ML20137H447
| ML20137H447 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1985 |
| From: | PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137H424 | List: |
| References | |
| PROC-851213-01, NUDOCS 8601210528 | |
| Download: ML20137H447 (422) | |
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, PGandE Lettir No.: DCL-85-365 ENCLOSURE 1
' Updates Included In This Submittal ~
DIABLO CANYON EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Volume 3A Updated Table of Contents EP R-6, Revision 10 EP M-6, Revision 12 EP M-9, Revision 4 EP M-10 (Uni't 1), Revision 5 EP M-10 (Unit 2), Revision 2 i
'3601210528 851213 PDR ADDCM 05000275 F I PDR bi $$$Nh a i
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PGandE Letter No.: DCL-85-365 ENCLOSURE 2 Location of' Proprietary / Privacy Information DCPP Emergency Procedure: Pages:
R-6, Revision 10 Pages 1, 3, 9 (Table 1, " Fire Code Call Locations"), and 10 (Appendix 1, " Fire Assistance Communication") of 12; Attachment 2. " Fire Fighting Preplans," Revision 1, pages 1 -2R,1 -3, 2-2R, 2-4, 3-2R 3-3, 4-2R, d
4-3, 5-2R, 5-3, 6-2R, 6-4, 7-2R, 7-5, 8-2R, 8-3, 9-2R, 9-3, 10-2R, 10-3, 11 -2R, 11 -3, 12-2R, 12-4, 13-2R , 13-4, 14-2R , 14-3, 15-2R , 15-3, 16-2R ,
16-3, 17-2R , 17-3, 18-2R , 18-3, 19-2R, 19 r3, 20-2R, 21 -2R, 22-2R, 23-2R, 24-2R, 25-2R, 26-2R, -
, and 26-3 4
M-6, Revision 12 Pages 1, 2, 3, 9 (Table 1, " Fire Code Call Locations"),10 (Appendix 1, " Fire Assistance Communication") of 12; Attachment 2. " Fire Fighting Preplans," Rev.1, Pages
- l -2, 1 -3, 2-2, 2-3, 3-2, 3-3, 4-2, 5-3, f-4, t 6-2, 6-3, 7-2, 7-3, 8-3, 8-4, 9-2, 10-2, T1 -2, 11 -3, 12-2, 12-3, 13-2, 13-3, 14-3, 15-2, 15-3, 16-2, 16-3, 17-2, 17-3, 18-2, 18-3, 19-2, 19-3, 20-2,.20-4, 21-2, 22-2, 23-2, 24-2, 25-2, 26-2, 27-2, 27-3, 28-2, 28-3, 29-2, 30-2, 30-3, 31-2, 31-3, 32-2, 32-3, 33-2, 33-3, 35-2, 36-2, and 37-2 M-9, Revision 4 Pages 2, 5, and 6 of 9; Attachment 1, " Hazardous Waste Spill Notification Requirements," page 1 of 1; Attachment 2, "Information Required for Initial Reporting of Hazardous Waste Release (Check List)," page 1 of 1; Attachment 3 " Transmittal Letter," Page 1 of 1; Attachment 5, "PGandE Personnel " Page 1 of 1 O
0635S/0038K
PGandE Letter No.: DCL-85-365
/ ' ENCLOSURE 3 e
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0635S/0038K
PGandE Letter No.: DCL-85-365 i
(- CURRENT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PRCCEDURES ,
TABLE OF CONTENTS Volume 3A TITLE -
REV E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 0 E-0.1 Reactor Trip Response O E-0.2 Natural Circula' tion Cooldown 1 E-0.3 Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel 1 (With RYLIS)
E-0.4 Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Yessel 0 (Without RVLIS)
E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 0 i E-1.1 SI Termination 0 E-1.2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization 0 E-1.3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation 0 l
E-1.4 Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation 0
E-2 Fiulted Steam Generator Isolation , O E-2.1 Alternate Auxiliary Feedwater Supplies 0 E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture O ECA-0.0 Loss of All AC Power 0 ECA-0.1 Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required 0 ECA-0.2 Loss of All AC Power Recovery With SI Required 0 ,.
ECA-0.3 Restore Vital Bus 0 ECA-1.1 Loss of Energency Coolant Recirculation 0 ECA-1.2 LOCA Outside Containment 0 j ECA-2.1 Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators O ECA-3.1 SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant-Subcooled Recovery Desired 0 ECA-3.2 SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant - Saturated Recovery Desired 0 ECA-3.3 SGTR Without Pressurizer Pressure Control 0 F-0 Critical Safety Function Status Trees .
O FR-C.1 Response to Inadequate Core Cooling 0 FR-C.2 Response to Degraded Core Cooling 0 FR-C.3 Response to Saturated Core Conditions 0 FR-H.1 Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 0 FR-H.2 Response to Steam Generator Overpressure 0 FR-H.3 Response to Steam Generator High Level 0 -
FR-H.4 Response to Loss of Normal Steam Release Capabilities 0
, a 0635S/0038K 12/13/85
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p, TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) , ,-
FR-H.S Response to Steam Generator Low Level '
O FR-I.1 Response to High Pressurizer Level 0 FR-I.2 Response to Low Pressuri:er Level 0 FR-I.3 Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel 0 i
FR-P.1 Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition 0 FR-P.2 Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition 0 FR-S.1 Response to Nuclear Power Generation /ATWS i 0 FR-S.2 Response to Loss of Core Shutdown j 0 FR-Z.1 Response to High Containment Pressure 0
! FR-Z.2 Response to Containment Flooding 0 i
FR-Z.3 Response to High Containment Radiation Level 0
- R-1 Personnel Injury or Illness (Radiologically Related) 15 and/or Overexposure i R-2 Release of Airborne Radioactive Materials 5 R-3 Release of Radioactive Li 4
- R-4 High Radiation (In Plant) quids 3
- R-5 Radioactive Liquid Spill
' 3 R-6 Radiological Fire 10 R-7 offsite Transportation Accidents 5 M-1 Employee Injury or Illness (Nonradiological) 13 M-2 Nonemployee Injury or Illness (Third Party)
/ , 11
- M-3 Chlorine Release
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- 5 M-4 Earthquake
' 9 M-5 Tsunami Warning 5 M-6 Nonradiological Fire . 12
- M-7 011 Spill Isolation and Clean Up 7 l M-8 Containment Emergency Personnel Hatch 0 M-9 Hazardous Waste Management Contingency Plan
' 4 M-10 Fire Protection of ' Safe Shutdown Equipment, Unit 1 5 M-10 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment, Unit 2 2
} G-1 Accident Classification and Emergency Plan Activation 5 l G-2 Establishment of the On-Site Emergency i Organization 7 l G-2 S1 Notification of the On-Site Emergency Organization 3 G-3 Notification of Off-Site Organizations 7 G-4 Personnel Accountability and Assembly I
6 G-5 Evacuation of Nonessential Site Personnel 3 x
I 0635S/0038K 12/13/85 1
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- 9GrF43 Pacific Gas and Electric Company NUMBER EP R-6 REVISION 10
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' DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS DATE 9/9/85 . I 0ASLO CANYON PCnNER PLANT UNIT NCMS) 1 AND 2 PAGE 1 0F 12
- ENERGENCY PROCEDURE RADIOLOGICAL FIRE TITLE.
- APPROVED. Y. S l *hb PLANT MANAGER 4' DATE-SC0pE This procedure discusses the actions which are taken in the . event of a fire which involves radioactive materials or radiation. This procedure and changes thereto requires PSRC review.
l GENERAL
,f_ .
A radiological fire is one which involves either radiation or radioac.tive materials. Examples of this type of fire are fires in the-l
( solid radwaste storage facility, the drumming station, contaminated
%~ ventilation filters, and electrical or lube oil fires in radiation areas. The primary hazard (after plant safety and personnel injury),
is the spread of contamination. All reasonable attempts to prevent
, the . spread of smoke-borne contamination should be made.
l SYMPTOMS -
- 1. A fire is discovered in the auxiliary building, fuel handling building, containment or solid radwaste storage facility. .
! 2. The fire detection system annunciator indicates a fire in any radiation area. !
. AUTOMATIC ACTION l
The fire water sprinkler systems may activate.
IMMEDIATE ACTION
- 1. Activate the fire signal by dialin s a code which gives the location of fire (see Table 1. e f re signal is a 30-second blast on the fire sirens. The signal will be followed by the location code of the fire on the epde call system.repaated 8 times. The first five persons to dial L71 will be connected into a conference call. The priority for the conference call is:
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DC0217 IVII l
Diam.O CANYON POWER Pt. ANT UNIT NO(S)- 1 AND 2 ON 9/9/85 Tm.E:
DATE PAGE 2 0F 12 / ]-
RADIOLOGICAL FIRE . f
- a. Shift Foreman (Interim Site Emergency Coordinator).
- b. Fire Brigade Leader (typically the Senior Control Operator).
- c. Assistant Fire Brigade Leader
- d. Plant Manager
- e. Fire Marshal l
- 2. The Shift Foreman and Senior Control Operator will dial 76 and be given full details regarding the fire. These should include exact locations, severity, potential danger to the safety of the plant and any special radiological hazards present. The Shift Foreman shall coordinate the emergency action.
- 3. Members of the on-shift fire brigade should report to the Operations Ready Room to pick up their fire safety equipment.
The Fire Brigade Leader will receive instruction from the Shift Foreman. Typically the Senior Control Operator (SCO) is designated Fire Brigade Leader. The Shift Foreman may assign a licensed operator who is qualified as a Brigade leader to fill this position if the SCO is not availt.ble. The Shift Foreman is responsible for establishing an appropriate on-shift emergency , j organization and assuring that Technical Specifications for _f g Control Room staffing are not violated. L/
- 4. If the fire occurs during normal working hours, members of the Maintenance Fire Brigade should go to the Cold Machine Shop. The Assistant Fire Brigade Leader should enter the
- conference call to receive their instructions. '
- 5. If appropriate, change the control room ventilation system to the
- isolation ' mode (Mode 3) to prevent the entry of smoke and -
I airborne activity.
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- 6. Evacuate the area affected by the fire. This may be done by
[
sounding the Site Emergency Signal, or other appropriate means.
- 7. Fire fighters should wear supplied air breathing apparatus unless air samples have been taken and indicate that there is no I airborne activity hazard. When self-contained breathing l apparatus (SCBA) is used, a crew should be dispatched to an air .
bottle refilling, station an6 trepare to refill the backpack l bottles as re44t.tred._ In the 85' El. hallway at the Unit I Safety 1
Injection pumps, on 140' El. behind the Control Room, and in the
- l Unit II East Buttress.
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. x OCO217 2VII e ,,-
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- otAm.o CANYON PCHNER PLANT UNIT NCMS) 1 AND 2 e~' ON 10
- DATE 9/9/85 PAGE 3 0F 12 Tnts: RADIOLOGICAL FIRE '
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS The Shift Foreman, acting as Interim Site Emergency Coordinator, shall direct all subsequent actions from the Control Room until relieved by
.the long-term Site Emergency Coordinator if the emergency warrants it.
Such actions should include the following:
- 1. If a fire cannot be physically contained and controlled promptly with available resources, assistance from the California Department of Forestry (CDF) should be requested. Their assistance should also be requested at any other time the Fire.
' . Brigade Leader feels that they may be needed. Refer to Appendix I for telephone numbers.
NQIE: 1) If outside assistance been ested, notify the Security Departmen and have-them notify the Avila Gate. ne or more plant operating personnel shall be dispatched to the Security Building to escort and provide
', radiological monitoring to CDF personnel.
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%.7 2) Maintain a record of notifications made to offsite personnel, Form 69-9221. " Emergency Notification Record" may be used to provide this record.
gives a name and number to call the plant back. Provide CDF with details concerning location and the type of fire. Also give CDF.
an update of the fire conditions even before they arrive as they may decide to send more support.
3 If CDF responds, they will stage at the G.C. Warehouse parking lot. Their first responding chief officer will take charge and identify himself. He may initially decide to go to the scene of the fire. He will eventually decide to contact the PGandE Site Emergency Coordinator. Therefore, escort and access should be provided to him to reach either the control room or TSC, depending on where the Site Emergency Coordinator is located. A -
CDF radio phone is available in the shift foreman's office and the TSC for the use of the CDF chief officer.
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DC0217 3VII -
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otAaLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NCMS) 1 AND 2 ON DATE 9/9/85 TITLE: RADIOLOGICAL FIRE -
- 4. During the course of the fire, the Control Operator and those at the scene should pay particular attention for signs that the operability of the various engineered safeguards equipment is reduced below minimum Technical Specification limits, or if such damage is im.inent. shut down the unit imediately.
E: Emergency Procedure EP M-10 provides the operator with '
listing of safeguards equipment which may be affected by I fires in various locations. This procedure should be consulted to assist in determining the operating strategy during the fire.
- 5. . Establish an initial emergency classification based on the
' criteria in Appendix Z and perform the actions required by the classification.
- 6. If the Control Room must be evacuated, follow the instructions given in Emergency Procedure OP-8.
- 7. If a sprinkler system was activated, the thenr.a1 element must be replaced before the system can be reset.
- 8. t Investigate to see whether any radioactive material . release * '
limits were violated.
- 9. Close out with verbal summary to offsite organizations and complete the following written reports:
- a. Plant Problem Feport (See Nuclear Plant Administrative Procedure C-12)
- b. Written sumary to NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for an Unusual Event or 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for a higher classification.
- 10. If a fire has been put out before C0F arrives they may still request to send one engine company to visit the site for their close out.
- 11. The plant Fire Marshal, or his designee shall be promptly notified of all plant fires.
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DC0217 4VII O
DIASt.O CANYON POWER Pt. ANT UNIT NCHS) 1 AND 2 ON
/.,' 'DATE 9/9/85 PAGE 5 0F 12 TITLE ltADI0 LOGICAL FIRE SpECIAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING RADIOLOGICAL FIRES
- 1. Radiation exposure control,
- a. Know the radiation levels.
- 1) Posted barrier signs.
- 2) Surveys by Chemistry and Radiation Protection Technicians.
- b. Radiation surveys may be required during the fire fighting as plant conditions change. The on-shift Chemistry and Radiation Protection Technician is designated to respond to all fire emergencies to provide monitoring support.
Additional Technicians are assigned to the maintenance brigade crews to assist the shift C&RP technician,
- c. All fire fightin radiation areas,gmust personnel entering wear and periodically radiation or high monitor their ,
b, dosimetry to av6fd exceeding the exposure limits set forth ,
in the DCPP Radiation Protection Manual. Off-site fire fighters shall be escorted by plant personnel in these areas.
- 2. ' Contamination Control
- a. Surface Contamination .
- 1) Fires in the surface contamination areas will probably also create.an airborne contamination hazard.
- 2) Wear self-contained breathing apparatus.
- 3) Turnout gear should provide adequate contamination protection to the fire fighters in most loosa surface contamination areas of the plant. In areas of very high contamination, additional protective clothing may be required. Fire fighters should never wear polyethylene boots or gloves, since these may melt to -
the skin or clothing in a fire environment.
- 4) A wide water fog pattern may help keep the contamination from going airborne.
DC0217 SVII
- _ _ _ _ . . , . _ , - - - _ - - - - - _ . _ , , , , _ , _ . , _ , _ - . . _ . . , , , _ em__. , , , , . . _ _ _ _ , . _ . , _ _ , . , _ _ _ _ . , , _ _ . , _ . _ . . _ . , _ _ - . . , , . _ _ _ . - . _ . _ -
OLAS4.0 CANYON PCMER PLANT UPNT %S) 1 AND 2 NUMBER EP R-6 REVISION 10 DATE 9/9/85
. TITLE RAtt0 LOGICAL FIRE PAGE 6 0F 12 ,
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- 5) Care must be taken to minimize the spread of contamination and its potential release to the environment.
- 6) Water use should consider processing capacity of Radwaste systems.
- 7) Turnout gear for offsite fire fighters which may become contaminated at the plant will be replaced from spares in the warehouse if it cannot be readily decontaminated,
- b. Airborne Contamination
- 1) Levels may be continisally changing.
- 2) Always wear a self-contained breathing apparatus when fighting fires in surface contamination areas, airborne contaminatio,1 areas, or radioactive material storage or processing areas.
- 3) Smoke will be radioactive and ventilation should be performed via filters and an effluent monitor. b
- 4) A wide fog pattern will help to reduce airborne contamination levels by entraining the radioactive particles and carrying them to the floor. -
- 5) High pressure water or dry chemical agent directed at areas of surface contamination will cause some of the contaminants to become airborne.
- 6) Radiation Protect' ion personnel should monitor airborne contamination levels during the emergency and reconnend actions and precautions to lower the concentrations.
- c. Environmental Conditions
- 1) Minimize excess water usage due to limited capacity of waste tanks and activity discharge restrictions. -
- 2) Minimize unmonitored releases to the atmosphere of water or airborne contamination.
)
DC0217 6VII
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Diaato~ CANYON POWER PLANT UMT NO(S) 1 AND 2 NUMBER EP R-6 REVISION 10 C DATE 9/9/85 MLE PAGE 7 0F 12 RADIOLOGICAL FIRE
- 3. Post-fire Fighting Activities ,
- a. Monitor personnel,for contamination.
- 1) External.
- 2) Internal monitoring may also be required.
- b. Monitor fire fighting and emergency equipment for contamination under the direction of radiation protection personnel.
- c. Determine radiation exposure of fire fighting personnel. A radiation work pennit may also need to be prepared to document exposures.
- d. Areas in or adjacent to the fire area may require
. decontamination.
... e. An environmental monitoring program for areas surrounding (s
the plant maf be required if contamination has spread .
e outside the controlled area.
- f. Smoke damage to electrical equipment and stainless steel piping must be assessed due to the high talorine content of the polyethylene used for contamination control.
- g. When dry chemical agents and halon have been used in areas of stainless steel piping or machinery, that equipment must be thoroughly cleaned and then inspected.
FIRE FIG' FRING PREPLANS '
- Attachrint 2 contains fire fighting preplans for plant locations which are reasonably expected to contain radioactive materials or a radiai; ion hazard. These preplans are intended to afd the Fire Brigade Leader and the Site Emergency Coordinator during the fire emergency.
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l DC0217 7VII
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DIACLO CANYON PCM2 PLANT UNIT A$) 1 AND 2 ON 10 DATE 9/9/85 '
PAGE ,
8 0F 12 " )
TITLE RADIOLOGICAL FIRE '
REFERENCES
- 1. Emergency Procedure M-6, "Non-Radiological Fire."
- 2. Emergency Procedure G-1, " Accident Classification and Emergency Plan Activation."
- 3. Emergency Procedure G-2, " Establishment of the Onsite Emergency Organization.
- 4. Emergency Procedure G-3, " Notification of Offsite Organizations."
- 5. Diablo Canyon Power Plant - Fire Protection Plan.
- 6. General Operating Order 1.300 and 1.301.
- 7. PGandE Fire Prevention Manual.
- 8. Accident Prevention Rule 23.
ATTAC}MENTS
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- 1. Form 69-9221 " Emergency Notification itecord," 3/82. _
- 2. " Fire Fighting Preplans".
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OCO217 8VII e
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OlA8t,0 CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO(S) 1 AND 2 NUMBER EP R-6 i
REVISION 10 l .
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- DATE 9/9/85 PAGE 9 0F 12 -
TITLE: RADIOLOGICAL FIRE -
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_ TABLE 1 l '
FIRE CODE CALL LOCATIONS CODE LOCATIONS Control Building No. 1 Containment No. 1 Turbine Building l
No.1 Auxiliary Building No.1 Fuel Handling Building Package Boiler Area Hot machine shop area l No. 2 Containment No. 2 Turbine Building No. 2 Auxiliary Building No. 2 Fuel Handling Building Security Diesel Area
... , Grass Fire
/ :
Outside Transfomer Fire b Intake Structure '
500 kV Switchyard 230 kV Switchyard Radwaste Storage All Clear
- Fire Drill -
Test Fire Code Administration Building Security Building .
Training Building Assembly Buf1 ding Technical Support Center Medical Emergency h
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.c DC0217 9VII
OlA84,0 CANYON POWER bT LMT NCMS) NUMBER EP R-6 l'AND 2 REVISION 10 DATE 9/9/85 s. ;
PAGE 10 0F 12
TITLE. RADIOLOGICAL FIRE f APPENDIX 1 FIRE ASSISTANCE COMMUNICATION
- 1. California Department of Forestry Emergency Only)
(Business) l adio Phone 1 E l San Luis Obispo County Sheriff 1. Automatic Tie Line (Request they dispatch the (Control Room and
' California Department of Forestry) TSC)
- 2. Radio (Control Room, TSC or Security)
E
- 3. Watch
- Coman er -
J g .-
- 4. Emergency
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'l 2. Fire Protection Plant Ext.
Randy Kohout Home Phone:
l OR l HP Freq. Pa Cal (Group Call Fire Marshal Plant Ext. '
Cannon Johnson Home Phone -
E '
HP Freq. Pager Ca 0
DC0217 10VII L _ _ . _
DiAaLO CANYON POWER Pt. ANT UNIT %$) 1 AND 2 NUMBER EP R-6 REVISION 10 *
', DATE 9/9/85 TITLE PAGE 11 0F 12 '
RADIOLOGICAL FIRE APPEN0!X Z EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NOTIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS
- 1. When this emergency procedure has been implemented, and upon direction from the Shift Foreman, proceed as follows:
- a. Designate this event an Notification of Unusual Event for fires within site boundary if a verified fire is not under control within 10 minutes of initiating fire fighting efforts or if California Department of Forestry Assistance is requested, or.for any fire in radioactive material causing an uncontrolled increase in airborne activity.
Notify plant staff and response organizations required for this classification by implementing Emergency Procedures G-2
" Establishment of the Onsite Emergency Organization" and G-3
" Notification of Offsite Organizations" in accordance with Emergency Procedure G-1 " Accident Classificatfor, and Emergency 71an Activation."
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h b. Designate this event an ALERT if a verified fire is not under control within 10 minutes of initiating fire fighting efforts and the fire threatens the operability of safety related equipment or is located in one of the following areas containing safety systems:
1 Containment 2 Control Room 3 Cable Spreading Room 4 Diesel Generator Rooms 5 Auxiliary Building 6 Intake Structure Pump Rooms Notify Plant Staff and response organizations required by EP G-2 and EP G-3 in accordance with EP G-1.
- c. Designate this event a Site Area Emergency if a verified fire is not under control within 10 minutes of initiating ~
fire fighting efforts in an area containing safety systems, and causes a confirmed loss of a safety system function that causes entry into a technical specification action statement (i.e., loss of both trains of containment spray when in modes.1, 2, 3, or 4 or loss of both Safety Injection pumps when in modes 1, 2, or 3). Notify plant staff and respor.se ,
organizations required by EP G-2 and EP G-3 in accordance with EP G-1. -
OCO217 11VII
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DIASLO CANYON POWER Pt. ANT UPWT NO(5) . 1 AND 2 R ON 10 DATE. 9/9/85 PAGE 12 0F 12 ' ]
Tritt RADIOLOGICAL FIRE '
- d. Designate this event a General Emergency if the fire causes massive damage to plant systems which, in the opinion of the Site Emergency Coordinator, is likely to lead to a core melt situation. Notify plant staff and response organizations required by EP G-2 and EP G-3 and implement the instructions in EP G-1 regarding on and offsita protective actions.
- 2. In addition to personnel required to be notified by EP G-2 also notify the following:
- a. Fire Marshal (See Appendix 1)
- b. System Dispatcher (if load may be affected)
E: In off-normal working hours, consideration should also be given to calling in additional members of the Plant Fire Brigade. This should not take precedence over calling C0F.
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DC0217 12VII 1
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PAGE 1 0F 1 f-a DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS DIA8LO CANYON POWER PLANT -
UNIT NOS 1 AND 2 -
ATTACHMENT 2 TO EP R-6 TITLE: " FIRE FIGHTING PREPLANS" UNIT # rREPLAN TITLE' PAGE REVISION
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1&2 AUX!LIARY BUILDING - EL 64' 1-1 R 1 1&2 AUXILIARY BUILDING - EL 73' 2-1 R 1 1&2 ACCESS CONTROL & CHEMISTRY LA80RATORY 3-1 R 1 1&2 AUXILIARY BUILDING - EL 85' 4-1 R 1-1 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION - EL 85'. 5-1 R 1 2 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION - EL 85' 6-1 R 1 1&2 AUXILIARY BUILDING - EL 100' 7-1 R 1 1
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION - EL 100' 8-1 R 1 1
FUEL HANDLING BUILDING - EL 100' 9-1 R 1 2
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION - EL 100' 10-1 R 1 2 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING - EL 100' 11 1 R 1 1&2 AUXILIARY BUILDING - EL 115' 12-1 R 1 1
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION - EL 115' 13-1 R 1 1
FUEL HANDLING BUILDING - EL 115' 14-1 R 1 2
2 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION - EL 115' 15-1 R I FUEL HANDLING BUILDING - EL 115' 16-1 R 1
' ( 1 FUEL HANDLING BUIDLING - EL 140' 17-1 R 1-s-- 2 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING - EL 140' 18-1 R 1 1&2 VENTILATION ROOMS - EL 154' & 164" 19-1 R 1 1 CONTAINMENT - EL 91' 20-1 R 1 1 CONTAINMENT - EL 117' 21-1 R 1 1
CONTAINNENT - EL 140' & A80VE 22-1 R 1 2 CONTAINMENT - EL 91' 23-1 R 1 2 CONTAINMENT - EL 117' 24-1 R 1 2 ' CONTAINMENT - EL 140' & ABOVE 25-1 R 1 1&2 RADWASTE AND CHEM STORAGE - EL 115' 26-1 R 1 5
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OC0009 13!!!
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DICL0 CANYON POWER PLANT .
. UNIT NO. 1&2 AUXILIARY BUILDING EL. 64' FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COM8USTIBLES: 1. Lube oil - -
- 2. Grease
- 3. Cable insulation
- 4. Hydrogen (Wasta Gas Decay Tanks) .
- 2. Lube oil
- 3. Cable insulation
- 4. Hydrogen from Weste Gas System
- 5. Grease ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. _ Primary.- Via Door No's. B-7 or B-8 from center Staimay S-2 or Elev. No. 2
- 2. Secondary Via Door No. B-15 from Staimay S-3 Unit No. 1 side
- 3. Tertiary - Via Door No. B-12 from Statmay S-4 Unit No. 2 side FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Staimay S-2 (E1. 64' Landing)
- 2. Secondary - Access Control E1. 85'
- 3. Tertiary - S-3 Staimay Unit I side S-4 Staimay Unit 2 side NOTE: E1.115' Tank Area is the primary response location for outside agencies responding to a fire emergency in the Auxiliary Building.
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS
- 1. Combustionproducts(cableinsulation, poly) -
- 2. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination, especially around tanks and pumps
- 3. Potential high radiation areas around waste tanks, monitor tanks, waste gas decay tanks, filters and RHR pumps and heat exchangers MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. The source of hydrogen gas fires should be secured before total extinguishment.
- 2. Halfways are provided with drains, and drainage is to the Auxiliary Building sump.
- 3. Key control of Elev. No. 2 is accessed at E1. 85'.
6
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Page 1-1R DC0217 14I REVISION 1
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
1 1. Water fog should be used to cool exposures. 7 especially iedundant safe shutdown equiprent.
./
. 2. Fire doors should be closed as r.ecessar/ to retard fire spread.
I
- 3. RHR and CCW pumps are required for safe shutdown. Protect redundant trains from fire and smoke.
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - six - 20# Dry Chemicals
- (3) Unit No. I side (3) Unit No. 2 side
. 2. Fire hose reels - six (3) Unit No.1 side (3) Unit No. 2 side VENTILATION: 1. Fans S-31 and S-32 Supply Air and E-1 and E-2 are exhaust -
fans.
- 2. Open grating at the east end would allow smoke and gases to vent to El.115' where it could be exhausted to the cutside via roll-up Door No. 354.
, 3. Portable smoke exhausters may be required, smoke could be exhausted via Stairwells S-3 and S-4 to El. 140' Hot Shop.
If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
5.
Positive pressure ventilation techniques could work best in T i RHR pump rooms.
NOTE: Smoke may be contaminated, contact C&RP. h COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone
- 2. Portable radios .
LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panels - PL 13-1 Unit No. 1 PL 23-1 Unit No. 2
- 2. Emergency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Self contained breathing apparatus vill be required.
- 2. An explosive possibility exists from H2 in the gas .
decay tank area.
- 3. Portable hand-held lanterns may be necessary during rescue operations in heavy smoke.
- 4. Wearradiationdetectiondevices(TLD, pencil dosimeter).
- 5. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti-contamination functions. '
. .o PACE 1-2R DC0217 ISI REVISION 1
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DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT -
UNIT NO. 1&2 AUXILIARY BUILDING EL. 73' FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN .
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POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Lube oil
- 2. Cable insulation (Cable Trays and 480V MCC's)
- 3. Grease
- 4. Hydrogen (Gas Decay Tanks)
- 5. Motor control centers
Cable insulation
, 3. Motor Control Centers
- 4. Lube oil
- 5. Hydrogen
- 6. Grease ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door No's. B-7 or B-8 from center Stairway S-2, or Elev. No. 2
- 2. Secondary - Via Door No. B-15 from Stairway S-3 Unit I side
- 3. Tertiary - Via Door No. B-12 from Stairway S-4 Unit 2 side FIRE BRIGADE STADING AREA: 1. Primary - outside E1. No. 2 E1. 73' Landing h--
- 2. Secondary - Access Control E1. 85'
- 3. Tertiary - S-4 Stairway E1. 85' Unit 2 side S-3 Stairway E1. 85' Unit 1 side -
NOTE: E1.115' Tank Area is the primary response location for outside agencies responding to a fire emergency in the Auxiliary Building.
, RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Sodium Hydroxide
- 2. Hydrogen l 3. Boric acid l 4. Combustion products (cable insulation, poly)
- 5. Potential radiological airborne i and surface contamination
- 6. High radiation areas such as hold up tanks, BIT tank, and charging pumps e
e PAGE 2-IR l
j DC0217 16I REVISION 1
LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panels - PL 13-2 Unit No. 1 23-2 Unit No. 2 m
- 2. Emergency lighting )
. I SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable hand-held lanterns may be necessary during rescue operations.
. 3. An explosive possibility exists from H2 in the gas decay tank area.
, 4. Wear radiation detection devices (TLD, pencil dosimeter).
- 5. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti -
contamination functions.
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e PAGE 2-3R OCO217 18I REVISION 1 L
O MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. Unit No. I sprinkler isolation nim i-located above walkway outside Edi rw ,, Room
'A. 1-3 (FP-1-346). Unit No. 2 outside CCW Pump Room 2-3 (FP-2-349). The Main Sprinkler I Isolation Valve is located at center stairway,-
landing El. 78' (FP-0-30).
- 2. Key control of Elev. No. 2 is accessed at El. 85'.
- 3. Floor drains go to Auxiliary Building sump.
Water may drain to E1. 64' via open grating on cat walks.
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Water fog may be required to protect exposures such as redundant cables in fire retardant enclosures.
- 2. Fire doors should be closed as necessary to retard fire spread (especially between charging pump rooms and RHR heat exchangers, i
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire exti.nguishers - Four 20# Dry Chemicals l Two 15# C02 's
- 2. Fire hose reels - Four (2) Unit No.1 side (2) Unit No. 2 side
- 3. Automatic Wet Sprinkler Systems (charging pump rooms and CCW pump cubicles) ,
,..~. _
~
VENTILATION: 1. Fans S-31 and S-32 supply air and E-1 and E-2 are exha'ust fans.
- 2. In each Component Cooling Water Pump Room, air ducts without
~
dampers could allow smoke and hot gases to spread from one compartment -to another.-
- 3. Open grating at the east end would allow smoke and gases -to "
l
' vent to El.115' where it could be exhausted to the outside via roll-up Door No '354. .
- 4. Portable smoke exhausters may be required, smoke could be exhausted via open Stairwells 5-3 and S-4 up to El. 140' Hot Shop. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
- 5. Positive pressure ventilation techniques are reconsnended to ventilate the charging pump rooms.
NOTE: Smoke may be contaminated, contact C&RP.
/
Plant telephone '
~
COMMUNICATIONS: 1.
- 2. Portable radios PAGE 2-2R DC0217 17I REVISION 1
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AUXILIARY BUILDING EL. 85' -
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FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. Lube oil
- 3. Grease
- 4. Control panel
- 2. Control panel
- 3. Cable insulation
- 4. Lube oil
- 5. Grease ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door No's.173 and 188 from Access Control Hallway
- 2. Secondary - Via Door No.187 from Stairway S-3
- 3. Tertiary - Via Door No.185 from Stairway S-4 FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Access Control El. 85'
- 2. Secondary - Cold Machine Shop
- (,i NOTE: El.115' tank area is the primary response
(' .
location for outside agencies responding to a fire emergency in the Auxiliary Building.
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS:
. 1. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination. -
- 2. Potential high radiation area by sample panel at 8.A. evaporators, in seal water and letdown '
heat exchanger rooms, safety injection pumps and radwaste concentrator.
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. Hallways are provided with floor drains.
, Drainage is to the Auxiliary Building sump.
- 2. Breathing air refill station at El. 85' should not be used to refill air bottles during a fire in the Auxiliary Building.
.3. Eley. No. 2 key control is accessed at l
El. 85'.
l l
I PAGE 4-1R DC0217 21I REVISION 1
I RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EOUIPMENT:
- 1. Water fog may be required to protect exposures.
- 2. Fire doors should be closed as necessary to , ) -'
retard fire spread. .
- 3. Open gratings should be protected to preclude .
- fire spread to El's.100' and 115'.
FIRE SUPPRESSION EOUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Five 20# Dry Chemicals One 15# CO
- 2. FirehosereelsFour(4)2-Un$tNo.1 2 - Unit No. 2 VENTILATION: 1. Fans S-31 and S-32 supply air and E-1 and E-2 are exhaust fans. ~
- 2. Open grating at the east end would allow smoke and gases to vent to. El.115' where it could be exhausted to the outside via roll-up Door No. 354.
- 3. Portable smoke exhausters may be required, smoke could be
- exhausted via open Stairways S-3 and S-4 to El.140' Hot Shop.
If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejector or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
NOTE: (Smoke may be contaminated, obtain guidance from C&RP prior to ventilating out of doors with portable exhausters.)
. t.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1.
- 2. Plant telephone Portable radios NOTE: (The use' or port M'
e ra los is prohibited in the .
Auxiliary Building Control Panel Area.)
LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panel - PL 13 Auxiliary Building El. 85' Col.
N17-4
- 2. Emergency lighting ,
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Self contained breathing apparatus wil1 be required. 1
- 2. Wear radiation detection devices (TLD, pencil . l l
dosimeter).
- 3. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti- l contamination functions. '
- 4. Portable hand-held lanterns may be needed for rescue operations. .
e PAGE 4-2R REVISION 1 DC0217 221 -
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, DIABLO' CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 l
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION EL. 85' - -
FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN -
' POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation !
- 2. Grease
- 3. Transient combustibles
- 2. Cable insulation
- 3. Grease (motor operated valves)
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door Nos.174 and 174A from Auxiliary Building El. 85' (Security Door)
- 2. Secondary - Via Door No.189 from Fuel Handling Building El. 85' (Security Door)
- 3. Tertiary - Via Door No.116 from Turbine Building through Post LOCA Sampling Room (Card Reader, C&RPLock)
NOTE: This area is criss-crossed with pipe supports and other obstacles.
4 .
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Access Control El. 85'. d
,' 2.
Secondary - Outside Auxiliary Building Control i panel.
I RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS:
- 1. Potential radiation area with possible localized high radiation hot spots.
- 2. Possible loose surface on airborne radiological contamination.
- 3. Consult with C&RP tech about radiation precautions. (Area Radiation Monitors, Radiation Surveys) 4.. Acknowledge posted radiation signs and barriers. -
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. De-energize electrical equipment as necessary to reduce shock potential.-
- 2. Fire suppression water will drain to floor drain receivers (Conservative water use should be observed). .
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT
- 1. Fire streams may be required to cool conduits to reduce heat damage.
- 2. Fire doors should be kept closed to minimize fire or smoke spread.
- 3. Ventilation ducts without fire dampers could allow fire to spread to vital conduit vaults north of the Chemistry Lab.
)
PAGE 5-1R DC0217 23I REVISION 1 d --.y_ _ _ . _ _ _-_.- _,_-.,_,_.,____-r- - - - - - - _ _ _ - - - - - . _ - _ , -
m FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Two 20f Dry Chemicals One 15# CO SarpleRoo$-PostLOCA fs 2. Fire hose reels - One-West of Door No.174 One-Adjacent to Door No. 189
- 3. No sprinklers are provided in this~ area.
VENTILATION: 1. An opening is provided between the containment structure ar.d El. 100' which would vent smoke and gases.to the upper l elevations.
- 2. Portable smoke exhausters may be required. Smoke could be exhausted via Door No.192 through the Post LOCA Sampling Room using positive pressure techniques. Open louvers are provided on the north side at El's.100' and 115'. If power is lost, gas powered smoke efectors or pertable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
- 3. If high airborne contamination is present, air should be sampled. prise to ventilation and filters used where possible.
l COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone
- 2. Portable radios NOTE: Use of por d cause inadvertent reactor shutdown signals in the penetration area and at the Auxiliary Building control board.. -
i., - .
- LIGHTING: 1. Lighting Panel - PL 13-2 Auxiliary Building El. 85' Col. N17-4
- 2. Emergency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: ,
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be' required.
- 2. Portable hand-held lanterns-should be considered for rescue operations.
- 3. Wear TLD and pencil dosimeter. .
- 4. Observe good contamination control practices, minimize water.
PAGE 5-2R DC0217 24I REVISION 1
_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ __________]
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT
, , UNIT NO. 2 CONTAINMENT PENETRAT' ION EL. 85' & SEC. DIESEL GEN.
FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. Grease
- 3. Transient combustibles (may be radiolc5fG 'ly contaminated)
- 4. Hydrogen in Primary Piping System
- 5. Diesel Fuel (Security Diesel Generator Area)
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles
- 2. Cable insulation
- 3. Grease (motor operated valves)
- 4. Diesel Fuel (Security Diesel Generator Area)
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES:
- 1. Primary - Penetration Area Via Door No's.174A-2 and 174-2 from Auxiliary Building El. 85' (Security Doors)
- 2. Secondary Via Door No.189-2 from FHB El. 85' (Security Door)
- 3. Tertiary - Via Door No.116-2 from Post LOCA Sampling Room (Security Door)
- 4. For FHB Fan Room South Side Via Door 194-2 (Security Door)
- 5. For Security Diesel Generator Area Via Door No's.199A and 1998
( . (Security Doors)
%;s -
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA:
- 1. Primary - Access Control for Containment Penetration Area.
- 2. Secondary - Outside Auxiliary Building Control Panel for Containment Penetration Area.
- 3. For 25-1 and 25-2 Fan Room Area Outside Door No.194-2.
4.- For Security Diesel Generator Area Outside Door No.199A.
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: '
- 1. Probable Radiation Area with possible localized high radiation hot spots in the penetration area.
- 2. Possible loose surface of airborne radiological contamination (except security diesel).
- 3. Consult with C&RP tech about radiation precautions. (Area Radiation Monitors, Radiation Surveys)
- 4. Acknowledge posted radiation signs and barriers.
- 5. H2SO4 in batteries located in Security Diesel Generator area. .
PAGE 6-IR DC0217 251 REVISION 1
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l MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. Deenergize electrical equipment as necessary to reduce shock potential.- 3
- 2. Fire suppression water will collect in floor drain receivers. ,
. i Conservative water use should be observed. .
- 3. Sprinkler shutoff valve for Security Diesel Generator and. Tank Room located at NW corner, above Battery Room (FP-2-359).
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Hose Streams may be required to cool conduits to reduce heat damage.
- 2. Fire Doors should be shut as necessary to retard spread of fire and smoke.
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT
- 1. Fire extinguishers - Four 20f Cry Chemicals (2)ContainmentPenetration (1) Fan Room Area South Side .
(1) Security Diesel Generator Area
- 2. Fire hose reels Three (2) Containment Penetration (1) Yard SW Fan Room Area
- 3. Automatic sprinkler system - Security Diesel Generator and Fuel Tank VENTILATION: 1. An opening is provided between the Containment structure and the El.100' which would vent smoke and gases to the upper elevations. Positive ventilation at El. 85' can be utilized.
- 2. If High Airborne Contamination is present, air should be m
. sampled prior to ventilation and filters used where possible.
- 3. Portable Smoke Exhausters may be re* quired for the Fan Room Area and Security Diesel Generator Area. Smoke could be exhausted via doomays to the outside. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
NOTE: Smoke may be contaminated, . contact C&RP prior to using portable smoke ejectors.
- 4. Hose stream ventilation could ,be used for exhausting smoke through open doors to the outside.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephones
- 2. Portable radios NOTE: Use of p le radios in t penetration area could cause inadvertent reactor shutdown signal. .
LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panel - PL 23-2 at El. 85' Auxiliary Building
)
PAGE 6-2R DC0217 26I REVISION 1
b SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus and turnouts will provide
'q 2.
contamination protection. -
._ Portable hand-held lanterns may be 'needed for rescue operations.' ~
- 3. Dosimetry should be worn (TLD, pencil dosimeter).
- 4. Sulfuric acid is contained in the batteries Security Diessl Generator
~
Room Area and this ac.'d " Reacts Vioiently with Water."
- 5. This area is criss crossed with pipts supports and other obstacles, caution should be exercised to avoid injuries.
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DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT 1
UNIT NO. 1&2 AUXILIARY BUILDING EL. 100' ..
FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Lube oil
- 3. Cable insulation 4 Grease
- 5. Transient combustibles (may be radiologically contaminated)
- 6. Demineralizer resins MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles
- 2. Cable insulation
- 2. Secondary - Via Door No. 257 Stairway S-3 Unit No. 1
- 3. Tertiary - Via Door No. 251 Stairway S-4 Unit No. 2
.( FIRE' BRIGADE STAGING AREA:' 1. Primary - Stairway S-2 at El.100' Landing *
'-'
- 2. Secondary - Tank area at El.115' Fuel Handling r
Building roll-up Door No. 35A NOTE: El.115' tank area is the primary response location for outside agencies i responding to a fire emergency in _the -
Auxiliary Building. -
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: .
- 1. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination.
