ML20136A922

Transcript of 790427 Meeting of President'S Commission on Accident at TMI in Washington,Dc.Pp 1-73

ML20136A922
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	04/27/1979
From:	Babbitt B, Haggerty P, Kemeny J PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE
To:
References
NUDOCS 7907180092
Download: ML20136A922 (74)

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9 C_0MMISSICNERS STAFF 10 John Kemeny, Chair": tan Michael Hollis Bruce Sabbitt Barbara Jorgensen 11 Patrick Haggerty Bruce Lundin Paul Marks  ?.cnald Natalie 12 Cora Marre : Karen Randall Thomas Pigford i

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13 Theodore Taylor -  !

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. Cruu.r_SS.CN at 16 John Deutsch, Department Of Energy, Direc cr of Energy Research, Acting Assistant Secretary for Energy Technology 19 19 20 l

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5 testimony from a number of individuals and groups. Tc give 6 us advice on how we migh go about dcing our business and Ic give Com=issioners a chance tc ask c,uestions. ~4e'll conclude 8 e .h. a . w 4 . 5 *..w. _#2- ..ic . . .# . . . ,

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12 Mr. Deutsch, may I welecme you, and ask you for

'3 the record, for our tape, to introduce yourself by name and 14 title, and your asscciates, please?

15 MR. DEUTSCH: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

16 My name is John Deutsch, I'm here today representing the 1- - ._ _7 _4 n...a

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5 In addi icn, we have Dr. Andrew .:ressesk/, the

a s-2-scb 1 Director of cur Reac:cr Develcpment Division, Nuclear Reac ce

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4 head cf the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Cecrdinating 5 Office in the Department of Energy.

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9 pleased to make some informal comments and answer whatever

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10 questicas ycu may have. The las: time was in this rocm, I 11 --was one of the great -acncrs c:- my re, a was asked- :c 12 address the wcmen employees Of the Departmen: en Federal 13 Weten's Day, and that's why I remember this reem with grea:

14 :cndness cf that occasian. Secretary acc es;nger nas 15 instructed me to provide whatever assistance I can and cur 16 Department can, Oc the proceedings of your commission. And 3' s .".e .#.#.-s c.o#.n I wou'd ' # .>. a *. maka

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18 cc effer you whatever assistance we can, technical assistance, !

19 administrative assistance , throughout your deliberations

.'O all that you need to do is call.on us and we will try're provide whatever .he1p we can. The charge, as I under-

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a 9-3 scb 1 of about some coservations that may be useful c 2 7 0 u 4 .n your proceeding with your deliberations.

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• s.- I 4 servations and answer, thereafter, any cuestions that you r.ay 5 have.

6 Before proceeding in 0 these remarks, I would like remind you about what the Department of Energy's role is

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12 react:rs in this country. We have an extremely limited 13 .- a. s , o n s.i'4./ 4..". *.h. _' a- = .- a. a , . .", a .

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15 Ory Cc= mission. Ecwever, in the case of a crisis, the 16 Department of Energy dces have certain responsibilities, and 1* 2 would 11x e to remind you c: wha: they are and or the ac oms 18 we have taken since -- the incident of Three Mile Island.

10 We maintain in the Department, under -he Assistan:

20 Secretary for Defense Programs; an emergency reaction capa-21 su:-- :- f .:- . s e a _, .:.*

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9-4-scb i Secretary for Environment, responded punctually once called 2 upon by the NRC in the Three Mile Island Incident and have 4

been extremely active up there under the supervision or 4

3 4 directica of the NRC in providing offsite monitoring, both 5 aerial and land based.

6 I draw your attention to the performance of this 7 emergency rapid, quick reaction respense team, or how i:

S performed, including, for example, such items as the way 9 they were equipped with communications , because we believed 10 that our efforts to assist the NRC, the utility, and the i 11 state, were -- in this environmental moni : ring function, qui m 2"'

12 high. In. addition, in the centext of the accident, a 13 variety of technical services have been performed, analyses 14 of various samples have been provided by a variety of our 15 laboratories, the Savannah River, Bettis, Knolls, Oak Ridge, 16 additional activities took place at Idaho in response :

la requests.

An :act, even went so rar as to probe one 0:. our 18 high energy laboratories LAMPF, Oc see whether they had a 19 particular robo manipulater which might be of assistance in 20 the clean-up operation.

21 In short, all of our technical resources have been o.,

ava _.aole and have been involved in prov cing wnarever assis-23 tance that was requested. As the i =ediate crisis has, if 24 ..c ,,asaed_, = . ' =_

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4 .echnology.

5 In particular, cur respcasibility for nuclear 6 "aa or deva.' "em e .. . a..d .# c ". , su .# . =. -# ".f" c ". . =.. . .'y' , ". = d------- # - = - # v a-waste management, leads us ic have a continuing concern 3 with the events in the accident a: -'hree Mile Island and 9 whatever actions must be taken from that point. 'de are a., so respons:.b, e r.or decontam:.nat:.cn and c.ecc=m' s s :.c n ' ng ,

10 11 so we worry about those problems as well.

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14 will make and does make te cur energy supply. 'de wish c see 15 tha: that technology is develcped in the safes: possible manne:

16 and as well, in an economical manner, in a way that maintains 1*

cur non-prellferation cb]. e c t :. v e s , :.n a way na: m:.n:.m :es 18 environmental consequences.

19 With that background en the Department of Energy's to a -n . t y .: ~. .aes :n he acn:- se n - , a..s -.a :- ..b -

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i-5-s b i 3 issues and I will try to enumerate them. And I would like  :

2 start with some history here. Some years ago, it's gradual, 3 but certainly by 1973, a decision was made tha: the white 4 w a . e .- - a_

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6 ment, further direct federal research and devel pmen On

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white water ccamercial nuclear pcwer plants. And we deter-3 mined from a situation where there had been many years of 9 federal R & D involvement in the LWR Reac: Ors 70 a situation 10 where utilities were expected to buy reacrers frcm nuclear 11 venders and operate them under inde enden: regula:Ory over-12 s _e3 .g . . . h. a . d- e 4 o _3 . r. - -a an . . .' . _= , . .b. e " e *_ m= . . ... a. . . c .# 7.

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13 then the Atomic Energy Commission, perhaps even under the 14 u.g : -..., n s .h _: p c .e

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.. 3. _ a_ . . _, _: . . _, y 15 began to phase out a technology which is considered to be 16 ready for exploitation by the private marketplace under 17 appropriate regulatory eversie-ht. The response was the 18 establishment of an independen: ae ency which would specify 19 -- and I would like to enumerate these rather carefully, 20 cond_e ..;cns eea u ;..n.. n.. -

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.,3 utilities and the vendors would res:cnd in all of those i

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in industry in this natica and in Others.

Now an issue -- and I think this is the fundamenta.

3 issue that certainly I would like to convey :: you and tha:

4 the Secretary would like to convey to you, and that is, how 5

does industry respond to these circumstances. The industry 6

responds -- and here, I think, Mr. Chairman, we would draw your attention to a ralrly :.undamental ques .en 0:. indus-S trial organization, dces not always respcnd in the optimal 9

way and does not respond on reasons of greed or reasons of 4- 10 inccmpetence, to_this situation. It responds in a way tha:

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we'.d have to understand complex organizations respond, and 12 it has a tendency to work on the regulations rather than on 13 the problem. And this is a fundamental point that I think 14 I would like to try := convey to you today. And maybe the 15 issues that I do turn to in a few moments will bear en this 16 ... .

spec 1 LC pcInt.

17 We cannot have a technical system responding to 18 regulations without having both the capacity and the scriva-19 tion to respond to the technical nature of the problem.

20 And all too often, whe:her it's in the chemical industry, a 21 utility industry, in the medical business' or the pharmaceu-n._,

tical business, when there's a regula ry climate people have

._,3 a tendency := werk the regulations rather than :: werk the 24 essential ingredients Of the problem, which recuires --

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e-pe 9-8 1 prctiems, both technical competence and it recuires motiva-2 tion. And that is the simple point that we would like to 3- mention to you, and we will be elaborating on it.

4 Now, to pursue this fer one ccent, we do have 5 in the case of TMI -- Three-Mile Island, a ccnfluence of 6

certain features of this industrial structure. We have a

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small utility, we have the smalles reac:cr vendor inter-S happening at the same time. So tha: the issues of their 9

ability to work the technical problems, as opposed to the 10 regulations, as well as dealing with the many regulations, 11 is cne which we think deserves some attention.

12 Now there are some hypothetical instances that one 13 sight ask, would the. circumstances have changed? What woule 14 have happened if there had been standardiced LWR designs 15 already ac.creved by the NRC in this case, as ce..osed to a

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16 wide variety of light water reactor designs? What would have l 1I

( happened if there was greater training by the NRC of reactor i 18 operators and the technical Pecple around the reactor? '

i 19 Or perhaps greater training of those Operators by the I

a0 Department of Energy under independen: NRC oversight? '

~33 What would have happened if there had been a situation where l i

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the-Tederal Government was still heavily involved in I

43 existing technology by resting and certifica:ica of ccmpc- l 1

of i nents? All of these are issues which could change the cir- '

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cumstances or Ine morava:Lon capactiv. 0:- O n, e u : 1 2 .;. ;. v. :: a ea_

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5 ahe second major poin: :na: .. wou_d ..._ _ .< e to d_.scus with you is again a fundamental one, and that has :: do with wnat

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has been a view which I have heard concerning '~hree Mile 9

Island which, I think, concerns all of us in the Departmen:

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or :.nergy , tha: technology can subst:.:ute :or numan :.nterven-11 tion, and to assume that technology can provide for :::21 lo. .

sa:ety assurance.  %

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"ne d ub. W 2 v _' a w . '.. 4 o .-- .e e "_ a_ _' _' a. v a. #. 2 14 possible to design components that can be made totally idic:-

15 mean one procr. A mean t.yat . net in a d:..sparag.ng way, Ou -

16 where you can have, simpa. y s.. ave an automatic system wh:.c.n 1 .

does not involve human intervention at all.

18 Nor do we believe that you can design and build 19 ... .

components wh:..cn are surr:.c:.ent,y redundan

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o.0 safety in the absence of any knowledgeable human technical

.n oversight.

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-10 1 We sugges tha: the problem of safety is one where there is 2 a mixture of both people and machines, and tha: The man-3 machine interf ace is really another 'eritical aspect of ycur 4

-- we would prop ~ose that you look a: that as a particularly 5

salient part of your inquiry.  :: is not machines alene, 6

it is not people alone, but it's how they work 0gether.

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Now, the third issue follows from both of the first 3 ~

two that I have mentioned. would like to emphasize in 9

the stronges possible terms -- the views of all parts of our 10 Department -- that reactor opera:crs mus have substantial 11 rechnical and engineering depth in all aspects of -- in all 13-aspects of the operation of commercial reac crs. And we 13 would ask you to examine the amount of technical and engi-14 neering depth in this situation, compared to some Other 15 . .

situations that exts in the country.

16 Now, technical and engineering depth is not simply l

a matter that can be defined overnight. There is an enormeus 18 amount of -- an enormous numo.er or - . . ..

n:ngs wn:c must happen 19 to assure that technical and engineering depth is presen:

.'O and present in a sustained way.

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We would point to training and education as being extreme.,y critica.,. ,de s. o n , : mean one-time training or

~33 one-time education. We mean sustained attention :: training

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and education. We mean sustained attention to quality 25 assurance, engineering and technical depth on site tha: an

l

. .e el. I assure quality assurance of every piece of equipmen and i

2 c~mponen.

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.a.nd we mean this to be at all levels Of management.

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6 and en up through the ranks. One exh=ple of this is c I

inquire into how safety was handled by this publi: utility.

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10 or was safety integrated en a technical basis, with proper 11 , ,, . ,, _w,

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14 research, or did they rely only on the N?.C?

15 Now, we draw your attention Oc this central role 16 of engineering and technical depth, particularly with regard to safety, but in all aspects, because of the experience IS tha: the Department of Ener4y has in anc:her aspect of 19 reacter operations, which I would like to call :: your a0 a . . a..a.~-_. d a n , v e .~ f . u c h *. o y o u ." .=.t =. .a. _#- ^ ".. , an .5.=.. '".=.s .

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i-12 1 The run , in ;ie Department of Energy, a naval 2

reac crs development pro s ram, and have done so for r.any 3

years under the leadership of Admiral Rickover. ~ha program 4

is built on extraordinary technical and engineering depth a:

5 all levels of the deve10: ment and coeration of a reac:cr.

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.,.e sportant, .cecause :ney contras: in sense tha:, if you 3

like -m. industrial organiiation very much in the presen:

9 operating circumstances or ccmmercial nuc.aear pcwer.

10 It emphasizes training and educa:icn in a way tha 11 would be thoroughly astonishing :: you if you were no l already familiar to it. And I urge you, in the strenges:

13 pessible terms, to take a look at that program. It is nc:

14 enough to ask Admiral Rickover to come here and testify in 15 - . . . . .

front or you. Mr. Rickover is part or our Organ _:a lon 16 but the Admiral will convey an incredible sense of what he 1.,

does and how he does it, and the history tha: he brings with 18 it. That will be inportant to you. I urge you :: do it.

19 But I~also urge you to step beyond that and actually lock and o

see what is involved in the technical depth of his organi- l 21 atien, because i: is there, in the training and education, continua _,1y, and certi : car on c:. cperators, exercises,

._.J compenen: testing, quality assurance, all cf these items

.,4

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25 give you a contras  :: the archetypal comme"cial power .

e

t

'a

'-13 l' system where you have.a utility working agains; regula:icn, o

.cr working with reference :: regula ica, Oc lack a: an 3 '

organization which is buil: en integral engineering and 4

recnnical competence throughcut its whole pa::ern.

5' Now, in that regard, I believe we have tried to 6

prepare a notebeck for you, which I will leave for Members of the Commission to look at, which discusses some of these <

3 issues in more detail. And i: also provides sece:hing which ,

9 I think will be useful to you. l 10 l It provides a .a.n s: cry c:. different statements i.a:

n )

11  !

, have been made by the Department and its predecessor agencies '

l~a about the importance of such matters as quality assurance, 13 the importance of such matters as safety, the imper:ance of 14 such matters as training.

15 In that regard, I would just like to highlight one 16 -

of these -- in this notebeck that will be leaving with you. -

2 .,

which is a historical document, which talks -- in 1967 cre- .

IS sented s hearings of the Joint C mmittee on A:cmic Energy, 19 and it is three pages long and it is entitled, " Advice 30 Furnished by Admiral Hyman Rickover 0 Prospec;ive Purchasers 21 Of Central Nuclear ?cwer Stations.' So we have here in three pages, a summary sta ement, in 1967, of certain salian:

.43 features tha: -- of what, since he was the builder of the first 3NR and =cre reactors than anybcdy else in the world,  ;

4

,,5 and the operator Of them all, the way, scme Of the items tha:

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ne thought were important.

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5 There are a few other issues that I would like ::

6 mention to you. We have in this nation paid, in my judgmen:,

. In tne Department or snergy, inadecuate attention ::

S reliability of nuclear power plants. New, : 'm going ::

0 distinguish here between reliability and sa#ety, because 10 the point I want to make is that if we had a better record 11 "a'#=b4'#.-], we s .h. h.ava=- a a .# =. .- af s.=-~.

