ML20136A912
| ML20136A912 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1979 |
| From: | Babbitt B, Haggerty P, Kemeny J PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907180077 | |
| Download: ML20136A912 (254) | |
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o scb 3-- 1 "A Presidential Ccamission, however, has an :pportunity 2 to stand above Inis and to review the overall policy 3 perspective. I hope you will present Presiden: Carter 4 no scre than a half de:en clear and simple major policy 5 findings and reccamendations , supported by such e:: ensive 6 documentation as may be required. *
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"In fact, the six functions assigned to the Commission 3
by Presiden: Carter provides primarily the foundation needed 9 for addressing the broad issues, the March - April radiclog-10 ical incident that TMI raises. This testimony that I'm giving 11 here, deals largely with the issues of preparedness raised 12 by (C) in the Commission's Charter. 13 z
"Governer Thornburgh" -- and in this copy we've mis-14 spelled his name, and c.erhaps the record would correct i --
15 "has said he's now ready for the second guessers. Let me say 16 that I was not present at Three Mile Island like my two I companions and advisors here this scrning" -- I've already IS indicated their names and positions - "~ have, however, had 19 considerable experience with emergency management bc:h as secretary or Ccamunity A:.,. airs ,n _rennsy,vania _ :or s_x an,. 1 at
~~ i cne-half years, where I had such various duties as Coordina- I l
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Agnes F10cd and the State Tuel Allocation officer, and
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c:her special assignments from the Gcverncr. And as Ad-I
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1 l sch 3-5 1 for the last 15 cr sc =cn:hs. During the TM: crisis days, o I personally directed the FDAA 0;eratica Center which, a: 8 the direction of the White Ecuse, served as a bridge between 4 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and mes: of the c her 3 Federal agencies previding support. Fcr 10 days we provided l 6 a daily report on Federal activities c Jack Watson." And
' l in the packet which we will make available, in as many copies j S
as, =cre as may be required, we have the final reper: of those l 9' 10 days, which I think give a goed insight as : what we 10 were doing here in Washington and in Harrisburg through the 11 Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, the Defense la-Civil Preparedness Agency, and a variety of c:her federal 13 . agencies. 14 "Mr. Adamcik coordinated" -- as'I've indicated the non-15 scientific federal opera:icas in Harrisburg , working , of 16 ccurse, with Mr. Denton of the NRC. "Mr. McConnell provided 1. critical technical assistance to the State and counties in is - planning for possible evacua:icn", as mentiened earlier. 19 "While we propose to avoid the invidicus implications 20 of second guessers, some preparedness lessons, perhaps also 21 applicable to other places and times, new appear eviden; frc-the TMI emergency. I respectfully sugges the following '
.v3 initial findings which can be subjec: :: later verification."
,,4 Although I'm prepared Oc defend them here this morning if
.,5 questioning.shculd move in that direction.
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I L-6 -scb 1 "1. The !Iuclear Regula:Ory Commissica lacks bc;h the 2 ,, e_.-...-
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3 _.. a.e 3 - # -- k ( au ..".c r _4 .*/ } " , -- a_ nd -' > s . _# . 'x , . - =-- = . . = " . ' . . _# . v. . 4 "to encourage adequate state and local s vernmental cre ared- . . o
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bureaucratic boilerplate and were no: always relevan :: 10 . . actual capability. 11 "3. Annex E, Nuclear Incidents (Fixed Facility) of the Com=onwealth of Pennsylvania Disaster Oc.erations Plan is . 13 ac va-"_e s =a- ..-"e - - ' _' _# . . .' =. v a _' " a. . " 1.. .d. -= - . v ~. .#
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14 ' the r acket which will be provided :: .v c u .
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"L. The pre-emergency coordination between county civil 16 de:.e n s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s w a s w e a x. a n d _'.nacequa:e.
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"S. The area and population contemplated "Or evacu-IS
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.>0 "5. Responsible Federal agencies have not given suf_
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e a w 3-7 scb 1 and area planning, fdr some decades, .such as in highway 2 planning, ecencmic development and health and hospital 3 41anning, has been demonstrated by experience decades ago 4 and TMI may well have demonstrated the need for this type of , 5 planning and readiness structure in emergency opera icns, ecc . 6 While the Federal Government, : always believe, must be ' 7 ' sensitive to state and local laws and cust =s, it should, 3 in my view, set the framewcrk requirements for a specialized, 9 regionali:ed, coordinated emergency response structure, 10 designed in detail by either the State's governcr or .:he 11 State's legislature. The creation and effective planning by 12 such a governmental or quasi-governmental agency should be , 13 a prerequisite for a licensee to operate a new nuclear pcwer 14 plant and should be required, after a reasonable time span, 15 of existing plants as a condition for centinued operation. 16 Among the agencies which would be represented en the policy-1"' ( making bcdy" -- and Mr. McConnell, this =cening, suggested IS an analogy with the Councils of 3cvernment, that already 19 exist in many areas near nuclear plants. "Among the agencies 20 which would be represented on the policymaking bcdy would be 21 the Nuclear Regula:Ory Commission and/cr the Federal Emergency 22
.Managemen: Agency (FIMA), just new in the process Of getting 23 -
Organized, the State Bureau cf Radiological Heal:h, the 24 S:are Emergency Officer.0f course, the ccunty, city, :r ::wn 25
-executives er governing bodies, and of course, las: but nc 5
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4 ness. The Cc.m ission, however, can forcefully sugges a 5 structure that will encourage cocrdina icn, cecpere-ion, 6 and communication. What I have proposed here will, in my 7 view, do just that." S New in the packer which we have -- ha: 00ncludes 9 the written prepared statement. In the e acket we have the 10 *
- .rst . tem, is quest',. ns suggested for review by 3res:'.dentia_' . .
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18 Commission members may, in due time if they cheese, place 19 their own observations with respect to the questions and "O the ccm=ents, in the second celumn. We're sensitive : the
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s . ._ 6 . . . . spons ve to prec se,y wna asked you to do, f:r your very concise statement that I've had a chance only :: glance quick ly 3 2: the kind of questions you have suggested. I:'s precisely 9
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be 10 sure all C =missioners have the chance to ask you uestions. l 11 .,
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'5
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Federal Disaster Assistance, and a goed many Iti of.vcurremarks of course, were addressed to such things as evacuation pro-1*
\' cedures -- and qui.e properly so, don't misunderstand re, 18 but le: me try an analogy -- I've a fondness for them --
19 Suppese this were a fleed? Quite clearly, being prepared for m.3 evacuation in case the flood actually cccurs is quite
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p0 3-10 1 develop to the pein where an evacuation is necessary, anc 3 where in the Federal Gcvernment that expertise exists? 3 MR. WILCOX: A the present time I would believe 4 that that resc. ens ibili:v. is the basic reso.cnsibili / of the 5 Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission. ! think it might be helpful 6 4
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9 Members and the Chairman may ac: know this, tha: there is a 10 rather precise relationship between the Federal Governmen: Om 11 ene hand and the State governments with respec Oc emergencies , 12 .a.g # s-An d . ' - e o .# n3 - . #. a '. .' +. w "a . #. a..'. . '] ~.5. e .#. =...ewc -k v .#
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13 lation under which the Federal Disaster Assistance Adminis-14 . . ., . 4 n o 3 e ,. a . a. s . 15 In the United States there are enly E0 people who 16 can trigger formal Federal action in response tc an emergency 1~'
. or a disaster, and those 50 people are the 50 Governors.
IS As it happens , sc=e of the Governors -- the Governers of the l' Territories can tcc, but for the sake of making the poin: ao
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that this must start with a Governor.
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. s ." e 3 cngoing wh..e the Governer :.s maxing this recuest, my organ -
_ , _ : n_ n m_ _, x e s , ._. , v a., ua _.- : , . . . .a 4 -- _ . h e s : ._.,, , _. : n._.. .a.., ,.._ u.e . _. ,. s _t a , n e . 5 both at the regional level and at the naricnal level. Tha: 6 report then goes to the President, who then decides whether to. issue the disastar declara icn er the emergency declara-a _:nn.
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Once he decides that a declaration is en.crocriate, . . 10 several things happen with respect :: the Federal Disaster 11 4 ~ 2.s s .s . a..C e .Ad.o_# .._# m- . . .= . _# c n . . .# . s . c .# a _' _' , . aaffc 4.. . _= ~ =. d.a. . a _i 12 .k.._' s _* . ,' c v ' '. *. d ... .'.= '_ _= w . ' ' A_v '. . e C ' c ~. ^._' n a . _* . . .- C. #_-.#.* - = . . . . _ 13 the President earlier in the process whom I intend :c 14 = c. p c' _.. . . An d ..h a . *. a.a. 4-a .a.spc..s.#b'a_ _ . c c . c r d..#. n a . a. a_ _' _' . .# . . ' a. - 15 various Federal agencies. There may be sometimes as many as 16 20 cr 30, or perhaps even more than that that are involved in 1~ a disaster emergency response. ~ is also his duty Ic werk l l 10 with the State and local governments in responding ic the 19 l a _: s a s _ e ,. ,_ , n d ,, a_. ,. .., ,., ., a,. ., y _. u. e s. .. ,.._ , c , c ,. , _; .,. , ._. _; n . _ . .: :. . ,. ,. .
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l no In addition to that -- and I won't dwell en this )
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_a 3-12 1 for the restoration of public facilities. 2 Now, implici in all the.: process, and -- i 's mere 3 than --it's explicit-in that process is tha: the State is in the 4 ! leadership role. The Governor must' make the request, the Governer 5 must certify it's beycnd the capability of State and local 6 government to deal with in full. He -- he or she must have I committed resources and it is our policy, abcve and beyond S the precise provisions of the law, Oc encourage the states to O remain out in front, just as much as possible.
'O Nobcdy, so far as I knew, ever read, during the $3: e 11 that we were in Harrisburg, anything about Rober: Ada=cik, 3a because the State was interested, and properly so, in being 13 in the front ranks in dealing with their own people, and we 14 think that's the best way c proceed.
15 Now, as it happens, Governor Thornburgh and I didn' : 16 agree with his decision at the time, and it shows the wisdom 17 of Governors that I've new changed my mind and feel new tha': his 18 ' judgment was correct, tha: -- to not request an emergency or i disaster declaration. We acted pretty much as though one had ao
~
been issued. It presented some minor problems. 21 So, I hope that wha: this fairly long-winded, and
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! hope, not too tortuous response is useful background in
~'3 '
dealing with the role of the Federal Government in these situations. 05
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,4 3-13 1 quite responsive to the questien I had in mind, and therefore 2 I'd like to fellow up on that. : think your statemen helps 3
me understand what happens after an emergency has :'een de-4 clared. I a= very much --and clearly we will have Oc probe tha 5 whole area, so-that everything you have said is relevant :: 6 the Cc= mission's work. .
~
But I would like to prebe how One prevents an emer-5 gency from eccurring? 9 MP.. WILCOX: Okay. We in -- ficeds, and te a lesser 10 extent, earthquakes, certainly tornadoes, hurricanes -- are a 11 way of life'for me and =y organication. They're predica:ble and 12 expectable , and high probability events , ever the period of 13 each year. And we are very =uch committed to trying Oc miti-14 - - gate the er:ects, and prevent adverse _mpact or : cods. We 15 try -- and the law so provides -- that we're to encourage 16 people to not rebuild in the ficedplain. We encourage land 1 use policies that will disecurage building in the floodplain. 10 When we provide resources to a State, as a result of a Presi-19 dential declaration, we require tha: the Gcvernor certify a0 that he will develop a hazard mitigation plan, so that if the al event should occur again -- 4.
~
We work with the Federal insurance program, parti-a3
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cularly the Federal Fleed Insurance Program. Sc in the high
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probability events, particularly a f1ced, we are very active 25 , 4-4-,_;, n -,-.-s- - n ,c_. ,.2t
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1 I 3-1" 1 a somewha: more difficult situaticn. We try 20 discourage 2 people frem, again, moving on the -- building homes en the 3 f aults , and so forth. And we actually used dellars, lever 4 dollars, c try to prevent mistakes of that scrt. 5 Tornadoes present a differen problem. There is 6 very li le you can do about a crnado because i: comes so -- in such a randem way, and strikes with such speed. 3 C.U A.'".".d AN F'd.r.T.' .
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O of these things for nuclear incidents? 10
.MR. WILCOX: I don *: know, I don't think I really 11 know the analog. I think that part of the answer to your lo cuestion must come :rce scient !. c persons as c wna scien-13
- steps, and from engineers as to what engineering steps --
14 I perceive that what I have suggested here, this morning, in 15 the written testimony, is a kind of mitigaticn activity 16 with respect to radiological accidents. 1.
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a you have the .. sin d c:. council of governments, or 18 a regional commission, in which people are, instead of writin s 19 letters back and forth to each c her, are sitting around the 40
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same table planning to deal with radiological incidents, and
-32 people that not only do the planning but have the responsi-
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bility for carrying ou: these plans, then I think ycu will
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3-o 3-15 1 testimony frcm others en that. I'm no: trying o duck any 2 question -- 3 C' JAI?JdAN KIMI!PI: 'de l' _ , '. e : ce a leas; ask you 4 then, specifically, about ycur cwn agency. Oces ycur agency 5 have a team of qualified nuclear scientists and engineers who 6 could go in on 24 hours' notice in case an inciden: looks
' dangerous?
3 MR. WILCOX: Absolutely not. 9 CHAIRMAN KIMI!Pf: Are you aware of such a tea: -- 10 MR. WILCOX: That function is the responsibility -- 11 to the extent that it's anybody's responsibility -- of the 12 Nuclear Regulatory Cc==ission, a: this time. New, actually, 13 in sc=e conferences I've had with the staff cf the-NRC, and 4 14 as ! indicated in the first of the six. items tha: I listed 15 here, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission may in fact be a 16 rc.ther weak read in this situation, because it has no authori - II ty to require State and local governments to do anything, and 18 it has no dollars to encourage them to do -- or a: least i: l' hasn't allocated any dollars to encourage them to do anything , 20 . on a pre-emergency basis.
~
33 All that the NRC -- the only leverage, as I under-
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~ ) i stand it, tha: the NRC has, is through its licensing authcri / '
23 to require that the licensee demonstrare tha: the area is i
~ 9 mobilized for a radiological incident. And, as I suggest in
.35
=y testiseny, my general perceptien -- and I think it will be 1 1
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. 3-15 1 .ycur perception after you look at scme of this material tha 2 I've cited in this fairly lengthy series of questions-- that I i
3 I much.of what the licensee collects is boiler plate, and 4-nothing more than boiler plate, and merely done to meet a ; i 5 requirement in cooperation with the local utility, rather than ,g ) 6 to really be sure that the capability to respond to emergen-I cies is there. The capability was not there in Threc Mile 3 Island, and I doubt, withcut kr.uwing it, whether it is there 3' in most, or any, of the nuclear generating plants in this 10 Country. ; 91 There is so much paperwork that ficws back and , l forth, and so easy to -- I have a letter here that was signed 13 in 1975 by the then-Director of Civil Defense in Pennsylvania, ; 14
.saying that, oh yes, the civil defense organi:ation was
'5 working with local governments in a very fine, cocperative 16 way, '
And two. years later, the same letter, then signed by a different director of civil defense in Pennsylvania, with the IS pertinent paragraph, word for werd. All boiler plate in my 19 view. I hope I'm being responsive now. L 20 CEAIRMAN KIMINY: Yes. You are certainly being al
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exceedingly frank and we appreciate that. Would c her t
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Commissioners like to ask questions?
.,3
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MR. WILCOX: I 's always easy to be frank with other people's shortcomings. I'm no: sure that we --
5 CEAIRMAN KIMINY: ! do unders'and
- that, yes. Yes, p -
S I l I S I e
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l 13 l 3-17 1 Governor Peterson? o
~
COMMISSIONER PETIRSON:- Mr. Wilcox, you have said tha: l 3
,you did not have the. staff and, presumably, the facilitier ::
4 make an independent judgment as :: whether or no a radio-logical accident had occurred. When they have a ficed, an 6 earthquake, tornado, it's obvious everybcdy would have the disaster. Sur it's not obvious when you have a radiological f 3 incident, unless you have the eq 'ent to measure it. 9 -
- rom where do you get your information, to ,newx 10 whether there is an impending disaster, or whether :ne has 11 cccurred?
1'~ MR. WILCOX: We would depend on the Nuclear Regula-13 tory Commission for that information. Also, the State 14 radiological health offices have information available. And 15 I think the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency would provide 16 some -- has seme radiological =cnitoring capabilities. 's 17 that righ2, John? IS MR. MCCONNELL: That's right. Yeah. : 10 COMMISSI0tER PETIRSON: In other words, before, you can 20 make any recommendation to the Presiden: of whether such a 21 thing exists, er is likely := cccur, ycu are dependen upon other people giving you that information? 23 MR. WILCOX: Yes, that's precisely true, but that 24 would also be, to a lesser degree, a: least, true of the nere 25 crdinary -- if ~ may use that werd -- types of emergencies and 4
I _1 e. 3-13 1 disasters. We depend on the Federal Highway Administration c 2 Tell us exactly what kind of highway damage has cccurred; 3 the Corps of Engineers fcr information en damage to public 4 facilities ; to the Depar ment of Agriculture for certain infor-5 ...a ~. 4 ,. . . . 6 Now, you know, cne needn't have the grea technical
~
capability to see a flood that one may need to detect a 3 radiological problam. Sur there is at least seme degree of 9 comparability between the si uations. 10 We're an organization of 150 people nationwide, so 11 . .
** obviously -- you knew, ccordination as our business, and sc we.
12 na-"-='*y have to depend en a wide range of experts throughou" 13 the Federal Government to assist us in damage assessments for 14 any ype of emergency or disaster, Mr. Petersen. I 15 COMMISSIONER PE"'ERSON: Ecw many 7ederal agencies we e 16 involved in'analy-ing the air in the Three Mile Island Area? 1~'
. MR. WILCCX: None of them were involved for us, 28 because we had no request from the Governor. Oc you have any 19 idea, Bob?
.'O MR. ADAMCIK: No.
-31 MR. WILCOX: You see, we never had occasion ::
'~
mission any Federal agency for damage assessmen activities
.,3 because we never had this rec. nest. : chink tha: the Gcvernor used good judgmen; in not making the recuest, as i happens.
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n 3-19 I Island, as it existed when I arrived on the scene, was tha: 3 we had -ac Federal groups responding Oc the situation. The 3 technically criented group, headed up by the Nuclear Regu'a-
- o r y C o mn u..ssion, that was respons:.b,e :.or 'nca.;.ents a: the 5 .o_, a. .~. . .e 1.c , a.i d .,..c n .: . .- ,.,;.-,. .= ,, n .
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6 and sampling animal, vegetable, and mineral around the Plant. 7 And there were a number cf Federal agencies werking 6 s : -_..._n. ,y w _; ~.u. . ggC n. ,. p a . ,.a n . c . a=..,. ,. /. ,3 : n e_. -_:- - =.- . a a---, . .u. 9 Service. There were many State agencies: DER a: the state 10 level, and others. 11 r. e y u. _ e m_ . a -g r a. .c : ~. .= ,S a y . ;e ,., a. . .. e y ,_ n_ .- ; v a . a.s
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i 12 the first day, er the second day? When dc they get in o the 13 act? 14 u..n .
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15 M.r . Petersen. I don' t k .cw if Tchn does -- I'm not sure 16 . .w. . .e., , 1 * ~ C"..A..'.~tv AN F. .I'.' ' . * * #.a. k w e ' ' _' *- e .=.h
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. a IS answered. We're going Oc get testimeny from key other Tedera:
19 agencies, and from representatives of 3cvernor T..crnburgh.
.,o I believe we'll be able to get that information, to date.
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3-20 I was.: hat just a rumer? 2 MR. WILCOX: The plan for response provides fc 3 Coast Guard involvement. And I believe that there was a 4 presence. The Coast Guard did have a presence of choppers in 5 the area. Whether the Coast Guard did testing or not. I don' 6 knew. I COMMISSIONER pETERSON: Sur you cannot activate - ask 3 for any activation until the Governcr says there is a dis-9 aster? Is that right? 10 MR. WILCOX: No. Where we can sometimes on an 11 informal basis ask c her Federal agencies to gear up and 13-begin undertaking damage assessment activities when we think 13 that there's going :: be a request from the Governor. We did 14 - not do that in th. s instance for two reasons.
- rs or al.,,
'5 We kept getting information tha: the Governor did no: plan to 16 request an emergency or disaster declaration, and, secondly, i we didn' t need, really, any pre-emergency -- this would 18 probably have fallin in the category of an emergency which
^O calls for providing unique Federal capability. And, we did oo not mission anyone :: do any damage assessment, because --
- n for a second reason, that was, that we fel: that if the l 4
de, ' Governor had made a reques > it was so clear-cu: tha: there were unique Federal resources that should be invoked, that we
. h wculd not have felt compelled to spend any time On a damage
.- ,5 assessment. We would have simply passed the paperwerk through I
_ __ _ _ ~- _ . _ _ - - - 1 l 13-21 1 ' to the 'ihite v cuse almes; simultaneously with its receipt, 2 and proceeded from there. 3 I guess you're Ocuching on an issue tha I mus: 4 =ention. I was concerned abou: the lack of a declaration, l 5 because I felt that it might impede our role, here in 6 Washington, our Ocerations Center, in marching up iRC and Me: a d requirements with the resources c: :.ne :edera. 8 Government. And we frequently did get a question from an 9 agency that we asked 0 help cut, and :ha: question was, 10 what is the funding scurce? 11 And the question, what is the funding source, needn' 12 be asked when there's a disaster and emergency declara:icn. 13 I could not put my finger en a single inciden; where the 14 Federal response -- well, there is one exception, perhaps; but 15 with one possible exception -- where the Federal response 16 was delayed by the lacx of a declaration. I That single incident was where we wanted to ship 18 some cots from Dayton, Chic, Oc Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and 19 the military felt that it could not incur that kind of an 40
~
activity without a funding source, and we then made arrange-al ments with the Red Cross for the trucks -- for the cc:s :: be an
~~
delivered by truck. Su: with that single incident, ~ don'
.,3 believe that there.was any impediment created by the lack of
.,4 a declaration, a
' ~5 C'-M'?$1T KEMI.Tl: ??cfasscr Marrer ?
m- g ,, , , - - - -w w 1-
3, 1 1 3 l' COMMISSIONIR MARRITT: 'fes, I'd like to folicw up en 2 the ccaments having1:o do with the usual procedure, which, i 3 as I understand it, has been for your Agency to ccordina e che ; 4 activities of several agencies. tew , I guess I get a bi l 5 concerned, then, if you say that this has worked out very l 6 - - - w e ., _, :or :, cods, hurricanes, these are n ings w n. experience 7
-- your staff has the expermise en that. But if calling ir.
3 the other agencies would mean, initially, making some evalua-9 tion of the kinds of questions to be asked, because I would 10 assume that'would have determined in part what agencies to 11 call in. Ecw would this work with reference to radiological 12 incidents? How do you decide which agencies', what kinds of 13 questions , are to be dealt with, in terms of making some 14 damage assessment? 15 MR. WILCOX: Well, the simple question of damage 16 . . . . . . assessment is, is the situa:Lon beyond the capability c:- II State and local government to deal with? And then there is 18 also an ancillary question which is, are there special 19 Federal resources that -- you need Federal resources tha can
^0 be brought into play in this situation? And I don' feel a:
41 l all uncomfortable. I feel uncomfortable about a lot of
.m aspects of this situation that we ' re talking about here, but 43
'I don't feel unccmfortable-about cur capability Oc mobilize og the necessary Federal rescurces Oc assis: in a damage assess-l 1
45 ment.
. -,_ __ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ --
2a 3-23 I First of all, in this specific situation, we wouldn : 2 have made a damage assessment. We would have, as I said a 3 moment ago, passed the paperwork thrcugh c the White Mouse, 4 and I think the White House would have respected and under-5 stood that. 6 Seccndly, I. feel that I have a handle, personally
~
-- and I'm sure some of: .my staff people have a be::er handle --
3 on where we turn for that kind of assistance en a pre-declara.- 9 tion basis if we needed it. We would turn Oc EE~d. We would 10 turn to Nuclear Regula cry Commission. These are probably 11 the two principal agencies. We would no doubt turn to the U Defense Civil Preparedness Agency for some assistance. i. 13 COMMISSIONIR MARRITT: Could you go a li le bi: scre 14 into where you would turn in EI'1, what kinds -- what parts? 15 MR. '4:LCOX: Well, new, you're going :c disclose i 16 that I have_generaliced knowledge, but sc=etimes no specific II s knowledge. I'm not sure exactly where we would turn Oc in -- 18 the Public Health Service -- ch, the Center for Disease Central ! 19 in Atlanta, is an organication that we've used quire regu- , i ' -so : larly, and we would no doubt turn to the Center for Disease
.,2 Centrol. We have an ongoing rela icnship with CDC and have !
a man out in Wichita Falls, for example, at the mement, from
,,3
~
COC en a mission assign =ent from us. 3 I-as not unce=fertable. I de nc: feel that even
.'5 l thcugh a nuclear -- radic1cgical acciden is a less probable
,. _ ..l
F. i 3-24 1 event, or in the past, has been though: to be a less probable 2 event, than a ficed - hat we would have any substantial 3 difficulty in missioning Federal agencies : provide us with 4 the necessary information for advising the White House. 5 I would say, in most cases, radic1cgical accidents 6 are sufficiently unusual and complex that we wculd lean in
~
the. direction of reducing time and red tape and predisaster 3 reviews 70 ge: On with the business of providing the unique 9 Federal resources. So for two reasons, I think we knew where 10 to turn, and I think that we would not spend much time 11 turning to them to ge: the answers we'd need for a rec 0= men-8 12 dation : the White House. 13 CHAI?S.AN KDfENY: Governor Sabbitt. 14 COMMISSIONER BABBIhT L. . Mr. Wilcer, did I understand t' 15 you to say that your agency does not have jurisdiction to de 16 emergency planning in advance of radiological problems? < l II MR. WILCOX: We have jurisdiction -- we have a
,3
' 4 program, Governor, that was funded sc=e years ago, Of a quarter l'
of a millien dollars to each State to prepare emergency plans
'o fer any kind of an emergency. Various States have chosen --
21 there were just three States, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Nevada -- which have chosen := include a radiological annex
.,3
~
in their plan, in their everall disaster p*an. _ We have generally encouraged preparing for all kinds
.'5 Of emergencies and disasters, rather than f:r specialized 1
I 1 ,
- e. 2
'!-25 1 . disasters. The reccrd of -- well, okay -- so the answer : o
.ycur question is,.if we are to -- the cnly resources we .nave ' 3 would be through the gran: ef a quarter of a million dellars, 4
and then there's,a minor ascun: of $25,000 in addi icn, a 5 year, provided each State for updating. That's the only rene.r 6 resource foi planning that we could provide to the States. COMMISSIONER BA3BITT: It appears to me from what I'tre 3 read, tha -- the reascn I asked that question is that the 8 NRC has the basic jurisdiction in emergency respense planning 10 for radiological disasters, even thcugh your agency has that 11 responsibility for every c:her kind of disaster. Is tha So accurate? 13 33, g LCCX: No, I -- I can certainly see how that 14
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15 correct impression. I think -"r: -- and I've included in this 16 i packet a letter frem rf predecessor, Mr. Dunn, 00 the Office l 17 I of Management and Budget, in which he said, in that le::er, 1 1 IS that the Federal Disaster Assistance Administra icn wculd 1 19 i be prepared to perform in a radiological inciden precisely
~4 those functions which it performs in any other kind of e=er- ,
21 '
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the generality, the case.
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2 something on that? That seems : contradict what you had 3 said earlier, that you don't have a team cf scientists avail-4 able that could go out on the site and act in such a situation? 5 MR. WILCOX: No, it's not contradic: cry, because ! 6 what I said was, that in every kind of emergency or disaster,
~
we depend on the resources f em other Federal agencies, and i S u.a , _n h.:.s case, _i . -. .e t _n a_ e _, a_ _...n _ o n::. _ ..,,,_ : 3..___ .. c. 9 agencies. It wculd be the enes that we jus: centioned a few ! 10 moments ago. But, in every case -- er in virtually every i 11 case, we lock to c her Federal agencies to assist in the 12 technical aspects of the damage assessment. t 13 So that, while'every disaster is different than 14 every other one, and every kind of disaster is a differen: [ 15 emergency than every other kind of disaster -- crnadoes are a i' 16 differen than hurricanes , and ficods , and se forth , the t
'1' general framework of Federal assistance through the Federal 18 '
Disaster Assistance Administration for this situation would 19 . . .
.ce precisely the same as for any other .ind s c:. s:. uaracn.
.m
~ .
The legislation lists a long list, perhaps as many , t 21 . . . ... . as 20 d...crerent ,xands or. things, :cr wnica we can provide
~
a's sistance . Most of them are natural disasters. ~here is !
.y
~
some man-made disasters , such as fires , listed. And then the , ~ ~y authors cf this legislationsvery ar fully added the words, i
.,5
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,3 3-27 1 the Gove.rnor had made the request, fallen under the category 2 of "other catastrophe" and would have been eligible. Now, 3
I'm not, by implication, criticizing the Governor because, as 4 I said before, I think he made the righ ~ judgment in not 5 so; n : s .~. . 6 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Goverdor Babbirt'.
~
COMMISSIONER SA35!'T: W . Wilcox, the reason I ask S those questions is, I've read a GA0 study which indicates -- 9 the' conclusion of it is that there has been virtually no 10 radiological response planning a: the Federal level, that 11 there has been a complete vacuum, that your agency has no: 12 been in that area at all. And it suggests that the reason 13 for it is that there's been an attempt by the NRC to keep
'4 you out of that area, and that in turn the NRC has no done 15 .
anything. 16 MR. WILCOX: Well, I reviewed that report some weeka I ago. I don't specifically recall that. I think that allega-IS tion would be incorrect. We do not feel tha: the -- there is 19 a document again, which is in the packe: that was issued some
*o
~
months ago, or some years ago, by another agency, the Federal al Preparedness Agency, which states that the lead agency for
~~
radiological incidents is the Nuclear Regula:Ory Commission 23 and the menitoring agency is the Federal Preparedness Agency. New that, hcwever -- what's that actually called,
^5 that document, there? -- Federal Response for ?eacetime 1
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2 which is, as I say, is in the packer, assigns ic a whole 3 variety of agencies a whole variety of planning responsibil - 4 Su tias. that deals with planning. I think you have to 5 keep the planning separate frca -- from the post-emerg=ncy 6 declaration activities, and the Nuclear Regula: cry Commission
~
is the lead agency with respect Oc planning. The Federal 8 Preparedness Agency has the moni cring responsibility. The 9 FDAA has the same -- and' we also have -- FDAA has some minima: 10 planning responsibilities, a: least in terms of reviewing all 11 of the State plans, so that whenever a 5: ate submits a plan la- ' to the NRC, it goes through a regional com=icies en which the 13 FDAA sits. But chat planning operation has to be kept dis-14 tinct from the, what happens when the actual emergency occurs , 15 COMMISSIONIR BA3BITT: Well, that's my c,uestion. > 16 Wouldn't you advocate that you have the planning authcrity as ; 1., i well? 18 u.R . 4 .-v S r C~X . . r. . .u._; nk . h-., . . .u. e s _; . .--e . , _: . . .a t. _, _, _e 10 largely addressed by the full implementa:icn of the plans for t 60
~
the Federal Emergency Managemen: Agency, the so-called FIMA
.,2
~
group, which is new in the early stages of development. And-4.,
~~
. I think one of the firs orders of business will be for FEMA
3
~
and the NRC to si: down and' decide as to who is Oc have the 4;
~
lead planning responsibilities fer nuclear incidents , and what l I as-
~
i division, if any.