- 2. Potential high radiation areas such as CVCS 1 filter gallery, demins, VCT tanks and liquid hold up tanks.
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. The east corridor is protected by an automatic sprinkler system. The system isolation valve FP-1-332 is located above hose reel FW-105-A25-1 N.E. corner.
- 2. Hallways are provided with drains. Drainage is to the Auxiliary Building Main sump.
- 3. Elev. No. 2 key control may be accessed at El. 85'.
7 %
PAGE 7-IR DC0217 28I -
REVISION 1 m .
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Use water fog from hose reels to protect .
exposures. '
- 2. Fire doors should be closed as necessary to ..-
retard fire or smoke spread. ...
- 4. Open gratings to El. 115' should be protected to prevent fire spread.
- 5. Boric acid transfer pumps are located near each other and should be protected to preclude damage
. .to redundant components.
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Five 20# Dry Chemicals
- 2. Fire hose reels - (2) Unit No.1 Side (2) Unit No. 2 Side
- 3. Automatic sprinkler system - east end corridor only VENTILATION: 1. Fans S-31 and S-32 supply air and E-1 and E-2 are exhaust fans.
- 2. Open grating at the east end would allow smoke and hot gases up to the El.115' to be exhausted outside via roll-up Door No. 354 with portable fans or hose streams.
NOTE: (Smoke may be contaminated. Obtain guidance from C&RP prior to ventilating with portable exhausters.)
- 3. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable . ~^.
generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
- 4. Positive pressure ventilation at El.100' could assist Q1 with ventilation out of El.115' if necessary.
/
-COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephorie
- 2. Portable radios LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panels - PL 14-1
- 2. Emergency lighting i
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
l 2. Fire brigade members may need portable lanterns for rescue operations.
- 3. High radiation levels can be expected in the demineralizer and filter
> areas. Radiation monitoring will be necessary prior to entry 'in this i
area.
- , 4. Dosimetry is required (TLD, pencil dosimeter).
i' 5. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti-contaminatinr.
l protection. .
PAGE 7-2R
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DC0217 29I REVISION 1 j
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DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION EL. 100' ,
FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN '
POTENTIAL COM8USTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. Grease
- 3. Transient combustibles
- 2. Cable insulation
- 3. Grease (motor operated valves)
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door Nos. 294 and 245 from Auxiliary Building El. 100' (Security Door)
- 2. Secondary - Via Door No. 265 from Fuel Handling Building El.100' (Security Door)
NOTE: This area is criss crossed with pipe supports and other obstacles making it difficult to access or egress. Use caution.
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Ou61de Elev. No. 2 El.100' Auxiliary
('.
Building *
- 2. Secondary - Fuel Handling Corridor East of Spent Fuel Pool. Hx. 1-1 RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS:
- 1. Probable Radiation Area with possible localized high radiation hot spots.
- 2. Possible loose surface or airborne radiological contamination. -
- 3. Consult with C&RP tech about radiation precautions. (Area Radiation Monitors, Radiation Surveys) .
4 Acknowledge posted radiation signs and barriers.
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. The area is protected by an automatic wet -
sprinkler system. The isolation valve FP-1-338 is located in the S. E. corner ininediately above Fire Hose Reel No.
FW-105-A23-1. -
- 2. Deenergize electrical equipment as .
necessary to reduce shock potential.
- 3. Fire suppression water will collect in floor drain receivers. Conservative water use should be observed.
- 4. Water could flow through open pipe penetration and the seismic gap in the floor to El. 85'.
J PAGE 8-1R l
DC0217 30I REVISION 1 '
l REC 0tetENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT. SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT
- 1. Hose Streams may be required to cool ccnduits to reduce heat damage.
- 2. v
,, eep fire doors closed as necessary to reduce fire and smoke spread.
- 3. Open louvers at the north west corner could cause the spread of smoke and ' .
hot gases to the pipe rack outside. -
FIRE SUPPRESSION EOUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Two 20# Dry Chemicals
- 2. Fire- hose reels - Two-(1) West of Door No. 245 south wall (1) East of Door No. 245 adjacent to Door No. 265
- 3. Automatic sprinkler system i VENTILATION: 1. An Opening is provided between the containment structure and i the El. 115' which would vent smoke and gases to the upper elevation.
- 2. Portable smoke exhausters may be required. Positive ventilation techniques would be preferable. Smoke could be exhausted via Door No. 269 to the pipe racks. (Consultwith l C&RP prior to exhausting smoke out of doors if airborne
, contamination is present, air should be sampled prior to ventilation and filters used where possible.)
- 3. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
/
( COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephones
- 2. Portable radios NOTE: The use o po los could cause inadvertent reactor shutdown signals in the penetration area.
LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panel - PL 14-1 Auxiliary Building El.100' ,
, 2. Emergency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
i 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
l 2. Portable hand-held lanterns may be needed for rescue operations.
- 3. Wear TLD and pencil dosimeter.
- 4. Observe good contamination control practices, SCBA and turnout gear will provide necessary personal anticontamination protection.
ce
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PAGE 8-2R DC0217 311 REVISION 1
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DIABLOCANYONPO$ERPLANT
. . . , UNIT NO. 1 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING, EL. 100' .
FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Filters (HEPA, carbon, rougning)
- 2. Transient combustibles (Rad Control)
- 3. Lube oil
, 4. Cable insulation j 5. Grease
- l MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles during outage periods (potentially radiologically contaminated)
- 2. Cable insulation, hot shorts
l h ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door No. 258 from Auxiliary Building El. 115' (Security Door).
- 2. Secondary - Via Door No. 262 from El.115' FHB (Security Door)
' 3. Tertiary - Via Door No. 263 from El.115' FHB
. (Security Door)
- Via Door No. 265 from Containment Penetration Area (Security Door)
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FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA:
- 1. Primary - Outside D'oor No. 258 Auxiliary
! Building El. 100'
- 2. Secondary - Outside Door No. 360 El.115' FHB 3.. Tertiary - Containment Penetration El.100' RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Smoke and fumes from HEPA, carbon and roughing filters or cable insulation.
- 2. Potential radiological airborne and -
surface contamination.
- 3. Potential high radiation areas such as SFP Heat Exchanger and ventilation filter. -
i j
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, . JA PAGE 9-IR DC0217 32I REVISION 1
, , . _ . _ - _ __-,..y _. _ , _ - . , _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ - . _ - _
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- MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. The AFW pump rooms and East Hallway are protected by an automatic sprinkler system. -.
The shut off valve FP-1-332 is located above , i fire hose reel FW-105-A25-1 N.E. corner Auxiliary' Building El. 100'. ..
~
7
- 2. Floor drains provided in the hallways allows drainage to the Auxiliary Building Main sump.
- 3. Use of water on hot piping in turbine auxiliary feed water pump room could cause pipe and a major steam leak failure.
RECOMMENDATION. FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire hose streams may be required to protect exposures, especially redundant AFW pumps. '
- 2. Fire doors should be shut as necessary I to retard fire and smoke spread.
- 3. Fire could propagate to El. 115' through unsealed ventilation. penetrations.
FIRE SUPPRESSION E0UIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Three 20# Dry Chemicals One 15# CO l
- 2. Fire hose reels - Four (3) - Fu$1 Handling (1) - Containment Penetration
- 3. Wet Sprinkl.er System - AFW pump rooms and east
- hallway i kj' s
VENTILATION: 1. Fans S-1 and S-2 supply air and E-4. E-S and E-6 are exhaust fans. .
- 2. Smoke may be contam'inated. Obtain guidance from C&RP prior to Nentilating with portable exhausters out of doors, positive pressure ventilation with portable fans could direct smoke and hot gases via stair wells to El.115' then out of
, doors. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be ,
needed.
7 COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone
- 2. Portable radio LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panel - PL 15-1
- 2. Emergency lighting ,
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable hand-held lanterns may be needed for rescue operations.
- 3. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary personal anti-contamination protection.
- 4. TLD and pencil dosimeter should be worn. j PAGE 9-2R I
DC0217 33I REVISION 1
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DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2 -.
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION EL. 100' - -
FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN #
POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. Grease
- 3. Transient combustibles (cay be radiologically contaminated)
- 4. Hydrogen in primary system piping I
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles may be radiologically contaminated
- 2. Cable insulation
- 3. Grease - motor operated valves ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door No. 245-2 From Auxiliary Building El.100' (Security Door)
- 2. Secondary - Via Door No. 265-2 From FHB El.100' NOTE: This area is criss crossed with pipe supports and other obstacles. Use caution.
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Outside Elev. No. 2 0 El.100' .
s
- 2. Secondary - Fuel Handling Corridor East of , )
c
. Spent Fuel Pool Hx 2-1 (f
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS:
- 1. Probable radiation area witn possible localized high radiation hot spots.
- 2. Possible loose surface or airborne radiological contamination.
- 3. Consult with C&RP tech about radiation precautions (Area Radiation Monitors, Rad Surveys).
- 4. Acknowledge posted radiation signs and barriers. -
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. The area is protected by an automatic sprinkler system.
The isolation valve is located in the SE corner imediately above Fire Hose Reel No. FW-10S-A23-2.
- 2. Deenergize electrical equipment as necessary to reduce shock potential.
- 3. Fire suppression water will collect in floor drain receivers. Use water conservation.
- 4. Water may flow to El. 85' via open penetrations and seismic gap.
PAGE 10-1R l
DC0217 34I REVISIGN 1 w - _ _ _ _ _ _
l' RECOP94ENDATION FO'R PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Hose streams may be required to cool conduits to reduce heat damage.
>f -
Do not apply water directly to exposed hot piping.
- 2. Fire doors should be closed as necessary to retard fire and smoke -
spread.
l
- 3. Open louvers at the south west corner cou'Id allow smoke and hot gases to impact the pipe rack area outside.
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire extinguishers - Two 20# Dry Chemicals
- 2. Fire hose reels - Two
- 3. Autumatic sprinklers -
l VENTILATION: 1. An opening is provided between the Containment structure and 115' El. which would . vent smoke and gases to upper elevations.
' '2 . Portable smoke exhausters may be required. Positive ventilation techniques are preferable. Smoke could be exhausted via Door No. 269-2 to the pipe racks. (Obtain guidance from C&RP prior to exhausting out of doors. If high airborne contamination is present, air should be sampled prior to ventilation and filters used where possible.)
l
- 3. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
/ .
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone
- 2. Portable radios .
h . NOTE: The use o por e ra os could cause inadvertent .
reactor shutdown signals.
_ LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panel - PL 24-1 Auxiliary Building
. 2. Emergency lighting -
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required. -
- 2. Portable hand-held lanterns may be needed for rescue operations.
- 3. Observe good contamination control practices. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide adequate personal anti-contamination protection.
- 4. TLD and pencil dosimeter needed for exposure monitoring. - .
- q.
- PAGE 10-2R DC0217 35I REVISION 1
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DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT i
UNIT NO. 2 m,
! FUEL HANDLING BLDG. EL 100' -
FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN l
POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Filters (HEPA, carbon, roughing)
- 2. Transient combustibles (Rad Control)
- 3. Lube oil
- 4. Cable insulation .
- 5. Grease MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles, during outage periods (potentially contaminated)
- 2. Cable insulation, hot shorts
- 4. Lube oil ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door No. 258-2 from Auxiliary Building El. 100' (Security Door)
- 2. Secondary - Via Door No. 262-2 from E1.115' FHB (Security Door)
- 3. Tertiary - Via Door No. 263-2 from El.115' FHB (Security Door) rm
' FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Outside Door No. 258 Auxiliary Building 100' El. *-
- 2. Secondary - Outside Door No. 360 E1.115' FHB
- 3. Tertiary - Containment Penetration El.100' RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS:
- 2. Potential radiological airborne' and surface contamination
- 3. Potential high radiation areas such as SFP heat exchanger and ventilation filter MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: .
- 1. The AFW pump room and east hallway are protected by an automatic sprinkler system. The shutoff is located above fire hose reel FW-105-A25-1 NE Corner Auxiliary Building El.100'.
- 2. Floor drains provided in the hallways allow drainage to the Auxiliary Building main. sump. .
- 3. Use of water on hot piping in the turbine AFW pump room could cause
. pipe failure and steam leaks.
PAGE 11-IR DC0217 36I REVISION 1 l
.. j-RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUI'PMENT:
- 1. Fire hose streams may be required to protect exposures, especially .
{
redundant AFW pumps. . ,
) I
- 2. Fire doors should be shut as necess'ary to retard fire and smoke spread. '
I
- 3. Fire could propagate to El.'115' through unsealed ventilation penetrations.
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire extinguishers - Two 20# Dry Chemicals
- One 15# CO
- 2. Fire hose reels - Four (3) FHB,2(1) Containment Penetration
- 3. Automatic sprinkler system
~
VENTILATION: 1. Fans 25-1 and 25-2 Supply Air and 2E-2, 2E-5 and 2E-6 are Exhaust Fans.
- 2. Smoke may be contaminated, obtain guidance from C&RP prior to ventilating with portable exhausters out of doors. Positive l pressure ventilat'.,n techniques with portable exhausters could be used to direct smoke up stair towers to El.115' and then our side. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be I
needed.
l i COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephones
- 2. Portable radios ._
~
f i
LIGHTING: 1. Plant Lighting Panel - PL 24-1
- 2. Emergency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable hand-held lanterns may be useful during rescue operations.
- 3. Turnout gear and SCBA will p~erform necessary anti-contamination function. -
- 4. TLD and pencil dosimeter to be worn for exposure monitoring.
PAGE 11-2R DC0217 37I REVISION 1
~ ~ ~ ~
__ __ ^'..
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2 cm FUEL HANDLING BLDG. EL 100' -
FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN '
! POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Filters (HEPA, carbon, roughing)
! 2.
l Transient combustibles (Rad Control)
- 3. Lube oil
- 4. Cable insulation .
- 5. Grease MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles, during outage periods (potentially contaminated)
- 2. Cable insulation, hot shorts
- 4. Lube oil ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door No. 258-2 from Auxiliary Building El.100' (Security Door)
- 2. Secondary - Via Door No. 262-2 from El.115' FHB (Security Door)
- 3. Tertiary - Via Door No. 263-2 from El.115' FHB (Security Door)
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Prirary - Outside Door No. 258 Auxiliary I
Building 100' El. *-
- 2. Secondary - Outside Door No. 360 El.115' FHB
- 3. Tertiary - Containment Penetration El.100' RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: .
- 2. Potential radiological airborne' and surface contamination
- 3. Potential high radiation areas such as SFP heat exchanger and ventilation filter i
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: .
- 1. The AFW pump room and east hallway are protected by an automatic sprinkler system. The shutoff is located above fire hose reel FW-105-A25-1 NE Corner Auxiliary Building El.100'.
- 2. Floor drains provided in the hallways allow drainage to the Auxiliary Building main. sump.
- 3. Use of water on hot piping in the turbine AFW pump room could cause
. pipe failure and steam leaks.
PAGE 11-1R DC0217 36I REVISION 1
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EOUI'PMENT:
- 1. Fire hose streams may be required to protect exposures, especially redundant AFW pumps. )
- 2. Fire doors should be shut as necess'ary to retard fire and smoke spread: ,
- 3. Fire could propagate to E1.'115' through unsealed ventilation penetrations. -
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire extinguishers - Two 20# Ory Chemicals
- One 15# CO
~
- 2. Fire hose reels - Four (3) FHB,2(1) Containment Penetration
- 2. Smoke may be contaminated, obtain guidance from CARP prior to ventilating with portable exhausters out of doors. Positive pressure ventilation techniques with portable exhausters could be used to direct smoke up stair towers to El.115' and then out side. If power is lost, gas powered smoke efectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone
- 2. Portable radios .s 1
r ..,)
~'
LIGHTING: 1. Plant Lighting Panel - PL 24-1
- 2. Emergency lighting i
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable hand-held lanterns may be useful during rescue operations.
- 3. Turnout gear and SCBA will p~erform necessary anti-contamination i function.
- 4. TLD and pencil dosimeter to be worn for exposure monitoring, j i
l l
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{ PAGE 11-2R DC0217 37I REVISION 1 l
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DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1&2 AUXILIARY BUILDING - El. 115' FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN - t POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Lube oil
- 2. Cable insulation
- 3. Transientcombustibles(radwaste)
- 4. Grease
! 5. Demineralizer resins
.MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transientcombustibles(radwaste)
- 2. Lube oil ,
- 3. Cable insulation
- 4. Dry resins -
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Stairway S-2 or Elev. No. 2 from Door No's. 346 and 344-2
- 2. Secondary - from S-3 (Unit 1) S-4 (Unit 2) stairways via Door No's. 356 and 350-2
- 3. Tertiary - from 115' El. tank area via Door No.
354 (Security Door)
. FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Elev. No. 2 Landing El.115'
- 2. Secondary - tank area outside full-up Door No. ,
s 354 NOTE: El.115' tank area is the primary h response location for outside agencies responding to a fire emergency in the Auxiliary Building.
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS:
- 1. Caustic (Sodium Hydroxide)
- 2. . Sulfuric acid -
- 3. Demineralizer resins
- 4. Nitrogen
- 5. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination (especially in radwaste packaging areas)
- 6. Potential high radiation areas such as spent resin storage tanks, or radwaste collection points -
O&
PAGE 12-1R DC0217 38I REVISION 1
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. Floor drains are provided at tank locations
' which drain to the Auxiliary Building floor drain receiver. ' ~
- 2. Hallways are provided with drains and drainage.
is to the Auxiliary Building sump.
- 3. Open penetrations such as gratings on hatch ways could allow water to impact lower levels of the Auxiliary Building.
- 4. Key control of Eley. No. 2 is accessed at El. 85'.
5.a) Drum compactor sprinkler isolation FP-1-591 located by drum compactor.
b) Compacted drum storage Sprinkler isolation FP-2-598 located by hose reel FW-120-A39-2.
c) Boxed radwaste compaction area isolation FP-2-1044 located at 18.6 and U line.
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EOUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire hose streams may be required to protect exposures.
- 2. Fire doors should be closed as necessary to retard fire and smoke spread.
- 3. Non rated roll-up doors separate the auxiliary and fuel handling buildings.
' FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Five 20# Dry Chemicals
- 2. Fire hose reels - Four (4) gg ;- . 3. Fire hydrants located at Radwaste Building accessible via roll-up Door No. 354 El.115'
- 4. Sprinkler protection in the vicinity of radwaste drumming and storage area and the box compactor.
VENTILATION: 1. 5-31 and S-32 supply air and E-1 and E-2 are exhaust fans.
- 2. Portable smoke exhausters, smoke could be exhausted to the outside via roll-up Door No. 354.- '
NOTE: (Smoke may be contaminated. Obtain guidance from C&RP prior to ventilating with portable exhausters. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.)
- 3. Hose streams could also be used to ventilate via doors to the outside.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone .
- 2. Portable radios
~.-
PAGE 12-2R DC0217 39I REVISION 1 l
l LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panal - PL 14-1
- y
)
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Fire brigade members may need portable hand-held lanterns for rescue operations.
- 3. Full protective clothing to be worn as contact with caustic and sulfuric acid can destroy skin tissue.
- 4. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti-contamination protection.
- 5. TLD ano pencil dosimeters to be worn for exposure monitoring.
e 8
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PAGE 12-3R DC0217 401 -
REVISION 1 eW
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DIA8LO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 CONTAINENT PENETRATION EL.115' -
)
FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN e POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. Grease
- 3. Transient comoustibles
- 2. Cable insulation 3 .' Grease. (motor operated valves)
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door No. 348 from Auxiliary Building El. 115' (Security Door)
- 2. Secondary - Via Door No. 358 from Fuel Handling Building Fire Pump area (Security Door)
- 3. Tertiary - Via Door No. 364 from pipe rack area of Turbine Building (normally locked security grate)
NOTE: This area is criss-crossed with pipe supports and other obstacles making access difficult, especially to the west side.
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Outside Elev. No. 2 El.115' Auxiliary Building
- 2. Secondary - North of Spent Resin Storage Tanks NOTE: El.115' tank area is the primary response location for outside agencies responding to a fire in the Auxiliary cr Fuel Handling Buildings.
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS:
- 1. Probable radiation area with possible localized high radiation hot spots.
- 2. Possible loose surface on airborne radiological contamination.
- 3. Consult with C&RP tech about radiation precautions. (Area Radiation Monitors, Radiation Surveys)
- 4. Acknowledge posted radiation signs and barriers.
4 PAGE 13-1R DC0217 41I REVISION 1
l l MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1.
l The area is protected by an automatic sprinkler system. The isolation valve l FP-1-29 is: located in the S. E. corner .
l immediately above Fire Hose Reel No.
FW-120-A36-1.
( 2.
Deenergize electrical equipment as necessary '
to reduce shock potential.
- 3. Fire suppression water will collect in floor i
drain receivers. Conservative water use I should be observed. $
i
- 4. Water may also drain to lower elevations
! through unsealed penetrations.
i RECOMMENDATION
- 1. FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT Hose streams may be required to cool conduits to reduce heat damage.
Do not apply water directly to exposed hot piping, pipe failure and steam l leaks could result.
2.
Fire doors should be kept closed as necessary to retard. fire arid smoke spread.
- 3. {
Thermolag enclosures protect safety conduits water spray could assist in the ]
protection of these circuits. l FIRE SUPPRESSION EOUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Four 20# Dry Chemicals
- 2. ;
Fire hose reels - Two-(1) West of Door No. 348
' south wall .
.. (1) East of Doo~r No. 348 I
,y
, adjacent ,to Door No. t 358
- 3. Automatic sprinkler system j
l VENTILATION: 1. 1 Vent openings on the northeast and northwest sides of the area i
would allow smoke and gases to vent to~the outside. Unsealed !
i l roof roof, penetrations also allow venting to the Auxiliary Building l
- 2. i Portable smoke exhausters may be required. Positive pressure j ventilation techniques could aid in exhausting smoke out north '
side.
NOTE: Smoke may be contaminated. Obtain guidance from C&RP
}
Tech prior to exhausting out of doors. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors. or portable generators t to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
I
- i Plant telephones -
1 COMMUNICATIONS: 1. - Fire Pump Room
} {
- Penetration Area j
- Penetra' tion Area
{
, - Penetration Area i
- Penetration Area {
} j
-8 Stairway No. 4
- 2. Portable radios j NOTE: The use of portable radios could cause inadvertent reactor shutdown signals.
PAGE 13-2R DC0217 421 ~
REVISION 1 '
LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panel - PL 14-1 Auxiliary Building 100' El.
- 2. Emergency lighting ,
-] '
SPECIAL' PRECAUTIONS: <
- l. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required. -
- 2. Portable hand-held lanterns may be needed for rescue operations.
- 3. Hot steam lines traverse through the area. Use discretion when applying water to these lines. Steam leaks could develop from pipe failure.
- 4. TLD and pencil dosimeter to be worn for exposure monitoring.
- 5. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide effective personal anti-contamination protection.
- 9 e-4 9
'l 1
l i
PAGE 13-3R DC0217 43I REVISION 1
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7 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING, EL.115' ' FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN # POTENTIAL COM8USTIBLES: 1. Filters (HEPA, carbon, roughing) ,
- 2. Transient combustibles (hot tool room)
- 3. Lube oil
- 4. Cable insulation
- 5. Resin MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles, during outage periods and in tool room
- 2. Filters (HEPA, carbon, roughing)
- 3. Lube oil 4 Grease ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Ventilation area from Door No. 363 (Security Door)
- Fire Pump room from Door No. 353 (roll-up door)
- 2. Secondary - Via stairways from Door Nos. 359 or 362 from E1.140'
- 3. Tertiary - Fire pump area via Door No. 360 from outside tank area (Security Door) *
. .')
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Vent. Area El.115' outside tank area
- Fire pumps, Auxiliary Building El.
- 115' outside Door No. 363.
- 2. Secondary - Fire pump area, El.115' outside tank area - -
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZAROS: 1. Ammonia - NH
- 2. Hycrazine $H
. 3. Smokeandfum$sfromHEPA, carbon and roughing filters and polyethelene
- 4. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination
- 5. Potential high radiation areas in
~ filter rooms and in the cask decon area MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. Floor drains provided in the hallways allows drainage to the Auxiliary Building sump.
i
~
PAGE 14-1R ( DC0217 44I REVISION 1
. i;
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RECOMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. A water fog from hose lines may be required tp protect exposures.
- 2. Redundant fire pumps are provided with little -
spacial separation and should be protected.
- 3. Small quantities of flamable liqdids may be stored in the Hot Tool Room.
1 FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Two 20# Dry Chemicals One 15# CO l One' Pressufized water l
- 2. Fire hose reels - Four l VENTILATION: 1. Fans S-1 and S-2 supply air and E-4, E-5 and E-6 are exhaust fans.
NOTE: Smoke may be contaminated. Obtain guidance from C&RP prior to ventilating with portable exhausters or hose streams.
- 2. Ventilation could also be accomplished with fire hose . streams via roll-up and personnel doors. (Negative ventilatfon techniques)
- 3. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
/
COMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone (;')'1 s 2. Portable radioM LIGHTING: 1. Lighting panel - PL 15-1
- 2. Emergency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Provide radiation detection devices (TLD, pencil dosimeter).
- 3. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti-contamination -
protection. - ;
- 4. An amonia tank is located in the fire pump room. Eye and skin :
protection is reqtifred, fire and explosion hazard is moderate when i exposed to flame. , 4
, 5. Contact with 35% hydrazine very irritating tu eyes and skin. This tank I is also located in the fire pump room. !
- 6. Skin should be flushed if contacted by chemicals. Seek medical assistance. j l
t se 9: - PAGE 14-2R DC0217 451 REVISION 1
e DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION EL. 115' .- FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. Grease
- 3. Transient combustibles
- 4. Hydrogen in primary system piping MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles which may be radiologically
- contaminated
- 2. Cable insulation
- 3. Grease (motor operated valves)
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door No. 348-2 From Aux 111ery Building El.115' (Security Door)
- 2. Secondary - Via Door No. 358-2 from FHB Ammonia and Hydrazine Tank Area (Security Door)
NOTE: This area is criss crossed with pipe supports and other obstacles making access difficult, especially to the west side. FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - outside El. No. 2 at El.115'
,- 2. Secondary - East of Ammonia and Hydrazine Tanks .
NOTE: El.116' tank area is the primary response location for outside agencies responding to a fire in Auxiliary or Fuel Handling Buildings. RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS:
- 1. Probable radiation area with possible localized high radiation hot spots.
- 2. Possible loose surface on airborne radiological contamination.
3 '. Consult with C&RP tech about radiation precautions. (Area Radiation Monitors, Radiation Surveys, etc.)
- 4. Acknowledge posted radiation signs and barriers.
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. The area is protected by an automatic sprinkler system. The isolation valve is located in the NE corner immediately above fire hose reel.
FW-120-A42-2.
- 2. Deenergize electrical equipment as necessary to reduce shock potential.
- 3. Fire suppression water will collect in floor drain receivers.
Conservative water use should be observed.
- 4. Water may also drain to lower elevation via unsealed penetrations.
~-
PAGE 15-IR DC0217 46I , REVISION 1 I
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RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire hose streams may be required to protect exposures. .
Do not apply water directly to exposed hot piping. ~N,
- 2. Fire doors should be kept closed as' necessary to retard fire and smoke -
spread. ' -
- 3. Thermolag enclosures protect safety circuits. Water spray could aid in the protection of these circuits.
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire extinguishers - Four 20# Dry Chemicals
- 2. Fire hose reels - Two
- 3. Automatic sprinkler system VENTILATION: 1. Vent opening at El.115' on the northwest side and northeast side of the Containment would allow smoke and gases to vent to the outside.
- 2. Portable smoke exhausters may be required. Smoke could be exhausted via north louvers to the outside.
. NOTE: Consult C&RP tech prior to exhausting with portable fans or hose streams out of doors.
- 3. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
Hose streams could also be used.
- 4. Some smoke will vent through unsealed penetrations at El.140' to the Auxiliary Building roof.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant tele' phone %g
)
- 2. Portable radios NOTE: Use of porta e rad os s area could generate a spurious reactor trip signal.
LIGHTING: 1. Plant Iighting panel - PL 24-1
- 2. Emergency lighting -
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable hand-held lanterns may be needed for rescue operations.
- 3. Hot steam lines traverse through the area. Use discretion when applying water to these lines. (Line failures could result in steam leaks.)
- 4. TLD and pencil dosimeters are to be worn for exposure monitoring.
S. Observe good contamination control practices.
- 6. Turnout gear and SCBA with provided necessary anti-contamination .
protection. G e PAGE 15-2R DC0217 471 REVISION 1
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PAGE 15- 3 '=*****"^***"-***"^'"'*
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, DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT . UNIT NO. 2 ~
3 FUEL HANDLING BLDG EL.115' - FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN I POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Filters (HEPA, carbon, roughing)
- 2. Transient combustibles (radwaste)
- 3. Lube oil -
- 4. Cable insulation MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles, during outage periods and radwaste
- 2. Filters (HEPA, carbon, roughing)
- 3. Lube oil
- 4. Grease ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - North end via Door No's. 360-2 or 361-2 (Security Door)
South end via Door No. 363-2 (Security Door)
- 2. Secondary - North end via Door No. 353-2 South end via Door No. 377-2 FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: . g
- 1. Primary - N. End Tank Area By Door No. 360-2 El.115' !
- S. End, Auxiliary Building El.115' By Door No. 353-2
- 2. Secondary - S. End, Tank Area by Door No. 361-2, El.115' ([J' RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS:
- 1. Ammonia - NH
- 2. Hydrazine $,H
- 3. Smoke and fds 4from HEPA, carbon and roughing filters
- 4. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination
- 5. Potential high radiation areas in filter rooms and cask decontaminated area .
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. Floor drains provided in the hallways allows drainage to the Auxiliary Building Main sump.
- 2. Sprinkler system isolation valve FP-2-1048 for the boxed radwaste storage area.
PAGE 16-1R OCO217 481 REVISION 1 k - _ _ _ _
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. A water fog from hose streams may be required to protect exposures.
- 2. Fire doors should be kept closed as necessary to retard fire and smoke spread. .
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT:
- l. Fire extinguishers - Three (2) - FHB
.(1) - Filter Room Corridor
- 2. Fire hose reels - Three (2) FHB (1) Containment Penetration
- 3. Sprinklers in east corridor, boxed radwaste storage area VENTILATION: 1. Fans 25-1 and 25-2 supply air and 2E-4, 2E-5 and 2E-6 are exhaust fans.
NOTE: Smoke may be contaminated; obtain guidance from C&RP prior to ventilating with portable exhausters.
- 2. Ventilation could also be accomplished by portable exhausters, or fire hose streams via roll-up door and man doors.
- 3. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone i 2. Portable radio LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panel - PL 24-1
- 2. Emergency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: .
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required. -
- 2. TLD and pencil dosimeter will provide exposure monitoring.
I
- 3. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti-contamination protection. .
- 4. An annonia tank is located in the N. end via Door No. 357-2. Eye and i skin protection is required. Fire and explosion hazard is moderate when exposed to flame.
- 5. Contact with 35% Hydrazine very irritating to eyes and skin. This tank is located in the N. end via Door No. 357-2.
l 6. Skin should be flushed if contacted by chemicals. Seek medical assistance. l PAGE 16-2R 1 DC0217 49I REVISION 1 , . __ _ -- r
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING, EL. 140' - FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN-
- POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Transient combustibles
- 2. Acetylene in shop area
- 3. Cable insulation
- 4. Grease and solvents in Fab. Shops
, 5. Filters (HEPA, carbon, roughing)
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles -
- 2. Acetylene in shop area
- 3. Cable insulation
- 4. Grease and solvents
- 5. Filters (HEPA, carbon, roughing)
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - from Door No. 528, El.140' (Security Door)
- 2. Secondary - from Door No. 529 El.140' (Security Door)
- 3. North fan areas to be accessed - from Door No.
540 or 541, El. 140' FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - outside roll-up. Door No. ,525, El. I ~~ v . 140' - outside containment emergency hatch, El. 140'
- 2. Secondary - tank area 115' El.
- 3. Tertiary - Turbine Building 140' El.
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Smoke and fumes from HEPA, carbon and roughing filters
- 2. Potential high radiation areas such as spent fuel pool and filter areas
- 3. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. Floor drains provided in the hallwafs allows drainage to the Auxiliary Building sump.
t , .
'v' PAGE 17-IR DC0217 50! REVISION 1
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RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire hose streams may be required to protect exposures 3 '
- 2. Acetylene bottles in the hot shop, should be /
cooled with water spray. . I FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Three 20# dry chemicals Two 15# CO 's Two pressufized water
- 2. Fire hose reels - Five VENTILATION: 1. Fans S-1 and S-2 p'rovide air and E-4, E-5 and E-6 are exhaust fanJ.
NOTE: Smoke may be contaminated. Obtain guidance from C&RP prior to ventilating with portable exhausters or hose streams.
- 2. Negative ventilation could be accomplished by using portable exhausters or water hose streams via roll-up doors.
- 3. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smcke ejectors may be needed.
- 2. rt b e r LIGHTING: 1. Lighting panels - PL 14-2, 15-2, 15-4 and 15-5 ,
- 2. Emerge.ncy lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self-contained breathing apparatus will be required. ,
- 2. TLD and pencil dosimeter will provide exposure monitoring.
- 3. Do not use halon or dry chemical on new fuel. - -
- 4. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti-contamination protection.
O e e O
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PAGE 17-2R DC0217 51I REVISION 1 l... , ,
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DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2 FUEL HANDLING BLDG'. EL. 140'
)
FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN r POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. Filters (HEPA, carbon, roughing)
- 3. Transient combustibles HOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. Filters (HEPA, carbon, roughing)
- 3. Transient combustibles ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door No. 557 El.140' to spent fuel pool
- Via Door No. 530-2 El. 140' to vent area
- 2. Secondary - Via Door No. 556 El. 140' to spent fuel pool
- Via sun roof El.140' to vent area FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Outside roll-up Door No. 525 El.140'
- Outside Containment Emergency Hatch, El. 140' .
- 2. Secondary - Tank Area El.115' - s
! J so RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS:
- 1. Smoke and fumes from HEPA, carbon and roughing filters
- 2. Potential high radiation areas such as spent fuel pool and filter areas
- 3. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. Floor drains provided in the hallways allows drainage to the Auxiliary Building Main sump. - -
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire hose streams may be required to protect exposures.
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire extinguishers - One 20# Dry Chemicals
- One 209 CO 2
- 2. Fire hose reels - Three
. 3 PAGE 18-1R DC0217 52I REVISION 1
VENTILATION: 1. ' Fans 25-1 and 25-2 Supply Air and 2E-4, 2E-5 and 2E-6 are exhaust fans.
/m.
t NOTE: Smoke may be contaminated. Obtain guidance from C&RP prior to ventilating with portable exhausters. '.
- 2. Ventilation could be affected by using portable exhausters and hose streams exhausted via doors to outside.
- 3. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone /
- 2. Portable radios .
LIGHTING: 1. Lighting panels - PL 25 25-2 and 24-2
- 2. Emergency lighting .
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Provide radiation detection devices (TLD, pencil dosimeter).
- 3. Do not use dry chemical on new fuel.
- 4. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti-contamination protect 1on.
('y - l e l F l - i I I s
~
PAGE 18-2R DC0217 531 REVISION 1
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DIA8LO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 & 2 VENTILATION ROOMS - E1. 154' & 164' ,- FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Filters (HEPA, carbon, roughing)
- 2. Cable insulation
- 3. Grease
- 4. Transient combustibles MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles
- 2. Filters (HEPA, carbon, roughing)
- 3. Cable insulation
- 4. Grease ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door No's. 605 and 604 of Stairway S-2 only for E1. 154'
- 2. For fan and elevator machine room Door No. 612 or No. 613 to roof area at El.164' FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - For E1.154' outside Elev.
No. 2 at El. 140' .
- For E1.164' Fan and Elevator Machine Room, outside Elev. No. 1 E1. 140' on ,- *, the control room roof -e t . . .
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Smoke and fumes from HEPA, carbon and roughing filters
- 2. Potential for radiological contamination of filters from l
airborne particles MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. Both Unit I and 2 rooms at E1.164' are - protected by a wet type automatic sprinkler system. The isolation valve is located at bottom of Stainvay S-2 E1.140' between Door No. 521 and Eley. No. 2. Valve FP-1-341. l
- 2. Drains are provided in each 154' fan room as i well as the condenser rooms.
- 3. Water from E1.163' fan rooms can drain to the control room roof.
~
PAGE 19-1R J DC0217 54I REVISION 1
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
, . 1. Close fire doors to reduce fire and smoke s spread.- .
)
- 2. A water, fog from hoselines may be required to cool exposures. . f
- 3. Fire could spread into the control room from the open duct penetrations at the west sia of El. 154' fan rooms.
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Two 15! CO,'s
. - One 20f Dry Chemical
- 2. Automatic wet sprinkler systeni (El.154')
- 3. Fire hose reel top of Stairway El.154' Fire hose reel outside Door No. 521 El. 154' Fire hose reel adjacent to Eley. No.1 El.140' Turbine Deck fur use at El.164' Fan Room NOTE: For El.154' an additional 100' of hose may be required. For El. 164' an additional 150' of hose may be required to reach fan rooms .5-27 and S-28.
VENTILATION: 1. Exhaust fans E-35 and E-36 are provided at El.154'.
- 2. Louvers are provided which could vent smoke to the outside.
- 3. Portable smoke exhausters may be required for the filter rooms and exhausted to the condenser rooms. For the Fan Rooms and . 3 Elev. Machine Room, exhaust to the outside using fans or hose y NOT bbtain guidance from C&RP prior to ventilating out of doors.
- 4. If power is lost, gas powered smoke efectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephones
- 2. Portable radios LIGHTING: 1. Lighting panel - PL 13-4 at El. 140' Auxiliary Building Col.
M-174
- 2. Emergency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Access and egress to El. 154' is limited to one stairway only.
i
.)
PAGE 19-2R DC0217 SSI REVISION 1
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DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 - CONTAINMENT EL. 91' ' ' FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN ? POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation "
- 2. Lube oil reactor coolant pumps 265 gals. per pump
- 3. Charcoal filters (iodine removal units)
- 4. Transient combustibles (outage periods)
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles (outage periods)
- 2. Cable insulation
- 3. Lube oil 9 R. C. Pumps
- 4. Charcoal filters 9 iodine removal units .
' ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. East stairway at approx.100'
- 2. West stairway at approx. 270' FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Unit No.1 Turbine Deck
- 2. Secondary - Hot Machine Shop - FHB El.140' RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Charcoal filters (iodine removal units) s
- 2. Smoke from cable insulation (j J
- 3. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination
- 4. High radiation areas inside shield walls by RCPs and S/Gs MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. Containment Fire Protection System.
Isolation Valve 1-FCV-633 open, Located in Containment Penetration E1. 100' GW Col. Lines K&l2'9". ' NOTE: FCV-633 should be checked open or opened following a safety isolation signal if fire water is needed in . Containment.
- 2. Floor Drains at El. 91' allows drainage to the Containment itructure surp.
- 3. Containment evccuation alara may be operated from the personne? hatch.
- 4. RCP lube oil collection tank located by fuel '
transfer tube (over flows to Containment sumps). SI PAGE 20-IR . DC0217 56I REVISION 1
, I
= .
RECOPMEND TION FdR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE' EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Water spray from hose reeJs may be required to protect safety related conduits and sensing lines.
2. Do not spray wa'ter directly on exposed hot piping. ,' Major steam leaks could result. FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Four 15# CO 's
- 2. Fire hose reel stations - Four 2
- 3. Automatic sprinkler system @ reactor coolant pumps VENTILATION: 1. 5-3 Containment Supply Fan
- 2. E-1 Containment Exhaust Fan
- 3. E-11 E-12 E-13 and E-14 CRDM Fans
- 4. E-15 and E-16 Exhaust Fans For iodine removal units
- 5. Hose streams may be effective from personnel hatch to ventilate out of doors as a last resort. C&RP should be notified first.
- 6. If' power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
COMMUNICATIONS: ~
- 1. Plant telephone
- 2. Portable radios NOTE: Use of por ios ontainment could cause a spurious reactor trip signal.
() Lighting panels - PL 16-1 and 17-1 LIGHTING: 1. ~
- 2. Emergency lighting
~
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable hand-held lanterns should be carried by Fire Brigade members for resc0e operations.
- 3. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide effective anti-contamination protection.
- 4. TLD and pencil dosimeter to be worn for exposure -
monitoring.
- 5. " CAUTION": SCBA's air supply capacity may limit Fire Brigade to 5 minute stay time at El. 91'.
l PAGE 20-2R DC0217 571 REVISION 1
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DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1
/~N .
1 CONTAINMENT EL. 117' - FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. RCP Pump oil
- 3. Transient combustibles (during outages)
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles
- 2. Cable insulation -
- 3. RCP Pump oil ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. East stairway approx.120'
- 2. West stairway approx. 270' FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Unit No.1 Turbine Deck El.140'
- 2. Secondary - Hot Machine Shop - FHB El.140' RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Smoke room cable insulation
- 2. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination
- 3. High Radiation Areas inside shield walls by,RCPs and S/Gs
(,;. . MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. Open grating and floor drains provided at El. 91' allows drainage to the Containment structure sump.
- 2. Containment Evacuation Alarm may be operated from the personnel hatch.
- 3. Containment Fire Protection System isolation valve (FCV-633), located in Containment penetration El.100' GW Col. Lines K112'9".
NOTE: FCV-633 should be checked open or opened following a safety isolation signal if fire water is needed in Containment. 4 4
\ #
PAGE 21-1R DC0217 58I REVISION 1 e
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF H' EAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT
- 1. Fire Hose Streams may be required to protect .,
safety related. conduits and sensing lines. .
- 2. Do not apply hose streams directly to exposed hot ., -
piping. Major steam leaks could result. <
- 3. Thermolag junction boxes on south wall ~ protect safety related circuits. Hose streams may help cool these boxes.
FIRE SUPPRESSION E0UIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Two 15# CO 's 2
- 2. Sprinklers for each RCP .
- 3. Fire Hose must be routed from El.140' or El.
91'
~
i VENTILATION: 1. 5-3 Containment Supply Fan
- 2. E-1 Main Containment Exhaust Fan 3.. E-11. E-12. E-13 and E-14 CRDM Fans
- 4. E-15 and E-16 Exhaust Fans for iodine removal units
- 5. Hose streams may be effective from the personnel hatch as a last resort - C&RP should be notified first.