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ava 3 ability, may not be c.ulte as sa:e as o_3 ants which are 13 14 intended in design, and worked, 95 er 25 percent of the time.

15 We believe tha: there is a strong connection with a reliably 16 operating plant and a safe plant, whether we are talking 1,'

about nuclear reactors or c her types of plant.

18 A se,ra. a .a. yo;.. ,

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attention to is :n.e ab;.11:y or. our system -- and n.ere . nean 20 our joint system of private industry, the Department of 21 r..

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3-15 1 the Federal. Government and the . private see:cr doing for the uti.

2 l ities, acting as e group, or independently doing wha: they can 3

to insure tha: there is adequate crisis response capabi_ity?

4 What was the reaction here, and hcw might it be impreved?

The final peint that I would like te make to you 6 . . . .

s to ask you to .xeep one c ner side or . : :n mind. .. lo: c:.

I data will have been ecliected at Three Mile ~sland. Tha:

3 data is importan Oc us, and it is importan nc: only ic 9

our nation, but to other nations of the world. Ycu shculd 10 not forge: the interest that other countries have in the 11 events which are taking place here :cday.

l

We ask you to keep track, for us, and encourage 13 the collection of technical data of all aspects of this 14 . . . . .

accident, ala, .xinds c: data, no rrem the poin: c:. view c:-

15 . . . . .

your narrow charge, but . rom :ne point or view c:_ preserving 16 that data, because we believe that it is extremely imper an:

r 17 to learn as much from some of the condi icns that cccurred 18 .. -

nere, wnicug are, noperua.3y, never to occur again.

19 Mr. Chairman, these summarice my -- some of our 20 initial thoughts. I would like to leave with you and c:her

.iy

~

Members of the Commission this bcok, which does previde pas:

._m_

statements of concern to the Department, and we'll be pleasec

.,3

~

c answer any questions that you cr :her Members Of the j 24 )

Ccmaission may have. '

5 CHAIRMAN KIMIMY: Thank ycu.  : suspec: tha several.

t i

LI 9-15 1 Commissioners will have a number :f :uestions.

wculd like

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4 The issues you cutline are certainly central ::

5 cur cnarge, and therefore one is -- has w.e Temptation of 6 jumping int that. Hcwever, ycu made the statement in your 7 opening remarks tha: :. nave :: prece :Or reasons .

.,l_,

S explain in a =cment. Did I understand ycu :: say tha: The

,epartment or .:.nergy sent :.n an emergency reac::. n team?

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13 was at Andrews, is that right? Within hours. It's an 14 emergency center of the Department, a German:cwn, and we 15 sent our -- we have airbcrne teams that were up there within 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.

1~'

CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Within hours? Tha is, on 18 Wednesday?

19 MR. DEUTSCH: Wednesda'/ --

we wil.!. be har.o.v :: .

oo

~

provide to you, for the record, a chronology of events there.

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-s 3-17 1 teams. We'll be happy to do that. We figure --

o CHAIRMA2I KEMENY: Yes. May we assume that, in 3

addition to the chronology, we may cbtain the data tha: tha 4

team has obtained?

0 MR. DEUTSCH: Absolutely.

6

, CEAIRMAN KEMENY: Thank you. Now le: me tell you why I'm probing that, and that leads to my nex; questi:n.

3 All day yesterday, in our hearings, we kep hearing abou; 9

the big gap between Wednesday and, depending On hcw you icok 10 at it, Friday or Saturday. And we were given the impression 11

-- at leas I certainly was -- that no one was menit: ring I

~

things other than the utility itself, for at leas; a LB-hour 13 ceriod.,

14 MR. DEUTSCH: Yeah. Let me j ust make two remarks 15 abou: that. One thing that you do lead me to say, :'11 say 16 it at the end. This group does off-site monitoring, okay?

17 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: 'Yes.

18 MR. DEUTSCE: And i: gets sprung by the NRC, and 19 it goes to wherever there's a nuclear incident, whether it's l 20 t

a reactor or anything else. That group is concerned exclu-21 sively with off-site environmental acnitoring, to ge adequa :e I

sM data on radiation levels.

23

. CHAIRMAN KEMENY; But you presumably measured 24 radiation levels starting sometimes en the day cf the acci-

~

.25 dent?

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-1s 1 MR. DEUTSCH: Exactly righ:. i. continucusly meni-f a

c. ors -- now, since it's an aler: ream, it has communications 3

capability, which was father in excess, perhaps, cf' wha: the 4

system was able.to absorb elsewhere. Sc.i: took a few days 5

for i: to catch up to the system, but I'. sure that. from our point of view, it is something wnich was triggered by thq RRC and it had off-site responsibility exclusively.

1 0 '

CHAIRMMI KE:ENY: May I first of all say how ,

9 delighted I am to hear that, because I knew a number of 10 Commission Members were greatly worried abou that data 11 having been los: -- I mean, never been taken. Su: --

la MR. DEUTSCH: No. I can guarantee -- I guarantee 13 you that the data is (a) not lost, and (b) will be made' 14 available to you. We can also make available to you, at a 15 later stage, if you wish to de so, fer me'mbers of your staff 16 to discuss with Mr. Joe Deale, that was the head of tha 1~

team, in tha: -- team. I might add i really worked, from 18 cur point of view, quite remarkably well.

19 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: No, I am delighted by that, and t'0 I am quite certain we will fc11cw this up.

_ Sur, n:w can ycu 21 help me with the fol10 wing dilemma? We heard frc= several 4.,

Federal agencies yesterday. They seemed to be unaware tha:

23 this cok place. We particularly prebed the Chairman cf the

.24 Nuclear Regulatory Commission abcu; the availability of 25 data in the early stages. Can you explain why Chairman .

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9 19 1 Hendrie would never have mentioned wha you have jus: ::1d us?

2 MR. DEUTSCH: I was nc: present when Chairman 3

Hendrie made his remarks , bu: I can assure you tha -- the in-4 taraction a: the sire, providing the data and data ana'.ysis.

o - ..

2 mean, a nad mysel:_ a da.,y .; readour, in summary f:r.., :f thc 6

data. I 4uss can't re s po nd . I don't knew what Mr. Hendrie I

was asked for --

3 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Yes. May I assume tha; he 9

Nuclear Regulatory Commission was aware that you were taking 10 that data?

11 MR. DEUTSCH: 'Je ll , in fact it was under their to#

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15 them.

16 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Thank you.

17 MR. DEUTSCH: It was done for them.

18 CHAIRMAN KZMENY: Thank yeu. Tha:'s what I wanted 19 ~

to probe here. wanted to go on some of the issues, and

.30 then all Ccmmissioners will have a chance te ask ycu questic:ns

.,1 l'

You mentioned the questica of man-machine inter-action, which happens to be a subject in which I have scme 23

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design rix or component redundancy, or some technica_, reature 10 . . - .

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14 cations. I 15 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: I assume by raising that issue 16 you at least have some cuestion in your mind as to whether i 1

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18 been in this particular case --

l 19 MR. DEUTSCH: Well, it's no: .my positien, cr my respen ao sibility, to give you.conclusionary thoughts, or speculacion

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.. ._ ._ s e a _ c.w. n - ..s. s a. y ..-, . .. m e ... a .t .: . . . a- .o ..u.e .go a-6 tiens, rather than to the problems tha: the regulations are 4 .

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11 regulatory pressure en them, tha: they mus meet. And with la that, you find more and =cre of the programs are designed ::

1 meet provisiens, rather than to build within the organi:atica,

(

14 as I mentioned earlier, both the capacity and =ctivation to 15 address the underlying problem. And I dc think that that 16 .

Is a separate problem. For example, the chemical industry; 1 o pharmaceuticals.. And I believe that'we are seeing some 18 aspects of that in the commercial nuclear power business.

19 Again, I would ask you to contrast that with the naval

.,0 reactors program.

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-.- au~--.-++.

- 9n-A-~ - - -*=. '-- ' s S a- --

.w 34

. 4-gT G- a*. --Sn -M. . M. f. M.g_

W.

Q &.%.%-

y -M

- ... - .M. . Q_ a /m

. S 9 t.M . . M.. .M.. $ .M. . 2 9. .

L

.-. t

-22 1 -either direction, er different kinds of regulations.

2 MR. DEUTSCH: I would say that it's differen: kinds 3 -of regueations.

4 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Because -- I mean, in a way, 3

you're saying you have regulations tha: rie down the industri 6

so much that they perhaps are hypnotized by it and don't

~

concentrate sufficiently on the main problem. On the ::her 8

hand, one wants to be assured tha: they do Concentrate on 9

the main problem. So you have a a dilemma there.

10 MR. DEUTSCE: I think that the main poin: is, you 11 can't rely on regulations as doing the problem for you, sir.

And I'm not sure that I have an instant solution for this 13 matter, but I do draw attention :: what I have seen all ico -

14 often. Operators are faced with regulations, they believe 15 that they have satisfied the regulations and then they stop.

16 Okay? For example, I go back to the cuestion of safety I

research and development. Do the utilities do independen:

18 safety research and development, either independently or 19 collectively? Or do they rely on the NRC to do it, send 40

~

cur regulations, and then respond to that? That's a very

.,3

~

different circumstance.

n.,

~~

CHAIRMAN KEMENY: The '4-2' =-== 7 wanted to probe a3

~

was,certainly your suggestion that we try to contras: the

~

industrial. situation with the naval reacter situation, _s a 3

very imper:an one. Let me jus: ask a questien. Clearly,

. I

, .. k

a n

~~

2'. 1

. 5 a. .I a v y C ey .= .=. . a s "a.a.d a . v a. --. f w" .#. .# . # =. . a .n . '.< .# . . C' a- -- .# a.'.- . . ~w ...# .-

o.

r- .e .- ,,..s *. .= .~...a s . ..".= .7 ,. . .# v a . =- .#. . d u a- . . ", w ^. u .' d. , 2..d.

. ." e -- "-

-- /-"-

3 h a '/ *. a. y

.# a 6 .' .# .". 5as

~'

- W.".*.".a..- .' .

. .#a-  : C sa_ - ' .'s..* .0 -=-.". .# a V .2 .."e-a 5

'z nC' na

.. w. s .an..s.a.-A

. s s e.u w.i a . .qay,f e a p k n. a.

.. . .... E C.u. _ n y a. .> .

't. ., u .'e . . e., y ,

0 C .74,. 2 . 1 ,/ ..u.a /, a :Ona.1 g.a .sanse

.a .

.yO*yas. _ _..

4., . m

.. A.

..t . a O

g y a.. y h. .a d5 n 9 e. .an, n. :. .,/ ,

. .aw.- e .ne g..:n- .. .a

. y C s a .: k., .a .,

off .-m',

y a..,b.1a_ a.,. A a-d s . .,, _: d L. s .-,.f anC* -. ~

nn

=- . . ae_-_1 .. m .'s e . .a -en.

f.

3

.:4 . m .- .u., , a- e n a . o, ." .# s e #. ^., ." _# ima d'd a- .. v, '.

f ". .# v a . a.

0

.y. . . e .zy. S -u sr L.. -. u. . a. a.n6 g y., ..  : -

.a, a . ..u.ns u .. - vpa. =- --. :. ,. . ,

10

l. ._ s . 2.,u w

.8- * . e do n.,ne n w w.u.a..n ..44 u .: . . 6 +.a

w. a L, .. .: n- .n.,. .- ,f - a..n..a . .v ,

11 d . . A.

s o. u. .a.  : a. .ha.

. . . .he . . -,..,v.a

. - . .,.ncas . n .4n.:.u..

. u. a

.. .. ,./,.., . .as,... ..-

la-

. _ . .sa- . .m e , .a O n a O L s,C'.a . .: .,.e ,w . a .:..- ,

. ..  :. n,. , .- . 4,.,, n..- a A. .: .:. .: a,. .

13 4  ; ,,

,.. . . , ,,, C ,f w, u ,. .,.n , ,. g 2 ua, ,., j. O _. .ai.

. .,, C ., , s a ., e , , . ,.

. d . .. ., . 2. <.,.d . s ,., ., -

14 p ec .o '.a. a.a d .4 # .# . a . a_ r,s . ".

.. e c .#..- c " ."a-

. .=.n c a s = e. , u .# . =_ " .# .." ." a_ * .= . . m ,

15 but the answer is, yes, one shculd be able to dc that wel' , .

16 at least.

1 >

CFAI?Jd.Mi KIME.'IY : hank you.

18

~ -

C ^M". " s S 0 N~r.~.'. .;; s' u^ u~R~. v. - v.v %. .a .

a' . .  ; e . a-. s. ".

a L' 3 6 = s .

19 is saying is that regula:ica shou.'..d concen: rate on principle l l

O.n

1 g4.s e .m.gw. we p. ,, .. 7 .i. e w .# .he .. ..m..# .4 .m. e a. (J. 4 . 2. .:_1 a -.. * 'a1 ..a . / m. L.*

. . ** , -m- *

=--

~* O -

\

5--

4.1 4

-.7 s#"a.

. . '.'. 5.#..k we h.ava 2.'.' - - k _# .d a-

= x .=. f _' a a

- ^#. "u .". a. .

4_t

. a. , r e.,

5 m . :. .a m. a.,y o . c m

. , s lg a.m.. =. m. . a g . o, 1 ." a. *..m: 9

, . . As.3.' a . 4 e , a- . '. . c.a .,. a.

n*t

.w

. .h -a

.. af.:2.a 4 gygg. . u. n

. . . . . 'e,

.u..n.a- g .: .,. _. a. A so

u. . .a a-.m a g .' . . .s 4.4

.a- 6 5 .,,*. m .-..., 0.". e .# .". . .". d . 'y*'..,*'a y* .s..'.'. -.."."a O L' 6* " "***- %

3 b' yO *" V *= 0 %' * /

4.5 m

- .u. s .t .-. .  %, g 5 . . . . . .m.s..

L, a.a..

..km u tis ' .yf

, g e e e. . .

,.,. u...n

. ,/ a. . .k. a . f a .- .. .:. .. ,,

. _~ .n. .,. . l l

l l

. 1

9

. .C

'-D 1 skill, because the system calls':ha particular skill out.

2 And as a consequence, you get concentration en the law, en  ;

'3 the control, on the regulat:.cn, instead cf on the pecblems ,

i 4

the-technology, or in the broader sense, the products and 1 5

services. So, it is indeed a problem that has : be icoked {

6 I 2: :.s a d. lemma, in an area such as this, where you at.

. . j have to have regulation, and I don' think anycne would deny ,

8 that. The structure of the regula:ica does beccme important.

9' '

CFAIRMAN KEMENY: Professer Tayler?

10 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: You indicated that you see 11 a shift in role now, as far as Three-Mile Island is con-1> . . . . ...

cerned, in terms or your involvement, tha 1s, ycur c:::ce,s 13 -

1 nvolvement. 2 oresume because of the nature of the clean-up 14

i. operations and so on, that your expertise in this #ield will 15

, be used to help?

16 MR. DEUTSCH: Professor Taylor, le: me make a 1.,

remark.

I have long advccated in our Department, long beforg 18 Three-Mile Island, a larger role in light water reac cr 19 technology. With respect to the cleanup operation, which

-30 . . .

cur :.n:. :.a1 scoping af , appears :: be exceed:..ngly substan -

.,3

~

tial, we. are interested in helping, but there is sug-

. . a. s . .# . n / a. . , . .o ==a_' a_ x o, i . . .= . d o n .^ .' ".c w . .%_ . wo u _' "_

=. ~..=.