3C
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u. t 3-30. 1 you er your staff. ! think you, as a atter of fact, referred ; t 2 Oc seme of the exchanges of correspondence frem the Civil 3 Oefense Coordina:cr as no scre than boiler pla:c. 4 Cees your agency, or any agency in the Federal 5 Government, that you knew of, have the responsibility for 6 advising, assisting, evaluating, the nature c# pre-emergency planning that is going on by the State and local authorities,
~
or is the only way you r..in d cut about it in the-ac.terma n c:- 9 an incident like this one? 10 MR. WILCOX: Well, there are two -- two distinc 11 situations. One is the State plan, in which nine differen: 12 Federal agencies -- several of them are sub-units of HI'd -- l 13 review State plans, and a number of States hava not ecmpleted 14
..u.a. f.ec sa. Some.3 .es . 4. e .s=. .- =.. ' .3 . . 3 c n . .#
5.-cu..w. . . . a. .2.=. , 15 and ! think sometimes through the dereliction of Federal l 16 agencies in not giving the satter high enough priority. 1 ( So that there is opportunity for ce==ent, and then IS the Federal Government, particularly the NRC, rates the t 19 plan as acceptable, with minor =cdifications, er unacceptable ,
~]
with major deficiencies. And the State is so advised, and in e
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adec,uate plan en the par: of the States. i I e,f
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Many States, and again there's scme material in the l
- 45
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packet en that, many states have nc really, so far as we 1
^ l
3, 3-31 1 know, even begua the process of preparing the State p_an. 2 ..w.a. eea_'o- w :_ . u. . .w. .. :
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n..y_: a : a. . _:.. _..u.a. .. ,s._.-,__, .o ,. 3: _-_o . ,y ., 4 as I say -- in the packet -- which describes who has wha: 5 ~ responsibilities with respect Oc that. n summary, the lead 6 agency is NRC. The monitoring agency is the Federal ?repared-l I ness Agency, and nine different agencies, including CCpA, 3 including FOAA, and including varicus units in "I'd, have 9 . . . . rev ew responsib;.,1 _ es. 10 Okay, let's se: that statewide plan situatica aside 11 3;eq ,
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13 the licensee, and the licensee is required by the NRC c pull 14 Oc5 ether varicus documents which purpor c prove tha: there 15 is an emergency response capa....c _ :y in the area c:. the site, . 16 and in fact, Met Ed has a large file -- abeu this chick -- 1*' (. of various letters and dccuments from everybody, almes: -- 1S , ,,, .,
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5 tate from the local governments , that everybody is ready if
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-i-32 -1 . veil down to the local government, where the individual State 2 agency, and say, " Hey, State agency," of "*dey, local govern-
- 3
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_ _' 4 y v . . a . .v .~.' ' v a. s a _# A_ h. a. . a. 4 that you have?" And that's a very substantial and troubleseme 5 ya .
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_ba-6 plan that I've suggested here for a regional radiological
~
response commission centered around every nuclear generating S p,an. ;n _ .u.e
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9 MR. NA"' ALII: Does the establishment of such guide-10 - - . . . lines :or preplann. ng :or the possibill y c:. nue.: ear inci-11 dents -- the establishment of a framework f:r that, is that 1., _= s .= . "v_.ic . .:- " sv
- ." e . ."._' .~. .~ . .h a /< c t.'. f e .~_ e La. s n ~. n' a . ...a. =. R. A.e'. c u _' _A 13 u., e - q,., _3 r e. e d *.o c =. -.-/ o u . '.' ?..=.'~=
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. ye 'a - =. _# a. . . a.d " s . o 15 with the Assistant Administrator of OMB. Is that also your 16 view?
1"
! MR. WILCOX: I have had a somewhat broader view of 18 the FDAA responsibilities than my predecesser, Mr. Iunn, had, 19 and I think that, had I been the Administra:cr a: he time, 49
~
I would have sought to intrude TDAA more in the planning
-31
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l 2 3-33 1 and se forth. And there were c her matters that needed atten-
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so forth, and we have the Federa' Energency Management Agency 5 c , .,_4 .. , - , , ,, .n ,e , ,,,., ._4 . ,, h 9.: .3 3 p ,.,c .y e s e .,. n e y a .- ,s .. .,e.,,.,_.,./,,,,,,, r _ . . . . . t., . . v;gorous way ic address tn..is issue. Bu . nad . us e a. n a c %._: .._: s- . _, . .- ,. _.,_ _ %. a . : _ a.
.. . . . . _ha a. e n. _:
3 2 .# . n s w e -. a. ad-e "_# . .h . a. s e. e c . ., . .'. e . =.d .' .'. g _#
. _= _' ..i.=...._'..~3 9
responsibilities, I wculd have scught a more vigcrous role 10 r m: . . _:2-- . . ., ._:
.aor he .,de,.,_, D .: =. a s e .
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.- . .,.,.u- .. Ac.. _ . n _. .u. ., . . _
11 now has. 1.,
.u.g.
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3.." brief questions, if I =ay. I think ycu indicated tha: 14 o . ,,. a , ,/an.2 .,
. . . . _ .s ene c.a
..u e. .u.,,,,.,.
. . . m- . .,. . , s _. .u. a . s. . e s .: ,..~. ,. , a , .
15
. .,.d.4 c. 3 g_er .a., p _1, nn _: .. g 4... e_, -
. .4 .,. .. ... p ., .. . =- _u.a.
.. r. ...r._.3 16 MR. WII.CCX: In the . clan, in the State plan which 1.
we funded, there is an annex to the Stata plan which the ?OAA IS funded for radiological response. As I indicare here, it's se generalized as :I, ce virtually worthless in my view. 20 Other States have really done much scre, I believe, l Than Pennsylvania. Althcugh I haven't reviewed those p'.ans l personally, but since they've gone thrcugh,a rigcrcus process
.,3 c: intera.ency rev.ew, and since the NRC in perhaps 12 cases
.ih S..= s o a_' d
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)
I
4 1 4 as l l 1-34 1 more than adequate plans, and c hers do net. l e 1 1 2 MR. NATALIE: Is the Pennsylvania State Plan tha: 3 you have described as vague, One of the plans tha: The .NRC l I 4 has evaluated and described as adequate? l 5 w . wrrCCX-
.u.m - . .No . .v.. . .V.
~
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-a )
i i
. here: Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Delaware, is that !
I I Florida? - Alabama, South Carolina, Arizona, what's tha -- 5 Iowa? -- Kansas, California, Washington. These 12 3:stes 9 have he.d their State radiological emergency response plans 10 concurred in by the NRC. The others -- we have 15 where there 11 are not concurrence, and there are a number of others where la - we are not aware or what the precise situation is. 13
., MR. NATALII: Does the 5:ste of Pennsv.ivania appear \
14 . 34.., on .na.. --a.. 15 33, y,LCOX: No, it does not. i 16 MR. NATALII: That's all, Mr. Chairman. II CHAIRMAN KIMINY: Thank you. Let's see, Governor 18 Peterson and then Commissioner McPherson. 18 CCMMISSICNIR PETERSCN: Mr. Wilecx, if an invisible 1 0 cloud of radioactive material emanated from a plant and tha:
.1
~
plant didn't tell -- had occurred, when would you er the o., i ecvernor or anybody e, se ,- earn about it, an, new,. 4 1 43 MR. WILCCX: Well, we learned abcur this plan frc= l a a
\
The United Press, about 10:30 Wednesday =crning.
~
t Ihere -- ' i i
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2 bilities, and really anything that we coulf de as an agency, 3 when the Governor'made an emergency recuest of the President. That's the normal way in which we formally learn about it. 0 M C.Ctu.M s~ s~ T.vdrp .. .c . v >.5. 0 rJ .. v_: A_ y..ou <na.v . .. n_.:_.__._n_.. ,_ , 8 : 2w*.aw,9
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nedia got that because the plan itself said tha: they had a 10 -f. ,e b 3. _ m . r.s ..ha . gh.3 e 11 MR. WI!CCX: Yes. here are precedures for the 3 1.=. n . *. o .a.o _ _# .' y . h a 5 w a . a. F..e va -.
. . ..e a.
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13
.#ami_' _4 a.- w#_ ..". *..".e ^_ e a _# _' a- . ." . ".c s e _ =_ su _# .- =...e n
. 2 .
14 COMMISS~0NER FITIRSON: But my question is, i# The 1 15
- 3. , an d__4 - dn ' w d o *..". a - , _' a ~. 5. e =. = a v me b. o d'/
7 _4m- . = n _# ...- '. '. c ' ._4 . . g ?. 16 Testing? To know whether this is happening in our communi-1
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IS v.c.
.. . gr.r w,og r. o.g. _. .t. . .k.a w . . " . = . c,"m e s
_#v - . . '. . a =, . - *, e 19 directed to the Bureau of Radiological Health of the Occmon-ao
~
wealth of Pennsylvania. I knew tha: these bureaus c' radio-33 1 -g 4_ .,., ge a_, _.g.
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of them are_ weak. I would hcpe that this Consission nigh:
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2/ '3-35 1 capabiity and it not only varies frcm State to State-but i , 2 .may in fact vary.from year to year, depending on the appre-3 priations which the Bureau of Radiological Health received 4 from -he State Legislature. ' 3- COMMISSICMER PETERSON: And now the radiological, 6 hypothetical cloud dcesn't pay much attention to State beun-I daries. Isn'tthataFederalresponsibiliy,-to-belookinga} 3 This, and not relying upon the State from which the hype:he-9 tical cloud emanated.to do the job? 10 MR. WILCOX: I think you have to direc: tha: 0ues-11 tion :0 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I just don't know. 1., Yes -- Governor, cerha:s I was CEAIRMAN KEMENY: . . e 13 negligent in not mentioning the list of people who will be 14 You will have ample opper: unity. We are testifying today. 15 going to hear the Union of Concerned Scientists, frem the I?A, 16 from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, from HEW, from we 1- representatives cui the Governor of ?ennsylvania, and cmcrrow 18 frem the Department of Energy, so you will have many opper-19
- unities to return to this. C -~4ssioner McPherson?
a0 MR WILCOX.:. Mr. McConnell suggests- . hat
.1
~
IPA has responsibilities in this area char you might wan: Oc i
- o.,ow
. s_ up on.
^3
~
CEAIRMAN KEMENY: Yes. C =missioner McPhersen?
.q
~
COMMISSIONER MCPEERSON: Well. Mr. Wilcox, does-45
~
your agency have any rssponsibility f:r cecrdinating public e
- e-i , + - , e- , mw>f
38
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2 and you are called in -- cr, in this role, even withcu: the 3 Governor's decision that he would ask for that declaration, 4 s- .f ou ..av. w . -.. ,,y -.sycnseue,4./
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.ac u1 A - .e u .o147 MR. WILCOX: There really are two questicas. One ne
'is, what happene,. .n this spectric situatten, anc wna ,s 9
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.n .h e s sp e e. _: .J- s;.,a
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_ --. , .k 4..c _a 10 head of public information of TDAA, was sen: Oc Harrisburg : 11 L work with the State, and he really, 0 a degree, was sen 1.,
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13 u lly concurred .n that action.
-. r. nere again, . :'s our posi-
*4 1
tion thad whenever the S are wants : be out in fran , we 15 eaccurage and welecte that, 16 The State handled -- there was scme confusion, as 1
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. 2. '_ a # - w e . .k =. d w #. ..'. . k.. a. .- . ur. . =..- a.- . .# . .
19 the Governor's office and others, but the releases pur cut'by
^0 us on behalf of various federal agencies, I think there was
.a only one release and that was -- kind of -- the release tha l
was sen: Out be:. Ore -- when we were fo.da.ng up our ac _ vi::es
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. 38 .I we have more of a role to advise the public cf available 2 Tederal programs, temporary housing and so f:rth. Sc that we 3 tend, in a disaster -- say, a flood -- c be nuch T.cre cut in 4
front with the, again, the concurrence of the S:are, in.com- ! 5 municating to the public what programs of assistance are 6 available. Again, we try to work within the framework Of the 3 State's desires on the matter. O CCMMISSIONZR MCPHERSON: 3ut you would -- it would 10 not be anyone from your agency who would help to determine 11 whether the public was told that it should evacuate if the 12 situation was becoming rapidly more sericus. You wouldn': 13 have a role in that? 14 MR. WILCOX: Well, I would think that if Governer 15 Thornburgh had decided to evacuate an area of a certain size 1 16 or dimension, that we would have helped with the public I l' statements and so forth, with respect :: it. Whether we 18 < would have issued any in our Own name er not, I rather doub l i 10 that we would, because of':he general framework with which 40
- i this thing was handled in Harrisburg. !
1
.1 Do you want to con =ent further on wha: Sob 31 air )i 44 i
'^'
did, because you were there, Seb? I I I
.,3 MR. ADAMCIX: Cur main purpose, again, in being
-34 there, was to provide assistance to Governer Thornburg, and
.,5 i =ediately Bob Blair frem cur staff me up with the Geverncris l
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5 was 'alsc. One decision then made, that Mr. Centon would be __ . , syo
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I u 3 u0 seb 3 . nut. WILCOX: Thank you very much,'4r. Chairman. 2 We would be happy to make any of cur files available to the ; staff cr'the commission, or whatever would be helpful. 4 CHAIRMAN KE'.INY: Thank you. I'm certain we'll 5 call en you as we go along. 6 MR. MCCCITNZLL: Mr. Chairman, may I submit a paper which may add to your body of information? It answers two e c.uestions> what was the responsibility of DC?A for response g in peacetime nuclear emergency, and what have been the activ-10 ities of DCPA in the Three Mile Island Inciden in Pennsylvania. 11 I think -- in CHAIRMAN KIMDfY: Very geod. Thank you. 13 KR. MCCONNELL: -- the answers to these questions 14 will out a lot of thinss in perspective. 15 CHAI?J4AN KIMINY: Thank you, we appreciate that. 16 Let's see, may I call on Mr. Rober: ?cIlard of the Union of 1~ Concerned Scientists? Mr. ?cilard, may I ask you :: intro-19 duce yourself for our official record?
- 19. MR. POLLARD: Certainly, my name is Rober:
19 Pollard. I'm a nuclear safety engineer with the Union of 21 Concerned Scientists. I do not have a prepared statement. 23 When I' talked with Miss La3cmbard, I was told an informal
)
23 statement, basically, -- that I would like to give you a 24' short su==ation of what I think the Committee ough: Oc icok- ; 25 into in its investiga:icn, and also some race =mentations as 4 i 1 1.- - _ - - -, . . .
t
.. . I 3-41-scbL 1 Oc.. hew to do that.
2 CEAIRMAN KIME:iY: That would be fine. Please pro-3 caed. 4 MR. PCLLARD 3efore I begin, I think I should a: 5' least give you a brief summary of wha; the Union cf Concerned d Scientists is, as well as my own background. I guess we 7 Jall.in the caragory ci wha:'s 1:csely referred to as the B 'public interes group. I 's a non-profi: coaliti:n of 9 scientists and engineers, and we're supper ed by public 10 contributions from over 70,000 members, or spcascrs. 11 My own background is that I was~in the nuclear pro-
~ 12 gram of the United States Navy for six years. I was ar 13 instructor training reactor opera: Ors, was aboard a nuc' ear -
14 submarine in charge of the reactor con:rci division. I have 15 been employed by the Nuclear Regula cry Commission from 16 July of 1969 until February of '75, when I resigned. A: 17 the time I resigned from the Nuclear Regula: cry Cc= mission, 18 sy position was Project Manager, and I was in charge of
<9
. licensing, or processing the license applica ens : r seven O' Since my resignation I have worked for the Union plants.
.1 of Ccncerned Scientists.
In =y presentation,.what I'd like : - de is jus: 1
.,3 j go into two broad categories ; my recommendati:ns as :: wha
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3 a2 a3 I course, cuite obvious that you are go ng to ,ock inte the . a f a- . # u .' a.=
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- v. u 4 are also going Oc have te leck at events which, in my opinien ,
5 s.
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6 is to look into heu does the Nuclear ?.egulatory Commission
~
operate, how does it de its reviews, hcw adequare are its a .# .... a .,. . r.., on.se- c 6#ya~ a_ x. .,.... , of a n;=_#-
- n. . . /.- n u , --_ . n .: ...g, 9 as you're icoking at what happened a: the Three Mile Island 10 accident, you should also be locking to identify which of 11 the long-standing, unresolved safety issues a'"ected the 12 accident at Three Mile Island.
13 te ..e wac.>. up a '.#.
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15 lis: of technical issues which they classed as generic; tha: 16 whey .,.,,pl#,a
-=
4
. . - e.4 w..
. . . . a ., _, .__,c.-.s c,. , ,.-. ,,., .- ._ _ c _
1~ - tors of a given type. Unt:.1 sy resignation, tha; 1:.s: was IS e .. w..wge,a.-....w...e ~ p u,b _1 _# .#o- . c w a v = # .' =_b _' e - . .k. a. f u " .' _# -- 19 and the NRC has #iled the report with Cen eress, identifvin .: . _ 20 the technical aspects of safety probleme which are still being
.,3 researched and investigated. And ! -- and I'm heping, c#
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Mile Island accident itself, I -- I would recon =end that you
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also, in .2. coking a: that accident, 'ce aware cf what has new 3 w.een c-,,,.,.s. ,, ,, p e . a. .c.. ., ., .., .. . , r
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- w. . - .yc 10 valves in the wrong position,
- have nc identi#iad a sing'e 11 errer en the par: of the opera crs. I: appears to ne frcs 12 what information is new available , the operaters fo'.lcwed .
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- 5. c c. e 5 can be accc=plished is to reduce the chances that such similar 6
accidents can happen in the future by resuirin . 3 the resolu-7 tion of sa#ety probla=s when they 're .identi'ied rather than 3 si= ply continuing to license clients. 9 We ' d '..# .>. e . 0 ." . n . w 'o . .# =. .# ' /+
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10 tions as to how I think that you're investiga:icn should be 11 done for the purpose of assuring that whatever your recommen- ' 12 dations are at the end, tha: they will be received with a 13 _. de=' o .' - . = ed.# S. .# _' _# +y _" y
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15 Regulatory Cc=sission Cc==issioners, Mr. ?erer Bradford, in 16 h s testi=cny of May 22nd, 1973 be'ere the Sub-Cc==ittee on 1"' Energy and the Environment of the Ecuse Cc==ittee On Interier t IS and Insular Affairs. One of the main points he made there 19 yas .5..e d' s . # n c . # o n ' e .we ...
. .#..~~..a.' a_. .d .3 ...#.- . a ' 'n e _a #.. i ~3 s , ;
40 between adjudicatory and legislative type hearings. And One
-31 of the main points he made was, the nere informal the hearing, o.,
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.,3 cial rescurces to parade before you wi ness after witness
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3 u5 as 1 crcss-examination, can easily, just by the cumulative effect 2 of repeating the same thing over and ever again, have.a ten-3 dency to prevail. Unfortunately, I don't believe such acticns 4 would be limited o the nuclear industry which obviously has 5 a financial state in the recommendations tha: this C::=issien 6 might make. Unfortunately, it's also applicable to the
~
Nuclear Regulatory Ccemission itself. ! think before you 3 proceed ::o far into your investigation, I wculd rec 0 :end 9 that you go back and examine some of the documents that have 10 been released from inside the agency which were written by 11 Dr. Joseph Hendree who is Chairman of the !!uclear Regulatory 12 Cc= mission.
~
curlined the contents Of some of those docu-13 ments in my testimony before Mr. Dingle last July and I have 14 given a ecpy cf my testi=cny to one of your staff me=bers 15 already.
- 16 -. . . 4 The second aspect c: new you condue: your _nves: - ,
i II gation; I -- I think you should give serious considera:icn 18
- having no closed sessions, whatsoever. I say this, cf ,
'O course, not because of anything this Commission has done be-cause -youf re j ust getting started,*out .1 coking a: the his:Ory al
~
of the nuclear' program, the enumerable Government investiga- ; 44 tions and Governcent _ studies , it has taken a grea deal of
~3 time, but eventually it's been shown tha: the study itself,
.,4
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in Mr. Bradferd's words of last May, "' ..were silenced and
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rigged and suppressed cafety studies". And se whan people
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3-46. L7 1 like myself who-try to work in this field resign and :nen 2 .beccme critical, I am simply labeled, " anti-nuclear" and 3 therefore, they think they can discount my technical views. 4 And Mr. Bradford, I think, summed it up quite correctly that 5 as criticism of the nuclear pcwer industry grew, Mr. Brad-t 6 ford said, "Those who participated in the initial misjudg-
~
ments behaved as though open-minded re-evaluations would be 8 admissions of previous errors. Instead they blamed the 9 nuclear power's troubles on delays and losses of confidence i-
. 10 caused by its critics whose patrierism and integrity and 11 allegiance to the American dream were subtly or not so subtly 12 called into question." And so I think that in doing our 13 work; I can understand why you would want to have some execu-14 tive sessions perhaps Oc discuss the hiring of your staff and 15 '
so on, but I really think you ought to give serious considera-16 - -
- en to minimicing the -- the amount of closed meetings you II might have.
18 CHAIRMAN XIMENY: Yes. May I jus; comment on that? 19 I knew there are a number of people here today who weren' here yesterday. We had briefing from legal counsel, public
.1 briefing where legal counsel instructed us that we can mee:
44 '
~
in executive session only under the most exceptional circum-a3 stances such as discussing -- MR. POLLARD: 7ery goed. CHAIRMAN KEMENY: -- such as discussing the r *
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5 and by desire, our meetings will be open --
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10 .MR . POLLARD: And then my final reconmendarien is, 11 hcw wculd you present your views to the public when you com-12 plete your investiga:icn. I think here, given the complexity 13 of the technical issues, given the relatively shcr time tha: 14 you have to complete ycur task, I would also recommend tha 15 you give serious consideration to publishing a draf: report 16 and allcwing someti== for public conmen; because when it is 1 such a technical area and there are going ic be completely is cpposing viewpoints presented to you :.n :ne course or your . . . il 18 investigation, it .could be very easily bec0=e, perhaps, a "O I misunderstanding at some point that someone was naking, and I ! 21
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o., for public comment would enhance your final produer. -! a3 have jus: Oc d you, e nave Oc to sumri::e wha . m a4 A .'* .._
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rli 3 a8 as I how the regulatory program worked that led up : the accident . 2 that you shculd look at costs c her than these cos s tha: 3 s can be measured in dellars and cents, that you should lock 4 at long-standing, unresolved safety problems that had really 5 nothing to do with the Three Mile Island accident, but have 6 . o . e n . 4 _,.
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I in -- in conducting your investiga:ien, to try and recognize 3 the informal hearings; the pecple with the most money have 9 the most opportunity Oc present their views repeatedly, and 10 the second reccc=endation as you've already indicated you've 11 adopted, of holding open meetings , and then finally, perhaps ,
~
12 considering issuing a draft reper: with opportunity for publil 13 comment. Thank you. l*' CMAIRMAN KEENY: Thank you. And may pursue -- 15 since you put particular emphasis on unresolved safety issues , 16 - may I request that you sucmi 0 the Commission in writing, a 17 list, not today obviously, but submit a lis: cf these issues 18 you censider as unresolved safety issues? 19 MR, POLLARD: I -- ! certainly will, Mr. Chairman. a0 I should also recommend along those lines, that ycu obtain
.n
~~
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission lists and the lists of the Advisory Cc=mittee on reactor safeguards. These ge back as
*3 early as, I believe, 1972 or '73. The mes recen: public
-9 list frc= the Nuclear Regula:Ory Commission is a report ::
Congress, January 1st of 1973 with the report . umber cf
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3 C:'AIRMMi XI'4EMY : Thank you. Could , just again, 4 4
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9 exa=ple that's directly related to the sequence of events at 10 Three Mile Island or cerha:s two. . . . 11 One of the issues that has been around long before 12 I resi ned 5 was the question of, is there adequate instrumenta-13 tion in nuclear plants to monitor the ecndition c" the plant 14 ,
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the generic safety problem is that the Nuclear Regulatory 13 Cecmission has still nc: decided even what should be monitored. 19 ' ' m *-
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4 amount of radiation was seriously underestimated, the amount o c:. t:.me :n.at these :..nstruments must rema n opera.,e . c_ was 6 seriously underestimated. l l
. :. - g.;ve you perhaps, another example that was nc:
a S .# ..vo_' v a.d # n ..ha. "."..~. = =. .v._ _#.=., bu. _ =_ ..-'_ a..d _= ~ ~4 de.... .5_'o-9 ac.c. lies to all other plants as well, is the question of fires. 10 In 1975 there.was a very serious " ire in the Brownsbury Plant 11 in Alabama. Ever since then the Nuclear Regula:Ory Ccamission 12 has been reevaluating fire protection in nuclear p'. ants. On 13 r.eb.ua-'] ...k. o.' .5 .4 s Ja.a. ,
. . . . .v.. . N., e . . .w--. a.4. . . a - e -y =. =. . c . .". e 14 Commissioners describing the curren: status cf that revicw.
15 Out of the plants we new have in operation, accordin S Oc Mr. 16 Denton, only eight plants have adequate fire protection. 17 Four years after the Brownsbury fire, they have not even ye: 18 reviewed twelve other operating plants and 51 cperating i 19 -,a. - ~ -
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20 cables arranged in'such inadequate fire protection that i.' . a i
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I want to le: the plants keep operating anyway en the basis tha-n - . .u. , . . -
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.. ._ _,x,e _..u.e 3 risk. Then they recommended :: he Commission that all of 4 these plants be allowed := continue in operation f:r :i=es 5 ranging fer two or three. years, until it's convenient during
'i a scheduled shutdown to go in and put in the basic safety 7 features that are needed. Sut they don't want :: be unduly S harsh on the nuclear industry and order it shurdcwn new.
9 That has been the attitude of the agency in the past. I: is 10 what caused my resignation, principally, when there's a con-I i n .e__, s. _. . , , .,.,] ... 4 . e _s : . 3 ..so,ved . _ "']
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. n 12 to prerect the health of the nuclear industry rather than 13 the health and safety of the public.
14 CMAIRMMI KIMI:fY: Questions from C ==issioners? 15 Professer Taylor? 16 CCMMISSIONIR TAYLCR: What do you mean by "inf rmal 17 meetings of the Commissien"? I'd -- 18 MR. POLLAF.D: Well, I -- I am -- 19 C CW_ .a~ S - 'C N '., 'i.m.. C .=. . -- __ka. .o 3=.. _' . .= . .
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=cre clear about that.
al MR.'?OLLARD: -- I am making an assumption that you
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are not going to have a-legal type of hearing where the par-U ties will present themselves, the :her parties could have , 2' disecvery and cross-e:< amine each of the witnesses before you.
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'2 consider for particular aspects of your investigari:n, par-3 ticularly when you get into the technical areas. Ehe detailed 4-analysis of what happened at Three Mile Island. Yes, I do 5
think you ought to censider using an adjudica cry hearing, 6 swearing people in ..: you have such autacrt:y, so ina: :ney,re . . - under both the' threat and protection -- 5 CHAIRFJ.N KEMENY: Jus: -- =ay : jus poin cc , the 9 White House has requested frc= Congress , e:cpeditious action ' 10 on both subpoena power and the power := take testimony under .
'I cath, and has made it clear tha: that's a very high priority la-for this Commission so we --
13 MR. POLLARD: Well, that would be goed. I think -- 14 CHAIRMAlf KEME'Cf: -- this is why in this sessi n 15 we're taking quite informal restimony because we don' ye: 16 have the power to do so. We certainly plan : take a grea: deal of testimony under cath. IS MR. ?OLLARD: Ch, yes, sir. I -- am no: -- per-haps I should say again; I did not come here at all criti-20 . - c :e yeu; A was just -- 4.1 CHAIRF).N KEMENY: No, I did no: take your remark 4., That way.
.3 MR. POLLARD: -- give ycu my rec ==endations frc=
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1 CHAIRMMI KIME.Tl: Governer Peterson? - 2 COMMISSIONZR PETERSON: It wculd seem to me tha: the 3 prime location for talent in con:rciling the operation Of 4 The reactors was on the plant site rather than bach at a 5 .f uc., e ar
.,.e gu., atory Cc=m:.ssion cr :ce in ,was..nington or in a An view c., your experience, ,o 9 governor,s c::..1ce and so on. ,
you think we have adequare talent today in the operating 8 plants tc cope with the pctential problems? 9 MR. POLLARD: I think in scme respects I have to be 10 careful to answer your question, because I have act, in my 11 wc . .u. w.a ..g m.g e y. uc _, -.. .. . o.e g,., _3 _ m- y cw _. _ a s _: _ . . , w e ._ n : . . 4 .~ ,. . . _, y 12 involved with the training and licensing of c0=mercial reacto? 13 cpera crs. I see scme weaknesses in comparing the Occmercial 14 program with the Navy program, but from my own experience in 15 working with utilities on particular plants, I would say tha 16 you have a range of answers to your question. I think some 17 - - < - - -- ut:11: es do have outstanding capac. 110:es on their star . 18 l I think in other utilities you will find a terrible weakness t l' l in terms of the competence of their people. To give -- be "O more specific about it, the licensing of reacter Operators 21 themselves is, of course, an area to be looked into and their '
.m training. Sur you shculd also recognice that the people who i
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~'4 l operator must rely uo.on, are no: licensed b.y the Nuclear !
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.n Regulatory Cc=misr_cn, and I have ne'ier quite unders::cd why
4 3-5a. 55 1 you bother :: license a =an who reads the meter and no: license 2 the man who calibrates the meter and makes sure whether er no-
-3. it's giving accurate information. Of course in the Navy we t
4 didn't have this problem because we didn't have s tany : 5 people and se the very same human being wac both the man who 6 calibrated as well as be the reactor operator.
~
As far as the implication I've heard ccming from 8 some Congressional ec=mittees and other people, putting a
'9 resident inspec cr en site, hopefully trying to that way 10 prevent future accidents, I would say that was primarily a 11 c., s ~-e .d_ c ac . ' c .. . %. ..a . 4 *aon' ~
do = 3.=.=.. . e_=_ .. -
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12 have a great deal of effect en preventing improper Operations ; 13 and -- well, to give you an example of the curren: s:stus of 14 the understanding of the residen inspector program, the , 15 NRC recently commissioned an opinion survey of all the per-16 sonnel working in the inspection and enforcement branch. One 1-of the multiple choice questions on the survey was, "How well ' 13 de you understand the residen inspector program?" And I be-18 lieve the figures were un percent of all of the employees in a0 the inspection and enforcement division said they underst cd i
*11 l
~'
the resident inspector program very thoroughly. Unfortunate 1*, ' ' only.13 percen of the inspec:crs gave that as their answer.
.,3 I'm not sure I was terally responsive :: ycur question. :
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1 CEA:?. MAN KEMENY: Mr. Administra:Or, may I ask you jus: 2 for the record to introduce yourself and ycur associates? 3 MR. COSTLE: d be happy te, Mr. Chairman. I'm 4 Dou.'as r.~s.'a, and -'.. ..w.e
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a . =.-. . .3 ..".a. . ..'/ _3 .- . . e n . =_'_ 5 Protection Agency. To my lef; is Dr. ?.ichard Ocwd, who is 6
=y Chief Science Advisor. And to my righ; is Or. Stephen
~
Gage, who is the Assistan: Administrat:r for 3esearch and 3 Development at EPA. It was really the three of us who consti - 8 tuted a com=and center, at least a EPA, during the Three 10 Mile Island incident. And I wanted := introduce them to the 11 Committee, and to also indicate that we will be available anc la accessible to the Occmi::ee at their convenience a any :ine 13 ~ i during the course of your deliberations. appreciate, Mr. 14 Chairman, an opportunity to meet with you informally, and to 15 ive you some preliminary thoughts on the work of the Commi:- 16 tee, and to briefly lay cut for you a li::le bi: about EPA's I
- role during the Three Mile incident.
18 I feel strongly tha: there are a number of very 19 serious questions that have to be resolved by this Cetmittee
~4 in order to provide the public with the kind of assurance
~32
- hat all the righ questions have been asked, and tha: the
~~
answers, hewever the answers look, in fact are brough: to the
~33 ~
fare. can think of perhaps no other Oct=ission in rela-
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3 we had no already taken we migh wish :: take. Based on
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4 _.. u... s. e.. . -y e .. y _, ue .a,ne . c.: a _:.. _ .. g _: n 3 5 water supplies within a 40 mile radius, because in the even 6 of a major release, we would have had the federal responsi-
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10 the impact of an evacuation and what might be required c have 11 _..u.. , _. c,. ._ e c . .: . 4. ._ w.. . .. 12 m.. b g_.. ,. -s .,.y . c . n _4n3 _ ou,- ,,. .,.-. y,A. : u. . g. - . _; o.- u g- e.
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14 and we joined with the 'ihice 'icuse Emersencv. 2. esc.ense eam av 15 mee ings on Saturday. 16 On Sunday our nonitoring system was ccepletely de-1"' plcyed, and we were obtaining through our instrur.ents our 1 1 IS .. , , . .
- rst rad:. at cn neasure=ents. .few , we had .ceen rece:.v ng,
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~m had been gathered at the site preliminary :c that point in ) .,3 ~
time, and had been assessing that data.