- 6. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephones
- 2. Portable radios NOTE: Use of po e radios in antainment could cause a '.
spurieus reactor trip si,gnal. - LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panel 16-2
- 2. Emergency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable hand-held lanterns should be carried by Fire Brigade Members for rescue operations.
- 3. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary -
anti-contamination protection.
- 4. TLD and pencil dosimeter will provide exposure monitoring.
m G w 9 9 PAGE 21-2R DC0217 59I REVISION 1
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DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 - CONTAINMENT EL. 140' AND ABOVE FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN f POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. HEPA and roughing filters (fan air coolers)
- 3. Transient combustibles (during outages)
- 4. Grease and Oil (cranes and fan cooler motors)
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles
- 2. Grease and oil
- 3. Cable insulation
- 4. HEPA and roughing filters ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Personnel natch
- 2. Equipment hatch (if open)
- 3. Emergency exit approx. 70* between fan coolers 1-3 and 1-4 FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Turbine Deck El.140' Unit 1
- 2. Secondary - Hot Machine Shop - FHB El. 140' RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: - 1. HEPA and roughing filters (fan air coolers)
- 2. Smoke from cable insulation G)
- 3. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination
- 4. High radiation areas around the reactor cavity MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. Open grating and floor drains at El. 91' allows drainage to the Containment sump.
- 2. Containment evacuation alarm may be operated from the personnel hatch.
- 3. Containment Fire Protection System . isolation valve (FCV-633) located in Containment -
penetration Ei. 100' GW FP-1-177 Col. Lines K & 12'9". I NOTE: FCY-633 could go shut on a safety isolation signal and may have to be re-opened. j PAGE 22-1R DC0217 60I REVISION 1
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~
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire hose streams may be required to protect
'~
safety related conduits and sensing lines. FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Four 15# CO2 8
- 2. Fire hose reel stations - Four VENTILATION: 1. S-3 Containment Supply Fan .
- 2. E-1 Main Containment Exhaust Fan
- 3. E-11. E-12. E-13 and E-14 CRDM Fans -
- 4. E-15 and E-16 Exhaust Fans for iodine removal units
- 5. Hose streams may be effective from the equipment hatch as a last resort C&RP should be notified first.
- 6. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable
. generators to power electric smoke efectors may be needed. .
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone
- 2. Portable' radios NOTE: Use of por n containment could cause a spurious reactor trip signal.
LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panels 4 2 3 and 16-5
- 2. Emergency lighting
( ,./ SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. 2. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.- Portable hand-held lanterns should be carried by Fire Brigade members for rescue operations.
- 3. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti-contamination protection.
- 4. TLD and pencil dosimeter area to provide exposure monitoring. ~
- 5. " CAUTION" 30 Minute SCBA's will probably not provide sufficient air capacity for a Fire Fighting response above the Polar Crane.
PAGE 22-2R DC0217 611 REVISION 1
R DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2
,s ~
CONTAINMENT EL. 91' ' FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COM8USTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. Lube oil (Reactor Cooling Pumps 265 gals. per pump)
- 3. Charcoal filters (iodine removal units)
- 4. Transient combustibles (outage periods)
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles
- 2. Cable insulation
- 3. Reactor Coolant Pump lube oil
- 4. Charcoal Filters ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. West stairway approx.100*
- 2. East stairway approx. 270*
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Unit No. 2 Turbine Deck
- 2. Secondary - Hot Machine Shop - FHB El.140' RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS:
- 1. Charcoal filters (iodine removal units)
{ . 2. Smoke from cable insulation , gg,. 1. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination
- 4. High radiation areas inside shield walls by RCP's and S/G's MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
l 1.. Containment Fire Protection System. Isolation valve 2-FCV-633 located in Containment Penetration El.100' Col. Lines L & 21. NOTE: FCV-633'could go shut following a safety isolation signal and may have to be reopened.
- 2. Floor Drains 'at El. 91' allows drainage to the Containment Main sump.
- 3. Containment Evacuation Alarm may be operated from the personnel hatch.
4 RCP lube oil collection tank located by the fuel transfer tube (overflows to Containment sumps). t I G l - s . PAGE 23-IR , l DC0217 62I REVISION 1
~
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EOUIPMENT:
- 1. Water spray from hose reels may be required to protect exposures such as safety related conduits and sensing lines. 'N
- 2. Do not apply water directly on expdsed hot piping. Major steam leaks - '
could result. FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Four 20f Dry Chemicals
- 2. Fire hose reels - Four
- 3. Automatic sprinkler system 9 Reactor Cooling Pumps VENTILATION: 1. 25-3 Containment Supply Purge Fan .
- 2. 2E-15 and 2E-16 Exhaust Fans for iodine removal units
- 3. 2E-11, 2E-12, 2E-13 and 2E-14 reactor exhaust fans
- 4. Fan coolers may also be run in their normal mode- to recirculate and cool hot gases and smoke.
- 5. 2E- Main Containment Exhaust Fan
- 6. Hose streams may be effective from the personnel hatch to ventilate out of doors as a last resort. Notify C&RP first.
- 7. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be, needed.
COMMUNICATIONS: I. Plant telephones
- 2. Portable radios NOTE: Use of por e radios in Containment could cause a spurious reactor trip signal.
LIGHTING:
- 1. Lighting panel - PL 27-1
. . n
- 2. Emergency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required, i- 2. " CAUTION." SCBAs Air Supply Capacity may Limit Fire Brigade to 5 minute stay time at El. 91'.
- 3. Portable hand-held lanterns should be carried by Fire Brigade members for rescue operations.
- 4. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti-contamination protection.
6 PAGE 23-2R DC0217 63I REVISION 1 O
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__ PAGE 23-3 REV-I i ". A 3%.
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- DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT .
UNIT NO. 2 CONTAINMENT EL. 117' - FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN , POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. RCP Pump oil
- 3. Transient combustibles (during outages)
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles
- 2. Cable insulation
- 3. RCP Pump oil ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. West stairway approx.120'
- 2. East stairway approx. 270' FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Turbine Deck El.140' Unit 2
- 2. Secondary - Hot Machine Shop - FHB El.140' RADI0tOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS:
- 1. Smoke from cable insulation .
- 2. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination
- 3. High radiation areas inside shield walls by RCPs and SIGs MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: --
- 1. Open grating and floor drains provided at El. 91' would allow water to drain to the Containment sump.
- 2. Containment Evacuation Alarm may be operated from the personnel hatch.
. 3. Containment Fire Protection System Isolation Valve 2-FCV-633 located in Containment Penetration El.100' Col. Lines K & 12' 9".
NOTE: FCV-633 may go shut following a safety isolation signal and may need to be reopened. i . PAGE 24-1R DC0217 64I REVISION 1
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RECOMMENDATION
- 1. FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE. EQUIPMENT:
Fire Hose Streams may be required to protect exposures such as safety
'f s, related conduits and sensing lines.
2. Do not apply hose streams directly;on hot , exposed piping. Major steam . leaks could result. FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire extinguishers - Two 20# Dry Chemicals
- 2. Sprinklers for each RCP 3.
Fire Hose must be routed from El.140' or El. 91'. VENTILATION: 1. 25-3 Containment Supply Purge Fan
- 2. 2-El Main Containment Exhaust Fan
- 3. Fan Coolers may also be run in their normal mode to recirculate and cool hot gases and smoke.
4. 2E-15 and 2E-16 Exhaust Fans for fodine removal units
- 5. Hose streams may be effective from the personnel hatch to ventilate as a last resort. Notify C&RP first.
- 6. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone
- 2. Portable radios NOTE: Use of po able radios in containment could cause a spurious reactor trip signal.
LIGHTING: 1. Lighting pane 1 - PL 26-2
- 2. Emergency lighting-
. SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1.
Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable hand-held lanterns should be carried by Fir,e Brigade members for rescue operations.
- 3. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti-contaminatien protection.
'4. TLD and pencil dosimeter will provide exposure monitoring.
r PAGE 24-2R i DC0217 65I REVISION 1
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2 C'. CONTAINMENT EL.140' FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN -' POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. HEPA and roughing filters (fan air coolers)
- 3. Transient combustibles (during outages)
- 4. Grease and oil (cranes and fan cooler motors)
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient.combus'ibles t
- 2. Grease and oil
- 3. Cable insulation -
- 4. HEPA and roughing filters ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Personnel hatch
- 2. Equipment hatch (if open)
- 3. Emergency exit approx. 290* between fan coolers 2-3 and 2-4 FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Turbine Deck El.140' Unit 2
- 2. Secondary - Hot Machine Shop FHB El.100' RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: . .
, 1. HEPA and roughing filters (fan air coolers)
- 2. Smoke from cable insulation. .
- 3. Potential radiological airborne and surface contamination.
- 4. High radiation area around the reactor cavity MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: - - -
- 1. Open grating and floor drains at E1.91' allows drainage to the Containment sump.
- 2. Containment Evacuation Alarm may be operated from the personnel hatch.
- 3. Containment Fire Protection System Isolation Valve 2-FCV-633 is located in Containment Penetration E1.100' Col. Lines K & 12' 9".
NOTEi 2-FCV-633 could go shut on a safety isolation signal and may have to be re-opened. U PAGE 25-1R DC0217 66I REVISION 1
- . . . .. _ \
3 . _ . . . . - - - - _ . . RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire Hose Streans may be required to protect exposures such as safety -
related conduits and sensing lines.- ..
~
FIRESUPPRE5SIONEQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire extinguishers - Four 20# Dry Chemicals
- 2. Fire hose stations - Four VENTILATION: 1. 25-3 Containment Supply Purge Fan
- 2. 2E-3 Main Containment Exhaust Fan .
- 3. Fan Coolers may also be run in their normal mode to recirculate and cool hot gases and smoke.
- 4. 2E-15 and 2E-16 Exhaust Fans for iodine removal units
- 5. 2E-11, 2E-12, 2E-13 and 2E-14 reactor exhaust fans
- 6. Hose streams may be -effective from the equipment hatch as a last resort. Notify C&RP first.
- 7. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors may be needed.'
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone
- 2. Portable radios NOTE: Use of porta e ra ios n containment could cause a spurious reactor trip signal.
LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting - PL 26-3, 26-5, 27-2 and 27-4, 27-3 *'
)
- 2. Emergency lighting (,T' t
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable hand-held lanterns should be carried by Fire Brigade members .
for rescue operations.
- 3. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti-contamination protection.
- 4. TLD and pencil dosimeter will provide exposure conitoring.
- 5. " CAUTION" 30 minute SCBA's will probably not provide sufficient breathing air capacity for a fire fighting response above the Polar Crane.
t l PAGE 25-2R DC0217 67I REVISION 1 l
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DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. .-.1 & 2 RACWASTE AND CHEM STORAGE - EL 115' FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN / POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Contaminated lube oil (approx. 2600 gals) ,
- 2. Transient combustibles
- 3. Class "A" combustibles (solid radwaste)
- 4. Hydrogen (Storage Vault North End)
- 5. HEPA and ro.ughing filters MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles
- 2. Contaminated Lube oil
- 3. Class "A" combustibles (solid radwaste)
- 4. Hydrogen
- 5. HEPA and roughing filters ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door No's. R-9, R-11 ,
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - East end Auxiliary Building by roll-up Door No. 354 RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XfCOLOGICAL HAZARDS: .
- 1. Contaminated~ lube oil T
- 2. Hydrogen d dJ
\-
- 3. Contaminat$d clothing
- 4. Sulfuric acid - H SO
- 5. Sodium Hydrazide fcadstic soda) NaOH .
- 6. HEPA and roughing filters ,
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. The boxeo waste area and contaminated oil storage areas are protected by an l automatic sprinkler system. The isolation valve is located inside Door No.
R-11 (Valve FP-0-207).
- 2. Should a leak or tank rupture occur at the ccustic and sulfuric acid tanks, contact Chem c.id Rad to have sampled prior to removal of spilled liquid.
- 3. A 4 3/4" curb is provided at Doorways R-9 and R-10 to prevent a contaminated lube oil spill leaking to other areas.
1 J j PAGE 26-IR I l DC0217 681 REVISION 1
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RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE E'QUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire Hose steams may be required to protect exposures.
, (~'s. 2. Do not apply water to an H,50 or NaOH spill.
- 3. Cool hydrogen cylinders with n,ose streams if exp,osed to fire. -
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - Three 207 Halon
- 2. Fire hose reels - Five (3) Outside Building (1) North End (1) South End
- 3. Automatic sprinkler system (s. radwaste)
. 4. Fire hydrant - west of Vault Area <
VENTILATION: 1. Fans E-401 and E-402 are exhaust fans.
- 2. Portable Smoke Exhausters may be required. Smoke could be exhausted via doorways to the outside (negative pressura techniques).
NOTE: Smoke may be contaminated. Obtain guidance from C&RP prior to ven.tilating with portable exhausters or hose streams.
- 3. Possible loose surface on airborne radiological contamin'ation.
- 4. If power is lost, gas powered smoke ejectors or portable generators to power electric smoke ejectors. may be needed.
COMMUfiICATIONS: 1. P1, ant telephone
- 2. Portable radios
( _s,) LIGHTING: 1. Lighting panel - PL 25-6
~
W~ 2. Emergency lighting '
- 3. Yard lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. TLD and pencil dosimeter will provide exposure monitoring.
- 3. Turnout gear and SCBA will provide necessary anti-contamination protection.
- 4. Full protective clothing to be worn in the vicinity of the caustic and acid tank, as contact can destroy skin tissue.
- 5. Avoid water coming in contact with sulfuric acid as a violent reaction takes place.
- 6. If skin is contacted by acid or caustic flush with copious amounts of water and seek medical attention.
~
J ' PAGE 26-2R DC0217 69I REVISION 1
. . . . . - - . . . . - - . - . - - . . . - - - -- ~
NUMBER EP M-6 7SEG Pacific Gas and Electric Company REVISION 12 e '% m . DATE 9/9/85-DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIOM AND 2 PAGE 1 0F 12 ,- DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO(S) EMERGENCY PROCEDURE l TITLE NONRADIOLOGICAL FIRE W
~ ~
APPROVED T O DAIE FLANI MANAGLM j SCOPE -
~
This procedure discusses the actions which are taken in the event of a fire which does not involve radioactive materials. This procedure and changes thereto require PSRC review. GENERAL Fires at Diablo Canyon can be classified as either radiological or nonradiological. Nonradiological fires do not involve either radiation or radioactive material. Examples of such fires are fires . . I- s in the turbine building or outside grass fires. Radiological fires - b,
- are handled in accordance with Emergency Procedure R-6, " Radiological Fires".
. SYMPTOMS .
- 1. A fire is discovered outside the plant'or inside the plant in an area where no radioactive materials are located.
- 2. The fire detection system may indicate the presence of a fire within the plant.
AUTOMATIC ACTIONS The Sprinkler, Deluge. Halon, Cardox, or Intake CO2 fire systems may activate. IM EDIATE ACTION
- 1. Activate the fire signal by dialin a code which gives the location of the fire (see a . ..e fire signal is a 30 second blast on the fire sirens. The signal will be followed by the location code of the fire on the go e call system repeated 8 times. The first five persons to dial L76_ will be connected into a conference call. The priority of the conference call is: ,
OCO220 1XIII
DIA84.0 CANYON POWER M. ANT UNIT NO(S) . 1 AND 2 . h0N DATE 9/9/85
. , PAGE 2 0F 12 ~,
TITLE. NONRADIOLOGICAL FIRE '
- a. Shift Foreman (Interim Site Emergency Coordinator).
- b. Fire Brigade Leader (Typically the Senior Control Operator).
- c. ' Assistant Fire Brigade Leader.
- d. Plant Manager.
- e. Fire Marshal l
- l
- 2. The Shift Foreman and Senior Control Operator will di nd be 1,
, given the details regarding the fire, including the exac l location and potential damage to the plant. '
- 3. Members' of th'e on-shift fire brigade should report to the Operations Ready Room to pick up their fire safety equipment.' -
The Fire Brigade Leader will raceive instruction from the Shift Foreman. Typically, the Senior Control Operator (SCO) is , designated Fire Brigade Leader. The Shift Foreman may assign a ficensed operator who is qualified as a brigade leader to fill l. this position if the SCO is not available. The Shift Foreman is l responsible for establishing an appropriate on-shift emergency . t organization and assuring that Technical Specifications for l l Control Room staffing are not violated.
- 4. If the fire occur's during normal working hours, merhbers of the Maintenance Fire ' Brigade should go to the Cold Machine Shop. The Assistant Fire Brigade Leader should enter the conference call to receive his instructions.
. 5. If appropriate, isolate (Mode 3) the contrul room ventilation -
system to prevent the entry of smoke. If the fire is within the I control room, change the ventilation system to Mode 2 for 1001 outside air makeup.
- 6. If the fire is in an area protected by either the cardox, halon or deluge systems, manual initiations of these systems may be accomplished from the panel in the control room or locally.
- 7. Evacuate the area affected by the fire. This may be done by sounding the site emergency signal, or other appropriate means.
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS l The Shift Foreman, acting as Interim Site Emergency Coordinator, shall direct all subsequent actions from the control room until relieved by the long term Site Emergency Coordinator if the emergency warrants it. Such actions should include the following: . usig % DC0220 2XIII G e I _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ ___.-
( l . oiAsLO CANYON POWCR PLANT UNIT NO(S) 1 AND 2 ON 12 DATE 9/9/85 O - PAGE ,3 CF 12 . TITLE NONRADIOLOGICAL FIRE .
- 1. If the fire is a grass fire, notify the California Department of Forestry (CDF) and give details regarding the fire.
- 2. If the fire is within the Protected Area and-cannot be physically contained and controlled promptly with available resources, or if the Fire Brigade Leader reconnends, assistance from the California Department of Forestry (CDF) should also be requested.
Refer to Appendix 1 for telephone numbers. M)TE: 1) If outside assista r ested, notify the Security Departmen and have them notify the Avila Gate. On operating person.nel shall be dispatched to the Security Building to escort CDF crews to the scene of the fire. Security Officers may be requested to escort off-site fire fighters to the appropriate plant access door.
- 2) Maintain a record of notification made to offsite personnel. Form 69-9221 " Emergency Notification Record" may be used to provide this record.
(s 3. If CDF is called to respond, insure that the person calling CDF gives a name and number to call back the plant. Provide CDF with details concerning location and type of fire. Also give CDF an update of fire conditions even before they arrive as they may decide to send more support.
- 4. If CDF responds, they will stage at the G.C. Warehouse parking .
lot. 'Their first responding chief officer will take charge and identify himself. He may initially decide to go to the scene of the fire. He will eventually desire to contact the PGandE Site Emergency Coordinator. Therefore escort and access should be provided to him to reach either the Control Room or TSC depending on where the Site Emergency Coordinator 1:; located. A CDF radio phone is available in the shift foreman's office and the TSC for the use of the chief officer.
- 5. If the fire is a. grass fire that is near the plant, a person such i as the Assistant Fire Brigade Leader from the Maintenance Brigade should be dispatched to the scene. This person can then .
interface with CDF and assist in providing equipment and manpower. DCD220 3XIII e+ie -*=- - e- een ao== ==e -*=.% -
. ese . . me. . , _ . , .-*=e e * - - - ** " = = =
~
EP M-6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NCHS) 1 AND 2 [DATE N1 9/9/85 PAGE 4 0F 12 , l TITLE. NONRADIOLOGICAL FIRE
- 6. During the course of the fire, the Control Operator and those at the scene should pay particular attention for signs that the operability of the various engineered safeguards equipment is being affected. If the operability of any safeguards equipment is reduced below minimum Technical Specifications limits, or.if such damage is iminent, shut down the Unit imediately.
f0TE: Emergency Procedure EP M-10 provides the operator with listing of safeguards equipment which may be affected by fires in various locations. This procedure should be consulted to assist in determining the operating strategy during the fire.
- 7. ~ Establish an initial emergency classification based on the
%. criteria in Appendix Z and perfom the actions required by the classification.
- 8. If the control room must be evacuated, follow the instructions given in Emergency Procedure OF-8.
. 9. If the tieluge~or cardax system has been activated, the system Q must be reset after the fire is extinguished. The reset buttons ./
for the cardox system are located in the teminal boxes on the south side of the cardox assembly on the 104 foot elevation of the turbine building. The reset buttons for the deluge system are located locally. If the system was activated by a thermal element, the thermal element must be replaced before the system can be reset.
- 10. Supplied air _ breathing apparatus should be worn if smoke inhalation is a hazard. If self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) is being used, a crew should be dispatched to an air bottle refilling station and prepare to refill the backpack bottles as required. The stations are located in the 85' El.
hallway at the Unit I Safety Injection pumps', on 140' E1. .behind the Control Room, and in the Unit II East Buttress.
- 11. Close out with verbal sumary to offsite organizations and complete the following written reports:
- a. Plant Problem Report (see Nuclear Plant Administrative Procedure C-12). .
DC0220 4XIII l
NUMBER EP M-6 DiAsi.O CANYON POWER Pt. ANT UNIT NO(5) 1 AND 2 REVISION 12
^
DATE 9/9/85 PAGE 5 0F 12 TiTuE. NONRADIOLOGICAL FIRE I l
- b. Written sumary to NRC within 24 hours for an unusual Event or 8 hours for a higher classification.
- 12. If the fire is put out before CDF arrives, they may still request to send one engine company to the site for their close out.
- 13. The plant Fire Marshal, or his designee, shall be promptly notified of all plant fires.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING BRUSH FIRES
- 1. Because of the danger of rapid spreading, the Department of -
Forestry should always be called in case of a brush fire.
- 2. Mobile fire suppression equipment is available on site to provide limited capability fighting grass fires. Portable fire fighting packs are located with the mobile equipment.
. 3. When fighting a brush fire there are several basic precautions *
- which should be taken by plant personnel engaged in fire fighting: -
- a. Always remain upwind on the fire.
- b. Stay on the downhill of the fire, if possible.
- c. Watch for fires circling' behind the fire fighters,
- d. The safest location is within the already blacked area of -
the fire. FIRE FIGHTING PREPLANS
- 1. Attachment 2 contains fire' fighting preplans for plant locations which will not routinely contain radioactive material or radiation hazards. These pre-plans are intended to aid the Fire Brigade Leader and the Site Emergency Coordinator during the fire emergency.
- 2. . Guidelines for fighting fires involving flamable gases, ifquids, and fires involving energized electrical equipment are as follows:
- a. Flamable Gas Fires
- 1) Protect surrounding equipment, usually providing a fog pattern to cool the equipment.
l DC0220 SXIII ( --
DIAsLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO(5) NUMBER EP M-6 - 1 AND 2 REVISION 12 DATE 9/9/85 PAGE 6 0F 12, -)' TRLE NONRADIOLOGICAL FIRE ,
- 2) Shut off the source of the leakage prior to extinguishment. This reduces the potential for explosion.
- 3) Extinguish the remaining fire, usually with water or dry chemical-type agent.
- b. Flannable Liquid Fires
- 1) Isolate source of fuel (most easily done by securing the pump or shutting a valve).
- 2) Shutdown (trip) the centrifuge to prevent possible spread of the fire or contaminated oil to other
, reservoirs.
- 3) Open the lube oil reservoir emergency dump valve to drain all the oil to the dump tank from the affected equipment (LO-1-300 for main LO resereoir, LO-1-230 for No. 11 feedwater pump, LO-1-220 for No. 12 feedwater pump and LO-1-51 and LO-1-52 for the clean and dirty s lube oil tank room). ,,)
- 4) When all the oil has been drained to the dump tank, close the dump valve.
- 5) Protect nearby equipment if possible with water fog. -
- 6) Extinguish the fire using dry chemical or foam.
- 7) Attempt to minimize smoke and water damage. .
- c. Energized Electrical Equipment Fires
- 1) De-energizt the equipment if possible.
- 2) Use carbon dioxide or halon, if possible, to minimize the residue and cleanup time.
- 3) Ensure the agent penetrates into the motor or cabinet
. via ports, vents, etc. Otherwise, the fire may reflash.
J DC0220 6XIII
=
DAsLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO(S) NUMBER EP M-6 1 AND 2 REVISION 12
- DATE 9/9/85 PAGE 7 0F 12 TITLE NONRADIOLOGICAL FIRE ,
- 4) If water must be used, use only a fog pattern and stand no closer than 6 feet from the energized 30 KV or less electrical source.
- d. Electrical Cable Fires
- 1) Use self-contained breathing apparatus due to toxic products of combustion.
- 2) Attempt to de-energize the source of electrical current.
- 3) A lifeline may be needed due to the density of the smoke.
- 4) Use carbon dioxide or dry chemical extinguishers if practicable, since they are relatively nonconductive.
- 5) Water may be used and is recommended on large cable fires, but recognize the hazard and use only a fog nozzle no closer than 6 feet.
\'
- 6) Smoke control is very important to minimize damage to electrical equipment.
REFERENCES
- 1. Diablo Canyon Power Plant - Fire ~ Protection Plan
- 2. Emergency Procedure G-1 " Accident Classification and Emergency Plan Activation."
- 3. Emergency Procedure G-2 " Establishment of the Onsite Emergency Organization." ,
- 4. Emergency Procedure G-3 " Notification of Offsite Emergency Organizations."
- 5. General Operating Orders '- 1.300 and 1.301
- 6. PGandE Fire Prevention Manual
- 7. Accident Prevention Rule No. 23
- 8. Emergency Procedure R-6, " Radiological Fire."
l OCO220 7XIII
DiAsLO CANYON POWER Pt. ANT ONIT NO(5) 1 AND 2 S ON DATE 9/9/85 i PAGE 8 0F 12 S l Tm.s .NONRADIOLOGICAL FIRE ATTACHMENTS
- 1. Form 69-9221. " Emergency Notification Record", 3/82.
- 2. Fire Fighting Preplans.
)
~.,#.
l l l I DC0220 8XIII
i oiAsLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO(S) 1 AND 2 EV ON 12 fm DATE 9/9/85 PAGE 9 0F 12 . , TITLE NONRADIOLOGICAL FIRE l l TABLE 1 i
. FIRE CODE CALL LOCATIONS CODE LOCATIONS Control Building No. 1 Containment I No. 1 Turbine Building No.1 Auxiliary Bldg.
No.1 Fuel liandling Bldg. Package Boiler Area Hot machine shop area No. 2 Containment No. 2 Turbine Building No. 2 Auxiliary Bldg. . No. 2 Fuel Handling Bldg. , Security Diesel Area
' . Grass fire Outside Transformer Fire Intake structure 500 kV switchyard
- 230 kV switchyard Radwaste Storage All clear Fire Drill Test fire code Administration Building Security Building Training Building Assembly Building Technical Support Center Medical Emergency
/ ~.
L.' DC0220 9XIII l
. . . l
otAeto CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO(S) 1 AND 2 ON 12 DATE 9/9/85 PAGE 10 0F 12 '
~N
- . i TITLE. NONRADIOLOGICAL FIRE APPEKDIX 1 FIRE ASSISTANCE COMUNICATION
- 1. Emergency
- 1. California Department of Forestry
- 2. (Business.)
- 3. CDF Radio Phone OR San Luis Obi.spo County Sheriff 1. Automatic Tie *Line (Request they dispatch the (Control Room & TSC)
California Dept. of Forestry) or
- 2. Radio (Control Room, TSC or Security)
- 3. Watch
. Comman er
- 4. Edergency' Fire Protection
- Plant Ext.
- 2. Hocie Phon Randy Kohout or HP Freq Pgr Ca (Group Call Fire Marshal Plant Ext.
Home Phon Carmon Johnson or HP Freq Pgr Call . M i DC0220 10XIII
NUMBER EP M-6 DLABLO CANYON POWER Pt. ANT UNIT NO(S) 1 AND 2 REVISION 12 e, DATE 9/9/85 PAGE 11 0F 12 TITLE. NONRA010 LOGICAL FIRE. APPENDIX Z EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NOTIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS ,
- 1. When this emergency procedure has been implemented, and upon ,
direction from the Shift Foreman, proceed as follows: '
~
- a. Designate this event a Notification of Unusual Event for fires within the site boundary 1.f a verified fire is not under control within 10 minutes of initiating fire fighting efforts or if the California Department of Forestry ,
assistance is requested. Notify plant staff and response organizations required for this classification by implementing Emergency Procedures G-2 " Establishment of the On-Site Emergency Organization" and G-3 " Notification of Off-site Organizations" in accordance with Emergency Procedure G-1 " Accident Classification and Emergency Plan Activation."
- b. Designate th,is event an ALERT if a verified fire is not
!( (
- under control within 10 minutes of initiating fire fighting efforts and the fire threatens operability of safety related l
l equipment located in one of the following areas containing l safety systems:
- 1) Containment
- 2) Control Room
- 3) Cable Spreading Rooms
- 4) Diesel Generator Rooms
- 5) Auxiliary Building ,
- 6) Intake Structure Pump Rooms Notify Plant Staff and response organizations required by EP G-2 and EP G-3 in accordance with EP G-1.
I
- c. Designate this event a Site Area Emergency if a verified fire is not under control within 10 minutes of initiating fire fighting efforts in an area containing safety systems, and causes a confirmed complete loss of a safety system function that causes entry into a technical specification action statement (i.e., loss of both trains of containment -
spray when in Modes 1, 2, 3 or 4 or loss of both safe.ty injection pumps when in Modes 1, 2 or 3). Notify plant staff and response organizations required by EP G-2 and EP G-3 in accordance with EP G-1. k, a DC0220 11XIII e
DiAaLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO(S) 1 AND 2 fE ON 2 DATE 9/9/85 PAGE 12 0F 12 , TITLE NONRADIOLOGICAL FIRE 1 APPENDIX Z (continued)
- d. Designate this event a General Emergency if the fire causes massive damage to plant systems wnicn, in the opinion of the Site Emergency Coordinator, is likely to lead to a core melt situation. Notify plant staff and response organizations required by EP G-2 and EP G-3 and implement the instructions in EP G-1 regarding on and offsite protective actions.
- 2. In addition to personnel required to be notified by EP G-2 also notify the following:
- a. Fire Marshal (See Appendix 1)
- b. System Dispatcher (if load may be affected).
M)TE: In off-nor:nal working hours, consideration should also be given to calling in additional members of the
- Plant Fire Brigade. This should not take precedence over calling CDF.
)
DC0220 12XIII
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PACIFIC GAS AKP ELECTRIC COMPANY Page 1 of 1 i DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT N05. 1 AND 2 i 1 (7 ATTACl#4ENT 2 TITLE: FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLANS - EP M-6 E UNIT
- PREPLAN TITLE PAGE REVISION 1 12 KV 5wgr and cable spreading room W 1 1 DG's 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3 2-1 1 1 Turbine Bldg. E1. 85' and below 3-1 1 1&2 Cold machine shop 4-1 1 1 4160 Swgr cable spreading rooms 5-1 1 and ISO Phase Bus Area 1 Diesel generator exhaust area 5-1 1 1 Turbine Bldg El. 104' 7-1 1 1 1 4160 Swgr and Elec. Shop Area 8-1 1 1 Turbine Bldg. E1. 119' .9-1 1 1&2 Turbine Bldg. Warehouse 10-1 1 1 Turbine Bldg. El. 140' 11-1 1 1 Condensate Polishing Area 12-1 1 1 Package Boiler Area 13-1 1 1 Transformers and R.0. Area 14-1 1 1&2 480V. Vital Swgr Area - El.100' 15-1 1 1&2 Vital Battery Rooms - El.115' 16-1 1 1&2 Cable Spreading Rooms - El.127' 17-1 1 1&2 Control Room 18-1 1 2 12 KY Swgr and cable spreading room 19-1 1 2 DG's 2-1, 2-2 & Occument Storage 20-1 1 2 Turbine Bldg. El. 85' and below 21-1 1
( 2 Condensate Polishing Area 22-1 1 ( 2 2 East Buttress and Transfonner Area DG. 2-1 & 2-2 Exhaust & Decument
.23-1 24-1 1
1 , Storage 2 Turbine Building El. 104' 25-1 1 2 Technical Support Center 26-1 1 2 4160 Swg'r Cable Spreading Rooms 27-1 1 and 150 Phase Bus Area 2 4160 Swgr area 28-1 1 2 Traveling Crews Quarters 29-1 1 2 Turbine Bldg. El. 119' 30-1 1 2 Turbine Bldg. El. 140' 31 1 0 Security Building 32-1 1 1&2 Intake Structure 33-1 1 0 Administration Building 34-1 1 0 G.C. Warehouse 35-1 1 0 G.C. Security and Payroll Office 36-1 1 O G.C. Project Office 37-1, 1 I Page I-11 OC0220 13VI!! Revision i
l, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY' DIA8LO CANYON POWER PLANT
UNIT NO. I 12KV SWGR. AND CABLE SPREADING ROOMS FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COPS'JSTIBLES: 1. Electrical cable insulation -
- 2. Breaker components
- 3. Switchgear components MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Fire in breaker cubicles and switchgear control panels
- 2. Electric cable fire in cable spreading room below switchgear room ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - from Turbine Building via Door #117 (Security Building)
- 2. Secondary - from Diesel Generator corridor via Door #118 ,
- 3. Tertiary - from transformer yard via Door
#119 (Security Door)
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA? 1. Primsry - Turbine #1 El. 85' South Door
#117
- 2. Secondary - hallway by Diesel Generator 1-1 outside Door #118
\
RA0!0 LOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Fumes from burning or overheated i electrical cable insulation
- 2. CO, from hose reel discharge (etpecially at low elevations)
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. Floor drain in cable spreading room El. 73' is located along the east wall and drains to Turbine Building sump. El. 85' drains to E1. 73' via stairs.
- 2. De-energize electrical equipment where
. feasible.
- 3. Automatic rolling fire doors are located at Door #119. Door #101 and ventilation openings '
on the east wall. . l l s . l Page 1-I ,. . REVISION 1 ' ~ OC0220 1511 l I
- RECOMMENDATIOP: FOR PROTECTION'0F HEAT SENSITIVE ECUIPMENT:
- 1. Water spray may be necessary to protect exposures. Use in a fog pattern only at a distance of at least 6 feet due to energized electrical equipment.
2. 3. Safe shutdown conduits in pyrocreted . enclosures need protection. Monitor concrete hatch at E1.104' for possible fire propagati'i. 3
./
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers C0 2 s in switchgear room dry chem in cable spreading room
- 2. CO 2 h se reels - (1) by Door #117 (1) by Door #118
- 3. Water hose reels - (1) outside Door #118 (1) outside Ocor #117
- 4. Hydrants and hose reels outside roll-up Door t's 101 and 119 VENTILATION:
- 1. Normal plant ventilation - FAN S-71
- 2. Portable smoke exhausters to aid in exhausting smoke. Positive pressure ventilation techniques may be most effective in smoke removal with fans.
Gas powered fans or generators may be needed if electric power is not available.
- 3. Hose streams could exhaust smoke via Door n's 101 or 119 to out of doors.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephon
. 3. Portable radios LIGHTING: 1. Normal plant lighting panel - PL 11-1 E1. 85' Col. 0-5 1
- 2. Emergency lighting along east wall
, l SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: .
- l. Self containea breathing apparatus must be worn.
- 2. Smoke exhausters may be required particularly for a fire in the cable spreading room El. 76'. Exhaust smcke via roll-up Door #101 or Door all9.
- 3. CO., the agent of choice.
4 Water to be used in fog pattern only due to high voltage electrical equipment.
- 5. CO 2 may accumulate at low elevations. Monitor for 20 e ncentration prior to removing SCBA's.
l Page 1-2 REVISI0f: 1 OCO220 16II /
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRfC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 ' DG's 1-1 1-2 1-3 - FIRE FIGHTING FRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Fuel oil
- 2. Lubricating oil
- 3. Cable insulation ,
- 4. Transient combustibles during maintenance l, ll MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles
- 2. Fuel oil fl
- 3. Lubricating oil ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - South Door #115A from El. 85' Turbine Building (Security Door) 2.. Secondary - North Door #102 from yard (Security Door)
- 3. Tertiary ' via 12KV switchgear room Door
#118 FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - outside Door #115A in the Turbine Building
- 2. Secondary - outside Door #102 in
- transformer area RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZAPCS: 1. CO, discharge J
- 2. Fumes from burning or overheated electric;1 cable insulation
- 3. Chromates in Diesel Generator coolers ,
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. A 2 3/4" curb is provided at each automatic door to prevent oil spread to adjacent areas.
- 2. systes. The All three generators generators are surroundedare protected by 3 hour byfire anwalls automatic CO, lings.The overhead and cei
- rolling doors are also 3 hour fire rated. The CO system 2 may be actuated automatically, manually from the control room, or manually from the Turbine Building North wall by the Turbine Pedestal area.
- 3. The west roll-up doors may not shut automatically on C0 manual discharge since they are activated by heat detectors only. The s$ut-off for the hallway sprinklers (FP-1-42) is located in the N.W. corner by booster pump 1 -1.
- 4. Fuel oil leaks drain to the Turbine Building Main sump. ,
Page 2-1 REv!SI0re 1 DC0220 17!!
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RECOP9(ENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire hose reels located in tne hallway, the Turbine Building or the yard
/ ~N loop may be required to protect exposures.
- 2. Maintain fire barrier integrity to assure protection of redundant ,
equipment.
- 3. West side cf diesel rooms are open to the outside. Redundint equipment I could be exposed to smoke or hot gases. Establish protection as necessary.
Check El.107' for possible fire spread.
~
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - (3) 20# dry chemicals (1 each bay) 150s dry chemical
- wheeled unit - C07hose
- reel 12KV switchgear room by Door a118
- 2. Fire hose reels - (1) hallway at Door r118 (2) Turbine Building E. and i W. stairways (3) Yardloop hose trailer
- 3. Automatic C0., system Diesel Generator rooms 4.
5. Sprinkler Foam (firesyttem in hallway) equipment locker NOTE: A second manual discharge of'C0 ' should De considered if a re-fl$sh occurs or to assure sufficient concentration. VENTILATION:
- 1. Ncrmal plant ventilation. Louvers are provided in the west wall.
(*, htomatic cardox activation will isolate ventilation.
- 2. Portable smoke exhausters may be required. Smoke can be exhausted to the
{() cutside via west ventilation openings using positive ventilation techniques.
- 3. Hose stream ventilation is also possible via Door #102.
COMMdNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephen - 2.. Portable radio LIGHTING: 1. Normal plant lighting panel - PL 11-1 El. 85'A Col D-5 in the 12KV switchgear room . Distribution panel PLD 11 Bk 5 breaker #'s 13-15 and 17
- 2. Emergency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Portaole smoke exhausters may be required. Smoke in the corridor can be '
exhausted via Door #102 to the outside.
- 2. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required due to smoke and CO2 discharge.
- 3. Tests should be conducted to detennine CO. 02 and flarmnable vapors prior to removal of SCBA. ,
- 4. Reopening of roll-up. doors for ventilation requirca engaging the ratchet mechanism above the door and opening the door with the cLlin operator.
Page 2-2
.# REVIS10h 1 CCC220 1811
- - - - - "______i_?_
q
- DEPA~~ME'.T OF f:L. CLEAR ha*.* C* iA A* .l,!.s OIABLO CAhf0*. P0 win PLAF.T .
l l UNIT NO. 1 l TURBINE BLOG. EL. 85' AND BELOW ! FIRE FIGnTING PRE-PLAh l POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Lube 011- ,
- 2. Ct.ble Insulation.
- 3. Batteries.
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Lube Oil Leakage
- 2. . Transient Coseustibles.
- 3. Cable Insulation.
- 4. Battery Casings.
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary I via door #'s 126-127 & 129 to West Side E1. 85'.
- 2. Secondary - via door #102 N. End at'O.G.'s.
Tertiary ,via door #122 East Wall by R.O. Unit. 3. FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Cold Machine Shop. -
- 2. Secondary - Fire Equipment Storage Area E1. 85'.
(- .'
- t. .
RADIOLOGICAL OR TOItCOLOGICAL NAZAR05: Hydrazine, Anaonia. Sulphuric Acid.
~ - Cable Insulation. Sattery Acid.
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: .
- 1. The clean & dirty lute oil room is surrounded by 3 hour fire barriers, raised doorways and sealed pipeways thus preventing oil from a ruptured tank leaking to an outside area.
- 2. Watee deluge systems protect the main feedwatee pumps 1-1 & 1-E & H2 Seal 011 Unit. Shut off valves are located at:
FWP-1-1 E1. 85' No FCV-200 Wall West of 6 Hte Drain Cooler. FWP-1-2 E1. 85' No. FCV 201 On Column East of Clean & Dirty L.O. Tanks Room. H Seal Oil E1. 85' No. FCV-203 at 5.E. Corner of Fire Equip Locker. 2 '
- 3. Wet sprinkler system protects the entire 85' E1. Shut off valves are located at: No. FP-1 50-South System Above & Behind Vacuum Pump 5.W. Corner.
No. FP-1-42-Nogh System N.W. Corner 8y Soester Pumps. Page 3-1 OCO220 17!
~ Revision I l
l 4 e me -m .
a- 1
- 4. L'ute cil resarvoir dump valves LO-1-230 (Fe:d water pu o 11) a-e ,c.:.Z;~ -
(Feedwater Pump 12) ara located 0310w tne pumps. Lub2 oil reservot,cae; valves LO-1-51 and LO-1-52 for the clean and dirty lube oil tanks are
. _s located below the south access catwalk. '
./
RECOMMENOATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEiT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT: Fire hose reels - may be requireo to protect exposures. Do not spray colo water directly on . exposed hot steam piping. FIRE SUPPRES$10N EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire Extinguishers 15a CO,'s Battery Rcoms.
- 20e 0 4 Chemicals.
150 Ory Chem Wheeled Unit.
- 2. Fire Hose Reels Each - 5 Deluge Systems - May be manually actuated from Control Room.
- 3. Foss (Fire equipment locker)
VENTILATION: 1. Vent Fan No's. 5-51. 5-52 & 5-53 located on the east wall and exhaust outlets are located on the west wall of the fire zone.
- 2. If extreme smoke conditions are encountered smoke could be exhausted by hose streams through outside opening doorways.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant Telephone System No's -
- 2. Portable Radios (00s. Freq.)
LIGHTING: 1. Normal plant lighting panels located at:
.anel
' PL 11-1-EL. 85' Col 0-5 Panel PJ 11-2-EL. 85' Col 8-6 Panel PLO-11-EL. 85' Col 0-5 .