.,3

~

.ss.. . ... e g. . , ,

,., a. ,_ y , . ..,.._ n ._ ;_ s . . ._ a . a .n.

. e. .: ~ _:c_2...,..-.s.

_n., m .a ,

.,4 We are probably the only people that knew hcw :: dc that.

.,5

~

COMMISSIONER TAYl0R: ' dell, having said tha you .

_ . - . ~. . ..... . .

v

-25 1 have examined the nature of the problem, and I guess the 2

general feeling you get is tha: there 's a big jcb to be done 3

there, I'.d like to ask, if you cr people with you now cculd -

4 tell us, as far as you know, wha: the presen; state of the 5

fuel inside that pressure vessel is? What fractica of the 6

fuel has been damaged? What the nature and extent of that I

damage is? Whatever you new know of that?

3 MR. DEUTSCH: I don't --

le: me first of all say 9

I don't believe the Department of Energy wishes Oc make 10 speculative remarks abou: the -- the nature of that core.

11 We have,- of course -- as technical people always do, we 1.,

speculate among curselves, but it's not cur responsibility 13 l to dc that. That's a questien directed :: ward the NRC, sir.

14 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: But why can't you tell us 15 the results of your speculations? I mean --

16 MR. DEUTSCH: Well, we think 30 percent of the 17 core has been damaged.

18 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thirty percen ?

19 MR. DEUTSCH: Yes, sir.

n.0 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: What kind of damage? I mean

.,I what do you mean by damage? Is the fuel tha was damaged still intact, er do ycu visualize its having come down in :

.- J.

the interior cf the reactor? Le me say, the reascn I'.

24 asking this, these questions -- the reason I'm asking :hese 25 questions is charf, :nere are two reasons . Ine is :: get scme .

l l

I I i

3  !

.l 7 .- 1

_a._a .

w. f . , _ ._ pw.4 , . .s ,

. ,a s _..w ,. y d e y . 1,, . ,y - p. A. , .

-- "a h a ~. . .h e _ # ~ --- ' " ". _ _' .9 2

yas , ,

g4.-. . n ,. o. s ,y e C . .wo _. a. . e s ,

m ., .,,. 3... ,,.

.e 2

. e. .,._1 w _9 ,/ww3 e -- ,

. . . m2ao. r. .

3 m a = a. d. .=._' .

W%. .e -.w. e.- ..".c s e ee - . .=_ , . _2o n s ._= - .= .- . - . =_ . <_- _ _ . . . r . ,

4 c a..n-_n .t .,. ...h _: n g., y e .n e .: .. ...h e y e ,s . _-o e .a fe,,,,

<3 sc , _: . . ..u x ,

a.".d w 5 e u w # .' .

. c o, _t a_ . # 3- h e..#. =,. ". . .'.e .=.w~ 4 d e n . , . h. u s. w" a.v ,

O

. .::-. _4 s. a y , 3 a .,a... ... ,. ,..da,y, . ge r

w. o_ 5 0J S

.s -..,,/ _O

. ..,w._C., 2

_w ,. y n yhg. s . .ua. s -o .:. n. n S

. _4 .,. ~am.

a .s.%.a .. _.. ,,seC p _1 a_ t s- ~a n a_ .e. p_ a_ e_ .:o .a. a_ .u.

S made whether c' ecc= mend :: evacuate, and sc On.

9 aht .

on :cr asking is that we,re -_ Our 10 _;

z o o , s 3c n, s_. ., ._ . c s s _ w. . ,_ _ , ,e w n ,_. .,. .

s _ . _ . . . "a c u .' " .

_# . .= 5 _# . . =_

11 . ,_

s o_..,., ,, . ,, be go_,ng on

. . .o - . , ,,u,_

v .. ,,,,n_.., . o .. ,,,/ _. , s. e.,_, ..; -._ x..

1' whe:'s inside the pressure vessel, and what's inside the 13

2. ,,, n.m_..

, , ,, ,,, e .,,. . s ..,,,. ., c _. ,., ,., , . . s. . d, _ , s e ,., . , s

, ,w ,. _. .o . .

. ,. . .., ._o.._. . . . .

14 y

. .R . n.,

.r ta.._,,.C. .. , . w ,, h _, nk ., _ _, .,. ,. x _. ,., ,. ., e , ,f , , , , , _ , , _ _ , , , , , _,

.. f . . . . . . ..

15 distinguish when cur organization has made judgments based 16 on data which we have acquired independently and thcugh:

1I abou*. Department of Energy has only obtained data c##_si':e IS in environmental sample acni cring.  :: is only new tha:

19 our technical people from our reactor development groups,

.n0 have actually begun to lock a: the circumstances. Sc we are -- :.: A were to respond :: "J cur quest:.c n accu wna we

.s.

~~

l

..".c u5 .*. . = .

a v a_. -*/ f o .. . w

- _en ..e.m e ,. w e w 6 ~. d. a .= .' .# .5. - ~. . s e _ ~_ . . -..e,d d w ..

, i l

responsa.w _ :y ::r wna: was 1

a:a, because we not . nave ru__.

' .,.d 3,

.3 3.S. _ .Eq. F. f.h

_4 4h .w

...e e . . a.s.,.

s , ,m g, ,. _ J _3

.. _ ,a, . 3 . gag..Mg.ag9. .. h._o. 4

____.M g yg ,m s n .d

4. s..

.i.a

.J

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. , . . ~. .". e '.4m. . '. . ' ' . - 'e' . =. _= e . . . !

9a

. 1 seav .amg.a.g ..e a .s . . e f.

m n. ,7 .4 A a ,y n, g u, g . T 4 , . a. . A n e. t . . .

~

. e. .n t.

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.. u. _

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s .. y 3 r

. w.

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. . . o. .ui_ ,. u. . a

., 2..i.....ae 2 a _

,,.m,, ,..u 3

SeCOnd hand.

5  :

,a.e g ,,, s.,e .3..: e V , , . . ,. , -, ,., -, ,-. - .u,,, ,. .X .. m. .

, . . . - ., a. . , . . ,s ,. .a.

6 A

s. g,.,la g a , 4..: .. k.e m.- . t S k.,e..,.. a ...a.,

4 3 mc --._s..

.: . .: s..2 . n f ,, d . .e . -w~ r ~ .-

I O n.a*'S gCne 'n*C--of. CCu"Se, 85 '/ C U ,,nC W ,

• h a **

• _ ':. 0,0

• 2 S'/ S t eC-

.s I

3 # '

. ~ 3 e S o- '.',L'.*'

'f' .- " a S e n ** V .

• W s m.. r.--

~ .." . , = ~ . _2 _' . ' .# . ." a_ --.'a. ~~'

". 8 c-

. ', 6 a,. ..

O ,:

A

- a m a g a_-A , .n .4- 1 0 p e .,,e_ a, .m. . 4..  %. a s % e a_ . .

. u. a_ .=. y _; _' ./

. A. s .~.. n3 ~ a s .

10 u .m.r. s e r o gr.o. . .a.v. r .a n.

c <w w. . .

L, ., a. f,

. , L. .a s ~j a ..-

n., . /. C om . .. a .n . .

11 .

a .

3'/g..g , y ../ 3., j S.

w ,, , , , , . . .,,,,4,. g .f.-,

. . . . ,7 ..j_ 3 .

a-

.'...12. . n,:r- '~* c- C. u. . . .,

e,,..n .a.d.a .: k- .- a_ n u.u.,.a p 3 .

13

,,n yy7 .. .. s3.7 g gre.

. . 3.y.v. . 4 3. ., og,.

_w, ,,,

, g ; ; ,, ,,

..., u., ,., ,. .,. ,. . .w . ,,. g 14 . . .

DCe5 Ona** :"le an , f o u *"n' n>,< , Ona!

'5 C .u.A. R.u.A.ni < r n. ...."4 . . v..  : xn,,Se-- . e.

. _. .,. L.. ~ _a . . r .. u..,,.,- .. k. = . .

16 D, r.r*~ v Aq .,C u.. u,I' a .s w- k. a, p ~. u.

.M.R . . . ,n .

L .1 .,. sA.wA .: . .g . . .. .' 2 --

1$ j Cu. q.-. q.u g{ q'.f.r$.Jv. . . . . c giA. .7,e., n. o. g.

r_. , a. .J. ,... u. g . .. . .k.m - =. e d, .e 18 "S W h.o "- ." a .". C ". e X 'f e ." *. ~a C .l " " . '

• au "#o""-

- ~

19 sv .R . DetI.SCu... . . v. . S , s 4 .,, . .

. m. .: .-y. . y. - , . , ,.., . . . ., .: ...u. . .:,.l e -

O

~

gS o. emb.,,y.u.n S pm. ,.S -., ..a ,,/. .u.a- s , - ,. a. , C.n . . . .:. ,- ... ;.. ,. ,4

- . o. .u. e -, .. --- .

~31 A ~.ig . . . , . . ,_ e .n .' e . - h = v a_ " e a_ n a x C s a_ d

., a_ .#.. ". a_ " .

. . . .k. a.

3 =- _= a_ _- " 3

^

. . , I.

g to g ' .h ea_ v* ". * "... + . * *a a . a ." , .".".#. ~"

. . . a, ." a ". . A S "., a a_ .". a v' .~. . '- -

f . . . "~..~C.'.~.

- ~ .#

..3

...u. .n . .m .a . a m .a .n .".

. ..k.a .. ts. --

3 ,Ca,  :.- . .u. e

_. :n_ u.J .a .

4

.t e

w e %..wM

,8

\e .[..4. .

. W.  %._.g T,. . . . A. S . . *. . 9. a* .

-'5 I r.,w.v u...:.,. . . W r e.w

. . . . . . e.,,. v. . ., . i i

-l - - - -

i l

o. c. I

-23 1 CEAIRMAN KEMENY: let's see. Professor ?igford ,

i 2 and then Dr. Marks.

3 C 0!e.v... s c C wdrR

- .m .c.en

.s. RD . . n.

, -w -

m e u, o. m . , - 3 = . w. . e. . u. = -

4 there are various individuals and groups within the DOE 5

labora:Ories who have done sc=e analyses, both analytical 6

and experimental, already, for the purpose of interpreting what happened?

5 MR. DEUTSCH: That is ccrrect. Tha: 13 correct.

9 COMMISSIONER ?:GTORD: So you would have some 10 basis, then, of telling us what happened with regard :: the 11 results of those studies, wouldn't you?

12 MR. DEUTSCH: Well, those stud es, we'll be happy 13 to provide you all that information, where reques:s made by l

the NRC have been, you know -- samples., analysis, :csi icned 15 robot, manipula: Ors, and things of that scr , the use #

16 l

Idaho Engine 4 ring Lab to do some =cdeling werk -- all of thes e I

were done in response to NRC requests. 'Jha: :': trying ::

18 ccavey to you is that we have not done, yet, our own 19 independent technical evaluation of wha: the sca:e of tha

.'O reactor is, or what will have :: be done about i.

-31 COMMISSIONER ?:3?ORD: I understand.

~~

MR. DEUTSCH: We are likely :: do that. i l

.,*, 1

~~  !

COMMISSIONER ?!3?ORD. New with regard :: :hese  !

- es.s ..".a . h. ava. w e a... ...a d a , > - = . . .h a_ . =_ s v- . ..a.

- .. ...#..=.. .a. c.._=, ..

.'5

. , ..e. c . a n d = , b..a'i ' ..-

s ..'.a. . a c t.+ .' . a-

-- - .# . .'.- s e. . =_ s .. a- '.

1 30 1-29 1 MR. OEUTSCH: Yes, sir, we can provide bc h the 2 summary reports that were put cgether daily, as well as, 3 I'm sure, the detailed primary data. We'd be happy Oc pro-4 vide that for you.

5 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: We can cbrain these?

6 MR. DEUTSCH; Absolutely.

I CHAIRMAN KEMENY: May I hereb.y reques that1 by now1 3

we have the chrencicgy, the data you got in :he early days, 9

and the reports we're just referring ::.

10 MR. DEUTSCH: But, it's the same --

11 CEAIRMAN KEMENY: They may turn cu Oc be ene 12 document. I don't care whether it's in one documen: or 13 separate. I just wan: to be sure we obtain all that.

14 COMMISSIONER ?!GFORD: Did you have scme group at 15 Cak Ridge perform seme analyses, both experimental or 16 theoretical, to deduce this exten: of core damage?

II MR. DEUTSCH: No. I think that was done at Idahe, 18 wasn't it? To the extent it's been done? We have nc ye:

' 19 done any extensive core modeling.

ao

~

COMMISSIONER MARKS: Couldn't hear that; I'm sorry.

i

' 21 COMM~SSIONER FI3 FORD: Well, I don': wan: to --

~~

you know, it's possible I've described it wrong. Did --

a3 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Scrry, scrry, but --

4 COMMISSIINIR ?!GFORD: -- semeene at Oak Ridge dc

^5

~

scmething f:r this diagnostic purpose of what happened --

1 '.

-30 1 .". .R . nrU~..cCu..-

. d..- n ' . *. e ' _# _ a_ '/ e e , ". u" ~ e "* _ _' _'

2 ...c,u,_ . _ _,we u _.

. _4..

3 .r -c a h o ,.

c- 0 M.s Lr S c- r_ 0 sLe R e. .. .: e. n.e.. n.

4 v.3 . DEU~. S C.u. .-

. V. a. s , w e d _# d_ do

- =_ v=.Ja_.y _ .#

. 5.4 . . 3 2 5

at Idaho. I believe that :he semi-scale acdel was buil: at 6

7 d = n' o .

- 7 .".

_ .# _a c . , _? a _' s o .". _4 . ..'< . . ' ' . _ = ~ . . k.. e y d_ _# .# , = _ . ..".a. -=.3 es.

of the NRC -- they also did some -- did :he pulse burs:

5 facility do some stuff there? or whatever its called? Pulse 9

transients facility? Pcweb burit facility --

10 C O M M.7 5 S 7_ 0 N 7_ R D. _ u- r 0nD . Who 4 s _ ..".a. -f . .# . . c # r_= _' _#.a.d- # -

11 J v_a,.,. _h,_. we c u.,d

--- . - won ac.,. one a_ _:- ..a _u._,_.,.

1., -c

.v..g . netu.sv-,.

m 'u ,. _ __, , .a.

3_. . n_,.. . e.,_. ./._. ,a , e...- .. ._w, . .

13

_ a_ n_ n. d.

14 C ." 4 _7 .5..V A N ^" T_.".r.N V. - . v. a s , . .k. .is . ..a ". e = . .=. *e . . . , . _' .=. . a 15 thing to say. I understand frcm the Secretary, '4r. Deutsch, 16

_. h a_, , o u w ,_ _, _, b e s h e ,. _, , _, a v_ n w , _. h _. y. 4 a,

_ C ., _mm _, s a_ ., ,. ,. . , ..,_ . s.

\

l' therefore our contact one we will deal with. i 1

IS 1 v..p . n,EUm.SC.u.

. . . m. w. .a_ ae . c....c.... .. v.es __ r _. w . .e. .,..<

19 Professor Figford -- so that ycu don't misunderstand this, 40 I mean, the Department of Energy does not have auchcrity or j

- '1 e, .e g__,ms ., . .:._.e-e s g . .__ , , ,/ , g .u. a_ .,. g n ,e n. .:. a e . . . .. c .' ..- - a , 3~~ ... . ".

