of the Standby Gas Treatment System.
If you have any further questions on this matter, please direct them to this office.
Very t y yours,
/
/. -n o-D.
. Farrar Director of Nuclear Licensing Im Attachment cc: NRC Resident Inspector - Quad Cities SEP 2 31985-8601280091 850920 "
PDR ADOCK 05000254 0650K G
PDR-
ATTACHMENT COMMONWEALTH EDISON COWANY RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION As a result of the inspection conducted June 1 through July 31, 1985, the following violations were identified:
1.
Technical Specification Section 6.2 requires that detailed written -
procedures including applicable checkoff lists shall be prepared, approved ano adhered to for normal operation of the Reactor. QAP 300-7, " Shift Change for Nuclear Station Operators", requires that both the offgoing and oncoming operators check the Control Room panels pursuant to QOS 005-2, " Normal Control Room Inspection and Shift Turnover Panel Check". Further, QOS 005-2 requires the -High Pressure Coolant Injection (FPCI) System flow controller to be in the automatic position.
Contrary to the above, on July 11, 1985, an inadequate shift turnover was performed by both the offgoing and oncoming Unit 2 operators resulting in the HPCI flow controller being left in the manual position for a period of approximately eight (8) hours.
2.
10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XIII requires that measures shall be established to control the handling, storage, shipping, cleaning, and preservation of materials and equipment important to safety. QAP 600-13, " Levels of Storage and Inspection Criteria",
section C.3.b. requires that openings in safety-related valves be capped, plugged or sealed.
Contrary to the above, the -inspectors found two safety-related check valves in the station warehouse without the required protective covers on the flanges.
HPCI FLOW CONTRCLLER On July 11, 1985, the Instrument Maintenance Department performed maintenance on the Unit 1 FPCI Flow Controller. After completion of the work, the Nuclear Station Operator was to test the Controller by putting the
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Controller in MANUAL and reducing the output signal. This would drive the motor gear unit (MGU) off it's high speed stop (HSS) and the HSS light would go out. He was to then increase the output back to 100% and the MGU would drive back to its HSS and the HSS light would illuminate.
The Day Shift NSO was doing this test when the Afternoon Shift NSO arrived to relieve him at 1445 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.498225e-4 months <br />. The Station Control Room Engineers (SCRE) had their turnover at 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br /> and the Afternoon Shift SCRE was
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witnessing the test. During the last part of the test, where the light should illuminate, the light did not function. The Day Shift NSO removed the lens cover and the bulb came on. He replaced the cover and both he and the SCRE walked away.
. The NSO's had their shift change and the Afternoon Shift NSO overlooked the controller being still in MANUAL when he did his panel checks. The Afternoon Shift SCRE isn't positive, but he thinks he had i
already performed his checks before witnessing the test. The Shift Engineers were to have a late turnover and the Afternoon Shift Engineer did not do his panel check until 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />, at which time he also did not.
notice the controller in MANUAL.
The Shift Engineer had another shift change at 2230 hours0.0258 days <br />0.619 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.48515e-4 months <br />, and at this time, discovered the Controller in MANUAL. If activated, the FPCI
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System would have produced more than rated flow because the manual potentiometer was turned to 100% (full open valve posi',. ion).
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN When the mispositioned Controller was discovered, it was immediately returned to the AUTO position. A Commonwealth Edison Deviation Report and Investigation was initiated in addition to a Potentially Significant Event (PSE) Investigation.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER NON-COP 4)LIANCE The NSO's are now required to use QOS 005-S1 as an item-by-item checklist while performing the ECCS System line-up verification (Step 44).
The SCRE's have been retrained with emphasis on the need to do independent verification of system status for ANY test performed during their shift, not just for surveillance tests. They were requested to not assign work, unless it is an emergency, to the NSO's near their shift change time. The NSO's should be allowed to devote their attention to a proper shift change.
All shift personnel involved have individualized letters of reprimand placed into their personnel files.
The AUTO position on the HPCI and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling l
(RCIC) Controllers will be high lighted with red paint to make a j
repositioning of the mode switch more apparent.
Finally, the Operating Engineers have been cautioned to write more complete tests, if necessary, on Work Requests. When appropriate, the Operating Engineers will provide steps for returning a system to normal line-up after testing.
_DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED All corrective actions-except for the high lighting of the FPCI and RCIC Controllers have been completed. The high lighting of the Controllers will be completed by September 30, 1985.
. VALVE STCRACE In accordance with ANSI N45.2.13, Quality Assurance Requirements for Control of Procurement of Items and Services for Nuclear Power Plants, QAP 600-13, " Levels of Storage and Inspection Criteria", requires that safety-related valves be capped, plugged, or sealed. During a tour of the Station Warehouse, two (2) safety-related check valves were found to be without protective covers.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN The two valves, when discovered, were immediately sealed with protective covars.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER NON-COMPLIAFCE In August,1985, the Storeroom personnel began performing QAP 600-13, " Levels of Storage and Inspection Criteria", and its associated checklist, QAP 600-T19, " Safety-Related Storage. Inspection Checklist", on a monthly schedule instead of quarterly.
In addition, during a weekly meeting of Storeroom personnel, supplemental training on this event and the related procedures will be conducted with emphasis placed on checking for proper storage of safety-related items.
DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED Full compliance with storage requirements is currently achieved.
The meeting and training on this event and the associated procedures will be completed prior to September 30, 1985.
ITEMS OF CONCERN Th'e inspectors expressed a concern with the ongoing problems experienced with the Refueling Floor radiation monitors and the associated automatic start of the Standby Gas. Treatment System (SGTS).
During 1985, the Station has experienced 25 radiation monitor trips. Twenty-one of these trips have occurred on Unit 1 and four have occurred on Unit 2.
Between the period of March 7,1985 to April 19, 1985, Unit 1 has had 18 trips of these monitors. A lengthy and extensive investi-gation by the Station Instrument Maintenance Department was able to determine the cause and effect the repair of the 18 trips during that period. The sensor unit on a Unit 'l Refuel Floor radiation monitor was found to have a loose capacitor and a faulty diode in its circuitry. Since that period, Unit 1 has had three trips, two cccurred on May 31, 1985, and one on i
September 5, 1985. The first trip on May 31, 1985 was a spurious trip whereas the second was an actual failure on the sensor convertor. Blis convertor was subsequently replaced.
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i 2.
Unit 2's four trips occurred:
March ~ 20,1985 2A Fuel Pool monitor trip while moving the steam dryer out of the Reactor.
June 28, 1985 Reactor Building vent' monitor CM tube.and sensor convertor failure caused two (2) trips.
July 29, 1985 2A Fuel Pool monitor trip caused by the j
setpoint drift to a low level.
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The Instrument Maintenance Department has discovered a higher than normal induced voltage on the IB Fuel Pool monitor.,The Station has called the Company's Operational Analysis Department (OAD) to the site to do.an electrical noise survey of the cable path of the IB Fuel Pool monitor. This survey has discovered two areas-of high noise. The Station tentatively has selected an alternate _ path for the cable connected to this detector and this alternate path is now scheduled for survey.
.By October 31, 1985, the best alternate path should.be determined. The Station plans to have the cable for this detector re-routed to an acceptably low electronic noise pathway by August 30, 1986. A major consideration in determining this date is the l
current refuel outage schedule and the belief that it is better-to not modify the system during refuel outages when the monitors are relied on the most for detecting abnormal radiation levels.
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