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1 i 5 , 1 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Fced and Drug Admini-1 a stra:icn, :: pcci che information that was being obtained I l 3 frem monitoring and surveillance instruments, " rem facd l l 4 samples, and 0 assure a quality check on the data tha was i 5 being obtained. And, of course, we me in an advisory capac-6 icy with MEW and with the Nuclear Regula:Ory Commission as 7 they discussed contingency plans for emergency evacuation, 3 should that have been necessary. 9 Sy Monday, I think, we had pre::y much established 10 a routine for surveillance and =cnitoring. And that system 11 is still basically in place. We really approached i from 12 two points of view. One, from the moment that we were noti-13 fied that it was a serious situation, in deploying as quick 1*, 14 as we could, and'being prepared for any immediate contingen-15 cies. But also the sense that we were going to have a mess 16 on our hands up there for seme time into the future, in that II the clean-up operations would present scme risk of radiation
'S release. And we just have operated en the assumption tha:
19 we would centinue to maintain a capacity in the Harrisburg "O
~
area, in order to ensure that we were adequately moni:Oring
.3 and instrumented Oc follow the evolu : n or that plan through
~
I shur-down and through eventual clean-up. a3
- f I can just make a couple of Observations --
.,4
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again in line with your invita icn, Mr. Chairman, the things
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OJ 1 - =es: -- ' from my perspective, one of the mos serious questiers 2 is - -relatas to timing. I: is clear tha: the gravi y of the 3 situdrica seems to-have emerged very slowly. In retrospect, 4 we've been told, again second-hand, that it appears tha: the , 5 reactor core was probably uncovered a substantial par: of the 6 day on Wednesday, or may have been uncovered a substantial
~
part of the day on Wednesday, but that was no kncwn. In any S event, the first real signal of a serious situation did no 9 reach me until yriday morning. And I think what was happen-
\ 10 '
ing in those first two days, why wasn't more information be-11 ing communicated, was there more information : he communica-12 red, and :o whom, is a very serious question in my mind. 13 Secondly, not only in those firs: two days, but, I 14 think in subsequent days, there was -- we, a: 1.e a s t , at EPA . 15 have a sense that there was a lot of noise in the communica-16 tion system, among all of the involved parties. Put another 17 way, the best information that we were getting on wha; was 18 actually happening inside the reactor and inside the plan: 19 was essentially that which we were getting through the L lea r o Regulatory Commission. And it could be, therefore, no better
.,3 than the information tha: the Nuclear Regulatory Commission -
o., itself was getting.- I think that's another area that needs
*3 to be probed pretty carefully.
.,4 My impression, frankly, is that once the gravity
.33 of the situation became clear, the federal agencies moved
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-2 This Commission actually interroga:s that, an asser icn, and 3 satisfy itself that as information became available, the 4 federal establishment, whether it be IPA cr :iEW cr anyone 5
else, really did the best job'they could under the 6 circumstances.
~
'T think that another issue tha: the Commission 8
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9 during this incident was, in fact, adequare. I' feel personal - 10 ly assured, with respect :c the time period Saturday on. 11 That's largely a function of ny ccafidence in my team. Bu: 12 I think that we would ask the question, and would encourage 13 you to ask the question, about whether the =cnitoring data 14 that was being collected in the firs: two days was in fac 15 adequare. We have no reason c think tha: the data was not, 16 but I think it's a question that needs to be asked. Our 1 impression is tha: the surveillance instrumentatica that was IS available i==ediately after the inciden was essentially tha-19 that is routinely in place around nuclear power plants. And ao
~
1 I guess the bottom line question is: is that adecuate? al-
~ l I think that another area that bears probing is the ,
I 4.,
~~
adecuacy of bc h state and federal implementati:n plans f:r A* rescenses to nuc ear inca,ents.
. th. nx the issue c:. ne I
. ~.,4 clarity of responsibility for con:rcl -- for example, if you as
~
have a damaged cere, reactor core' operation, wP is really l 1 l
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i 1 1 in charge? And how is that decided? And I think also a ! 2 c ' =- -"-# - "j o .# = . =. s c. e ns # b ' '- # .,*
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3 =cnitoring, c::sare plans , including evacua:Len p' ans . Are 4 there ' clear lines of authority? :s there a clear contingency
. t 0 plan? In shcr , is there an operations plan for situations 6
like this, and if so, is it adequate? And : think probably I one of the most-heloful services that.this C = mission can ; 3 l provide is to help lay out your best jud5 ment of what it 9 would take to be adequately prepared. 10 And I think, finally, the very obvious se: Of 11 - of :ne training c:- pec-c.ues:Lons that relate to che adec.uac 12 ple, both with the utility, with the federal governmen:, in 13 terms of their ability to respond :: events. And I would 14 say you've really got :: look at federal, state and utility 15
- c. ersonnel :..n that res:ect. .
16 . . A have just skatened out in very. prel.m:. nary :orn myself, Mr. Chairman, several suggested questions which : 15 will give to you for your consideration. Su: they range everywhere from issues of fact, such as with respec : the
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reactor operations itself, why weren't the valves noticed in 21 the off position.scener, : why were the gauges apparently j
~~
. indicating incorrectly, questions of fact along those lines, al., the way into issues of =anagemen -- why was there sc i
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rather chan go through all of these, I'd be happy :: make l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ __
9 56 1 these available c you. They're really incended c be no 2 "*
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your shoes, what questions would we he asking, what are some 4 of the questions we'd be asking. And as I unders cod your 5 invitation, that's precisely what you wanted. 6 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: That's precisely what we are
~
hoping you would do. 3 MR. COSTLE: And there are, as you'll see, there are 9 a number, and I'= sure there will be scre that will 20ce up 10 as well. It would be maybe helpful, Mr. Chairman -- several 11 things have occurred c us, in icoking back on what happened 12 du .34.7- ..h a . , ,a.- ..# ."_' _=_ _1'/ d"..ad..3. - ..'a.
.#_#.s. =ev=...-day e..#.c, 13 that I'd like to share with you.
14 One is a questica that cccurs :: us, and that is: 15 should the Nuclear Regular:ry Commission rec,uire the utilitie s 16 to provide measurements of key reactor Operating variables cr. 1e a telemetered basis. Also, radiation monitoring data both 18 onsite and o ffsite, on a telemetered basis . 'ihat I'm ge ing 19 at is that via a telemetering network tied to the NRC or to
*0
~
the state offices, er oth, even with several hundred reactors 21 across the country, these key parameters could be fed instan. 44
~
raneously into an NRC computer in 3ethesda, which can handle a3 m_: _, _, m. _ n s n. .: . ;_. .o o . c .: : _ ....
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24 viewed, essentially, by the computer and ecmpared :: the ner-
~
mal values once a second, virtually. And if key data fell
n 1 I 1
-W -,
3/ I 1 cu; side those acr=al deviations, the computer could alarm the 2 NRC staff : follow up. It ~ appears tha: there was a lag 3 4 time .nvolved in :ne c0==unication of information to people 4 throughout this system, ar.d it =ay be that we're missing an 5 could nake opportunity that space age cccmunica:icns in fac
'6 available to us at a reasonable cost.
~
' CHAIRMAN KEMENY: May I paraphrase that as saying 3
you're suggesting, in effect, an intensive care situation f : 9 nuclear pcwer plants? 10 MR. COSTLI: That's exactly right, Mr. Chairman. 11 I think there is a questica about whether the NRC shouldn' 12 be requiring a frequent upgrade in reac:cr opera: Ors, with 13 continued emphasis on how to respond to emergency situations, 14 not just how do you handle routine operations. This is anal-15-ogous, as I mentioned to you the c her day,'dr. Chairman, to 16 the FAA relicensina of c =mercial pilots. There are prece-dents for this kind of approach.
*S And then, I think, a questi0n tha: the federal 19 government must answer is should we be in a pcsi icn in' he a0 future, should an event like this happen, to have a radiolog-.
.,2
~
ical accident response team identified and possessed Of the
.,a capability of being in the air within One hour frem the time 23 the aler; is scunded? And if so, which agency should have
~
tha: responsibility, and what c:her activities :culd the , l "5 response aa undertake between accidents? I think :ne,
t _3 c 1 again, the key breakdown here is the chain of Ocm=unica:icn 2 and information. When do you trigger the nex level Of re-3 sponse? And that can cnly turn on hcw goed your da a is and 4 hew effectively that's being transmitted to all the relevan: 5 people. You ough: to have seme input in:0 making tha 6 judgment.
~
Those are j us: a handful of thoughts, Mr. Chairman, 3 and really, all I intended : bring :c the Cc==ittee's atten-0 tion this =orning. But I'd be happy to pursue any area that 10 any member of the Commission would like : discuss. 11 CEAIRMAN KIMINY: Yes. I would like to be very 12 sure of two things. One, firs of all, ycu have effered to 13 give us a timetable of events from IPA's point of view. 14 MR. COSTLI: That's correct. 15 CHAIRMAN KIMINY: I certainly wculd like to have 16 - - that. We may want to ge tha : rom several d.--::eren: pcInts II of view, and piece i: together. But we'd like you -- 13 - MR. COSTLE: Indeed, would urge exactly that 19 approach. a0 CEAIRMAN KIMINY: Yes. Secendly, since you have
.,3 said that a: least since Saturday, you have had intensive
~
=cnitoring of the area, may I assume that all data frc= that
.33 soni:Oring will be available to this Cc==ission?
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. 2 not become aware tha: there could be.a sericus incident'here 3 until. Friday, at which point you put int motion certain 4 steps. And you expressed concern about the two-day gap , or 5 maybe three-day gap before the teams were fully there. Do 6 you have any feeling en the quality of meni Oring that oc-cur. ed wishin that period, or is there some vital data tha 3 may have been los during that period? 9 HP.. COSTLE: think our restrespective sense, 10 quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, is tha: the monitoring network 11 that was in place at the time the incident occurred, that is, 12 The routine monitoring system around these plants, in fac: 13 was not adequate. It's adequate for ncrmal operations, but 14 we're not talking about a normal operation. And se the abil-15
;7j ;3 -deploy additional instrumentation to ge: = ore scphis-16 icated measurements in a timely way is in issue here.
II Obviously, it would have helped had we had, or had we seen 18 a much mere complete monitoring system external :: the plan: 19 . _ _ . . than is routinely there. so a think, my own -- and again,
*0
~
this is a hindsight evaluation, and I wouldn't want to be held 21 to' it as an ironclad conclusion, but my sense was that scrs instrumen:1:icn would have been clearly desirable , . in germs a3
~
of the-vectors.for release,-in terms of distances from the
. plant, in terms of plant line capability. Again, : have nc
.5
~
reasen':0 doub the integrity of the information that did I
2 ., -m
<u . I come out of that initial system, but I think by the time we 2 were there and the instrumentation had been augmented, then 3 we had a saturation. We had reached the saturation ;cin:, !
4 think, by the end of Saturday, and I'm no sure that routine-5 ly you need quite the heavy instrumentation that was deployed 6 while they were in fact working en how o deal with the I hydrogen bubble,'and where it was touch and go, a sense of a S ouch and go situation as to whether there'd be other major 9 releases. 10 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: I!d lixe to pursue'a cuestion I askec 11 Mr. Wilc0x earlier this =orning, because it's one I feel we 13 ought Oc track down. There have been a number of answers we 13 - have heard : day in terms c: how the rederal government react s 14 w' hen it is clear there is an emergency. This Commission, of , 15 course, also has a major interes: in not allowing situations 16 to develop to the emergency point. Is there in your agency, 1 or to your knowledge, anywhere in the federal structure , let' s l 18 say, a team of nuclear scientists and engineers whc could 19 be called on very short notice : help out if this seems de-ao
~
sirable at the power plant? 21
. MR. COSTLE: I'm no aware tha: there is an idenri-
~
fied list of people.to be called in the even: Of an emergencv 1 1 2 : that would represent the kind of expert team I think you're l l 1 a4
~
l alluding to. I think the experts clearly exist. Whether ans 1
"5 i
when they were called in this case, if it had :: do with I L i l r
1_ 1 reactor operations, I'm no: sure. Car:linly with respect to 2 =cni:Oring and health effects assessment, by the time w'e were 3 alerted and began processing data, we clearly have a lis cf 4 identified people, and a team of people, as does F.E*d. And 5 the Surgeon General and the head of the National Cancer Insri - 6 ture, the head of Food and Drug Administration, I think we
~
all went to work on Saturday and worked pre :y feverishly 3 Sc I think you almost have to lock a; it, during that day. 9 ..a_4y, .:n _e.ms o.: . u.e _: n. . -. .a_4 p,_=n.
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14 the public, sc they understand what it is tha; everyone's 15 a e a_, 4 ... w: h. w . 16 Cr.,:.A RMAN ,L..w,P.f . u s- ons,. c. , ...m . a_ s _: - e .,, .u.a.,,,., ,. _m . . , 1~' COMMISSIONER .").RRETT: Yes, I'd like to know when 1 1 IS dces EPA get involved, more specifically. You've given us 19 l the chronclogy, bu mus: I?A await the information frcm NRC? I 1 1
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I system, which in this case did work. That is, a 9:05 a.m., 2 Wednesday scrning, we were notified that scce:hing had hap- , 3 pened. Su: we geren't given any details as to what happened, 4 ncr were we given a sense of :.ne grav;;y c:. :.ne situa:,:n 5 unti; much later. 6 CEAIRMAN KEMENY: Excuse me, could 1 jus: ask -- 33..cas..t.ea .Oc w.'.5 .esae. r ~.~ . 5e ' a . . ..
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9 . n g ,.:. - ,.. s ,,,s e m , u. u . : .: .our .,. nc. .,co.: .::, . . s. ..,: . .u. e . J.. u. . 10 things, what good does it dc? 11 CEAIRMAN KIMENY: Yes. Could I jus ask One ques-12 tien en that, since you'used the werd routine notifica:icn. 13 How =any of those wculd you receive in a given mon:h? 14 XR. COSTLI: 'lery, very few, Mr. Chairman. This is 15 the only one that's ever been brough: c my attentica in the 16 two years that I've been Administra:cr of EFA. 1' CEAIRMAN KIMENY: Thank you. 18 MR. COSTLE: In this case, actually, no: Only did is we have a no::.,;.ca .
- cn, but on :riday, as .i recal,, we were 20
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.5 cc==ents that you would like :: see certain kinds of changes 6
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16 tien, that we somehow speed up the reaction time. And again,
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-t 7a 1 =ee:ings, I =arveled a :he fac: tha: the NRC cc=missioners w'ere trying;very diligently :: keep me apprised 0f as such as 1
2' 3 they knew a: the ise they knew it. 3 4 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Commissioner McPherson? ; i 1 5 COMMISSICNER MCPHERSON: Mr. Cos:le, where was all l 6 This =cnitoring information going? You said abou: Friday, Or 7 Saturday, certainly, there were several agencies who were ; 2; -ny: ..
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9 lated, and did it go into the governor's effice to advise him , i t 10 so that he might understand whether :: order an evacuation, , i 11 or Oc declare -- ask the ? resident : declare this area a 12 disaster area? 13 MR. COSTLE: As I understand, the informatien being 14 generated was being collated and collected every evening, and
- 15 being assessed by a join federal-state team; that is, the 16 team of people who were actually collecting the data. Now, 1.
This is clearly the case beginning S.r.turday. Before tha: 13 time, as I said, I can't speak :: what information was going 19 to the state, because -- I have to assume that it was, as i: , 20 was ccming to us, indeed, through the NRC loop.
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- 3 1 MR. CCSTLI: My impression, quite frankly, is tha:
2 'that is one of the ambiguities in this whole situa icn. ::'s 3 not ' clear who has that responsibility. Clearly the governer, 4 under the conventional notion of emergency preparedness and 3 reacting to civil disasters, has the firs: call. But I think 6 there is -- and again, I'm in no be :er position than you are
~
at this point in time te make a judgment aboum this , but my 3 impression is tha: there's clearly scme a=biguities between 9 the federal regula:Ory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis- l 10 ' sien, and the c mpany, in terms of who calls the shots when 11 something goes wrong. And when does that -- does, and if se, 12 when does, the authority and responsibility for that 13 transfer? 14 COMMISSIONER MCPHERSCN: Do ycu have the means, with . 15 the equipment you've get, to predict what will happen with 16 this -- I use the word vector -- what will happen in the fu-i 3' ' ture, let's say the next 12 hours, given weather and wind 18 condi:icns, that if there is a release, it would be carried 4 19
- cver a certain populari:n at -- -
1 ao MR. COSTLE: Yes. We can comeute that kind Of in-
+
21 . . . . . . .
- Ormation. ue ,re not exclusive-y in possess cn or the ac...a.; ty
~~
- .do that. ! think the Department of Energy has that capa- :
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the key issue is that you can' even employ that skill until
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1_ .2 c. :. I been released? Then i:'s possible, of course, o -- In fact, 2 The point of flying our plane back there was that it's a a sensitive enough instrumented aircraf tha we could've no: 4 Only forecast, but then tracked very carefully, exae:ly, wha: 5 was happening. And it would allow you c, for example, break H down the radioactivity into individual radicactive nuclides ,
'so that you knew exactly whether you were dealing with ncble
~
3 gases or iodine, or whatever else. And it's, as I say,.de-9 signed essentially :: monitor res shots, where ycu lock a: - 10 ' the full range of fission products. The data that we saw indida 11 ted that none of tha in' fact.was released frem the plant, tha 12 we were dealing principally there with releases of the noble-13 gases, with very cuick dissipation charac:cristics, and re-14 sulting icw exposures. 15 COMMISSIONER MCPHERSOM: In the -- a question ge:- 16 ting away for the moment frem Three Mile Island -- as f ar as 17 EPA's responsibility is concerned, is pc11urien from radiatie n 18 treated differently under federal law than pollurica from 19 other scurces , so far as EPA's jurisdiction is concerned? s 20 MR. COSTLE: It really is. And maybe it wculd be 21 helpful for the.Cc=mittee Oc give you scmething in writing 22 that attempts : lay cut precisely what ESA's jurisdiction in 23 the radiation field is. I: is evolving, i is going through 24 changes. Congress, for example, in the Clean Air Act Amend- e 25 ments of 1377, added to I?A's responsibility. Sur it's 4
20' ,,
$ I l' sufficiently complicated that i: =ight in fact be useful c I
2 the Cc=mittee for us to try to put that down in a clear, con-3 .cise way, sc that you'il have -- And I think, useful to ask 4 that some question of other federal agencies in attempting to 5 pull toge:her the =csaic of who's in charge of what. 6 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Thank you. I think that would be i very he.lpful. Professer Taylcr? S COMMISSIORER TAYLOR: You mentioned several times 9 that you became aware of the sericusness of the situation ou i 10 there on Friday., =cening, and I have tw questions abcut that. The 11 first is what was it tha =ade it seem serious := you? In 12 other words, what aspect of it was it tha =ade it see= 13 sericus? In particular, was i something connected with any-14 thing known about the radiation that had already been released, , 15 or was it more about the pctential for releasing a lo more ; 16 radiation? 17 MR. COSTLE: Scth. The fac: tha: there had been 18 a release,- it shouldn't have happened. And that immediatel,v , e said something more sericus is going on nere than normal. 19 - - 20 Simultaneously, of course, we began having conversations wirr 4} the Cc=missioners of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and aa Peter 3radford in particular. And he was very forthright in l 1 I o3 saying that he though: the situation was =cre serious than -- 1
.- . * . They were having -- they were it was clearly _not routine.
o 25 still assessing exactly what was happening, and that he wcult, e
. . . . - - - - . . . - . . . .- .~. -
21-3 1 make'himself available-to me on call, and we would talk with 2 each other about every two hours during the course of the nexm 3 several days while we tried to -- while NRC was trying to ge: 4 a more precise handle on the thing. All I needed to hear, 5 obviously, from a commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Com-6 mission was that it was serious, and I was willing to take him at his word. 8 COMMISSIONIR TAY10R: My second cuestion has to de 9 with jus: that. And that is: did you feel that you would 10 have like to have had at that time, within epa, under your , 11 direct authority, a capacity to nake an independen: assess-12 ment of wna the potential was for the acciden: releasing a 13 lo; more material than had been, or whether or not in fact 14 there had been enough radioactive material to have been a 15 serious hazard? But would you have liked to have been able 16 to look at it yourself, and not depend entirely on NRC? II MR. COSTLE: Certainly with respect to the -- wha 18 had been released, and wha: the potential for addi:icnal re-19 lease could be. We do not have a nuclear engineering capability i l "O
~
1 in place. That is, we don't have engineers who are trained
.1
~
to understand these power plants and their details, and who
~~
have as their job to forecas: or to predici disaster scenar-
.,3 ios. As i: turns out, we do have people on our staff who
-34 know a lot about nuclear power plants , and two of them are
.,5 si;;ing here with me this morning. Steve Gage, at one
l l e, 79 1 time in his career, actually trained nuclear power plan: cper-2 a: Ors, and Dr. Richard Ocwd, in his misspen youth, was a 3 high-energy physicist, before he becar< an environmentalist. 4 And as i: turned ou: -- and again, this is in re: respect -- l l 5 we did a lo cf speculating in my Office abcur what was proba - 6 bly happening with that reac:Or. And much of that speculatien I turned out to be remarkably accurate. And of : curse, we 3 weren't Operating in the dark; we Obviously had the benefit i 9 cf whatever information the Nuclear Regula:Ory Commission was I l 10 giving us. But once you realize the role you have to -- It's 11 a question of to what extent do Other people than the Nuclear 12 Regulatory Commission need to be experts in nuclear reac cr 13 operations? And clearly we need :: have, and shculd have, 14 the expertise for monitoring, and for surveillance, and the i 15 ability to predict er forecas: the"what if ?" scenarios . Su l 16 does that mean that we have :0 be able to second-guess what's i 3e' 1 happening to the reactor, in the innards of the reac:cr it- l 18 self? My sense, again, is tha: the NRC was pre::y forthright 19 with us as that was happening , and telling us wha: they knew. l ao
~
And they're the " technology experts." 21 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: ' dell, had you begun informal-42
~
ly, let's say, in your cwn discussions in your own Office , a3 before you actually go a direct notification frem the NRC
~
that it was sericus, had you begun :: form any kind Of a a5
- . 34 -
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23 30 i 1 was g0ing en in the containment vessel, was in fact serious. l 2 Sericus enough for you to label.i: that way? 3 MR. COSTLI: The minute that we were informed tha: 4 scue releases'had taken place,.although they were the noble 5 gases, Dick Dowd and Steve Gage and I began speculating abou: ' I 6 what could be going en inside that reac Or tha: could cause l 7 such a reaction. Su: that was just pure speculation en our 3 part. I: turned out, ! think, : be accurate. - 9 CF. AIRMAN KIMINY: Commissioner Tr r.k? E 10 COMMISSIONIR TRUNK: Since you were doing the 20ni-11
- ring, why couldn't you give your data to the public? At na -
12 ti=e were we able : ge any numbers. And I would like :: 13 determine.for myself how much radiation I'm getting. 14 MR. COSTLE: As I say, we were no: there On the 15 scene until, and deployed, until Saturday night. 16 COMMISSIONIR TRUNK: Well, we didn't hear about i: ; II until Friday. So we're .cm the same level. Su Saturday and 18 Sunday -- Sunday was a very bad day for a 10: of people. And f II all we were being told was it's safe. ; I 20 MR. COSTLI: Well, what we chose :: do in that- { 21 situation was : feed our information into the same data cen- l
.i
-~
ter that everyone else was feeding their information inte. i
^3 I think One contribution that we did nake was :: ensure tha: l j
all'0f the. people who were monit: ring were meeting :: 50 Over '
.'5 each Other's data, ha: there was some 00erdina:icn of data.
, ,.r-r--w
. .. - .- -~ . - . . . _.
3, a-1 The release of that informa:icn, as I understanc i , was 2 handled basically through the Nuclear Regulatory C:mmission. 3 And my hunch is that if you'd had several differen: agencies
'4 say well, gee, cur scnitors show this, your monitors show r 9
5 whatever they show, that that migh: lead to more confusion. 6 I think there was a -- I sensed a clear sense of concern tha-7 there be a tight, si$gle cecrdination point for the release ' 3 of information in crder not to mislead or pani: The public. 9 And we just simply subecribed : that, and said we'll feed 10 cur information into whcever is then making the decision : ' 11 release it, and that was essentially the Nuclear Regula:Ory 12 Com=ission. So I think the question you'd have : ask is de 13 you really wan: 15 different people talking abou: their i 14 instruments -- ' 15 COMMISSIONER TRUNK: Well, after you had -- i t 16 MR. COSTLI: -- or have a person trying := ac ura e -
- 17 - -
ly depic . what was happening : rem the whc2e information net. i 18 COMMISSIONER TRUNK: Well, after you had ge :en all [t
'9 the numbers : gether, you would have come up with a :otal, l ao amd then we could .have had it.
But here we had nothing. . ' 21-MR. COSTLI: I think I've expressed my_ concern abeur ! 4., that. I have that same kind of concern, 0:o. I think clearly , t a 3 members of the public were making private decisiens, irrespeg- l as
- ve c: wna: :ne governor was weighing in .a.n s mind as ::
whether :: Order evacuation Or not. And I think that, in a o O
l 3 ,. 1 situatica like that, members of the public have a righ: :: 2 make their own decisions. 3 COMMISSIONER TRUNK: That's right. 5 4 MR. COSTLE: And tha: they.should be given informa-5 tion on a regular, reliable, open basis. You jus wan :: 6 be sure that it's accurate, and that it's been assessed
~
properly. My sense is ha the information was being assessed S properly, and certainly by Saturday, there were enough inde-9 pendent people on the scene that nobody,~ o my knowledge, 10 could.possibly have gotten away with hiding anything, because 11 we all had our own instruments, and everybcdy had :: face up 12 to that data pcol at the end of each day, and say what dces 13 it mean. 14 CEAIRMAN KIMENY: Let's see. A thought occurred :: 15 me,.and since at the mement we only have One copy of the Sa - 16 urday issue -- Incidentally, it's certainly an extremely 17 challenging list which will be shared with the entire Commis-18 sien and the staff -- I noticed that one of the headings was 19 Issues of Training, which you haven't commented on. Did I 20 understand correctly that Dr. Gage had been invcived in train -
.n ing opera: Ors in the past?
MR. COSTLI: Yes.
.33 CHAIRMAN KIMINY: *4culd ycu have any objecti:n if I ask Dr. Gage if he has any particular concerns abcu: the 25 L training of Opera: Ors and what his assess =en: Of that is?
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u-26 33 o_ne.n.) 1 MR. COSTLI: '
.ic ; I'd think it'd be entirely appro-
, .. . _: n . ,. .
3 DR. GAGE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think tha: 4 =y general concern, having had experience both teaching nu-I 5 clear engineering and operating a -- then an AIC licensed H reactor en the University of Texas campus, lies in the area
~
of preparing operators to deal with emergency situations. 3 While we had a -- a reac Or which had'been designed to -- to 9 be very safe to operate on a nuclear -- Oc Operate within a 10 high population area such as the middle of a university 11 campus, we did have to practice with our Opera: Ors quite 12 extensively en how they should respond in the case of -- of 13 various kinds of accidents. When I think of that -- tha 14 very =cdest small reactor system multiplied a hundred fold 15 in complexity into a large power reacecr system such as Three 16 Mile Island and also reflect en what I know of the difficulty 1' it is to simulate nuclear accidents or even non-nuclear 1 18 accidents associated with a nuclear pl' ant, I am -- am less
- - - - )
19 - than sanguine that any or the operators wnien are in opera:- 20 ing plants today are really trained and given hands on ex-21 perience in dealing with amergency situations cf the type a: . Three Mile Island or of many other types of -- Of incidents
^3 nuclear reacters across the which have occurred a: -- a
.,4 00untry. I think this is a -- a real challenge, parti:ularly
^5-given the information that we have second and third hand abet: l
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3 infor.ation at first hand, so I don't wan; you to speculate 6 cn that, but simply en your question -- frca ycur experience s:.nce you've expressed some concern, have you thcught abcut 3 what kind of ex~reriences could be provided :c cpera: Ors to 9 prepare them for a -- the unusual rather than the com=cn 10 cccurrence? 11 "o AG .- We ' _' , D.R . 3.# v a.. . . k. a.
..".e =..< . a. . ..a. ?_ _# _# .# _# - ". _' .. r 12 and actually =aking a reac cr r'espond under emergency situa-13 tiens, I think tha: the -- probably the -- the next bes:
14
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15 a sense c:- the experience thre igh s:..muaat:.c n tr a ..n .n g . . - . 16 Now s:..mulation training is used :..n the reac:cr :..ndustry, but 1., . . . . . not near.,y :.n -- :.n the extensive a rash:..cn as :.s used, . rem 13 y h a . <. A,a.a.d e '.a e ' =_..d , _# . . *'
.. h e ~. ~. =. _# n # . . - c#
3 . .. ~ ~ ~..~...e '.' a .# a ' ~,. # _' c *. =_. =m d 19 in probably several other areas as well. This is not a re-O quirement, as I understand, of cr.erators licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Cecmission. It is used by, I believe, s c ~. e c .' -
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-33
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r:- 1 e. u-29 .. CO i l I extend over the range of -- cf experiences which we new knew 2 can happen in a ecumercial nuclear power plant. 3s CEAIRMMI KEMEiY: Governor Peterson? 4 CEAIRMAN PETERSCN: Mr. Costle, you reported how 5 you have installed the sophisticated monitoring devices today 6 at Three Mile Island and you intend to keep them there at
~
least through the clean-up period, and also expressed concern 8 about whether anybody knows how adequare the menitoring was 9 during the first few critical days. My questien is, if 10 another similar incident occurred tomorrow, would there be 11 this delay in getting information? Neuld we still have grea: 12 uncertainty abou: the release during the first few days? 13 Do we need this sophisticated monitoring a every plant on an 14 on-going basis? 15 MR. COSTLE: Russ, I don't really knew the answer 16 to that question. The -- I won't -- I have :: say, was there 17 a reason why it :=ok two days that nade that ancmalous situa- , 18 tion. Could pecple have kncwn earlier? As I understand i: 19 - - - -
- or example new, they weren't -- 1 's only -- : was in nind-no sight they reali:ed that the reactor core was probably un-
.n
~
covered for a period of time. That while that was happening,
~~ .
They didn't know that. And so they didn't have anything to 43 Tell anybcdy in that respect. If that's -- clearly if tha:
.~ ,
- were : a in, then the answer :c ycur question is hat. ten as
~
quite clear. We wculd no knew, and that raises the question
4-I? 36 1 about whether the -- the normal routine deployment of moniter+ 2 ing capability around these nuclear power plants in anticipa-3 tien of normal cperations is in fact, adequate er not, and I 4 would -- I raise that question in my cwn mind. I'm not sure 5 that it is. In fact, I think I'm reasonably sure it's not. 6 And there may be better ways to -- to -- to have a more
~
affective communication. ! think the notion of telematered 3
=enitoring of plant parameters could be tremendously helpful.
9 You could also obviously have telemetered -- it's expensive, 10 but you could do it. You could have telemetered informatica 11 from meni:Oring. External off-site moni:Oring sites as well. 12 And I think we ought to explcre that. But I think the key 13 questien is, did anybcdy know the righ: thing a: the righ 14 time scon enough? ! 15 CHAIRMAN iGCGY: Professor Figford? 16 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Mr. C stle, i 's been report ed II that subsequen to the accident there is seme old bcdy chopping I IS - going on in the area; a.s.na: an -?A activity? I' MR. COSTLI: Tha 's principally.the Department of 20 .. . nealth, .ducation s and ..e,:.a n are. al
~
CCMMISSIONER FIG?CRD: May I ask one additional 49 m. question 3 i
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a-30 37 1 assessment of population exposure. You didn't comment on the 2 latter. Cculd you do so? 3 MR. COSTLI: .Be hac..ov . o. The -- when EPA was firs" 4 established it inheri ed something called the Federal Radia-5 tion Council which is charged with se::ing out guidelines on 6 population exposure; that is recommending levels of exposure 7 that should : tot be exceeded. I- is a -- an adviscr/ rype S responsibility Oc the Presiden: and I might poin; cut that in 9 January of 1977, E?A proposed and then adopted a rather dra-10 matic reduction in its guidelines for exposure fer -- for ' 11 nuclear power plants. The previous guidelines had been in the 12 neighborhood, if I recall, and Steve you can help me cut, i: 13 was 5 0 0 mi" # ims per year exposure fer somebody whe wculd be 14 standing on the plant line 2u hours a day for a full year. ; 15 We cut that to 25 millirems -- 16 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: May I probe that, just so I heard s 1s :_ _. . c...c.,, , 18 M. R . C evS e. r_,_ .. __ 4.. ,
.a.7i.
18 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: It's a reduction from 500 milli-
"O rems to 25?-
.1 MR. COSTLE: That's right. And that was not sc such
-- that reduction was -- was not a function that we knew
#3 something abou: the figure 500 as opposed c the figure 25 Or s-nea_. h e:..:ects. .
vice versa in terms c:. : was essen: a_,_.y i 1 25 .w
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-1 nuclear facilities has always been that you drive the numbers 2 a s 1 . u s s * - ~. =. c *.n ~ .'. ~. ~s ' c _= _ _' _' y ." =_ _= = _' c_ 1 =_ = ..~.^. _* ~. ~ a s _ _' =_ = _=_ . n' _= ~.
- 3 it was technologically feasible :: keep it down in the 25 i 1
9
'4 millirem level and for that reason, the standard was pushed 5
down to that level, although there was sc=e resistance a: tha-6 4me. 3u. aga_:n, 4.
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the science knowledge tha: there is a -- a thresheid for S -- nea n ec:ects at 2s. as co.cosed :c 300. . would o.c:.n: cut , 9 aise, that normal background from year to year is in the > 10 neighborhood of 150 millire=s. 11 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Professor Pigford? la - COMMISSIONER ?!GTORD: Mr. Ccstle, you state that 13 the previous guidelines for population exposure; 500 =illirens 14 i per year? ' 15 MR. COSTLE: Sat was the -- a .' plant line level 16 for nuclear power plants; that's correct. 1h
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18 individual exposure? t 19 ' MR. COSTLE: There --
~
MR. PIGTORD: I'm not speaking of eceupational.