- Panel PJ-11-1-EL. 85' Col 0-5
. Panel PL-12-1-EL. 85' Col 0-17
- 2. Emergency lights.
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: Self Contained breathing apparatus and other personal protective equipment will be required in the event of a fire. Portable hand lanterns may be required if smoke conditions dictate. Special protective clothing will be necessary if sulphuric acid, ammonia or hydrazine spills occur. Page 3-2 Revision 8 DC0220 181
- _s
1 1 0 PAtmENT OF h0CLEAP PLAT:7 OPERAT;0'.5 1 DIABLO car.rct. ;c.ER p.Ata
. I UNIT NO. 1&2 'l' COLD MACHINE 5NOP FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN f POTENTIAL COM80STI8LES: 1. Acetylene.
- 2. Lube 011 Tank.
- 3. Electrical Panels.
4 Misc. Combustibles. (Tool Room)
- 5. Solvents.
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient Coe ustibles.
. 2. hielding Fire.
- 3. Electrical Panels.
- 4. Solvent Spill.
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary Access - Hallway via door No.131. E1. 85'.
- 2. Secondary Access - Hallway via door No.135. E1. 85'.
- 3. Tertiary Access - via door No.138 to Unit No. 2 tureine b1dg., E1. 85',.
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Unit 1 Turbine 81dg. 85' E1.. outside door No. 131. -
- 2. Secondary - Access Control, outside coor No.135.
- 3. Tertiary - Unit 2 Turbine 81dg. 85' E1.. outtice s door No.138. *
]
RADIOLOGICAL OR 70XIC01.0GICAL HAZAR05: Some small quantities of solvents may pose a small health risk. f . MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:- 1. The entire shop offices, tool crib and welding shop are protected by automatic sprinklers. J.Thesystemshutoffislocatedon l E1. 85' above and behind Nash vacuum pump (valve No. FP-1-50). I I Page 4-1 I DC0220 191 Aevisten g .,
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PEC0F5'IN:A?:0'. FCP Da0*E**:0?. 0: H~a? Sets:T:!E ECL D*E *.? : Use -a s- s- a,. ; Cool compresseo gas ano acetylene Cyllncers ano flamm4 Die licuid sockers. FIRE SUPPRES$10N EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire Extinguishers 208 Ory Chem. Shea Area. g 158 CO 's Shop Area. 15e CO Lunch Area. 21 Gal Water Shop Area.
- 2. Water Hose Reel's - (1) - by door No.135 Shop Area.
(1) - Turbine Bldg. via
, door No.131.
- 3. Wet Sprinkler System Shop Area. Offices.
- I' l Tool Room and Welding Shc; l -
VENTILATION: Normal plant ventilation system. Smoke from a fire in this area l would exhaust through the equipment opening to 140' El. roof. Portable exhausters could be used to ventilate offices and welding shop areas. 1 CG9*JNICAT10NS: 1. Plant Telephones Shop Area
- 2. Portable Radios. (Ops. Freq.
LIGHTING: 1. Norwal plant lighting control panel located at panel PL 121 El. 85' Col. 0 17. (Machine 5 bop)
- 2. Emergency lights indicated by E on drawing.
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Self Contained breathing apparatus will be required especially in the offices, tool room and welding snop.
- 2. The possibility of an esplosion exists from leaking acetylene.
1 t i . Page 4 2 (_,; OC0220 201 Revision i
- - . - - - ~ .. . . . . - . . - . . . . . . . . , _ . . _ . . . .
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIA8LO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 4160 SWGR CA8LE SPREADING ROOMS AND 150 PHASE BUS AREA . FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN , POTENTIAL COMBL'5718tES: 1. Cable insulation - cable spreading rooms
- 2. 150 phase bus cooler panels
- 3. Transient combustibles MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Class "A" transient combustibles
- 2. Electrical fire in cable spreading rooms
- 3. Fire in !$0 phase bus cooler panels ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - via Door #213. E1.104' Turbine 8uilding (Security Door)
- 2. Secondary - via Door #'s 212 and 209 (Security Decr) .
- 3. Tertiary - via Door #210. up from 12KV switchgear room (Security Door)
NOTE: To maintain separation of, vial bus cable spreading rooms. Enter bus G and H rooms via Door #'s 202 and 204 respectively. FIRE EPIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - outside Door #213 9 E1.104' f 2. Secondary,- corridor to east of Emerge,ncy
' Diesel Generator Exhaust. Stack area via Door #'s 212 an 209.
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Fumes from cable insulation
- 2. CO2 discharge from hose reels MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. No floor drains are provided in the cable spreading rooms (minimize water use).
- 2. Isolate affected buses if possible.
I Page 5-1 REv!SIO*: 1 OCO220 23!!
l The followice table lists equierent powered from the 3 differen2 buses.
)
Bus F AC8's 52PF7 Diesel-Generator #13 Source s 52HFS Auxfitary Sa:t Water Pump *11 i
^.
52HF9 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #13 52HF10 480V Load Center IF Feeder 52HF11 Centrifugal Charging Pump #11 52HF12 Component Cooling Water Pump #11 52HF13 Auxiliary Transformer Source 52HF14 Startup Transformer Source 52HF15 Safety Injection Pump 811 Bus G ACB's 52hG5 Diesel-Generator #12 Source -
'52HG6 Auxiliary Salt Water Pump #12 52HG7 Containment Spray Pump #11 52HG8 Residual Heat Removal Pump all 52HG9 Centrifugal Charging Pump #12 52HG10 480V Load Center 1G Feeder 52HG11 -
Rsciprocal Charging Pump #13 52HG12 Component Cooling Water Pump 812 52HG13 Auxiliary Transformer Source - 52HG14 Startup Transformer Source 52HG15 Startup Transfonner Feeder to Buses F G, H Bus H ACB's ' , 52HH7 Diesel-Generator #11 Source 52HhE . Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #12 52HH9 Containment Spray Pump 812
. 52HH10 480V Load Center 1H Feeder 52HH11 Residual Heat Removal Pump *12 s 52HH12
- Component tooling Water Pump 713 52HH13 Auxiliary Transformer Source ..J' 52HH14 Startup Transfonner Source 52HH15 Safety injection Pump 812 RECOMPEhDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Use water fog only if necessary to cool ano protect exposures due to high voltage electrical hazards.
- 2. Maintain fire barrier penetration seals to protect redundant equipment.
- 3. Maintain separation of vital 4KV cable spreading rooms if at all possible (especially during fire suppression and ventilations).
FIRE SUPPRESSION E00!PMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - 15* CO2 's
- 2. CO2 hose reels -
inside Door #213 inside Door #201
- 3. Fire hose reel - hallway N.E. Eno by Door #201 (1) by N. Stairway E1. 104' Turbine .
. Building Page 5-2 REV!$!ON 1 '
OC0210 .241! -
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VEMTILATION: .
- 1. Each C5p is provided with a grating at ceiling level which would allow smoke
'- to exhaust to the 4160 switchgear rooms (El.119'). The 4160 switchgear rooms are provided with ceiling grating with fusible link closers (El. 140') which would allow smoke to exhaust at the Turbine Deck area N.E.
- corner. *
- 2. Portable smoke exhausters could be used to exhaust smoke thrdugh Doors 203-205 and 207 to Door 213 at El. 107' Turbine Building.
- 3. Plant ventilation fans on the west wall of the ISO phase bus room would fc ce smoke to open louvers on the east wall leading to the outside. An opan stairway leads to El.140' Turbine Deck. Maintain the followir.g ver.t fans running-5-67. $-68 and S-69 for Bus rooms-F.G and H respectively at El. 119'.
COMMUNICATICES: 1. Plant telephone
- 2. Portable Radios LIGHTING: 1. Norsal plant lighting panel - PL 11-4 El.119' Turbine Building exciter switchgear roon. Panel fed from dist. panel PLD.11 breaker 6-8SA. .
. 2. Oner2ency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: ,
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required for a fire in these rooms.
- 2. High voltage equipment, especially by Iso phase bus panels. Minimize water use.
- 3. Keep redundant safety trains separated wMere possible.
- i -
e DC0220 2511
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIA8LO CANYON POWER PLAKT
/ UNIT NO. 1 DIESEL GENERATO N ST AREA -
FIRE FIGHTING PRE PLAN - POTENTIAL COMBUST!8LES: 1. Transient combustibles MOST PR08ABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles in contact with hot exhaust piping i ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - via Doorway 212 at El.104' (Security Door)
- 2. Secondary - via Door #209 NOTE: Access to DG 1-1 and 1-3 exhaust plenues is through a sheet metal hatch. Access to Diesel Generator 1-2 is via Door #2098.
a FIRE 8"ilGADE SIAC!':G AREA: 1. Primary - Turbine Building i El. 104' outside Door #'s 211 and i 212
- 2. Secondary - hallway to the east l
. RAC10 LOGICAL 0F T0Xi'0 LOGICAL HAZAR0_S: None . . C..,n <
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- . 1. A flat nead screweriver will he required to gain entrance to exhaust areas, available in fire brigade tool Leves.
i 1 I !(s- e . Page 6-1 REY!SI0f.1 l l 0".0220 261!
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
. 1. Do not use water on hot Dissel Gen 2rator exhaust pipas because cracking may occur.
- 2. Diesel Generator plenum is common at the north wall and separation of redundant equipment is minimal. -~s FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire Extinguisher - (1) 208 Ory Chemical inside Door #212 Fire hose reels - (1) located at N.W.
stairs El. 104 (1) hallway by Door #201 To effectively fight a fire using the above two hose reels an additional 100' of hose would be required from each reel. VENTILATION: 1. Louvers in the permanently open pofition are located on the west wall. COMMUNICATIONS: 1.
. 2. Plant telephone W Portable radio -
LIGHTING: 1. Norral plant lighting - PL 11-4 El.119' Col. D-2
- 2. Emergency lighting hand-held lenterns recuired in the OG exhaust rooms
- 3. Hand-held lanterns required in the DG exhaust rooms.
. . .s SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: None - -
, ,)
l l l Page 6-2 REVIS10f! I DC0220 27II
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CEPARTM?if 0F NL' CLEAR PLAtJ 08E:ATIOris - O!ASLO CAttf0N POWER PLA:ii UNIT NO. 1 TURBINE BLOG. EL. 104' FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN .. m
)
POTENTIAL COMBUSTf8LES: 1. Lube Oil. ~ '
- 2. Cable Insulation.
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Lube Oil.
- 2. 0verheated Cables.
- 3. Electrical Panels.
- 4. Transient Combustibles.
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - via stairway 5.W. turbine building.
- 2. Secondary - via elevator #1 or adjacent statmay.
- 3. Tertiary - via door 213 from iso phase bus area.
- FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA
- 1. Primary - cold machine shop E1. 85'. .
- 2. Secondary - outside elevator #1.
- 3. Tertiary - 150 phase bus area.
* ~.
RA0!0 LOGICAL OR 70XTC0 LOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Fumes from burning or overheated cable insulation.
- 2. CO, total ficoding system in Main Turbine L.O. Reservoie Roem.
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. The entire floor area is protected by wet piped automatic sprinklers. North system shut off valve #FP-1-50 located on El. 85' N.W. corner by booster pumps. South system shut off valve #FP-1642 located on E1. 85' above and behind vacuum pump 5.W. corner.
- 2. The main turbine L.O. reservoir is protected by a total flooding CO, system that can be activated manually from Control Room or outside the north wall of the L.O. reservoir room. 3. The main lube oil reservoir dump valve LO-1-300 is located at E1. 140' inmediately west of the Shift Foreman / Clearance Coordinator's office. 4. Floor drains below the L.O. reservoir allow drainage to the U-1 main lobe oil tank located under the machine shop.
Page 7-1 DC0220 261 Revision f l
)
l
RECOMv!r ATIO's FOR PROTECTION Or w!AT SEf45!TIVE E",UIPME C : Fica Mcse ete's may oe requireo to protect espcsures, Do not spray colo water on ex;;csec e:: steam piping. i FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire Extinguishers 20# Dry Chemicals. l
- 2. Fire Hose Reels - Each 5.
- 3. Cardox System - L.O. Reservoir Room.
- 4. Wet Sprinkler System.
- 5. Foam (Fire equipment locker)
VENTILATION: 1. Ventilation Fans 5-55 & 5-56 are located in the N.E. corner.
- 2. Four (4) exhaust fans are located on the west wall.
- 3. Sacke exhausters may be required to ventilate pockets under solid flooring.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant Cosaunication System Phone No's
- 2. Portable Radios (Ops. Freq.)
e LIGHTING: 1. Plant Lighting Panels: PL-11-2'ET.'104'Corf-6 .
. PL-11-3 E1. 104' Col 8-7 A- 2. Lube 011 Reservoir PL-12-2 E1. 123' Col. C-16
- 3. Emergency Lighting , ,
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Self Contained breath,in,g apparatus will be required particularly for a fire in the lube oil reservoir. 2. Portablo hand: lanterns should also be available. 3. A lube oil fire may also involve tha 85' elevation below or 119' elevation above. 4. Use extreme caution in areas of open grating. l Page 7-2 DC0220 271 .. , Revision I
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PACIFfC GAS AND' ELECTRIC COMPANT DIA8LO CANYON POWER PLANT
' UNIT NO. 1 4160 SWGR. AND ELEC. 5 HOP AREA FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN -
POTENTIAL COM9USTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. Switchgear components
- 3. Transient combustibles - shop area MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Fire in switchgear components
. 2. Transient combustibles
- 3. Cleaning solvents
- 4. Overheated cables ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary via Door #303 from the Turbine machinery area (Door #305 Security Door)
- 2. Ser,ondary - via Door #304 to Iso phase bus room (Security Door) * -
NOTE: Access 4KV switchgear rooms via Door -
#'s 306, 308, ar.d 310 to maintain separation of redundant components.
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - outside Door #303 in the Turbine spaces
- 2. Secondary - via Door #304 from Iso phase bus
/' room
(.. RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Fumes from cable insulation 2. CO,E:from NOT CO,hose reel discharge is heavier than air check 0, level at El. 104' after discharge. MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. 5prinkler isolation valve (FP-1-47) for electric shop, vent fan area, is located on Turbine Building side of Door #303.
- 2. De-energize affected buses if possible.
- 3. No drains are provided for the vital 4KV switchgear area. Minimize water use. Water will drain to El.104' cable spreading rooms via open ventilation opening in the floor.
1 Page 8-1 REVISION 1
, _ , 'DC0220 30!I
The followinc i'able lists ecuf ement powered from the 3 different buses. ; 1 Bus F ACB's ! 5ZHF7 Diesel-Generator #13 Source - 1 52HF8 Auxiliary Salt Water Pump #11 . 52HF9 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump *13 - 52HF10 480V Load Center IF Feeder 52HF11 Centrifugal Charging Pump #11 52HF12 Component Cooling Water Pump #11 52HF13 Auxiliary Transfomer Source 52HF14 Startup Transfomer Source 52HF15 Safety Injection Pump til Bus G ACB's . 52HG5 Diesel-Generator *12 Source 52HG6 Auxiliary Salt Water Pump #12 52HG7 Containment Spray Pump *11 52HG8 Residual Heat Removal Pump #11 52HG9 Centrifugal Charging Pump el2 52HG10 480V Load Center 1G Feeder 52HG11 Reciprocal Charging Pump *13 52HG12 Component Cooling Water Pump #12 52HG13 Auxiliary Transfomer Source - 52HG14 Startup Transformer Source 52HG15 Startup Transformer Feeder to Buses F, G, H Bus H ACB's 52Hni Diesel-Generator #11 Source 52HH8 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #12 52HH9 Containment Spray Pump *12 52Hti10 480V Load Center 1H Feeder
- 52HH11 Residual Heat Removal Pump =12 . s 52HH12 Component Cooling Water Pump #13 l.
52HH13 Auxiliary Transformer Source # 52FH14 Startup Transformer Source 52HH15 Safety Injection Pump #12 RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire nose streams may be requirec to protect exposures.
- 2. Water should be used in a fog pattern no less than .6 feet away from energized electrical equipment.
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - (2) 20# Dry Chemical (4) 15# CO 's
- 2. CO 2 hsereelseach-(2)-Doof#305 (1) - Door #311
"; . Fire hose reel - Door #305 4 Sprinkler system in shop and fan areas Page 8-2 REVISION 1 . DC0220 311I
)
.. ._l .
~VENTfLAT!ON: .
- 1. Switengear vent fans f's 5-67 through 'S-72 are located in'the switchgear vent fan room. Switchgear room supply duct has fire dampers. -
/7 2. Smoke exhauster may be required. Positive pressure techniques with ventilation exhaust directed through ceiling grating to El.140' Turbine ,
Deck is preferred. Ceiling opening has a fire damper at El.140' that may need to be opened. ,
- 3. If no power is available, gas powered fans or generators may be needed.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone l l l
- 2. Pcrtable Radios LIGHTING: 1. Normal plar.t lighting panel - PL 11-4 El 119' Col D-2
- 2. Emergency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: .
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Smoke exhausters may be required particularly for a fire in the Electrical -
Shop and store room.
- 3. CO is the agent of choice (sample for 0 after use).
- 4. If 2water used in fog pattern only due to 2high voltage electrical equipment, minimize water on floor areas.
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o DEPARTSENT.0FfrdCLEARPLAt.TOPERATIOf.! DIABLO CAta0r. POWER PLANT UNIT NO. I TURBINE BLOG. EL. 119' f.s. FIRE rIGHTlhG PRE-PLAN . POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Lubricating 011.
- 2. Electric Wiring.
- 3. Transient Combustibles MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. 480 volt nonvital motor control center.
- 2. Transient com ustibles.
- 3. Broken lube oil line, oil soaked insulation.
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via elevator No.1 or adjacent stairs.
- 2. Secondary - Via S.W. stainsay.
- 3. Tertiary - Via N.E. stairway.
FIRE BRIGADE STM iNG AREA: 1. Primary - Outside Elevator No.1.
- 2. Secondary - Cold machine shop crane bay.
(-
- 3. Tertiary - By Maint. Fire Brigade Locker.
(- ,
- RA010 LOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: None anticipated beyond products of coreustic9 ,
MANAGEMEFT OF Pt. ANT SYSTEMS: The entire floor area is protected by wet piped automatic sprinklers, shut offs are located at, North system EL. 85' behind condensate booster pumps #FP-1-42. South system EL. 85' aoove and behind Nash vacuum pump S.W. cornee #FP-1-50. Page 9-1 Revision ( DC0220 .301 ,
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atop 9'i'.0A?!OM FCA PROTECT!0n 0F HEAT SEN5i?!EE s.r ti*- f
- 1. Fire nose reels say os required to protect exposures, !
- 2. Caution should be used when applying water to hot steam Itnes. rapid cooling can cause cracking and steam leaks.
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FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIP
- TENT: 1. Fire Extinguishers . (4) 20# dry chemicals (1) 15# CO2.
- 2. Fire Hose Reels each (6).
- 3. Foam (Fire equipment locker)
VENTILATION: Ventilation Fgos 5 57, 5-58 and 5-59 are located in the N.E. area of the 014g. There are no exhaust outlets on the west wall. Smoke would vent to EL. 140' via stairways and open grating in the N.W. corner. Smoke , exhausters will be required for a fire in the S.E. corner of this area and /
/
smoke vented to EL.140'. l COP 99UNICATIONS: 1. Plant communication telephones No's a
- 2. Portable Radios. (Ops ireq.) :
LIGHTING: 1. Normal plant lighting panels located at
- PL 11-4 E1. 119' col 0-2 *
- PL 12-3 E1. 119' col F.16. ,
- 2. Emergency lighting.
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 5 elf. contained breathing apparatus Will be required. Portaole nand lanterns should.De carried by members of the fire brigade. , ,
- 4 Seismic bracing makes access very difficult. Lube oil fires may also involve lower elevations, exercise extreme caution while working on open gratings. .
Page 9-2 R*'iSto" l DCO220 311 me# C -- -
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OEPARTMENT OF NUCLEA% PLANT OPEPAT*095 - D!ABLO CANY0h POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 TUR8!NE BLOG. WARE 80USE FIRE FIGHTING PRE-FLAN ,, s POTENTIAL COM8UST!8LES: Packing Materials. Thinners. Trifluoroethane - Glass bottles. l Linseed 011. ; Ethyl Alcohol. l Urethane Spray Cans. Paint Spray Cans. MOST PR08A8LE FIRE: 1. Pecking Materials.
- 2. Flaymable Liquids.
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - West entrance via warehouse office or sliding fire door No. 381
- 2. Secondary - East entrance via door No. 319 E1.119' elevator lobby.
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - E1.119' outside 480V MCC 15 Room.
- 2. Secondary - At elevator lobby east of warehouse. ,
RADIOLOGICAL OR 70X!COLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Dense smoke from combustibles and toxic solvents. MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: The area is protected by automatic wet piped sprinklers. 5 hut off valve is located on EL. 85' - Above and benind kash vacuum pump (valve No.FP-1-50). Page 10-1 DC0220 321 Revision 4 l
~ " " - - - - - - - - - - - , . _ . , _ _ , , _
. l RECOMME' CATION FOR PROTECTION CF HEAT SEP.S!TIVE E00!PMi.T:
- 1. Level C storage is neat ano numiotty sensitive
- 2. Flammable liquids - protect exposures with water spray O..
i FIRE SUPPRES$10N EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire Extinguishers - (4) 20# Ory Chemical 1- at door e319 1- shelving behind counter I- elevator hallway 1- crane bay hallway (1) 15# CO, Level "A" Storage
- 2. CO, Hose Reel Outside 480V ACC 15
- 3. Fih Hose Reel - Crane bay hellway i 4. Automatic' Sprinkler System VENTILATION: 1. Normal Plant Ventilation - Supply fan S-74
- 2. Portable smoke exhausters to exhaust smoke through sliding door at counter to crane bay.
COPNUNICATIONS: 1. Plant Teleph'one No. arehouse Office *
- 2. Portable Radios (Ops. req.) -
LIGHTING: 1. Normal Plant Lighting Power Supply Panel. PC 12-3
- 2. Emergency lights. ,
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SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Breathing apparatus must be worn due to . confined . area (large quantities of smoke probable also toxic fumes from quantities of flarenable liquids).
- 2. Protect pressurized spray paint containers located on shelving adjacent to door No. 319 and flassable liquids with water spray to preclude possible explosion.
Page.10-2 DC0220 331 Revision 3 v... l l
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- PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT r-'%
UNIT NO. 1 TURBINE BLDG EL. 140' - FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN - POTENTIAL C0KEUSTIBLES: 1. Lube oil
- 2. Hydrogen
- 3. Class "A" combustibles in office areas
- 4. Solvents repair shops
- 5. Transient combustibles MOST PR06ABLE FIRE: 1. Class "A" combustibles
- 2. Hydrogen leak
- 3. Lube oil leak ACCESS ANC EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - stairway'or Elevator No.1
- 2. Secondary - N.E. stairway
- I 3. Tertiary - S.W. stairway FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - outside Operations Ready Room
- 2. Secondary - outside Instrument Repair Shop RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. C07 discharge at #10 bearing
*~
- 2. Chromates in stator cooling syster
( , D MANAGEMENT OF PLAfit .SiSTEMS:
- 1. Cardox control valve 1-FCV-216 is located between vent fans 5-62 and S-63 on the east wall.
- 2. Deluge control valves are located at Turbine Pedestals (FCV-204, 205, 206, and 207).
- 3. Sprinkler control valve, Shift Clerks Office, is located outside the Control Rocm by Elevator #1 (FP-1-145).
A. Instrument Shop sprinkler control valve is located by Booster Pumps El. 85'.
- 5. Hydrogen shut off valve is located at 85' El. near seal oil Unit #1-1
(#GGS-1-5).
- 6. Main hydrcgen shut off valve is located at the south end of the west buttress El. 85' (#GGS-1-81).
- 7. Hydrogen is vented to the roof from vent valve shut off at seal oil Unit 1-1. El. 85'.
- 6. Cardox tie in to No-10 bearing is located at El.104', Cardox Tank (0-FCV-215).
Page 11-1 REVISI0t: 1 DC0220 37I1
~
RECOMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Water spray from hos2 reals may be ussd to cool housing of Turbine Hoods, the Turbine and Generator Exciter Unit. Care must be exercised as water may cause steam leaks when applied to hot metal. Water spray should be used to protect exposures from a hydrogen leak. ,
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - (7) 20# Ory Chemical (3) ISP CO,'s (1) 17# HaTon (6) fire hose reels
- 2. Deluge Spray System (Turbine Bearings 1 thru 9).
- 3. CO, system to #10 Bearing ,
- 4. Wet sprinkler system - Offices and Instrument '
Repair Shop. VENTILATION: 1. Supply Fans - S-61, S-62, S-63, S-64 and S-65
- 2. Smoke from any fire .would probably vent through the roof via the open vents.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone
- 2. Portable radios LIGHTING: 1. Nonnat plant lighting panel - PL 12-4 El.140' Col. G-14 PL 12-5 El. 140' Col. A-14 PL 11-5 El. 140' Col. D-1 " "s
- 2. Emergeqcy lighting , _)
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. In the event of a hydrogen leak, do not attempt to extinguish the fire until such time as the hydrogen supply has been shut off at. valve located by Seal 011 Unit 1-1 El. 85'.
- 2. Self contained breathing apparatus is required to fight a fire in the office and shop areas and may be necessary on the Turbine Deck.
i Page 11-2 REVISION 1 T, DC0220 38tI .)
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.dA27HEi;T OF fiUC;. EAR PLA!.T ODE:ATIO'.S DIASLC CAP.YO:4 POWER P At47 UNIT NO. 1 CONDENSATE POLISHING AREA FIRE FIGHTINi PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COM8UST!BLES: 1. Cable Insulation. -
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- 2. Electrical Contml Panels.
- 3. Anhydrous Dimethylaime (DMA).
- 4. Hydrogen Storage (S. End).
- 5. Fuel 011.
- 6. Dry Resin Storage.
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Cable Insulation.
- 2. Electrical Control Panels.
- 3. Overheated Pump Bearings.
- 4. Anhydrous Otmethylaine (0.M.A.).
- 5. Hydrogen Leak.
- 6. Fuel 011 Spill During Loading.
- 7. Transient Costustibles.
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Door at South End E1. 85'.
- 2. Secondary - Via Door North End El. 85' (for EL.104' Via stairways NAS).
- 3. Tertiary - Via center roll up door-FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - North end EL'. 85'.
- 2. Secondary - South end EL. 85'.
NOTE: Staging area selected should be upwind - of smoke plume. RA0!0 LOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZAR05: 1. Anhydrous Oimethylaime (DMA) health Hazards: Eye, skin and respiratory irritant, direct or prolonged Contact can cause burns and serious injury.
- 2. Sulfurie Acid (N,50,)
i Health Hazard: Causes severe, deep burns to tissue; very tor?osive effect.
- l Avoid any contact.
i
- 3. Caastic (Sodium Hydroxide)(NaOH)
Health Hazard: Toitic. A severe eye hazaro; soTid or f.oncentrated solution destroys tissue on contact. Deep tissue burns. MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. 0.M.A. shutoff valves are located in the cylinder cabinet. A rent is provided from the cabinet to the roof above 104' elevation. -
- 2. Fuel oil transfer pump shut offs are located at the 480V. MCC - No. 1-7 cubicle (manually) or automatically from the control room. -
- 3. The acid and caustic controls are located at the individual tanks.
Page 12-1 OCO220 361 Revision g 3 J l
3 y , - - -- REC 0te9ENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSIT!vE EQUIPMENT: Fire Hose reels located on west sioe of guiloing may De required ir3 tne event a fire cannot 3 be extinguished using portable extinguishers.' Exposure protection is necessary for the H2 storage until source of gas is secured. , FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire Extinguishers - (3) 15# C02's 85' E1. (3) 15# CO2's 104' E1. (1) Halon Ext. Control Cubicle. (1) 20# Ory Chem 9H2 Storage.
- 2. Fire Hose Reels (2) West Side North & South encs Next to office complex.
(1) Col. 8-14 Turbine 81dg. . 85' El via roll up door #123.
! 3. Fire Hota Trailer
- 4. Fire Hydrants (1) South end 9 office complex.
(1) N.W. corner at fence. NOTE: sulti purpose dry chemical or foam should be used on fuel oil spills or fires. . VENTILATION: 1. Exhaust Fans: E-82 El 104' N. end. E-74 El 104' control cubicle. E-47 El 104' above acid and caustic tks.
. E-68 El 85' between acid & caustic tks.
- 2. Portable, smoke exhausters will be required. Smoke can be exhausted via doors 9 N & S and and rolling doors west side-all on EL. 85' and via double doors EL. 104' opposite resin hopper.
' COP 94UNICATIONS: 1. Pldnt Connunication Telephones - No 85' elevation 8~~, and n rol cubicle.
i No 85' elevation a and control cubicle.
- 2. Portable Radios (ops, freq.)
LIGHTING: 1. Normal Plant Lighting - Panel,PL 19-1 located on west wall in No 1-7 resin tank bay
- 2. Emergency lights.
l $PiCIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Self Contained Breathing Appara'tus and Personal Protective Equipment will be required due to large quantities of sulfuric acid & caustic.
- 2. H2 Explosive Hazard
- 3. Provide additional dry chemical extinguishers when unloading fuel oil. .
Page 12-2 h' DC0220 .371 Revision i Yww . C _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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O. DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS
\. DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 PACKAGE BOILER AREA FIRE FIGHTING PRE. PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Diesel Fuel to Boiler.
- 2. Start-up Propane to Boiler.
~
MOST PROSA8tE FIRE: 1. Burner 011 Leak.
- 2. Propane Leak.
- 3. Overheated Pumps.
s
~
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: Primary - North Door No.191 E1. 85'. Secondary - Door No. iS4 Fuel Handling.
- L1dg. Fan Room (Access only)
NOTE: Egress from door 190 is restrict'ed since door No.199 is a locked security door.
\ -
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: Primary - North end EL'.' 85' ya-d area n
. (.
~
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: Toxic fumes or skin contact from
. 351 Hydrazine..
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. Diesel fuel shut off located at top of stairway in area covered by asphalt, control valve in same location.
- 2. Propane shut off in small penetration above bottles.
- 3. Sprinkler system shut off located at EL. 85' Indicated by FP-1-20 on drawing.
- 4. Shat off fuel oil rather than de-energize.
This allows 30 sec. purge. -
- 5. Floor drains. Drain to Aux. 81dg. sump.
'~
Page 13-1 DC0220 381 Revision g
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,cq " ,j* f RECOPMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT: Use water fog to . cool exposures. -
- - : }
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire Extinguisher - 20# Dry Chem. in room.
- 2. Sprinkler System. !
- 3. Fire Hose Reel Outside North end.
- 4. Fire Hydrant N. end E1. 85'.
$. Foam. -
NOTE: Additional fire hose will be required to reach
, south end of room.
VENTILATION: 1. Fuel Handling B1dg. Ventilation.
- 2. Portable Smoke Exhausters. ~
. 3. Fire Hose Stream Ventilation capability via door No.191
. i COP 9PJNICAT!0NS: 1. Plant Telephone System N
- 2. ' Portable Radios (Ops. Freq. ~
LIGHTING: Normel Plant Lighting Control Panel PL 15-1. ' Emergency Lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Contact with 351 Hvdrazine very irritating to eyes and skin. Personai protective equipment should be worn. i Use SCSA to prevent inhalation of hydrazine vapors. l 2. Secure source of propane prior to extinguishment to avoid explosion. I { i - l l l Page 13-2 1 DC0220 391 # , Revision l l l l l L
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OEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT 0;ER*T;0?.5 O!ABLO CANYON P0iER PLAh? ( UNIT NO. 1 TRANSFORMERS AND R.O. AREA
N FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAh POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Transformer Oil . j
- 2. Cable Insulation.
- 3. Electrical Control Panel (R.O. Area).
. 4. Transient Coecustibles (R.0. Area).
- 5. Temporary Structures.
1 l MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transformer 011.
- 2. Control Panel (R.O. Area). '
- 3. Transient Coseustibles (Temporary Structures)
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. R.O. Area EL. 85' via Roll-up or personnel doors
- 2. R.0. Area EL.104' via Stairway from EL. 85'.
..s
'i FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Transformers North end Turbine Bldg. . j R.O. Area Northeast of turbine bicg.
- 2. Secondary - Transformers east end turnine bics.
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS:
- 1. Citric Acid.
- 2. Sodium Bisulfate (inorganic salt sol.ution).
- 3. Hypochlorite(bleach).
- 4. Formaldehyde (HCHO).
(See special precautions) l l l Page la-1 OCO220 401 - Revision i __)
M M *!*I'.T OF PLA*4T SY!*I*S: 1. All nine (9) transformers are crote::ec :, automatic deluge water spray systers. Ina: can be manually operated locally or remotely fece the Control Room.
- 2. The pavement around the transformers is sloped so that spilled transformer oil would drain away front the turbine b1dg. Rock blotters with drains are provided around each transformer which prevents oil from reaching the turbine bldg.
A sliding gate valve located opposite Fire Hose Station YL-5, North side of roadway controls discharge to Diablo Creek.
- 3. Burning oil discharging to Diablo Creek could ignite a wild land fire.
4 Deenergize involved transferiner. REC 0PetENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT
- 1. Fire hcse streams may be required.to provide exposure protection for transfonners and the turbine bldg.
2. The interior exposure of exterior of the turbine fire.bldg. should be checked for heat. damage in vicinity
~
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire Extinguishers 15# CO s. 2 C. Fire Hose Stations - YL N.W. by fence . ~
- YL N.E. by fence
- YL At transformer 2-1
- YL N.E. Corner YL East side YL N.W. Corner turbine bleg.
- 3. Fire Hose Trailer - N.W.. Corner Turbine Bldg.
Hose control device available for exposure protection.
- 4. Deluge Systems - FCV-209 Startup Transformer 2-1 FCV-208 Startup Transformers -
- 1-2/1-1.
FCV-210 Aux. Transformer 1 Unit 1 Main Transformer SP Unit 1 Main Transformer 0-C FCV-211 Aux. Transfonner 1-2 Unit 1 Main Transformer BA Locker OS
- 5. Foam - (Fire Equipment Locker)
Page 14-2 DC0220 411
, Revision l
vE'. :' ':ct.: 1. ctew grating at ceiling level of the R.O. :rea. .c.;c a _ - :.e and gases to vent to the cegasifier room aoove anc os eAP .a **{c by 51-81 exhaust fan to the outside.
- 2. Smoke can also be. exhausted to the outside by opening the /
- three overhead rolling doors with hose streams or portable
- snoke exhausters.
/
i COMMUNICATION 5: 1. Plant Telephones M-
- 2. Portable' Radios (0ps. Freq.)
LIGHTING: 1. Plant Lighting Panels PJR0 &PPRO in R.0. Area.
- 2. Yard lightirg.
- 3. Emergency , lighting.
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: .
- 1. Fire nose streams in fog pattern only should be used when fighting a transformer l fire due to extreme high voltage. If foam is used, it is more conductive, so I application should be very cautious. .
- 2. Self contained breathing apparatus may be required for a fire in the R.O. ar'ea.
- 3. Formalde, hyde - vaporizes readily from solution and is flannable in air. g Life Parard, eyes, skin and respiratory irritant.
4 S. sodium utsulfate, when heated releases sulfur dioxide (50,). Eye and skin protection should be worn in the R.O. aree, tye contact with J sodium bisulfate requires immediate flushing for a minimum of fifteen (15) minutes followed by calling a physician. Page la-3 OC0220 421 Revision [ .
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l PACIF8C GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIASLO CANYON POWER PLANT i UNIT NO. 1&2 480 VITAL SWGR AREA EL.100' 's I FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Electrical switchgear panels
- 2. Cable insulation M0'ST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Switchgear panels
- 2. Cable insulation
. 3. Transient combustibles ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - via Door #222 by west stairway (Security Door)
- 2. Secondary -via Door #231 by east stairway FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - outside Elevator #19 El.104'
- 2. Secondary - access control at bottom of Stairway S-5 leading to Door 7231 RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. C0. discharge from hose reels
- 2. Ca61einsulationproductsof combustion NOTE: Due to non rated steel
*' atches. CO and toxic
- hcombustionphoductscould drif t down to El. 89' or smoke could impact El. 119.
Sample both areas for 02 ' CO, etc. MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. No floor drains are provided in this area. Water would have, to be removed via the equipment hatches er stairways.
- 2. De-energize affected equipment from control' room where possible.
- 3. Minimize water usage. Water on floor could cause breaker failures.
Page 15-! REVISION 1 DC0220 4611 .[,
- n.
RECOP94ENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIP
- TENT:
- 1. Protect exposures with water fog if required on a large fire (use sparingly).
2. Maintain fire barrier penetration seals to separate redundant safe shutdown .' trains.(480 volt vital switchgear). .
3.* Keep fire doors closed as necessary to retard spread of flanes and smoke. - FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - (9) 15# C0's l
- 2. CO 2 hose reels - (1) at bus 1-H room ,
(1) at bus 2-F room !
- 3. Fire hose reels - (1) stairway by Door #231 (1) Turbine Building, by Door #221 1 -
l l VENTILATION:
- 1. The ventilation to each switchgear bus room is equipped with automatic fire i dampers in both the supply and exhaust ducts. These dampers a're designed for fire confined to one bus room. Ventilation is cut off to the room with the fire by these dampers. Maintain ventilation fans S-27 and E-27' in s'ervice to provide ventilation to the redundant buses. Portable smoke exhausters may be required. Smoke can be exhausted via stairways to upper elevations. Positive pressure techniques could be used to keep redundant areas free of smoke. Gasoline fans or generators may be needed on a loss .
of A/C power. COMMUf;ICATIONS: 1. Plant telephones (~ (.. . , l 2. Portable radios LIGHTING: 1. Normal plant lighting panel PL 13'-3 located 9 El. 100' - Col L-18 Auxiliary Building
- 2. Emergency lighting l SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. CO, fire fighting agent of choice.
- 3. Water from hose reels in fog pattern only to recace electric shock ,
potential. .
- 4. Minimize water use due to absence of floor drain's.
i l l Page 15-2
~
,, . - REVISION 1 DC0220 4711 l
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~ ia REVi
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT
~
~~' ~
. UNIT NO. 1&2 VITAL BATTERY RUDR5"T[. 115' FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN .'
POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. Electrical cabinets
- 3. Hydrogen (battery rooms)
- 4. Battery casings MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Electrical cabinets and inverters
- 2. Transient combustibles t
i
- 3. Cable insulation ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - via Door #323 from west stairway (Security Door) 2.- Secondary - via Door #'s 342 and 343
- free east stairway FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - outside Elevator #1 Turbine Building at El. 104'
- 2. Secondary - access control via east stairway
- 3. Tertiary - outside Elevator #2 Auxiliary Building at El. 100' ,
.~.
f,_/ RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOG{ CAL HAZARDS: 1. Batteries (Hydrogen-H2 / Sulfuric Acid-H 0)
- 2. No flo rains are provided in this area; water used would have to be drained via equipment hatches or stairways.
. 3. C0 discharge from hose reels N0fE: C07and toxic gases could migrate to adjacent areas
. via stairways and unrated steel hatches. Sample j adjacent areas for CO, 0 '
2 l etc. ! MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. De-energize electrical equipment where feasible.
1 2. No floor drains are provided in this area. Water used would have to be drained via equipment hatches or stairways. Minimize water usage. Excessive water on floor could cause equipment failures. Paje 16-1
.... . REVISI0h 1 I l - . ~ . - - . . .. ... .. . _
RECOPMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT
- 1. Water spray may ba required to protect exposures. Use a fog pattsrn only. -
Maintain a minimum distance of six (6) feet from potentially energized electrical equipment. 2. 3. Minimize water usage since floor drains are not provided. Keep fire doors closed as necessary to retard spread of flames and smoke. *
-) '
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - (9) 15# CO
- 2. CO, hose reels - (2) east side,2(s 1) west side
- 3. Fire hose reel - east stairway at El.115' NOTE: An additional 100' of fire hose will be required to reach 1-2 and 2-1 battery rooms with water spray.
~
VENTILATION:
- 1. Battery rooms ventilation is supplied by S-27 and E-27 Unit I side, S-28
. and E-28 for Unit 2 side.
- 2. Fans S-43 and S-44 supply inverter rooms Unit 1 side, S-45 and S-46 supply
.'nverter rooms Unit 2 side. The inverter rooms have natural draft exhaust ! to El. 140' Turbine Building east side. j i 3. Portable smoke exhausters may be reqt;f red. Smoke could be exhausted via ;
Door #'s 323 and 234. Care should be taken to minimize smoke in the ; redundant battery or inverter rooms. ' l 4. Gas powered fans or generators may be necessary if A/C power is lost. l i - s COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephones j ,
. 2. Portable radios -(
) i LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panel - PL 13-3 Auxiliary Building 100' El. Col.
.! L-18
,2. Emergency lighting .
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. 5 elf contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Water to be used in fog pattern only due to high voltage electrical equipment.
- 3. Should the exhaust system fail, concentrations of hydrogen could exist, presenting an explosive atmosphere.
- 4. Sulfuric acid is contained in the batteries and " Reacts violently with water". ' !
$. TuTTprotective clothing to be w'orn, as skin contact with sulfuric acid I causes severe deep burns.
- 6. Flush skin that contacts acid with copious amounts of water. Seek medical ,
attention. ' i i
~
Page 16-2 REVISION 1 DC0220 49II j l b _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ - - -. _ _ _ _ -
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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLMT O: UNIT NO. 142 CONTROL ROOM . FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN - POTETTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Class "A" combustibles (paper) .
- 2. Cor. trol panels
- 3. Cable insulation
- 4. Lighting diffusers
- 5. Carpet MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Class "A" combustibles (paper)
- 2. Control panels
. 3. Cable insulation ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - via Door f508
- 2. Secondary - via Door #503 *
- 3. Tertiary - via Door #560 l .
TIRE BRIGADE STAG 1NG AREA: 1. Primary - outside Elevator #1, Turbine
- Building, E1.140'
- 2. Secondary - outside Elevator #2, Auxiliary Buf1 ding Roof E1. 140'
' RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HA7ARDS: 1. Cable insul'ation products of . *
./ combustion
- 2. Halon discharge inside SSPS rooms MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEPS: .
l 1. Automatic Halon Fire Protection is providad by two (2) automatic systems. - I one for each SSPS room. A manual activation switch and a mserve tar.k switch are provided in each computer room. A Halon abort switch is provided for each system as well.