. a .- a.

and do a con:..._1ct .

analysis in the :;rs:

we w-ll cer-

.,3

~

tainly dc that. The problem will be here for scme time. We

.g e_ _, _- __ _w.a_.e. -e a.... y ". .a s _# _ e . .". e # ... yC . . =..w- a. &#

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. . , . ..3- . . .

25 l

_.. . e.w.... . 2 _, d==..=.. 7-

.w ~. , we'.a. .# . . . a. .- a. s . a. d _# . . ". . . "av . k.

. e .# . . s . . " .. a . . 3 l

l.

a 1.0?

1 f.e . . . . . . '. e d , .#.*.,". . '* X a.".'.p .* *. .

2 L

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.- ,ADCe. .s. .,. a. . s. . . m. , iw . .t,.

3 #

4a s d ...e = s a s eV. . - a.

. . . . , M. . "%., ..' ' = . . " * . . * . .". a . . .'/ .' ' * ~. '/ = " * .' '.

4 a

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5 y

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_ 1. .e., C.a.

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6 . .

COMMASS.0N_.R 2  ?.._O.D:

.o: s sur it was dene and i:

2, . e v e.s ,.s _ w. e.-,. , n u t., ae .- s * = .a.d _4 .- - a 'n _#-- ". . ' .# .' .' " a.

. .'. a e .# '2_' s.

3

-# n' .k,s e .'. u = .' .v .

.u.m.

. . n.,

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. '.' =. s , a .. . :e .

".e_ . . . v. --

9 COMMISSIDER ? GFORD : And you have somecne a:

10 Los Alancs whc has done scme work or is doing scme work?

11

.v e. . ,s r.w, . S c~... . von. a w o, w...,v,. ,

. 2 n _ w. ... ,. . 2 . ,/ ,.

0 1m so. ..a e _. _,,

wnen a tecnnica_, system gets in treco_.e, a _ a, 13

(,

k'..ds - o#

• eco.'e ==s,c.-

d ... a .aa.r"es e . 7.e w#_'_' _ . . v . .- ' .-y v # .' a, 14

.vcu with a ccto.rehensive list of al'. the resc.enses. 'de did 15 a ,c: c:. ana_,ys s n savannah River; a .o; c:. ana_ys:.3 :.n 16 m., e _. _. _ s ., ,. ,,_ ,. o. an-,, s_a a _. s. ,,,,

. . ,_, . ., m, _

.e ..

.m...,,,,,. .a ,.,._. .- . .

1"'

s .a. 7 da".O

. . . < a.".d .4 .=-d .i d a w^ m a wo".k

. .  ? v a. '.. ...'/

. . .u'w .'. =_.= - 'f."." a .#. .# a- .

IS a f AM.. 7. , = *. *..Se .f.a s A_' a=c s. . e s -r. .'ac _# _' _# .y

. . # ..". 5. 4 s

. _4 .~. e".# .*y 19 about whether one cf their manipulators which had a particu-o0 lar :crque feedback syste could be useful for a prebe.

.,1 e,a -

ee ma ,. . _ , , - c .e

.. _ .,,..u.. ..: .u_,-_ . ,. s ,, .. .. ., .s_.,.,/ _, _. _ _, u, . ,. . .

~4e'll provide ycu, as much as we can, with a detailed lis:

.J.

oe a _, .3 _w...e aC s, :.J.,:,s4 w...a_...e,, -

2

. . . . e.

a.d

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.35

~

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. . . .w.

. u. w, _. .3 .-.y

, u s ...,

. s . . e _. ,. g u .~ . 3

l

-32 scb- 1 MR. DEUTSCE: Fine, Fine.

n. CJ A .M.'.t.

.. .e S.r m. .C...: D. r. J . nw::../ .n. .Le - -a *-

s

.a....3 w . . .u. s. m. a. .n*. ,---q, -.

3 k- u . k e . a a yc *. . c a r. . = # n # .7 s-

. n' a- *=-"'.=.

.v.g. . 3 C.g . e, %- u. .. .

re,,

4 - -- ' e '. . a y , 'o]

a .-".5=...

a .

5 C 0 t ". ..' S S.' .O T =., .= --",. . .= 0 n D ' . mu. - ..,,w .. ~. =

2 - 4 ~3 .' . .

• j"

= abi, a.c . . .a. e s a . a C u. ..,. .; = - a

. ~

s d.t..*.= e n. e r4 . ,

'M a., - = s - ' a, . ' ' r. w .'

. 'a"..=.~.

. happened.

5 Now I'm not asking you to describe i: Oc as : day, 9 b u . ..ha . ."-# .-h. . b e wc a. ..k.wh 4 7.a. * ,

^

k. u . . ' ... .* .. . .w. . . . . w =. s k _# . . . - j e t.' ,

10 does *h.e D07 .have .".. 4 . =- cwn

• eu-ccse,

. = . e .x... .=. ' " a. s m- . # _ . # . r.

11 o .' w h a . h.a p f e n.e d. '

iF. .' a - 2 ' = . . d '.'

. . = . . ~.k.. . - = a. .?. ' k a.

. k. a.

. = e3 u a..--. - a ,

12 and what vou interpre: mi-h:. e have happened with re sard ::

13 core damage and with regard to hydrogen production?

14 MR. DEUTSCH: 'de do have such -- a variety of such 15 es 3-a.es WP4 - .b. we "4 -- " ."o v4 . d. e . .J' u " # . ". ..".#..

. - . k r c >. . . #..

16 summary form. Sur I --

wan: to insis again, it's based 1.,a on second --

18 cogg;33;cygg p;sFORD: Of course.

19

.v.i. . . D,.rU=SC.u.. . N; ew , .o .e . o.c u , a .ue ,f,..:ec ,,

.. ,y -

. -.f, go .. . .. .

you would wis.n to request, :: the C.nairman wishes c 21

..qt

. .s

. t. o ,e..y e a e a a es.e..-- a va. .= . .=. . =.... e n .^'

. . w h a . w a.

.m w

.,e- '#

eva h a. - ff e .a. =. d. , wa.. we S..afcy .o . .a.sfc..".-.."..=...

- . 7. .- ..'.*. -

.,3

Ic.=., "-e'ud w. e ". aaefmf . -.. a s c .~..d .+ . u- be=. =_s.#...=.=_

. _ . -- .3 +...

=..

24 ue ..u..: .<. . . . e gs . u. e a -.,

. n ,- .:..,. ..... .u. .:. a. ,c.: . .

.-..p.

a.

25

.. m.m. z --e. .L- .1 .=...a r - - ..an.. e.,:cd.

+-,r , -- _ , - - - -- --- - - > . -

Ii i

-a3-1 MR. DEUTSCH: New :ha: those are , the seccnd .:ar:

2 is an extremely, as I'm sure ycu're aware, majcr understand-

3 . . .s - -

s 4 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: ' e:'s see, : 'm no:

5 MR. DEUTSCH: -- undertaking.

ei CHAIRMAN KIMENY: I'm no v. e requestin~5 that.

7 .MR. I!EUTSCH: I understand that.

1 S CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Ycu know, by President's Ixecu- '

9 tive Order, the reques has Oc ccme frcm the Chairman. And 10 le: ce say why I'm not requesting it.

11 All the backpound inicr=ation we have stated 1., ,,-,:,n,

. e,w, , ,s ..tns. . .u. .: . .X, .h . : a- .<-..- -. - ; . n:...- ..e r

13 new talking about we ought Oc take informal restimony befcre ,

14 this Commission.

i 15 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: Is there in existence, a 16 decument then, within your organi::ation, which describes wha:

17 happened? And of course, seme of it's interpretive and t(

18 describes 'the basis for that interpretaticn --

19 MR. DEUTSCH: We will be providing a.11 cf tha:

20 to you, Professer Pigford, yes. Encr tous paperwork --

21 CDM.M.ISSIONER ?!GFORD: 'de ll I' m only asking ycu 22 about the existence. I'll le: the Chairman handle the --

23 c U., p .o.u.s N K

.. v..r

- y. v. v. a. s , wa --

'i f .V..3. . P"??*C/90..

s.w.. -. . * . .b. .J .m.X' gp-

. .m .e. 7 . ty .J d o- ---a--

. =e m# . b. . g . .

05 The poin is ..

9-34 scb 1 CEAIRMAN KIMI:1Y: I seems c me --

4 m..a . c.r.u.m. ,. C. u. .-

. " . = . '- e ".= v a. ^+-'....=..~.~.2~

. ... .h.'2 "..-3 3

which were reports -- as bes: people could estimate a: the 4 _e.e., ye e. e 30:n-3 .c f.cv- -, 22

,. ,---, . . w. a . s- _, . a . . ,, . u. , , o.

. - ..e,,

5 as reports from cur labora: cries that under:cck all kinds s . .

c:. work in this area.

a cus

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...e ",u'--

-a B -

3 c e,3 ..- .. ,,n.

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,, u.. . . . .: . p. ... _. . , wa .<-.

3 ~ .c 9 ye mm,.

n_my,_

4.,.,..,._4...,

. . . .u.e ,a-3,.s.

- we ,/ e . .w.. .. -. . a . .a.. .d 10

think we ought, as Cctmissioners, :s study that and 11

..h e .". i .n v 4 . e ..h e D 0 -7 .# . .- ..a ' ' v

. + s .as # .#-]

. a. .# . .- =. . " . . = . F-

-- ...'as#cm l

la -- by tha: time, we may know exaccly the c.uestions we wish 13 Oc ask you.

14

.v..R . D. TUT. C C.". - . 'de..' "e hae.,v c .. - r v dda

. - - ...-. . a. .# . . .# - - --

15 mation ,ater on, and any time you may ca,_, cn us, sir.

16 u .n.s e . s . , . .s. .:

- s, -

C. u s.. .c u s sI C.. v.r sF.. . - -- . n a- . , ,a=,

a a, y,

and I appreciate that. Dr. Marks.

18 -s -ea CC.u.M*33ALNv.p. .u.A.2..< 2

. - - ic . . .- .,.-...,=m-.....n4.

19 . -

d...::erent issue. vou_,d you give me some idea c# what processe:

a0

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.,1

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~~

n ?' t-- .

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3

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- .~_ . . -. - - ._ .- .. . _ . . . -

ao 9-35 scb I response Oc that in the reccrd. Su we de have two -- jus:

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--. . . - a a. y o3 n . a- .o jou- =. =*....# . . .. ...a -

4-

-a

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-- . . a ., : - : . j

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4 them, which is an extremely important ;cin:. And they are 5 able to communicate back :: the Department cf Energy Head-6 c.uarters instantaneously when they arrive a: the site.

~

Accordingly, let me give you an ancedotal remark, that, 3 I've forgo: en what day,.but I suspect i: was =cre, sc=e:hing 9 -

~

s ay -- e. :. nt.2- d= y - .7 .# .-a .. 3 . w n a . k..a_. -. #.'. ~. '. .u. s m" a'/

10 cr Friday, I was given a phone number where I could dial 11 a, .: .-----

. - , >. . o u. v an " ,., .4 .. T. h. . a_ ev. . 4 - a ~. =1.=. . .d , e u - a....a - 3 ."." v.

12 reaction van, to talk to Jce Deale, the person who headed 13 tha eam up there.

14

_rn agm.:.:on, v.

a . se-,:,./e ,

.u..,. e-n . r t.,n : ,..,.:. .=- .a ,__ ._

15 established on site directly  : the. NRC, so these two 16 .

12nks Of cccmunication were up front.

1 1

-f l.a -

s. C orv. .u..r e S- ? 0 tC- R .... v =.K, .c .

= e ._ . .e c , .-..w.,. , , s . ., .4 18 your kncwledge, you don't have any direc: --

19 -.

M R . D c.,.u S C n.. : :ne .rennsylvan. a ,epartment c . 2 : ate 20 also had --

33 e 0.u.Mr .= .= v.ut==.

. .u sv.Ko -u..e,j

. d : a ,.

~ ' '

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.. . .' ".".'.=.D. = =_= _- . .. e .". .

. v" .' . = . = . . =*. . . . ~ . = = .~. ~. s v, ' -

3

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......., . . - - n.  :..s

-34

-nu L w . u.r..e,3 --

- nd =.. .v.d: . zD - -

......a, s :--.n.... ,- , .

25 l

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b .:. .. V. 2 s .

l

4

?. I

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. 36 ac"-

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^#

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3 .,e...1 s a..,,. . m n a .,.e. .: ./ e s n- n _. u.a s C a., a, , .a n .; h ..a w

.v a.

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- .i_ . .

5 ,-

-e fu b _' _# c 'ne a ' . 'n sa.#a.y w..".e

. .as'.a_ . .- =_ m 4 =a_.# .. . . a .

' P "-

6 you had a team --

C.5iA.R.V A V .'s'?..v..r NV. . .- 7

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3 ..,,m

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9 cas6-vu._ s s --m Nrq. .v 43gs . . .<-.,.p.. . e , ,. _w.

.m .... L, . : . _: . ~j ,

- . _23...

.w.

10

~ :~ you had a team on site with:n neurs , wh..c-a we nave been 2 -

11 C 1_ d . ,...m... 4.w w v . . d ,., sCL..C.s . . .w% . . e .r a was _3 s_4. ., _- s ,, ., t . . . . A.

- - . . . , . . . s 3 .,., d 12 whv w.ha. c. o v e . ..c . ' a- ^#

. o .# .# .# e ".v a s . . ' " e _4 . . 3 ~.ad

~

. e .=.wa. a. .. . ". a. a a_

13

.-aad#ne s =nd .k..e#-

-- . .# .a. . = . -f . a . a . .# . n.. 4.. e . .". a-

^

w .# ,"..".'-#.. .".a.--..". 2' -

14 safety.

15

." R . Dr"w-'CCV..- 't" 5. e s e .= - a_ v = .- v.,

• e - . .' . . a . . . v".as_4--. .s 16 and I do not have the details. The communication links 1"'

s were established as a function o# time, and I will provide IS _w

...o s e .:o .. . h ,. ,., ,,,,,r s - . 7

. . ..4 ., , 5e .. L,_ . e h.,,yp/ _.,. 2.

- .o.

a

. ic .v.

'9 the only point that -- would be their own certain -- each a0 link needs to have a transmitter / receiver on it.

We knew,

.,1 wa. ko ad c u - we '.< a c. e e,acka.s ^.# -...~ =...s...# . a. d _4..'.....=._#.. . .=...d.

.i

~

..e n t. 3 ., .. /

. 3 y.m,, Vt _ ae JCL. .a. _ ~ . 'n . .w. a- u ,.n e) ..

:s

-...n . .. .-,-. .a n. .e. -..

.a .--. s ~. _'a v

-'3

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w ._... , w.

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-, 1_4

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-- ..w2.

a... 2. . . s

.54

., ..w,,,.,

. a . . w. . .

^5

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, .._ u.

a. ,,'_,,,

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I

a 3

~

'7 s-b .1 - don' -- a..d 4.'-= uo. .- ..".e t..a#....=..

. - - =. =. . " e 2

. 4-

~

o. . 3 . .7 k ..'.a ..".e r e a - a.. . " o e. s ,e c. . a- ^#

.. . .'. ' s . "..a.=., <v ". . c- .

.=.'2='.'-.

