ML20136F813

Insp Rept 50-267/85-25 on 850903-1004.Violation Noted: Licensee Did Not Rept 850916 Reactor Protection Sys Actuation Until 850917

ML20136F813
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	11/15/1985
From:	Farrell R, Jaudon J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20136F740	List: IR 05000903/2010004 ML20136F735 ML20136F813
References
50-267-85-25, NUDOCS 8511220193
Download: ML20136F813 (7)

See also: IR 05000267/1985025

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APPENDIX B

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S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMilSSION

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. REGION IV

NRC Inspection' Report:

50-267/85-25

License:

DPR-34

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Docket: .50-267-

Licensee:

Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)

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P.'O. Box 840

Denver, Colorado' 80201

Facility Name:

Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station

. Inspection At:

Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station, Platteville,

Colorado

. Inspection Conducted:

Septemb'er 3 - October 4, 1985

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Inspector:

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'R. E. Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector-(SRI)

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Consultant:

W. A. Spencer', EG&G Idaho

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. Approved:

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pu J. P. Jaudon, Chief, Project Section A

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Reactor Projects Branch-

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted September 3 - October 4, 1985 (Report 50-267/85-25)'

Areas' Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety'

verification, licensee event reports, surveillances, systems important to

safety, performance enhancement program, onsite engineering staff, quality

assurance audit staff, and media contacts.

The inspection involved

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179 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector and one NRC consultant.

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Results: Within the eight areas inspected, one violation was identified

.(paragraph 2, failure to report in the required time).

No violations or

deviations were identified in the other seven areas inspected.

8511220193 851115

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ADOCK 05000267

PPR

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DETAILS

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Persons Contacted

' Principal Licensee Employees

. W. Ashmore, Training' Instructor

D. Alps, Security Supervisor

• W. Bates, Lead Security;0fficer

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• T. Borst, Support Services Manager / Radiation Protection Manager

R. Burchfield, Superintendent, Nuclear Betterment

• M.~Deniston, Shift Supervisor

D. Evans,. Superintendent, Operations

J. Eggebroten, Technical Services Engineering

• M. Ferri.s, QA Operations Manager

W. Franek, Superintendent Operations

• C. Fuller, Station Manager

• J. Gahm, Manager Nuclear Production

• S. Hofstetter, Nuclear Licensing & Fuels

• M. Holmes, Nuclear Licensing Manager-

• 0. R. Lee, Vice President, Production

M. Novachek, Technical / Administrative Services Manager

J. Petera, Electrical Supervisor

• L. Singleton, Manager QA

• H.

Starner, Coordinator Nuclear Site Construction

• D.;VanHasser, Lead Security Officer

• D.>Warembourg, Manager Nuclear Engineering

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The SRI also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the

inspection.

• Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2.

Operational Safety Verification

The SRI ~ reviewed licensee activities to ascertain that the facility is

'being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements and

that the licensee's management control system is effectively discharging

its responsibilities for continued safe operation.

The review was conducted by direct observation of activities, tours of the

facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent

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verifications of safety system status and limiting conditions for ~

. operations,.and review of. facility records.

Logs and records reviewed included:

Shift supervisor logs

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Reactor operator logs

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Equipment operator logs

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. Auxiliary operator logs

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Technical specification compliance logs

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Operations deviations reports

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During tours of accessible areas, particular attention was directed to the

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following:

Monitoring instrumentation

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Radiation controls

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Housekeeping

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Fluid leaks

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Piping vibrations

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Hanger / seismic restraints

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Clearance tags

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Fire hazards

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Control room manning

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Annunciators

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On September 17, 1985, at 1445 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.498225e-4 months <br /> MDT, the licensee reported on-the~ ENS

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line that a scram had occurred at 1423 hours0.0165 days <br />0.395 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.414515e-4 months <br /> on September 16, 1985.

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reactor was shut down with all rods in at the time of the scram.