- 2. The SFM Office, Clerk's Office, and CAS are provided with wet piped sprinklers. The shut-off control valve is located next to Elevator #1, E1.
140' Turbine Deck.
- 3. A control room fire 'could necessitate shutdown from the hot shutdown panel (OP AP-8).
l l . l I: Page 18-1 ,V AEVISION 1 DCO220 52!1 l l . l l.. . ~~.% : , ' . .,~-'.~.%~ ~ ? 'y% : .,. . . - .. . - . . .~ ~ . . - . .
~
RECOMPENDATION FOR PROTECTf0N OF HEAT SENSfTfvE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire hose streams in fog pattern only may be required in an extreme case.
- 2. Smoke should be ventilated as soon as practicable to avoid damage to sensitive equipment.
- .- 3 FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extingJishers - (7) 17# Halon
- 2. Fire hose reels - (1) by Elevator #1 Turbine Deck (1) Roof Outside Elevator
#2
- 3. Halon Systems - SSPS rooms only
- 4. Wet sprinkler system - Shift Foreman's and Central Alarm Station -
VENTILATION:
- 1. a. Main supply fan (S-35 or S-36 for Unit 1, and S-37 or S-38 for Unit No. 2) ,
- b. Filter booster fan (S-39 or S 40 for Unit No.1, and S-41 or S-42 for Unit No. 2)
- c. Pressurization surply fans (5-% and S-97 are located on Unit No. 2, while S-98 and S-99 are located on Unit No. 1).
- 2.
- Portable smoke exhausters may be required. Smoke can be exhaus'ted through Doors 503 and 501 to the outside. Also, threugh Door #508 to the Turbine Deck. If A/C power is lost, gas powered fans or generators may be used.
1 l COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephones -
- 2. Radio console
- 3. Portable radios CAUTION: Porta er -
not be used in the Control Room due to interference with the NI's and seismic detection equipment. Portable radios could cause a spurious
.reacter trip signal.
LIGHTING: 1. Normal plant lighting panel - PL 23-5 Unit 2 13-5 Unit 1
- 2. Emergency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus may be required.
- 2. Minimize any use of water or dry chemical agent.
Page 18-2 REVISION 1 DC0220 53II J
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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2
. 12KV SWGR AND CABLE SPREADING ROOM
- FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN ,
l POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. Breaker components
- 3. Switchgear components MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Fire in breaker cubicles and switchgear control panels
- 2. Electric cable fire in cable spreading room below switchgear room ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1.
Primary .from Turbine
#117-2 Building)via (Security Door Door
- 2. Secondary - from Diesel Generator corridor via Door #118-2
- 3. Tertiary - from yard area via Door #119-2' (Security Door)
FIPE hRIGADE STAGING AREA:1. Primary - Turbine #1 El. 85' south Door
#117-2
- 2. Secondary - Hallway by Diesel Generator 2-1 outside Door #118-2 Fumes from burning or overhgated RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1.
electrical cable insulation CO, from hose reel discharge
~
2. (etpecially at low elevations)
. MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. Floor drain in cable spreading room is located along the east wall and drains to Turbine Building sump, El. 85' water also drains to E1. 73' via stairs.
- 2. Deenergize electrical equipment where feasible.
- 3. Automatic rolling fire doors are located at Doors #119-2,101-2, and at ventilation openings on the east wall.
.- Page 19-1 REVISION 1 ~'
CC0220 5411
. e y j
q
. RECOPMENDATION FOR PROTECTkON OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
, , 1. Water spray from hose streams may be necessary to protect exposures. Use
,1, in fog pattern only at a distance of at le.st 6 feet due to energized
( , eltetrical equipment. .
~ -,
- 2. Safe shutdown circuits in pyrocrete e'nclosures need protection.
- 3. Monitor concrete hatch on El.104' for possible fire propagation.
FIRE SUPPRES3 ION EOUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguisers - (3) Co., switchgear rooms (2) dry chem in cable spreading rooms
- 2. CO., hose reels - (2)
- 3. Water hose reel in Diesel Ger.erator corridor
- 4. Hydrants and hose reels outside roll-up Door
#'s 101-2 and 119-2 VENTILATION: ~
- 1. Normal plant ventilation
- 2. Portable smoke exhausters say be required. Smoke can be exhausted via roll-up Door #101-2. south end or Door #119-2. Positive pressure ventilation techniques may be most effective in smoke removal with fans.
If A/C power is not available, gasoline powered fans or generators may be" used.
- 3. Hose streams could exhaust smoke via Doors 101-2 or 119-2 to the out of doors.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephon j
- 2. Portable radi N.. - LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panel - PL 21-1 !
( 2. Emergency lighting l SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
, 1. Self contained breathing apparatus must be worn. -
- 2. Smoke Exhausters may' be required, particularly for a fire in the cable spreading room, El. 76'. Exhaust smoke via roll-up Doors 101-2 or 119-2.
- 3. CO., is the agent of choice. .
- 4. Water to be used in fqg patten only due to high voltage electrical l
equipment.
- 5. CO may accumulate at low elevations. Honitor for 02 concentration prior 2
tr removing SCBA's. Page 19-2 ( , , REVISION 1 v' DC0220 55I1
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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC CDMPANY , DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT l 1
- b. WU M.
DG's 2.-1, 2-2 & DdIDIERT STORAGE 2 1 FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Fuel oil
. 2. Lube oil
- 3. Cable insulation
- 4. Transient combustibles during maintenance
- 5. Class "A" combustibles (document storage)
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles
- 2. Fue) 011
- 3. Lube oil
- 4. Class "A" combustibles ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - via Door #115A-2 from Turbine Building E1. 85' (Security Door)
- 2. Secondary - via Door #102-2 from yard at .
E1. 85' (Security Door)
- via 12KV switchgear Dcor $118-2 ,
- 3. For document storage - via Door #115-2 (Primary)
- - via Door #112-2 (Secondary - Security
. . . Door)
(\ - FIPE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - outside Door 115A-2 Turbine Building El. 85'
- 2. Secondary - outside Door 102-2 South End l Turbine Building (south yard)
RACIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL_HAIARDS: 1. CO, discharge at Diesel Generators
.anc document storage 2.
Cable insulation products of i combustion
- 3. Chromates in Diesel Generator -
coolers I l l l - Page 20-1
~~ '
REVISION 1 DC0220 5611 e _ - - , . _ _ _ _ , , _. .---...s,-=-- -"+*-v- -'-'-v er--- .e--- - . . .'1-.'___ _ - - - - . _ -*--r- - ---e- - - - , - - -
-w---- - - - - - - --
MANAGCMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. A 2 3/4" curb is provided at each automatic dsor to prevcnt oil spread to ,
adjacent areas.
- 2. Both generators are protected by an automatic CO 2 system. The CO system may be actuated automatically. manua,11y from the Control Room, ur2 from the ]/
Turbine Building south end behind the condensate booster pumps. The west .- roll-up doors may not shut automatically on CO manual discharge since they 2 are activated by heat detectors only.
- 3. The shut off for the automatic sprinklar system in hallway is located behind condensate booster pump 2-1 SW corner.
- 4. A manual activation of the CO . system for the document storage area is located on the wall adjacent $o Door #113-2.
S .- Fuel oil leaks drain to the Turbine Building sump. RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire hose reels located in the hallway. Turoine Building or the yard loop may be required to protect exposures.
- 2. Maintain fire barrier integrity to assure protection of redundant equipment.
- 3. Protect from exposure outside west side intake louvers.
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - (3) 20# dry ' chemicals (1) 17# Halon (1) 150# dry chem
, wheeled unit
- 2. Automatic CO, system generator rooms and document stoPage rooms
- 3. CO hose reel in the 12KV switchgear room 4.
. 5. Sphinkler Foam (fire equipment systemlocker in hallway)
NOTE: A second manual discharge of CO should be considered if a refl.a$h
]
_/ occurs or to assure sufficient concentration. VENTILATION:
- 1. -Louvers are provided in the west wall. Automatic CO2 discharge will block ventilation ducts.
- 2. Portable smoke exhausters may be required. Smoke can be exhausted via west ventilation or Door #102-2 to the outside.
- 3. Hose stream ventilation is possible via Door #102-2. *
- 4. Portable smoke exhausters will be required for a fire in document storage and can exhaust via Door # 112-2 to El. 85' polishing area. j I
COMMUNICATIONS: 1.
- 2. Plant telephone M Portable radios LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panel - PL 21-1
- 2. Emergency lighting
, Page 20-2 REVISION 1 '
4 DC0220 57II .. O
SPECIAL PRECAt!TIONS:
- 1. Portabla smok; cxhausters may be required.
- 2. Self contained brwathing apparatus will be required due to smoke and CO m discharge. 2 3.
Tests should be conducted to determine CO , 02 '"d fl***DI' **8"#8 E#i"# 1" ' ' removal of SCBA-in Diesel Generator Rooms.2 '
- 4. Reopening of rcil-up doors for ventilation requires engaging the ratchet mechanism above the door and opening the door with the chain operator.
- 5. Access to document storage is locked, with keys controlled by the Shift Foreman and Document Control.
I b'. Page 20-3 ,," , REVISION I DC0220 5811
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t . l f DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PU WT OPERATIONS DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT
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w R8i.E .Lo.. it. 5. a.d .e, FIRE FIGHTING PRE. PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Lube Oil !
- 2. Cable Insulation
- 3. Batteries
- 4. Solvent - Maste Solvent. Diesel Oil I
M ST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Lube Oil Leskage
- 2. Transient Com6ustibles
, . 3. 011 Reclamation Room (Approx. 3000 gal. Flamable Liquids)
- 4. Cable Insulation s
ACCESS AND EERE55 ROUTES: 1. Prisery - Via Cold Machine Shop (Locked Security Barrier)
- 2. Secondary - Via Door 102-2 4 115-2 South End
- 3. Tertiary - Via Roll Up Door 125-2 West Side FIRE BRIGADE STAG 1NG AREA: 1. Primary - Cold Machine Shop
- 2. Secondary - Outside Roll Up Door 125-2 West Side Tertiary - D.G. Hallway by Door #115A-2
!{- (
. 3.
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HA7ARDS: 1. Hydrazine. Amenia Sulphuric Acid. Cable Insulation 5 Battery acid.
- 2. Calibration facility contains radioactive
. sources.
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. The oil drum storage room 1s suerounded by 3 hour fire -l Barriers, raised soonveys and sealed pipeusys thus preventing oil from a ruptured tank leaking to an outside area. ! 2. Water deluge protects the feedwater pumps 2-1 i and 2-2 and seal oil unit. Shut off valves are located at: AT the COLM,!NE t 21/C North End for FWP 2-1 AT COL LINE by Hydrazine & Asumonia Tanks for FWP 2-2 At 5.E. corner by Stator Cooling Unit for M Seal 011 Unit Deluge. 2
- 3. Wet sprinklee systems protect the entire 85' E1.
North System Shut Off Yalve FP-2-59 is located at the N.W. side of the Freignt I elevator. South System shut off valve FP-2-66 is located by Condensate looster Pune 2-1. s .
. Page 21-1 DCD220 561 Revision t
1 _ j RECOPe9ENDAT10N FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSIT1VE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire Hose Reels may be required to protect exposures.
- 2. Do not spray cold water directly on exposed steam pipiny, r
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire Extinguishers 6 20# Dry Chemicals 1 150# D.C. Wheeled Unit
. 2. Automatic Sprinklers. General floor Area, oil reclamation, paint storage & drum storage, and non vital battery rooms.
- 3. Deluge Systems. Feed pumps and H2 S'"1 Oi1*
- 4. Foam (Fire equipment locker)
VENTILATION: 1. Vent Fans 25-53 25-52 & 25-51 are located on the East wall and exhaust outlets are located on the West wall of the fire g gone.
- 2. If extreme smoke conditions are encountered, smoke could be
, exhausted by. hose steacts through outside opening doon.ays.
- 2. ab e r s(
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. LIGHTING: 1. Plant Lighting PL's PJ21-2. PJ22-1
- 2. Emergency Lighting.
1
! SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: Self contained breathing apparatus and other personal protective equipment will be required in the event of a fire. Portable hand i lantems may be required if smoke conditions dictate. Special protective clothing may be necessary to cleanup sulphuric acid, asmonia or hydrazine spills. ,
9 Page 21-2 nen?/n 471 Revisinn i
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. PAGE 21-3 REV s 1 .
DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPER*T:CNS O!ABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2 CONDENSATE POLISHING AREA I FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN -
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POTENTIAL COM8UST!BLES: 1. Cable Insulation
- 2. Electrical Control Panels 3.
- 4. Anhydrous dimethy(laime Hydrogen Storage N. End) (OMA)
- 5. Dry Resin Storage MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Cable Insulation
- 2. Electrical Control Panels
~3. Overheated Pump Bearings 4 Anhydrous 01methylaise (OMA)
- 5. Hydrogen Leak
- 6. Transient Combustibles ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1., Primary - Via Door At N. End 85' E1.
- 2. Secondary - Via Door At 5. End 85' El.
- 3. Tertiary - Via Center Roll Up Doors.
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - North End 85' E1.
- 2. Secondary - South End 85' El.
. NOTE: Staging area selected should be up-wind of smoke plume.
. . ~
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RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICULOGICAL HAZAR05:
- 1. Anhydrous Dimethylatme (DMA) - Health Hazards: Eye Skin and Respiratory Irritant. Direct or Prolonged contact can cause Burns and Serious Injury.
- 2. Sulfuric Acid (H 50 ) - Health Hazards: Causes Severe Deep Burns to Tissue; verycorrosiveEffe8t. Avoid Any contact.
- 3. Caustic (Sodium Hydroxide) - Health Hazards: Toxic A Severe Eye Hazard; solid or Concentrated Solution Destroys Tissue on Contact. Deep Tissue Burns.
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. DMA shutoff Valves am Located in the Cylinder Cabinet. A Vent is Provided From the Cablinet to the Roof Above."
- 2. The Acid and Caustic Controls Are Located at the Individual Tanks. .
Page 22-1 OCO220 581 Revision i
RECOW.INDATION FOR PROTECTI N OF HEAT SENSI-'VE EQUIPPE'.T: Fire hose reels located on the etst sice of the bulloing may be required in tr.e Jishers. Exposure g - event a fire cinnot be extinguished using portable extingf gas is secured. j protection is necessary for the H2 st rege until source o
- 1 FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire Extinguisners
- 2. Fire Hose Stations - f 3[*-West Side (Vard Loop)Via Rollup Door 123-2 E1. SS' Turb. B fl.
- 3. Fire Hydrants -d2]-WestSide(YardLoop)
~ -
VENT 1LATION
- 1. supply Fans Art 251 25-77. . ,
Exhaust Fans Are 2E-60 & 21-61.
- 2. Portable Smoke Exhausters Will Be Required. Smoke Can Be Exhausted Via
~
Doors 9 M & 5 Ends and Rolling Doors West Side E1. 85'. I i COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant Telephones !
- 2. Portable Radios (UP5 FREQ)
Hermal Pit Lighting Panels - PL 29-1 & 29-2.
- LIGHTING- 1. *
- 2. Emergency Lighting.
(
- 1. Self' contained breathing apparatus and personal SPECIAL PRECAUTIDMS: protective equipment will be required.
- 2. H2 explosive hazard. ,
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Page 22-2 ' ReviS10" I DC0220 591
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ut. Pair,r.n. uf huCLEAR PLANT OPERAT80fG - DIABLO CANY0. POWER PLANT ! UNIT NO. 2 . l
. IAST SUTTRESS AND TRANSFURMER AREA .
l FIRL FIA TING PRE PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Transformer Oil
- 2. Cable Insulation
- 3. Transient Combustibles i WST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transfomer 011
- 2. Transient Combustibles
- 3. Cable Insulation ACCESS AND YGRE55 ROUTES: 1. Primary Buttress Ares ,!
NOTE: Access through security barriers;fram Unit I to Unit 2 on EL 140' and EL A5' only. ( . . i [' FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - South End Tuttine B1de.
- 2. Secondary - East Side Turnine aldg.
RADIOLOGICAL OR TortC0 LOGICAL HAZARDS: None MANAGDqwT t" PLANT 1Y1T(M5: 2. All transformers are protected by automatic deluge water spray systems that can be manually operated locally and remotely from the Control Room. 7
- 2. The pavement around the transformers is sloped so that spilled oil would drain auey from the
, Turbine Bldg. Rock blotters with drains are ! - provided around each transfoguer which prevents oil from reaching the Turtine 31dg. .
- 3. Deenergize involved transformer. .
Page 23-1 DCO220 802 Revision i i i 1
- - - - - - . . - _ _ ~ . . - - , - - - , . . _ _ , - , - - - - _ - - . , , . . _ _ . _ - - , .
RE"*r E*02 !O?. FCR PRO *ECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE ECCIPME!.T: r
- 1. Fire nose streags may 03 required to provida esposu e protection for transformers and the Turnine 81dg.
- 2. The interior of the Turbine Bldg. should be checked for heat damage in the vicinity of an exterice exposure 3 fire. ,
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire Hose Stations - YL 20-N. of Main Transfomers YL 19-5.W. of Standby ; Transformer 2-2.
- 2. Fire Hydrants - By each Hose Station YL-1g & YL-20.
- 3. Foss (Fire Brigade Equipment Locker)
- 4. Deluge.Systaes FCV-214 Main Transformers. B&C phase
& Aux. Transfomers 2-2.
FCV-213 Main Transformer A pnase & Aux. Transfomer 21. FCV-212 Standby Startup Transforme* 2-2. VENTILATION: N/A (OUT OF 000RS) . COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant Telephones
- 2. Portable Radios ( FREQ) s LIGHTING: Yard Lighting \
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I SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Fire hose streams in fog pattern only should be used t when fighting a transformer fire due to extreme high voltage. If foam is used, it is more conductive, so application should be cautious. Page 23-7 Revision l OCO220 61!
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PACIFlC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIA8LO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2 DG 2-1 & 2-2 EXHAUST T~l R LNENT STORAGE FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN *
]
POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Class "A" combustibles i
- 2. Transient combustibles MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibics in contact with hot exhaust piping i
- 2. Class "A" combustibles (records storage)
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - via Door #'s 211-2 and 289 El. 104'
- 2. Secondary - hallway via Door #290-2 El.
104" for Diesel Generator exhaust
. area
- 3. For records storage.via door #115-2 and stairway at El. 85'. Turbine Building to Door #'s 129-2 and 130 2 FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA _: 1. Primary - for Diesel Generator exhaust area outside Door #211-2 El. 104' Turbine Building
- 2. Secondary - hallway outside Door #290-2 El.
, 104' '
- 3. Primary ~only for records storage .-
outside Doer *
#115-2 Turbine Building El. 85'
. RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. CD, discharge in records storage area MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. Access keys to record storage must be obtained from Document Control during normal hours and from the Shift Foreman on back shifts.
- 2. Automatic C0 system local actuator and abort valve is located immediately insideDoor$129-2.
- 3. Sprinkler system isolation valve is located at El. 104' east of Door
#211-2.
Page 24-1 REVISION 1 DC0220 65II j
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1 f RECOPMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EOUIPMENT:
- 1. Do not use water directly on hot exposed Diesel Generator exhaust. Pipe cracking may occur.
2. Diesel Generator plenum is connon at the south wall with minimal separation of redundant equipment. .
FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - a. (1) 20t dry chemical (1) pressurized water, outside Door #129-2 9 E1. 96'
- b. (1) 20# Dry Chemical (1) pressurized l water, outside . (
Door f287-2 9 E1. 104'
- 2. Automatic CD system (records storage)
. 3. Automatic spfinkler sysiem, hallway between Door f's 211-2 and 289-2. hallway outside Door #290-2 and storage rooms VENTILATION:
- 1. Louvers in the permanently open position are provided on the west wall Diesel Generator exhaust area.
- 2. Portable smoke exhausters will be required for a fire in the records storage room. Smoke could be exhausted via Door d's 130-2 and 129-2.
. COMMUNICATIONS: 1.
Plant telephone M/
- 2. Portable radios LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panel - PL 21 - 4
- 2. Emergency lighting ,
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be req.: ired in the records storage area until air quality is checked. C0 could migrate to the stairway and below. Sample all areas for 07 concen$ ration.
- 2. Access and egress to and from records storage area on E1. 96' is linited to l stairway from Door #115-2 SW corner Turbine Building behind Condensate Booster Pump 2-1.
l 1 Page 24-2
' REVISION I DC022D 66II . . . . . . . y
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l F @rW E Pacific Gas and Electric Company NUMBER EP M-10 REVISION 5 m DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR Pt. ANT CPERADONS DATE
; 11/8/85 OIA8LO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO(S) g PAGE 1 0F 4 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
, FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT EenovEO 7f. l . Y ll'lT- M UNIT PLANT MANAGER M DATE IMPORTANT TO SAFETY SCOPE This procedure provides anal a fire (s) in any plant area (yzed corrective s) containing safeactions shutdownto take following equipment.
Fire areas not containing safe shutdown equipment are not addressed by this procedure. Safe shutdown equipment are those defined in Appendix 2 of this procedure. This procedure and changes thereto require PSRC , review. 1 t DISCUSSION The equipment required to place the plant in a safe snutdown conditio~n ( t is c.ontained in various fire areas (zones) within the plant. A fire area is defined as that portion of the plant that is separated from other areas by boundary fire bartIers (walls, floor, ceiling) with any openings or penetrations protected with seats or closures having a fire resistance rating equal to that of the barrier. The barrier-rating is consensurate with the free fire, hazard in the area. Fire zones are subdivisions of fire areas and are not necessarily bounded by a continuous fire barrier. Should a fire break out in one of the fire areas (zones), safe shutdown and free fire hazard anaTysis has derenstrated that the safe shutdown of the unit will not be jeopardized. However, the manual operation of certain safety shutdown equipment may be required depending on the location and severity of the fire. I Safe shutdown equipment are defined on the stipulation that a complete loss of off-site power has occurred, and only diesel power is available. Therefore, this procedure may be conservative at various places. If a fire does occur in an area containing safe shutdown equipment but off-site power or in-house (non-vital) power continues to be available, the operator should continue to attempt to operate the plant with "nonnal" equipment, using the instructions provided in this procedure as back-up.
-L')
l DC0275 1VIII
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CHASLO CANvCN POWER PLANT UNIT NO(S) 1 S ON DATE 11/8/85 PAGE 2 0F 4
]
TITLE FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
~ 1 UNIT l
1 There are more fire zones in the plant than is addressed in this ! procedure. The reason why certain fire zones are not included in this
. pr.ocedure is because those zones do not contain safe shutdown circuits in them.
PROCEDURE
- 1. If a fire occurs in the plant the following additional procedures should be used immediately:
- a. Non-radiological Fires - Volume 3 in the Plant Manual, .
Emergency Procedure M-6 '
- b. Radiological Firt -
Volume 3 in the Plant Manual. Emergency Procedure R-6 2. The DETECTOR ZONES (listed in the Fire Plan) do not coincide with theFIREAREAS(ZONESJdefinedinthisprocedure. Once the location of the fire is known, determine which area (zone) it is in by referring to Appendix 1 of this procedure.
- 3. Not all fire zones am equipped with fire / smoke detectors.
Because of that, page* locators arg placed on Appendix 4 of this ,T procedure which shows the various fire zones in the plant, to aid J the user in locating the specific instructions which he needs to refer to. 4 After identifying the affectea fire area (zone), follow the guidelines in Appendix 3 of this procedure to maintain the operability of the safe shutde m equipment. In addition, refer to the instructions in Appendix 6 to address possible spurious control valves actuation
- 5. In Appendix 3 of this procedure, whenever the instructions call out for manually closing pump breakers for CCW or charging pumps, be aware that there are dedicated wrenches available in the 4KV switchgear rooms that can be used to open the switchgear doors.
The instructions to manually close the pump breaker are posted inside the door. .
- 6. Whenever manual valving is perfomed on a motor operated valve.
the power supply for the valve should be tripped off at the 480 volts load center. DC0275 2VIII
,-,-,-,-,--y,. ._ - --- , - - - . , _ - -
I \ osaaLO CANv0N POWER PLANT UNIT NO(S) 1 NUMBER EP M-10 REVISION 5 DATE 11/8/85 A ' PAGE 3 0F 4-
.- TITtt -
FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT e
, UNIT
- 7. Whenever the feeder breakers to the vital 480V MCC transfonner trip open due to a fire induced fault, restore power to the 480 MCC'by manually opening all non-safe shutdown loads, and raciosing the affected feeder breaker. This should be done expeditiously since the bus may be required to supply emergency AC lighting to allow manual valving operations. Refer to Appendix 7 which identifies the safe shutdown loads on the 480V vital buses.
- 8. The smoke and fire detectors located throughout the plant are not seismic qua11ffed. Therefore, following any earthquake that registers greater than .02g at the plant, it must be assumed that the detectors fail. Within two hours all fire area (zones) must be inspected for possible undetected earthquake induced fires.
REFERENCES -
- 1. Fire Protection Review, USNRC Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323.
- 2. Technica) Specification 3.3.3.8.
- 3. Report on 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Review Unit 1. USNRC Occket No.
-p 50-275, July 15, 1983 -
ATTACl# TENTS Specific infonnation concerning safe shutdown equipment affected by fire is included in this procedure as follows: APPENDIX 1 - This section contains an index to allow the operator to quickly locate the fire zones, and the page number for the corrective instructions corresponding to the fire zones, when a smoke / fire detector alarm is activated in the Control Room. , APPEleIX 2 - This section contains a ifst of the various i systems and equipment required for safety shutdown and also lists the redundant equipment available. ! APPENDIX 3 - This section contains a list of each fire area (zone) that contains safe shutdown equipment and states where the equipment is. It includes guidelines for maintaining the operability of safe shutdown equipment.
) DC0275 3VIII e'e-., e -
+- T
DIA8LO CANYON POWER Pt. ANT UNIT NO(S) g NtM8ER EP M-10 REVISION 5 DATE 11/8/85 FAGE 4 0F 4 1 TITLC FIRE PROTECTION ,0F SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMEF. UNIT APPENDIX 4 - Plant Layout Drawings of Fire Area (Zone) Locations and Boundaries. APPENDIX 5 - Temperature <:orrection curve for cold calibrated pressurizer level transmitter LT406, and steam ger.erator wide range level transmitters. APPENDIX 6 - This section addresses spurious operation of various control valves. In event of a fire anywhere in the plant, in addition to performing the operator actions called out for in Appendix 3 the operator must also refer to this section to address other possible malfunctions. APPENDIX 7 - This section identifies all the safe shutdown loads on the 480V vital bus'es F. H and G.
.]
DC0275 4VIII w
. :R '
PAGE 1 0F 13 APPENDIX 1 - EP M-10 J' NIT 1 FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOW EQUIPMENT l DET FIRE PNL ZONE DET LOCATION / DESCRIPTION ZONE PAGE REMARKS
~ UNIT A 1 1 128' ELEV M AUX RELAY RACKS / CA8tE SPREAD RM. 7-A 32 2 * " * "
128' ELEV UNDER MAIN CONT 80 IV84/ 7-A 3 " " "
- 1 128' ELEV UNDER MAIN CONT 80 IV82/ 7-A 4 ." " " "
128' ELEV UNDER MAIN CONT 80 IV85/ 7-A 5 " " " " 128' ELEV M A8NRillCIATOR RACKS / 7-A 6 " " "
'128' ELEV M U110ER OPERA' TORS CONSOLE / ." 7-A 7 " " " "
128' ELEV M UNDER MAIN CONT 80 IV81/ 7-A . 8 " * *
- 128' ELEV M UNDER SAFEGUARDS RACKS / 7-A 9 " " " "
128' ELEV NR CONT I & PROT II RACKS / 7-A 10 128' ELEV NR PORT III RACKS / 7-A 6 A " " " 1 11 128' ELEV UNDER RAD MONITOR RACKS / 7-A 32
~
~
12 " 128' ELEV UNDER PROT I RACKS / LOCAL ALARM LIGHT 7-A 13 " " " " 128' ELEV UNDER PROT II RACKS / 7-A 14 " " ' " " 128' ELEV UNDER PROT III RACKS / 7-A 15 " " " " 128' ELEV Ull0ER PROT IV RACKS /' 7-A l l, LEGEND: PNL = PANEL NUMBER DET ZONE =
' DETECTOR ZONE. NOT SAME AS FIRE ZONE DET =
FIRE OR SMOKE DETECTOR HUMBER FIRE ZONE = AS DEFINED SV APPEl0 DIX "R". FIRE PROTECT {0N OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT ENGINEERING REPORT. REV. 0, JULY 15, 1983 . PAGE = l GO TO THIS PAGE(S) 0F THE PROCEDURE (APPENDIX 3) FOR THE CORRECTIVE OPERATOR ACTIONS THAT i MAY BE REQUIRED FOLLOWING A FIRE IN THE ZONE IN QUESTION N/A = NOT APPLICABLE. SECAUSE THERE IS J10T SAFE SHUTDOW CIRCUITRY / EQUIPMENT IN THIS FIRE ZONE. DC0275 SIII
PAGE 2 0F 13 APPENDIX 1 - EP M-10 UNIT 1 . FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQU!PMENT DET FIRE PNL ZONE DET LOCATION / DESCRIPTION ZONE PAGE REMARKS (j$dl* A 2 1 119' ELEV OVER 480V. MCC ISE 14-C N/A
- 2 119' ELEV OVER 480V. MCC l'50 14-C N/A
'3 119' ELEV OVER 480V. MCC 15 J/CND POLISHING AREA NOTE 1 A 3 1 119' ELEV. 4KV SUPPLY FAN ROOM 13-E 36 2 119' ELEV. 4KV SUPPLY FAN ROOM 13-E 36 3 119' ELEV. 4KV SUPPLY FAN ROOM 13-E 36 4 !!9' ELEV. OVER EXCITATION SWGR 13-D 35 5 119' ELEV. OVER 4KV SWGR BUS F 13-A 35 6 119' ELEV. OVER 4KV SWGR BUS G 13-8 35 7 !!9' ELEV. OVER 4KV SWGR BUS H 13-C 35 1 .
hOTE 1: NOT ASSIGNED e e DCo?75 611I
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DEPARTMENT OF WUCLEAR PLANT OPERAT20ft5 DIABLO Carn 0N POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2
.S -
TURSINE BUli. DING EL.104' . FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COMSUSTIBLES: 1. Lube oil
- 2. Cable insulation MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Lube oil
. 2. Overheated cables ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1.. Primary - Via Elev. No. I to Doomay 240-2
, 2. Secondary - Via SE Staimay
- 3. Tertiary -,Via SW Stairway fGE: Access through security barriers from Unit I to unit 2 on EL 140' and EL 85' only.
(f s
. FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA:
- 1. Primary -^ Outside. Door 240-2 at Lube 011 Reservoir Rm. (When security b'arrier removed) -
- 2. Secondary - SE Stairway from EL 85' or 140' e 3. Tertiary .5W 5taimay from EL 85' or 140' l
RADIOLOGICAL OR TOIICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Toxic fumes from table insulation
- 2. CO2 Discharge tube Oil Reservoir MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. The general floor area is protected by wet piped automatic sprinklers. North system shutoff valve located at EL. 85' N.
end ismediately west of freight elev. South system shutoff located at EL. 85' SW corner by Cond. Booster Pump 2-1.
- 2. The main Lube 011 Reservoir is protected by a total flooding CO., system that can be activated manually from the Control Room or E. end of R8am.
- 3. The main Lube Oil Reservoir Duisp Valve is located at EL.140' of the Turbine Deck.
4 Floor drains below the L.O. Reservoir' allow drainage to the Unit 2 mair. Lube Oil Tank located under the Machine Shop.
.s Page 25-1 _,
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DC0220 64I Revision j ; 4
. O O
RECO W EtDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMEt4T:
- 1. a re nose stes2s may b2 required to protect exos'sures.
- 2. Idater should not be spraycd directly en caposta, hat steam piping.
S I l .' FIRE SUPPSESSION ECUIPMENT: 1. Fire Extinguishers - (4) 20# Dry Chemicals
- 2. Fire Hose Reels - (5)
~
- 3. Cardox System - Lube 011 Reservoir 4 Wet Type Sprinkler System (General Area)
- 5. Foam - Fire equipment locker l
l VENTILATION: 1. Vent fans 25-55 & 25-56 are located in the SE corner.
- 2. Four exhaust ducts are located on the west side.
l l i 3. Sac'te exhausters may be required to ventilate pockets under solid flooring and the tube oil room. 1 ColHUNICATIONS: 1. Plant Telephones
- 2. Portable Radios (OPS LIGHTING: 1. Plant I.ighting Panels, PL. 21-3, 21-2, a 23-2
' 2. Emergency Lighting. . . l SPECIAL PRECAUTION 3: 1. Self con'ained t breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable lanterns should be available.
- 3. A lube oil fire may involve the EL. 85' below and EL. 119' above.
- 4. Use extreme caution in areas of open grating.
l 1 Page 25-2 Revision l DC0220 651 W
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DEPARTMEtif 0F NUCLEAR PLAr4T OPERATIONS DIABLO CANYOh POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2_, . TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER FIRE EI5hTING PRE PLAN ,
'}
POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Class A combustibles
- 2. Computer equipment
- 3. Fil.ters in HVAC room.
MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Class A combustibles
- 2. Overheated computer equipment ACCESS AND EGRESS A0UTES: 1. Primary - computation center - west door from condensate domin area.
- 2. Secondary - Office N.E. door via EL 10 Turb.
Bldg.
- 3. Tertiary - NRC Office E. door via EL 104' Turb.
Bldg. -
, (NOTE: Access from Unit 2 turbine b1dg may be blocked by security grating).
FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - EL 104' condensate demineralizer catwalk.
- 2. Secondary - EL 104' Unit 2 turbine building.
.. (NOTE: Access from Unit 2 furbine building may be blocked by security grating). s '} RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Toxic products of combustion from cable insulation.and plastic furnishings.
- 2. Halon 1211 from portable -
extinguishers.
- 3. Low level radiation calibration sources.
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. TSC is not provided with floor drains.
- 2. Sprinkler system isolation is at about EL 114' of the turbine building along the east wall of the TSC and between the office and NRC office doors.
I Page 26-1 DC0220 66I . Revision l, , e
-- ,- . . - - - r -----v-r-r --t- - - -
RECOMyr340ATIOf, FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SEN51TIVE EOUTPMENT:
. Use Halon 1213 at the agent of choice for fires involving computer equipment.
FIRE j,UCRE'!SION EOUIPMENT: ,
- 1. Hrr extinguishers (5) 17# Halen 1214 -
- 2. Automatic sprinklers.
- 3. Fire hose reel stations (1) operation center (1) EL 104' turb bldg.
4 Fire hydrants and hose reels of the yard loop.
- 5. Fire hose trailer.
VENTILATION:
- 1. TSC ventilation system is self contained in the HVAC room located between NRC Office and the laboratory.
- 2. Supply fans 05-92. 05-94, and 05-95.
- 3. Portable smoke exhausters - exhaust to the West (cond demins) or the East (turb bidg 104')
COMMUNICATIONS:
,1. Plant telephones
- 2. Plant radio console.
- 3. CDF radio telephone stored in emergency locker. l LIGHTING: '
[
- 1. Plant lighting panels PL-29-1 and PL-30-1.
- 2. Emergency cattery powered lighting. l SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. De-energize electrical equipment where possible prior to attempting extinguishment.
- 2. Hose line protection for a westerly attack will require 2)" hose from yard hydrants to the EL 104' of the condensate demineralizer corridor, reduced to 14" lines for attach and personal protection.
.s Page 26-2 DC0220 67I Revision l
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, DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT .O t '
UNIT NO. 2 4I60 SWGR CABLE SPREADING R00R3"7R0 150 PHASE BUS AREA . FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation - cable spreading rooms
- 2. Iso Phase Bus Cooler panels
- 3. Transient combustibles MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Class "A" transient combustibles
- 2. Electrical fire in cable spreading rooms
- 3. Fire in iso phase bus cooler panels ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - via Door #213-2 El. 104' Turbine Building (Security Door) -
.- 2. Secondary - via Door d's 201-2 and 284-2
- 3. Tertiary .via Door #208-2 ,
, FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - outside Door #213-2 9 El.104'
- 2. Secondary - corridor outside Doors d201-2 3 i
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Fumes from cable insulation '
- 2. CO discharge from hose reels 2
- f. MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
No floor drains are provided in' cable spreading rooms (minimize water 1.
- usage).
. 2. Isolate affected buses if possible.
- 3. Keep redundant safety trains separated where possible.
RECON ENDAT!ON FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Use water fog only if necessary to protect exposures due to electrical hazards.
- 2. Maintain fire barrier penetration seals to protect redundant equipment.
- 3. Maintain separation of vital 4KV cable spreading rooms if at all possible (especially during fire suppression and ventilation).
' FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUlPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - (5) 15# C07 's (1) 20# dry chemical (1) pressurized water l
l 2. Two CO, hose reels
- 3. Two fire hose reels - (1) next to Door #201-2 ;
(2) Turbine Building - i El. 104' north of ! Door #213-2 ) Page 27-1
'v 1
.. REVISION 1 DC0220 71II l
. _ _ _ ___ . - . _ - . - _ _ _ ._. 1
1 , . . VENTILATION:
- 1. Each cabla spreading room is provid;d uith a grating 3t ceiling level which -
would allow smoke to vent to the 4.160 switchgear rooms at El.119'. The 4160 switchgear rooms are provided with grating (fusible link closers) 9 El.140' which would allow smoke to exhaust at the Turbine Deck area SE s l Corner. .
- 2. Portable smcke exhausters could be used to provide positive ventilation through Doors 200-2. 204-2 and 202-2 to force smoke up to El. 140'.
- 3. Plant ventilation fans on the west wall of the Iso phase bus room would i force smoke to open louvers on the east wall to the outside.
- 5. Maintain the following vent fans running: 25-67, 25-68 and 25-69 in bus rooms F. G and H at El. 119".
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant telephone . l
- 2. Portable Radios LIGHTING: 1. Plant lighting panel - PL 21-4
- 2. Emergency lighting 1
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: *
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. High voltage by Iso phase bus panels
- 3. Minimize water use since no drains are provided. l
- 4. Ke*p redundant vital equipment separated where possible.
- )
I l I . Page 27-2 REVIS10rt 1 j-DC0220 7211 , g e o
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. . v PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIA8L0 CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2 4160 SWGR M 7 FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN . /
POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Cable insulation
- 2. Switchgear components
- 3. Transient combustibles MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Switchgear components .
- 2. Transient combustibles !
- 3. Overheated cables ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - via Door #304-2 to switchgear vent fan area
- 2. Secondary - via Door #302-2 to switchgear components from stairway (Security Door)
Tertiary - via Door #311-2 (Secur'ity Door) 3. FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - ou'tside Door #304-2 E1.119' , Turbine Building
- 2. Secondary - Turbine Building El.140' by stairway leading down to Door #302-2 o RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGiCAL HAZARDS: 1. Funes from burning cable insulation
- 2. CO2 from hose reel discharge ,
)
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. The Vent Fan Room is protected by an automatic sprinkler system. The isolation valve is located outside Door #304-2 Turbine Building E1.100'.
- 2. De-energize vital 4KV buses as necessary. - -
- 3. No floor drgins are provided in the vital 4KV switchgear area. Minimi:e water use. Water will drain to E1.104' cable spreading rooms via ventilation openings in the floor.
Page 28-1
' REVISION 1 DC0220 7311 ,
1
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire hose streams may be required to protect exposures.
,' 2. Water should be used in a fog pattern at least 6 feet away from energized electrical equipment.
' IRE SUPPRESSION EOUTPMENT: 1. Fire extinguishers - (2) 15# CO.,'s (1) 20i Dry Chemical
- 2. CO., hose reels - (2)
- 3. Fire hose reel - (1) by Door #301-2
- 4. Automatic sprinklers in fan area VENTILATION:
- 1. Switchgear vent far.s f's 25-67, 25-68, 25-69, 25-70 and 25-71 are located in the switchgear vent fan room. (Switchgear supply ducts are equipped with fire dampers.)
- 2. Smoke exhauster may be required. Positive pressure techniques with ventilation exhaust directed through ceiling crating to El.140' is preferred. Dampers are provided with fusible links at El.140' and may need to be reopened.
- 3. If A/C power is unavailable, gas powered fans and generators may,be used. .
COMMUNICATIONS: . la le h LIGHTING: 1. plant lighting panel - PL 21-4 i
- 2. Emergency lighting SPECIAL PRECAUT" IONS:
I . .,
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. CD is the agent of choice (sample for 02 after use).
- 3. If ter is used it should be applied in a fog pattern only due to high voltage electrical equipment and from no-closer.than 6 feet. Minimize water on floor especial.ly in the vicinity of 4KY switchgear. ,
l Page 28-2
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1 DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATI0r45 ,
. DIABLO CANYON POWER PLAT <T l UNIT NO. 2 l 0 TRAVELING CREWS OTRS .-
, FIRE FIGHTING PRE-PLAN POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Class "A" Combustibles
- 2. Electric Stove in kitchenette MOST PROBABLE FIRE: 1. Class "A" Combustibles 2- Kitchen Fim (gmase)
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - via Door 305-2 from E1.119' Ture. B1dg.
- 2. Secondary - via Ocor 301-2 from staimay S-7.
. 3. Tertiary - via Door Nos. 393-2 & 392-2 from Staimay S-6 70TE: Access through security barriers from unit I to unit 2 on EL 140' and EL 85' only.
y FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Outside Door No. 305-2 at 119' E1. Turb. Bldg.
- 2. Secondary - Top of staimay S-7 at E1.140'.
RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOG1 CAL HA2ARDS:
- 1. Toxic products of coueustion r
MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. Isolation Valve for automatic sprinkler system located overhead & outside Door No. 304-2 E1. 119' Turb. 81dg. / ' Page 29-1 L - DC0220 721 Revision i
- M t sF.t'..-ar:0ft POW PaGTEC1:0h 0F FtAT SENSIT!vE EQUIPME?..:
- 1. Fire Nose 5treams may oe requirec to Dro e:t es;;s.-et.
i ,! FIRE SUPPRESSTON EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire Extinguishers - One - 20# Dry Chemical One - Pressurized Water
' 2. Automatic Sprinkler System
- 3. Fire Hose Reel - Outside Doorway 301-2 l
VENTILATTON: 1. No'rmal Plant Ventilation
- 2. Saske Exhausters may be required. Smoke could be exhausted via Door No. 305-2 to E1.119' Turb. 81dg. or up stairway S-7 to the E1. 140' Turb. Deck.