3 happened on Three Mile Island --

4 MR. DEUTSCH: Yes.

5 COMMISSIONER MARKS: --

in this regard, and two, 6 what should ha"r.en c in theor.y --

~

MR. I)EUTSCH: That's right.

3 COMMISSIONER MARKS: -- because as I understand 9 it, these emergency reacti:n teams respond :c any nuclear --

t 10 MR. DEUTSCH: Exactly.

i 11 COMMISSIONER MARKS: --energy related acciden: l 12 anywhere. And --

13 MR. DEUTSCH: For example, say a Scvie: --

14 ,c y.g. r s c- - ,"., N"r U.. .'d A.S .'< S .- 3 4 3- ". . .

15 MR. DEUTSCH: -- satellite falls in Canada; they 16 respond to that too --

i l~

.( COMMISSIONER MARKS: Right. And so therefore -- l

~

IS the Department's perception of I

its responsibility with '

l I

19 regard to :.nterr.ac:.ng w:.th ?uba. :.. c ..nea th Sar.e:y c:: cers woult

. . . . ... i l

no be an extremely important aspect or- .ne. : n ormation.

21 v. ,s . . .u. : . x- .f o u , .- ,. x. . . : . ,. - - :3- .u. . ,

.x.R . D. -e

.  : n . e..Cu. ,. .

Professor Marks, to focus en the c0=.unications capacity in

.33 that whcle business, because frecuently the informatica 24

,,y ume gya .u.e ~  :- ,. a - : . y ..g y

.- ao ,., . ...-a- n...=. ,1

- . .n. . .

25  : w ,

- e . a.v e .#- . r.. . ..".a. '..# . . e ^. .# . .' . a. s a. , ". e s '.4.- .* ..'.a.

i

, y w.

n 3-33 scb 1 you will be very interested in hearing directly frc 'dr . Jo e .

. 2 Deale, who headed tha: team up there en site :: ge the 3 firsthand news of this matter.

1 4 COMMISSIONER MARKS: Another detail is, do you knew 5 -- were personnel from 3reckhaven National 'abcra : ries -

6 involved in this offsi:e monitoring at Three Mile :sland?

7 MR. DEUTSCH: I don' believe so, but I will check.!

3 COMMISSIONER MARKS: Appreciate that.

9 C .-u .n..r q.u.A.y z e..v.r. .y v.

. .v . D, e u . . - w. , - e .. . ,. ,/ a . . 3 .: .. , .v. a 10 a distinction between background information we need to 11 knew even wha questions := ask, and it scunds voluminous.

12 This is the obliga:icn we have under our mandate :: take 13 certain restimony formally and under cath. And : hat's why 14 T. r .. -_

15 MR. DEUTSCH: We'll be happy :: provide whatever 16  ;.:n--,-ann .u.g.u

-a .- a. s,u e s . ,g ,- . an./-

_t ..e . g e . a. ...a,ae-e ,,

- s i

~ w~ do .".a..

18 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: 'lery good , sir. Professor 19 -a,z

.-3 o-a.

40 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Dr. Deutsch, I can see

.1 the value of the suggestion you have made concerning the naval reactors program, and there's much :: be learned frc=

a3

..nd maybe a.se scme capaa....l_ :y wcu d be .ne-pru_,.

- 4 . . -

nat.

.k y .; ..b . a-3. n , -s.  :-- ,

.a .s. , e , g-. a. , ,

. .u. a. .n a. _../

-a3--a.--i.g

.tb

.d a . .k. .p- am *A . - - a. , 6-- . a .- e a.*

-. .e. , .J a .? .

I i

kC 3n: =xc .,1 .v.R . sne_Lr. A ~

.. . w. -. -3.- . c..

..w

..s. . .m___ ,, . . . _, , _ 4_.., n o-w_e 5 .-asye". .~ ..av a _i . a..= c . r s . a.- . =.-" .#-..=-

.n . ~"n

. 3 _'e_ . ..".a- . - ~ ~- " _ ' .

3 draw your attention :c are nc: NRC regu'ati:ns, but these 4 w h ' ". 5

• h. e. o, . o g. am b u _' _' e, s w .d . ."i _. '

_# . = =_ _' ' . . , . ...=.r." = _' s . .. a f . . -

5 ation, manua_,s on hcw to form testing, manua_s en safety, 8 manuals on quality assurance. All of this -- the -- with

~

.=. c c . mo. ar.y

• 1g ". . L _' n _' .. , uh _' _ .b '_ = k., u_ ' _; . _' . . . o ". . . =. ~  ;* '

3 ~r ~. ~~3 . =_~... '_ . c e _ . .

8 C 0 td..' S * ". N73 . 2_7G T0 . *.,D .- '.'". . a.. v .= .- a.

3 = . a. . .= . = d k v ..". e g p o-._,2s _z... e _.a , :..- ..ua. ._3n..

10 MR. DEUTSCH: They are reviewed by the NRC and ,

11 =-a- 3ene a.ad byt - he.e 3 . . -.3= n. .

'Ic " , .'=..

, . e =av,, *.. . P. .". _= _# .-...a . . .-

I go - . .

.: y.ou ask Icr a cpoy or a_,_, these manua_si /,cu w _.. r e_ a _, _, v.

13 have something in your hands.

14 COMMISSIONER ?!GTORD: ' del' I wasn'; abou: to 15 sugges that, Dr. Deutsch. Su: does -- can it be --

16 be boiled down at least seme overriding generic regu'ations, 1~

ma y, .e,w.,, ..x 3.,e, =eme,g_:ng ..mya

. . _3_3._ .,. .... _w. ._ _3 _3. .u

- . m _ _, ._. y o. .,. . ..y IS exposure rate that we have heard abou: frc= NRC and I?A.

19 .s,,. ,.

..b. e *. = s u ch = =. 3" _' .= . _' C .a.s a s * .k.a w '.',

20 MR. DEUTSCH: Yes, of course --

.)1

- /? .Nl 'O ,d W 9,e.... Cn,

. .w. .= . - e, : m. _.

'J A. .s.*J .%f A.4 aJ'.T '4.7.%{V.

6 . ... . ,4.

. . f .

.33

-  : oc_o g

.. _O C u ' . a. h. _# . .*. .# .- ' b *"*- ="a"

. . e, $. _# .**C a. - - - - - ."*

• v "- " *

$3 .;..,.Cu s , --  : a .m.. u, a .. .,, ,: . .u. . r, ._. ... _: m.> :.

./ C _9 .d. . ., s s i, .. e _..u.a . m 2..,_ ... . . , . .

25  ::

a_._ n' =.g . . . C _2e.. a - ,la.n.

..: _: _: .:. ,.,...w. _: n s _ ., , . _3 4 n ..g ., X _, ,. . _: .,. . _u.m.

g . . , .

.'5 and perhaps --  !

I l

F l

-40 am-b 1 .V..R . .0 .7"*. S u- U.. -. V. e s . .c w m=_ ..

..'.e ^ ^,a. ". =_ . #_.- 3 ... .= . . u = _' m ,

o u

.e- 14 eve, a~a.

. .r . c ' = s . .# .# .# a. d . 3u . '. a .

. =-b.."....'.

. '_ a_ .= . . #. . . s ". . -

3 =cuntable problem.

4 C'J. a._.7.M . A N .'<I'.4.r.'iY -

. . .Ne . 7 = . v. 3.-d. . ..- . .' a_ s o-..- -

5 Taylor.

6 COMMISS ONER TAYLOR: In connection with the Naval Reactors program, have there been verv detailed safety ,

3 e -wo m n d _: e s *. h a . n' a</e w arm. .:a?. e. .%.m. e Ler.3 h ..k e 2 . _n g. ei n, . _1-- sa

. .2 9 -

-- o,an .-w ..u.e ,.x.,.... h,_ . = me n_.; . .u. ,_ n. n. . _ _ =- u a.- a. ,. -

u.nde.s.and ..k.a. .he co. e 10 s . .#-a , u .# . =. d _4 m .# .# =_ .- a. .r. *. .# ~. ^. ~ - . .". e .-.-a. .# .a.

11 commercial pressurized water reac crs. Sur what I'r. inter-12 ested in knowing is whether there has been scr: Of an analog 13 of the so-called reac cr safety study. The Rasmussen Study, 14 for naval reac: Ors specifically. And le: me tell you the 15 reason for asking the question; : have an understanding whict 16 -rd ,.:.<a

. . o ask, wha _she.  :

t-o .- . . . a_ c . ve . . .o v , . u.a . .

... . <n a.

17 - e. u.w s e o .s a..b.e m

• .o ". sa.#e*w*/ s.""y, *-

( w_ e__= -

. .". e . a ' 2 *- 3 . a_ _d . "

• _ ' ' .#

18 ., . . n, s.a n.n 3_: /en oc yga -u, m_: 3.. . ___g

-f

. n. a e c :_ . . . ,. .= , . =- :. . . 3 -

19 clodding integrity, fuel integrity, and then a great deal no on the consequences,

centainment were reached. There is 21 = ...e _.... a _, y s _es n.s y c .# .e .# . n .= , . = . .."

. f o s s .e b _4 _' _# k./.' d .- . 3- a . . =_ x y i 22 what would actually happen if some of the core neited and 23 o#..-3 . " - u 3 ."4 a wa.- .=.d 3 .

e f . a_ s o "-.- =_ v =_ s o e .' . :u. a s

~...d=_.- -

24 -

_: ~. , . .n. .a .u. em. a_ . h a . .,.,.a _ y s _: s-2 . _s .e.c -.. .

_2 . u. e e .a_ _ a n.;

. 2. u ,a3 ,. e .. . ~. n..

I i

S _..u. .,. . ..u.e .g.:...a. e..: -:  :-. ~

a . . ~w.a . .. ..u.a . a. e y ,. . . reg a . ....- ,_ ,_

. v._:_~ ,. l 1

_. 3

?_a'. sch 1 Island would in fact develep, and was theref:re no analyzed .

(

2 And a- guess _,m A curicus :: K,now whe:n.er . .

na: :.s also 3 true of safety ana_,yses :.a :.w.e nava_- reac: Ors situation.

4 v.". . D .U ~. S C.M .

.. . .:. .^.# = s o v- . ~. = t/'. o *. , .# . *. .=. -.e.

f 4 s a.

5 description of the safety analysis of the naval reac: Ors 6 program, _ wou.:.,, suggest you 2:.gn: certer hear that frca 7 cur naval reacter safety *e:sen. Se le r.e say scmething 4

5 a_k ou . = _c ~_ _' '_ =_ n . s c e ..a~ '. ~. s . 0 n e c .= ..".e ~..". _..3 2 w"..' -

. . ..". c ..w-=.- . .a- l 9 me.is that if you go to =y eclieague, professer ?asmussen's l l

l I

10 study, you have a certain se cf acciden: scenaries tha:

11 specifies -- I believe the ecs; severe one which is a :Omplete 12 .o s s

.# - c'an.

- . a__*n, _w 4 " .- _ f . ' /'.

__ . .A.. .d b. =,. *. =. s 3 =_ _# . . ,

."f o u' 3 a. .

13 . o ~. *.e 3~ u e s . 4 o r. o .#

. . a _* n _* . . 3 . = ..^=_~_.".._~.=._1

~.- . _ -s__'= _~.~....=~.*.=.

14 o .c e . a ...*

• s , a..d . h. a. #

a k _i _' _# ..v m n' e . =_ c k. .. _#w _= _' e e c ",_' =. = v- _= _' _' _= b _' =.

1 1

15 on site. Because people tend  :: train to that i

16 p.ng i .a s c e n a ,.,_; e . .ney a,e ..aa c a_ s_ ..:... _ u.. ,_ s. , _t _3u. _ _, ,/ ua.;. .: .x , . a_ . . . .-. .-.. a 1- as they were in this case, and they take actions based en j

, 18 the -- perhaps more extreme scenaric, they can build them-19 selves in:0 trouble. And I think you will find that a T

scenario based safety procedures may not be the most 1

-33 effective way Oc proceed. And I wculd suspect tha: the nava.

.a.ac.- . - - -

f.-3._=.. . - = s .ed. . w a .a d_ a- a w d _"_ e v _= . 4_ =_ . v. . .# =. v.= . ,.# n. e a- .

3 against a wide variety of eventualities.

e)

C-,m.__a-_w,N .. ,, r

w. _ R mv.m2. . ~ . .ve__ .na_ ,;x,.

__ _. ..s :e__._.. ~ _: .

, .3

.a. %__

s . . e. a. C_, - se_,,/3 b e e_.n. .,s e .* ..t .w n_

. .- sw. , , ,. u.

.ww. _ -.w

a. m. .. . e A s_ .u. C L. _ .

. , - - - < ~ ,

_ _ _ _ . - - - c- - - - - - - - -

47.

- 1 o _ *. > = c..o ,a .:,..,,, se, ,e c _4_,, _.,..s . ,..c _s

. ...tw= , . __. v. ....,a . . 2. e ./...

. , ... , s -

. ,- . n . ..,. e n

hydrogen bubble of a certain size, and se on, but rather, 3 . . .

that what seems no: to have been ana_..v: e c :. s :ne runc::.:n-4  :

..s, o.c -h - e ,,3,u;pmen -.,

. .-. e ,.< , .,..,e , e , y _: .. u..: .,. n n-en . , _: . . ,. . _ . . . ,

. u. 6. -

0 a_a .. .e .,. . a__ , a_ as e o .; m u.: . _n:_en: _ _, d ; ,. ac :.,/ a. ...a . , _: a

_ . o_ s m, . u. a _.

6

.: ' s :.mpo s s . ble :.or people to ge: :.n :nere, there were, as 2 understand :..:, a number or. p.eces or equ:.pment outs:.de the . _ . .

3 pressure vessel, inside centainment, tha: were :: be .anuall*,

9 wee.a =- , .a. - ou.' n'.

. e ope -== ad .#..... _ . -..". e v --

. n. .. . .' -- "- c. .. .

10 New that sus e~ests -- and since apparentiv the safety analyses .

11 didn't take that into account, or if they did, then one l

~

wonders why the equipment is designed that way. ~here's 13 a who'a_ s e . ^ .# . .# .. 3 s i a v 4. ..3

~

..- d',

. .a.o . a--e ...uc k. . w # . .k.

14

• ce.a.~.~.-mach _'..e

. . * ~.~

. =.. ~ .# > c =. s , b u m ~B _;- ..u. ..".a. #=e.

. . . " . = ~ _ ' . . --o e ...a.

15 cases those interfaces didn't exist, or a: leas were -_

16 didn't exist in a framework in which an operat:r could de 1.,.

d w . . .".o u . .k _# .' _' .4 . . 3~ h, 4...s e ' .# .

. 'h. = . s e = ...s "4 ....a. ^#.

sc..ewh.#.a.3 . . . . .

18 the characteristics of what happened, that equipnen: was no:

19 designed to be useful under the particular circumstances of

._,0

.hau

. ac ise .y- , ..

.r g a a,/ .he .

5 ,_ n e .n

. --.  : - . .ma- _.., . n , s ;. . +. . . : n -.u.

._I massive radiation deses would have been received by anybody

. ./ _:.,.- - o 3 -,_ . -.

4, . s a . - ,n _. _. . ,e ,.

..a -- . . . . . .

.J MR9 DEU~ 5 C'-! : Should such a circumstance :e the

.,4 nase, a..A i

se

- .e. ..

n x' ..