.,3
~
I'= speaking of-public, unrestricted. I'm speaking new a:
~
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43
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the maximu= expcsure := an individual, versus the guideline
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h_32 29 1 _4 ,a.e ie s-.t, ,_, . 2 COMMISSIOffER PIGFORD: Let's ta'.k about wha it was 3 before you changed it? 4 MR. COSTLE: 500 for an -- as ! -- as I recall, 5 :_ _r : o ,. ,,
. ...d_;y;_m>ua_,.
6 COMMISSIONER ?!GF0?.0: And what was the population e exposu::'e gu se,_ ne. . . S MR. COSTLE: I'm not sure I'm grasping the question 9 C.'3.4 _.s'd a N. r_W..r'IV. . . ::
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10 if I understand it? I believe the question is, is there a
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11 3 _ " e _ _ . .e *- c .= . .a.s ..=.~ _; . n . o w* n_ ...u. .u..a
- e .- . .u. e . o . .=..' a. o un 12 entire population may be axposed? Is that correct?
13 COMMISSIONER ?IGFORD: Yes. ~here -- as I under-14 s ,._..d _: . , , s _: s . .: ..c ._: c n _: n .he _. . g,a _, _, _. _: .- u s an s e . u..a ,. s .u. : a. 15 : _ s .ypf. , . .'.ou-h s a_' o a #24-
. , "A",
. _=
3 a _# d e '. _# . .e ." - . . ax # ..."m 16 for an individual, secondly, a guideline "or the average and 1.,' a ud _=b_'/' .' = . -3 a s a a,, _' e o '. ..k. e ,,c , u.' _= _ _d . n. 2.n- ' ~. ' ... = e a. .k _d . ..- 18 what is the latter number? 19 MR. COSTLE: I'll have to supply that. I think
.,o that is -- it's essentially the same number, but --
but a
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COM'd. SSIONER PIGFORD: But present y you're saying _ 25 . _.. u. a _. _. .u. ,. .99 _: _u..,.
. . a x _:._ um_ _. o _..u.e :....s__: ,4__ ,~.a_,., . :. .n.._,
a
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4-33 : 1 MR. COSTLI: That's right. A: -- a: the -* 2 COMMISS~0NER FIG?ORD: 25 is now the maximum ic the 3 individual. 4 MR. COSTLE: At the plant of a power -- 3 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Then we are left with the . 6
, question; is there a past and present guideline for the ,
I average to'the population? That's what I'm getting a . S MR. COSTLE: Well, if I understand correctly, tha 9 would be sece:hing on the order of background. That is, cur 10 recommendation has always been that you keep exposures to 11 background levels ; that is that you reduce radiari:n exposures 12 to the =aximum extent that can pessibly be done. New in cal-13 culating background, there is usually seme assumption made 14 about a diagnostic uses radiation; X-rays. So I -- if I 15 understand, I think the number ycu're searching for is 150 16 roughly, which that is the -- that approximate amoun that ( 1 approxi=ates background. That is what you and I would ge: IS here in Washington, D. C. standing cut on the street and the 19 principal source of that, of course, being the sun. 20 COMMISSIONER FIG 70RD: I'm merely seeking what your
.,1
~
reguistions did and new say on the issue. That's wha: :'
~
1 coking for. Is it semething tha: maybe could be checked and
-33 supplied?
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a.3a il 1 CEAIRMAN KIMENY: Well, as I understand you will i 2 research that and answer that question? Yes. 3 COMMISSIONIR PETERSON: IPA doesn't do any work 4 then, to relate health effects :: the exposure to radiation? 5- MR. COSTLE: Steve is ruggi.s. my ar=, Russ, en that, 6 DR. GAGE: Let =e -- within c . Office of radiation ' 7 programs we do have expertise which is trained to de speci-3 fically that thing, Cc=missioner Pete:-;1. We have been 9 developing the kinds of guidelines whica the administra:Or 10 just described a few minutes ago and that does require that 11 type of -- of an assessment of what is the relative risk to 12 -- 00 individuals and to pcpulations given different levels 13 of radiation exposures. 'ie did get involved on -- beginning 14 en Saturday with the initial assessments of the population 15 exposures in the vicinity of Three Mile Island. These were, 16 again, individuals from our office of radiation programs
' II working with the Nuclear Regulatory Cc= mission and representa-18 tives from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
19 And, in fact, the radiation exposure estimates which were pre-a o sented that following week when testimony was presented before
.,1 Senator Kennedy's cetmittee, resulted from the three agency
~
effort to assess those pcpulation exposures. We've been in- ! .v,
~"
volved in that, we remain invclved in that. The lates: I wrinkle in that is that we have new asked our Las 7egas libera-
~
~
cry group which has been doing the monitoring up there :: 1
a-35 e. 1 -- c apply the same technic.ues tha: they have applied in 2 estir.ating exposures c radiation released frc... the res: 3 sites there in -- in Nevada. That is a different kind of
- approach. .
Anstead c:. using the actua_. -- in a direct way, the 5 a c . "- = ' .= = d 4a 4 c.~. me = s t.<.-a...n. e n 2- .=ke.". .~. ..'.e _**=_'_ ", -. 1 . . = .~ ~, . o-6 to -- Oc synthesize what the exposures wculd be given a -- the population densities and given an estimate of the releases 3 frem the pcwer plant and given the metacrclogy, and we can 9 use computer programs to synthesize what we think the expc-10 sures have been and then to check those with individual 11
=easurements. 'de think that svn:hetic apprcach aay mive us 12 e m2. , ,_ ~ ,_ , y .; .,.s-en,n f.
s e.,. .. .u.e,.y c.: . .u. ,. ,s _:... , . ,s _..u.a . , a.,. , u_e_.. 13 made so far which have been made by scr of interpolating 14 u., e . , e e n ~u.u.e s -e . .:,_ _-,_ n .. .
..c n 4 .. .. e, s.. .- :ons a sa- . .'. a va.--o # u-15 .
popu,ation areas. 16 COMMISSIONIR FITIRSON: What I meant, are you trying 1 ( tc relate the a=cun of exposure tc the number of cases of 13 cancer that may develop over a 30-year period? 19 DR. uAGr: .. tes, that -- that is par cf that same
~'O process, and we've been very much working --
i
-31 l
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- cur responsibility. The Department of Energy aise does it.
2 The Department of Health, Education and 'delfare also does it. 3 It's no: the kind of function tha -- that either exclusively 4 resides in a particular group of pecple who are the cnly 1 3 oeco.le that know how to do it, nor probably is it a s cod 6 idea to have that. In this sort of business, my cwn sense is
~
that the'=cre peeple involved, the better. The estimates cross 3 check very well. Our own estimates in EE*4, we did these 9 jointly during Three Mile Island, and -- and actually put to- . 10 gether a joint taa= of experts to assess that data en a day 11 to day basis. And, -- 1O - COMMISSICNER MCPHERSON: Ixcuse me; what data? 13 MR. COSTLE: The -- the monitoring data that had ' 14 been made available to us -- 15 CCMMISSIONER MCPHERSON: The amount of radiation. 16 MR. COSTIL: -- and the amount of radiatica and I i what the exposure implications of that were , and we provided IS really, an independent check on that. 19 COMMISSIONER EAGGERTY: Su: on what basis did you
~'O make that judgment? What standards did you compare those
.1 readings against.? .
~
.M2. COSTIL: Essentially against background, as you
~'3 ge: to -- down to -- :: practical case. In other words,
.q
~
assessing what radiation releases were we aware of, did we
.'5 have.=enitoring data en, what were -he - -he implica:icns of 1
e 9 - , -y_-, . , . < - , - - - , , --
. = .. = .-
u-37 9u 1 .that. New the implications of that are as -- are derived 2 essentially as a result of a series of mathecarical exercises 3 and quantitative risk assessment. J.nd that is cnly as good 4 as the =cdels and only as goed as what we know about the heal-:h O. -. unerein ,les . errects c: rad. ation at c_::eren: leve.s. _ .ne 6 rub. The -- the scientists de not knew that there is a -- I
.such a thing as a -- an absolutely safe threshcid. In terms 3
cf observed results ever the years starting back :c the 9 senitoring that was done after the Second World War, the 10 assu=ption -- there has been an assumption that if you're in 11 the -- in -- at a certain range, it's probably Okay. : think 12 as time goes by, that assumption gets revised centinually 13 downward. And I think that we've.had -- in fac: the ?residen; s 14 asked that a Cc=mi: Tee be established a year age, chaired by
*5 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, c -- to
'6 really go back and reassess what we know about the health I
effects of radiatica at differen: levels cf exposure and that IS report was just released from preliminary for= and it essen-19 tially says, we de not know tha: there is such a thing as a a0 threshold, but we de know, as a practical matter, when you're oi
~
getting down Oc the 25 millirem range that is the equivalen: no c:. an .X-ray, you,re -- you,re in a pre: y ,cw a risk exposure a3
~
l situatien. But -- but the models wou'd still cause ycu ic og
~
cc=pute, you knew, "X" tenth of a percen excess cancer a e _, _..w. , .,, u . ..'. a . #_a- .= __u ..d--.a "_ a o d_ ~- _= '_ _' ", .# . =_ _ k.a m a __. # s .
. .' . d-
. m. . . .
a _ J w: a: I the basic fac. to understand, I think, is tha: -- that we -- 2 the-scientists"are unable tc say that there is such a thing 3 as a safe threshold. New, how relevant is that when you con-4 sider that if you turn off all the power plants in the world 5 and all the X-ray machines in the world, we would still 6 probably get something in the order of 150 to 150 millirems or exposure a year Just : rom ~ sunlignt , and .. : you ..:ve in 3 Denver, it may be as high as 200. 9 CHAIRMAN KEME!Y: Professer Figford? 4 10 MR. COSTLE: Dr. Dowd indicated he -- he would like 11 to add --
. 1.,
DR. DOWD: I think the question was with relevan 13 to what standard, and really what we tried to do and i 14 wasn't jus: EFA, but it was the other agencies, is take 15 the measurements that were available; the best tha: there 16 were; there were desimeters around, there were some instru-1"' ments that were better desimeters , and we tried to calculate IS it on a population ~casis around Three Mile Island knowing 19 ' what the population densities were, to try to average in oo
~
each quadrant; the. level of radiation exposure that each 21
- 3. up o.# ,e*r. o. '. e k.. a d ~. . ~ c . m e ".
e a w' . 5 _.n a s . 3 ...a . = - .' . .'. e . . . _= ' _
~~
population desage, so that if -- if all 550,000 people
~33 had had one millirem it would have been 350,000 millirems
,_.f
.< c s " a =. . 'Ae _' _' , e .~. 4 =.^. . . ' .-
. *. . a . _= . . ^ =. s . _' ...a . =. '.&. . a . ~. .' . =.
.,5
- oral population expcsure to radiation was based On the bes:
i
- n. .
4-33 evidence we had of dosimeters 1 and we came up with that 2 and then based on the kinds of studies that Doug jus 3 .en _4cned - ." -
.h a. ao' _' _1_4 .y . o . .=. .'<. _3. . .=. _' . c 's a s .&. = . .~ ~. .. _' =. ". =. _1 s 4 o f r a d_' _= _' . n m^.- . o ,*. a. n. p 1. =. o . > n = s . _...w, . = d ...a
. .". e ...a _' _ _= _'
3 conscript of what that might be to estimate hcw many excess 6 cancer deaths might happen in a population, and, in fact,
. .u.s._nk .ha. ,.a._;
e . .,_,
. . s _ _; m_, _ u..c n s s ,s _, ,s o- _u.mn ..n n.n , _,__ _..u.a.
3 moment. 9 C.u s. .q.u.ksi '<e..v.r..s!v.
. v. L,.
a a a s. _ue
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- 2. . . . . . .
w . 10 moment is less than one? 11 ;R. DCWD: Yes. l i 12 r..u.A_R.u.sAir .g.ursiv.
. _4 .
..,.,_.r.2 _..,, ;--
_mou,. _.. u. . ., e. _ .a. ,-:c.. 13 will have to prove on its own based on your data. Ycu'11 14 _ =_ s p e c _' _# _4 m = _'_ ' y .5 a.-- =.
- a. c a _' _' w e = _=
3 d w d_ . .". = v a_ _' " = . # . 3- .h a. 15 actual and c.otential inc.act of the events on oublic health . 16 and sar.ety; there:.cre, the Commission must irs e.1:. prece these .
- 1. .
- .s s u e s .
18 n r..u.n_.2 o. r . r. e . u e .. _;._.e- --
,a : ,
-e a .n._. , . ~ . . . . .
19 those firs: two days when you said you don't have any data?
.'O MR. COSTLI: Yes, roughly. And the data we have l
l rhose first two days however is not data that's generated 3., _k..
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; 20 1. substantially augmented by the Federal Government in sub-
+
2 sequent days. 3 COMMISSIONER p!GTORD: Mr. Costle, with regard 4 to the.presen EPA guidelines, is i possible that you have 5 a guideline for what is called "ncrmal routine Operation," d the kind cf operation that you'd expect to go along' day after 7 day and, on the other hand, a different guideline fer 3 accident conditions, some suitable and probable accident 9 condi icns. Do you have twc such guidelines? 10 MR. COSTLE: The -- Yes , there is in our guidance , 11 a number that. represents normal operations, and there is C also in the guidance, a nt=ber that says if you ge: :o levels 13 that lock like this, you ought o be thinking about moving 14 people. And, thus, we de -- in our guidelines, we do.make ; i 15 these kinds of recommendations. They are essentially is advisory. My understanding is. hat at nc time did the 17 numbers at.Three Mile Island even approach that. ! think 18 the issue of evacuation, as _ unders cod it, turned a: some 19
=easure en what might happen as they tried co d'eal . '.eh the M hydrogen. bubble.
-31 COMMISSIONER PIG 70RD: I'm no: asking abou Three 3.,
Mile Island right now. I'm simply asking abou your guide-
^3 lines. New a =cment ago, you quoted your current guideline
.,i as.25-milligrams per year. Which one is this? Is this normal reutine Operation, er --
i l l
.I l
l
93 4-31 1 .TR. COSTLE: That's ner=al reutine operation. 2 Co .- vv.- e e -a r r N.- :R m. eu-: a- D .. . ae.. 3 MR. COSTlI: The guideline for evacuacion would 4 be -- 5 DR. GAGI: There are.really two levels, Commis-6 sioner Pigford. There is a level a 1,000 where there is 7 an expectation ~'that an individual vould be exposed to an 3 accumula 'ed dose of 1,000 millirems., then our guidance says 9 that consideration should be given to evacuation. And then, 10 there is a second level which, on the same basis, that if 11 the exposure would be 5,000 millirems, then we recom=end 12 very strongly that all individuals be moved. In the band 13 in there, there are the additional facecrs of the, that have 14 c be taken into account, in terms of the difficulty of 15 moving indigent, sick people, tha: the difficulties in 16 transportation and the rest. New, the best estimate of 1"' the total dose received by any individual in the Three Mile 18 Island incident, to o.ut this into perspective, a c. c. e a r s 19 to be on the order of 100 millfrems ,1/10th of the action 20 level.
.g COMMISSIGNIR ?!GFORD: Thank you. New wit.h
~~
regard to the guidelines. Wheh you supply the clarifica-
~3 tien we jus:-discussed on individual versus populati:n. I i
Af
~ l Would you also please include these other guidelines :ha-l
~
yeu've jus mentioned about acciden and these various -- i
39 4-42 1 MR. COSTLI: We would be nere than happy :o. 2 COMMISSIONER FIGTORD: -- levels and also please 3 include guidelines about occupational exposure. 4 MR. COSTLE: Yes, we would be happy 0 do that. 5 CHAIRMAN KEMEMY: Professor Taylor. 6
, COMMISSIONIR TAYLOR: Are these numbers total I
anticipated dose forever to an individual as a result of an 8 accident, or does it merely run for hcurs? What are the 0 units? 10 DR. GAGE: Yes, Commissioner Taylor, this is, this 11 is a total anticipated dose associated with this event, the 1., i event under question at the time. 13 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: In c:her words, if the 14 person proposed to live in the area for the next fifty 15 years, you add up whether -- 16 DR. GAGE: If, if the exposure level would be 17 anticipated, let's take an example. That if the area were 18 contamine:ed with something like cessium 137 which is a 19 30-year half- life ,- a dose would be, rate would be an calculated or would be determined on that cessium 137 and
.,3
~
if :.t ' s geing to- be th*re, if :here's no chance of cleaning up, then the total expected dose rate would ge
..' 3 over 10 half-lifes of .csssium 137 :: be calculated in 24 that --
25 COMMISSIONER FIG 70RD: You just said tha: if
-l .
1
,-n aJu 4-43 1 there's ac chance of cleaning up, does that mean that in 2 the guideline, there's an assessment of how hard it is g:ing 3
to be to clean up? 4 DR. GAGE: Yes, in fact, there is. 5 COMMISS10MER PIGFORD: Is that clearly spelled 6 out somewhere? I mean, some measure of how much money or I how much water er how much digging it has to take :: ge: S to clean it up? I mean, I find that hard to believe, 9 frankly. 10 DR. GAGE: It's not. But I think probably 11 the best thing to do, Mr. Chairman, wculd be for us Oc submit, for the Committee's record, the guidelines to which 13 our Office of Radiation programs has developed and promul-14 gated over the past several years. 15 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: I think that would be the bes 16 thing : go after. It's guite clear that we will have : 17 come back to EPA a number of times in our investigation. 18 MR. COSTLE: It's a confusing area because of the 19 way we measure radiation and exposure. It's a function 49 not only of the rate but also time. Time, obviously, being
.1
~
in#1uenced by the kind of radiation by-products you're dealing with. Our understanding is that, from the data
.J that we've reviewed now from Three Mile Island, was tha:
24 the releases of ncble gases were primarily what we were 25 dealing with, and they have very sher half-1 ves,
- . .~ - --
.e c. .
k-44 1 dissipate very rapidly. ~ 's ne the same thing as a I 2 cessium, whereas now, if you had a melt dewn er even had 3 elements of the reac:cr core ge ing out in the environmen 4 where they could not be retrieved, you wculd have to then, 3 in making your calculariens, assume that, make assumptiens 6 su
- ou.., .u.e
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~
CHAIRMAN KIMINY: Yes. Just sc there's no mis-understanding, the 100 millirem figure is your current bes: 9 .ge
.s 4.a . c.s
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4
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10 MR. COSTLE: That's correct. 11 DR. GAGE: Maximum -- la MR. COSTLI: Maximum to a persen. 13 CHAIRMAN KIMINY: Chief Counsel? 14 MR. NATALII: Mr. Administrator, ~ just wanted , 15 .. to ask you one ques:. on. t wo questions. -ven ic you n.ad 16 been told that 9:05 on Wednesday =crning tha: the inci-
- 1. i dent at Three Mile Island was sericus, presumably legis- ,
18 tical necessity would have meant that your team and equipmen: 19 could not have been in place for a day er day and a half :
^0
~
which was proved to be the case, and ycu were told on Friday. ! oo
~~ ,
MR. COSTLI: That's absciutely correct.
~3 MR. NATALII: And, does that, can I draw the Ocn-
.--, , , s4 _ ,. n . . . m ..w.a . , . .w. a . .: . . . .".a . .# n . =. ."v =- ' , b. .e we v e . '. .. . . ' -
25 would have been, the only nit: ring that would have cccurred
i _m. 3-45 I would be the permanen; in* place meni: Ors above, whose effi-2 cacy for the c.ur,ose, for this purpose, you have expressed 3 reservati:ns? 4 M..*.. C^vS*.?..?.- Now, .' n a ~o ' s _- ^_ _* _ a_ r_. * .
. ". e n' _' *. .".c u"s.b. .
3 ,epartment s c:. _nergy nas instrumented .nesacopters. _,a a j 1 6 not -- I think it probably varies from state :: state in ) 1
' 1 terms of what kinds of stand-by er,uipment state offices I i
5 nave. - e.s a said, in our case, :ne thing we a; ways cc, wnen ' 4 1 9 l we get a notice, or an alert, even thcugh we don't knew the 10 gr_.v_./ 4 m o.< 4.,_ _s .o _.s
. :_mme..a.a__y , _
nn.ac. .he
. . _m . a.,. ,..s.
11 and 4 _' e ~.~ e .< .< e . w .".e as s # s . _= n c a. . . d .'y .
..".a_ __= _k o =. _= ~. v~ ~. #_ =_ s . .".. 2 .
12 a-a_. -1e e s e s . .'*.*. .s u*_-,c s e s o # 'f -. c _ s o- # . . 3- _ . _= d _' _o ' . g #...= ' 13 samples of one kind or another. I nean, we did, for example, i 14 h a v e o. e o c. _' a_
. 4.. o u ~. =. =. g d
_ a. . .a .' .+.' .# _# - a_ '_ a. ' .c = _= . . . y a- m _= . . d _#3. . - -.' v, ,
'5
- I but in terms of getting the same team that we go: there on 16 Saturday, that is, the crack team from Las Vegas, it wculd i l
l'
..u.o .e ...: m ,
, .y e .u.e .e. n. m- . .u. e . : m- ,_ n .; .n _:n_ ,_ _m o . ..- n e .- ,. y ,__ -
.. a.n..n ..
IS in the ccuntry tha: ream would be deployed. 19 MR. NATALII: But if understand what you say, N- - 1 may u.e possib.3e that, a ,eas: scre effective meni cring al y s . _,... , - . u. , > _ ,_ :-..
..u.a.. _: a. ...e f e..-. a,.e n . p , a..
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t., a ace scener?
-33 u.q . c nw.e . t.r .
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C'#. AIRMAN KI'4ENY : ""nank you . Perhaps could we 25 _#w
- n. . ~ ^ v a. ". ..c ". :=..=.*=.~.., a .n d- ~' , _ a_=
_ap. e .n a . ' .e *_ _= s . ,- "_ e s . . . - = A-I l I
i 3 _. 0. , L-a5 1 'go ahead. 2 COMMISSIONER PETIRSON: You said the analysis of 3 the effect en health of the measured exposure was , would lead 4 to less than one case of cancer. Have you done an/ calcu- . 5 lating, estimating, the potential kind of hazard if the 6 incident we all worried about had occurred if the containmen I vessel had ruptured and if they had a =eltdown. Have you 3 gone through that or not? 9 MR. COSTLE: No, we haven't. That would invcive 10 speculating on so many different perameters in terms of 9 11 what would be released, in what quanti:ites, what wculd be 12 the population at risks dec.ending on where it happened. f 13 COMMISSIONER PETERSON: All of us accepted, the 14 people of the country accepted the fac.: that less than one 15 case of cancer was, as a result of all of this effort, it 16 seemed kind of unnecessary to have a Three Mile Island , 17 accident commission. - 18 CMAIRMAN KIMINY: Governor Petersen, I wish we 19 all had copies of the number of issues the Administra cr "O
~ ~
had suggested we look at which is an exceptionally well thcught
.,1
~
out list and, I wish I could, you will all have ccpies as 4., quickly as we can =ake them. I don': think the Administra- i 43
~
ter is telling us that this Ccmmission has very little : y~ werk Oc dc. Is that a correct s:stement. l l
.s$
~
MR. COSTLE: Nc, I would certainly nc: wan: ic i _- . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . - . . . _ . ._ --e_.. . , _ . ~ - . _ , - ,
1]u i c7 1 tell the Com=ission that. Quite the centrary. 2' ' CHAIRMAN KI'4ENY: ife is raising some quite over-3 whelming issues on those lis: of questions. , COMMISSIONER PETERSON: Fine. Eu it's that 5 concern about this much bigger event that has us here.
- MR. COSTLI: That's exactly right.
I COMMISSIONI2 PETERSON: -- sc=ehow we have to 3 get a better handle en that, and I jus: wanted to knew 9 if you had speculated on that as yet. 10 MR. COSTLE: No, not in the sense of trying to 11
' calculate, based on the incident. The magnitude which we 1"-
really have no way of gauging. I mean, we could perform 13 I mean, the Cc= mission would like us : and it would give us a set of assumptions to work frem, we would be happy :: ! 15 run the calculations, but we do not, after this is ever, 16 sit dcwn and say, what would have happened had you had a 17
=eltdown. It's not even clear if you had a meltdown what IS would have been released, or not released. I think cne 10 of the questions on our list was the, has :: do with i
t. ao
~
the integrity of the containment building, and what in fac: 21 i eculd : lerate. CHAIRMAN KIMINY: Mr. Administrator, may I thank
.e ycu.and your eclieagues for your ccoperation and cander.
.,4 It's a long time teaching me, I see. I particularly appre-25 ciated your willingness :: say ~ don't knew.
.~
105 L a3 1 y,... . -n
. w S s ,.: : .nank you, 3, , cyg57 ,gg ,
2 CH/.I.EAN KEMIIrt : May invite Chairm.an Hendrie 3 of the Nuclear Regula: cry Cc=ission and his colleagues 4 . . to Jo n us please? 5 (Recess) ri 3 0 10 11 33 4 13 14 15 16 1 IS 19 20 21 mee
.iat
..a 5
25 i l l I
5_ ;- 106
?JA 1 cgA;RMAN xzMz:rt: Chairman Hendrie, as you knew, 2- you're Commission is very prominently mentioned in the charter 3 given c this Commission by the President of the United 4 States, so we are very eager :c hear from you. As you know, 5 we have been asked :c evaluate your Commission's licensing, d inspection, operation and enforcemen procedures, as i:'s ap-i plied :c this facility, and scre generally the assessmen: cf' S emergency preparedness of your Com.nission and c her federal, 9 state and local authorities. May I ask you, just for the 10 record, to introduce yourself so we have i on tape, and your 11 colleagues, and then please make whatever statement you wish M te make.
13 MR. HENDRIE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members 14 of the Commission. My name is Joseph Hendrie I~ the 15 Chairman of the Nuclear Regula cry Commission. I have with 16 me this morning, starting on my left, Mr. James Cummings, the 1"' i head of' cur Office of Investiga icn and Audi ; Mr. Kevin 18 Cornell, the Deputy Executive Direc cr for Operations of the 19 NRC staff; and on my'right, Mr. Leonard Bickwick, the General 20 l Counsel of the Ccamission.
.1 I wan: Oc say tha I appreciate the opportunity Oc meet with ycu this merning.
I bring for myself, for my col-l os leagues on the Commission, and for every member of the NRC
-3 staff, our assurances that ycu will have cur :::al cccperation 25 in every pessible way. "de think the establishmen cf your l
i l-
- e. --,
avi 1 Commissicn is an important and necessary thing, and we are 2 very anxious that we do everything we can := aid you in the . 3 essential tasks which you have. s 4 This =cening I would like to just note for ycu a: 5 the beginning, so that you will understand what we're abcu , 6 I want to note very briefly the ser cf investigation tha
~
the NRC itself is carrying out and will be carrying cut. 3 There are, at the moment, the Office investigations going 9 forward. Our Inspection Inforcemen: office is interviewing 10 people, trying to get the chronology carefully established, 11 plant records in hand, and associated things. That investi-l 12 gation, which is now in progress, will broaden very seen as
; 13 we establish a =cre sweeping investigating board, which will s
14 lock for the Commission into all aspects of the matter. l 15 We have clearly a resc.onsbili v. : 1 understand where 16 cur procedures, where the.contex: of our regulations, and 17 where the way in which we license and inspect these plants 18 has failed to prevent the Three Mile Island accident. I want 19 you to knew abou: that investigation, and Oc knew, =cs is-20 portantly, I think, frca your standpoint, that the results of 21 that investigation, as they ccme along, are fully available d to you. I look for the closes; cooperation of cur inves:1-l' i 23 gating staff with your staff, sc that you have full access :: 24 all of that material as i comes along. I wan: :: be quite l 25 C 3 .. a ..w.a . , a., . w.r- u g .w. ye .e..-
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d 5 every way that you want to go, anc indeed, we want i := be 6 shaped, and we will require that it be shaped and carried Our 7 so that it aids you in every possible way. l l S tihy don't we see new where your :uestions, Of which . 9 ~'s sure you have more than I can answer this morning, take
.e 10 us,.Mr. Chairman?
11 C"..A.2.'d.AN. F. 'd.?.'.iv. 2ea, ..".a. d -- # ...# # # . " .' . -] d
-. v.u.- - =-ae 12 is that we've been asked to lock at sc =any different':hings, 13 Ma.
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a.a.. e...h y .* ave.a.a. . s ues .:wn e..: . .u. a_ ay, sn-.h :. . .a..=.' . 15 would like :: understand, and everyone else :Old us that ycu 16 alone would be able to answer this, so :'m locking forward. 1~ ea-=-1s---J *.0 a s k.' .'. s .' . . ~'.
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. . 'e 19 signs that an emergency could exis : preven; an emergency Does your sta:: nave a sta:: c:- sc:.ent:.s:s ready -- - -
*o happ en:.ng .
4 21 who could go out en very shcr: notice :: assis a nuclear
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2 have a large Inspection and Inforcemen Office, 500-cdd peopip 3 about new. They are quartered in five regional offices 4 throughou: the country and in a headquarters, large heac-5 cuarters section in Se:hesda. They are the pecple who inspect 6 the blants , who have a regular schedule of getting around anc 7 reviewing how things are going en at plants. They are aisc 3 . .k. a. . .#.#.# . e .k.a .e =~.d m oue,c-. ..".e . =. s _' '_ e n t _# .a.es a e . . - . s , f . c v #_d . 0 where we have been able :: place esiden inspectors a: a 10 nuclear plan . That's a program which is in the process of 11 b e.: n. _: . p _' e...e n e e s , a..s. _a.-. w n _:..- u.
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m . _ .= u. .a s 12 been made available in recent agency budge:s, and will ne be 13 fully implemented for another, probably, year and a half, or 14 perhaps two years, as we bring in people, train them, and ger 15 people to every site. 16 With regard to an immediate response capability, as 1~' soon as the opera: Ors of a nuclear uni: detec: tha: they've 1 18 reached some sort of threshold level in an event, they, in 18 addition to first calling their local emergency plant contac: : i a0 in the local area, get through c cur regional offices, and
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so we have to have a n0 ification before we can -- before we 2- launch the team. Once we have the notification, why, we go 3 ahead and do what we have :: de, it's no: the licensee's 4 prerogative to tell.us whether :: send people er no: :: send 5 people. So tha: these people can be on the site, depending
'i en the distance and the difficulty of ge::ing there, frc= the 7
nearest regional office :0 the plant in questien, and then S whether or no:.: hose pecple can be useful in keeping a situa-9 tion from ge: Ting worse. It depends On hcw fes:-moving it is . 10 I may have already =cved in:0 an emergency situation before i 11 they can get there. 12 CFAIR."AN KEMENY: Perhaps I could sharo.en my c.ues-
, 13 tien by asking a hype he:ical question. Suppcse the CO:=is-14 sion found tha: the information coming in was so confusing 15 tha: the Commission really did not know whether the situation 16 was serious or net. Would that rigger sending Out such a l~' l ream? '
i 18 MR. EINDRlI: Of course. Typically, upon any notif - l 19 . aca on : rem a. licensee that events at nas plant have reached
. .. l i
.'O one of these threshold levels , the regional office i =ediatel y 21 sends pecple to the si:n, or if there are inscec Ors in the - ,
course of making visits who may be actually physically nearer I 4- ,
.3 and able to ge: there faster, why, they'll reach them and ge:
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- s, r pe .-o 1 particular case, at what mement did your Commissica send such l 2 a team Oc Three Mile Island?
3 MR. KINDRII: The prejudging, new, if you will -- t
~4 the final cutceme, en getting all of the chrenclogy carefully 5 scr:ed down -- but i does seem c be fairly well established 6 that cur-Region I office at King of Prussia icgged in the .
~
notification frem Three Mile Island a: 7:u5 a.m. on *dednesday 3 morning the 28th. They immediately called in a team and go: 9 them launched. They were on the way in, probably something - - 10 an hour, or something a li::le less. They were a: the site 11 at about 10 a.m. That would have been a five or six-persen 12 team, with hand-carried, some hand-carried =enitoring instru-13 men *s. ( 14- Then, as time went on, why, more people were sen: 15 down. By --. think by Friday night, why it was 30 or 100 16 pecple frem the NRC on site. 1"'
! CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Yes. '4ha: :'m trying :: probe II here is the fcilewing -- and remember, in a way, while 18 we're a fac -finding mission for Three Mile Island, we've >
' a
~o been instructed by the President to find our every fact we
.3 can on these weighty charges :: make reccmmendations for the
.m future. Therefore, in some sense, we're in a Monday scrning a
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cuarterbacking-situation, but hopefully, Oc learn fer :he ; i of
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.'5 o 'ihen your team arrived en 'dednescay, what was the r y -,,_ _ _ , m- .. . - , . ...~-.--,-----,,y ,.%,
3-7 1 Pcwer Authority -- : :.e a n , suppcse --
- don't know this :: be 2 a fact, but suapose e they found tha: Opera: Ors there were not 3 performing the right steps in order :: preven; a sericus 4
situati:n frcm develeping, wculd they have had the authcrity 5 to take con:rcl, er how far did : heir authori y stretch? 6 MR. EENDRIE: I don': think the inspectors who I first arrived on site would have had that authcrity. That a
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9 inspection enforcemen: Office er the licensing senior Officers 10 on the licensing side. The response capability to emergencies 11 f:r these plants, I would note for you, depends strongly 1., on the plant Operating staffs. They have emergency plans.