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scram was initiated by technician error while performing a surveillance.

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An actuation of the reactor protection system must be reported within

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> according to 10 CFR 50.72, paragraph (b)2(ii).

The regulations

specifically exempt an acutuation that is part of a preplanned sequence

during testing.

This scram, however, was the result of an error; it was

not' preplanned.

Though the licensee reported the event on the ENS, the licensee failed to

report the event in the required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

The licensee reported the event

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after its occurrence.

This is an apparent violation

(50-267/8525-01).

This failure to report within the prescribed time limit

is similar to a violation which occurred in August 1985, when the licensee

was issued a notice of violation (50-267/8517-01) for failure to report a

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nonemergency event within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> as required by 10 CFR 50.72.

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During-a tour of-the plant, tlie

SRI observed that a mercontrol pressure

switch:had a smashed glass face' plate in the west. diesel generator room.

Two additional mercontrol pressure switches had the face plates pushed in.

The face plates on the switches provide physical protection and a barrier

to gross dirt and debris, although not an ' air tight or water tight seal.

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The SRI'also observed two broken mercontrol pressure switch face plates

and.one pushed in face plate in the east diesel generator room.

The SRI-

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contacted plant management to assure that corrective action was being

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1taken.,<Three days later, September 12,'1985, the SRI again toured the

diesel generator rooms and observed that the pressure switch face plates

.in the west diesel generator room had all been repaired, but none of the

problems:in the east diesel. generator room had been corrected.

Though the

licensee had taken corrective action regarding the damaged pressure

switches in a diesel generator room, the switches in the second diesel

. generator room had not been-repaired.

The SRI will continue to monitor

the-licensee's corrective action for timeliness.

This is an open item

'(50-267/8525-02).

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3.

Licensee Event ~ Reports

~.(Closed) LER 85-014, l"A Helium Circulator Trip on Buffer-Mid-Buffer

Differential Pressure"

'The SRI-reviewed'the licensee's analysis and proposed corrective action

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.for this event.

It was.noted that the licensee took the position.that the

Ireport was made voluntarily and that the event was~not reportable under

10 CFR parts 50.72 or 50.73.

The SRI found this position to be curious,

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since the licensee was recently found to be in violation of reporting.

requirements for this occurrence.

This is documented in NRC Inspection'

Report.50-267/8517. The SRI had no question's concerning this event report

=other than'the discussion of.why the report was not required.

Since the

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licensee made the report, this discussion was moot,

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Surv'eillances.

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The: SRI reviewed three procedures all titled, " Station and PPS Battery

~ Check," . procedures SR 5.6.2a-W, 5.6.2b-M, and 5.6.2b-Q to verify that

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_ procedure changes had been implemented to. address concerns identified by.

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-.the performance: assessment section of'the Office of-Inspection & '

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Enforcement.

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For procedure SR 5.6.2a-W, this involved adding a requirement for record-

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ling the temperature of the battery cells adjacent to the pilot cell and

'also. recording the cell number of those' adjacent cells and the pilot cell.

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'For' procedures.SR 5.6.2b-Q cnd SR 5.6.2b-M, the changes involved adding a

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' liquid level: acceptance criteria to the procedure and requiring a

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' recording of. liquid level in each cell.

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.The NRC inspector-. accompanied the plant electricians during the

performance of procedure SR 5.6.2a-W, which is the weekly surveillance of

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.the station,. security, plant protection system, and alternate cooling

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' method batteries.

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.No violations or~ deviations were identified in this area.

5. - : Systems Important to Safety:

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The licensee received authorization to restart the reactor on

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September 30, 1985.

Because of questions regarding the environmental

qualification of equipment necessary to cool the reactor following a' steam

line break event, the NRC required that a procedure for manually aligning

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cooling water to the prestressed concrete reactor vessel liner'from the-

fire water system be in place and the reactor operators and shift

supervisors trained on this procedure prior to the reactor being made

critical. -The SRI reviewed the Operating Order No. 85-17, Issue 1, which

fulfills this requirement.