,._. w  :

. %e .-

av --

_ es n . .. . ,s. a .. ,. , . e

..J f9A gw

@ _.99 g ..b. .4 .

18

_1G

• • :88 g e g. 4 _ . j.j $8..

8. 9P f .J.

g a.q g

_g g . a.ll 98 .f 9

. _3 e

94Q I

v

I

'; u 9_a3 scb i Secause these designs are supposed :: be under license, and an _: ..sm e p e . .s. e ,_. . . _, ,_. __.u. .-n. :  :

w ,_ a,/ a_ _

a

.. , - n o e. s - -- ue n._su

. ./ . . ..u. _: _ .u. _ _e f - -- - -

3 Oc -- should be -- and de -- analyzing these designs " rem 4 .". e *,c # . . . ^# v i_ a w "

e. . ." a _' _' _=_=_=_./ #. a _= . ". . a s , " . = _ . " . u_'"_

. ." a.

5 something which I would have argued ic be as much a regula: 2ry n _e _ _ _ _ . 6,:,:,- ,g

- a ges_;6.. -  : : .

.a___..3 7 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Let me jus: ':110w-up with 3 .. ne "cra_ ,ues 4 n e__kcus

_ . ..S a . , _=..d. . " . . = . _4a , /* c "- a a", ..".a . ' a-9 f- . _ m _ ,

_. _4 _, /' a -. a. 3 '-- _' a . . .* / _# _= _' _' _# . . . .s

. _4. -c . _=

4 _#_=__'_4..- 3 #.. .5e 10 d e s _' s-.. c .# . he s", s . a n k v ..".e v a. a.d . .

. e..d k."y

- . . " . = . _= _ - a. o . .= .a.c

- ac_ .#

11 . 5_=

. ~w d a.s 43 -.. bv , ..".a. "_ u _3 _' _4 . / , a -

t' ." .d a r . -

-a.-"._'_=__4-.a-

. 3 e. o# .cu.sa, 1'

_ k.u. a-a *cu -

/ su 3 s-a_s.4..3- . " . = . "-*.. a . w a a-

. . "- . "s . 3.- "a a >- . ._" = . ..'.a. . a. 3 " --

13 ' _= _ _' c..a-

_ d'^n'

--_ ~~fe a c_ .= */ . .h _' n g s - -

14 .v..g . g.e."vT S c.u. .- W e _' .' _#.. . ." e ". . , c . ". . e . ' . a _' a-#_ . u a . .# . . . , .ha 15 1 yo u, s o. e c .:./ , _, , , _, y _; _. r s ,- a ,s .;.._ . .: ,u. ., . , bu. _' . ' .- ".

. ___ . . .a. . . *_. = * .

16 s.".c u _' d_ ib._= v e b e a_ n . _= "_ -

• 3 .". w b y . 5 e _ a_ 3'2_' _=. . . y _= u . ".. . . # __ _# =_ s , . ".a_

1' cne you specified, in my j udgement.

18 e.  ::_

L.u.A.R.u 2ni .C. . .. v.r..Iv. . . .. .:=_s a c. . _3 .s..

19 -

u,0.uu. , , --w

_.e e _c NeR :. _ e r. v,RD . . s, ,. . .e,.as.., ,_

3 _, _2 . . w 4. . .w.

20 regard :: the naval reacters program; since apparently the 21 .av a_'

. =

. =_ a c_ s . s 2 __- =_ _= _' c ~ *f.=_ s -a " ._ # _ e d_ w a . =. . . =_ _=. - . s . s = . .c' . .". a . a ' _

a much to be learned by this --

l 23 v..o. .

. ..r."v . 2 v- .c.. . v. a_ s a _: . .

24  :

e.0 vu.. a S _ sm.I:=.. o

. . _ ::,m.

. . v.. __

~o'n _a . s_ .u c , . >_ . _ _: '. a_ . . a-25 n _= v a _' .= =. _= "_ . . . s '. .a_- a_ n'ay -

- #_=- = . . v. . .". _# .~. ~3 --

_ a_ . ... a. " a. ....a.

43

3. u4 scb } .a p s c _i .a--t e . =.

. .a.y a . .k. a. .w a. k a. a. .n. - n ~.-.. a so 2_ Co .: A a. . . ~. a , s.fa, , . . .  : _

a_ _ . .u.. a -

n. . .h e. m g e. .. s qg.e.j . e. . .u. a a -

ge ..f.m.e. y a.j g . a..rq , -s- .q

. -- A ma fce .a .

e. . . . .k. a.

3 . -- w-u, #.. . a s c..s a ^ .hosa. _= _ - # " a . .= '.

4 MR. DEUTSCH: Nc: in the ~nited States Navy. .

5 COMMISSIONER ?!3 FORD: The secondary -- i 's 6 =. _' _7 =_ g e d.

• h a m at .b..e ^#.

. ~i h. r e a_ .v. _# _' =_ . s _' =..d , ...a ..".a_ ---... c . . a. .a. .

i _e _ _ _ .L. . ._ s eu . . a . s eg,.. _

..u.e _,cn_de...

. wa.= =.- . ,..na a . ..as

. _: , se- e 5 pump in the secen.,ary system,: scw, :.s :.: po s s :.c _ e :.ya: cne 9

cf the nuclear submarines might have had some problem with 10 some weld, through-weld, or a valve in the secondary sys:sm ,

11 .ha

..._#6 .5. ' nave d.##e .ed- w .-k. e *. a_ _= C 12 v. q . n,EU~.C,CV.-

. . .. ~k.

u .e . .av _= _' .-=_.=c.. **

f

~~

-.~ 3..=..'.

13 C 0t. u.u._r S S T vNt r R 2. 7.u r .o,.D v. a_ s .

14 v.R .

. D.e.ra.m. S Cu. . . sic .

15 COMMISSIONER ?!GTORD: I see. Dr. Deutsch, then 16 I wan: Ic ask you something about your field of chemistry,

,~

because I's curicus. Dces the analysis that you have

,s seen sc rar ndicate nydrogen was :..n :ne reac:Or vesse ?

19 ,

A- . 2... g a. hyd. c ga n bubb _, e a . m.w..-a.a.

. .v._e, _ e T _ =. _, a..s - .. ,a . . . e. . ..- -u.a.

"o course of this accident?

-* e v.g. .

s.p *CI*6 S L.u.. ..

J v. a s .

a.s m0M4.T.;,0.v1s

. M.

--at r.;s : . . cra. V r.D. . .a. A.- w

..e... , , , , Cs .

w _a

_a ..e o3 w e. g * *.

.. j t . we

.pg .3. n M e v.'d ww...Aa .. . ..* b..,2. *. h.

. g,. e. m.,

. e . =_ '.'.'. '. 7. .* ^v r. w .". : ' '.< .# . . ' .' .#

-34 e .= . a ,.

Ok

=w

• V..

. . . N, .?.?u'***

.. .*2 s.u. '.V'e _7 1. , . 3 4ga 8 ,. g.

=,, a

.. . .h. a f-e _:. . . *J

< a_t.

- o.

3. g3 m.w-

.> 1 c .: . . C . .a. m . . ~. .k. .s . . ..%. ,.

e. .k. a. . %.

-. e.~.. 4a. ~. , ,s. ..a,..

s - - . n .,. d . : ..- n. n .m. a . . ~.. d ~. .he 2 enaya.a.s amna. y . ,.,,-a.s

.,:,, .,e..<

. . .s. . n. 3 a. .

. ..-. . _.m. 3.ya. ,

/ n. u. 8.f , . s ,. . . .

3 ;_,  ;  ; , . ,a , ..;  : ::.

t o ,e , , _, ,/ p.au,s b,e, ..,, . 4 , ;-, a- - - =w-. . -. - av.,.......- ,-

4 But I do believe that we have hydrogen samples ex rt::ed 5 .

at regular intervaa.s - mean samp_,es, gas samples, w..n:cn .

6 had high hydrogen content in them. The absolute ccmpesiticr a .: *he bubbte

.. .4 e se.9.:, -t~. s a. x . a. . . ~. a..A

.  : - . c nemy

-.o n c .: . : nn, - .

S bei,* - eve a". a. s u'.; k # e * *,

• o .# ' ' " *. .b. a. ". ." . '.' d '/ , .'s*.'.#.'<*.

. -- . b. . a.

O C -n m ,y o s .: . -: - . . c .c one b 0.s. s .., a,.

n, ,- a

-a - c. -..

. , , C .. .; C .e. s . . :...e , a n A n.-

10 cumstances, and --

l *'

COMMISSIONER ?~GFORD: What is your presen inter-1*,

. -e.a 4 -n w.d.5 -a.g=-a . . .o ..k.a. -

o s s .'k. .' e o x ", ~ a. 3 a.. -^.=....'.

... '. l = a-13 .

i explosive?

14 MR. DEUTSCH: Well, that --you have :: be a li cle 15 bit mere precise for me. Will hydrogen and cxygen a: -hose ce-16 grees of temperature, pressure, detona:e or de::nate under

1. . . .

tre circumstances in that reac cr --

IS COMMISSIONER ?IGFORD: No, that's a ::o genersi 19 question. I wouldn't pose that. For that particular situ-a0 ation was there exygen at a sufficient concentration so tha:

_. -: 3.

.t.,d,  :

_. -. o u, _ s ,. x e _,n g. e ,.

( -

., MR. DEUTSCH: We have no independen: Technical

..J.

ua u, . , e n . h . =.u,s;ec.. 54

.,4

~.

-- M.u. .. c- . ? vN=_ R .2 . .o .- snn.

.w . 1. . d . .. u.

. .,. . . ~. .a s 3 ,. . . . :. . .3 n5 is, sc ycu conclude there was hycrogen there, my uesti:n is, l

l 1

i

, 9 /

1

3-46 s cb -1 do you have some basis fcr estimating hcw much hydrogen?

2 MR. DEUTSCH: That's exactly the sor cf cuestien t he <

3 _ : will only be prepared to have :Ke Department of Energy answe: 1 4 after careful work, locking at the available data and thinkir,g 5 about it. That's precisely the scr of issue, questien, that 6 we care about, but we de not yet have an independen: icok 4 7 the matter. And so, I can'; -- speculate on it.

FJA- S COMMISSIONER ?!GFORD: I understand. And wha:

9 about some of the people within the DOI labora cries? Have 10 they previded any estimates yet of the amcunt of hydrogen?

11 MR. DEUTSCH: I can't assure you.cn that point, but :  ;

12 don't believe so.

13 CEAIRMAN KIMINY: But let's see. As I understand 14 it, you're going to provide us this ccmplete chrcnology of 15 what information you had at which stage, and the bes analy-16 sis you had of it. So presumably, it will be available :c 17

his Ccamission as it becomes available.

18 MR. DEUTSCH: Yes. I do want :: make .ius: -- I 1 19 sean, I knew that this will perhaps no be necessary, but I 20 would like to make the remark that as a technical crgani - I 21 ca:icn, we feel it's very important no: c held curselves l cut as making a judgment until we've given a careful consid- i 23 eration of the data, ccmprehensively assessed it and formed i

i 24 an opinien. We have nc: done so ye: in these ma :ers. I 25 wan c make that extremely clear, sc --

3-47 u.

m- 1 CHAIRMAN KEME.Tl: I understand.

o -

. n v .w.. ..QQ - - .sc d. r .os .e .e%, . nsRu .n.

F.. .s. - .. .s a.. s _.

. . .. s, ., T. .,,,,.,.s...w

. w...

J .%' . d . t .. ne,, . E s t< _4n .

s , f.w u .,,...o...,

.. w 4 w.c. __a

. .  : . . u. a. OLS .r f. e s .: .. .: . . . ,

.. w., L. _

a.n ,,y wha: :.s the curren: state or any ana.yses by any

.ng.:c/ :.,oua, s w:.

.g :.. .n your crgan .:at:.cn , even :.:. they o . .

s...c :nem 6 at NRC rec,uest.

q.. . u.r.n. . 3 C.e. . h e .., Bas C .,.

. .. 5.a . .- , . .w, 0 .4 . . w,

• • ,-S_-,. *- --

• '5

$ nos h e _ 1_, C y' O .: ,d .4. 1.1: - .-. . 9,s a. -

_n

.w ne.cV y s. e ), n. G, .d _: ... u.

, nr:

.s  ;. Ca.-

9 .' o r., u h' '.r* a* = .# . =.. - = _ ' '

. ~. = n s ' .- ..

_.. ..t_= . . =.. s .'.. .'._4 . o - . wn ,

10 but rather my own judgment about how a technical persen should 11 -e.oc=.a.d 4 .. . w. . a_e . - m.a. e . .

12 COMMISSICNER FIGFORD: Is 00E spcascring any re-13 .' .i - 5 wa *. =. =. . a. _= c . o . , a.' a . -] '.

a e a . c.". .# .7 .

11  !!R . DEUTSCH: Yes, sir, we have a small program 15 .ha.r s

. 2, a.-,. c .2 o u.- ,. .4 h . ua . a. . . a ac . .. - ,. ., g . . , a . _n a _ _.  : . ,, .o..: .n -

16 generic safety issues with light water reac Ors. We have in 1,8

( . a..".d e d , &.".d w #..' .' h e a. X . a. n d _# .7 g" *..b. a *. p- . *. 3" *. = = .#.". =.

. g -".*.*"b"--***

• - ^ 3. C c -

r** -

18 ,.  :-

_ e L,. . .wrwa"d . be.# . .-a. .."..'a- a c c .# ." e . . c c .".-. . a.d. .

19 COMMISS*0NER ?!GFORD: And I gather the purpcse of ao .

t h:. s sarety research 2.s to prov de r.urther understand:..ng c:.

21 .ge

.. y ess_43_,e a a.#a. v, .'. sues w d .k.. '_#."..

3 v. a . a..- .- = _= c . .. a '. .

l

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23 .... , n' ..o .i 0 3/ 4,

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-.3 a5 00MICSS!;NER p!GFCRO: Sy generic, you might say

48 49  !

1- generic to FWRs.

2 MR. OEUTSCS: Exactly. Cr -- Excuse me sir, r i i

4 3 generic with respec to the controls, whether man, machine, 4 interface between reactor opera: Ors and reac Or design.

5 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Professor Taylor?

6 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Was the Depar:sent of Energy consulted by the NRC cr the utility company in the : curse Of 3 people trying to decide what specific kind of c0 cling process 9

to go to, to aim for, in the presen; situation? That is, the 10 approach Oc cold shut-down.

11 MR. DEUTSCH: Nc.

12 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I understand there was a 10: )

i 13 of discussion about whether to use convective eccling er not.

14 Was DOE consulted in that deliberation? .

15 MR. DEUTSCH: No.

16 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Gcverner Babbit ?

1I A. COMMISSIONER BA3BITT: Just foll wing up en that.

18 You were requested to do some modeling, en which semebody 18 else based their decision. Is that correct?

1 ao '

MR. DEUTSCH: I think some, not on the particular i el . . .

assue or tha.s natural convective eccling. m not sure :na: --

4.,

We did de modeling work 'a: Idahe , s ir. I will have :: check a3 whether that modeling included, :lthough I dcn't believe a i

l Of this time it did, if i includes natural convective medeling.

t t

^5 I thought we did seme of that a Fo :mac, but I'm not sure ci

- y - ,- --- , - , , - - , . , - - - - - - , , - - - -

49 .

