ML20136B004
| ML20136B004 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/26/1997 |
| From: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Davis L STATE, DEPT. OF |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9703100110 | |
| Download: ML20136B004 (10) | |
Text
$ 4# UNITED STATES .
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CHAIRMAN February 26, 1997 Dr. Lynn E. Davis Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs U.S. Department of State Whshington, D.C. 20520
Dear Dr. Davis:
At the request of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea (R0K), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) met on February 11 with five ROK Natic'al Assembly Representatives and accompanying personnel (list at Enclosure 1) who had asked for the opportunity to voice their opposition to the Taiwan Power Company's (Taipower) recently concluded contract to ship up to 200,000 drums of low-level waste from Taiwan to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) for storage and management. Since the NRC has had no involvement in the formulation of U.S. policy on this issue, the Commission agreed to relay ROK concerns to the Departmr'nt of State as the load agency on the matter. Below, their primary points ar> summarized.
- 1. The ROK is opposed in general to all transboundary nuclear waste shipments, and is opposed vehemently to this particular program of shipments.
The ROK's firmly stated position is that the Taipower-DPRK transfer should not i proceed. The ROK appeals to the U.S. to use its influence with Taiwan to prevent implementation of the contract.
- 2. If the contract is activated, the ROK greatly fears possible impacts on the environment, not only of the Korean peninsula but of the Pacific Rim as a whole. The ROK asserts that there is no evidence that the DPRK has the knowledge, experience, or facilities to handle, store, or manage the waste safely. Little is known of its capabilities, including its regulatory infrastructure. The ROK believes that an accident could have far-reaching, long-term consequences. Neither is the DPRK known for its stability.
Regional security could be at stake.
- 3. The ROK also is very concerned about the expected transboundary movement of nuclear material by sea. The contract likely will require numerous trips across 1000 nautical miles to transport the material from Taiwan to the DPRK.
The ROK believes that the DPRK lacks adequate transport vessels to complete /
required shipments safely and in a timely manner. An accident at sea could /
affect the global commons.
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- 4. The waste transfer contract is creating massive political problems in the '
ROK - problems which could jeopardize the ROK's ability to fulfill its commitments in support of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework and the KED0-DPRK Supply Agreement. The Korean public and its elected officials are united in their opposition to the contract, and it is they who must approve the funding' for the two 1000 MWe reactors to be provided to the DPRK. It was asserted that approval is most unlikely if the waste shipment cont a ct proceeds. One ,
, of the ROK Government's key rationales for the commitments made was that they '
helped assure the safety of the DPRK's nuclear power program. The public and their elected officials believe this contract violates that intent. The contract has even elevated the level of public opposition to the ROK's own domestic nuclear power program.
The Commission met with the delegation in a one-hour closed session, during which time we articulated our understanding of the U.S. Government's position ,
on the transfer, as expressed in recent cable traffic, listened to their '
views, explained why NRC export controls do not apply, and then gave them a presentation (viewgraphs at Enclosure 2) on how NRC regulates low-level waste in the U.S. I had a..similar exchange with ROK Atomic Energy Commissioner and )
Ambassador for Atomic Energy Cooperation KunMo Chung, who made a " courtesy :
call" to me the week before. He made similar points to those made by the. l legislative representatives. ;
I We are aware that the ROK has made several demarches on this issue in the U.S. !
and elsewhere, but are passing this to you to abide by the commitment we made l to the ROK legislators. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any i questions about this meeting. i Sincerely, Shirley Ann Jackson
Enclosures:
List of ROK Attendees l l.
- 2. Title 10, Part 61, Code of Federal I Regulations (Viewgraphs from Presentation by J. T. Greeves, USNRC) cc: Mr. Leon Fuerth Office of the Vice President l
I 1
1 LIST OF ROK PARTICIPANTS
, CLOSED NRC COMMISSION MEETING, FEBRUARY 11, 1997
- 11
- 00 A.M.-12:00 N00N 3
18TH FLOOR CONFERENCE ROOM National Assembly Representative Sang-Mok SUH, Delegation Leader and Chairman of the Science Committee National Assembly Representative Woong Kyu CHO National Assembly Representative Sun Kil KIM National Assembly Representative Soon Sung CHO i National Assembly Representative Bu Young LEE l Mr. You Hyun MOON, Scientific Coun,sellor, ROK Embassy Dr. Jae-In CHIN, Former President of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (Technical Consultant)
Mr. Choong Hee HAHN, Assistant Director for North America, Division 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Sang-Soo JUN, Assistant Director, National Assembly Mr. Chang-Hee HAHN, Officer, National Assembly Mr. Yang Suk Y0ON, Officer for Administration, ROK Embassy I
1 1
l l
ENCLOSURE 1
I k
TITLE 10, PART 61 .
- CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS i
John T. Greeves U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5 i P
8 E
m 6
L i
f PART 61 CONCEPTS Land Disposal, Not Extraterrestrial Or Sea Disposal ;
Near-Surface Specific Technical Requirements - 30 Meters Depth i Stability Cornerstone:
i e Stable Wastes And Stable Site
- Minimize Access Of Water, Minimize Migration Of -
i Radionuclides, Long-Term Active Maintenance Avoided, Potential Exposures To intruders Reduced i
I
e 8 e
PART 61 CONCEPTS (Continued) :
i e Graded Stability Requirements - Classes A, B, C ;
I e For Mobile Long Half-Life Radionuclides, Maximum Disposal Facility Inventory To Limit Potential Exposure May Be Necessary.
e inadvertent intruder - Protection Provided Through 100 Year Institutional Controls And intruder Barriers LDepth, Engineered Structure) For Waste With Long-Term Risk.
l e Greater Than Class C Wastes Unacceptable For Near-Surface Disposal.
PART 61 CONCEPTS (Continued) i e State Or Federal Government Ownership Of Land To !
Assure Custodial Care During Inst'itutional Control Period.
i e Site Closure And Stabilization Licensee Actions After j Operations Followed By 5-Year Post-Closure !
Observation And Maintenance.
I J
e License Transferred To State or Federal Agency For 100 Years Institutional Control Period. Monitoring, Access
' Restriction, Minor Custodial Activities. ;
6 10 CFR PARTS 20 AND 61 SYSTEMS APPROACH TO REGULATION e Requirements Established For:
Site Characteristics . Institutional Controls l
. Facility Design - Financial
- Facility Operation . Waste Transfer t
Waste Form . Waste Manifest i i
Waste Content . Licensing Process (Controlled Progression of ,
Site Phases)
I
-s-
l 10 CFR PARTS 20 AND 61 SYSTEMS
. APPROACH TO REGULATION (Continued).
- Requirements Apply To: ,
, Facility Operator (All)
Waste Generator (Waste Form, Waste Content, Transfer And Manifest) i
, Government Land Owner (Institutional, Financial) ,
- All Are Licensed e Rule is Progressive in Nature Such That Requirements For Disposal increase As The Hazard Potential Of The Waste j l
Increases (Waste Classification System)
10 CFR PART 61 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES i 1 - Protection Of The General Population From Releases Of I Radioactivity 2 - Protection Of Individuals From inadvertent intrusior.
t 3 - Protection Of Individuals During Operations 4 - Stability Of The Site After Closure
-