ML20137K329

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Forwards Insp Repts 50-454/96-12 & 50-455/96-12 on 961218-970131 & Forwards Notice of Violation
ML20137K329
Person / Time
Site: Byron  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/13/1997
From: Caldwell J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Graesser K
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
Shared Package
ML20137K332 List:
References
NUDOCS 9704070010
Download: ML20137K329 (6)


See also: IR 05000454/1996012

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March 13, 1997

Mr. K. Graessor

Site Vice President

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Commonwealth Edison Company

4450 N. German Church Road

Byron, IL 61010 '

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SUBJECT:

NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-454/96012(DRP); 50-455/96012(DRP)

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NOTICE OF VIOLATION

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Dear Mr. Graesser:

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On January 31,1997, the NRC completed an inspection at your Byron 1 & 2 reactor

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facilities. The enclosed report presents the inspection results.

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During the inspection period, operations at Byron were conducted in a safe and

conservative manner. However, during this inspection we identified an essential service

water pump room water-tight door open with the room unoccupied. Other examples of

finding open and unattended water-tight doors have been identified by both your staff and

ours during the past year. One example led to a corrective action violation in inspection

Report No. 96-06.

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Your staff also identified that essential service water cooling water divider plates in the 1B

essential service water pump room cooler were not aligned correctly. We considered the

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identification of the issue a positive example of a questioning attitude by the operations

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staff. However, a similar occurrence where the end-bell of an oil cooler for a safety-

related pump was not aligned correctly was documented in inspection report No. 95-09.

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Conective actions after that event should have precluded the room cooler divider plates -

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from being installed incorrectly.

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We consider each of these to be examples of inadequate corrective actions and violations

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of 10 CFR Pzt 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. We are becoming increasingly concerned

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over yNr failure to effectively correct identified issues.

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Additionaly, operators failed to document the degraded condition of the Unit 1

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containmort floor drain leak detection system when the alarm was locked-in due to a

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' secondary ar4 steam leak. We considered the failure to identify and log the leak detection

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system as degraded a failure to follow station procedures and a violation of 10 CFR

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Part 50, Apperdx B, Criterion V.

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in following up or, the degraded floor drain leak detection system the inspectors identified

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that a surveillance rocedure had been implemented to compensate for the loss of alarm

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function, which was + specified system feature in the Final Safety Analysis Report. The

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procedure put in place to compensate for the degraded system condition was

inappropriately screened to not require a safety evaluation. A safety evaluation was

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subsequently performed. We considered the failure to perform the safety evaluation prior

to the approval of the procedure a violation of 10 CFR 50.59.

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The violations discussed above are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation. The

circumstances surrounding the violations are described in detail in the enclosed report.

Please note that you are required to respond to these violations and should follow the

instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. Tf.o NRC will

use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary

to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter

and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Sincerely,

/s/ J. A. Grobe for

James L. Caldwell, Director

Division of Reactor Projects

Dca:ket Nos. 50-454; 50-455

License Nos. NPF-37; NPF-66

Enclosures:

1. Notice of Violation

2. Inspection Report No. 50-454/455-96012(Gr.r)

with Attachments A and B

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED CONCURRENCES

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Document: R:\\l N S PR PTS \\POWE R S\\BY R O\\BYR 06017.DP.P

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box "C" = Copy without kn&ddenci

"E" = Copy with attach /enci "N" = No copy

OFFICE

Rill

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DATE

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3/ /97

3/ /97

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

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K. Graesser

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was lost and the system was still considered operable by the operators, a safety

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evaluation should have boon performed for the surveillance procedure to evaluate the

potential for an unreviewed safety question. We considered the failure to perform the

safety evaluation a violation of 10 CFR 50.59.

The violations discussed .mbove are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation. The

circumstances surroundins the violations are described in detail in the enclosed report.