, 13 They are reasonably detailed.
14 One of the things you will be locking at is the 15 array of those emergency plans, and whether you think they're 16 adequate, or in what ways they ough to be improved. Su: 1*' these emergency plans establish that when anything happens IS there is an - ' mediately, an emergency direc:Or for the 19 site, who then comes into being, as it were, and typically
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that's the senior official of the operating crgani:ation who
-'1 is on the site. And then as more senier pecple ge: here,
_: :ney,re not a, ready there , why they as s ume the emergency
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., -l-the licensee's emergency direct: rate. They have the respon-
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sibill:y to take all measures necessary for public safety.
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Mcw, as :GC people c me en site , in the Three 'dile I i
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14 capability, and the way we have arranged curselves to 15 respond to these events. 16 v.w . , ccKa a s w.u.e u g .u. e.s.. w s. y e,. .,. . .: . . 3 m ,. ., .:: . .a .t. a . . e .
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5-3 3 3 .. I core damage, but cf a limited nature. 1 I 2 The information, the radiation levels, although 3 there were some conflicting data frem several, frc= the
- various instruments, the scr of radiarien levels that were l 5
observed seemed characteristic of a release from the fuel 4 pins of gasecus fusion product -- fission products,'which dc ,
~
accumulate inside the fuel pins , and which, if the rods are 8 thermally cycled through extreme cycles, can deveicp cracks 9 9 sc tha: the gases come out. , 10 I: Icoked, Wednesday -- Wednesday night and, I 11 guess, most of Thursday, from the available data -- as though 12 that was what had happened. We sen frem the NRC successive 13 waves c: nspection and enforcemen: people in :c the site 14 . - - and .cy, on Thursday put in a team c:- system engineers : rem 15
..nd :n. ear the licensing starr, experts in these matters.
16 work in the plant, over Thursday night, made clear tha: the 17 ccre was in very much worse situation than that initial view IS had suggested. 19 But clearly, one of the urgent questions which we
*0
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have to deal with, and that you will want : deal with, is 21 why didn't we knew earlier, and scre accurately, what was 42
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going en inside the machine.
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CFCR.9.N 'GPf:
. For example , the Administra:cr og
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cf IPA suggested that perhaps havin; on site scce scr: cf I "5
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meni cring equipment, .pcssibly even telemetry, sc tha ycur , t
__4 .: 5-10 1 Cc= mission would have real time. data available to it, :: use 2 in an emergency situation. Since he made the suggestion and 3 we have had no time to think about it, I am testing on tha: 4 as -- something like tha -- is i premature for you to 5 comment on that? MR. HINDRII: I think ~'ll speculate tha Adminis-I trator Costle =ay have had in mind radiological meni cring 8 equipment which -- from which we would have a more direct anc 9 then.. complete readour. Because there were cc=municarica -- 10 - . . . - - serious communication dif::culties in the early stages c:- 11 that accident which made it very difficui: to make decisi:ns 12 away from the site. I suspect he was talking about radicic-
< 13 -
gical mons:cring equipment, no -- l' CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Yes. 15
-- 10_ suen equipmen; nad been avas..
MR. .d:.NDRa._s: 16 able, I rather doubt that it would have improved cur analyti-17 cal capability on wha: the core condition was. I think the 18 latter situation requires a careful icek a: the scr:s of 19 in-plant -- what's called in a chemical plan: -- process ao
~
instrumentation array, than radiological readouts.
.3
~
C'# AIRMAN KIM.ENY : Yes. Since you raised the issue as Oc whether operators did or did not recognice the nature of the problem.early, I'd like to turn c the license in
'~4 question. One thing I am perscnally commi::ed tha: his Cc= mission should research is, and you can a leas: ge: us
5-1. I started on that, is, to what degree does ycur Ccmmission take 2 into account, before granting a license er in renewing li-3 censes, two things: one, the degree ofstraining of the 4 opera: Ors, and of course, as opera::rs change, whether they 5 continue to ..'ve that; and secondly, since it has been sug-6 gested in earlier testimony, tha: there nay be a big differ-
~
ence between normal operations and respense :: an emergency, 3 to what degree does your licensing precedure take in 0 9 account capability of the Operating utility :: respond -- 10 .s.t . a.; a,.,, e.4, o,,e a.-.s . en = _:.,., a..g ..q,,. . ..u.e . ...a~: .,, 11 to have a bacxup team, n case c:- an emergency? 14- . . - , A, R . n JD R - : ukay. B e:. Ore the 23:n. o r d, a r e n. , a 13 would have said a perfectly adequate review of those capa-14 bilities. We license the Opera: Ors who run these pl=.nts. 15 The individuals hold individual reac:Or opera:Or or senior 16 reac cr opera:Or licenses frem the NRC, which are the resul 1 of their having undergone training programs and passed them, 18 or c., having -- 19 CHAIRMAN KIME:Ff: May I interrup: just for One ao
~
second? Ccmmissioner Trunk, I premised you a question we'd 21 get in. She wanted to knew earlier how long the required aa
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i 3_ .r , j 5-12 1 in a steam electric plan; and who wan to improve themselves. 2 and become licensed reactor operators. The training program: 3
- associated with the reac:cr side will probably run six month:
4 to a year, but let me note that that question can have a [ 5 fuller and more complete answer as we go down the line, t 6 COMMISSIONER TRUNK: Is the training adequate? I I know there's a let of young fellows working there, and I
'8 heard they panicked. They started pushing bu : ens. [
9 MR. EENDRII: Well, you're uniquely si:uated, in 10 scme ways,.to be closer to that situation than I am. I hadn' t, 11 in fact, heard that. At least by the time our people arrive d la on the site, the impression they reflected back was tha: the 13 operating staff was handling itself pretty well. They were 14 keeping calm and trying to understand what was going on. 15 COMMISSIONER TRUNK: Well, a: tha: :ime I guess 16 they'd stabill:ed themselves, but when they firs: saw the instruments ne measuring right, they didn' know wha :o do. 18 MR. EENDRII: I think that could very well be the 10 case, Mrs. Trunk. When the incident occurred, why, there ao
~
undoubtedly were a lot of annunciator lights flashing and
.1 warning bells going and so on, and operators have a certain
~~
difficulty in fast response, an accurare response in those 23 circumstances, and that's one of the -- that's certainly a 24 ,
' key area that we all want to be locking at very =-=#"y, 25 Let me go On':o try to complett some of wha I w - - - ..y.- --e-- ,n -,e---..
3 ., o, 5-13 1 was about. 'de license the Opera: Ors. There is a training 2 program. They de have :: pass examina:icns that are given 3 them by NRC examiners. They do have to have sc=e experience. 4 either developed en another uni: -- scce of the training is 5 done by sending student operators :: other Operating units 6
.to work for a while -- or on simula:crs which are d
- ust wha 7
the name implies, they are cenrrol recms which attemp: c 3 simulate , and then there is a computer behind i: tha: makes 9 the lights, as so on, respond the way, presumably the way 10 the reactor would respond. 11 The operators have to train specifically for the 12 uni tha: they're licensed to operate. They have to know t 13 where all the valves are, and the pumps are, and all the 14 procedures, and so on. There are a very substantial set of 15 operating procedures, volumes liters.lly, associated with 16 each of these plants, and those procedures cover both normal 1"' cperating procedures and off-normal or acciden precedures. 18 And there are training routines agains: those procedures. 18 Now, one of the things that we 're going to be
.'0 looking at very carefully, and that you will also want ::
U look at, are these arrays of procedures. Are they really
~
adequate? As
- say, before March 23th, I would have thought
.,3 they were, and would have :Old you :ha: they indeed :cvered
.4 all of the transient situations tha: eculd arise. Tha:
.,5 clearly is ac: the case. And I wan :: knew why -- you knew,
4 , a 5-14 I where we missed it, and you will wan c knew tha: :co. o- c..us..R.u.a. .xi .r_ev.e.g.
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s 3 . .ha... .r g,v. J"s. _= _ _m - m. - " s. e s . .# . n . - _~ ' m a "m.- a v-.. ". e .- 4 Ccamissioners have many questions. And here,
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am speaking 5 of hearsay evidence and if I'm wrcng, please tell me so, 6 but, tha: there may have been scme fairly large number of
~
incidents at this particular plan: befcre. De .vou hac.can :: . 3 knew how many incidents had been reper ed at this plan:? 9 .v.a . u.r.yu g..r
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10 has been working up for -- what? Sc=e:hing -- had been werking 11 up for something like a year and a quarter, I guess. They
- 12 had a rather limited time at full power. I think seme:hing 13
( like three -- the equivalent of three full-power scnths, er 14 scmething like that, when the inciden: eccurred. 15 There were, without kncwing -- en all units , during i l 16 . . . . . he working-up pnases, acter they begin te start cperation II -- after they begin operation -- oh, why, there are generally 13
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19 . . happen in large plants. .hings trip c::.. en you and ycu go
.,o and find cut why, and se on.
.,3 Now, one er the questions , again, which we have
~~
to answer fcr curselves and which ycu will wan: :c know the
- u , _, answer to is, were there a series or events c:. :s. s .
1
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kind wh.#.ch went beyond either -- individually, went beycnd
.,5
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what you ceuld reasonabl"/ expect a plan: in the werk-up
3 3. .J 5-15 I stage : undergo, or which, in total, constituted a pa :ern 2 that should have alerted us tha: there was scmething no: 3 - a n' ~. .
.-s 4 CRAIRMAN KEMENY: That's what I'm trying := probe, 4 whether it's true in this case or not, and let me --
8 MR. EINDRIE: I can't tell you the answer, and I
' can't give you -- don't have details en that.
3 Yes, I understand that. CHAIRMAN KIMENY: 'ic -- 9 . .
=ay .a :nere: Ore request, as you rurnish us . n:ormation --
10 MR. HINDRII: Absolutely, absolutely. 11 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: -- in the future, I would like 12 very much to know how many incidents over what period had 13 been recorded a: this plant. 14 MR. EENDRII: That certainly is going :: be a -- , i 15 CEAIRMAN KIMENY: I'd like to knew how cha: com-16 pares to others -- 1 MR. EENDRII: -- full record. - 18 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: -- and what the p ::ern in others 19 has been. And -- if you can give us -- if there are any
%~
guidelines the Cc= mission uses as to when you become suspi-
.ig
~
cieus tha: the number of incidents is ::c high, and therefore
.. 3
~
-there may be a danger here, I would like := see that as par:
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of the testi=0ny.
~
MR. EENDRII: Yes.
.'5
~
CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Commissi:ners? 1 1 i 1 1 4 1
- 39. .,
5-15 1 COMMI55!0NER EAGGIRTY: Yes. Thursday -- you said o that by Thursday night you recognized tha: the situation was 3 moving from what one might describe as a low-level emergency.. 4 I suppose, c a higher level. '4ho , in fact -- your people 5 were there. Did you observe wha the plan operators cen-6 cluded, or was it your people who provided the addi icnal judgment that made that conclusien come to pass? 8 MR. HINDRII: I guess : can't tell you, in the 9 sense that I know, you know, who said wha: :: whom and what:he 10 points that -- you were there -- as tha Team werked through 11 late Thurstay afterncen and through Thursday night. It may 14. be that it was in effect a join conclusion, because they 13 would have all been there in the Con:rci Recm trying ec 14 understand what some of those instrument traces from the 15 early .hcurs meant And also, as they locked a: the plan: 16 situation, as it was then, and tried c -- and locked a: 1~ what had happened when they had tried Oc brins the plant IS down to a lower pressure, and ge the plan: on:0 the residua:. 19 heat removal system -- it seems :: me tha: it was over that 20 night that i did beceme clear. And I don't knew whether
.,1 cur cecc.ie were the discover =-=s, or .ha
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2 . _= _ e , or whether they scr of gathered on it all at the same time,?ha: 23 it became clear to the people in the Control Roca that there
.,4 was a substantial volume cf acncendensable gas in the reacten
.,5 system, c her :han the volu=e in the pressurizer. 5ecause l
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4 removal system, which seemed the desirable shutdown mcde to O go c. 6 And the system simply wouldn' respond in the way they would expect as you started to reduce the pressure. 3 That is, the pressure wouldn't reduce. '4hich indicates there 's 9 a pneumatic volu.ae in there that ius: expands as you reduce 10 the steam in the .cressurizer. And that awareness would have 11 g u,,,, sa m ay n ..,,,,
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whether it was cur peonle or theirs. 13 CHAIRMAN K.EMENY: Governor Sabbitt. 14 CCMMISSIONER 3ABBITT: Mr. Hendrie, I have scme 1$ concerns about the :..mo. l:..ca :.cns c:. a ,uc. w . :. . care :.nves eat:.cn 16 by your ,.ccmission and u.:.. . s C o m=:..ss:.cn c:. scme c:. the :. acts, 1' e .ac .,a, , ,,,
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19 these crucial hours.
.,0 I think it's obvious that a duplicate factual inves -
.32 tie *ation can cause serious .crob.l ems :..n :ne c.rocess 0: a:cer-
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.,4 with an eye toward assuring that our factual investiga:icns
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i 2 MR. HINDR I: Absolutely. Y0u knew, we -- there
.3 .=~.a_, s - ~. ~. o .# , .w o 5 .4.. s ..ha. d._dva_ "_ o-
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4 efforts. One, obviously, our own responsibilities under the 5 law that we canno shirk. And, secondly, that we couldn' o nave he3,- c::.. because as :.me goes on meteries begin to ge: I a little foggy, and one of the things we have learned cut of
- a. . . 4 . r. a..d 3 ..k.a . ' =- _4m c, o . . .= . . . .# c . ..".a.
fas. ave.n.a _4 .- _3 _# ...- . en#creement :.nvest:.ga:.ng teams to ge
- .n and ta_. .r. :s the 9
10 peuple who were in the incident, sc that you retain cha: -- 11 and ge that on tape, sc that you retain tha: me= cry. 1.* S. u . , ..".e . e 4 s ..'ea _,. y . k. a.
. , c =. .~. . .da _' -. .. *., _' a_ m . .' . .a. .
13 you suggest, and it's our intent to ecoperate in every way 14 we can, and whatever the -- your sta#f felt was bes: :: do, 15 we certainly don't want to sugges: to you that, you knew 16 that we icok at sc=e area and you lock at scme :her area. 1' You have a broad mandate, a national mandate, frc= the IS President to do it, and I want :: encourage you to lock 19 jus: as -- in just as much detail at everything you wan: :: ag look at as you want to. It migh; be -- 21 Cu. a._S..M
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. V.a y
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22 s ues._:on c. ,s a .,. . : _.,-_, a .,,s ,. .=. e ..a:....
-. . . a_.
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.,3 Would ycu be taking your testimony under Oath?
24
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l 5-19 1 CHAIRMAN KIMIN'f: wan: to ask' Chief Counsel if 3 ye ,, . , , . , . s : _n., , , _ny <_ g :
. e. s_ _e .: .: .: ,. -. . _, _ y ..,..-,._.s
, : ... .v.o - , , ,
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, 3. .
3 take testimony, one not under ca:h and one under Oath'. and 4 - 3,... 4
.o *.ob.'a.ms f w_# 5. . .b. a '.
5 MR. NATALII: We don't get in:0 any legal prob'. ems. 6 M. . Cw..a
. . an. We - .w...e ,ec .e.-
s e . c . . . . _: a ,. p.,c
. . . . . . .. ca_- f,-b,. .
I that Governer Babbit discussed obviously will occur, but 3 there aren't any legal problems -- 9 CHAIR.9.N iCME.Tf : Yes. Gcvernce Sabbit:? 10 COMMISSIONER BABBITT: Mr. Chairman, my suggestion 11 wo u.' d- a to#- .' y b e ~ 5a , a s a . a . =. .- +- .#
"--a.n*.
3 f.#. . . . #./, .."..=. 12 u.. . .u. e n d . _: ,_ , s s ,. .: g,. .es,_.he,
. . . . w:.n- .ou. a.a..
.. ,.,_y.e 13 the methodology of investigation, to make sure that fr:m thit 14 date forward we are eliminating any unnecessary problems that
^5 1
could detract from the completeness of it, if that's agreeab:.e. 16 MR. HENDRII: Yes, absolutely. I think that's a 1.,a very good idea. 18
- C.= A *. . .AN '.C*. . ' ff . C- . ..'aa_'o..e . .*.=.-.a. '.
19 COMMISSIONER MARRETT: This is along the sa e liner.
~'O I guess I'm interested in how the public would perceive two
.1 3 '
- .yes..:..=.#
ns so .# ..-3 e n, ..".a obv.oua'y k..=va s e--. a. f a .= _= _ _' a. ' .= ce-.a:.. -a.sfec.a. Now,
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.33
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25 a
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3ec 5-20 1 we're undertaking? 2 MR. HINDRIE: Well, I think it inevitably has a -- 3 in some ways a.different cas frc= yours. You have a clear 4 and' direct mandate-from the President, and so you knew what 5 you' re about . We need :s knew what happened at T h r e e .'!i l e , 6 first frem the standpoint of enforcemen actions, which we are required under the law and cur-cwn regulations ;c S censider. 9 Secondly, because clearly our precedures -- the 10 framework in which this plan: is licensed and inspected and 11 was operating, didn't prevent the acciden and we have :o 12 .know why that is in order := carry cut our responsibility. 13 So, in a sense, our investigation perhaps focuses scre on 14 these aspects, and yours includes these, but alsc'has a 15 broader object. 16 C0KMISSIONER MARRETT: Well, that's, I guess, wha 17 I was getting at. Obviously, we need :s know these things 18 as well, so, :s an extent, then, that is a par: cf the 19 activity. And the only difference from that angle would be
*0 that our mandate is broader, tha: there are scme other kinds l
-31 c:- :ssues w;;h reference l c pctential, et cetera.
And then, I de get concerned then about wha: --
.,3
- c what.exten is there really going :s be duplica:icn insc- '
.,4 far as we are beth.:alking abou: Three M.ile :sland-NRC, 25 .. ..
and .hr e e d. i_ e .s _ and ? l l 1
33 _.c u-1 MR. HINDRII: Well, I think the way :: deal with in 2- is to have a very . close workin6 relationship between the 3 staffs. And, you then, and your staff -- anyplace, Obviousl;. , 4 that material that we develop will serve your purpose, why, 5 it's -- you know, you'll have it immediately and will surely 6 use it. And any place that you feel that you ought to go
^
~
and icok for yourself, whether we've been there or not, why, 3 then, I think you ought to do it, because, you know, ycu hav , 9 to do that to carry ou your responsibilities. 10 But it seems to me that the best way 0 deal with 11 possible duplication -- which may no: -- you know, there may 12 be some places where you want to see some duplication as a 13 check, I don't knew. But the best way to keep it from being 14 in any way, interf ering with each other , is One of making 15 sure that our staffs work cicscly to ger:nar . 16 COMMISSIONER MARRETT: Just one las: question On 1"' that. What's your own time frame for this investigation? 18 Have you thought through that? 19 MR. EENDRII: It's -- it has to -- I think it a0 inevitably scales about the same as yours, of the order of
.,3 siX months.
~
CEAIRMAN KIMENY: May I ask you, Chairman Hendrie,
3
~
are you centemplating any public hearings as par: of your M -, : an,.
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.'5
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-*I i-22 . I and I don't --
we haven't developed the plans far encugh. 2 This would be more in terms of some of the broad scope issues i 3 in the investigations, and -- I don't kncw. I mus: say, 1 4 I haven't thought much about it. ~;'s a pcssibility, but 1 5 I think one of the considerations there, clearly, is that.yotr 6 proceedings are -- your mee ngs are a se: c:- puc*ac meetings "and-i:~might be, you know -- One might feel tha; that was 3 -- that this was the appropriate forum -- 9 CHAIRMAN KIMINY: Yes, I mean -- clearly, curs 10 are public, as has been explained, except for staff deci-11 sicas. And there -- you know, very narrow areas we can have 12 executive meetings on. And, somehcw -- I can envisage the 13 wors: possible scenario of the Commission hciding hearings 14 in 37 n' ear Middle cwn, Pennsylvania, and ycu holding hearings 15 - - - - -
- nree m ,es from there, and competing wita cur hearings.
16 I think that would not serve the national interest. II XR. EINDRII: I don't think it wculd either,
'S Mr. Chairman. I'm sure we can prevent that kind of inter-19 ference.
40 CEAIRMAN KIMINY: Professcr Taylor?
.2 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Chairman Hendrie, you've indicated that sometime late Thursday -- Thursday nigh: --
.33 you, and I presume, the c her Ccamissioners --
..E MR. HINDRII: Well, I found cu abou it, and sc:
25
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,om
(-ali 1. COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Okay., well, -'s not so much a concerned abeua the exact timing as -- 3 MR. HENDRIE: The staff was werking at i: through 4 Thursday night and -- 5 COMMISSIONER TAY' OR: -- what it was precisely 6 that you found cut, that then made you concerned? You used 7 the word, core damage -- 3 MR. EENDRII: Yes. 9 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: -- and suggested that wha 10 you found out, late Thursday, was tha: the ccre damage was 11 more extensive than people had originally thought. A: that 1., . . .
- Lme, nad anyone yet begun : try :: explain the cause ::-
13 the core damage, and the extent and the general nature of 14 . . . it, and in :act, the general nature or ne ruel, er the parts 15 cf the core that had been damaged -- where it was, what had 16 happened to it? Let me couple that with another question, 1~ and that is, at wha: time was it clear :c you tha: there was 18 a large volume of noncondensable gases that were probably 10 largely hydrogen? The reason I ask that question is because ao I'm very interested in knowing at wha: time there was an
.,1 attempt by the staff, Or by the utility -- by anybcdy -- ::
.s.,
~~
find out how these things coupled ::gether, to give one scr:
-33 cf a self-consisten: picture of what in fact had happened ic 24 +
the core, how much was involvec. , what happened :: the 45 cladding, and so On. C:uld you tell us a little bi: abcut
. e. c.
2 .,, 1 ne ta.m*ng c:. :nat and w.na; you knew: 2 M.R. HENDRIE: Well, yeah, the -- when we found Out 3 that -- finally decided tha: there was a fairly husky 4 noncendensab'.e volume in the primary sys:em. I think there 5 wasn't very =uch doubt on our side that i: was hydrogen.
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those conditions, and there isn't much else around. 3 New, w _d n' . e g = .- d .
. _ . '._=_ja'- -a .'.. .d . . '] # . . g . . # #-s_
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D cut what had happened and wha: the core condition was , tha 10 ser ef analysis and hypcthesizing, Oc see what seemed to 11 be consistent with the facts as they were bein~5 developed, 12 4 .. c n # .~. a c 'a s .# a s .4.4 , n _" e _ .=.u a e - we-a. s o . . c ' .- . # . . .~
. . w.. . _= _' . .*.^, t< -
3.". . 13 the primary thrust of interes: was, how do we =ake sure char 14 the situation doesn't degrade? in order c have 00nfidence 15 that the actions that you either take er don' take :: keep 16 the situation from degrading -- you, the more ycu understand i 1"' about what you're dealing with, why the be::er off you are. l 18 So, in connection with tha: thrust, why, people were then 19
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a0 did this gas ccme frem, and what does that imply with regard , n* ^ w .u.e
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00re on Our hands.
.'5
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. u._3
130 - 5-25 1 resulted frem such things Jas putting cge:her the 2 -estimated volume of the hydrogen, which I guess was already 3 kncwn, at leas during the day on Friday, publicly -- 4- MR. EINDRII: Yeah. 5 COMMISSIONIR TAYLOR: And wha: that corresponded 6 to, in-terms of the amount of cladding that would have had to have reacted with the water.:o form the hydrogen? 3 MR. KINDRII: Yeah, there were -- yeah, that's 9 9 right. There were estimates that were being made. 10 COMMISSIONIR TAYLOR: Those were then available to i 11 you on Friday? During the course of the day on Friday? 12 MR. EINDRII: Ncminally, yes. Because tha kind c: 13 estimate was being made, and remade, and remade as you wen: 14 down the line. I certainly ' would have had scme kind of 15 rough cut at it. And it -- it was clear, you know, that you 16 couldn't have that kind of hydrogen volume witheur a sub-1 3* stantial metal-water reaction. And if you had a substantial 18 metal-water reaction, that was going to produce a thousand 10 cubic feet at a thousand pounds gauge, that was a whale of a lot of exidized :ircolite.
- 31 COMMISSIONIR TAYLOR: Well, one fellow-up questien 44 en that. I'm not aware of any public disclosure of the scurce a3 cf the hydrogen, the amount cf fuel that might have been
. -.,4 released, in the New York Times , the Washing;cn ?cs: -- any cf the =edia, generally, thrcugh the presen: time, in terms o
i I-
i i
.3, 5-25 1 of any statements about how much of the :re was involved, e
2 and what people in MRC cr other people tha: =ay have been 3 analyzing this, guessed :: be the general state of affairs? 4 That has not been part of the media statement abou: the 5 . . situa:Lon in the core. 6 There was a 10: of discussion about possible
~
hydrogen explosions, but in terms of the exten: Of the core 8 that was involved , and what had happened :c it, and what 9 might have happened to these parts of the Ore that might 10 have lost their structural integrity and so en, : don't 11 recall any Of that being made pub'.ic. la- ,MR . n.._,!D
- s. R. . - : .
den,: reca_1 wha: the -- there 13 - - - - -- were a series c:- -- series or press brier ngs by various 14 members of the staff, ever the Triday-Saturday, scr: of, 15 period. It became apparent very scon on Triday that i:
*6 would be best to concentrate the news information source a:
1"' the site and with a single person, er a few people, dcun 18 there. Harold Denton got the assignment, as the senior 19 cfficer on the site. no
~
I think I actually breached : hat rule on Saturday
.2
~
because there were a 1c of.pecple at Se:hesda from the press wne were very anxious that somebcdy talk :: them, and I held
.,3 a =bcu., .as~.=.-=--,...=.
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there was cere damage, the status Of the machine -- the
~
hydrogen situation, and se on. And then there were a :cuple I (
l i s. me l 5-27 1-cf sta#f members who followed me. ~ don't recall any;hing ) 1 0 . . s p ec t.p .ic accut extent c# =etaa.-water reaction, that scr: c-3 l detail. I expect, in part, it derived frcs the fac: tha: 4 Denton's. briefings at the site were scre directed a: the
- i 5
status of the machine than what the -- whatever calcula:icas l 6 may have shown abou its state. His interest, obviously, in the site, and his responsibility, was to make sure tha S nothing else gc: away from us down there. 9 COMMISSICNIR TAYLOR: Well, were there any c her 10 cbservations that were being made a: that time that would 11
=cre directly tell what the probable state of the core was la~
than these calculations? 13 MR. HIMDRII: Well, you remember there were a se: 14 ~ of ther=ccouples in this core. There are something like 15 50-odd, strings of them, instrument strings, self-pcwered 16 detectors, each with a thermecouple at the upper end. In 1~ the early stages of the accident, you recall, these went off IS scale. And the opera;nrs assumed tha: the instrumentation 19 jus failed, and it failed in a way Oc leave an up-scale to '
= .t .- . . a _, .
.,1 As time wen: on, and particularly through tha:
\' me Thursday nigh pericd, our people a: leas became convinced 3
that these thermoccupies were still -- tha: those were 24 ' neaningful si;nals and wha: they were telling us was, we 25 u.. ,g , n ,., a c .c n .: s,.u. '. ,...ye . .n-.g
-.. ..b e..n. . .: .nf ys- . n. .: .he 1
- , , , - - - -,,n.
3 eJ .: 5-23' 1 inference, on core damage, then derived frcm assuming that 1! _indeed either all, or r. cst, of these ther=ccouples were in 3 fact. reading high temperatures, just as they were indicating. 4 And then, once the cachine .ger stable en dednesday -- 5 got in c a stable and cool configura:ica en ilednesday, late 6
'dednesday afterncen, some of those temperatures began c come down.
3 The thermeccuples that would be located a: the 9 core periphery, and hence, in eccler parts of the core, 10 very rapidly came down on scale, and then down fairly cicse 11 to the saturation -- cr, :: the bulk temperature. Others 12 stayed up for a while but were ecming down. And, so, the 13 staff had good reason to think tha: those things were reading 14 what the temperature was, and tha: was par: cf the basis for 15 the estimate of core damage.-- 16 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: May I ask a questien en this? MR. HINDRII: -- and I think there was discussion IS of that. It seems to me that I can recall Harold Den:cn 19 in seme of his press briefings commenting that these tem-
"O
~
peratures, wha: they were, and what the high enes wers, and
- 32 what they were doing.
3.i
~
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I don't recall any. tempera-
.'3
~
tures in the fuel being quoted. In fact, the highes tem-
~
perature I reme=ber seeing described was about 700 degress F
.'5
~
The concern, of Ocurse, was tha: there were -- migh; have r- --
,- r -
--a--- - - - - , -
-m .; . --s 1 been much higher temperatures in the fuel itself.
2 MR. HINDRII: Nell, these temperatures con': 3 reflect the f.a1 temperature. What I mean. c say is, they 4 reflect the temperature in the bulk coolant, or whatever 5 structure is immediately around them. They are located at 6 the tops of the elements and are characteristic, then, of . I the bulk coolant coming up out o f the -- S CHAIRMAN KIMINY: .iay I ask, then, if instruments 3 went off the scale, in a sense? Is i: possible that the 10 instru=entation available is adequate for normal operations 11 and =ay not be adequate for an unusual event? la MR. HINDRII: Well, these theraccouple arrays and 13 the self-powered detectors that are in these s rings at 14 50-odd locations in the ccre , at Three Mile, are used for 15 pcwer distribution management, and burn-up management, to 16 ge: the most efficient burning of the nuclear fuel, over 17 the long term. They're not -- were not regarded as safety-18 grade instrumentation. The fac: that they were there turned 19 cut c be very useful. The fac: tha: the potentiometers tha- , 20 read them out, and then reported signals into the process al computer for the plan:, simply ran cut of scale a:
~
- -- I don' knew -- 700-odd degrees, simply reflected the expectatica l
23 tha: that was a higher temperature than you wculd ever see l 24 in the-machine.
*5
~
Now,-I think we may wan: Oc lock a: that, and you l
\
.,e 5-?O' 1 may want to lock at that, and we =ay all decide that some of 2 'These things would be usefully se up, 30 tha: they'd read 3 on up scale, and be available if we ever get into another 4 situation like this.
5 CHAI?S.AN KD!ENY: Governor Peterson. 6 COMMISSIONZ2 ?ETERSON: Probably one of the best
= . . . . . .
' sources or in:Orma:10n comes : rom :ne opera: Ors invo.ve,., _
5 themselves. And I sender if you have available a' debriefing 9 cf those operators right after the incident? A transcrip: 10 of that? Do you have a log where they entered what changes 11 they made, and why they made them -- :: be made available Oc 12 us? 13 MR. HENDRIE: You'll certainly get everything there 14 is. I can assure you of that. I 's sort of the las; par: 15 of the question. A debriefing -- the debriefing, in a 18 sense, is going en acw, with the interviews that are being -- II have been held and are being held with the opera: Ors. 18 A debriefing immediately after the critical days, the firs: 19 few days, no. Because this wasn' quite like an airplane
*0
~ 1 that maybe does a barrel roll and then lands and everybody i 1
1 3, 1 says, whew, we,-= =,, new safe an, we can .aave n.e p _,c an- s a., the co-pi10: off in a back room and talk : chem. In a sense
-33 "'
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~ I although it's now in very good shape and it's coming in for '
25 a landing, it hasn': landed as of 0 day. I l I i
,_., 5-5-31~ l So, you knew, we're not.cuite in a position to 2
pull pecple ou: Of the plant and, you knew, go through things 3 tha: take up very much of their time. 4 COMMISSIONER PETERSON: Su: have you ac ually 5 interviewed the operators Oc ask their judgment of the event: 6 leadin e un. to it and things which happened during that time?
'MR. HINDRII: Thats going on new. That started, 3
ch, maybe -- what? -- a week er se age. Yeah. I' jus: 0 saying that, you know, one would really like to have, perhaps , 10
- have had sc=e of the operators' thcughts, maybe every nigh 11 at midnight, through those first days and that just wasn' --
la-wasn't within a reasonable -- t 13 i COMMISSIONER PETERSON: Ocn't they keep a leg of 14 what they're doing? 15 MR. EENDRII: Logs -- a rough log and a kep log 16 in the centrol room. There are instrument records, char 17 records, which reflect what pressures were doing as a func-IS tien of time,.and so on. All of that kind of material, yes. 19 COMMISSIONIR pETERSON: Uell, I mean: -- an opera- 3 20 or says, instrument so-and-so wen cff the scale and I did 21 sc-and-sc. Don't they normally do that? . MR. KINDRII: You'll typically icg the action and n3 there =ay be an indication there of why. You knew, what he
.,4 i
read that caused his :: dc that. I'dcub: very much if they l l 25 i I had any co.c.criunity :: keep very much of a ic-
. s in the v
e E i 1 e c -
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1 I
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I 5-32 1 critical, you know, firs -. I den't knew -- half hour or n
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mental to have a clear line of authori / in an cperation like 1 3 this. Always knew who's captain cf the ship. 'dere the 9 opera crs in a position here where they had many differen: , 10 people giving them instructions, or is a well-crganized -- l 11 , , . . .-, ! D ,. . ,. .