0 1 that. That's exactly --

o

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. r..u.c . su u.as a-re . s e .- a. s. .a -

4 included the study cf hydrogen generatien frem, say, -

o . . .

rconium-water reactions.:

6

u. ..n. . s.

- r.um. s C.u. .. _.e s u. .c . n c a. : v = b _' e . .

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I haven't studied water-:irconium and steam-:irconium inter-8 a c. cns.

a 7=sa..r. 4=y,<

- --- f u see, c u' . ' = ." c = . . . J =. s . . .3 . a. . = . . ' ",

9 carried out the NRC safety research work -- as you surely 10 are aware.

11 Cn. .u.."..' S s~ ~u 0 N- T R P _' 0 7. ^s .: s" .- V. a. s . .s' n' re - h a s . ". . = . , . ". e .- ,,

1' begins to focus. When you do it f:r NRC, who then decides 13 f

what's worth dcing?

14 MR. DEUTSCH: The sponscr. In this case, it wculd 15 be NRC.

16 Cv,MM.sS 7ONyR - - .3,q

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the DOE safety research, which is paid f:r by your r.cney, is 18 . . . .

In response to speci:1c reques:s?

19 ~

MR. DEUTSCH: Oh, no. ~ apologi e. apologize.

ao

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50

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n y .- . -, = ... 4-a d

-.a. =x-as-2 c' 2 5100 million. In addition, cf course, we have safety research 3 work going on with naval reac Ors, but that's undertaken 4 .s .t .a .a. ,. , n w ., y .

5 COMMISSIONER ?IGFORD: With regard to safety 6

research on light water reactors that ICE sponsors, is soma of that carried out by the industry?

3 .V..D . D, 7_fJ*uC CU.

. V. ,. s .

9 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: The industry that designs 10 and constructs light water reactors?

11 MR. DEUTSCH: Yes.

12 CEAIRMAN KEME:IY: Thank you.

see no further 13 Ccamissioners asking for the ficer, so may I thank you very 14 much, both for your restimony and for being candid. We look 15 forward to getting a great deal of data from you and hearing 16 - -

ormal testimony at later meetings.

17 MR. DEUTSCH: Thank you very much.

18 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Thank ycu very much. New, the 19 Commission -- A- ,new scme Commissioners have to ge: away even s

20 before noon, so it's very important that we should take cer-21 . . ..

tain actions, or we won,: .nave ruture meetings, vn:le . .

we nave a quorum. Le 's see. How is our tape situation? 50w much

.y time -- 10 minutes lef: en the tape. le: me sugges: while we're clearing the recm that you change the tape n:W.

5 (Recess)

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4 United States made on Wednesday' morning. You may remember 5

he said essentially that he hopes to accept the recommenda-6 . .# e n s ^ .# .h#s C-.~# a s'o.

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14 operators of atomic plants, but nose who live arcund them, 15 and who fear for their own safety, will all be aided by a 16 frank, honest, competent report to the American people about 1'

.".=.s =*.us o.# nuw.'ea. powe a.M #.-

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a .d 18 what can be done to make nuclear power plants safer in the 19 future. And that is why I believe tha the Kemeny C mcissior,  !

a0 will play a very constructive role. I think it would hel; to

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4 time and their place, and then discuss what kind of schedule 5 .u.e Co._m.# a s# _w n a_=-hes .#c.

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6 On the basis of a poll, we have established the availabi'_ity 7 of the Commission "or either all o# three days or at leas 5 two and a half days in three periods of time. Thursdays --

9 you have these dates in front of you -- Thursday through t 10 Saturday, May 17 through 19 ; Wednesday through Friday, May 3C 11 through June 1; and Wednesday through Friday, June 13 throug:-

12 15. I remember in one of those it's only a two and a half 13 day =eering was possible.

14 The Commission members also suggested, a number of 15 them, and you may wish to decide this today, tha: the next 16 meeting, May 17 through 19, might be held in or near l Middletown, Pennsylvania. In order to provide you with the 18 - - - - -

necessary in:orma:Lon :or that, made some phone ca_,_.s i nis 19 mornin on .vour behal . -A . m h a.c o. to report, : rs; c:- a _, ._>

00

- -t * * *

• a ve reached the Governor's or:1ce to ascertain :*ne w **. 2 ng-

-33 ness of the Governor to appear before us, and al hough I

~

didn't talk to the Governor personally, I know if it's a: a_;

,.^ so

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1. will cooperate in every way in testimony, and that we will be 2 able -

c 3c and inspect the pcwer plant at Three Mile :sland.

3 COMMISSICHER MARKS: Soth?

4 C .a u.n _r.u.

s p.I .g e_.v..e ".

v. .

re

. . q u,_4 e., c , .- m .e. . . . .r a_ss_ -. .. . csx 5

in that detail, but I'm quite certain the answer would be yes 6 Oc that. I would like to suggest, in view of -- you have te

=ake the decision new, but in view c:. :ndividual suggestions 3

that have been made, that since it's a Thursday, Friday, 9

Saturday =eering, that Saturday might be a particularly appre -

10 priate time for citicens who live around there to restify be-11 fore us. As Commissioner Trunk pointed cu :c me, many of the.t 12 work, and do not wish :c lose a day's wages, and therefore, 13 it would be particularly nice to save Saturday for testimony 14 from them. I thought we ought to take scme formal testimony 15 before we went to see the plant, so we'd see =cre clearly 16 what we're 1 coking at. .Su perhaps we could use the first 1"'

day for that, and visi: the plant on the middle day, which 18 would be Fridey.

19 CCMh!SSIONIR HAGGIRTY: May I ask tha: the staff.

20 ..

and a recognice the star:.. .nas not existed up unt;;, inis . .

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. n ..'.a_'/ e. = n d-_#3 - ^u . , _= .- .d , u . # .. . as

.- .u . .b.,

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as many questions as are necessary, will provide us with a

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I

-- , .y -- -r-..,

I controls inside the centainment vessel, and se forth, when we t.

2 don't really know whe:her these can be reached-under these 3

circumstances or not, we don't know what.rsally happened. I 4

knew enly what I read in the newspapers or in the magacines, 5

or in a few tschnical surmises that have been made by people 6

axternal to the events, and I think it is - r.cw incumben en I

us-to begin to have a better idea, so we can ask =cre intel-

'3

1. gent questions.

I 9

CEAIRMAN KEMEMY: I completely a e ree with veu, and 10 - -

it seems to me, with your concurrence, tha: the divisten oc-11 responsibility is for the staff to dig cut as much advance 12 information as possible, so we knew whom to call as formal 13 witnesses, because in the last analysis, we have to ge: that ,

14 informal testi=cny. And I would think that cur meeting in eq 15 near Middletown in mid-May would be a time te line up a num-16 ber of witnesses who can tell us, if pessible, from firsthanc 1

experience exactly-what happened.

CCMMISSIONER HAGGERTY: I'm no: asking this be done 1

19 so that they can swear to this being -- But just :o the bes t

I a

~o of their ability, a description of what actually happened.

21 CEAIRMAN KIMENY: I understand. Mr. Lundin, dc ycu wish to ecmment on that?

.,3

~

MR. LUNDIN: Yes, I think we'll be able c. I mign be helpful, also, Mr. Chairman, to previde the Ocamis- .

1 a5

~ '

sien with a description of its plant and the general e

--e .

-e*r

eJ 5 56 1 operations to give you a be: er understanding of wha: the 2 people will be telling you during the visit. As far as defin-3 ing the cause and the exact sequences of the events, I think 4 that will take a great deal more information and time. To 5

do that in a certain way, it isn't going to be possible, eve-6 by a large staff over a considerable period of time.

~

COMMISSIONER RAGGERTY:  %* ell, you can do -- you car 3 do what you think.

9 MR. LUNDIN: But I'll be glad to have someone as-10 semble current speculations, and current statements of people .

11 Thdt does not constitute a definition of the event.

12 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: No.

13 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: There are official documents 14 that are now public, such as the transcript of at leas: one 15 of the NRC meetings , on April '4, and then an ACRS meeting 16 following that. In which at least at that time, their pic-II ture of what happened, minute-by-minute, hour-by-hour, is 18 described.

18 MR. LUNDIN: Exactly. You're right.

.'o COMF.d3IONER TAYLOR: Now, that may not turn cut ::

-33 be accurate, but I think it's important for us te knew wha:

~~

they --

-33 MR. LUNDIN: That's exactly what I had in mind wher

• 4 I used the words current thcushts and specularicns.

.,5 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Yes. That is available, and --

5 t~

-/

1 MR. LUNDIN: That we could assemble for you.

2 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: -- is it realistic that some 3 of this information, like a diagram of the plant --

4 MR. LUNDIN: That was my first thought.

5 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Could that be mailed to us?

6 Well belure the meeting?

7 MR. LUNDIN: If you'd like, certainly.

9 COMMISSIONER FIGTORD: Dr. Kemeny, I think Mr.

9 Haggerty has gotten at a very crucial point, and I do think 10 that in addition to the staff's attempts, which are going to 11 be contihuing and updated, wouldn' t it be appropriate for us 12 to take the opportunity of this visit to then ask the utility 13 company to provide us with a document of what their interpre-14 tation is of what happened? And I think we should be sure 15 that goes beyond just the chronology of signals -- who said is what, or who learned what. But further, their interpretation 17 as best they can at this time, like what happened within the 18 And I want to mention that I'm assuming the utility reacter.

19 company has that, and I would.be surprised if they don't.

20 Secondly, I believe that it's possible that the utility

.1 industry, as an industrial group, has already begun such a

4. .

~~

study, and I think it might be appropriate to ask for that a3 group, or its representatives, c also meet with us and

.y provide that description. Secause it may be that from tha:

• 5 group is a mere detached and thcrough investiga:icn; I don':

i L

2 8 1 know. Both of these could presumably be handled a: the next 2 meeting, and it would be enormously beneficial to the visita-3 tion to the plan itself.

4 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Let's see. I have one concern, o . .

and _ am not cutting this discussion of:. . As a ma::er c:.

6 fact, I have here an item: what does the Commission wan

~

done before the nex: meeting. I'm worried a some point cf 3

our losing our quorum. With the understanding I'll return to 9

the whole issue of what homework we want or have porvided for u 10 could we approve the three dates with the understanding that 11 --

three sets of dates -- the first one will be in or near 12 Middletown, and the other two in Washington , D.C.?

13 CCMMISSIONER ?!GFORD: So move.

1*.

CEAIRMAN 'MT.': Second to the motion?

15 '

COMMISSIONER SA3BITT: Second.

16 CEAIRMAN KIMENY: Others in favor, please raise II your hand? That's a unanimous vote. Those meetings have 18 been approved. Dr. Marks?

19 COMMISSIONER MARKS: Can we discuss the subsequen 4

meetings, too,.

-33 CEAIRMAN KEMINY: Yes. Dr. Marks, I know you ' ave a concern on the --

• 3 COMMISSICMER MARKS: I have a concern tha: _f we

.,4 meet at too frequent an interval, the staff really isn't go-45 ing Oc be able to do what we're asking them to do.

In c:her 4

n2 39 (0303)

I words, if we meet every two weeks, I think that half the 2 time of the staff at.a minimum, will be spent picking'up the 3 pieces of our last meeting and preparing fer the next meeting.

4 And I -- I would like to suggest that we stretch out the

'5 interval of the meeting and.particularly maybe after these 6

first three' meetings have a hiatus of at leas three weeks

~

or -- or so, so that the staff can then go to werk on'what i

3 I'm sure will be a great number cf different aspects of the 9

problems and then -- and provide them with enough time to --

10 to sort of give us a -- this is -- this would be about a 11 third of the way through our job. Sort of an early warning 12 point collection and collation of where we stand. And so I'c 13 like to suggest that -- you know, the meeting -- the next 14 meeting be, say, some -- like July lith, 12th and 13th 15 which would give them a little over three we.eks. You have i 16 the July 4th weekend in there too, which I suso.ect is no: .

17 going to be a very effective workweek. I mean, I'm sure 18 everybody is going to work right through it, but it still is 19 difficult. And then, meet at, say, three-week intervals 20 thereafter and then I think that at the time when we get our

.3 first drafts, hopefully by the end of August, we may have to then meet more frequently, because I think those meetings

-33 will be primarily discussions among us. And so in September

.,4 we can return to say, an every two-week schedule. '

.'5 CEA Fld.AN KIMINY: Professor Marre :?

..-,.r

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2 sc=ewhat indirectly on the suggestion about dates. But I n -- w:..s.

J guess 2 was env:.sion:.ng somewhat c:. a c ::erence s

4 reference to some responsibilities to be carried cut. Tne o statement just new set :.w.e amount c:. t:.ne that star: w :. _, _,

6 nave to spend comp 1_3:..ng -- de:..ng al3_ c:.

.g.e werk.  ; guess .

7 anticipate some work on the part of Cc=missioners as we , _

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9 documents; tha: -- that as I unders ced it would not be 10 simply left to the staff to have to carry cut.

11 CHAIRMAN KIMINY: Absolutely not.

10

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n a_.r.= a 3-_.es 13 part or why , - ,A guess 1:.. we ,_o it :na: way, 1: w o u _, a_ n , :

i 14 be necessary then to have to werry about such long perieds 15 in between, because we're all going :c be working during 16 -s h a .. .__.t.,_ e .

1' q C'#

.- 4 . *..* *_i K ".._.IV. . Su* 7 ..k..# .sk w h a . D r . M.a .- k a- . .#a-18 speaking to and after he pointed this cu o me became 19 '

worried. Say for example, the timetable between acw and 20 the Middletown meeting we have al=ost no sta#f. We have the

-31 senior u nbers en board. We have 00 recruit, in acccrdance with the instructions you gave me in executive session, sene

-33 senior scientists who will serve as censultants and members

-34 of the staff, and Mr. Lundin dees nc: yet have a -- an aide, 25 and ..".a --

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n.e nanover end c:. ;c aise, sc :na; ycu . snow nope:ully, a . .

how to 5et in cuch with us. We -- we de have a phone num-

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10 COMMISSIC'IF,R MARKS: 553 --

'm sorry?

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1 #cr all Commission meetings, and carry ou: the crders of the 1

2 Commission afterwards is fol10wup, when do they have time cc 3 do the investiga icn tha: they are supposed Oc do? That's my 4 majer cencern. Governor Sabbitt, do you have a view cn the 5 subject?

6 COMMISSIONIR BASSITT: ' dell, I agree with everything

• ou

/ sav.

3 CHAIRMAN KIMDY: So, wculd i: be agreeable? 'de had 9 agreed that we would circulate as quickly as possible, a ,

4 10 calendar sheet where you can put X's and O's and tell us 11 when you're available. But then suppose we take Dr. Marks' 12 n e x . ...e . . #.s s us~ s a s . .' o r. .h a *. *s.b.e n~wou'd . . b. e . # g ". . .= .# . =. .= . .k. a 13 Tourth of July week, anc. I guess Tourth of July occurs in ,

14 the middle of a week, doesn't it, which makes i particu-15 larly bad. That =akes that week bad, right after that. And 16 then we try on the basis or availab:.1:.:y or nanmum nun er c

1-of Commissioners which we'll determine by tail, to call is meetings at roughly three-week intervals wich the.under-19 standing that as we get to the conclusion drawing and repor:

.,o writing stage,.we'11 either have to =eet more frequently or

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. =.. . ' a. .= v '_ .T-

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depending on what your calendars lock like --and clearly 1 33 the Commission will have a chance. I'll send cut as seen as y e . g y e n .c , _, a . e s,. .u. .: = , a _ ,_ ,. . _, : y ,. ,:

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1. can confirm or change at its nex formal meeting. 'ic uld

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4 - - - - _ " - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -^-

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.0_.19 oc 1 -hat be agreeable? Professor Pigford?