ComtNICATIONS: 1. Plant Telephones '
- 2. Portable Radios (O FREQ LIGHTING: 1. Plant Lighting Panel - PL 21-4
- 2. Emergency Lighting.
.:}
SPECIAL PRECAUTTONS: 1. Self Contained Breathing Apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable hand lanterns should be carried by Fire Brigade mesters.
Page 29-2 DC0220 731 Revisice l
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DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OpZPATIO*S DIA8LO CANYON POWER PLAr.T UNIT NO. 2
~
TUR8INE BLDG. EL 119' FIRE FIGMTING PsE-PLAN POTENi!AL COM8USTIBLES: 1. Lubricating 011
- 2. Electric cible insulation
- 3. Transient Coseustibles
. MOST PR08A8LE FIRE: 1. Broken Lube 011 Line. Oil Soaked Insulation '
- 2. Transient Combustibles
- 3. Overheated Electric Motor or Control Wiring ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Southeast Statmay from EL 85' or 140'. l
- 2. Secondary - Via Southwest Staimey from EL 85' l or 140'. ,
ICTE: Access through security barriers 'from Unit 1 to Unit 2 on EL 140' and (L 85' only. FIRE ORIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - by Door No. 304-2 in 4160 Swgr fan . area.
- 2. Socoridary - Top of SE Sta,1may EL 140' w
- 3. Tertiary - Top of SW 5tatmay EL 140' . ,)
RADIOLOGICAL OR TOITCOLOGICAL MAZAR05: 1. Toxic products of combustion MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SY$TEMS: 1. The entire floor area is protected by wet piped automatic sprinklers. Shutoffs are located at North System 9 EL SS' ismediately west of freight elev. South system 9 EL. 85' SW corner by Condensate 8 coster Pug 2-1. Page 30-1 DCO220 74! Revision !
REC 0rE?Ca*10N FOR PRCTECTIOfi 0F HEAT MNSITIVE EOU!PMENT:
- 1. Fire Hose 5 teams may be requirec to protect esscsures.
p 2. Caution should be used when applying wate- to not e steam lines. Rapid cooling can cause cracking and ~ steam leaks. FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT: 1. Fire Extinguishers - Five 20# Ory Chemicals
- 2. Fire Hose Reels - Six
- 3. Automatic West Sprinkler System 4 Foam - Fire equipment lockers.
VENTILATION: 1. Ventilation Fans 25-57, 25-58 & 25-59 are located in the Southeast end. There are no exhaust outlets on the West wall. Smoke would vent to E1. 140' via stairways and open grating in the SE corner.
- 2. Smoke Exhausters will be required for a fire in the NE area and smoke vented to E1. 140'.
~
COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Plant Telephones: 1
- 2. Portable Radios (0 S l
;m ..
b, '~ LIGHTING: 1. Plant Lighting Panels - PL 22-3 & 22-2
- 2. Emergency Lighting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: 1. Self Contained Breathing Apparatus will be required.
- 2. Pertable Hand Lanterns should be available.
- 3. Seismic bracing makes access very difficult.
- 4. Lube oil fires may also involve lower elevations.
- 5. Exercise extreme caution while working on open l- gratings.
l l
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-Page 30-2
,j DC0220 751 Revision l
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TUT 8t"NE BLDG. EL. 140' F IRE P lfsM INC: PME-PLAN l POTENTIAL COMBUSTIBLES: 1. Lube 011
- 2. Hydrogen
- 3. Class "A" Transient Caseustibles MOST P1108A8LE FIRE: 1. Lube 011
- 2. Hydrogen Leak
- 3. Class "A" Transient Coseustibles f
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Stairway No. I from Unit 1 Turbine Deck
- 2. Secondary - SE Stairway from EL 85'
- 3. Tertiary - SW Stairway from EL 85'
)
l l l FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Unit 1 Turbine Deck, North End
- 2. Secondary - EL. 45' by SE Stairway
- 3. . Tertiary - EL 85' by SW Stairway. -
t RADIOLOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL NAZAR05: 1. Discharge at No.10 Bearing
- 2. in generator casing during ou ge periods.
MANAGDIENT OF PLANT SYSTDt5:
- 1. Gareon controi valve located between vent fans 25-62 & 25-63 East wall.
- 2. Deluge control valves located at Turbine pedestals.
- 3. Hydrogen Shutoff valve located at 85' E1. near Seal 011 Unit.
4 Main .14. g r. shutoff valve North end of West buttress 85' E1.
- 5. Hydrogen is vented to the roof, vent valve shutoff at Sw.1011 Unit 2-1.
Page 31-1 DC0220 761 Revision l
. -- -r:o-~~-----
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i ' RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE EDU!PME*.T:
- 1. betar spray from nosa reels ruy os us%c to cool nousing of turoina 9enerator. Care must be exerc);.ed as water may cause steam leaks when applied to hot turbine parts or piping.
- 2. Water spray should be used to protect exposures from a hydrogen fire. ]
FIRE SUPPRESSTON EQUTPMENT: 1. Fire Extinguishers - Four (4) 20# Dry Chemicals
- 2. Deluge Spray System
- 3. CO, Flooding System at No. 10 Bearing
- 4. Fi h hose Reels Five (5) l l
l VENTILATTON: 1. Supply Fans 25-61. 25-62, 25-63, 25-64 & 25-65
- 2. Smoke from any fire should vent via center roof vents.
COMMUNICATTONS: 1. Plant Talephones
- 2. Portable Radios (0 ,
LIGHTING: 1. Plant Lighting Panels - PL 22-5 & 22-4
- 2. Emergency Lighting.
*1)
SPECIAL PRECAUTTONS: 1. In the event of a hydrogen leak, do not attempt to extinguish the fire until such time as the hydrogen supply has been shut off at valve located at seal
. ott unit 2-1 E1. 85'.
. 2. Self Contained Breathing Apparatus will be required.
PageJi-2 DC0220 771 Revision l I
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SECURTTY (J!LDING _ FIRE FlfaHTING PRE-PLAN '"3 POTENTIAL COMBUSTILLES: 1. Class "A" Cosenstibles -
- 2. Electri: Wiring to Control Panels MOST PR08ABLE FIRE: 1. Clav "A" Coseustibles
- 2. Electric Wiring .
l
. l ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Doors 19, 20, 21. 14, 17, 18
- 2. Secondary - Via Doors 1 & 2
- 3. Tertiary - Via Door 28 ,
. i , FTRE BRIGADE STAGING ARCA: 1. Primary - North end outside Doors 19 & 20.
- 2. Secondary - South end outside Doors 1 & 2
_D RA0f0 LOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: Toxic products of coseustion MANAGD*ENT OF PLANT SYSTDt3 Security building fire protection system isolation valve FP-0-360 - Page 32-1 DC0220 781 Revisien i w w --+ees w- p-e. w w n -- p-,,vy -
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- 1. Fir 2 Hose st Mars may b3 required to pro *ect exposures.
- 2. Care snould be taken to protect sensitive computer equipment.
t* *
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FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire Extinguishers - Three 20# cry chemicals one 15# CD
- 2. FireHoseReels-TwoHallwayBfDoorNo.26 Outside NW Corner
- 3. Fire Hydrant - Yard Loop l
VENTI'.ATION: 1. Building Ventilation System
- 2. Portable Sacke Exhausters my be required. Smoke could be l exhausted via doorways to the outside.
CON 4UNICATIONS: 1 / LIGHTING $ 1. Lighting Panels - LB - UP - LA & HL
- 2. Emergency Lighting - SAS
' is g .. - . SPEC!AL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Asmunition storage is provided inside Door 13. Access may be gained via Door No. 14.
. l Page 32-2 DC0220 791 Revision i F
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- )
POTENTIAL COM8USTIBLES: 1. Lube oil
- 2. Cable insulation
- 3. 480V switchgear panels
. 4. Transient combustibles
~
MOST PR08A8LE FIRE: 1. Transient combustibles
- 2. Lube oil -
- 3. Cable insulation
- 4. 480V switchgear panels -
P ACCESSANDE5RESSROUTES: 1. Via stairway east side
, 2. Via stairways N and S ends Door d's 11 and 12 FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - outside east side of intake structure (Security Door) -
RADIOLOGICAL OR 70rIC0 LOGICAL HAZARDS: 1.
- 2. Chlorine Fumes from(CL,ble ca insulation)(heavierthanair)
- 3. C0., discharge at circulating pumps (CD will drift to lower
,... ,eleIations) 1 -
f MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS:
- 1. Water circulating pumps are protected by an automatic CO2 flood system.
- 2. Each circulating pump has a local C02 "'""*I ***"**'"*
Page 33-1 REVISION 1 DC0220 83II i l
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENST VE EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire hose reels may be r; quired ta protect cxposures. .
- 2. Maintain separation of redundant auxiliary salt water pumps by keeping water tight doors shut.
- 3. Safe shutdows cables have thermolag protected junction boxes outside of ASW N, cubicles. ,
. f
- FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT
- 1. Fire extinguishers - (6) CO 's
- 2. Fire hose reels - Eight (4)2 exterior and (4) interior
- 3. Fire Hydrants - (2)
VENTILATION:
. 1. Portable smoke exhauster may be required. Smoke can be exhausted via the -
three stairways to the outside. .
- 2. Hose streams can also be used to ventilate smoke and hot gases out of doors. .
2'. r b r o LIGHTING: 1. Plant Ifghting panel - PL 18-1. PL 18-1
- 2. Emergency Itghting SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Liquia chlorine -(CL,) will cause serious skin burns. Gaseous CL2 "III I"
hcl when inhaled caQsing possible respiratory arrest.
- 2. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
NOTE: (A) Use water to keep fire-exposed chlorine tanks cool. (8) Two (2) Self contained breathing apparatus are wall mounted 3 outside on the east wall between the 480V switchgear rooms. J (C). Chlorine emergency kit is located in the chlorinator room to
. plug chlorine cylinder leaks.
l f f i Page 33-2 REVISION 1 DCO220 84I1 , i
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PAGE 33-3 == mammam acesas - = =u. antae REVl =* umavacc*u
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- DEPART) TENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS
[ DIAdL0 CANYON POWER PLANT - UNIT NO. O I ADMINISTRATION BUILDING %
, FIRE FIGNUNG PRE-PLAN
)
POTENTIAL COMBUST!BLES: 1. Class "A" Coseustibles
- 2. Electric Wiring MOST PR08A8tE FIRE: 1. Class "A" Com6ustibles
- 2. Electric Wiring '
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: Doomays - Lunch Roos East Side . Document Control (2) Emergency Exits West Side (2) M: Anes, prybars and bolt cutters may be required to gain access. FIRE BRIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Outside Door No. 31 South End
- 2. Secondary - Outside Door No.19 East Side
. -~
J-RADIOLOGICAL OR TOIICOLOGILAL HAZARDS: Toxic products of coseustion. L MANAGEMENT OF PUuff SYSTDes: Contact " Temporary Power" to doenergize various buildings and trailers. f
~
Page 34-1 DCO220 821 Revision i 1 4 e
. +,
3 m
~
nE* M EM ATION FOR PSOTEC~fCN 0: .U. SEN5!!fvE- Ect,lPMENT: Fire' P. St.sta!*:*5
. loca*ec Qu;51de may og requirec 45 b4CKup fCP fi*e ext 1".gui1Ners Ic:4!tc w*;***
the. Building. Mose control devices on hose trailers may be used witn 26" f're hose to proteC1 exposed structures. FIRE SUPeRESSION EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire F.Xtinguishers - 51 Pressur.ized Water
! Two 30e Dry Chemicals One 5* CO One9#Hakon
- 2. Fire Hose Stations - Two Outside East Wall
- 3. Fire Hydrant - One Outside SE End VENTILATION: 1. Normel Ventilation System
- 2. Portable Smoke Exhausters may be required, smoke can.be exhausted via doorways to the outside.
- 3. Mose stream ventilation may be more effective.than exhausters.
COMUNICATIONS: 1. Telephones In All Offices.
- 2. Portable Radios (0PS FREQ)
Plant Lighting Panels A-8-C & D. ('- v LIGHTING: 1.
- 2. Hand held battery powered lanterns will be required. .
( - SPECIAL PtECAUTIONS: 1. Self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. No emergency lighting is provided, portable hand lanterns to be carried by Fire Brigade.
- 3. Provide hose stream exposure protection for the turbine building buttress areas.
4 Offsite fire fighting assistance should be called since the entire complex is of coseustible construction with no automatic suppression systems. l l Page 34-2 DC0220 83g RevisionI 2 .
-- -n . . - . - ., l
' OEPARTM!NT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERAT!ONS OIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT WIT NO. 1&2 G.C. wAaTNUU T -
FIRE N PLAN PortsilAL c m srlsLE5: 1 class A" cassustibles
- 2. Lube 011 (45 gal, druse)
- 3. Flasunable liquids (gasoline tanks)
- 4. Drum Resins
- 5. Grease
- 6. 401 Hydrogen (cylinders)
- 7. Acetylene MOST PR08ABLE FIRE: 1. Class "A" Combustibles
- 2. Flasumble liquids
- 3. Flammable gases ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. Primary - Via Overhead Rolling Doors
- 2. Secondary - Via Man Doors NE End & SW Side ICTE: Ames, vrybers or bolt cutters may be reautred to gain access.
- FIRE BRIGADE STAGIMG AREA: 1. Primary - Occk Unloading Area West side e
RA0!0 LOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL MAZARO5: 1. Potassium Hydreafde
- 2. Asmonium Hydroxide
- 3. Resin In Drums l
l 4. 355 Hydrazine
- 5. Reagent chemicals MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTIMS:
- 1. Tne entire mutlaing 's protected by an automatic met sprinkler f.ystem.
The rprinkler isolation valve is located in the NPO storage area east well south end.
- 2. The sprinkler system 11 catended to cover the cyltnder storage racks west side north end of docf. unloading area.
Page 35-1 OC0220 841 Revisten) e 9
D RECOmENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSIT!vE E0u:PMENT"
- 1. McD11e Fire Fignting Apparatus sncula oc stagte sucn tnat water sDraf 4,.
- at applied to compressed gas storage on the west side and the gasoline tants f to the north.
- 2. Brush and grass should be wettid down,to preclude potential wild land fire. ,
FIRE SUPPRES$10N EQ'JIPMENT:
- 1. . Fire f,xtinguisners - Three - 30# dry chemicals Two - 15# CO.,'s Five - Presscrized water
- 2. Automatic Sprinkler System 10TE: Since no hydrants exist in the area. Outside fire fighting assistance will be required. Nearest fire hydrant is outside GC Security Office. .
VENTILATION: 1. Normal Building Ventilation System
- 2. Portable Smoke Exhausters may be required. Smoke could be exhausted via overtiend rolling doors to the outside using hose streams from offsite fire engines.
ComUNICATIONS: 1. Plant Telephones -
- 2. Portable Radios (OP5 Q LIGHTING: 1. Plant Lighting Panel Located in the Office at the N.W. corner.
O . ( SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. Self containec Dreathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable hand lanterns should be available.
- 3. For a fire involving the south end NPO 5torage, full protective clothing will be required as contact with hydrazine and assonium hydroxide are very toxic ('d attach eyes *and respiratory system. Liquid is corrosive.to skin.
- 4. ~ The possibility of a severe flamable liquid fire exists in the south!end which would involve toxic materials stored in this area.
- 5. Access to the NPO Storage area requires a "D" master key available from the Shift Foremen.
- 6. Actual fire fighting will probably require offsite assistance.
. Page 35-2 OCO220 851 Revision {
e e eeem-# . 90 m -N' @**Me w e- en o se 6 ,,,, . ,e m.--e ,, , 68 9** N 66 _ .p, .,,p., _
DEPARTMENT 0'F. NUCLEAR PLANT QPERATIONS DIA8LO CANYON Pol.EA PLANT - UNIT NO. O G.C. SECURITY 8 PAYROLL 0FFICE Flitt FIGHrins rut-PLAN N j ru s tnII AL wMuusTisLE5: 1. Glass A coseust1 Dies
- 2. Electric Wiring l
3 MOST PR08ABLE FIRE: 1. i Class "A" Combustibles l
- 2. Electric Wiring -
ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES: 1. East. West and North Doorways
- 2. For QC Area. East and South Doorways 10TE: Fire axes. prybers and bolt cutters may be required for access. .
FIRE BRIGACE STAGING AREA: 1. Primary - Parking Lot Area South End
- 2. Secondary - NE 51de Admin. B1dg.
g .
*=
RA0!0 LOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: Toxic products of combustion l MANAGEMENT Or FL8JfT SYSTEMS:
- 1. rne entire su11 sing 's 1:rotected by an automatic sprinkler system. The isolation valve is located on the South end in the room housing the Halon spheres.
- 2. The QC vault is protected by an automatic Halon 1301 system. The isolation valve is located on the south well.
Page 36-1 OCO220 861 Revision i
.)
e e'
*W + $ 1
.____9 ,_,_ - - _ _ _
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTION OF HEAT SENSITIVE E~t!PMENT:
- 1. Fire Mose Streams may be requireo to protect esposures (i.e.., Trailers to the North and Administration Building to the West).
l FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire Extinguisners - One 1) 108 dry chemical Two 2) Pressurized Water One ) 15# CO QC area
- 2. Fire Hose Stations - (1) $W Corner butside Security
~
J (1) East Wall Admin. Bldg.
- 3. Fire Hydrant - $W Corner in Parking Lot Area
- 4. Automatic Wet Sprinkler System
- 5. Automatic Halon System (QC Vault)
VENTILATION: 1.- Normal Bldg. Ventilation System { 2.. Portable Smoke Exhausters may be rwquirid. Smoke could be , exhausted via doorways to the outside using exhausters or hose l streams. C0p99UNICATIONS: . Pa le s / LIGHTING: 1. Lighting Panet Located in Sec. Visitors Waiting Room f3 2. Portable hand held lanterns will be seguired. (, ,1 , SPECIAL PRECAUT " - k Self contained breath 1'ng apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable hand lanterns should be available. -
- 3. _ cr= " madJnssh4a *u areg could be ignited from heat or eseers. CDTshould be called as a backup.
l . 1 Page 36-2 DC0220 871 Revision I e , . _ , ,. . .. . . . . . . . . - - . - - - - - - ~
OEPARTMENT OF NUC'. EAR PLANT OPEPATIONS OIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 PROJECT OFFICE BUILDING FIRE FI(aMillWe PRL. PLAN PCTENTIAL COM8USTIBLES: 1. Class."A" Costustibles
- 2. Electric Wiring l l
M05T PR08A8LE FIRE: 1. Class "A" Cos6ustibles
- 2. Elec'. rte Wiring
~
ACCESS AND EGRE55 ROUTES: 1. Primary - East Doomays
- 2. Secondary - West Doomays FIRE 8RIGADE STAGING AREA: 1. Pa'rking Lot area SW corner
- 2. Roadway bottom of staimeys West side RA0!0 LOGICAL OR T0XICOLOGICAL HAZARDS: 1. Asuonia in Print ' Room ,
- 2. Toxic products of coseustion MANAGEMENT OF PLANT SYSTEMS: 1. The entire building is protected by an automatic sprintler system. The isolation valve is located on the East side.
Page 37-1 DC022S 881 Revision l l O
=
~
. R!cotHENDSTION FOR PROTECTIOr: t H2ar SEN!!T!vE ECUIP"ENT:
- 1. Fire nose streams may as requ6 eo to protect exposures (i.e., tratie-s to the North and South end the G.C. Security Building to the East.)
{' FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT:
- 1. Fire Extinguishers - Five Pressurized Water Two 15# C02 's
- 2. Fire Hose Stations - Two (1) NE corner (1) SE corner
- 3. Fire Hydrant - SW corner in Parking Lot area VENTILATION: 1. Normal Building Ventilation Systein
- 2. Smoke Exhausters may be required. Smoke could be exhausted via decrways to the outside by smoke exhausters or fire hose streams.
COWeJN! CATIONS: 1. LIGHTING: 1. Plant Lighting Panel "A"
- 2. Portable hand held lanterns.
- o. .
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS:
- 1. self contained breathing apparatus will be required.
- 2. Portable hand lanterns should be available.
- 3. Small quantities of asuonta may be encountered in the v:cinity of the print room.
- 4. Grass and brush in the area could be ignited from heat or enters. CDF
. should be called as a backup.
? Page 37-2 DC0220 891. Revision n
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i
FGs#3 Pacific Gas asul Electric ComM NUMBER EP M-9 REVISION 4 A ( " I oEPNNT OF 6 W OPEMM DATE 11/6/85." ciesto canyon POWER PLANT UNIT NO(S) 1 AND 2 PAGE 1 0F 9 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE g TITLE: HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN u,,.ovEo: #. d Th II-l? 4'5 PUU(T MANgR DATE - t IMPORTANT TO ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
- SCOPE
~ This procedure describes the responsibilities and the actions which are taken to minimize hazards to human health or to the environment t from any fire, explosions, or unplanned sudden er non-sudden release of hazardous waste or its constituents to the air, soil, or surface water. This procedure and changes thereto require PSRC review. I GENERAL i
,q The Hazardous Waste Management Contingency Plan (Contingency Plan)
!L j meets the requirements of Title 40 CFR 264 and 265 and Title 22 of the g "V California Administrative Code.' The provisions of the plan shall be carried out insnediately whenever there is a fire, explosion, or release of hazardous waste or hazardous waste constituents wht'ch could threaten human health cr the
. environment.
The Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plan (SPCC) for Ofablo l Canyon Power Plant which covers the handling of oil spills, will be used in conjunction with the Contingency Plan, if appifcable. RESP 0kSIBILITY The Site Emergency Coordinator at the Diablo Canyo1 Power Plant is the Plant Manager. Several sunagement positions at Ofablo have been designated alternate Site Emergency Coordinators. These include: o Assistant Plant Managers o Material and Project Coo-dination Manager o Operation Manager - I . OC0227 IVII
DIA8L.O CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO(S) 1 AND 2 ' S ON OATE 11/6/85 ~g PAGE 2 0F 9- y Tm.E. HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN The on-site Interim Emergency Coordinator is the Shift Foreman. - Coverage is continuous 24-hours per day, 365 days per year. Attachment 5 lists the names, addresses, and phone numbers (home and office) of all persons qualified to act as Site Emergency Coordinator along with other qualifications. This attachment also lists the names and office extensions of Shift Foremen qualified to act as Interim Emergency Coordinator. Any spill or leakage of hazardous waste will be reported innediately to the Shift Foreman on duty by the first employee having knowledge of - the situation. The Chemistry and Radiation Protection (C&RP) Department will provide ! technical assistance to the Shift Foreman in assessing possible l hazards due to the unplanned release of hazardous waste, and wi.11 assure proper disposal of hazardous waste. . PROCEDURE
- 1. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS In the even): of an inminent or actual emergency situation involving the release of hazardous waste, the Shift Foreman will take the following steps as expeditiously as possible;
- a. Activate the site eeergency signal, as appropriate. The pubite address system may be used to alert personnel of the affected area. .
- b. Call Security Shift Superviso evacuate the affected area. !
I
- c. Determine if any personnel are injured.
- d. Innediatel I the type (yfrom dispatch NFPAanplacard operator to the scene if release is fromtoadetermine tank or from Material Safety Data Sheet), the exact source, the i
amount of the spill or leak, the extent of the area affected, and if the hazardous waste:
- 1) Presents an innedtate threat to life or health;
- 2) Extends beyond.the prcperty line of the power plant; ,
i DC0227 2VII
. DiaaLO CANYON POWER M. ANT UfeT NO($) 1 AND 2 S ON ' ' DATE 11/6/85 PAGE 3 0F 9, Tm.s. HAZAR0005 WASTE MANAGEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN 1
i
- 3) Could enter a nearby body of water;
- 4) Could create a fire or explosion hazard; l 5 Could contaminate the atmosphere;
- 6) Could interfere with power plant operation; 7)) Could mix with other materials and create an additional
, haz.ard.
- e. Issuediately, contact the Chemical and Radiation Protection l (C&RP) Hazardous Weste. Manager or Foreman for technical .
assistance. (The Emergency Safety Services Department may 2 also be contacted for technical assistance.) l
- f. With the assistance of the CARP Hazardous Weste Manager, assess possible hazards to human health or to the environment that may result from the release. Both the direct effect of the hazardous weste and indirect effects, which might result from the actions taken to correct the situation, should be considered.
- g. The Plant Manager or his designee will determine if it is appropriate to evacuate personnel not involved with the safe operation of the plant. If evacuation is necessary, the i {- site. emergency stren will be activated. The stren,will -
alert personnel to assemble in designated locations, where all fndividuals can be accounted for and from which personnel can be evacuated in an orderly fashion through the plant's normal access road or the alternate route. In the unitkely event that the Plant Manager should decide to evacuate plant personnel he will initiate an evacuation of non-essential personnel in accordance with plant procedure, EP G-5, EVACUATION OF NONESSENTIAL SITE PERSONNEL.
- h. Instruct the Operator or other individuals to make the required telephone calls to request assistance and to notify other Company personnel, pubife agencies and outside contractors. The telephone numbers of Company personnel are listed in Attachment 5. The telephone numbers of governmental agencies are listed in Attachment 1. The information to be reported is outlined in Attachment 2.
DC0227 3VII (.
. - . - - - - - - - - - e---
l - oimaUs canyon PoweM PUWT UfeT AS) 1 AND 2 fE S ON DATE 11/6/85 , 3 PAGE 4 0F 9 ) ma HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN
- 1. Detennine the source and cause of the release and prevent further release by taking appropriate action including the following:
1 Securing the valves; 2 Directing the waste to holding tank; 3 Collecting the waste in containers; and 4 Stopping the operation that produced the weste. J. Initiate actions and physical means for containing and isolating the affected areas in order to prevent further spread of the waste o.' the mixing of the waste with incompatible materials. i;.rr *: **, ' arrier tape, warning i signs oil spill absorbent, and other avaliable means shall be used as required.
- k. Record in the Shift Forenan's Log Book., the time, the date.
and the details of v.f incident that required the use of the Contingency Plan. Trc record shall be sufficiently detailed to serve as the basis for the required written report to the California State Department of Health Services.
~
s i- - 2. After the release of hazardous waste has been brought under control, the Shift Foreman will initiate actions to: 2
- a. Inspect valves, pipes and other waste handling equipment
- for leaks. pressure buildup, gas generation. or rupture.
wherever this is appropriate.
- b. Instruct the Hazardous Waste Manager or Foreman to collect I and retain the recovered hazardous weste and contaminated soil, water, or other material in compliance with the regulations taking care that no incompatible wastes are mixed.
i
- 3. The CARP Department will:
- a. Arrange for the shipment of all hazardous waste and contaminated soil, water, oc ather material recovered during the emergency to an EPA-approved disposal site via a registered waste hauler.
1 I . DC0227 4VII j 1
, om CANYON POWER Pt. ANT UNIT NO(S) 1 AND 2 S ON l
- DATE 11/6/85 l PAGE 5 0F 9-
.mQg HAZARDOUS WASTE MA AGEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN {
l
- b. Assure that no materials that may be incompatible with the released material is brought into the affected area until cleanup procedures have been completed.
- c. Have all emergency equipment cleaned. restored to proper -
condition, and returned to its location. The overall clean-up procedure shall not be considered complete untti this has been done.
- 4. If the Plant Manager or his designee deterufnes that the facility has had a release, fire or explosion which could threaten human health or the environment, outside the facility, he shall report his findings famediately to the State Office of Emergency Services as outlined in Attachment 2.
- 5. If a reportable quantity (RQ) of a hazardous substance or waste is released outside of a company building, or.ini non-enclosed area. the Plant Manager or his must i iately notify the National Response Center ' Examples of RQs of hazardous substances or was ,
PCS Idp6unds
- h' ' Radfonucifdes 1 pound
- Mercury 1 pound Hydrazine 1 pound
- 6. Reports to California State Department of Health Services
- a. Telephone Report
- WIthin 24 hours of the occurrence, the Plant Manager or his .
designee will notify the California State Department of Health Services by telephone of all accidents involving hazardous wastes which resulted in, or. could have resulted in, a hazard to public health and safety, or the environment. After the clean-up has been completed. the Plant Manager of his designee will notify the Californfa State Department of Health Services. All agencies previousl I release will be notified that the clean up y notified has beenof the completed and that the facility is in ccepliance.
-- OC0227 SVII
,e ap -ea w * * * * * * '
- l
'otAsu3 CANYON POWER MT WT %S) 1 AND 2 NUM8EF EP M-9 ,
REVZSION 4 DATE 11/6/85 7
,PAGE '
Mi-6 0F 9 HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN
- b. Weftten Report Within 15 days after an incident that requires I inglementation of the Contingency Plan, a wrf tten report on the incident will be prepared by the C&RP Department for submission to the California State Department of Health Services.
REQUIREMENTS 1* Arrangements with Authorities Arrangements have been made with the following authorities to assist with emergency situations at OCPP:
- a. State Office of Emergency Services b.
c. U. S. Coast Guard f San Luis Ambulance Service
- d. French Hospftal
- e. C411fornia Department of Forestry / ,
San Luis Obispo Cot'nty Fire
- f. Calffornia Highway Patrol *
- g. San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Office
- 2. Emergency Ecutement The Emergency Equipment at DCPP is capable of providing appropriate personnel protection and emergency strike response.
OCPP is equipped with the following e'mergency equipment: a. Telephones are dfstributed throughout the plant within easy reach of all employees. Emergency instructions are posted by the phones. Phones are located fanediately adjacent to the Hazardous Waste Storage areas and the Wastewater Holding Pond. l
- b. An alans and coensunication system is established at the site to alert employees of emergency situations and to suusnan emergency assistance from the county and state emergency response teams.
- c. A radio-connuntcation system with three frequencies;
' Operations, Security, and Health phystes.
\
DC0227 6VII j e
ound CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT As) 1 AND 2 .
# ' ON OATE 11/6/85 ,
PAGE 7 0F 9' rina; HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN
- d. Safety showers and eyewash stations are inmediately adjacent to the Hazardous Waste Storage areas and the Wastewater l
Holding Pond and available for,imediate use. i
- e. The fc lowing emergency equipment is maintained in gang j boxes located at the Hazardous Waste Storage areas and the Wastewater Holding Pond:
11 Industrial type first aid kits 2 i Disposable coveralls j 3 I Goggles V Faceshields 4) 5 6J Rubber boots Gloves ,
- f. Portable fire extinguishers are located at the Hazardous Weste Storage areas and the Wastewater Holding Pond.
All fire fighting systems are tested on a regular basis. I Test and maintenance frequencies are described in the Surveillance Test Procedures Manua).
~
j
- g. Protective clothing and equipment approved by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH):
- 1) MSA (trademark) Respirators as follows:
i face filter respirators, located at the plant's
' maintenance tool room; full face filter respirators, located at the plant's Access Control; in line full face respirators, located at the plant's
- Access Control; and j full face powered filter respirators, located at the plant's Access Control.
l ' Appropriate cartridges for filter face respirators are - used for chlorine gas, organic vapors, acid fumes, am onia, and particulates. 4 DC0227 7VII
e 06 CANYON POWER PL. ANT UNIT PQs) 1 ANO.2 ON . ~ . DATE PAGE 11/6/85 8 0F 9 l
, TITt.a.
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN
- 2) MSA self-contained breathing apparatus including self-contained pressure demand units, located at:
< . Operation Ready Room (140' level, Turbine Building)
. Maintenance Fire Erigade Locker (85' level. Turbine Building
. Technical Support Center (on the plant site)
. Radiological Access Control (inside the Auxiliary Building)
. Stairway 1. Area N l
- 3) Spare bottles for the MCA self-contained breathing apparatus, located at:
l . Radiological Access Control (inside the Auxiliary t Building
. Maintenance Fire Brigade Locker (85' level. Turbine Building)
- 3. Amendment of the Continoency Plan i
The Contingency Plan shall be reviewed and, revised under any one
- or more of the following conditions: >
;/
3 a. Applicable regulations are revised;
- b. The plan fails in an emergency;
- c. The facility changes - in its design, construction opration, maintenance, or other circumstances - in a way that meterially increases the potential for fires, explosions, or i releases of hazardous waste or hazardous waste constituents, or changes the response necessary in an emergency;
- d. The Itst of emergency coordinators changes; or
! e. The list of emergency equipment changes. 4 Cocies of the Contineeney Plan The Contingency Plan and all revisions to the plan will be kept on file by the Plant Manager at Ofabio Canyon Power Plant. . t
/
DC0227 8VII ' i e ____...m_ . , _ _ _ . . , _ . , _ _ . . _ , _ , _ _ _ , , , , , _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ , _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . - , . _ _ _ _ _ . . , _ _ . , , _ _ . . .
own.O CAMON POWER PUWT UMT MNS) 1 AND 2 ON DATE 11/6/85 PAGE 9 0F 9 Tm's; HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN
- I 1 Copies of the Contingency Plan will be incorporated into the Hazardous Weste Operation Plan for Ofablo Canyon Power Plant for use by the Shift Foremen and other plant personnel.
Copies of the Contingency Plan will be provided to other Company personnel and to outside agencies or organizations who may be called upon to provide emergency services. A copy of the Contingency Plan will be submitted to the California State Department of Health Services for approval. REFERENCE
- 1. DCPP Interim Status Document April 1981
- 2. OCPP Emergency Procedure G.4
- 3. DCPP Emergency Procedure G.5 ATTAC M S f 1. Hazardous Weste $ pill Notification fequihnents.
\' '
- 2. Information Required For Initial Reporting of Hazardous Weste Release (Check List).
- 3. Transmittal Letter to accompany Hazardous Weste Management Contingency Plan.
4 Fazardous Weste Management Contingency Plan Receipt and
, Committment Form. .
- 5. Site Emergency Coordinator's List. *
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1 i . 1 . 1 i OC0227 9VII - t I
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11/85 . by] 1 Page 1 of 1 . d PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
- DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 ATTACHMENT 1 TITLE: HAZARDOUS WASTE SPILL NOTTFICATION REQUIREMENTS In the event of a spill or leak of hazardous waste which could threaten human health or the environment, the following must be nottffed as soon as possible.
Government Agencies a) National Response Center l b) California State Office of Emergency J Services (if spill affects area outside plant property) c) U.S. Coast Guard d) California Department of Health Services
- Fresno Regional Office l
e) California Regional Water Quality (,.. , Control Board - Central Coast Region . f) Environmental Protection Agency - Region IX, San Francisco _
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DC0227 10V e * ** **
, 11/85 Page 1 of 1 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
) DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 ,
ATTACHMENT 2 TITLE: INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR INITIAL REPORTING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE RELEASE (CHECK LIST) When a governmental agency is notified by telephone of a release of hazardous waste which threatens human health or the envircnment, the following information should be available.
- 1) Name of reporter: /
Telephone number:# Extension
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- 2) Name and address of facility:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Diablo Canyon Power Plant Avila Beach San Luis Obispo, CA 93424 ,
- 3) Date and time of incident:
Type of incident a Spill of hazardous waste b ' Leakage of hazardous waste-c Fire d) Explosion e) Other: -
~ 4) Name of materials involved (to the extent known). Include approximate pH and toxic concentration of material.
Quantity of materials. (to the extent known):
- 5) Extent of injuries., if any:
- 6) Possible hazards to human health, or the environment, outside the facility.
Areas affected: a) Inside plant property
- Notify only Company personnel unless directed otherwise b) Outside plant property c Ofablo Cove d Diablo Creek e Contamination of atmosphere DC0227 11V i
1 4 ATTACHMENT 3 t ) TRANSMITTAL LETTER
. October 14, 1985 Hazardous Waste Management Contingency Plan Pacific Gas and Electric Company operates a hazardous waste facility at Otablo
^ Canyon Power Plant (DCPP), as authorized by the State Department of Health Services (DHS). The permit requires that a Hazardous Waste Management Contingency Plan be maintained at the facility and copies of the plan be provided emergencytoservices. state and local agencies that may be called upon to provide The provisions of the attached Contingency Plan are to be carried out innediately whenever there is a fire, explosion or release of hazardous waste which could threaten human health or the environment.
.-' Please review the Hazardous Waste Management Contingency Plan, and keep it on ffle for future reference. . If any questions arise in is matter, please contact Mr. G. Richard Potter, of my staff, a turn the completed Receipt and Conatunent Fonn to my of < ca.
Sincerely. ROBERT C. THORNBERRY RCThornbe xc JVBoots 8Patterson l MJPeterson
,GRPatter Enclosures l
l l l v DC0227 12Y i l 1
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DIA8LO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 ATTACHIENT 4 TITLE: HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN RECEIPT AND COMMITMENT FORM AGENCY RECEIPT OF DIA8LO CANYON POWER PLANT HAZARD 0US WASTE MANAGDfENT CONTINGENCY PLAN signa *.ure Date (' . k' AGENCY COP 9tITMENT TO RESPOND IN CASE OF DERGENCY RELATED TO DCPP NON-RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDOUS l WASTE FACILITY l YE5 MO . signature Date l8 l DC0227 13V
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11/85 Page 1 of 1
.m PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER. PLANT UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 ,
ATTACHMENT 5
, TITLE: PGandE PERSONNEL
' Office Home NAME TITLE Telephone Number Telechone Number Site Emergency coordinators (Notify One) __ -
R.C. Thornberry Plant Manager J.M. Giscion Asst. Plant Manager W.8. McLane Materials and Project
- Coordination Kanager J.A. Sexton Operations Manager Law Department (Notify One)
David Williamson Kenneth Oleson Chemistry and Radiation Protection Department (Notify One) J.V. Boots
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(C&RP Dept. Manager) m M.J. 'Peterson (Hazardous Waste Mgr)
] G.R. Potter (Hazardous Waste Foreman /
Interim Site Emergency Coordinators N.J. Aiken G.R. Gaelzer '
. J.S. Bard J.E. Hendrickson O. Ba rkley T.A. Kensinger J.R. Becker M.S. Lemke -
W.L. Bowles . R.J. Magivder B.L. Briley D.V. Pierce 0.A. Cole J.M. Raab. L.R. Collins D.A. Vosburg R.L. Ewing L.R. Waters
' NOTE: Correspondence with any of the above named personnel should be addressed to:
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY Diablo Canyon Power Plant P.O. Box 56 Avila Beach, CA 93424 gj DC0227 14V
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PAGE 3 0F 13
- APPENDIX 1 - EP M-10 UNIT 1 FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUT 00NN EQUIPMENT I
DET FIRE
- PNL ZONE DET
;, LOCATION /0ESCRIPTION ZONE PAGE REMARKS UNIT A 4 1 104' ELEV. UNDER*4KV SWGR SUS F/ CA8tE SPREAD ROOM 12-A 35 2 " " "
j 104' ELEV. UNDER 4KV SWGR BUS G/ 12-8 35 , 3 " " " 104' ELEV. UNDER 4KV SWGR SUS H/ 12-C 35 . A 5 1 85' ELEV. OVER 480V NCC 110 & llE 10 32 2 85' ELEV. 0VER 4 & 12 KV RELAY 80 " 10 3 85' ELEV. OVER 4KV SWGR BUS E "
, 10 4 85* ELEV. OVER 4KV SWGR BUS E 10 5 "
85' ELEV. OVER 4KV SWGR BUS D 10 6 " 85' ELEV. OVER 12KV SWGR BUS E 10 7 85' ELEV. OVER 12KV SWGR BUS 0 " 10 8 85' ELEV. OVER 12KV START-UP SWGR " 10 A 6 1 75' ELEV. UNDER 4 & 12KV RELAY 80/ CABLE SPREAD ROOM 10 " 32 2 " " " " " 75' ELEV. UNDER 4KV SWGR BUS E/ 10 3 " " " " 75' ELEV. UNDER 12KV SWGR BUS D/ 10 4 75' ELEV. UNDER 12KV START-UP SWGR/ 10 a DC0275 7111 , , ,
PAGE 4 OF 13 APPENDIX 1 - EP M-10 UNIT I FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTOOWN EQUIPMENT DET - FIRE PNL ZONE DET l LOCATION /0ESCRIPTION ZONE PAGE - REMARKS gy f A 7 1 100' ELEV. CONTM'T PENETRATION AREA / ELECTRIC 3-88 12 - PENETRATION AREA A80VE CA8tE TRAY 2 " 100' ELEV. CONTM'T PENETRATION AREA / ELECTRIC 3-88 PENETRATION AREA A80VE CA8tE TRAY 3 " 100' ELEV. CONTM'T PENETRATION AREA / ELECTRIC 3-B8 PENETRATION AREA AB0VE CA8tE TRAY 4 100' ELEV. CONTM'T PENETRATION AREA / ELECTRIC 3-88 PENETRATION AREA A80VE CABLE TRAY 5 " 100' ELEV. CONTM'T PENETRATION AREA / ELECTRIC 3-88 PENETRATION AREA A80VE CABLE TRAY 6 " 85' ELEV. POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLE AREA 3-88 7 85' ELEV. POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLE AREA 3-88 8 95' ELEV. HVAC RM OVERHEAD / POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING AREA 14-A 36 9 " 95' ELEV. HVAC RM FLTRS/ CHARCOAL FILTER TEMP SENSOR 14-A , 10 " 95' ELEV. liVAC RM FLTRS/CHARC0AL FILTkR TEMP SENSOR 14-A 11 " 95' ELEV. HVAC RM FLTRS/CHARC0AL FILTER TEMP SENSOR 14-A 12 " 95' ELEV. HVAC RM FLTRS/CHARC0AL FITLER TEMP SENSOR 14-A e DC0275 Hill G & n )
t 1 PAGE 5 OF 13 APPENDIX 1 - EP M-10 UNIT I FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DET FIRE PNL ZONE DET LOCATION / DESCRIPTION ZONE PAGE REMARKS gjggl][ A 8 1 115' ELEV. CONTM'T PENETRATION AREA / AB0VE CABLE TRAY 3-88~ 12 2 115' ELEV. CONTM'T PENETRATION AREA / ABOVE CABLE TRAY 3-88 " 3 115' ELEV. CONTM'T PENETRATION AREA / AB0VE CABLE TRAY 3-88 " 4 115' ELEV. CONTM'T PENETRATION AREA / ABOVE CABLE TRAY 3-88 " A 9 1 115' ELEV. COMPUTER INVERTER 6-A-5 31 2 115' ELEV. 8ATTERY CHARGER 11 ROOM 6-A-1 28 j 3 115' ELEV. 8ATTERY CHARGER 12 ROOM 6-A-2 " 4 115' ELEV. BATTERY CHARGER 13 ROOM 6-A-3 " 5 115' ELEV. R00 CONTROL CA8LE TRAYS 6-A-4 30 6 115' ELEV. R00 DRIVE MG SET l-1 6-A-4 " 7 115' ELEV. RDO CONT. CABINETS 6-A-4 " 8 115' ELEV. R00 DRIVE MG SET l-2 6-A-4 " ' 9 115' ELEV. R00 CONT. CA8INETS 6-A-4 " 10+18 (NUM8ER 10 THRU 18 SHOWN ON UNIT 2 --- SM0KE DETECTOR LOCATIONS TABLE) 1 . e DC0275 91II l
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PAGE 6 0F 13 ' APPENDIX 1 - EP M-10 UNIT I FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT PET FIRE PNL ZONE DET LOCATION / DESCRIPTION ZONE PAGE REMARKS (jggg][ A 10 1 100' ELEV. HOT SHUTOOWN PANEL 5-A-4 27 ' 2 100' ELEV. 480V BUS IF ROOM' 5-A-1 26 3 100' ELEV. 480V BUS IG ROOM " 5-A-2 4 100' ELEV. 480V BUS IH R00M - 5-A-3 " 5 100' ELEV. UNDER PART LENGTil ROD CONT. CAB. 5-A-4 27 6 100' ELEV. UNDER 480V. L. C. 130 5-A-4 " 7 100' ELEV. UNDER 480V L. C. 13E 5-A-4 " 8 100' ELEV. UNDER R00 DRIVE PROGRAMMER 5-A-4 " 9 " 100' ELEV. UNDER 480V. MCC 12J 5-A-4 10 100' ELEV. UNDER 480V, MCC 121 5-A-4 " 100' ELEV. HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL " 11 5-A-4 12 " 100' ELEV. HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL 5-A-4 13+20 SHOWN ON UNIT 2 SH0KE DETECTOR LOCATIONS TABLE A 11 1 73' ELEV. 480 V MCC 12M AND 12N 3-F 6 2 73' ELEV. 480 V MCC 12M AND 12N " 3-F 3 SHOWN ON UNIT 2 SM0KE DET LOCATIONS --- 4 SHOWN ON UNIT 2 SM0KE DET LOCATIONS --- e DC0275 10111
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PAGE 7 0F 13 APPENDIX 1 - EP M-10 UNIT 1 . FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DET - FIRE PNL ZONE DET LOCATION / DESCRIPTION ZONE PAGE REMARKS [jgfl][
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INSIDE CONTH'T NR COL 7 BET INST TRAYS 1-A 1
?NSIDE CONTM'T BET SG 14 & RCP 14 1-8 3 INSIDE CONTM'T BET SG 13 & RCP 13 1-8 3 i INSIDE CONTM'T BRG 64* ELEV. 150 1-C 5 FLAMETVPEDdTECTOR INSIDE CONTM'T OVERLDAD CNTR 13J 1-A 1
. SIDE CONTM'T BET SG 12 & RCP 12 l-8 3 j .lDE CONTM'T BET SG 11 & RCP 11 1-8 3 L IWSIDE CONTM'T NR COL 12 & TRAY EJ8 1-A 1 98 INSIDE CONTM'T NR COL 10 & TRAY PJ8A- 1-A 1 10 INSIDE CONTM'T BRG 265* ELEV. 150' l-C 5 FLAME TYPE DETECTOR 11 INSIDE CONTM'T NR LOAD CNTR 131 1-A 1 i 12+14 INSIDE CONTM'T BELOW 140' PENETRATION AREA 1-A 1 FLAME TYPE DETECTOR j 15+22 INSIDE CONTM'T BELOW 117' ANNULUS AREA 1-A 1 23 29 INSIDE CONTM'T 8ELOW 117' ANNULUS AREA 1-A 1 l; A 13 1 155' EL CONTROL RM VENT INLET DUCT 8-8-3 N/A A 14 1 155' EL CONTROL RM VENT 00TLET DUCT 8-8-3 N/A i.'