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13 to the operations superviser, to the superintendent of the 14 plant. That's a line of cc==and which we rec.uire be very 15 ,
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16 part of the thing that we will review before we license a 1. p _, , .,. .. . .u...,... c ..,. ,,an d _, _: . . e . . a _: ..s .. . .u.a. .-,. . IS
'4 hen NRC -- when the senior officers went down and 19
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n. they sat in the Cen:rcl Recm and turned valve switches, er tha: they s: cod over an opera:cr's shoulder and said, ycu
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33 1 withcut our concurrence, and we had pecple a: the stations 2 throughout the plant to keep with things and so on, but i: 3 wasn't a situation in which -he Operator didn' know whether b i 4 Oc icok to his left, to the plant superintendent for wha 5
- do, or to his right, to an NRC can, because --
6 COMMISSIONIR FITIRSON: It would be nice to ask I the operator that question, that's -- 8 ~ MR. EINDRII: think that's one of the things 9 you'll -- 10 CHA~PXa.N KIMINY: Professor Pigford wants to ask 11 . . a question. A Just have one r o].lew-up en what vou have '.us . a la~ said. Are you satisfied with the presen; arrangemen cr 13 are there circumstances under which you feel that NRC 14 sould have the authority :0 take charge of the situation? 15 MR. HINDRII: Well, I've been asked that question 16 and I guess maybe I'll know better down the line sometime, 17 (' - as the investigation becomes clearer. For the =0 ent, I IS sust say, it see=s := me that we have ample authority. 19 It's quite clear tha: the staff officers have the authority 20 to issue an order, either to do something or no to do 21 something, and have 1: i=:ediately effective. in a situa-
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4 A.*3 We're not.se up, and ~'m no: sure we ever should 1 24- ' be se: up, for a crewd of NRC people :: go in and chase the a.5 whole operating staff cut and sit dcwn a: the desks and 9 i.. l i r-l l
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__n./ . _, . _; _< _: a .- . ~. _; _..u. _. 5 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Chairman Hendrie, that's 8 ebviously one of the issues on which this Cc==ission will have to make a judg=ent as to whether the Ocvernment should 5 cr should not have such a team available. 9 MR . .._,ID R_._s: ns. Jus so; just se. 10 CEAIRMAN KEMI.Tf : Frefesser ?igford? 11 COMMISSIONER ?IGFORD: Scc:cr Hendrie, when la~ - we're talking about the extent of fuel da= age and the ancun I 13 of hydrogen, these, c" course, I suppose, are conclusions, 14 based upon, as you have said, analysis of sc=e instrumen: 15 readings and experimental data, aren't they? 16 MR. HINDRII: -- and hype:heses abcut how things 1. would have gone that would have yielded the configuration IS of the plan -- 19 00MMISSIONER ?IGFORD : .Have they been docu=ented, n.0 then -- the readings themselves, the analyses of those, and
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3 COMMISSIONER ?IGFORD: Is there nothing written 4 down on this subject yet? 5 MR. HENDRIE: Oh, I think, with regard c wha: -- l 6 analysis of what happened? It's in progress, and will either -- is -- let me put it , is being , I guess is the righ-9 .a.,.m .o . ,.,u_-
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g.;__,,. .....--s yn. s 9 COMMISS~0NER ?~GFORD: Are you also rec,uesting 10 such documentation, both data and analysis, from the utility 11 c o m 0. a n. v ? l MR. EENDRII: Yes, they will be supplying their -- 13 COMMISS~0NER ?IGFORD: Do you have anything in 14 hand now? 15 MR. EENDRII: No: that I know of. No. The 16 utility's been very much engaged with the need to keep the 1~ plant stable and in good condition, and to scve i: On :: ward 18 a cold shutdown condition. 19 COMMISSIONER FIGTORD: ~'here's no documentation so
~
now, either frem NRC cr the utility, on the calculation of 21 a cun: of hydrogen, is that right?
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MR. EENDRII: There must be an asserimen: cf yellow
.'3 pad ca.culational
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o, COMMISSIONIR ?!GTORD: Casn't vour Conmission . asked for a summary of this so that you'll have in hand the , 8 . . . . cas_s :Or :nese conclusions? O ye. . ..rsevg:: . r. . e_ _. __ _, ___,,, u,.,me
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A w. t , I S-37 1 MR. HINDR*I: I expec so. i 2 COMM"55!O!!IR ?!GFORD: And is there something also 3 available frca the utility company? 4 MR. EIMDRII: I don't know. 5 CHAIRMAN KIMINY: Let's see, could ~ make tha: 6 question stronger? I was just reminded of a question I
~
should have asked you. May we assume that all the data tha 8 was generated on site is in the hands of NRC, er at leas 9 copies of it are in the hands of NRC? 10 MR. EINDRII: Or coming into the hands of NRC, 11 yes. And we're making -- In- CHAIRMAN KS"INY: Ycu can assure us that all cha 13 data will be available to the Ccemission? 14 MR. KINDRII: We're making a c=mplete set of copies - 15 for you, and other bedies that may wan c have it; yeah. 16 COMMISSIONI?,PIGFORD: Do you have in hand the J ' I cperational history of this plant? The ;cwer versus time,
*S up to the time of the accident? :
19 Oh, MR. .n NDR;.s: a.
;magine so; sure. 2ne no
~
operating records would be very clear on that. oi
~
COMMISSIONIR ?!GFORD: And have you used these .
~~
data to generate any predictions On the radienuclide inven-a3 Ory at :he time. of..the .acnident?
~ ;
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- Sure.
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1-1 l 1 1M I l 5-33jn 1 MR. HINDRII: I am sure you can. I can assure you 2 that you will ge: copies. 3 -u r...u u..A w u.e. I < e u._r.lv. . r
. . s 2-. . . . . . . s_ e .- ...e :. .- o or :. 2. e .,._. e 2 4 order, what NRC has is available to us, Mr. Chairman?
3 MR. HINDRII: Absolutely. 6 CHAIRMAN KIMINY: Co=missiener Me.:herson? *
~
COMMISSIONER MCPHIRSON: Very brie'ly, Mr. Chairman . 3 This =crning Mr. Wilecx o' the Flood -- Federal Disaster 9 Assistance Program said a number c" things that I'd -- two 10 of them are these and I'd like your comments en them. He 11 ; :_: s a _:-s , ,, - r a
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which can be subject to later verification. certainly 13 would be prepared to defend them here under questiening. 14 One, the NRC lacks both the carro:-dollars and/or the 15 stick-authority to encourage adequate state and local 16 government preparedness for radiological accidents." 1" That's the first statement. The second was, many of the IS assurances provided by public agencies of which NRC is a 19 prime one, to the Metropolitan Idison as to available
.so rescurces in the case of a radiological inciden at Three Mile Island were so much bureaucratic bcilerplate and were
.,.i not always relevant := actual capabilities."
23
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1 In l 5-39jn 1 of course, are the responsibility of the state. And I don't 2 know'of any stature which requires a state to have one and 3 gives us authority to tell them they must. 'de encourage i: 4 very much. And my impression is that all of the states do 5 have radiological health bureaus or the corresponding sorts 6 of offices. I think probably as a group, their -- those 7 ... state o::10ers are concerned and trying to do as good a j.ob 3 as they can. I expect they have some staff and budge: 9 limitations just as nos government entities have. So, they i 10 probably don't have as many people as they'd like. 11 C0!Of!SSIONER MCPEIRSCtf: Let =e interrup: you there. la When you -- when you license a plan , does the plant have Oc 13 . come up -- have to give you a plan :.or reponding to an
'14
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15 MR. EENDRII: Absolutely. 16 COMMISSIONER: And, does that include evacuation 17 plans: Does it include protectin s the public? 18 MR. HENDRII: Yes. 1 19 COMMISSIONER MCPHERSON: Cr is i: purely related a0
~
to the plant site itself?
*1
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MR. HEMDRII: No, it applies bc:h to on-site and
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25 state'have a responsibili y and dc you have a responsibility 1 e I e e
145 5--0jn 1 MR. EENDRII: We have 2) a respensibility nc: :o 2 license-unless we're satisfied tha: the applican: has an 3 emergency plan tha =ee:s our -- cur regulations. Now, in 4 requiring the licensee to carry that cut with regard to - 5 off-site matters, the licensee simply isn't empowered to 6 go cut and tell people : move or : stay indocrs or : 7 do much of anything. So tha: the licensee -- the applicant, S before he can get a license to Operate the plan: has :: go 9 and make arrangements with local authorities -- maybe a 10 sheriff's department and then the state police or : wn , 11 police forces and the state pclice; with the local 12 government entities, sc=etimes fire departments as well l 13 as police departments; the local civil defense offices, 14 Sc that, he has a branches of the civil defense offices. 15 plan which has fully identified a set of communication links 16 in it for notifying the people who would, in turn, have the 1"' - police power to carry cut evacuartons or to require 13 people to stay indcors or whatever seemed - 'seemed 19 appropriate. And we review those plans and there was indeed l 1 20 one at Three Mile Island. What I was saying earlier about 41
~
the NRC's authcrity to require state plans was true. Mr. Wilc x's statement is true. We don't have that authority. 23 .- . . . . .. . . unerher we s.neuld have er 1., 1: snou c ce required in sc=e w a v. ~. .# ..".e s . a . a s ' a- s - -- = . 5 .2 .. s- ..". .= . ~....-.....u-d'~-- J war.. I l 25
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4e JN 5-41 1 COMMISSIONER MCPHERSON: On the second cuestion as 2 , w t .w.e . - he _4 a. --
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3 Oc be provided is bureaucratic boilerplate or reality, wha 4 would be your judgment'on that? 5 MR. HENDRIE: Well, we don': -- I think Mr. *dilecx 6 is welecme to his opinion. I have mine. I think it's =cre than bureaucratic boilerplate. Those cc==unica:icn links 8 and the people with the licensee would contact in the even: 9 of an emergency have to be well-established and we verify 10 them. They -- before they go into operation they have to 11 run a drill; =ay run several drills before they get it all la-shaken down in which those communication links are exercised 13 and we can see that indeed, word of the kind of inciden and 14 wha: the recom=endation for acticn of one kind or ancther is. 15 - tha: that &ces up the linet reaches appropriate people. And 16 that the people that it reaches knew abou: this plan, know 17 about the emergency plan, know about the various levels of 18 inciden; that are laid out in the emergency plan, know wha: 19 the. nature of responses are, know what it all =eans. Ncw, 20 maybe that's boilerplate. We don't actually recuire that 21 the licensee get the local governmen: enti iss c carry cut a physical evacuation of population. It has been our feeling 23 that any sort of mass sevement of the public of that kind 24 4
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would be useful c me and I hope -- and I think for the 3 Occ=ission c have Cc==issioner Hendrie give us his view of -- 9 questions he thinks we cugh to ask or material we should 10 assemble about the sher:cc=ings of c her agencies. ? cur 11 ,, ,. n c.,
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COMMISSIONER MCPHERSON: A=cng government agencies. 15 Nc -- 16 MR. HENDRII: Certainly a=cng government agencies, 17 a -- a -- probably the central agency in it. IS
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3 MR. HINDRII: If Kevin will take a ncie, why we'11 4 see what we can do to supply that. 5 C:* AIR.v_Mi KEME'iY : Yes. Commissioner Mc.:hersen, 6 are you assuming that if each federal agency tells us what's
~
wrong with the other agencies, we may get the complete truthi 8 C OM'i "._ .*-~ u 0' ii=_ *. .*.C .= .u.=*. S v* i% . ".".. a . ' .- ..".e *.. y e . 9 C u..A_ z. uA>i v. ,r.u. _ ._e.,lv. . . C~n _, _ _- -. a.. u.. e n d .-_ , , e n ,. _..u._: .. , - 10 chink we ought, unless there are urgent cuestions to termina-:e 11 i -. . We'll have many opportunities c talk to you and your 12 , _, , , , s-,_, e s , a
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15 go for the kind of information ue discussed that we wish 16 to have frca you. 1~ MR. HENDRII: Yes. 18 C H A I R."_ U I K I M E N Y : And secondly to have staff 19 . . . . . cecperat:.cn .oe: ween ycur com=*.ss:.cn and curs to e_:.mina:e
.'O unnecessary duplication.
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r- e e y o +. y :r _3 e1 :r a y A 3 usisnL_ L _. 1s_0 5-1 1 CEA~RMAN KIMENY: I call the meeting to order agair . 2 Cur next witnesses are from EZW and may I ask Mr. Champion 3 and Mr. Cotton to join us here. My Under Secre ary, may I 4 just ask you for the record to introduce yourself to our 5 tape, and your associates. 6 MR. CHAMPION: Yes. My name is Eale Champion. I i am Under secretary or the Department c: neal:n. n .
, s duca:icn 3 and Welfare and this is Rick Cotton, who is the Executive 9
Secretary of the Department. 10 CEAIRHAN KEMENY: Mr. Under Secre ary, do you have 11 a prepared statemen you wish to make or -- la MR. CEAMPION: Yes, yes, if I say. I might add tha: 13 Mr. Cotton also served- as the coordinator of all of our acti-ri-14 ties and communications during the Three Mile Island episode , 15 In inviting us to testify cday, Mr. Chairman, you 16 asked that we suggest the c,uestions tha: the Commission should consider. The Executive Order establishing the Commission 18 obviously identifies the basic ground the Commission is to 19 cover. The implications of many of these cuestions as well
*0
~
as potential additional areas of incuiry with respect to al-
~
nuclear technology will be discussed by many who. have a f ar
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~~
deeper familiarity with nuclear technology than we. And we a3 will leave those discussions to them.
~
.,3
~
EEW's special area of interest and competence wi-h
~
While I respect : Three Mile Island is public health. .
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-e-5-2 I intend : confine my remarks :: day to those :cncerns, : will )
l 0 no: attemp: := catalog every public heal:h concern. Rather, 3 I want to focus, in particular, on the decisi:n-making process 4 by which public health issues are : be raised and decided in 4 1 1 5 . . . . ,. such a s;.;uar:On. .
- :s cr :: cal, . .; seaieve, :: e s t ab a. .lsh 6
for the future clear and open channels for exper: public health knowledge and opinion to be received and applied :: a relevant decision-making within the Federal Government. 9 The Cc==ission will need to review carefully the 10 allocation of authority within the Federal Government for 11 those decisions , which mus; include assurances of adec,uate l~a protection of the public health in the Operati0n of nuclear 13 power plants -- loth during emergencies a..d---4.. A"
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14 . opera: Lens. 15 The Commission will also need to consider the 16 allocation of responsibility between the State and Federal l.'
- t. -
Governments: What division of responsibility should exis: 18 between the State and the Federal Government in the first 19 instance; under what circumstances should the State be able 20 to ask the Federal Government to assume further responsi-bilities; and under what circumstances, if any, shculd the Federal Government be able : step in without a request from n.3*
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25 Le =e make our concerns as direct and concrete as
i- .c e. 5-3 1 possible. 2 Sy statute and regulation, HEW has essentially three 3 sets of responsibilities in the event of a nuclear accident: 4
- 1) To sample and =cnitor the food supply := assure 5
that it is safe and not contaminated; 6
- 2) To provide assistance to State health Officials I
and other health organizations to plan to prevent adverse 8 health effects from radiation exposure; and 9
- 3) To provide advice and guidance to local health 10 agencies on a variety of questions including:
11 how to evaluate and prevent radioactive con-la ta=ination cf food; 13 ( the appropriate exposure limits for emergency 14 health care personnel- ,
'5 systems for health care personnel to use in 16
=easuring and detecting dangerous levels of radiation.
1$ ( These formal responsibilities are plainly limited 18 and circumscribed. To the extent that HIW necessarily 19 became more involved in the Three Mile Island incident, as 20 it did, that involvement had to be structured and formulated 21 in an iso. remt. ru and ad hoc fashion.
._._.i When the seriousness of the accident became clear an
.3.J Friday, March 30, Secretary Califanc established an informal 24 arcut. of the :0p health cfficials of the Department := advise 25 his on rec ==endati:ns he should make to che White Ecuse, c i . . - . . , . .
5-4 1 the NRC, er : the State to prc ec: the public health. This 2 group included the Surgeon General, the Direct:r of the Na-3 ' icnal Institutes of Health, the Direc:Or of the National 4 Cancer Institute, the Direc:Or of the Center 'Or Disease 5 Control, the Commissioner of the Fced and Drug Administration , 6 the Director of the National Institute of Occupational Safety
~
and Health, and the Direc:Or of the Bureau of Radiological 5 Health. 9 There was not, however, under any law or any 10 established system, any defined relationship cr nachanism by 11 which the Secretary of HEW -- er this special health group -- l~a could provide advice : the White Ecuse, the NRC, Or Oc the 13 State, in this kind of situation. 14 The White House did establish a special interagency 15 group to coordinate the overall Federal effort. The White 16 Ecuse group did provide a =echanism for sc=e censultation with 17 the NRC and with the Governcr's office. Su: both, of IS necessity, had to be developed in a hasty, improvised fashion . 19 , In the field, there was cooperation and consulta:ica i
- 9) .
between EIW and other Federal representatives en-site and
.,1 the State health, agriculture, and natural resources depart-
.m Once aga. a, ments. : was a case of improvising even with .
23
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Similarly, there was no established nechanism for o. ed
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,eu 5-5 1 the extent of possible releases of radicactivity, and so 2 forth. Nor was there an established mechanism for pooling 3
environmental moni Oring data en off-site releases being 4 collected by different agencies. 5 In the absence of established relationships, all 6 these improvided arrangements deve10 ped within a reasonable I time. Fortunately, there was neasonable time available in 8 this case. For example, Secretary Califanc called the EPA 9 Administrater on Friday =cening, and they agreed 50 meer 10 Friday afterncen-to discuss the need for joint activity. 11 Subsequently, NRC was invited :c join the meeting, and two la- NRC Ccamissioners attended the meeting that afternoon and 13
.; briefed HEW and EPA officials.
14 A: that meeting, Secretary Califano also urged 15 that all environmental monitoring data be pcoled so that all 16 agencies would have access to all data. We agreed that all
/ 17 agencies would provide their data to NRC's Command Center 18 and that each agency would maintain personnel there on a 24-19 hour basis.
20 Shortly after the accident, all agencies monitoring; 21 environmental data belatedly had cen:ralized their Operations 44 at the Harrisburg airport and established cooperative working 03 relationships. A: the end of the following week, on April 13, the White House designated the I?A as the lead agency 25'
- = coordinate-the cellection of the'off-site environmental. ,
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l 1 4 :: 1 5-6 1 monitoring data. 2 . The fundamental decision on whether or nor :o order
~
s 3 an evacuation of the area around the Three Mile sland plan: 4 or to take other precautionary and health measures always 5 rested with the Governer of Pennsylvania. Su ourrent legis+ 6 lation and regulation provides for no formal involvement and 7 no formal mechanism within the Federal Government a: the 3 National level for obtaining advice from the public health 9 officials of EE'd in formulating a Federal recommendation 10 for Federal advice to the state on the desirability and 11 extent of an evacuation. 12 In addition, there are no established mechanisms 13
- or providing in:ormation on the evacuation options being 14 considered or on the potential exten; of radioactive releases 15 to the public health experts in the public Health Service 16 a.. --
gr.d . i II Again, in the absence of established mechanisms IS . .. - . we sought and received : rom NRC _ad ._ nec orterings on -r day 19 night, March 30,_ Sunday morning, April 1st, and Tuesday
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morning, April 3rd of the NRC's bes information on'evacua-
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. tion options, the state of the reactor and the exten: of possible releases of radioactivity.
,,3 ven with this information, ?HS scien:ists and
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medical experts could only make preliminary recommendations
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to the Secretary as to. he need for an evacuation. 'dicho u: l 1 1 l I l t l
- o 5-7 1 a least this information, they wculd have.been handicapped l 1
2 in understanding the nature and nt=ber of medical assistants 3 that were recuired; and they would not have been able to plan needed assistance to the State had an evacuation been ordered . 5 r - - . - .- - _n examinan~e the acercoriate responsibt:1:- :or 8 protecting the public health in the Three Mile :sland acciden t, , I the Commission also will need to examine four other areas: 3 Long-term follow-up studies of the populati:n near 3 the plant; 10 long-ter= follow-up studies of workers (as well as 11 the i==ediate responsibility for safety of workers in an 14-accident situation); 13
-Health assessments for werkers and individuals (such 14 as pregnant weten who may be particularly susceptible to ra-15 diation) for the purpose of detecting and permitting treat-16
=ent of any radiation relatad injury;..and 1.
Cleanup and decontamination activities in the wake IS of the accident. 19 Although HIW has no staturcry responsibility in 20 these areas with respect to nuclear power plants, operating 21 under cur general public health authority, we have scugh: to work closely with the State, with the NRC, and with the
.J utilities to see tha: the follow-uo studies are done and ::
1 1 24 provide assistance and advice sich respec: :: public health
.'5 cencerns invo.vang the cleanup activities. .
1 I l v - - 4 _. '
_3 - ~/ , 5-3 1-HEW has focused en follow-up studies of the popu-2 lation living near the plan: (particularly pregnan: women , 3 and young children) and of werkers a: the plan: because ef' 4 our growing responsibility with respec- to the health effects 5 ef icy _;,y,l radiation. Secretary Califano is chairing a , 6 White House Task Force that is considering the entire questic a I of icw-level radiation. In additica, in response Oc a Cen-8 gressional mandate, we have assumed the responsibility f:r 9 assuring that an adequate Federal research program exists wit a 10 respect to the health effects of low-level radiation. 11 We continue to believe, based en NRC's information l abou the ext.ent of exposure frem the accident tha there will 13 be no additional cancer deaths caused by the accident. 14 .. newever, significant uncertainties remain in general about 15 the health effects of low doses of radiation. It is there-16 fore important that we closely examine the exposures and
- 17 possible health effects caused by the Three Mile :sland IS acciden: Oc further our understanding of radiation health effects, not only there but elsewhere.
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As the Commission examines the public's righ: to 01fermation concerning the events at Three Mile ~sland, we
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urge;you' 0 censider hcw public health assessments and i **J ! public health advice should be made public in the course Of , ,i I l a
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, - .o 5-9 1 . occurrences is obvicusly an important par: of the Commission's 2 charge. Su: the Ccmmission should also consider who should 3
have the responsibility :0 inter re: the facts and := assess 4 the public health significance of various events. 5 Mr. Chairman, I have in no way tried to cover 8 every one of the public health's concerns tha your Commissicn
~
must examine. Rather, I have tried to illustrate major r 3 concerns that we a: EIW had as the acciden: Occurred. Wha 9 I urge you to analy e with particular care as you review these i 10 concerns is the adequacy of the curren: information and [ 11 decision-making structure: Who should make these decisions ! la and hcw should information, recctmendations, and considera-t 13 tions with respect to public health be delivered and repre-14 sented in the decision-making process, at both State and Federal levels , beginning with the licensing decision all the way to decisions concerning the cleanup alternatives. If you have questions abou: these issues, er any IS other part of EIW's involvement in the Three Mile Island 19 accident, Mr. Cc: ten and I would be happy 00 try Oc answer i
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them, o.1 Let me also. assure you that HEW is ready Oc assis: the Cc= mission in any way that it can and that we will make ' 43 available all repcrts , records , and other necessary assis-
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3 your remarks prompt a few questions. First, a reques we 4 are making from several agencies. The C:= mission is trying 5 to piece together the timetable Of events that happened during l 6 few crucial days, who knew what when, and hcw thei-
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l decisions are made. May we request, cbviousiv. nc a This. 3 moment, but :0 supply the C:mmissi:n with the best timetable 9 you can reconstruct. 10 ,R . C ". A M P 7. 0 N -. 'v'e ' .' _' "_ e d_ e _' _# 3 .h . a. d. . .- d .- . .". a . . 5.. , 11 CEAIRMAN KIMEMY: Thank yeu. 'de thought it wculd so *
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13 several different agencies and clearly Secretary Califano 14 played a key role in this and, therefore, this is importan: 15 to us. Secondly, I was very much struck -- you emphasized 16 the word " impromptu" in the arrangements. May : infer from 3-that, tha: there were no standing plans as := hew such a 18 situation would be handled? 19 MR. CHAMPION: That's ccrrect. Much cf what was : a
~o done was based en people taking initiatives, trying to find
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was, and doing that as quickly as possibly, but entirely On
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an impromptu basis. v..e._ die,.N .. <_,dr_,Jy :. .Ie s . -I mean, in a way, y0u y:ur . 25 self said you urged us c talke's 10ck as :: who should have
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2e., . _4 . . . . l- health issue, and other Com.tissioners - I am sure will wan: 13 to probe those questions, you kindly offered information and 14 s u c h. . R.. _' a- C..~~..._; a 4s _o n h as ..".e f .- " ' .. a..m.. ~ . ' ~.~. y;_n3- ~.~ ~ft .'. ~ . ~. _ . 15 gather a highly able sta'f in a very shcr: period of time. 16 ., ..
- 2. we ::.nd that we had.,y need someone :. rem nr.a.. . to work :.Or 1'
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18 . 0 quote some c: . On.e nea_,th issues, nay . assume that we . 19 can call en the Secretary?
.30 MR. Cua.MPION: We will be e lad to provide whatever -- ;
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_1, 5-12 1 position than you to answer this. 'Jho really was in charge 2 or was anyone in charge to give information, for example, 3 en public health dangers to the public? 4 MR. COTTON: ' dell, the way it in fact werked was 5 through a very centraliced public information process. All d after ~, my' recollection is abcut 23 hours after the acci-I dent, all information was cocrdinated through either the s ..
,v .. nite n.ouse press of .1ce or the NRC on the site press of-9 fice se tha: there was, it was simply unclear frem cur 10 perspective in terms of whether the public health advice 11 was coming from the Federal Government or whether it was 23 -
ccming from the state. Basically, there was a decision, and 13 again ~'s not the best one to speak 00 this, Oc have tha: 14 . . . . .
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.sind or. advice ce given : rom the state. o n-w 15 was concerned to the extent tha: there were questions about 16 that, these questions were answered either through the NRC l
( press effice or through the White Ecuse press office. 13 COMMISSICUIR MARRITT: I'm interested in this 19 particular context in the way health is being used and I O
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ask that because I think there are many who would say )
~31 in a crisis situation, sc=e of the greates stresses are
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psychological and social for that reason as well. And, a3
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I wonder to what exten; is that a concern as HI*J talks abcut
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o-. 5-13 1 ! didn't happen to see, for example, that par: of public 2 Health Service National Institute of Mental Heal:h , and I 3 just wondered, does that become a par cf the whcle interes: 4 -- the mental, social, and related psychological issues? 3 MR. CHAMPICN: It did not in our censideration. 6 Well, obviously people thought about that, it was mentioned I in the discussions, but there was not an involvement in the 3' sense of bringing the full expertise and competence within 9 HEW to bear en the cuestion of what ought you to say in 10 terms of how people might react. The emphasis was entirely 11 on what really might happen and what were the possibilities 12 That's a considera:ica you might well think about. there. 13 COMMISSIONER MARRETT: But even -- 14 MR. CHAMPION: But that was, it was certainly dis-15 cussed, but it wasn't discussed in technical or highly 16 . specialiced ways. l' I COMMISSIONER MARRETT: But even in asking wha 18 might happen, wouldn't it be reasonable to ask that about 19 the psychological side as well as the purely biological 20 . side.
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MR. COTTON: The one amendment : migh make 44 Oc that is that there is an authority that HEW has in the "3
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provide bc h event of evacuations , particularly : i Of counseling and mental health expertise to a state ; and if
*5 ef an evacuation, strains there had been in the contex l-I
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5-13 1 imposed by people leaving their homes and being placed in 2 evacuation centers, indeed, in respense : a reques frc= 3 .the state, EEW was prepared to make quite a few mental 4 health professionals available to the state in terms of 5 providing counseling of a variety of kinds at evacuatica 6 centers. The one other thing I would note is the state is ) very interested in the af termath of the accident, I gather, 3 in conducting a study, that would examine the cuestien of 9 the stresses that people came under in the course of tha: 10 period of time. But, there was no, in terms of people in 1 11 their homes, in terms of providing counseling or any l 1 12 special kind of mental health assistance :c the state, with 13 people in their homes, there was not. 14 CCMMISSIONER MARRETT: I guess it wasn't simply 15 providing counselling but whether or no: this would be ; 1 16 . . de:..Ined as a part c:, trying to make some assessment of the I I.'
- 1. health effects. Whether there would be an interest in, 1 18 say, as a part of our general interest, in health effects, i 19 to what exten are there effects in that area.
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MR. COTTON: As an assessment, there is no ques-
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tion. The state has put tha forward, fren and center and 1
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heir discussions between HEW and the state a: this
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time of a study of the mental health affects as an af termath
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of the accident.
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5-15 1 COMMISSIONIR P!GTORD: Mr. Cha:picn , I understand 2 that there are scme whole body counters new located in the 3 Harrisburg area and.put there'by HIW. Is that correct? 4 u. s
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. MR. CCTTON: I don't -- there are whole body I
counters, as I understand it, in the Harrisburg area curren - 3 ly by the =anagement centractor that the utility has brcugh 9 in. HIW did make available to bc h the centrac cr and to
- 10 the utility and Ic the state the use of whole bcdy counters 11 that we have at the National Institutes of Health here, 12 and, as I understand it, some people did cc=e down here and 13 they were used. Su I don't believe that we have sen
14 whole body ccunters up c Harrisburg. 15 COMMISSIONER ?IGTORD: New, could you please 16 explain what information you ge cut of these that's rele-1"' vant Oc this particular accident? IS MR. COTTON: I have to say you're pushing the 19 limits of ny technical knowledge but the, ny understanding ao cf it is, and we would obvicusly be prepared c bring the al
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3 4 wha: the exposures have been, it actually measures the a=cun: 5 of radicactive materials that are in sc=eene's bcdy. 6 COMMISSIONER ?!GFORD: I see. New as I recall -- CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Mr. Professer, cculd I ask you I 3 a question? %'nat's a whole bcdy counter. 9 COMMISSIONER ?!GFORD: Perhaps he could explain. 10 MR. COTTON: I -- that is so close :: The limits, 11
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_ c ." . .=.d _d _ a c ~ _# 4v _ y ..w.a . . 14 a person has -- 15 CHAI?ld.AN KIMENY: Is it an instrument with which l 16 you actually go up c a human being and measure something? 1. MR. COTTON: That is cor ect. 18 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: You put the human being 19 inside -- ao
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CHAIRMAN KIMINY: You put the human being inside? i (
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COMMISSIGNIR FIGFORD: -- and i: counts all c' the
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- '.3 COMMISSIONER Mc?HIRSON: Excuse me. Ceuld I ask
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4 COMMISSIONER ?IGFORD: Well, there are other 5 counters that are smaller and simply measure the amount of 6 : _. -. ,_. ..e n . _ :. s e _~ :. ..n.. _gg.ag _ .: n. n , c m _:...- .o a , ...s
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in~. e This whole body counter is special, and I want to tell 3 you why I as interested because I think it is relevant. J
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9 Instead of measuring the radiation coming from the surround- l 10 l ing that a persen might be exposed ::, as he has properly l 11 s a _ _a , : _.. ....__3s you w..,,y muc.. w . ad _# . a c . _# */a. . .= . =. . _# _a _' _a #..-'. s _' ' a. 12 The person, and it's a very sensitive and pcwerful techni-1 13 3 e .so.
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a _J _J _ a. *.. 4 1 1' ' National -- l l COMMISSIONER ?I FORD: Excuse me, I'm not sure 19 . _we..._ s_# s .4.e . 3 .k. wa'/ ~.~. _4....c uca. 4-
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~O understanding from what he said, that the main radiation l' 21 dose tha *< ecole in the :co.ulation
. . s c;. was from exposure
- the airborne ncva gasses, xenon, mainly, and kryp:On,
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mi l 1 about that exposure. Oc you think i does? 2 .u. .m. .4,. m es .._.v..
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people, at leas; as far as NIH is concerned, who have been 5 tested, were werkers, and that it was act, is no the o 3 ne a_ -epu.3a._:on.