2 Well, Mr. Chairman, I -- !

COMMISSIONER FIGFORD:

3 think there's a lot of sense in what Dr. Marks has said.

4 The trouble is, we have a lot of work :: do and only a shor c

5

-time and it maybe that we just have to find some new approacr 6

tham can get the work done, and I suggest we kind of keep an I

open mind until we have laid out a more definitive schedule '

3-of the issues and how we're going to attack them. I ray be 9

we just have :: double up and work tha much harder, if it's s 10 at all possible. At least I'm very much concerned abou: the 11 I short time and the necessary amount of involvement of the la -

Commissioners and the starr. __

13 CHAIRMAN KEMDIY: Governor --

14 COMMISSIONER BA3BITT: Mr. Chairman, i may be : c  !

15 i that we at some point may have to consider the possibility 16 of having sort of subsidiary hearings conducted by two or j

. 1. . . . .

three Commissioners in areas of their special expert se.  ;

~8 mean that would be better than none, --

CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Yes.

a0 COMMISSIONER SABBITT: -- as one -- as another 21 example, o.,

~

CHAIRMAN KIMITf: Would that be a reasonable Option, 1

a3

~ 1 because that would help a great deal?

a COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: One -- this is a legal c_ues-a5

~

tion, I guess. Suppose we had a meeting involving, I don':

l I

l

. . . . - - - - ~ . . -. - . .. .-. ..

10 sa 1 knew, three of the Cccmissioners and brought in witnesses.

2 Can they be subject c the same fermalities of testifying 3- under cath and se on?

4 MR. NATALIE: They -- they will be subject : -- :c 5 'the same formalities that govern the deliberations cf the 6

full Commission. The law requires that all these things

. apply whenever there's a quorum of the Commissien present.

s The quorum . s something you set.

_: you determine you want 9

to have three members, let's say, sign the authority :: con-10 duct the meeting, then two members beccme a quorum and -- anc 11 the law applies en its full --

1 12 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Sc that in other words, can the 13 Commission delegate to a designated sub-cenmi::es, le:'s say, 14 cf the Commission, the pcwer :: cenduct a particular hearing--

15 MR. NATALIE: Yes.

16 CEAIRMAN KEMENY: -- as long as the whole Cummission II

(, approves that. Is that legal?

IS u.n. . >iA2A1.. v. s.

19 '

CMAIRMAN KEMENY: That's very helpful. Dr. P. arks?

"O COMMISSIONER MARKS: Yes. And what is the notice t

-33 required? I mean ! think I just --

MR. NATALIE: The notice is going Oc be -- the nc-n c .:e On.e same. . .

tice requirement is gcing ..:,s s:1..__ gcing

.,4 Oc be a- requirement of 15 days. Now, --

'S COMMISSIGNER MARKS: Fifteen days.

1 i

_ - - -. .. . . - - _ . = .

10-l'a 55 1

1 MR. NATALIE: -- we have -- we -- for reasons that i 2 are sufficient, if we -- if we determine that a sherrer no-1 l

3 tice period is required, Commissioner Marks, we have the 4 authority to request the Administrator of GSA to -- c waive 5

that requirement subject to a vote which will have to be 6

taken oy the Commission wn:cn can ce cone by re epnene, on I

the basis of that explanation, tha no sconer nctice could S

have been given and we have te reci e the reasons why that's i

9 so. That's not an impossibility.

10 CEAIRMAN KEMENY: Sur in particular, by having se:  !

l 11 the next three meetings, we new can comply with the 15-cay nct- 1 12 tice; incidentally, we just barely can ec= ply fcr the firs 13 meeting. And --

14 COMMISSIONER MARKS: Are we at liberty Oc advertise l 15 that we are going to, you know, in -- in the public press?

16 MR. NATALIE: Well, if -- you mean buy ads er are 1

\ ,, you -- I assume you don't mean that. You mean actify -- do 18

. ever thing we can to notiftJ the -- all the :ublic c. recs and 19 everyone who is concerned that we're going to be :here and

~m when we're going to be there?

.,3

~

COMMISSIONER MARKS: Right.

MR. NATALIE: You're no enly at liberty Oc de it,

,,3

~

The law requires that you de it. The law requires scre chan

.y

~ ~

-- than jus: the Federal Register pub'_ication. impcses

• 5

~

cn the Commission, an obliga:icn : make -- de everything it l I

1

.. -- _ , ~._ _ _

I

10-15 33 (ne- Jw ~/

1 can to make sure that all interested persons are aware of 2 when -- when and where the Cet ission will --

3 COMMISSIONER MARKS: And, -- and hcw do we --

4 C.HA7 5- MAN KT_.V.7T. .' - . - ..c 4 "--a n ~e _= ' ' .v , -#-

a .#c. ..h a *. - a a -

5 son that yesterday I had a caucus with he three senior staff 6 members, just on mechanics, and the decisien was made tha:

7 the appropriate . place for responsibility for all the arrange-3 ments for a meeting wculd be with Barbara Jorgensen. Zu:

9 this is in part because c. :.ne ract that c:_ course we have 10 cc make it public and we have to notify people, and it will b e 11 the responsibility of her and her sta#f c make the physicial 12 arrangements for meetings. And on the other hand, as 'ar 13 as help supplying all materials to the Commission and back-14 up mate ~ials , and helping Oc :.ake hotel arrangements and 1 such, tha' will be Mr. Lundin's area as scen as he has some 1

16 s .a s.c .

1I

-(. The -- let's see, the third senior member, of course, 18 is Chief Counsel and Chief Counsel has said that there are 19 certain votes that would help and would 'cu / please inform 20 us as to what it would be helpful for the Commission to dc

.,1 in the legal area?

MR. NATALII: Yes. I would like c recc= end to

3

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..k.e C+r 4--#cn a>- .."at . - v =- . .'. a-

- 34 issuance c# any subpcenas that he determines are necessary

.,5 between new and our nex cee:ing, since obviously there wcn';

1 -

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10 57

1. be an opper: unity ic vote en that. I bel ve tha: tha; 4- +

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4 that subpoena duces tecum which is subpoenas, says produce 5 docu=ents, should be issued c all the ac crs in this -- in 6

this event as rac. id1'/ as cessible te inc. ese les al sanctions against the ,estrue: en or disposa_ c:. any c:. :ne materia,s a

S that have been generated over the las: few weeks. That's 9 not because I'm suggesting I suspect people are going c de 10 that, but I just think that's a pruden way to condue an 11 investigation o f this magnitude.

12 The second reasen is that we have already determined 13 Oc ge to Three M.ile Island and -- and you have already de-14 - .e-. ; ,.e s. .e- a c -

u u...a_, _

u i.;_,e .2,_,nd a-,_a ,n s r- . . .e,. ,_ s . _: ..~n . . /,

15 from the people who were actually physically involved in 16 the events that occurred at this time. Although we've been 17 assured of every cooperation from the managing utility, and is .

A have no reason Oc -- to doub: tha :na cooperarten will 18 be expended, it's been my experience in -- in the cases -hat I have tried in the past, that many witnesses, particularly l

.,1

~

icwer level employees at that cc=pany wculd feel r.uch scre

~~

ccmfortable if they knew they were appearing under ce=pulscry '

-33

,,n.c.ss.

. . . .>s mnr._ o -  ;.s s . so. . ,. ., .e ., n. ..u.e _: .- a n n_ a_ . :. _ _: . . s_

~34 and -- and ccmfort. Sc, that's the second reason why I l

l 4

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'10-17 a 1 during the -- during this interregnum between the nex:

2 meeting --

3 COMMISSIONER MARKS: I would so move it.

4 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Second?

5 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: Second.

6 CEAIRMNT KIMENY: Discussion of the merien? New al:,

those in raver,.please raise your n.a n , ,. -

3 MR. NATALIE: Ceuld I make One -- one additional 9 suggestion? Sie have --

10 CEAIRMAN KEMENY: Sur I should just state for the 11 tape that was a unaniscus vote of the Ccmmission.

12 MR. NATALIE: A: Dr. Kemeny reported this morning, 10 he has been assured by the President of Metropolitan Idison 14 tha: the Ccamission will be given access to the plan , al-15 though Commissioner Marks has already raised one questien 16 about the exment of that access and whether it applied c 1I both of -- of the plants.

. Legislation which will be adopted IS also authorizes the Ccamission to issue orders to Metropoli- i 18 tan Edison -- inspection orders, allowing the access.to the i

20 - . . . ._ .

acility of the Commission and its star: Just as a precau-3, ricnary measure in case anything ccmes up between new and

~

then. I would urge the Cemmission Oc also adept a resclu-

.'3 tion conferring on Dr. Kameny, the power Oc issue such an ]

.,4 inspection order.should he believe cha: c be necessary.

.,5 COMMISSIONER MARKS: So scved.

10'-15 5g 1

CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Discussion? All those in favor, 2 please raise your hands? And that's a unaniscus vote.

3 MR. NATALIE: These are my only twc suggestions, 4

Mr. Chairman.

5 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Thank you very much, Chief Coun- '

6 sel. Yes, Dr. Marks?

I COMMISSIONER MARKS: May we return to preparations 3

for the next meeting? -

9 CEAIRMAN KEMENY: Yes, that's -- was the last item 10 on my agenda. I want to hear from all Commissioners wha 11 homework you wish us to prepare.

12 COMMISSIONER MANKS: If possible, and -- ebviousip 13 all suggestions have the cavea: that we reali:e the stress 14 and the strain and we will be very understanding, but -- but .

t 15 if possible, I would like to also get a descripti:n of the 16 e course of events from the Governor's office. In other.words s II i not only in terms of what happened at the site, but I think IS our -- we'll be particularly involved in testimony which --

I '

in which -- what happened actually in the Governor's office ao

~

will be relevant in terms of the events.  ;

.,3

~

MR. LUNDIN: Certainly.

4..

~

COMMISSIONER MARKS: And I would also, frem the ,

43

~

point of view of the public health safety issue, cf which 4;

~

I's feeling I'm becoming a broken record, I would appreciate

~s i if we can include invita:icns to the Secretary of Health, -

y .r

13-19 -

73.

1 Mr. McLeod, to Professer 'dald who was an advisor at the time.

2 the University of Pittsburgh --

3 CMAIRMAN KIMENY: Yes; these twc names egreainly 4 came up very prominently in the testimony we heard yesterday, 5 and I certainly favor that unless any other Cc=missener --

6 COMMISSIONER MARKS: And -- and you might --

~

MR. LUNDIN: Invitations Oc them for what?

3 CFAIRMAN KIMENY: To testify.

9 COMMISSIONER MARKS: To restify.

10 MR. LUNDIN: Testify.

11 COMMISSIONER MARKS: In other words, I -- I -- and 12 again, if we wan Oc -- if our -- if the schedule is so ecm-13 plex that we can't accccmodate it, and we wan: Oc invoke 14 the -- Governor Babbitt's suggestien, I would certainly take 15 syself available 0 -- with anybcdy else who was willing, --

16 - - - - - -

any other Ccmmissioner willing to meer wit,n them, 1: -- 1:

1~'

, the schedule was --

18 CHAIRMMI K:MENY: Yes. Let me suggest for that, 4 i

18 which is a very helpful suggestion, that we certainly plan 20 to start out as a whole Commission, --

1

.,1 COMMISSIONER MARKS: Right.

4.,

~~

CEAIRMAN KIMENY: -- and take certain testi=cny,

.3 and if we find tha: the number of witnesses we wish to hear is tco large. that perhaps we could divide into two cr

nree groups a: that t ce cy vote or :ne cc== ssion :c near -

l 1

L 10-20 71 (057u) b i

i enough testimony, l

2 COMMISSIONER MARKS: And I would like to also sug-3 ges because I have some information that pecple on these 4 campuses were involved, that in some way we communicare ::

5 the University of Pennsylvania Medical Scheci, the medical 6

school at Hershey and the medical school at the University of I ?ittsburgh that the Commission will be holding hearings and 3 if any members of their faculty or staff wish to restify, 9 you know, we'd be glad to -- whether we -- you know, without 10 guaranteeing that we can hear everybody, but I -- it's my 11 understanding tha: there was involvement of key pecple from 12 all three campuses.

13 MS. JORGENSON: That's the University of Pennsyl-14 vania's med school, med schcol a Eershey and the University or l

15 Pittsburgh?

16 COMMISSIONER MARKS: Right, med schocl.

17 MS. JORGENSON: Med school. Okay.

IS COMMISSIONER MARKS: I'm sorr*/ I can't be scre help- ,

19 ful in telling you specifically, I mean I --

20 CEAIRMAN KEMENY: No, no; but I -- I think we both i

-33 understand there, what you mean.  !

1 MS. JORGENSON: Yes. l e,* 1 J l CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Other suggestions? Professer l

1

-14 Tayl:r?  !

05 COMM~SSIONER TAYLOR: One question abcut witnesses.

l l

_ _ - _ , a

, 3 ,. .,

i.

1 Is it appropriate or is it possible :n call members of the 2 press as witnesses under -- under cath?

3 MR. NATALII: Yes.

4 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: There's going to be a problem 5 of confidentiality of sources and that sort of :hing.

6 MR. NATALIE: ' dell, there's -- there's no difficult- ,

with -- there's no legal difficulty with -- with calling 3

them and -- and inquiring depending on where the inquiry 9 goes.

10 They may COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: lead Fourth Amend-11 ment or -- or First Amendment or something like that.

12 MR. NATALII: Yes, and -- or the state shield law 13 if there happens to be one in that state in which we're lo-14 cated at the time we're taking the hearings.

15 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Secause, the public percepticr.

16 of what happened is one thing that's very important :: us anc 1'

that was largely through the media.

18 CHAIRMAN KEME:TY: Are there any other suggestions 19 from members of the Commission? If net, if I may say I 20 personally found this meeting absolutely fascinating. I

.,3 knew -- I knew we had an ener=cus job when we started. All that has happened in the last two and a half days is -

3 3

think it's about three times as big as what I thought was an 24 encimcus job to start with, and I certainly am 20s: grateful

.,5 for Cetmission members who have expressed only ico much

r__

_n-24 73 1 willingness to be available for meetings.

2 And may I ask, is there any further business tha:

3 should come before this meeting of the Commission? Commis-4 sioner Trunk?

5 CCMMISSIONER TRUNK: I don't know how far they ge:

6 into it, but I know the PUC in Pennsylvania is investigating 7 ..Thrse M47e. Island, also.

3 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Thank you. And, any further 9 business? If not, I declare the first meeting of the Commis-10 sion adjourned.

11 ('4hereupon , at 11:50 a.m., the meeting was adjourned as 12 described above.)

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

.w.

me 23 2k i

25 i

I f

e

, REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the in the matter of: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND DOCKET' NUMBER:

LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

HEARING DATE: APRIL 27, 1979 were held as herein appears, and tha: this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Department or Commission.

I l'N.. 'd  ;,

Reporter National Reporting Co., Inc.

2009 N. luth Stree Arlington, VA 22201 e

i

-_ _ _