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- APPENDIX 1 - EP M-10 UNIT 1 .
FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHuTOOWN E0ulPMENT A DET FIRE PNL 20NE DET UNil LOCATION /DESCRIPil0N ZONE PAGE REMARKS A 15 I INTAKE STRUCTURE BETWEEN 480V MCC 140 & 14E 30-8 N/A 2 INTAKE STRUCTURE OUTSIDE U-l ASW PUNP VAULTS 3-A-5 38 8 1 1 64' ELEV. WSTE GAS COMP 01 ROOM 3-C 6 2 64' ELEV. WSTE GAS COMP 11 ROOM 3-C 6 i 3 64' ELEV. CA8tE TRAYS NORTH WALL / AREA H 3-C 6 4 64' ELEV. CABLE TRAYS NORTH WALL / AREA H 3-C 6 5 64' ELEV. CA8tE TRAYS NORTH WALL / AREA H' 3-C 6 l 6 64' ELEV. RHR PP l-1 ROOM , 3-B-1 5 ! 7 64' ELEV. RHR PP l-2 ROOM / AREA K 3-8-2
- 8 64' ELEV. CABLE TRAYS NORTH WALL / AREA'K 3-C 6 -
j 9 64' ELEV. CA8LE TRAYS NORTH WALL / AREA K 3-C " l 10 64' ELEV. DRAIN PPS i . l l 4 l DC0275 12111 *
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s O PAGE 9 0F 13 APPENDIX 1 - EP M-10 UNIT I FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DET FIRE PNL ZONE DET LOCATION / DESCRIPTION ZONE PAGE REMARKS (j$jl' 8 2 1 73' ELEV. A80VE CORRIDOR DUCTS / AREA H 3-C 6 2 73' ELEV. A80VE CORRIDOR DUCTS / AREA H 3-C 3 " 73* ELEV. ABOVE CORRIDOR DUCTS / AREA H 3-C 4 73' ELEV. A80VE CORRIDOR DUCTS / AREA K 3-C 5 " 73' ELEV. ABOVE CORRIDOR DUCTS / AREA,K 3-C 6 " ' 73' ELEV. ABOVE CORRIDOR DUCTS / AREA K 3-C 7 73' ELEV. ABOVE CORRIDOR DUCTS / AREA K 3-C 8 " 73' ELEV. ABOVE CONTM'T SPRAY PP l-2 ROOM 3-F . 9 73' ELEV. CONTM'T SPRAY PP l-2 R00H 3-F 10 73' ELEV. CHG PP l-3 ROOM 3-H-2 7 11 73' ELEV. CHG PP l-2 ROOM 3-H-1 12 73' ELEV. CHG RHR HX l-2 R00M 3-B-2 5 13 73' ELEV. CHG RHR llX l-1 ROOM 3-B-1 73' ELEV. CHG PP l-1 ROOM " 14 3-H-1 7 15 73' ELEV. CCW PP l-3 R00M 3-J-3 9
- 16 73' ELEV. CCW PP l-2 R00M 3-J-2 8 17 73' E' LEV. CCW PP l-1 ROOM 3-J-l 7 s
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i PAGE 10 OF 13 APPEN0lX 1 - EP M-10 UNIT I FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DET ' FIRE PNL ZONE DET LOCATION / DESCRIPTION ZONE PAGE REMARKS gjgggq{ 8 3 1 85' ELEV. 51 PP l-1 ROOM . 3-M N/A 2 85' ELEV. St PP l-2 ROOM 3-M N/A , 3 85' ELEV. SA EVAP PKG l-1 ROOM 3-L 9 . 8 4 1 100' ELEV. NOT SHUTDOWN PANEL 5-A-4 27 2 100' ELEV. HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL 5-A-4 " 3 85' ELEV. CHEMICAL LAB 4-A 21 4 85' ELEV. CHEMICAL LA8 4-A " 5 85* ELEV. CHEMICAL LA8 *
. 4-A 6 85' ELEV. CCW HK ROOM 14-E 36 7 85* ELEV. CCW HX RDOM "
14-E 8 8 5 1 100' ELEV. AFW PPs 1-2 & 1-3 10 3-Q-2 2 100' ELEV. SPENT FUEL PPS 3-0 N/A 3 100' ELEV. AFW PP l-1 3-Q-1 10 i 4 100' ELEV. A80VE CABLE TRAYS . 3-X 11 5 100' ELEV. 8A XFR PPS/ AREA K 3-X 11 l DC0275 14111 i U d
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g . _ Q' ) PAGE 11 0F 1 APPENDIX 1 - EP M-10 UNIT I FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTOOWN EQUIPMENT i DET FIRE PNL ZONE DET LOCATION / DESCRIPTION ZONE PAGE REMARKS UNIT B 6 1 115' ELEV. FIRE PPs ROOM 3-N N/A . I B 7 1+9 !!S' ELEV. FILTER 8ANK ROOMS ,. 3-P-4 N/A AIR SHIELD TYPE 10+14 115' ELEV. FILTER BANK ROOMS , 3-P-4 N/A FLAME DET TYPE 8 8 1+9 115' ELEV. FILTER SANK ROOMS .i-P-4 N/A AIR SHIELD TYPE 10 13 115' ELEV. FILTER BANK ROOMS 3-P-4 N/A FLAME DET TYPE 14 115' ELEV. EXH FAN 1 ROOM 3-P-4 N/A 15 100* ELEV./ AREA L 3-P-1 N/A 16 85' ELEV. (FUEL HAND) SUPPLV FAN ROOM 3-P N/A B 9 1 125' ELEV. FUEL STORAGE 3-R N/A 1 B 10 1 140' ELEV. SPENT FUEL STORAGE 3-R N/A FLAME DET TYPE 2 140' ELEV. NEW FUEL STORAGE 3-R N/A FLAME DET TYPE 3 140' ELEV. HOT SHOP AREA 3-5 N/A B 11 1+8 140' ELEV. NORTH FILTER ROOM & EXH FAN E-5 ROOM 3-P-7 N/A 9+12 140' ELEV. FAN E-5 ROOM 3-P-7 N/A 1
PAGE 12 OF 13 APPEN0l! 1 - EP M-10 UNIT 1 . FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DET FIRE PNL ZONE DET LOCATION / DESCRIPTION ZONE PAGE REMARKS UM 8 12 1+8 140' ELEV. SOUTH FILTER ROOM 3-P-8 N/A AIF-SHIELO TVPE . ! 9+12 140' ELEV. FAN E-o a00M 3-P-8 N/A FLAME DET TYPE < ! 8 13 1+13 140' ELEV. 101 CONTROL 80AR05 8-C 32 INDICATING LIGHTS - 14+16 140' ELEV. CONTROL CONSOLE 8-C 32 INDICATING LIGHTS 8 14 1 140' ELEV. COMPdTER ROOM 8-A N/A 2 140' ELEV. SSPS ROOM 8-G 32 6 3 140' ELEV. REC & STORAGE ROOM . 8-E N/A 4 140' ELEV. SFM 0FFICE 8-E N/A l 8 15 1 140' ELEV. 500 KV CONT 80ARD 8-C 32 INDICATING LIGHTS
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2+5 140' ELEV. NIS RACKS " 8-C INDICATING LIGHTS 6 140' ELEV. INCORE INST RACKS " 8-C INDICATING LIGHTS
- 7 140' ELEV. G.F. FUEL DET RACK 8-C "
INDICATING LIGHTS , 8+12 140' ELEV. RAD MONITOR. RACKS 8-C INDICATING LIGHTS 8 16 1+2 140' ELEV. 5-31 & 32 FAN ROOM 8-8-1 N/A 3+5 155' ELEV. CONTROL ROOM VENT ROOM 8-8-3 N/A - i l l . I
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/ T T T T N E E E E O B 8 B B I
T T T T T A C 'M 'M 'M 'M O T T T T L N N N N O O O O C C C C E E E E D D D D 1 I I I I 1 S S S S 1 N N N N I 7 _ I I I 1 _ 5 7 T 2 E 1 1 1 I 0 D t D E TN 1 2 3 4 EO DZ L N D P 0 9
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Page 1 of 9 APPEN0!X 2 70.EP M-10 UNIT 1 , EQUIPMENT REOUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN UNIT The following list represents the minimum equipment required to bring the plant to a cold shutdown as defined by 10CFR50, Appendix R. Section III.G.I.a. and b.
$YSTEM AND ACTIVE COMPONENTS REDUNOANCY AN0/OR COMPONENTS
- 1. Emehlency Power Supply _
- a. Di'sel e generators, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3 2 of 3 required
- b. Ofesel fuel oil transfer pumps, 1 of 2 pumps require'd 0-1,0-2
- c. Day tank level control valves 1 of 2 LCV's per day tank required LCV-85, LCV-88 LCV-86 LCV-89 LCV-87 LCV-90
- d. 125V de batteries 2 of 3 rtquired
- e. Battery chargers 2 of 5 required
- f. Inverters 2 of 4 required
- g. * .4KV power supplies to 480 volt 2 of 3 required Toad centers and load center transformers
- h. 125V de supplies to 4KV switchgear 2 of 3 required
- i. 125V power supplies to main 2 of 3 required switchgear board .
- j. Instrument ac power channels 2 of 4 channels required
- k. System process ifne boundary valves considered for spurious operation SV-277, SV-278, SV-493, SV-494 See Appendix 6
. Olesel generator .
1-1 air start isolation valves SV-281, SV-282, SV-495, SV-496 See Appendix 6 Diesel generator 1-2 air start isolation valves SV-283 SV-284 SV-497, SV-498 See Appendix 6 Diesel generator 1-3 air start isolation valves - OC0275 18tV l l l
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Page 2 of 9 APPEN0!X Z TO EP M-10 UNIT 1 , .. SYSTEM AND ACTIVE COMPONENTS REDUNDANCY AN0/0R COMPONENTS
- 2. Auxiliary Feedwater System UNIT
- a. Auxfliary feedwater (AFW) pumps 1 of 3 pumps required (t; urb.ine-driven AFW pump 1-1 and
- motoa-driven AFW pumps 1-2 and 1-3)
- b. Assxiated steam supply valves for Appitcable only to AFW pump 1-1 AFd pump 1-1: '
FCV-95, FCV-152, FCV-15 Required for AFW pump 1-1 FCV-37, FCV-38 1 of 2 valves required for AFW pump 1-1
- c. Associated level control valves:
Pump 1-1: LCV-107. LCV-108 1 of 2 valves required fo' rPump 1-1 Pump 1-2: LCV-110, LCV-111 1 of 2 valves required for Pump 1-2 Pump 1-3: LCV-113, LCV-115 1 of 2 valves required for Pump 1-3
- d. ' Water supply and associated valves:
- 1) Condensate storage tank, or No valves required
. 2 ). Fire water storage tank 1 of 2 valves required for fire water FCV-436 FCV-437. storage tank. Can be manually operat -7 f f requireti. ,
- e. System process line boundary valves considered for spurious operation FCV-438,FCV-439,FCV-440,FCV-441 See Appendix 6
- 3. Residual Heat Removal System * ,
- a. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps 1 of 2 pumps required 1-1 and 1-2
- b. RHR heat exchangers, 1-1 and 1-2 1 of 2 Hx required
- c. RHR valves:
HCV-637, HCV-638 (RNR Flowpath) 1 of 2 valves required 8809-A, 8809-8 (RHR Flowpath) 1 of 2 valves required 8700A,87008(RNRSuction) 1 of 2 valves required 8716A, 87168 (RNR Flowpath) 1 of 2 valves required
- Components of RHR system are r2 quired for COLD SHUTDOWN l
OCO275 191V , e
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.m APPENDIX 2 TO EP M-10 UNIT 1 !
1 SYSTEM AND ACTIVE COMPONENTS REDUNDANCY AND/0R COMPONENTS I
- d. RHR heat sink:
Component Cooling Water (CCW) See Item 5
, System Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW) System See Item 6
- e. RHR valves 8701 and 8702 (hot leg 1 of 2 required to maintain reactor RHR suction) coolant pressure boundary during HOT SHUTDOWN. Can be manually opened for COLD SHUTDOWN. Valve power circuits are normally racked out at the motor control center.
- f. Valve 8703 (hot leg discharge) Valve power circuit is normally racked out at the motor control center. .
- g. System process ifne boundary valves considered for spurious operation FCV-641A, FCV-6418 RHR pump recirc See Appendix 6 9003A, 90038, containment spray See Appendix 6 header isolation 8982A, 89828, containment recirc Valves are normally closed with power sump isolation racked out at MCC during manual l' N ,. -
operation. - 4 Charging and Boration
- a. Centrifugal charging pumps l'-1, 1-2 1 of 3 pumps required reciprocating pump 1-3 (used as backu,1 to 2 centrifugal pumps)
- b. Charging pump ccoling:
CCW system See item 5 ASW system See Item 6 *
- c. Centrifugal chargino pump 1-1 and Only utfitzed to start charging pumps.
1-2 auxiliary lube oil pumps. Can be bypassed. l .
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Page 4 of 9 - ' APPEN0!X 2 TO EP M-10 UNIT 1 - SYSTEMANDACTIiECOMPONENTS REDUNDANCY AN0/0R COMPONENTS
- d. Charging and boration flow path One flow path required
- 1) Using boric acid tanks: UNIT
- Boric acid tanks 1 of 2 tanks required Boric acid transfer pumps 1 of 2 pumps required Boric acid filter -
Only flow path required Valve 8104 Required for boric acid tank flowpath Charging pumps 1 of 3 pumps required i Valve FCV-128 Required for centrifugal charging pumps. Two manual bypass flowpaths, and a) Charging through reactor No additional components required coolant pump seal via RCP seal injection b) Charging through All of these valves required for this regenerative HX and valves flow path HCV-142, 8108, 8107 and: (1) Valve 8145 and 8148, 1 of 2 valves required for pressurizer charging to auxiliary auxiliary spray pressurizer spray, I
- or' (2) Valve 8146, charging Valve required *
. to loop 3 cold leg
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or (3) Valve 8147, charging Valve required to loop 4 cold leg 4 or 2) Using baron injection tanks: Refueling water storage tank Required for this flowpath Valves 8805A, 88058 1 of 2 valves required Charging Pumps 1 of 3 valves required 4 Valve FCV-128 Required for reciprocating charging l pump Valves 8803A 88038 1 of 2 valves required 8eron Injection Tank (BIT) Required Valves 8801A, 88018 1 of 2 valves required 8807A, 88078 BIT 1 of 2 valves required to be closed recirculation to boric acid storage tank OC0275 21!V '
l l l Page 5 of 9 (' APPENDIX 2.TO EP M-10 UNIT 1 SYSTEM AND ACTIVE COMPONENTS REDUNDANCY AN0/0R COMPONENTS
- e. System proc'ess ifne boundary valves considered for spurious operation 8166, 8167. HCV-123, excess letdown See Appendix 6 kIfdllI isolation 8149A,81496.8149C LCV-459,LCV-460 See Appendix 6 1etdown isolation 8105, 8106, charging pump See Appendix 6 recirculation FCV-110A, FCV-1108, FCV-111A, See Appendix 6 FCV-1118. Primary water and boric See Appendix 6 acid mixing, isolation valves LCV-1128. LCV-112C, supply fras VCT See Appendix 6 HCV-104. HCV-105, boric acid See Appendix 6 transfer pump recirculation 8843,8881, accumulator fill Ifne See Appendix 6 isolation 6804A, 8807A, 88078 RWST isolation See Appendix 6 valves to RHR and SIS
- 5. Component Cooling Water System
- a. CCW punps 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3 1 of 3 pumps required
, b. CCW heat exchanger 1-1,1-2 1 of 2 Hx required m
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"c. CCW Valves:
Required for reciprocating charging FCV-355 (CCW Misc. Service Header) pump 1-3 cooling. Can be opened manually if required. FCV-430, FCV-431 (CCW vital 1 of 2 valves required
- service headers)
FCV-364 FCV-365 (CCW to RHR Hx) 1 of 2 valves required for RHR system cooling. Valves required for COLD SHUTDOWN. Manual operation assumed in event of failure of remote control. e 1 OCO275 22!V ( .. V, a
- Page 6 of 9 gr APPEN0!X 2 TO EP M-10 UNIT 1 f .
SYSTEM ANO ACTIVE COMPONENTS REDUNDANCY AND/0R COMPONENTS h
- d. CCW pump 1-1, 1-2, 1-3 aux tl f ary Only required to start CCW pump UNIT i
lube oil pumps
- e. CCW heat sink:
ASW system See Item 6
- f. System process line boundary valves considered for spurious operation LCV-69, LCV-70. Domin water makeup See Appendix 6 to CCW system RCV-16 CCW surge tank vent See Appendix 6 FCV-360, FCV-366 Bypass around See Appendfx 6 TCV-27 and 28 FCV-356 FCV-357, FCV-363, See Appendix 6 FCV-749 FCV-750 RCP thermal barrier Hx valves SV-629, SV-695 CCW Hx Vent Tank See Appendix'6 Vent
- 6. Auxiliary Saltwater System
- a. Auxilf ary saltwater (ASW) pump, 1 of 2 pumps required 1-1, 1-2 .
. b. ASW valves: ,
FCV-602, FCV-603 (ASW to CCW Hz) 1 of 2 valves required
- c. ASW PIT supply gates: 1-8, 1-9 1 of 2 gates required
- d. System process line boundary .See Appendix 6 valves considered for spurious operation FCV-495, FCV-496 ASW cross connect valves 1
OC0275 23!V
)
+
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Page 7 of 9
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APPEN0!X 2 TO EP M-10 UNIT 1 spf Fe SYSTEM AND ACTI7E COMPONENTS REDUNOANCY Ah0/0R COMPONENTS
- 7. Main Steam System gyggg.
- a. 10% steam relief valves: PCV-19, 1 of 4 valves required
. PCV-20, PCV-21, PCV-22 Backup to 105 steam reifef valves provided by main steam code safety valves ,
- b. Steam generator blowdown isolation Required to close to maintain water valves: inventory for safe shutdown FCV-760, FCV-761,.
FCV-762. FCV-763 FCV-244 and'FCV-160, Required to close only if above steam FCV-246 and FCV-157, generator blowdown FCVs fail to close. FCV-48 and FCV-154, FCV-250 and FCV-151 .
- c. FCV-41, FCV-42, FCV-43, FCV-44 All four M5IVs required to close to maintain steam generator water inventory.
- d. System process line boundary See Appendix 6 valves considered for spurious operation FCV-22, FCV-23 FCV-24, FCV-25 .
(.. . . 0 e e i OCO275 24!V i l
Page 8 of 9 3 3 APPENDIX 2 TO EP M-10 UNIT 1 g$. SYSTEM AND ACTIVE COMPONENTS REDUNDANCY AN0/0R COMPONENTS
- 8. Instrumentation a.
g Steam generator level 1 steam generator required for cooldown SG 1-1: LT-516" , LT-517,
- LT-518 LT-519 SG 1-2: LT-526", LT-527, LT-528, LT-529 SG 1-3: LT-536", LT-537, LT-538, LT-539 SG 1-4: LT-546**, LT-547, LT-548, LT-549
- b. Steam generator pressure: I steam generator required for cooldown 1 of 3 PT's required for Loop 1: PT-514, PT-515, PT-516 that loop Loop 2: PT-524, PT-525. PT-526 Loop 3: PT-534. PT-535, PT-536 Loop 4: PT-544, PT-545, PT-546 ,
- c. Reactor coolant system 1 of 2 required per loop temperature: 1 loop required for cooldewn -
- Loop 1: TE-413A, TE-4138 '
Loop 2: TE-423A TE-4238 i ' Loop 3: TE-433A, TE-4338 *
- Loop 4: TE-443A, TE-4438
- d. Reactor coolant system or 1 of 3 wide range pts required pressurizer system:
PT-403, PT-405, PT-406, Wide range PT-455, PT-456, PT-457, Narrow range PT-474
- e. Pressurizer Level 1 of 4 required LT-459 LT-440, LT-461, LT-406**
- f. Source range flux monttors 1 of 2 required NE-31. NE-32 l Cold calibrated OC0275 25!V 1
O w _. - _ - - ~ - - - -. , - - .--._,.- n - , _ , , . , . - - _ _ , _.,,-,.,n-,,.-,n- _ ___-, ____.,.,._.,__,,_n_.,_n _,, __ , . - _ ,,. _
Page 9 of 9 3 APPEN0!X 2 T0 iP M-10 UNIT 1 - SYSTEM AND ACTIVE COMPONENTS REDUNDANCY AN0/0R COMPONENTS
- 9. Ventilation for Safe Shutdown Equ1oment
, a.
% switchgear room and inverter i
room supply and exhaust fans
! S-43, S-44 . 1 of 2 required E-43, E-44 1 of 2 required l Dampers:
j H043, H044 1 of 2 required i
- b. *4.16KV switchgear room supply fans 2 of 3 required 3-67, 5-68, 5-69
- c. ASW pump room exhaust fans E-101, 1 of 2 required 1 E-103-
- 10. Reactor Coolant System
- a. Pressurizer power operated relief Required to prevent LOCA due to stuck valves PCV-455C, 474, 456 and open valve block valves 8000A, 5 and C.
~"
( '*, b. System process line boundary
- s valves considered for spurious .
actuation
- PCV-455A, PCV-4558 See Appendix 6 8078A, 80788, 8078C 80780 ,
See Appendix 6
- 11. Fire Protection System
- a. System process Ifne boundary See Appendix 6 valves considered for spurious operation FCV-433 Ff reweter i
isolation to containment. i
- Portable fans are available in the event these 'ans are unavaflable due to a e fire. -
OCO275 26tV i
o -s
)
Appendix 3 For EP H-10 Unit 1 Page 1 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AFFECTED f W ifM Nr ALTFMATIE EWifMNf/0 RATM ACTi mS UNM 1.0 Fire Area 1 (Fire Zone I-A) Containment Annulus Area, Elevation 91' ' l.A) Residual Heat Removal System
- 1) MOV 8701 1) Verify MOV 8701 and 8702 breakers are racked out to MOV 8702 prevent inadvertant opening. hihen needed for cooldown, manually (handle) open valves, or open from Control Room.
[The pressure and temperature interlock on these valves may need to be jumpered in order to open valve from ControlRoom.] 1.B) Charging and Boration
- 1) 8146 Normal Charging 1) Charge and borate via 8147 Alternate Charging
- 34 TCP seals L- et i bypass
, c. -5 T
- 2) 8145 PZR auxiliary spray es Continue to use PZR normal spray from loop 1 or loop 2 f f 8148 P2R auxiliary spray bypass offsite-power is available. If not, use PZR PORV's, l.C) Steam Generator Blowdown Inside Containment Valves
- 1) FCV-760 5.G. fl -
- 1) If these valves spuriously open due to hot short, RV-* ..G.
#2 . manually close their corresponding outside containment (OrN 1.G. #3 isolation valves, which are FCV 151,154,157 and 160 and C '11 5.G. #4 FCV 250, 248, 246 and 244. -
[ ] Statement enclosed is not part of Appendix R review. DCd??S ?Sil
i Appendix 3 for EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 2 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AFFECD FQlifMNT AtTEWTlW EQUIMNTMERATOR ACTims UNn i 1.D) PIR Level Transmitters
- 1) LT 459 . 1) If all three level indications are lost, use LT 406 at LT 460 the dedicated shutdown panel. LT 406 is cold calibrated.
LT 461 therefore adjust for temperature errors accordingly. See i correction curve attached to the back of this procedure, 1 1.E) Steam Generator Level Transmitters
- 5.G. #1 S.G. #2 S.G. #3 S.G. d4 fire Protection Review indicate'd that at least 2 out of 4 LT 516
- level transmitters should still be available.
l LT 526 LT 536 LT 546 LT 517 LT 527 LT 537 LT 547 LT 518 LT 528 LT 538 LT 548 LT 519 LT 529 LT 539 LT 549 l i 1.F) RCS Temperature Elements Hot Leg Cold Leg Loop 1 and 2 temperature elements or Loop 3 and 4 temperature elements may be damaged by fire, but not all , Loop I TE 413A TE 4138 four loops. Use TE's from the two loops still available.
. 2 TE 423A TE 4238 3 TE 433A TE 4338 4 TE 443A TE 4438 .
l 1.G) RCS Wide Range Pressure Transmitters - J - PT 403 - loop 4 hot leg PT 406 may have been fire damaged. If so, use PT 403 and
, PT 406* - loop 4 hot leg 405 indications in the Control Rooe.
PT 405 - loop 3 hot leg
- At dedicated shutdown panel DC0275 26I1
, L, ,V l
, em I e f /
Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1 - Page 3 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment FFEC D E2 1FE NT 4]tWTM EQUIMNTMERATOR ACTl016 UNIT 1.H) Pressurizer PORV's and block valves PuRV 474, 8000A Fire Protection analysis of the circuits for these valves PORV 455C. 80008 indicated at least one PORV will be available following a PORV 456, 8000C postulated fire in this area. Theworstthatcouldhappen is the PORV's will fall as is, closed. l.I) Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor NE - 31 One source, range should still be available. NE - 32 2.0 Fire Area 1 (Fire 7one 1-8) Reactor Coolant Pump Area Elevation 91' 2.A) Steam Generator Slowdown Inside Containment Isolation Valves , FCV 760 - S.G. #1 If fire damage cause valve (s) to open spuriously, close their FCV 761 - S.G. 82 . corresponding outside containment isolation valves, which are FCV 762 - S.G. A3 FCV 151, 154, 157 and 160 and FCV 250, 248, 246 and 244. FCV 763 - S.G. #4 2.8) Pressurizer Level Transaltters LT 459 Not affected by fire in this zone. LT 460 LT 461 LT 406
.4 DCo??S 2711 .
Appendia 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 4 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment WFECTB) EWif9fMT ALTERMTlW EWIFf0(TMMTQt ACTIG6 gg 2.C) ACS Temperature Elements Loop I 413A (hot leg) 4138 (cold leg) Either loops I and 2 or loops 3 and 4 should still be i Loop 2 423A 4238 available. l Loop 3 433A 4338 - Loop 4 443A 4438
- 2.0) Pressurizer Pressure Channels l PT 455 IN.R.) Not affected by fire in this area.
' - PT 456 LN . it.1 l
PT 457 CN.R.1 PT 474 fN.R.) 1 4 PT 406 [W.R.] . 2.E) Pressurizer PORV's and 81ock Valves 1 ! PORV 474 8000A Fire Protection analysis of the circuits for these valves j PORV 455C. 80008 indicate at least one PORV. either 474 or 456, will be POAV 456, 8000C available following a postulated fire in this area. The worst that could happen is that the PORV's fail as is, closed. - 2.F) Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors NE 31 One source range should still be available. NE 32 ( i
~
\ , a j DC0275 28tl
- C * .
'J
~,
Appendix 3 for EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 5 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment , AFFECTED Em l N ALTEIM TI E EQUI M /0 W RAIM ACTIONS UNIT 3.0 Fire Area I (Fire Zone I-C) Control Rod Drive Area Containment Building, 100' Elevation 3.A) Pressurizer PORV's and. Block Valves , . PORV 474, 8000A Fire Protection analysis of the circuits for these valves i PORV 455C, 80008 indicatgd at least one PORV, either 474 or 456 will be PORV 456, 8000C available following a postulated fire in this area. The worst that could happen is that the PORV's fail as is, closed. 3.8) Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors One source range s' maid stiil be available. I
; NE-31 -
NE-32 I 4.0 Fire Area 3-B-1 RHR Pump 1-1 and Heat Exchanger Room. Elevation 58 thru 113 . RHR Pump 1-1 If RHR Pp 1-1 is fire damaged, use RHR Pp I-2 5.0 Fire Area 3-B-2 RHR Pump 1-2 and Heat Exchanger Room Elevation 58 thru 113 RHR Pump 1-2 - If RHR Pp 1-2 is fire damaged, use RHR pp 1-1 , S S OTO97C 9455
. t Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 6 of . 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AFFECIFD falifW NT ALTEMATIE EQUlFWNT/0NRATOR ACTims UNIT 6.0 Fire Area A8-1 (Fire Zone 3-8-3) -
SIT Room, Elevation 32 thru 75 8803A 81T inlet valves If both of these valves are fire damaged, continue to use 88036 normal CVCS boration path. - 7.0 Fire Area A8-1 (Fire Zone 3-C)
. Orain Receiving Tanks and Gas Decay Tasks Area, Aux tidg 75' Elevation 7.A) Diesel Fuel Transfer Pump 0-1 power If damaged by fire, use Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 0-2.
7.8) Aux Feedwater Pump 1-2 Control If damaged by fire, use Aux Feedwater Pp 1-1 or 1-3 8.0 Fire Area A8-1 (Fire Zone 3-F)
. Containment Spray Pump Room Reciprocating Charging Pump 1-3 If damaged by fire, use centrifugal charging pump l ,1 or 1-2.
e - DC0275 301I A '... ,
q , 3
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Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 7 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AFFECD EQUlfMNT RTERNATlW EQUlFENTA)RIMTOR ACTIONS UN11 9.0 Fire Area 3-H-1 . Charging Pump 1-1 and 1-2 Room. 73' Elevation 9.A)- 8803A BIT inlet valve use normal CVCS charging path for boration.
- 3 88038 BIT _ inlet valve 9.8) Reciprocating Charging Pump 1-3 control All three pumps can be fire damaged. But it is possible to i
bypass the control. circuitry for pump 1-3 in the 4KV , switchgear room, and manually close the 4KV breaker to start the reciprocating pump. Refer to Step 5 of main l procedure. I 9.C) Charging pump 1-1 and 1-2 power and control Same as iten g.B above. 10.0 Fire Area 3-H-2
- Reciprocating Charging Pump 1-3 Room. Aux Bldg. 73', Elevation 10.A) Reciprocating charging Pp 1-3 Use centrifugal charging Pp 1-1 or .1-2 11.0 Fire Area AB-1 (Fire Zone 3-J-1)
Component Cooling Water Pp 1-1 Room. 7S' Elevation ll.A) Control circuit to Diesel 1-0 0.Ed 1-3 . Diesel 1-3 normal control circuit, and Diesel 1-2 backup control circuit may be fire damaged. If so, switch to alternate control circuit locally at the diesel generator t rooras. - DCO??S 3111
Appendix 3 for EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 8 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment t AFFfmfmimT ALINTIVE EQUlFKEDERATOR ETl2 UNr , 11.8) Diesel fuel Oil Transfer Pump 0-2 , Circuit for pump 0-2 is protected t,y a .2-hour fire barrier and should not be affected by a fire. Circuit for pump 0-1 is not protected. 11.C) Aux Feedwater Pump 1-3 Use AFW p, 1-1 if pp 1-3 is fire damaged. , 11.0) AWS Pump 1-2 Exhaust Fan E-101 Use ASW Pump 1-2 and its exhaust' fan E103 as alternate safe .. shutdown equipment. II.E) CCW Pp 1-1 Use CCW Pp 1-2 and 1-3 12.Q Fire Area A8-1 (Fire Zone 3-J-2) Component Cooling Water Pump 1-2 Room. Elevation 75 12.A) Boration Path 8803A BIT inlet valve Continue to use normal CVCS charging path for boration. 88038 BIT inlet valve 12.8) Component Cooling Water Pump 1-1 and 1-2 The auxiliary tube oil pump control for CCW Pp 1-1 and 1-2 aux lube oil pumps. may be fire damaged. Use CCW Pp i-3. or locally start CCW Pp 1-1 and 1-2 at 4KV breakers. Refer to Step 5 of main l procedure. . 12.0) Charging Pumps 1-1.1-2 and their aux lobe oil The circuitry for auxiliary lube oil pumps for charging pumps pumps, reciprocating charging Pp 1-3 control. 1-1 and 1-2 may be fire damaged. Without the auxill,ary lube oil pumps, these pumps cannot be started from the Control Room or Hot Shutdown Panel. Therefore, if they are needed,
- start them locally at 4 KV switchgear. rooms. Refer to Step 5 l of main procedure. If reciprocating charging pump is lost,
, use centrifugal charging pump 1-1 and I-2.
~
DC0'2?S 32il G V y)
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i.
)
Appendix 3 For EP M-10 unit 1 Page 9 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AFFECD EQUIMNT RTEl4NATIE EQUIMNTAIFEMTOR ETIG6 UNil 12.0) Olesel 1-2 backup control Verify and continue to use norinal control power for Olesel Diesel 1-3 output breaker trip 1-2 selectable at the diesel generator room. If diesel 1-3
. trips, verify diesel 1-1 and 1-2 available.
13.0 Fire Area A8-1 (Fire Zone 3-J-3) Component Cooling Water Pump 1-3 Aur 81dg. 75' Elevation 13.A) Boration Path 8803A - 81T inlet valve Use norinal CVCS. charging path for horation. 88038 - SIT inlet valve 13.8) Ct.W Pp 1-3 Use CCW Pp 1-1 and 1-2. 13.C) Charging pumps 1-1.1-2 and their aux lube oil The circuitry for the auxiliary lube oil pumps for charging pumps, reciprocating charging pump 1-3 control. pumps 1-1 and 1-2 may be fire damaged. Without the auxiliary lube oil pumps, these pumps cannot be started from the l Control Room or Hot Shutdown Panel. Therefore, if they are needed, start them locally at 4 KV switchgear rooms. Refer to Step 5 of main procedure. If the reciprocating charging pump is lost, use. centrifugal charging pump 1-1 and 1-2. l ' 14.0 Fire' Area AB-1 (Fire Zone'3-L) Boric Acid and Weste Swaporator Area, 85' Elevation 14.A) Charging and boration flow path Continue on to the next page, and eqelpment. DC0275 3311 s
- Appendix 3 For EP M-lG Unit 1 Page 10 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AFFEtim FOUlfftNT ALTEINATlW EDUIPENT/0FERATOR ACTl0f6-UNil
- 1. Valve 8805A RWST suction If 8805A and 8 cannot be opened electrically, use manual 88058 RWST suction handles provided for the valves. If 8104 is damaged, 8104 Emerg borate continue to use nonnel boration path, or the manual bypass valve 8471 around 8104, if FCV 110A is open. ,
- 2. Boric Acid Transfer Pp 1-1 and 1-2 If both boric acid transfer pumps are fire damaged, borate via 8805A and 8, or inject the BIT.
- 3. Charging Pp 1-2 aux lube all Pp
' Use charging Pp 1-1,1-3, or locally start pump 1-2 at 4 KV switchgear room. Refer to Step 5 of main procedure.
l 14.B) Aux Feedwater Pp 1-3 - Use Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pp l-1, if MD AFW Pp 1-2 and Aux Feedwater Pp 1-2 1-3 are unavailable. (Note the circuits for pump 1-2 and 1-3 are provided with a 2-hour fire barrier in this fire zone). 15.0 Fire Area V-1 (Fire Zone 3-P-3) Aux Bldg Main Exh Fan Room #2, 115' Elevation Aux Bldg Normal Exh Filter Room,100' Elevation i Aux Bldg Normal Concrete Exh Duct, 93' Elevation, and Plenum, 85' Elevation Aux Feedwater Pp 1-3 Use Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pp 1-1. , Aux Feedwater Pp 1-2 l l l 16.0 Fire Area 3-0-1 Aux Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump 1-1 Turb driven AFW Pp 1-1 Use motor driven AfW Pp 1-2 and 1-3 DC0275 3411
\ k., s
J Appendix 3 for EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 11 of 41 . Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AFFEC E EQUlf9fMT ALTEIUMTlW EQUllffMT/0FERATOR ACTIONS-gyg7 17.0 Fire Area AB-1 (Fire Zone 3-0-2) , l Aux feedwater Motor Driven Pumps AFW Pp 1-2 and 1-3 Use turbine driven AFW Pp 1-1 ,
- 18. Fire Area A8-l (Fire Zone 3-X) .
Boric Acid Transfer Pumps and CVCS Demins,100' Elevation Boration Floy,,P,ath,,,,,, ,
- 1. Valve 8805A - RWST suction If 8805A and 8 cannot be opened electrically, use manual 88058 - RWST suction handles provided for the valves. If 8104 is damaged, 8104 - Emerg borate continue to use nomal boration path, or the manual bypass valve 8471 around 8104, if FCV 110A is open.
- 2. Boric Acid Transfer Pp 1-1 and 1-2 If both boric acid transfer pumps are fire damaged, borate i via 8805A and B (use manual handles if necessary), or inject
- the BIT.
l i 19.0 Fire Area A8-1 (Fire Zone 3-AA) Boric Acid Tanks Aux Bldg. 115' Elevation ' Boration flow Path
- 1. Valve 8805A - RWST suction If 8805A & 8 cannot be opened electrically, use manual 88058 - RWST suction handles'provided for the valves. If 8104 is damaged, ,
8104 - Emerg borate continue to use normal boration path, or the manual bypass valve 8471 around 8104, if FCV 110A is open. - f)CO275 3511
e Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit i Page 12 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment
- AFFECIFD EQUlfffNT Al.1FRNATlW FQUIMNT/0KRATOR ACTlas UNIT
- 2. Borate Acid Tank 1-1 and 1-2 l'evel use boric acid flow integrator and control operator log to indication LI 102 and 106. determine boric acid tank level. Notify ISC to set up temporary level indication for the tanks.
20.0 Fire Area 3-88 (A. Penetration Area 115'; 8. Pe'netration Area 100'; C. Penetration Area, 85') 20.A) Penetration Area,115' Elevation. Aur Bldg
- 1. Diesel 1-1 Normal control power for Diesel 1-1 may be fire damaged. If
- so, select backup control power at diesel generator room. in
; addition, diesel 1-2 and 1-3 are available, i 2. Aux Feedwater Level Control Valves
~
I LCV 113 LCV 110 and LCV 111 from AFW Pp l-2 supply is available. ' ' LCV 115 They are not affected by fire at this elevation. LCV 108
.- FCV 37 Fire in this area could fall these three valves (LCV 113, 115 l FCV 38 and 108) only in the OPEN position. The capability to FCV 95 modulate these valves may be lost. If so, modulate auxiliary feedwater flow locally using handwheels provided at the valves. Ilowever, valve. modulation may not be needed since it's associated AFW Pump (s) may not be running. In addition, there are check valves downstream which will prevent reverse water flow.
- 3. Charging and Boration 8104 - Emerg boration valve use manual bypass valve 8471 around 8104 f f FCV 110A is open.