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C0ts!!SSIONER . IGFORD :
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hasn' been brough; in ad 3 e ye.s. enc.. .w...a__.c . u.e :. . i wee,. , c . . e .f.. . . e _. . s,. .._ , c.....a 9 there are such counters available for the popula:icn up there 10 and I wonder if they really understand what they're ge: ing 11
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3"esa I i s {4 . hat's not a fair question, because naybe you den' know. i 13
- should ask you about your counter, and what your inter-14
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say that frem my own standpo:..nt , _ wo ulc. nuch prefar c have IS you direct these c.uestions c Dr. Uc.ron and :c Or. Fredrickson 19 at the National ~ncti:utes for Health. ~ hey're much, by 20 far the people to answer that question, and they'll knew 0.1
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l 5-13 1 CHAIRMMI KIME:fY: Other C missioners? Commissioner 2 Trunk? 3 COMMISSICNER TRUNK: Of some 750 people su1c.osedly 4 run through this body scanner, nine were found to have high 3 doses of radiation. Are you doing anything abou: that? 6 Cur -- MR. CHAMPION: As a Cepartment, I think not. I I have only the generalized information that obviously -- S well, let me put it into two parts -- doing anything abou 0 those people? My understanding is that we do not believe 10 are outside of the worker situation, tha: there in this, we 11 is no one we think has a dose that is sufficien :: cause la- long-term problems. The research on that information and 13 that data in trying to find out what happened and what is 14 there and what possibility, I's sure we will continue to work 15 on it. Sur, that we are specifically doing anything about 16 any given individual,is the Department of Health, Education 17 and Welfare, no we're not. 18 COMMISSIONER TRUNK: Well, whose responsibility 10 will that be now? ao
~
MR. CHAMPION: I think that's, I think that is a
~33 state and local responsibility as indeed the direo applica-tion of any kind of health information has been in this
~~
. _ . .J from the beginning.
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5-20 1 a mass study ever the years of the low level radiatica n
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3 MR. CEAMPION: Well, it is not clear what we will 4 finally decide to do, but we dc think tha there cugh :: be 5 and there will be, we have tried Oc keep all cf the available 6 data and make sure there is as such data as possible for the I construction of icng-term research in this area. There is 3 a federal task force chaired by the Secretary which is 9 attempting Oc determine what the ccurse cf all that re-10 search cught to be. 11 MR. CCTTON: The state itself is very anxious Oc 12 be involved, not cnly invcived, but :c evc've that kind of 13 a study cooperatively sc that the c.uestion as :: who is l' actually the contrac cr, whether HEW simp'.y provides funding 15 - - . . . .
- or a state er.,crt, s a ma:Ter c:- very active discussion.
16 COMMISSIONER SABBITT: Su everybody recognices 1*' that you're the source of the money. IS MR. COTTON: We are at leas one pctential source ID of the money, yes. And there clearly is a commi:=en: which 40 the Secretary has made publicly in testimeny and else-
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where, that we will pursue long-term studies of the workers
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and at leas cf pregnant women, young children and scme 43
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sample cf the general pcpulation.
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170 5-21 1 long on this, Mr. Secretary. But, as I listen : day to the 2 yederal Disaster Assistance Administration leader, and' he 3 Chairman of the NRC, I ge conflicting notions of whether 4 there was a working mechanism for getting information in a , 5 hurry and then disseminating i: to the people who needed to , 6 know it. Apparently, ner. And you said in your testimony I that there was no established mechanism fer involving HEW, 8 for ge: ing, there was not under law or any established system, i 9 any defined relationship er mechanism by which the Secretary 10 of HEW or this special health group which included the. 11 Surgeon General, the director of the N:H and the Cancer 12 Institute and all the rest, culd provide advice : the 13
'4hite Ecuse, the NRC or the State of Pennsylvania in this 14 -
kind or s;;uar en; :nere was no mechanism or NRC to give 15 you information except as you asked :or :.:. And ye , the 16 NRC has been in being for four, five cr six years, seme-II thing like that, HIW much lenger, the nuclear power indus- , 18 . Try has been in business for some time, and . :.ind :.:, ; 4 19 frankly, astounding that there is no Ocherent, well under-
-'o s: cod mechanism by which the Federal Government, even within el itself, goes into operation in a hurry, and everybody under.-
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stands what's up, and wha: they're supposed to de, and hcw
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They cooperate, and how they share information and who's
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go respcnsibility for what. ::'s really very surprising
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- me'tha: that situation appears :: exist. The licensee t 4
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3<, 5-23 1 on the spo:~ negotiation and discussion and so en with dif fer-2 ent people taking different initiatives. And that, there 3 wasn't a clear understanding that NRC would perform the 4 information function which is what we agreed on, er even 5 until a week'later, that IPA would take over the icng-term o . . . .. _ data assembling runction, whien was one or the mos: -- we
~
do food, they do air, we do sometimes wa er, they do c her 3 kinds of water, and se on. 9 MR. COTTON: Mr. McPherson, if I might make jus: 10 ene observation, I think the Cemmissicn will find tha: there 11 was a structure in place, and I think one of the things 12 tha: this -- the Under Secretary's restimony raises is
- 13 whether you will find if that structure is the one that 14 cught :: be in place. I think tha: the historical fact is 15 that much of the regulation and responsibility for the public 16 health statutorily, legislatively, resides with the II Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and that wha: this restimony 10 reflects, is that other agencies which in most other e_reas 18 have a public health, environmental protection respcnsibili-
"O ties have simply,in this one area are not included with the 21 new statutory and legislative scheme. It seems :: me that ene of the issues before the C0= mission is whether, in re-
.,3
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viewing this accident, that scheme comes to this Commission
.2 Oc make sense.
CHAIRMA! KEir!Y: Yes, I think Cc=missicner
.3 5-2 1 McPherson's s uestion is verv, =uch to the ocin: and ext.erience .
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3 not in this recm. In a university, when i: ends up in the 4 president's office, i: =eans i 's a mess. And, you did 5
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. situation out in this case which, at least, leads us to I
ask so=e questions as to whether there was scmething lack-3 ing in the existing structure. 9 MR. CEAMPION: I would act wan: tha: :o be under-10 stated. A lot of these arrangements were worked out ascag 11 the agencies but clearly Oc have one public kind of state-la cen in one place where it was understood that we had 13 worked out an agreemen that was all right with everybody, 14 that clearly had to be located a: the center of the govern-15
=ent. So, I would not like you to have the picture that 16 it was what sometimes happens in a university president's 17 office. It wasn't quire that bad.
IS -' C .u t .~ .2.M A 'I .K I V. "..IV. .- .~'m 3-=d- - -
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19 pion. Other questions? If not, thank you very much and ao
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do doubt there will be -- sorry -- 21 COMM~SSIONER MARKS: m very sorry I'm late cu. -- 23 CF CRMAN KIMINY: I knew yee were the one Cor. mis-s :... e .- ..u. , . u..a. s o . : a. s ..u._: s . c .-.. ; .. 3
~'S COMMISSIONER MARKS: I'm very scrry, bu: I have O
,,u 5-25 -1 two.questiens tha: -- you may have : uched en and, if you 2 did, I'll get it out of the transcript. But, in ycur opini:n 3 at the time that you, tha: the Secretary convened this fairly 4' high-level group within the Department to develop recc==enda-5 tions, was there any ambiguity "ith regard :: the definitions 6 of what was safe? In other words, the critical issue of
, 7 the rec 0 =endations which you say to assure the public tha: 8 it is safe'or not safe. Was -- in ycur perception, was this 9 an issue? 10 MR. CHAMPION: No in the sense -- the bigges: 11 problem in those discussions and Mr. Co :en was presen; a: 12 scre of them than I was and he may want to add to this, 13 but during the time that I was involved, it really was a 14 matter of information. With adequate.information and under-15 standing, I don't think tha: most of these pecple were 16 constrained from saying what they thought was safe er no: 17 safe. Now, we all know that there are some questions abou: 18 the long-term effects of low level radiation, a highly 19 uncertain bus.. ness whicn a lot or people recognize needs "O much more research. But, for operational purposes, they 21 . . .. were pretty certain as to wna: were appropriate stands -- 1: certain things existed, certain information existed than 23 there was, they cculd establish the nature er the danger of the problem, er the excent measured in terms of wha:
.,5 the long, either shcr:-ter cr ' 1 ng-:erm hazards migh; be
5-25 1 from given levels of radiation, or certain kinds of radia-
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physicians in the area don't seem Oc be clear on whether, x 3 you ,new, wnether or nc: 1 was sa:e say Or pregnant wcmen 9 c remain in the area or to leave or -- the whcle issue of 10 whether firs trimester expcsed women should consider 11 abortion and so on. 'dhy do you think there is sc much 12
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13 i your impression tha: there is a great deal of confusion 14 cn this -- issue and, if there is, why do you think it is? 15
.MR. CF.AMPION: There uncuestionably is some; 16 there -- for instance, there was, based on news reports, II there was in one of the columns of the New York Times a 18
=isunderstanding of what the pcsiti:n of the governmen:
19 with respect c hazard was. And, sc -- jus: the ecmmunica-
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would take an extracrdinarily attentive and studious publi:
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'27-1 tha 's surprising. I can't think --
I 2 COMMISSIONER MARKS: 'de l l , I agree it isn't l 3 surprising to me, but did you come out of this experience, I l 4 the Department,with any new insights as c how in such a 4 1 5 crisis information should be com=unicated to say, physicians l 6 in the area, so that, they in turn, can deal with their
' patients with -- raise these i s s ue s,.
3 MR. CHAMPION: I don't :hink that we formulated I 9 _.. h a . - *..h a . c =_ =. ~. a _4 4. _1 y _4a- _= =.. _= ~. a. _= .5.a. cue.h. .o
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10 about, just as it is in any kind of a catastrophe or dis- l i 11 as =.=. a _# . 'aa _ don. **
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12 could have been better ways of doing it and we probably 13
, ought to look a: that, but that again becomes part of what 14 channels do you send tha: thrcugh so that we don': have a 15 confusing babble on that subject that we've go;; that sc=e 16 place there is the responsibility where all of the informa-1"'
( tien comes together. The problem is that in many of these IS . . . cases,=uch of the in:ormation here, people were respending 19 . . . . . to hypothetical cuestions, not having good in:crmation, nc having the data, so that if you spcke to the public, woll,
.1 if this is the case, then this is what would be the result.
~*
If this is the case, that would be the result. And r. ec o. le a3 frequently don't hear if this would be the case er knew
.4
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whether er act such was the case. And, we all ough: to 25 s,e.nd a '.. e*.# ..#. a_ . . . . .' . a . _# . . _= *.. c .# c. . .' . a_ " s _4 . . = . ' .- . .
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v '- - -a** 2 particularly in terms o# technical people, peop'_e whc are going 3 -
- o'have prc:essional responsiol_,::y.
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L-. .-. 5 urged us early in his testi=0ny to take a very hard 'cok - 6 in the whole public health area es to where the responsi-bility lies amongst federal, state and local authorities 3 d and where i: Ou-h: e to lie. He posed that as a T.a.er 9 9uestion to us. Thank /*ou verv. nuch for v.our ac.c.earance. 10 I have felt that probably by this time we need a change of 11 pace-, -.. 4 add.i..#^n - .- w'#n-n~ _' . va_ _ y ..u c *. . m- wa_- a_ ^" . .". e 12 s--..a.
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u g .4.- an .4 .. . e..s # ve .. a # ...# ..c., 14 experience, I, for One, feel that one goed lecture takes 15 the place of a hundred bocks you don't quire understand, 16 particularly if you can ask the lecturer questiens. We are f, l.' : na*.= =.noug.h **, h. ave v- =_ x f e _ . s en ..h ' a- "....#-.#..
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18 could give us a lecture on nuclear reactors and I asked cne 19 of them, Professor Taylor, if he wculd be kind encugh to
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- o. rec.are a lecture for the briefing of the C0==ission On the
.si physics and engineering that underlies is a nuc' ear reac :r. .
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.,s 5-29 1 want the blackboard?
2 Probably not. COMMISSIONER _ TAYLOR: 3 CEAIRMAN KIMIMY -- because it's there if you wish 4 1.. 5 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Okay. If we find it useful, 6 then I'll use it.
~
CMAIRMAN KEMENY: Thank ycu. Yes, incidentally, 8 Professer '..,_or has written ou: the lecture in some detail 9 and there rue ' copies of the lecture available on the back tab Le. 10 That's our homework, as I understand it. 11 Well, since I have written CCMMISSIONER TAYLOR: 12 ou a rather =cre detailed description of the kinds of 13 things tha I think would be important for members of the 14 Cc= mission to understand about =cre or less basic nuclear 15 physics, and some of the engineering aspects that we -- 16 I've written this out, I'm not planning to go through this 1"' in the detail in which it's -- it's been passed ou :: you. 18 What I we'ld like to do is fairly.quickly to pick out a few 19 of the concepts that I-think it's important to have pretty ao
~
clearly in =ind as all of us go through the nex: six months 21 . . . . . c:. being exposed to a great deal or. recnnica_, :n:crma:10n. o., I would like to say that all of us represen; sc=e kind of a3 particular area cf kncwledge, specialized, and that's one
.,4
~
of the reasons tha: I think we've been selected for this
.,5
~
C ==ission, and I hope tha: my talking :: you about nuclear
i. 5 1 physics to sc=e extent and nuclear engineering is ac: the 2 enly example of the exchan6e of expertise be veen us because 3 there are many of you who know a grea deal abou: certain 4 things that I'= rather mys-ified by. So I hope this is 5 really just an example or a rather tree : low of somewha: 8 informal information between us. I I'd like to say at the outse: that I have a 3 conviction that I developed across the years and that is 9 that the basic ideas behind certainly nuclear energy, its 10 applications, its opportunities, its hazards, can be under-11 s: cod well by any intelligent persen who is willing to 12 u 4n .5e
. . =-."."c.+. *.* - .-] - o "-..de-s.=nd
.. ~. 5..a..- =. ' a- ..o 13 excuse for those of us that are so-called experts in these 14
- a. ar on or opac,ue expos : lens or One
- leids to ..de ni behind 15 kind or another. There's certainly no excuse for our 16 . . . . . . .
hiding our ignorance ben..ind this ,sind c:. set or curtains 1 and I'm going to try to do the bes: I can no: to do that. 18 I really don't knew what in the educational or 19 technical backgrounds of all of you is going to seem very
-T . . . . . . .
- amiliar, not so :amiliar er totally un:.amiliar in doing
.1 this, so that I'm sure that a lo: Of what I would like ::
4., say suspec wi,., be .<newn to as . nany or you.
. that probab,y .
none of you, except pcssibly Dr. Figf:rd, really knew
-3 y w:3s
.y.-,..s..
- .gs.. -en,. - -- h e aa'J #7.s.
^5
- s. e q , -- wa s . .o 's -= - .
. . 'w,v a av,#..s- . . ' . = ---
- . = ..a.=."#.='
- ,r--+ e y,vv -- * - ,*
.320 5-31 1 that exists, certainly on earth, is made up of what are 2 ' called. atoms. These are tiny particles that consis:
1 3 of a compact core, very dense, solid core, called a nucleus. 4 Around .this nucleus revolves much lighter electrons. The 5
;ey,1. weight, the : tal mass associated with electrons, is 6
roughly 2000th cf the total weight associated with the nucleus. I So there's an analog between what a nucleus would lock like, t 3 er wha: an atom would Icek like if we could see it, and the 9 solar system; a large body in the middle and these rela-10 tively small particles rotating in orbits around the nucleus. 11 There are 106 known elements. ~1ements are specifically 1~ labeled kinds of atoms. All but 17 of these are found 13 s naturally on earth. The -- most of the 17 that are no: 14 found naturally on earth have been discovered in laboratories , 15 in nuclear reactors, and some of them on certain kinds of i 16 H stars. We knew they exist naturally in seme places, but 17 I generally not on earth. IS Scientists rank the elements in increasing order 1 19 of the : ass or the weight of the atoms. Hydrogen is the I 20 lightest,.and of those that are found naturally on earth, 21 uranium. is the heaviest. There are different kinds of particles inside these compac nuclei. There's basically
. 23
. wo kinds of particles. One is called proton and the 24 other is called neutron. We'll hear a great deal about 25 neutrens during the course of our deliberations; very g - - , -ay---y---,ey y p 9% p y y-t r % g gm--+9 fy p-. .,p.
,e-1 little about protons. But they are both essential in 2 determining properties of atomic nuclei. These pro Ons 3
and neutrens are bound : gether very rightly by forces tha 4 scientists call nuclear' forces. They are much strenger 5 than other forces in nature. The energy that's required 6 Oc break up the nucleus of an atom into its -- into the proto ns I and'neu:rens that make it up, is called the binding energy. 3 New, the chemical nature, the ordinary chemical reactions 9 and so on that go on between atoms, is determined by the 10 number of protons in the nucleus. The prc Ons have a 11 positive charge; the neutrens have no charge. - ach pro On 12 has a charge which is exactly equal to the negative charge 13 en an electron that has the oppcsite side. Sc tha: the I' electrens in crbi: around a nucleus are attracted 15 electrically to the protons in the nucleus. This is rather 1 16 similar to the gravitational force between a satel' lite, I I' l
'. the moon and the earth tha: tends to hcid the moon in 0 = i l
18 fixed, fairly well defined orbit. 19 Now, the chemical energy connected with the -- i ao
~
with atoms as a whole is all associated with these light low
.,2
~
weight electrons that revolve about nuclei. This
~~
energy exhibits itself in ordinary processes like combustion, a3
~
' burning coal, burning of hydrogen, by releasing energy
~34 generally both as heat and light. The energy that's re-leased can be. calculated from the difference in weigh:
1 l l
. e.
5-33 1 of a collection of arcas before and after they've reacted. 2 This difference in energy is ecual to the difference in 3 weight before and after the reaction times the scuare of the 4 velocity of light. This is Iinstein's famous I:MC 2. 5 New normally that's always talked about in the centext of
*4 . . -
release or. nuclear energy. But, in ract, that : o rmu _, a I holds for the ordinary chemical energy production processes 3 that are a part of our everyday life. The da...r:erence 9 between the energy assceiated with rearrangements of these 10 light electrons and a: cms around the nuclei and rearrange-11 ments of neutrons and protons inside the nucleus is simply lo a matter of degree, not really of character. The energy ( l"' 14 connected with the binding of electrons to nuclei is abou a millionth of the energy connected -- the energy that is associated with the binding.together of neutrens and pro:Ons 16 insida a nucleus. And the result of that is that when one I I talks of a nuclear reaction, which is a rearrangement of IS the number of neutrons and protons in nuclei, one is talking i 19 about energy releases per pound or per cunce or whatever ao
~
that are roughly a million times greater than the energy that
.q
~
we're talking about in chemical reactions. New another concept that is importan to under-
.J stand is the concep: of an isor pe. A nucleus has sc=e 24 ncaber of neutrons and protons. The simples element whcse 25 nucleus has .iust one sin-le s .
cro On, cha:'s hydreren.
- 's
n-
- .3 5 .u 1 ..k.e etes. =x ay.#-..
- - .0 ..".e s e..a -. a' ." = ..".a. = . .u c ' =- #
- .k.= v a-1 5
I
- a. "o..". ..a" .or.s =.d
. ns.
. . " . . = . ."
. '="s
. . . " . . = . . - .a.
1 3 '..a s a s /. .A.o ' , .". ." - . '. .'/ a..- . s =. .- = .i d ..".= .. = '_ w ".#
- . - .5 4 s = - u .". -
s . l 4 ...e = s u.-- a o .# 4. . a- . *a' we#-k.... s 1 There is ancther form of hydrogen called heavy 4 hydrogen which consists of a neutren and proton bound 7 together. -' hat nucleus weighs twice as much as ordinary a u,y6 ,gan -. n.ng t.r-a ca,,,g s s av - ,.;t- . . . . . a. xa g . a - : ,-
-...-...-a..,
9 about one part in somewhere around 7,000 cf crdinary hydrc-10 gen in nature. Nature is heavy hydrogen material. Water which is 11 made of up crdinary exygen and two hydrogen a:0ms of an 12 scr #- c.d#.na~] . -a c.=.' 7 a d o *. --d#..a.'y w a . =. .- / ' # .". s . w a . =. =. . 13 We'll be hearing a lo: about that. *ieavy wa er is simply 14 a replacement of light hydrogen by heavy hydrogen. Sc 15 that two deuterium a:0ms, tTo heavy hydrogen atoms and 16 ene oxygen atom make up what we call heavy water. , s 1' - some elements have severa, dozen d:...::eren: . sc-i 18 topes. They're all clinically the same. They all have the 19 same number of protons , but tin, for example , has
.sg l
over two dozen different isotopic forms, as we call them, l 1 .,,
..ha dea.-e'.d. a'..#.-=..
-. c .1 .k. e . .u n. k e - +~ . ' . = " . ~ .~. s .
. .Vcw ,
nuclear reactions, which is what we are geing :: 'e con-
.v3 l
l
- =- .-..a-- d
=-,cu. .
c-._/ e
#.n .='.'#.1-s a " c u . -.=. = c . .,. s , #.. v -- ' ". a-
*14
- m..b.a.m. s ,.g g I. .e. . h. . e a ..=,
,e-..- .-- -g-- .. E
- h. g g g m...--s---- s,9 ---
- A w.g O , e.-.M- . .". a -
25 ,,
..h2 ,.,. n u C ., ,- .,. ---, , w,, . .. * . s - = k =
,,,,,C
, - - ,s a- -j w - - ' = c = = . d ". a. ' =- = s =-
194 5-35 1 energy are of two types. The first is called radicactivity, 2 radicactive decay. This is -he ; recess tha occurs in 3 nature. :: involves a spontaneous change in :he number of 4 neutrons or protons in the core of an a:cm. That spontane-5 ous change a:chibits itself by releasing what's called radia-6 tion. There are three types of radiation that people are I concerned with that make up 9 hat people call the products 3 of radicactivity. One is the -- is called alpha particles. 9 These are actually cores of helium atoms that consis of 10 two neutrons, two protons, very tightly bound together inside 11 generally a fairly heavy element inside a fairly heavy nucleus. i., Spontaneously some radieactive nuclei release these alpha 18 particles so called. Now this type of radiation is not very
$4 penetrating, a piece of paper.will s:cp mes: alpha particles.
15 They're dangerous only really if the isotopes that produce 16 them are inhaled or one way or another go :en inside the hu=an
' body because inside, once inside, these alpha particles, 18 when they are released, even though they only go through 19 1 the thickness of a piece of paper, if they're lodged in the
]
'm lungs, for example, can-do an awful lo: of damage.
.4 The second type of radiation that's imper:an: is
.u called beta particles. As far as we're concerned with 23' reacters, almost all Of the beta particles that are connected 24 with radioactivity, they're par: cf the radicactivity, are
.,5 electrons. They're emitted frem the nucleus, no: frem the l
1 l
. ~ . - . . . _ . . . _ . . . . . - , . - __.
- -. =
3-c
.3.
5-36 , I curside -- they're not one of the electrons rc:ating around 2 the nucleus of an atom. Occasionally, a beta particle 4 3 isn' negatively charged electron, but a positively charged 4 electron. It's called a positron. Most of the radicactive ! 5 =aterials that we'll be dealing with in talking about 6 reac crs are negative electron =erers, not positron meters.
~
And, finally, the thi-d type of radiarien tha , 3 comes cut from radicactive nuclei is called ga==a rays. These 9 are rays that are very similar to light er x-rays excep: i 10 that they are much more energetic. Light is absorbed in 11 any material. It's opaque in a very s=all thickness. 12 X-rays will go through somewhat bigger thicknesses of some ' 13 saterials like what makes up our own bodies, sc=etimes 14 several inches. Gamma rays go much further. They're ener-15 geric and penetrate a 10: further. 16 . . . - New one important measure of radicactiv : or a ( 1I particular isotope is called half-life. That's a measure i 19 cf how long it takes on the average for a given number of 19 radicactive atoms to decay through one or =cre of these 20 . . . . . processes in giving of:. an alpha particle or a be a particle
~32 cr a gamma ray. The half-life is a measure of hcw icng i: t a.ces
.m
~
for half of some given quantity of electron -- cf radicac-
.,3 remain.
tive materials : One thing that has been said
.i;
~
already in some of the testimony heard and which is extremely
.5 imper: ant is that'radicactive decay does occur naturally .
l [' l l l _ _. - _ _ _
.0 6-37 1 on earth. It's a source of hea: that is responsible for the o
ccre of the earth being a let harder than the curside. It's 3 a scurce of what people call geothermal heat. Esdicactive 4 decay is a natural process that has been going en from the 5 time of the formation of the universe. 6 Now, nuclear radiation frem naturally radioactive materials or from artifically radioactive materials can 5 disrupt some of the organic molecules that make up living i 9
=aterial and plays an important role in genetic changes 10 that have been connected with the evolutionary changes 11 in all forms of life. At much higher intensities la-than occur naturally, at leas: On earth, nuclear radiation i 13 can cause cancer, a variety of types of illnesses er even 14 death. But, it's going to be importan: for us :: keep
'5
^
remembering that radicactivity cer _se_ is not a process that's been somehow cosmically imported by humans onto earch. It's 3, ( . something that naturally goes on in our bodies, in the air, 18 in the soil, to some extent, in water. Thetype05 nuclear 19 reaction that we're going to be mes; concerned with is 20 nuclear fission. This is the splitting of very heavy nuclei,
,,1 like uranium, in a way that releases energy. All nuclear reac crs produce energy this way using neu:rens , these neutral particles that make up Only roughly half of the weigh Of
~
, nuclei. All 2r :.ke reactors prcduce energy using neutrens M
- = cause these fissions. :Tev, the basic idea' of a chain i
l l l
I 33y 33 1 reaction depending.cn fission, is quite si=ple and cemes from 2 the fact that when a neu ren hits a -- some heavy nuclei, ! 3 '4.%e _- u =n4". 2'S, _ _ . '. ax..#~.es - ..".a.
. . e " . . . . 3 =. . o m e- . . ~ . . '
1 4 gobbled up, abscrbed, and excites the nucleus of let's say 5 uranium. That starts it vibrating and oscillating in 6 various directions , and under scme conditions , can cause I it to be formed into something that's shaped like a dumbbell 3 in which case, it splits in two, generally wo big pieces, i 9 that added :cgether take up the nucleus of the heavy elemen:, ! I r' 10 split apart at very high speeds. The energy of motion of the se 11 high speed fission fragments, as people call them, accounts t 12 for about 30 percent of the total amount of energy that's ' 13 associated with fission. The other 20 percent is connected g 14 . . . . . with various :orms c:. nuclear rad. arten, the type we ;ust 15 talked about. In a reactor fuel, or in a nuclear explosive, t 16 . . , where :..:ssion is going on a a big rate, this energy, these 1I wo fissicn fragments separating rapidly is aimes: imme-( 18 diately converted into heat because these fairly massive , 19 charged particles hit other particles nex: to them, slow , ao
~
down, and dump their energy into the immediate environs i
.3
~
as heat. Typically in the reac cr fuel, these fissien pre-ducts grew a thickness which is considerably less than
~'3 the thickness of a piece of paper. They're just deposited 1
~
quite locally and they dump their energy as heat. ] i stew, _e - .i.= e.w.
. . . . .- . . . e--.e a ..3. . .e . . a . ". . =. i l
I
133 5-39 1 -that a:0ms that can be' fissioned by neutrens, when they do 2 ' fission-, not only release two big particles, twc big nuclei, 3 but also generate somewha mere than two neutrons. ficw 4 even.if they only release slightly nere than one neutron, 5 the possibility of sustaining a chain reaction, in which H this process keeps going on and doesnt s cp er even proceeds I explosively,ir is possible as long as a neutren from each fis-8 sion is : hen able to produce a least one other fission.
'9 And the fact that the average number of neutrons that are .
10 released in fission in those nuclei that we're concerned 11 with in reactors is over two neans that there's actually 12 a lo: of excess, there're a 10: cf extra neutrons availa-13 ble to be Ics: from the curside of the core or the center 14 of the nuclear explosive , if that's what we're concerned 15 about, and that makes it fairly easy in.a fairly small is package, to keep a chain reaction going and produce a grea: (, 1~' deal of energy, if you want i: ro. I IS
.Most of the neutrons come from fission released l l
19 almost instantaneously in a time that's nuch less than
*0
~
i s' billionth of a second. But very fortunately and this l I al
~
l is one of the-most fortunate accidents of nature, se far as l . . ,
~
l the capacity to make nuclear power is concerned, it happens
.,3
~
that about one neutron in 100 cr one neutron in 50 in the
~
case of uranium 235, ccmes cut slowly, and by slowly I mean l
.'5 -
~
within anywhere from a second er sc to as 1cng as a minute
133 pe-
.6-a0 1 after the. fission takes place. The reason that's importan:
'2 is tha these " delayed neutrons," so-called, give one the 3
capacity to con:rci chain reactions, by moving materials in 4 cr out of a place where a chain reaction is going on fairly 5 slcwly, not in times like billionths of a second. d If it weren't for that, if it weren't for the fac: .
~
that the delayed neutrons exist, control of reactors would 3 be virtually impossible. 8 New, just imagine that one has some collection of 10 material in which there is some heavy isotope of some heavy 11 element that can ce : ssioned .oy neutrons c:- at,t energies, 12 of all speeds -- high speed, icw speed, very low speed. One 13 example of an isotope that does this is uranium 235. This 14 is the relatively rare isotope of ordinary uranium. It exists 15 in nature but only abou 7/10 of 1 percent of crdinary 16 uranium is uranium 235. The other 99.3 percent is uran.'.um 1"' ( 238.
^s-Sur just imagine that, one way or ancther, there ;
19 has been collected together a ecliection of -- a piece of 40
~
material which is largely uraniu= 235, mixed with some other
~>3 Things, and ask, what are the varicus things that can happen
~~
- the neutron -- or one of the slightly more than two
.y
~
- neutrons that have been released through fission.
~ ;
i 1 The most commen. thing :: have happen c a neutron
S
~
when it's released in'some bulk material is Oc have i 1 1
,. e. n v
5-41 1 scattered, elastically, off of c her acces , off of c her i o nuclei, much as a cue ball on a peci rable elastically sca:- 3
.ters off of other balls on the table. 'dha: this does is to 4
change the direction in which the neu rens are going and if 3 the collisions are with relatively light nuclei, to sicw 6 them dcwn. Su: no nuclear reactions per se happen as a resul-: or elastic scattering. 3 The second thing that cculd happen is tha: the 9 neutron that's released frcm fission goes on ahead and 10 produces ancther fission -- sustains a a chain reaction. 11 A third thing that can happen is a neutron can get l~a what people call " captured." Many isc cpes, including 13
, uranium -- all kinds of uranium -- can cac.ture a neutron and 14 release a gamma ray, or proton, which is very unlikely Ic 15 cause fission. So as a result, the neutron is doubled up 16 and is essentia_,1y removed :. rem any rcle in sustaining a ! 1~ ' chain reaction, so that capture tends Oc sicw down or preven:
18 a chain reaction. ~1astic sca :ering doesn't jus -- causes 19 the neutrons c rattle around, change direction, and in some o.0 cases sicw down. 21 Another thing that can happen to a neutron is that it gets scattered, but inelastica.1y. na
- ..ts seme:hing --
23 hits a nucleus, s_cws down c.uite a bi -- but hen neves off
..- . = . -. . , . . .
in another d. rect on a mucn ,cwer speed. _ .h ;.s ine_ast c
.5 scattering is s121.ar : c what wou_d .nappen 1: a cue :a_ ,
,9,
- 5-421 1 instead of hi :ing a hard, resilient pool ball, hit a piece 2 of putty.- It wouldn't s:cp altogether but i vould slew 3- down a lo: and the energy -- the kind of collision -- would 4 he similar to what we call an inelastic collision when we're 5- talking about nuclei.
6 These inelastic sca erin 6s are importan in reac-tors that have lots of uranium 233. The reason is that 8 uranium'238, when it's hi by neutrons, has a tendency to 9 behave like a piece of putty, and to slow them dcwn, just in
'10 one collision.
11 The las: thing that can happen to a neutron is that 12 it simply escapes, goes out beyond the boundaries of wherever 9 13 the chain reaction is going on. 'dhen that happens, obviously, 14 that neutron is lost, and is not able to sustain a chain 15 reaction. 16 If one asks, how big a piece of material is 1i necessary to sustain a chain reaction, t.w.en the answer is 18 largely determined by the rendency for neutrons, as they
~ 18 wander through the material, sca :ering elastically, to get
~
near the edge and then leave. The likelihcod that neutrons
.,1 in a chain reaction will ge: los by jus leaving the ou side f
~~
the surface -- that likelihood depends on the ratio of the
.,3
. area of the_curside of the sphere or cube or whatever it is
.i- g -
in which the chain reaction. is going on, to the c al vclume.
.,5
'Os.is changes , as .one alks Of scce:hing bigger and
1
.09. ,
- 5-33 1 bigger, in such a way as :: =ake i: less likely for neu rens 2 to get lest. That leads to the concept that pecple have 3 "
' _= b e ' a. d " c..= # . .# c a ' .m=ss. . .. _. = . y , a.- . _d a "_ _ _' _= ~. . . ' _' . a_ r_ . .d . n e~ .#
. . . g. . . . . .
4 a:c=s, some c: whicn can g.e ._ssionec in scme ,inc s c:. an 3 a..an s- a. en., in.c a syna_==_, . d _ .a. . e a ."..k e , . ' . . . . _= r.y 7 _ _'.a. d a a. , 6 there is some minimum size below which Occ many neutrens leak _na: mass _s
- cut and one can,: sustaan a chain reaction. .