Please note that you are required to respond to these violations and should follow the

,

instructions spedfied in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will

use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary

to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter

and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

1

Sincerely,

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James L. Caldwell, Director

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Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455

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License Nos. NPF-37; NPF-66

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Enclosures:

1. Notice of Violation

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2. Inspection Report No. 50-454/455-96012(DRP)

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with Attachments A and B

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Document: R:\\lNSPRPTS\\ POWERS \\BYRO\\BYR96012.DRP

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To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box "C" = Copy without attach /enci

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"E" = Copy with attach /enci "N" = No copy

OFFICE

Rlli

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DATE

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March 13, 1997

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Mr. K. Graesser

. Site Vice President

Byron Station

Commonwealth Edison Company

-

4450 N. German Church Road

Byron, IL 61010

SUBJECT:

NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-454/96012(DRP); 50-455/96012(DRP)

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Dear Mr. Graessor:

On January 31,1997, the NRC completed an inspection at your Byron 1 & 2 reactor

facilities. The enclosed report presents the inspection results.

During the inspection period, operations at Byron were conducted in a safe and

conservative manner. However. during this inspection we identified an essential service

water pump room water-tight door open with the room unoccupied. Other examples of

finding open and unattended water-tig,ht doors have been identified by both your staff and

{

ours during the past year. One example led to a corrective action violation in inspection

Report No. 96-06.

1

Your staff also identified that essential service water cooling water divider plates in the 18

essential service water pump room cooler were not aligned correctly. We considered the

i

identification of the issue a positive example of a questioning attitude by the operations

staff. However, a similar occurrence where the end-bell of an oil cooler for a safety-

related pump was not aligned correctly was documented in inspection report No. 95-09.

Corrective actions after that event should have precluded the room cooler divider plates

from being installed incorrectly.

We consider each of these to be examples of inadequate corrective actions and violations

of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. We are becoming increasingly concerned

neer your failure to effectively correct identified issues.

Additionally, operators failed to document the degraded condition of the Unit 1

l

containment flocr drain leak detection system when the alarm was locked-in due to a

secondary side steam leak. We considered the failure to identify and log the leak detection

I

system as degraded a failure to follow station procedures and a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

In following up on the degraded floor drain leak detection system the inspectors identified

that a surveillance procedure had been implemented to compensate for the loss of alarm

function, which was a specified system feature in the Final Safety Analysis Report. The

,

-

._

_ - _ _

__.

.

.

K. Graesser

-2-

procedure put in place to compensate for the degraded system condition was

-

inappropriately screened to not require a safety evaluation. A safety evaluation was

subsequently performed. We considered the failure to perform the safety evaluation prior

to the approval of the procedure a violation of 10 CFR 50.59.

The violations discussed above are cited in the enciosed Notice of Violation. The

circumstances surrounding the violations are described in detail in the enclosed report.

Please note that you are required to respond to these violations and should follow the

instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will

use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary

to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter

and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Sincerely,

' ames L. Caldwell, Director

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455

License Nos. NPF-37; NPF-66

Enclosures:

1. Notice of Violation

2. Inspection Report No. 50-454/455-96012(DRP)

with Attachments A and B

cc w/ encl:

T. J. Maiman, Senior Vice President

Nuclear Operations Division

D. A. Sager, Vice President,

Generation Support

H. W. Keiser, Chief Nuclear

Operating Officer

K. Kofron, Station Manager

D. Brindle, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

1. Johnson, Acting Nuclear

Regulatory Services Manager

Richard Hubbard

Nathan Schloss, Economist

Office of the Attorney General

State Liaison Officer, Wisconsin

State Liaison Officer

Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission

Document Control Desk-Licensing

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K. Groesser

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cc w/ encl:

T. J. Maiman, Senior Vice President

Nuclear Operations Division

,

D. A. Sager, Vice President,

Generation Support

H. W. Keiser, Chief Nuclear

!

. Operating Officer

'

K. Kofron, Station Manager

D. Brindle, Regulatory Assurance

Supervisor

1. Johnson, Acting Nuclear

Regulatory Services Manager

Richard Hubbard

Nathan Schloss, Economist

'

Office of the Attorney General

State Liaison Officer, Wisconsin

State Liaison Officer

Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission

Document Control Desk-Licensing

Distribution:

Docket File w/enci

OC/LFDCB w/ encl

DRP w/ encl

SRt Byron, Braidwood, Zion w/enct

PUBLIC IE-01 w/ encl

Project Manager, NRR w/enci

CAA1 w/enci(E-mail)

A. B. Beach, w/enci

RAC1 (E-Mail) w/enci

Rill Enf. Coordinator, w/enci

Rill PRR w/enci

TSS w/enci

DRS (3) w/enci

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