Or use supply from RWST via 8805 A and 8 - DC0275 3611 b b
- p. ,
l Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1
- Page 13 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AFFECTFD EQllfMNT ALTERNATIE FQllfMNT/0FERATOR ACTIOP6 lJNI HCV - 142 '
If fire damaged the capability to modulate this valve, use the duplicate control at the hot S/D panel. (using backup nitrogen supply) 88018 - BIT outlet use 8801A . 8145 - PZR Aux Spray For depressurization of RCS, use PZR PORV 474 (which is 8148 - PZR Aux Spray Bypass sufficiently separated from these valves) [if RCPs are not
. running. If RCPs are running, try the normal PZR spray valves, or the manual PZR spray valves bypass inside containment.]
- If 8145 or 8148 fall open due to het short, terminate premature RCS depressurizatio9 using 8107 or 8108. These valves are not affected by fire at this elevation. ,
8146 - Normal Charging Fire at this elevation could cause both these valves to fail 8147 - Alternate Charging close. If so, use charging via
- 1) Manual bypass valve 8969 around the BIT
- 2) or charge through the SIT
- 4. CCW from the RHR HX FCV 364 If hot short cause the valve to go close, and it is needed to FCV 365 have it open, do as f,ollows:
- 1) Isolate instrument air to the valve
- 2) De-energize the DC control power to the valve by i
pulling fuses at Control Room, or disconnect 'the instrument air line going to the valve. [ ] Statements enclosed are not part of Appendix R Review - DC'0275 3711
Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 14 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown EqJipment F R CTED faul m T RTEMTIW FQUlFEW0KMIOR ETE UNIT 5.a 10% Steam Dump Valves if fire damaged the capability to operate these valves from VB-3. go to the hot shutdown panel to operate them. Otherwise, manually operate these valves using handwheels provided. Analysis indicates that these valves cannot fall open due to hot short or short to ground resulting from a fire in this area. 5.b Steam Generator Slowdown Valven Inside If these valves failed open due to a fire in this area. Containment isolate the corresponding outside containment blowdown isolation valve. FCV 760 FCV 761 FCV 762
.FCV 763 5.c Steam Generator Level Transmitter Fire in this elevation may have damaged the steam generator LT's. At least the level transmitter ending in 7's or 9's (LT 517, 527, 537, 547 an'd LT 519, 529, 539, 549) should '
still be available, due to their physical seperation one another. 5.d Steam Generator Pressure Transmitters At least one of the following groups of steam generator pressure transmitters should still be available after a fire in this area: Group A: PT514(S.G.ft) PT 524 (S.G. #2) Group B: S.G. #1 PT515(S.G.#2-PT 525 L Group C: PT536(S.G.f3) PT 546 (S.G. #4) [ ' Statement enclosed not part of Appendix R Review
~ '
DC0275 3811 N
.]
Appendix 3 for EP M-10 Unit !
- Page 15 of 41
] Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment l l AFFEC D EQUlitFNT ALTEINTIVE F2lMNTERATOR ETIONS UNii 6.a Pressurizer PORV's and block valves A fire at this elevation can cause at most two PORV's to fall close, and the block valves to fall as.is, normally open. In PCV 474, 80004 addition, aux spray valve 8145 will be available. There fore. PCV 456, 80008 either 8145 or the available PORV 474 or 455c and 456) can PCV 455C, 8000C be used to depressurize the RCS. L(When using aux spray. . secure normal and alternate charging.] , However, following a fire a hot short could occur when the operator operates (opens),the PZR aux spray valve 8148 resulting in the spurious opening of PORV 455C. [Therefore l the operator may want to attempt closing block valve 8000C l before opening 8148, or not use it at all) ! 6.b Pressurizer Level Transmitters At least one of these pressurizer transmitters should still I be available following a fire at this elevation. LT 459 j LT 461 6.c RCS Wide Range Temperature
- Either loop 1 and 2 or loop 3 and 4 temperature element should still be available following a fire in this area.
Loop 1 413A (hot leg) 4138 (cold leg)
~
Loop 2 423A 4238 Loop 3 433A 4338 Loop 4 443A 4438
- 7. RHR hot leg injection isolation The fire could cause a hot short in the control circuit valve 8703. . resulting in premature opening of this valve. However, there are two series check valves downstream which will prevent the RHR piping from being pressurized.
- 8. Source Range Monitors At least one source range monitor should sttII be available.
NE 31 . - NE 32 ' ' [ ] Statements enclosed are not part of Appendix R Review usmr 19si , _.)
r . I i .
)
i Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1
- Page 16 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment .
MFECD EDUINNT RTEIVRTIVE EQUIMNIMERATOR ETIONS gygg 20.8) Penetration. Area, 100' Elevation -
- 1. Diesel 1-1 Normal control power for Diesel 1-1 may be fire damaged. If l
so, select backup control power at diesel generator room. In addition, Diesel 1-2 and 1-3 are not affected by ,this fire.
- 2. Steam Supply to MW Pp 1-1 Turbine, and
, AFW Level Control Valges I FCV-37 S.G. #2 to AFW Pp Turb use motor driven pumps 1-2 and 1-3. Depends on the location i FCV-38 S.G. #3 to AFW Pp Turb of the fire, AFW 10 pump train may be available. . ) FCV-95 Steam supply to AFW Pp Turb , i j LCV - 107 TD AFW Pp to S.G. #2 LCV 107 and LCV 108 f f damaged by fire will fall only in the ! , LCV - 108 TD AFW Pp to S.G. #3 OPEN position. The same fire may also cause FCV 37, 38 and ! 1 . LCV - 110 MD AFW Pp 1-2 to S.G. #1 95 to fall as-is (closed). Therefore, no flow is expected LCV - 111 MD AFW Pp 1-2,to S.G. #2 from the turbine driven AFW Train. LCV 110, Ill, 113 and 115 LCV - 113 MD AFW Pp 1-3 to S.G. #4 - when damaged by a fire in this area, can fall only in the LCV - 115 MD AFW Pp 1-3 to.S.G. #3 OPEN position. Since the motor driven AFW pumps are not affected, AFW flow is assured through these LCV's. However,
, in order to modulate flow, the operator must resort to the handwheels provided for at the valves. Local valve modulations is at the options of the operator since the
, engineering analysis demonstrated that there is adequate seperation between the redundant trains of the LCV's, depending on the location of the fire. Either AFW TD train (LCV 107, FCV 38 and FCV 95) or AFW MD Train 1-2 (LCV 110, 111, AFW Pp 1-2) or AFW MO Train 1-3 (LCV 113, 115. AFW Pp ,
1-3) would be available and controllable from the Control
- i Room.
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DC6275 4011 _.___- _9 _ _ _ _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
\ 'N I
Appendix 3 for EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 17 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AffEqB) EQUIMNT 'ETERNATlW EqulMNTMERATOR ETIONS-UNIT
- 3. Charging and Soration 8104 - Emerg boration Use manual bypass valve 8471, if FCV 115A is open; or 8805 A'
- and 8 - supply from RWST.
8107 - Charging line iso valve They are fall as-is valve that is, when damaged by fire 8108 - Charging line 150 valve during at power condition, they will remain open.
- l 8145 - PZR Aux Spray If this valve hot shorts open, isolate using HCV 142 or 8108_.
These two valves (circuits) are sufficiently separated from each other to preclude concurrent damage by a single fire in i this area. When RCS depressurization is required, use 8148, (aux spray valve bypass). [When aux spray is used, secure ' ); normal .and alternate charging valves.] 8146 - honnal Charging (loop 4) When damaged by fire 8146 and 8147 can fall either open or 8147 - Alternate Charging (loop 3) closed. [The fail open position is not of concern since' 8801A - BIT outlet charging flow would not be affected.] If they fail close, 88018 - Bli outlet RCS boration can be accompitsbed via the BIT bypass manual valve 8969. The same fire would also likely damage circuits for valves 8801A and 8. Therefore, in order to borate using the BIT. the handwheels provided for the valves must be used. HCV - 142 . If damaged by fire, this valve is designed to fall closed. - Attempt to operate this valve from Not S/0 panel. In the event of a premature RCS depressurization due to spurious aux spray valve operation, at least one of the three valves HCV 142, 8107 or 8108 should be available to isolate aux spray. , Sufficient fire seperation exists between HCV 142 & 8108. l 4. CCW from RHR HX If hot short cause the valve to go close, and it is needed to
~
have it open, do as follows: FCV - 364 . FCV - 365 1) Isolate instrument air to the valve . i
- 2) De-energize the DC control power to the valve by pulling fuses at Control Room, or disconnect the instrument air line going to the valve. -
[ ] Statements enclosed are not part of Appendix R Review 3 DC0275 4111 '
Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 18 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment MFECD FWIFKNT RTEIMTlW EQUlFWNTMEMTM ETIONS-UNIT 5.a 101 Steam Dump Valves The 10% atmospheric steam dump for S.G. 73 and 4 are not i PCV-19 affected by a fire at this elevation. Those for S.G. #1 and PCV-20 2 may be fire damaged. However, their control at the hot S/D
, panel may still be available for these valves. [If not, use the handwheels provided for the valves.] In no case, should j the fire cause these two valves to spuriously open.'
5.b Steam Generator Slowdown Valves inside if these valves failed open due to a fire in this area. Containment isolate the corresponding outside containment blowdown
- isolation valve.
FCV 760 ' FCV 761 . FCV 762 . FCV 763 5.c Steam Generator Level Transmitters Fire at this elevation may have damaged the steam generator Lis. At least the LTs ending in 7's or 9's (LT 517, 527, 537, 547) or (LT 519, 529, 539, 549) should still be available due to their physical seperation from one another. 5.d Steam Generator Pressure Transmitters The following steam generator pressure transmitters are not
,affected by a fire in this area.
S.G. il PT 516 S.G. #2 PT 526 S.G. f3 PT 534, 535, 536 S.G. #4 PT 544, 545 [ ,] Statement enclosed is not part of Appendix R Review 0C0275 42fl U
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I Appendix 3 for EP H-10 unit 1 . Page 19 of 41 i Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment WFECD EQUIMNT RTERNATIW EQUIMNT/0FERATOR ETIONS UND 6.a Pressurizer PORV's and Block Valves A fire at this elevation can cause the.PORV's to fall close, and block valves to fall as is. Therefore, PORV's failure PCV 474, 80004 should not cause a RCS pre-mature depressurization. However, . PCV 456, 80008 the same fire at this elevation could hot short pressurizer i PCV 455C 8000C aux spray valve 8145 causing it to spuriously open thus j prematurely depressurizing the RCS. If that occu's, r use one i of the three valves 8107, 8108 or HCV 142 (at the hot S/D
- panel if needed) to isolate aux spray. When RCS j depressurization is required to bring unit to cold shutdown, j open the above valve that was ciosed to provide the needed
- spray via the fall open aux spray valve 8145. !
6.b Pressurizer Level Transmitters LT 459 and LT 461 should still be available. They are not . affected by a fire in this area. 6.c RCS Pressure Transmitters PT 403 should still be available. The others (PT 40'Sand PT 406) may have been damaged by the fire. I 6.d RCS Wide Range Temperature Elements Loop 2 hot and cold leg wide range temperature elements j (TE-423A & 8) should stfil be available. TE's from other j loops may have been fire damaged. I 20.C) Penetration Area, 85' Elevation
- 1. Charging and Beration The charging if ne and isolation valve 8108 f f damaged by fire -
will fall as is, which does not pose a problem. HCV-14? can
, HCV - 142 fall closed. If so, control should still be available fron l ) the hot S/D panel. If 8805A and 8 are fire damaged, use the '
i 8108 - Charging line iso-valve handwheels provided for the valvcs. Also, valve 8104 is I still available. It is not affected by a fire at this 8805A and 8 - RWST supply elevation.
- 1
- l l
l i l i DCO?75 4111 I
1 1' Appendix 3 For EP H-10 Unit 1 Page 20 of 41 ) Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment l l AffEC E EQUI M NT ETERNATif EQUIMNUOWRATOR ETI0t6 UNIT l
- 2. Aux Feedwater System The steam supply valve FCV-95 to turbine driven AFW pump may be fire damaged. However, motor driven AFW Pp 1-2 and 1-3 1
i should still be available, although the ability to modulate LCV 110 (AFW Pp 1-2 to S.G. f t)) and LCV 111 (AFW Pp 1-2 to i S.G. #2) may be lost. In that case, handwheel modulation will be required for LCV 110 and 111. ~ At any rat'e, LCV 110 and 111 can fall only in the OPEN position. Using the handwheel is an operator's option since LCV 115 and 113 are l unaffected and would be available with AFW Pp 1-3. ! 3. Diesel 1-1 Normal DC control power may have been damaged by fire. If so, select backup control power at local diesel control
- 1 panel. In addition, Olesel 1-2 & 1-3 are available.
~ ; 4. CCW from.RHR HX If hot short cause the valve to go close, and it is needed to have it open, do as follows: .
FCV 364 FCV 365 1) Isolate instrument air to the valve.
- 2) Deeenergize the DC control power to the valve by pulling fuses at Control Room, or disconnect the instrument air line going to the valve.
1
- 5. Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter Steam Generator 1-1 pressure transmitter PT 514 may have been damaged by fire. All other steam generator pressure transmitters are not affected by a fire in this area.
i 6. RCS Wide Range Pressure Transmitters RCS wide range pressure transmitters PT 403 and PT 405 may be { fire damaged. However, PT 406 should still be available. l l DC0275 4411 C U v i
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Appendia 3 For EP M-10 Unit I . Page 21 of Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AffECD EQUIRfNT 41 1
, ALMTlW EQUllMW0fESTOR ACTIONS- UNIT 21.0 Fire Area 4-A Counting and Chemical Laboratory. Aux Building. Elev 85 This entire fire area tan be grouped under six *
"sub-areas' or "sub-sr, aces" as follows:
21.A) The north wall 21.8) The south end of the west wall 21.C) The space above the drop ceiling of the counting room. 21.0) The space above the drop ceiling of the - chemistry engineer office.
'21.E) The space above the drop ceiling for the balance room.
21.F) The space above the drop ceiling of the laboratory and storage room. 21.A) ShutdownFunctionsalongtheNorthWa[I
- 1) 480 volts. Sus F Fire Protection Review concluded that sufficient fire protection has been provided to these equipment such that a .
- 2) Diesel 1-2 and 1-3 postulated fire in this area will not adversely affect their functions. Nevertheless, the equipment are listed here to alert the operators of the possibility.
- 3) Centrifugal charging pump 1-1 and its aux lube oil pump
- 4) CCW pump 1-1 and its aux lobe oil pump ,
nennr. 4re 9
Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 22 of 41 Lt fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment VFECD EQUlfWNT ADEIVMTIE E0VifMNTMERATOR ACTI0f6 UN1'
- 5) Motor driven AFW pump 1-1 and its LCV 113 and 115 *
- 6) Aux Saltwater Pump 1-1
- 7) SIT inlet valve 8803A -
21.8) Shutdown Functions at the South End of of the West Wall
- 1) CCW HX l-1 outlet valve FCV 430 See comments for item 21.A above.
CCW HX l-2 outlet valve FCV 431
- 2) ASW valve FCV 602 to CCW HX l-1 ASW valve FCV 603 to CW HX l-2
- 3) AFW control valves LCV 110 and til 21.C) Shutdown Functions above the Drop Ceiling of the Counting Room
- 1) CCW HX I-2 outlet valve FCV 431 See comments for item 21.A above.
- 2) Diesel fuel oli transfer pump'0-2 .
- 3) AFW Ievel control valves LCV 110 and 111
- 4) 480 volts vital load center. IF 6
DC'0275 4611 -
'% 0 .)
( ( , ! Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 23 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment . AFFECD EQUlfMNT ALTE!UiATIVE EQUlFENT/0FERATOR ACTIONS UNr 21.D) Shutdown Functions above the Dro9 Celling of , Chemical Engineer Office
- 1) CCW HX l-1 outlet valve FCV 430 See cosaments for item 21.A above.
CCW HX l-2 outlet valve FCV 431 ,
- 2) Diesel Fuel oil transfer pumps'0-1 and 0-2
- 3) Boric acid transfer pump 1-1 .
and RWST supply valve 8805A 21.E ) Shutdown functions above the Drop Celfing of ' Balance Room
- 1) 480 volts vital load center, IF See cosuents for item 21.A above.
480 volts vital load center, IG 21.F) Shutdown Functions above the Drop Celling of the Laboratory and Storage Room
- 1) CCW HX l-2 outlet valve FCV 431 See comments for item 21.A above
- 2) Soric acid transfer Pp 1-1 and 1-2 * '
8805A(RWST) 88058 (RWST) 8104 Emerg boration valve
- 3) Olesel fuel oli transfer
- Pp 0-1 and 0-2
- 4) 480 volts vital load center, IG 480 volts vital load center, lH O
DC02}5 47I1
t l Appendix 3 for EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 24 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AFFECD EDUIMNT ALTERNATiW fQUlFENTMRATOR ACTIONS i UNIT
- 5) AFW level control valves LCV 110 and 111
- 6) Power (Bus-F) to Unit 1 Control Room ventilation, and power (8us H) to Unit 2 -
Control Room ventilation 1 22.0 Fire Area 4-A-1 . G. Sus Compartment Next to Chem Lab and Counting Room. Aux 81dg. 85' Elevation 22.A) 480 V Vital Load Center. IG
- A fire in this area could damage the Bus G safeguard equipment listed to the left. Sus F a' nd H are not affected, 22.8) Diesel 1-1 and should stt11 be available. For diesel 1-2. If backup Olesel 1-2 (backup control power only) contrdi power is lost, continue to use the normal control
, power.
22.C) Centrifugal Charging pump 1-2 and its aux lube oil pump - 22.0) CCW Pp 1-2 and its aux lube oil pump 22.E) ASW Pp 1-2 . 22.F) 81T inlet valve 88038 22.G) Diesel fuel oil transfer pp 0-2 l 22.H) RHR pump 1-1 i . i - i l DC02J$ 4811 . O J'
t' ~ m , L) ) Appendix 3 For EP H-10 Unit 1 Page 25 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AFFECTED EQllfENT ALTERNATIE EQJIMNT/0KRATOR ACTIONS l_INIT 23.0 Fire Area 4-A-2 l H. Bus Compartment Next to the Laboratory. Aux Bldg. 85' Elevation 23.A) 480 V vital load center. I H A fire in this area could damage the Bus H safeguard equipment listed to the left. However, redundant trains Bus 23.8) Diesel 1-1 F and G are not affected, and should still be available. For Diesel 1-3 (Backup control power only) diesel 1-3 continue to use normal DC control power. 23.C) CCW Pp 1-3 and its aux lobe oil pump , 23.0) MD AFW Pp 1-2 and its LCVs 110 and 111 23.E) Diesel fuel oli transfer pump 0-1 , 23.F) RHR pump 1-2 i i 24.0 Fire Area 4-B Showers. Lockers and Access Control. Aux 81dg. 85' Elevation 24.A) FCV430(CCWfromCCWHX1-1) One of these two valves are normally open at power. Since FCV 431 (CCW from CCW HX l-2) they are fall as-is valves, at least one valve will be in the . open position following a fire in this area. 24.8) FCV602(ASWtoCCWHX1-1) If hot short cause the valve to go close, and it is needed to have it open, do as follows: FCV 603 (ASl( to CCW HK 1-2J -
- 1) Isolate instrument air to the valve
- 2) De-energize the DC control power to the valve by pulling fuses at the Control Room, or disconnect the instrument air line going to the valve.
24.C) Diesel fuel oil transfer pump 0-1 and 0-2 Circuitry for Pump 0-2 is provided with a 1-hour fir 5 barrier and should be available for service. DCd275 4911
O l . Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit ! Page 26 of 41 . Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment . ! AFFEC D EQul M NT ALTERNATIE EQUIMM/0KRATOR ETIONS UND i 24.0) Diesel 1-2 i; control? Verify and continue to use normal de control for diesel Diesel 1-3 ccontrolJ generator 1-2. In addition, diesel generator 1-1 is
, available.
24.E) Ver.tilation Exhaust fan E101 for ASW pump Circuit for this fan is provided with a 1-hour ' fire barrier 1-2. cnd should be available for service.
- i 1
l 25.0 Fire Ar.pa 5-A-1, 5-A-2 and 5-A-3 480V Vital Switchgear Rooms (F, G & H Buses). Area H,100' Elevation 25.A) Emergency power supply Verify redundant equipment from the alternate buses are
; available.
Also, a fire in any one of these areas could have damaged the control power to the diesel corresponding with the bus, and ' In addition, the backup control power, and power to the lobe oli heater to one of the remaining diesels. ! 25.8) Steam generator blowdown inside containment isolation valves j FCV760and761(FireArea5-A-2) If these valves spuriously open due to fire damage, close its ' FCV 762 and 763 (Fire Area 5-A-3) corresponding outside containment steam generator blowdown isolation valves. i i l
- l s *-
DC0275 50ll C O d
_ - . _ - _ _ - .. .~ . _ - _ _ . ,' O , Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 27 of 41 fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment t VfECD EQUIRtM ALTEMATIVE EQUIRfMM RATOR ACTIONS UNIT 26.0 Fire Area 5-A-4 Hot Shutdown Panel Area and Non-Vital 480V Switchgear Room Area H,100' Elevation 26.A) Aux Feedwater System . Il LCV !!3 and 115, le AFW Pp 1-3 The motor driven pumps may have been damaged by the fire. 2j LCV 110 and 111 MD AFW Pp 1-2 The LCVs for the motor driven trains may have been damaged by 3] LCV 107 and 108 and FCV 95 (TD AFW Pp the fire in their open position. If the motor driven pumps 1-1) are damaged, use the turbine driven pump. If the motor driven pumps are operable, but their LCVs have lost their modulation ability, modulate AFW flow using handwheels provided for the valves. If the TD AFW Pp 1-1 is the only
' means to feed the steam generators, and AFW flow modulation is required, manual modulation is available using handwheels provided for the valves.
26.8) FCV 602 (ASW to CCW HX l-1) If hot short cause the valve to go close, and it is needed to FCV 603 (ASW to CCW HX l-2) have it open, do as follows:
- 1) Isolate instrument air to the valve.
- 2) De-energize the DC control power to the valve by pu111ag fuses at Control Room, or disconnect the instrument air ifne going to the valve.
26.C) Boric acid transfer pump 1-1 Engineering review indicates centrifugal charging pump 1-2, Boric acid transfer pump 1-2 boric acid transfer pump 1-2, and emergency boration valve Centrifugal charging pump 1-1
- should still be available following a fire in this area as Centrifugal charging pump 1-2 the circuits for this equipment is associated with their Emerg boration valve 8104 operation from the hot shutdown panel only.
26.0) CCW pump 1-1 Engineering reviews indicates fire in this area could damage CCW pump 1-2 CCW Pp 1-1 and 1-3, FCV 430 and 431. However. CCW Pp 1 CCW pump 1-3 . should still be available. Also, since one of the FCV's are FCV 430 (CCW to CCW llX l-1) normally open, sufficient flow path exists for the CCW system FCV 431 (CCW to CCW HX l-2) to provide adequate shutdown capability. The FCV's d're motor operated valves and they fall in the as-is position. 000775 5111
t 1 i Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 28 of 41 ) Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment i AffECD EQUlfftM RTEIVMTiW falliffMMERATOR ETIONS UNIT 1 26.E) Diesel 1-2 backup control circuiting Verify and continue to use diesel 1-2 control power from the normal DC supply. 26.F) Instrumentation System
~
- 1) Steam generator pressure transmitter Use redundant pressure transmitters for affected steam i PT 514, 524, 534 and 544. generators.
i ! 2) RCS wide range temperature loop 3 and 4. Use loop 1 and 2 RCS wide range temperature indications.
- 3) PZR level LT.45g and 460 Use pressurizer LT 461 and LT 406 (cold calibrated).
! 26.G) Ventilation System Exhaust E101 for Aus Salt Water Pp l-2 The exhaust fan for ASW Pp 1-2 room may have been damaged by fire. If so, use ASW Pp 1-1 and exhaust fan E-103 for plant shutdown. 26.H) 101 Steam Dump Valves nitrogen and control If these valves cannot be opened pneumatically, use air (no electric circuit involved) handwheels provided for the valves. 1 27.0 Fire Area 6-A-1, 6-A-2, 6-A-3 Sattery inverter and DC Switchgear Rooms.115' Elevation fI 27 A) Emergency Power A postulated fire in any one of the DC switchgear rooms can damage all the vital equipment connected to that DC bus, and
, all the equipment receiving power.from the instrument AC panels located in the room. Verify redundant equipment from i
alternate buses are available. j in addition, a fire in any one DC switchgear room will likely - i damage the t,ackup DC control power for one of two remaining j diesel generators. 2. DC0275 5211 - C' J l.
A ;
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_ _ - } i Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit ! Page 29 of 41 4 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment - FFECD EQUIMNT ETEMATIE EQUIMNIAKMOR ETl0E { UNI-27.8) Main Steam System i los atmos A fire in this area may damage the control circuits for these ! control) pheric steam PCV 19, 20, 21, dump and (power 22 and valves from the control room. However, control from Hot Shutdown Panel should still be available. - Steam generator blowdown inside If fire damage causes these valves to spuriously open, close containment isolation valves FCV 760, their corresponding outside containment blowdown' isglation 761, 762 and 763. . valves. l 27.C) PZR PORVs and block valves , . ! PORV 474, valve 80004 One of these three sets of valves may be affected by a fire ! PORV 455C, valve 80008 in any one DC Switchgear room. The remaining two flow paths l PORV 456, valve 8000C should still be available. No adverse hot short could cause 27.D) 480V Switchgear and laverter Room Ventilation System . - J l Supply fan 543 Following a fire in a DC Switchgear room, verify continued
- Supply fan 544 . ventilation is being supplied to non-affected DC Switchgear room. If necessary, open door (s) and provide portable fan (s)
{ to ventilate the remaining DC Switchgear rooms.
- 27.E) AFW System Verify the availability of redundant train if a fire took j
j
, away the vitality of the room. However, for fire area 6-A-1,
, motor driven AFW Pp 1-3 and LCV 113 and 115 which feed S.G.
i 1-3 and 1-4 may be lost due to a fire in this area. Local i action may be required to handwheel the FCV open. MD AFW Pp j i 1-2 and TD AFW Pp 1-1 should still be available. FCV-38 to TD AFW Pp 1-1 may have hot short failed in the closed . I position. Local action may be required to handwheel the FCV open. i 1 DC0275 5311 . l i 1
Appendix 3 for EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 30 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment VfECD EGilftfNI ALTEIVMTIVE E011ftfMTMERATOR ETies UNIT 27.F) ACS wide range temperature Verify the availabill'ty of redundant nstrument train if a fire took away the vitality of the room. In addition, for fire area 6-A-1, loop 1 and 2 hot and cold leg temperature indication may be lost. However, Loop 3 and 4 should still be available. - 28.0 Fire Area 6-A-4 Reactor Trip Switchgear and Rod Control Programmer Area Elevation 11S' 28.A) PZR Aus Spray valve 8145 If fire damage causes this valve to fall closed, use its bypass 8148 which is not affected by a fire in this area. If a hot short occurs and cause the valve to prematurely open, use charging line isolation valve 8107, 8108 or HCV 142 to stop RCS depressurization. Should charging line become isolated, boration via BIT bypass or the BIT ltself should still be available. [Whenever aux spray is (intentionally) used to depressurize the RCS, verify that normal and
. alternate charging valves are closed.]
28.8) FCV 364 CCW from RHR HX l-1 Use RHR Train 1-2 FCV 365 (CCW to RHR HX l-2) is not affected by fire in this area. 28.C) PZR PORV 456 , if fire damage causes this valve to fall open, use it's block valve 8000C to isolate the flowpath. 28.0) 101 Steam Dump for S.G. #1 and 4 "The 10% atmospheric dump for S.G. #2 (PCV-20) and 3 (PCV-21) should still be available. [ ] Statement enclosed is not part of Appendix R review. DCO275 5411 , U .__.
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s . , Appendix 3 for EP N-10 Unit 1 Page 31 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment , FECD EWIF9tN ETElpMIE EWifWifAKRATOR ETION UNIT 29.0 Fire Area 6-A-5 . 29.A) feedwater System Noter driven Ani Pp 1-3 Turbine driven AFW Pp 1-1 is not affected by a fire in this LCV 113 and 115 area, and should be available for use. Motor driven AFW Pp 1-2 LCV 110 and 111 29.8) FCV602(ASWtoCCWHIl-l? If hot short cause the valve to go close, and it is needed to FCV 603 (ASW to CCW HX l-2c , have it open, do as follows: 1 Isolate lastrument air to the valve. 2 De-energize the DC control power to the valve by-pulling fuses at Control Room, or disconnect the lastrument air line going to the valve. l 29.C) FCV430(CCWfromCCMHI1-IL These are fail as-is valves. One of them is nomally open, FCV 431 (CCW from CCW iiK i-is . therefore at least one CCW HX will always be available. ,j 29.D) 8146 - Normal Charging, Loop 3 The-DC control power to these valves may be lost to a fire in 8147 - Alternate Charging, loop 4 this area. If boration is required, use the 81T bypass, or i the Bli itself. . t 29.E) Diesel 1-2 , The backup DC control power to Diesel 1-2 may be lost due to j a fire in this area. Verify and continue to use normal DC . control pourr far starting diesel. 29.F) RCS Loop 3 and 4 Wide Range Temperstare RCS Loop 1 and 2 wide range T-hot and T-cold are not affected TE 433 A40 by a fire in this area.- TE 443 A48 29.5) 101 atmos'pheric steam dump Fire in this area could damage the control circuits for these PCW-19 steam dump valves from the control room. Use the controllat PCV-20 the Hot Shutdown Panell that circuit is not affected by a , PCV-21
- fire in this area. '
PCV-22 - ' i
I Appendix 3 For EP M-10 unit 1 Page 32 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AFFECD E0VIFffMT ALTERNATlW EQUlff0fT/0HRATOR ACTims UNil 30.0 Fire Area 7-A Cable Spreading Room. Elev. 128' - Refer to 0F AP-8 CONTROL ROOM INACCESSISLITY for guidance to shutdown the plant. 31.0 Fire Area CR-1 (Fire Zone 8-C) Control Room. Elevation 140' Refer to GP AP-8 CONTROL ROOM INACCESSIBILITY for guidance to shutdown the plant. 32,0 ' Fire Area 8-G Safeguards (SSPS) Room SSPS Train'A and 8 When a fire occurs in the SSPS room, manually trip the reactor. Go to EP OP-0 REACTOR TRIP WITH SAFETY INJECTION' for guidance, and/or follow the procedure for fire area 7A/CR-1. 33.0 Fire Area 10 12 KV Cable Spreading Room. 76' Elevation and 12 KV Switchgear Room. 8S' Elevation 33.A) ASW Pp 1-1 and 1-2 and their associated At least one of these two ASW trains should still be exhaust fan E101 and E103. available following a fire in this area. DC0275 5611 C v/ J
.s I .' ;
Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 'l Page 33 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment
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MFECD EDUIRfMT - ALTEMATlW EQUlFME4I/0ERATOR ACTIONS UNH 33.B) CCW Pp 1 * =r..i its aux lube all Pp At least two of these three puaip sets should still be CCW Pp 1 ~ aad its aux lube oil Pp available. CCW Pp l-3 and its aux lube oil Pp 33.C) Ventilation System 4KV Swgr Am, (Bus H) At least two of three supply fans should still be available. Supply fan, S-67 Open doors, and use portable fans for ventilation if needed.
,4KV Swgr Ra (Bus F)
Supply fan, S-69 , 33.0) RHR Pp 1-1 and 1-2 At least one train should still be available.
'33.E) Emergency Power Diesel 1-1, 1-2 and 1 .
At least two diesels, one fuel oil transfer pump and two 480V Diesel F0 Transfer Pp 0-1 and 0-2 . vital load centers should still be available. 480V vital load center F, G & H 34.0 Fire Area TB-1. T8-2. T8-3 (Fire Zone _ll-A _1. 11-8-1. Il-C-1 Respectively)
~
Diesel Generator Rooms (F, G-4 H), 85' Elevation Diesel 1-3 Verify the affected diesel generator is tripped, rolldan Diesel 1-2 fire door all the way closed, carbon dioxide flooding to.the Diesel 1-1 diesel generator room activated. In addition, the following fuel Transfer Pp 0-2 equipment may be lost: Fuel Transfer Pp 0-1 9 DC0275 5711
Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 34 of 41 , Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment 1 AFFECTFD EQUlFK NT ALTERNATI W EQUlFK NI/0KIMTOR ACTIONS UNIT
~
,(1) Lube oli heaters for one of two remaining diesels (2) Backup DC control power to one of two remaining diesels ,
(3) Diese) Fuel Oil Transfer pump associated with the affected diesel 35.0 fire Area 11-0 Corridor Outside Diesel Generator Rooms Diesel 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3 All three vital buses F, G and H power and control circ 0itry, and diesel generator auxiliary and support systems circuitry Olesel fuel' 011 Transfer run through this fire area. Due to the fire barriers
- Pp 0-1. LCV 88, 89 and 90 provided for the conduits, and due to the low combustible loading in this area, engineering review concludes that all Diese) Fuel Oil Transfer of the equipment should still be available following a Pp 0-2, LCV 85, 86 and 87 postulated fire in this area. Diesel emergency stop pushbutton is not need for safe shutdown.
Diesel emergency stop pushbuttons b e e 0C0275 5811 O '
)
O,*
) -
Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 35 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment - f AFFECTED E0ulMNT ALIFlWATlW EQUIMNT/0WRATOR ACTIM UN11 36.0 Fire Area TB-4 T8-5 and T8-6 (13A; 13-8; and 13C Respectively) . 4 KV Switchgear Rooms F, G and H Buses 4KV Switchgear Each of the three fire zones houses the 4KV Switchgear for a Bus F, G and H single vitality. In no case 1: the switchgear for one vitality housed in the same zone as that for a redundant vitality. Based on that, one train of safe shutdown equipment should still be available following a fire in any one switchgear room. 37.0 Fire Area 13-D Excitation Switchgear Room 37.A) Ventilation ducts to 4KV Switchgear rooms ,A fire in this area could fall closed the ventilation dampers to the 4KV Switchgear rooms. Following a fire, verify dampers position if possible, and verify cooling air being
- supplied fros'the 4KV cable spreading room (s) below through
, the floor grating.
37.8) 4KV Bus F H, and G Auto Transfer A fire in this area can damage the circuits which provide auto transfer to Startup power upon loss of auxiliary power. Engineering review indicates that a spurious transfer to startup due to het short is not possible. Even though transfer to startup power may have been impaired, auto transfer to diesel should still be available. That feature . is not affected by a fire in this area. [i i DCO?'75 5911 l
Appendix 3 for EP M-10 Unit 1 - Page 36 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment i AFFECTED EQUlftENT Al. TERN 4TIVE EQUIFPEND0FERATOR ACTIONS UNH 38.0 Fire Area 13-E 4KV Switchgear Ventilation Fan Room (119' Elevation) and Air Intake Plenum (107' Elevation) Supply fan 5-69 to 4KV Bus F
- If the fan (s) are damaged, open doors (post fire' watch). use Supply fan S-68 to 4KV Bus G portable fan (s) to provide switchgear cooling. .
Supply fan S-67 to.4KV Bus H ' 39.0 Fire Area T8-7 (Fire Zone 14-A) Turbine Building - Main condenser,' feedwater and Condensate Equipment Area , ! Motor driven AFW Pp 1-3, LCV 113 and LCV 115 Try MD AFW pumps. If they are damaged, use turbine driven
~
Motor' driven AFW Pp 1-2 40.0 Fire Area 14-E Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers. Turb Bldg. 85' Elevation 40.A) FCV 602 (ASW to CCW HXI-1 If hot short cause the valve to go close, and it is needed to FCV603(ASWtoCCWHXI-2) ) have it open, do as follows: < 4
- 1) Isolate instrument air to the. valve.
- 2) De-energize the DC control power to the valve by pulling fuses at Control Room, or disccanect the j instrument air line going to the valve, i ,
40.8) FCV 430 (CCW from CCW HX l-1) These are fall as-is valves. Analysis indicates that hot I FCV 431 (CCW from CCW HX l-2) short will not result in valve closure if open. Since one Vdive is 41 ways open at power, at least one CCW train would still be available. DC0275 6011 i ! Q
- m. x Appendix 3 for EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 37 of Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment 1
I l 411 I AFFECTED EQUlFKNT , ALTERNATlW EQUlFENT/0HRATOR ACTIONS UNIT F 41.0 Fire Area 28 Area Outside the Plant North of Unit I Containment and North East of Unit 1 Turbine Building 1 .
- 41.A) 101 steam dump A fire in this area could result in valve closure., but would i
PCV19(S.G.#1-1) not cause spurious openig of valves. Regardless of the PCV 20 (S.G. fl-2J dana p to these valves. PCV 21 (S.G. #1-3) and PCV 22 (S.G.
#1-4) should still be available.
1 41.8) AfW System Use motor driven AfW Pp 1-3 to feed S.G. #1-1 and S.G. #1-4. LCV 110 This AfW train is not affected. A fire in this area could LCV 111 damage the control circuitry for LCV 110, LCV 111, and LCV LCV 107 107. However, these valves could fall only in their OPEN
. FCV 37 positions (pr engineering analysis). Since motor driven AFW l Pp 1-2 which provides flow through LCV 110 and LCV lil .is not ; affected by th fire, this AfW train is still useable .
although valve' modulation for LCV 110 and 111 may be lost. If modulation is desired, use the handwheels provided for the valves. FCV 37 and LCV 107 are associated with the turbine driven AfW
. pump. FCV 37 is normally open and is a fail as-is valve.
Assuming the turbine driven AFW pump is running, it can still
, feed all four steam generators because LCV 107 can fall only l In the OPEN position. However, naqual (handwheel) oprator action will be required to close it (LCV 107) when plant conditions require.
41.C) Steam Generator 1-1 and 1-2 pressure
; transmitters PT 514, 515, 516 Use steam generator 1-3 and 1-4 since they are not affected PT 524, 525, 526 by a fire in this area.
nen.\r 611:
i - Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 38 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment AFFECD EQUIMM Al.TElWIW EQUIRfNIMMTOR ACTIONS UNn 42.0 Fire Area 30-A-1 and 30-A-2 Aux Salt Water Pump Vaults
, . 42.A) ASW Pp 1-1 Engineering review indicates one of the two ASW Pump trains Exhaust fan E-103 should be available. A fire in any one pump room should in Discharge pressure switch PS-185 no way affect the redundant train.
42.8) ASW Pp 1-2 . I Exhaust fan E-101 Discharge pressure swit' ch PS-186 43.0 Fire Area 15-1 (Fire Zone 30-A-5) Circulating Water Pumps Area 43.A) Exhaust Fan E-103 Engineering review indicates.one of these two ASW trains Olscharge press switch PS-185 should be available following a fire in this area. ASW Inlet Gate SW-1-9 Starter - . 43.B) ASW Pp 1-2 Exhaust fan E-101 Discharge press switch PS-186
- *ASW Inlet Gate SW-1-8 Starter i
i l 4 DC0275 6211
\_ . j
<-'~.
e -- - Appendix 3 for EP M-10 Unit 1 Page 39 of 41 c: Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment ' AFFECTS E0VlftENT . ALTERNATiW EGJIffEhT/0FERATOR ACTI0f6 ilNI? 44.0 Fire Area'34 . Roof Area at Elevation 140' above Aux Bldg and Penetration Area GE and GW unit I and 2 ' l 10% Atmospheric Dump PCV21(S.G.#1-3) Use PCV 19 (S.G. #1-1) and PCV 20 (S.G. #1-2). They are not PCV 22 (S.G. #1-4) affected by a fire in this area. 45.0 Fire Area 35-A and 35-8 , Diesel fuel Oil Transfer Pump Vaults No. 0-1 and No. 0 . Diesel fuel Oil Transfer Pump 0-1 and 0-2 A fire started in one pump vaunN will not effect the . remaining pump in the other vau)'.. Hence, one diesel fuel oli transfer train should still be available. 46.0 Fire Area AB-1 (Fire Zone S-3) ! Stairwell in the Aux Bldg l Motor driven AFW Pp 1-2 Attempt to use these motor de lven punips for safe shutdown. Motor driven AFW Pp 1-3 If they do not work due to fire damage, use turbine driven AFW Pp 1-1. It is net affected by fire in this area. 000??E f.311
I - Appendix 3 For EP M-10 Unit 1
. Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment Page 40 of 41 g. '
AFFECTH) EWIRfNT ALTERMTlW EWIRfMTmlMTOR ACTIGtS gg. l l 47.0 Fire Area TB-4 (Fire Zone 12-A) 4KV F Bus Cable Spreading Room 47.A) 4KV Bus F A fire in this area will likely damage 4KV Sus F,and disable all the safeguard equipment powered from the bus. 47.8) Motor driven AFW Pp 1-2 (8us H) A fire in this area could damage the ability of motor driven AFW Pp 1-2 to auto start on loss of both main feedwater pumps. Manual operator action may be required to compensate for this loss. Regardless, turbine driven AFW Pp 1-1 should still be available. It is not affected by a fire in this area. 47.C) ASW Pump 1-2 (Bus G) This pump may not auto start at the loss of ASW Pp 1-1 on Sus F. knual operator action in the Control Room may' be required to start the pump, t 48.0 Fire Area T8-5 (Fire Zone 12-8) 4KV G Bus Cable Spreading Boom 48.A) 4KV Bus G Loss of this bus is likely if a fire occurs in this area. { , However. Sus F snd H should still be available. 48.8)~ ASW Pump 1-1 (Bus F) This pump may not auto start at the loss of ASW Pp 1-2 (Bus G). knual operator action in the Control Room may be required to start the pump. 48.C) Diesel 1-3 The fire may have' damaged the backup DC control power to this diesel. Verify this diesel on normal DC control power. 4 DC0275 64fl b .;
~
~~
. ~,
~
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I i Appendix 3 For EP M-10 unit 1 -
. Page 41 of 41 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment
-r ,
i . i AFFECTED EDUlftfNT ALTEINLTIVE EQJIffENT/0PERATOR ACTIONS- . UNIT
, 49.0 Fire Area TB-6 (Fire Zone 12-C) 4 .
4KV H Bus Cable Spreading Boom i j 4KV Bus H toss of this bus is likely if a fire occurs in this area. ,, However Bus F and G should still be available. 1 l l . 50.0 Fire Area T8-7 (Fire Zone 12-E)
, Iso Phase Bus Duct Area 1 4KV ' Auto Transfer A fire in this area could damage circuits that provide for j Bus F. G & H auto transfe'r of the 4KV vital buses to startup power following the loss of auxiliary power. However, the transfer
' to diesels should still be still available. Those circuits j are not affected by this fire.
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