The SRI interviewed the training instructor

responsible for. training shift supervisors and reactor operators, as well

as. ome-of-the shift supervisors, and all'were trained on this procedure.

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Additionally, the instructor and the SRI. walked through the procedure and

reviewed flow diagrams to verify that the procedure would work.

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No violatihns or' deviations were identified in this area.

6.

Performance Enhancement Program

The NRC inspectors reviewed the nuclear performance enhancement program

(PEP)' undertaken by the Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC) in

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-response-to concerns expressed by.the NRC and, specifically, to address

.the results of a management assessment conducted by NUS Corporation.

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-inspectors obs,erved upper management involvement in the PEP is high. The

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' PEP Project Manager briefs the Vice President of Power Production monthly

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and makes"special' reports on subjects of particular management interest.

Additionally, upper management-involvement is required for the hiring of

new employees,: letting of contracts, and 'other large expenditures of time

.or money to implement.this program.'

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The NRC' inspectors reviewed selected subprojects of the PEP to assess the

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. thoroughness with which these issues'are being addressed.

The inspectors

obse'rved that Institute of Nuclear Power'0perations materials, input from

other nuclear plants, and numerous consultants are being used.

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program progresses, additional issues to be addressed are being

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' Reorganization of PSC divisions directly supporting Fort St. Vrain (FSV)

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has been accomplished and work'is proceeding to fill new positions.

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-date, results are mixed with varying degrees of success in attracting

personnel with sufficient experience and the appropriate skills.

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Currently, consultants are supplementing PSC employees.

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PSC currently has no method for evaluating the effectiveness of the PEP.

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Additionally, five items from the NUS management assessment were reviewed

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'and closed by-PSC prior to initiation of the PEP.

One of these was-

" Quality Control / Quality Assurance activities do not receive continuous,

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. aggressive management attention and have resulted in problems regarding

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definition and control of safety-related equipment." This appears to be an

ongoing problem which merits inclusion in the PEP since PSC has been cited

.for inadequate-quality assurance audits in the two most recent-inspections

by_ Region IV' inspectors (NRC Inspection Reports 50-267/85-28 and

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50-267/85-29).

No violations or' deviations were identified in this area.

7.

.Onsite Engineering Staff

The-SRI reviewed.the site engineering groups progress towards staff

' expansion.

Ten employee requisitions were approved.

The results of those

requisitions'are as follows.

Additionally, the site engineering group is

currently augmented by 70 consultants.

Description

Number of Years Experience

Engineer

6 years

Computer Technician

7 years

Senior Technician

7 years

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• Senior Technician

6 years

Engineer

2 years

Engineer'

2 1/2 years

• Engineer

10 years

Engineering Technician

12 years

• Engineering Technician

8 years

Engineer

No Candidate

(*These-positions have been offered to candidates with the indicated

experience.

The candidates have not yet accepted the offers.)

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Quality Assurance Audit Staff

The SRI reviewed the size, education, and experience of PSC's quality

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assurance audit staff.

The QA auditing section consists of one

supervisor, two auditors, and four clerical personnel. One new technician

with no quality assurance background has just been added to the section.

Including personnel in the audit section, PSC has 11 people utilized as

auditors.

Of these 11, 8 hold college degrees, 5 in engineering or

science, and 1 in engineering. technology.

Of the 11, 5 have joined'PSC in

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-the last 12 months, and bring a total of 2 years commercial nuclear

experience to PSC.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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Media Contacts

During the~ inspection period, the SRI was interviewed by a reporter for

the Colorado State University newspaper.

The SRI also spoke to a group

from Mensa, the international high IQ society, which toured the FSV

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~ visitor's center.

10. ; Exit Meeting

'An exit meeting was held on October 4, 1985; it was attended by those

indicated in paragraph 1.

The SRI summarized the scope and findings of

the inspection.

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