8 called the critical mass. 9 For an isetcpe like uranium 235, which plays the main 10 role in releasing energy in the reacters that we'll be 11 . _= _' k #.. . - ab cu". , .ha c~.4. ._3 . a.' m=so- c .#
. a. _ u . a_
. e . _= '_ ' #
..".c u .
12 any surrcunding material is about 130, 140 pounds. It's a 13 sphere somewhat smaller than a basketball. 14 r _: ...ge_g_ 4 s a...:
. . . . a, . .cu,.d w".a
- fe p'a.__wa__...e- "
15
" core," sustaining the chain reaction, it doesn' have 16
..nything a in i: that #issions, but it does re#1ec: neu:rens, 1~'
does scatter.them -- well, then, adding material like tha: 16 a,. ,.und _.u.e _a _ s s _: c n_: ... ,,_,
. . .w: , , c ,_, _
.__ s_ u.. . _
.u.e c,;.____
- _,, aas 19 and help sustain a chain reaction simply by returning neu-20 trens that might otherwise re' lect ~ and hi: the 21 . .
recm er gone inic -he air.
.v, ,
2 4 .a _. 1x.4 d m .#
. _2 m a. .* A. . _S _= _l , p u* *. 2 .- . u* *.. M. . .# _o.
E
- t .E -.. P. _E ."..-
.'S C_,3*A_d A. m. m. e_ , _s __
2 M.g..8. 3. g C _. A. M. . .d.* ..e. s *. J_ _i _' M
. &_ _2 C *. .M s , _3 _9_i *..b. @_
..eg
.. ge ._i krae d e _= _' _# . . .- w # * .. b. , k. ._8 V a_ sC.e k#..d .
^#
.. a _ a_ #'. *. r. . *. ". ,
25 . ..,,
.n .h _4
. , . _a
- . 4,.s_.
_, zw
...., _4
.s _a_.,. .
. a_. _. _ s.e ~. _,n e n_. ,_ - _- _ c -m--_ m
,. c. 2 5-aa 1 Three-Mile Island reac cr, it's simply water that is not --
o doesn't contain within it any of the fuel. There is scme 3 ' water arcund the core. 4 Now, there are two basically differen types of 5 chain reactions that are simply called " fast" and " slow," 8 and wha this means is -- what the fast refers to is the average speed with which the neutrens cause fission. 3 When neu:rens come cu: of a nucleus tha 's been , 9 i fissioned, they're traveling at very high speeds. These are
\
10 speeds which are enormous compared to the speed of a rifle 11 bullet. They're even something in the ballpark of a 1'- thousand times the speed of a satellite in orbit arcund the f 13
, earth.
*4 If the material in which the fissions happen doesn';
15 tend to slow the neutrens down before they cause another 16 fission, so.they're still traveling very fast when they are re - 1~ leased from the fuel and neutrons cause a fissien, then that 18 system is called a fast chain reacti:n -- or the reacti:n is , i 19 called a fast chain reaction, and a reac:cr that does tha T) is called a fast reactor. 21 A slew neutron reac cr is One in which there are
=any more atoms of usually light materials that tend :: sl w n.oJ..
neutrens down, than there are ate =s that produce fission. 24 i So that -- what happens : a tygical neu:ren is that i makes 25 many collisions, sc=e:imes 20 cr 30, with light elements like 4 l-L \ l
1 o. u
- _a:. I h y d .- . -3 = n , . "=. .# ..- - =_ 4 = c . " .= .' .' y
_ . .=. " = =. a ." 3_2= _# . . . n. s{C,vi ,
.w.
. . . . . _ a s. C .. _w ...m. . J. . t s nse.e n _1 ..... _4 C .. a.. e 3
. a ...__ _4 ,., ..%.a.. s _r w s . n . ,,.,. n s a.
... ., wn , .4. J .h , .: _: a
. o .J 3... ., , b _* ,_ a. . ,,4 , .-
4 ,e.ge __ n.,n.:"m, 4- _a ..".a . s o...e 4 a. . _ p a s , .'. _4 k e " *. .= n _4 " .. '.' 'a , , _ = _ - = _ 3 much =cre easily #issicned by /ery slew neutrens chan by very 6
.aas enas. e,C . h,. . . . ;..:Ca., , ,a..m.m . , ., ,s d n...n a , . u. ,. .
.....n.__ .
.--s o
.J. s s .'na.' .' a." , _# .# VCu '3.4 x U 7..' .
"a' .# . .". s" C Ce *. .b. 4 .3. -.' .# .k a. '.Ja.=_.-*....=.
3
%..a s k.../ d-. .g.. ..4.a . a. i ,.,w s
.. L. , a,n s ;..g,i . , . k.a. . 4 .: _t . r m- ;L
.. 4 , s . . .w. . .
9 m f L, ,. .. . 8.a.1 10
.gy ,.a,.,,,a.
, .w
...a.. 2 a d- d e d . .- w h a . ~...= . a s "', k.a_
11
. , , ,...,,4_ a 3. .3 ,4. 4 -..
4 , ,, _ , C.w. a.: n ,.,, .,. ,. ,, ; , ,. 4_a ., . C . ., ,e.3 _a ..,g , 3 .. . __. - 1.,
. d e .= = . '.' - "...de.=. _ . " ..' a .= .. _' .- . -- k a c..a.a_ e . . 4 -. 3.-. h _= . ... d =_ . = _ a_ s ,
13 s_, ws d wn, ~'k. i .e ..'.c d e .= =. ., . .4 .-. ..'.a. '.. .. a_ a_ . M _4 _' =_ ...'.=..*.d, . _e = _ . - .- 14 is ordinary water. The oxygen doesn' really play any very 15 big role. Oxygen is, as you know, is two arc =s c' hydrogen 16 connected with one arcm o' oxygen. The oxygen weighs about 1.,, 1- _e __4..es as .um-h a_s ~5e .5 d oga_.n, =..d
. . .ha_. =.#-. . a. d. _ a_ s . . ' . o. _' a 'y
,S a y .:. ,c.
f .. g... . o ., e _tn ssn.,u:n3 . u. .. ,. .. e u . .- n.,n s m an*~. . . 19
'.. 5 e ,,, s
. . e .v. . . .me ./,,. s :. . n n. .:
. u. , .e , .- . -a_,c.
. . . _z=-
.,0 a nuclear explosive. In a nuclear explcsive, sc=e means is
.,1
". s e ^ ~. ~. %. . 4 .n . - . .g =_ ~.". =. - ~. ~c . ...c -. ~_ , _' a_ c a_ s . .= _=.. 4_2v - - . .+ ,a_ . .". .=. . ' s 3_ as J _9 y .E J.ssJ ne
. %.,y e. e u. . . ,e
. . e. s p,
. .8 3 _ b. enem.ay,
%. . _4 3 cvm i. A. e.g .2
..e.
. ,, v.4 ~ * *3., ,
1 l
.3
_x_: ._ L._. _. .3_2 , . m. 32.. . _ _ " ..hesa. . c ,: .# = . a s = - = * *. . u 3.". . . e =_ . .'. a .
.,4
.'.=.s . a . .,u e' .., .k..a . . ..k.=. . . .". a .' .a.. =_ _= c . .# n . ". _= . . =_ x' =. s ,'_ _= c = _ _=. .
.g
~.,.,,.M_ ,
O_ .MT 993N_=_, y ..M.
#8 3 . .E. . M. ... .
-@.O...O f
O
- O__ ,
1 1 I 1 1 i 1 I I l
. s. .e 1
5-46 1 "supercritical" state. A " critical" state is One which is i 2 just -- a situation in which a chain reaction.is jus: barely i 1 0 .being sustained. A "supercritical" state is ene in which,
-1, 4 for every neutron that is released frc= fission, 20re than 5 'one fission takes place, so you get a rapid buildup very 6 quickly of a lot of energy.
~
New, an extremely importan point abou'reac; ors is 3 that slow neutron reacters, that are depending en neutrens D that have been slowed down, to maintain a chain reactica -- 10 these are sometimes called thermal reac:crs, thermal neutron 11 react:rs, because the neutren is often sicwed dcun to the 12 point where it's traveling about the same speed that at:ms l 13 and =clecules are in material at crdinary temperatures. 14 An importan: point about a thermal reac Or is tha: 15 . . . One can just say categoricaAly, there's no possib. 1:7 c:- 16 getting a nuclear explosion. Now, what I mean by nuclear y, . . explosion is an explosive release oc. energy by any kind c:_ a 18 rearrangement, accidentally or otherwise, cf the core of a l'
' hermal nuclear reac:cr in such a way as to have it in any
*0 way-be labelable as a nuclear explosion. One can get a
.3 loc of heat released, and one can get a buildup ci perhaps
~~
high pressure steam tha: may make an explosion, bu: it's no:
.:.3 an explosion in which the energy that's released is anything
.,4
~
even approaching, by a facter of. a thcusand, the energy
" released in, for example, the Hiroshima weapen. That is I
i
=
l l t
_ c. . 2.u- - 1 - g a-n. 4
-s .-- a-,.7 n
~ ~-ees.:u,,.> - - - -
e ~. u. . e. - ,- , n . se ,. .<. ,... , s .' . . . s . . . . a_ r_ . = d w ' . .b. . . " _ ' = __.= = s 3 pewe . p.,an.s ..ga. 3o - w a..
. ane .w
...a. -
-y ,....,a, . _
j 2-
-. s- . _ . , _ _,
4 bi of damage locally, but these are all # rom chemical sources. 5 As we knew from Three Mile Island, there are ways in which 6 hydrogen can be for=ed. In principle, that hydrogen can combine l with air cr oxygen and explode. Or steam can explode. But this 3 is semething en a scale -- these chemical explosions -- are 9 e n a sca,,. -
.nn.. .ae ,.., .. use-s o .: .,. , , n. .
. n. .: o...e . .. .d,,s . . :,, - -
a.onr.. 10 sno,..n..;ses,
. ... ,n a r
. . y. _; ny. : e c,n _e u a ges- . c s . . n 3_, ,,
11 -
- n a: this is -- this s ind
- c: explcsten -- tha: ne sind c:-
12
,x2.,cs4,n
_ . _. .na c,,.. .,.v,, e.,, ce .n ,.. _ _, .sa
. . . - . .y .we . . a .m.- . - ne.
. - . . .. .n 13 Ocwer clan
. . is small, on the scale of crdinary industrial 14 experience.
15 New, .. a nave written cu quite a bi: abou dic:eren: 16 nuclear fuels. The main point I'd like to make new is that 1
- e . s. - a . ,/ ,..a , .. a ., u,.- , n t u,m , as w e wa _3
-.a. .
_. . u . c . . u. 3,_ -.ou
. . d, -, ,
IS by itsel" -- that is, the elemen: uranium; the metal uranium -- 19 . cannet sustain a chain reaction under any circumstances. .: a0 has to be mixed with c her things, and rather carefully, to
.3 be able to sustain a chain reacticn. That is, natural uranium.
. ,o
..we ,_ason .se.. .w,.
. _4=. .4..,.., ,1-
. .w.c u .w. ...4,,..
. . . . . . S. t., 5 ,
.33
.. .:a n n. u. .o . .u. e s u..w. s a . . _4ov. , . o p e c .: ,..:..
- c o. s. . .g .,y .._,.4-, :
C=.. .,
- e .# .#.a a-_.4 n =_ d x., v . . e n . . . . . s , . k. a. . =- E .- a. .m. ' ,, a.. .C u 5 k U- a* "- -- --
, - ~ *- -*
.,5 e: .n :: :
se...._,_n ,..,.e 3, ny .-a_e-se
, ,- a : ... ::.
._a :. n... . . . - u.e nun.,_ .. a.
.n g
_3 .: i 5-'8 1 this in a way that sustains a chain reaction in ordinary 2 ,2-. a. . .a. ,., ... . .zucu. . .ac. u._.ss c.:_ u..e
. .. et . . - n n s .. _, , , s e s
. . __ .i .,. :_ ; _m o. _: c a ,
3 whether it's uranium-238 or uranium-235, are sufficiently 4 high-speed, sufficiently energetic, :: be able to fissi:n
.a. , n _4 ,a , 2 ., 8 . = _,_, _. _w nad c .we..x. , ., c , , _ ,
5 , Jew , 4. .: . h a ,. , _ . . . - .s._ . . . . . -- 6 # w c . 5 .4 .- d. s c .# , s ay , 2 ' ./ *. , *./n _# -.-5
. _# s- .b. a .= v a. .- a3- a. .a. L' .."
. a .- i
~
neutrons released in a fissien, is still enough 50 sustain S a chain reaction. 9 Sur it also happens that uranium-238 tends c 10 sca; er neutrens inelastically, v.cy easily, and this tends 11
. . w. .. %. . _ie,.w. .,y s e e A .e .. ,a_..,. n s~, . .,4.. ., . . t,.1 y ..,. .. 1 c 4., . J_n _, e . . . _
2 a r e _ s_ 12 - ._ g _e r ., n _4n wh #- 'n .b.e y ' . =_ x e _' w ..". e n -'. . =- b.c. . ' .d_ .#-".
. +=_ 'a s _# . . ,
. . e 13 fissien of uranium-218 and so they're les: frc= that ser of 14 chain reactien.
15 , , _ ,____
..rns cu_ ha_. .w
.. .. . ..e., , ,
s a c,.. . _. .. 16 uranium-238 -- or, uranium-235 to uranium-238, in the metal 1' itself, that will sustain a chain reaction, in a very big l 1 I 18 c,iece, and that's 5 percent. Below that, uranium metal will I 19 . .. . . . not sustain a cha:.n reacticn, even :: :'s as big as this
.'0 building.
.3 Adding scmething that slows down neu:rens ".ces make
.w.e . ..an _eu ,,,.. _ _ ...g e
. . . ._ _, a # v a_ '_ v, =-. ..a_ ' .'. a-..c u. . . ^. # . ".-=.~.4"...'.'.:
.3
..a.. "
. .=.
..=._#"
"* , ...u c .h. . c .-a. a. .# .# a. " . _# v -a , "ae=
. usa. ' . a_
. a'^wa"
_W
. ..t. . .,.ns
. ..av..
w ,
..U C.k. w4 -.* ,49.7Jk cd s _5 6 -- - - " - - - ' - 5 3
-- -" .y S--_ g y,*-S
.'5
~. , u3 .4 .. e, .::. s s .# n #..7 ".2...#"....'.'.'.
.c. a 2- = . a. s " .' . , '_ v.,
1 1 1 i I l
, 22
=. _ _ :. 1 4 4 x-.7. - wa.e. ,
. a. x = ...a.
'_ a_ , w .3 . .k. "=n'"...,.'.."..=.~.~._=_'
2 uranium, you can almost sustain a chain reacticn but nc: 3 quite. The reason fcr that is tha crdinary water, which has 4 the iso:cpe number 1, that is a single pro:cn in its nucleus, 5 ordinary hydrogen has a tendency :c capture neurrens, gobble 6 them up, and not give anything back. - neavy water doesn,: nave tha: reature. so tha 6 you can make a reac cr with natural uranium and heavy water 9 in a variety of different ways. That's the basis for the 10 so-called Canadian "can-de" reacters which were developed in 11 Canada and new represent a small fraction, abc ut 10% cr less, 12 of the reac crs that are world-wide. 13 We chose no: to dc that in this country. We chose l' to use ordinary water, and instead cf using ordinary uranium 1 Oc use slightly enriched uranium. By enriched, we mean 16 uranium in which this relatively rare but very valuable 1 isotope, as far as energy is concerned, uranium-235. Tha: is .
.: was enrichment process is very expensive, very di :: cult. .
'O developed during World War !~ a: Oak Ridge National Laboratory a
"0
- and is now, by now, is a ec=mercial, fairly well-unders cod
.3
~
prccess that's used in perhaps as many as a docen countries, 1
.. i j
~
new, Oc make available uranium of different grades cf con-
.,3
~
centra:icn of uranium-235,
~
We had tc learn hcw :c make large quantities :f
~
highly enriched uranium in ecnnecticn with the World War :: 1 I i 1 i -
. - . . - - - . . . . . . ~ . ,
2 :. e. 5-50 1 a:cmic bomb project, so we had these reac:crs available'-- 2 I'm sorry -- we had these ways of making enriched uranium ' 3 available. So, we chose to go in that directica, and our 4 reactors, then, use light water and slightly enriched, 3 typically, about 3-percent enriched uranium -- 3 percent in 6 the iso cpe U-235. 7 Now, I want 00'say just a few things about the main 3 c'empenents of a nuclear power plan:. I'm not going := ge: 0 into any of the details of the safety devices. This is scri 10 of an idealiced picture of what a reac:cr has := have := be 11 able := make energy, extract it in a form that it can be 12 ' converted to electric energy, and operated in some kind of 13 cyc e. i l' The main parts of a nuclear pcwer plant are a 15 core of nuclear fuel; some kind of a modera cr, at least 16 for the reac crs that we're building in the United 5: ares -- 1~' using them less -- 18 This nuclear fuel and neutron sicwer-downer -- 19 neutron moderator -- are arranged in such a way that scme 40 coolant, such as water, can remove the heat produced in the
.2 core by fission, and use that hear one way or another to drive
-~
some kind of a mechanical device tha: makes machinery rciate,
.,3 that can'then be used Oc run an electrical genera cr and make
-34
. , . e .. e.c-.
. ..,.. s e . ..- . ..Ae . .a. r. a. s.a a .~ . . . O c .a =. . . . .a . ..c ~...= . . =. ".
what.
' 1 <
l 1
200 3-51 1 To be able to control the reac:cr, :: make in 2 subcritical, when we don't want i: to operate, we need scme 3 type of centrol system. The mes convenient way to centrol 4 the rate at which a chain reaction is going en is to inser: 3 rods of isotopes that tend to gobble ut neutrons and give 6 ncthing useful back. I Two elements that de this almost greedily, as far 3 as neutrons are concerned, are cadmium and bcron. Sc tha 9 any reactor, to be centrolled has a se of centrol rods made 10 of cadmium and boren that can be pushed into the reac :r to 11 slow down, or stop, the chain reaction, or can be pulled out 12 . a 3_a _t . 3v;ng,
-. c. . at n .a_: n :_ ..
13 '
. Tow, there are several types of nuclear reactors.
14 All but one, operating in the -- all hu: one of the ccmmercial 15 reacters operating in the United States, uses light water as 16 both the coolan; and the mcderator. There is one in Colorade 1*'
-- this is the only exception in the U.S., new -- that doesn't 18 use water. It uses graphite blocks to slow the neutrens 19 down. These graphite blocks then have embedded in them some ao
~
uranium fuel, and instead of using water c cool the core
.,1
~
and extract the heat, they use pressuri:ed heliu=. There are two types Of light water reac:crs. O r.e
.,3
~
is called pressuriced water reactor; this is the Three Mile
.,4 Island type. The c:her is called boiling water reac: Ors.
- To w , the fundamental difference between these twc types Of 1
40, e .:,. 1 ..k.=+, 4.. a a.=.- .==
. a.a c ~ ~. ~. s d o- .
. . a. s s u . 4..- a. d. . -, ..".e -a.ss"--*-
o vessel plays a role analogous to a pressure cocker. :: 3 contains .he care, with the con:rci reds, and liquid water -- 4 that's completely liquid water, no steam -- in a pressure 5 vessel, which is then connected to sc=e pipes that can take het water from the top of the reactor and through what's I called a heat exchanger heat up a secondary ficw of water S and convert that secondary flow inte steam. As far as the 9 flew of water thrcugh the reacter -- the pressure vessel --
^O is concerned, this water ficws continuously, generally with 11 .
no steam gaps; a solic at team c:. water, and i: jus: goes l~ continuously nrcugn a loop. 13 -w e, w o--_4 ( ...e -
.. ya.,.- .,.ac.v- . , w n _2cn .4s, -
3... ess, 4 .,. < 14 the U.S. made exclusively by General Electric, is nc: the 15 type that is at Three Mile Island. The pressure vessel has 16 water in it that actually is boiling and making steam in the 1., pressure vessel. Having made steam, that steam can then be 18
. ,an -s: -, c . , ,./ ;
- . . . a . ,, .. :,
...a L, ,..,. ,. ,. ,. . . :. ,. .: . .j . ~u.
u . a . ...a .., ,. s 19 that in a boiling water reactor, the same water that's ecoling
.,0 the reactor is actually appearing later as steam in the
.11
.. . . - b .d . . a. . ~. 5. .a . ' s = v e .~/ ' ... o . . = .n . ' .# ..# .# =. . =. .a.c a_ , ..".=. . , k e . a.=...
- hese two types of reac:crs. The pressurized water reec cr:
_ .J there's a physical separation between the her water, under
.,4 variable pressure, in the pressure vessel, and -he steam
.,5
. .. ... -w- e ., a_ s . .'.a . = =. = . u . .# d a. ."..e ..=#.....e... vaso e'. =
_. .d. u o- .# . . 3 l l
e n e. 5-53 1 water that is not specifically, in fact, no: at all in contacf 2 with the fuel at any time. 3
'de're going to be seeing a lot of differen diagrand 4
of not only the Three Mile Island plant, but I think, pro-3 bably for comparison with others -- 6 I'm afraid I've already kind of laboriously taken more time than I really intended. Let me just say that as far
" as the Three Mile Island Reactor itself is concerned, I wan:
9 to get across two important points about it. 10 One of them is that, like all nuclear reactors, i: 11 can be shut off, as far as the chain reaction is concerned, l by inserting control rods. These control rods gobble up 13 neutrons, make a chain reaction impossible. So far as fissica 14 is concerned, they stop that process, very c,uickly. 15 That doesn't stop the process of productica of heat 16 in the reactor, however. The reason for that is that, of the 17 total energy that's eventually released from the fission, 18 about 10 percent is released relatively slowly in the radio-10 active decay of these two fission fragments, generally, tha: 20 result from fission. 21 . So that #~ mediately after the reactor core has been shut down by inserting the control rods , the hea; in the 23 reactor is still being released at a rate which is abou 24 7 percent of the rate at which it is being released when it's 25 operating at full power.
CJ f.54 1 7.f.a g 9 .: 3 .7 1 ] _J ...y C w. . s . . . ... e.
+
- . . e ....w. e . . w. . & . . n _Ja . n_ .m .
. ..k.a - ' s ' e .' .. - .3a_ _' a_ _= s e d. , ~. 4 . .5. . a .' ~. a. ". s k.". . d .wn , d.es
. ..c. ,. ma.
3 .". o m .#- # s a. # . . , b. . a s -
. . . *. .k. .' . 3 . o " . w. ' . 5 . k.a c h. a _# . . - = = c . .' . . . . .k. e . .
4 operating. That heat is being released by radioactive fission 5 p . o d u c *. a- ~. 5 a . .= ~. a. ~~. _= , o, e d. .# . . .ha .a_'_,
. .=..d.
. . . . _.n u a. o 6 release energy, but at a much lower scale. .
3- a 'v. . d c w. , . .k. _3 a-V e .-] c,u .'. ..k ' tf , a ." =. *.
..b.e ". a. a r. . o . .a -
3 so-called decay heat starts dropping -- during the ' irs: few 9 m .J .,.u . =_ s , =. .=. ..".a ". d = a.#ca . - vaa.w'-.na- _# . #s . #. ..a. d 4 -= =_ _' /' 10 . . a::er s.nutdown. Seven cercen: or rull ocwer riz_h: after the 11 r.e.~..a,
. .ods =-a. . -a h-- v a_ d. #..
.. .. .= " c u . a .
. . . S..c u . .# . ' 2 d. .a c o, y e -d 12 to less than 1 percent of that, and -- well, af ter 2-1/'* -
w
, 13 ..o u .- s , .4 ' =- .d.- . , p e d. . " . . , . 7 c a . = ~. .~. . . " . ' " _ _ ' '_ , cwe.
. .- '.
- a .-
. a. n *. ,
14 .lithin a day, the end of the firs day after a series of 15 eyen .a s....a.d o.. w1'..5. '". h. -. a a. .v.a - - _ 7. s .' a. ~d , . n' _' 2- a c - c = ' '. a d .". a . ...a .' 16 power level, the rate of release of heat energy in the core, 1"' had dropped to about half a percent of what i: was a: full 19 pcwer. 19 g..en .ws..e .a . 4.: d. o p -o .# .' a =-.a-
. d_ a_ .c - a..=.s _' .. . . ...
.,o other words, it doesn't drop off as fast as it did during the 21
. t-- s ,. .e , w .neurs, ,nd,
. .,w. exa p,,_, .
. ,..,.c c.: - .~-...u,
~~'
core -- and this is abou: the situation up there .cw -- the
.,4
.s ee.. . s c . ,d u e d .a. - .=3 .b., o u' . '. / .2 0
- , e . . =. . . . o .#
. .k. a. a. .=. - 3 ] '.
.,4 :
.9..*.
.. f Cye . .
.%. ..g e . ..d a .s .a. .f
. 2. %. ..g.a. y _J _* _' a, n y .s 3 .:'. C '_' .
0 ,: a .re . a. ., . e .: a .:_J _: . .w. -. .. u. .s. , dnwn . ., 21acu, -
. . . . w,,.A.-a.A
. . . . . ..u.s m.. - .
l l
234 6-55
~
1 full pcwer. A tenth of a percent sounds small; that's one 2 in a thousandth of initial power. Ecwever, that is a fraction 3 of a very large number, That is, the rate cf heat production 4 in a reactor the size of the one at Three Mile Island at 5 full power is ecuivalent of abou 3 billion watts, so tha 6 1/10 of 1 percent of that is 1/1000 of 3 billien, which is
~
3 million watts. Now, to put that in perspective, or one 3 way to think about it, is tha 3 million watts is equivalent, 9 roughly, to the output of about a hundred home furnaces in 10 the middle of winter when they're going full blast. That's 11- abou: the situation we have up there av Three Mile Island 12 right new. 13 That decay heat has to be removed, and if it isn't, s . 14 then what happens is that the reac cr fuel starts heating 15 backl up again and if 4, isn't cooled it can hea up to 16 temperatures such that it can start building up the steam 17 pressure, 1:. it's in centact with some water -- say, the core 13 is not completely covered. 19 If it's in contact with nc water and steam, then ao after a matter of time like a day, at this stage, it can
.,1 heat back up to points where you begin to worry about melting,
.u,
~~
' So the core.has to be kept cold.
~33 It's much easier to do this at power levels that are
.,4
~
1/1000 cf the level at which it is under normal condi icns,
"- - but you have to do it. 'fou can't jus walk away frc= it and
)
205 5-56' I let it be. I n THE REPORTER: Excuse me. We're cu ef tape.. 3 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Are you within two minutes of 4 finishing, Ted? 5 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Yes. C:' AIRMAN KEMENY: Then why don't you finish it. COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Twc minutes? Okay. l 3 Let me just say a couple of things about the core. 9 The core consists of about 200 wha are called fuel assemblies, 10 which are big objects about 8 inches across, about 15 fee: 11 long. Each of these fuel assemblies has in it, again, abou la-200 fuel rods, which are cans about 15 feet long, made of an 13 alley of circonium, within which are stacked uranium cxide (. 14 pellets. It's a ceramic material that are about an inch long 15 and half an inch in diameter. 16 These are all stacked into the reds , and the rods i 17 are essembled cgether in the fuel assemblies, and the fuel 18 asserolies are assembled together into the ccre. The core is 19 about 15 feet high, and roughly 7 or 8 feet across. Within t
'N that there are about 90 : ens of uranium.
l
! 21 That's an important number c keep in mind. That's l .
a very heavy weight, so that when one ta..a.1 Union. >
CHAIRMAN KIMENY: My other questien was, you gave
- 23 us an excellent timetable on the decay hear. On the rods
~2' s;:pping fission, i
you simply said it's very fast. I mean, 1. E ' 05 what order of magnitude is very fast here?
-m.,. - . . - . - ..n.. , - , - . , u ..m
,...q ::
7-2-scb I COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: The rods drcp in during a c sc-called scram, which I didn't mention. If something gces k 3 w".on3 , a c met.._#...
= a_ . .# . ". s 3 o e s w . - .~.~3 ~ _# . .h ". a_
. . an c
_ . , .".a. 4 usually the firs: thing that happens is tha: the control reds 5 drop, by gravity, in:0 the reactor. That happens in abou; ei a second. 7 CHAIR:d.AN KIME:1Y: Well, once :he.v drcp -- 3 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: They're normally withdrawn 9 and they're pushed in and out, normally, in much longer time , 10 sometimes several hours until the reactor ccmes up to pcwer 11 or goes back down again. Always maintaining the chain l'.' .-a s c 4^7 .. v a..-'y -1cse
. .o m"._#-
. o p c _i . . . w n.
' e - a. 4.'2 at-.
a .~ ..m
~4 .4 _= _' .
1> r.uArg. uay v,r.v.e_yv.
. ._ . Bu. _'# 4. . d. . . ~a 4..
. e n4 me -
r.d, 14 h ~. u
. .a.~ ~ .h _= .' . a. -.< .u. = . .A n a s .: . ._= x' e
. . .:n.
. . .u. a. s.. u. c _: . . . a. .=. c . _: ., . . . .,
15 s:cp? I mean, is that the fraction of a second then, once 16 they have droc.eed? . 1 1~ COMMISSIONER TAYl0R: The chain reaction as such is . s: Ops :. mec:.ately.
..cwever, these rough,y one percent of th
- e. _ e 19 neutrons released are delayed, and they finish their course, 1 I
l 20 roughly half of them go ahead and make fissions. So tha: l l i 1 21 s u.. .: ., g .1 ,a . n e x . .. , . .u . ,_ , . .,. e .- a r .= av,me w
....u,g :
_., . .2 z:
.2a.-. -: .. !
22 by the delayed neutrens. But that's abcur a 0,uarter Or so l l 23 -_. :ng ...e s n.: .ge s c_.y n ,_=. . . :. .. l 2, w : : ,,
...s_. 0 ser,n-- . - .w..
. u.
l
., \
na,: _1:e isciopes. . l 1 1 25 c ..r...- .:..u a y v. r..ar.y.
.. v. ..
ae.. -u.._..
. . . j. e ,s . 3.. .. _w,-.
I
- o. n. e.
7-3-seb 1 other questions frc= Commissioners?
. 2 COMM;SSIONER PETERSON: I'll ask Ted, hcw abcu 3 discussing the swimming pools where you put the used fuel 4 reds and how that is a problem co?
5 COMMISSIONER TA*lLOR: Well, we jus: talked about 6 chain reactions mostly and a little bi: abcut the reac:Or. I New that's only one par: of the whole system. There's seme-3 thing called the nuclear fuel cycle', that starts with the mines 9 where you get the uranium, the enrichment plant, the' reactor 10 the fuel fabrication plant, the reactor, -- the reac Or, 11 after.a while, has to have its fuel replaced. The reason 1' for that, there are two reasons; one is, you star running 13
, cut of this valuable isotope uranium 235, it simply is con-14 sumed. And the other reascn, it builds up fission products 15 which tend to capture neutrons and poison the reac Or dcun 16 so it won ' t sustain the chain reaction. So that after, l 1~'
typically,. after about three years of being in the core, 1S part of the core a: least has : be taken cut and replaced l 19 by fresh fuel. When it's taken cut, it has to go somewhere 20 where it can be cooled and shielded. Shielded meaning, 21 put in.a situation where there's a large bulk of ma:erial
~~
between the' fuel and the curside world, because of the
~3 radiation. The cooling and the shielding is dene simultan-
.,4
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scusly in what are called s:Orage pccis for the spent fuel. 25
.These are generally in the building right next :0 the
- . _ m _ - m - , - - . = =
93- '7-4-sch' 3 containment. structure around the reacter. They have 20 he 2 kept there until.about six months after they've been taken 3 out. Whatever the intention is going :: be for ultimately 4 disposing of that spent fuel, the reason they have 0 be 5 kept. here is tha: they are still producing hea a: a 6 sufficien rate so if ycu try 0 transport them in some kind of a container, the heat removal requirements for those con-
~
7 3 . tainers ge: to be sc big that it's unwieldy. So there's a g cooling off period, no matter what's going Oc be done with
.10 the fuel, that requires several months.
11 In fact, righ now, the end of the line of the 12 nuclear fuel cycle is that spent fuel. None of it's being 13 reprocessed, none of it's being broken up, chemically pro-r 14 cessed, and the radicactive fission products separated from 15 the unused uranium and se on, so that has 10 be dealt with. 16 And there's a big controversy about what's the best way :: 17 do that. At the moment, spent fuel is being s:Ored in larger 18 and larger quantities, generally in the reac Or, in the 19- nuclear power plant areas. And scme of the reac Or, scme Of 20 the power plants are beginning to fill up their pools. 21 We're, scme pecple call this nuclear constipation; there's 22 a build-up new of spent fuel and waste. ?ctentially a rescurce, 23 bu at the cement, a waste right around the reac: Ors. 24- CEAIRMAN KEMENY: Any c her questions? 25- COMM~5SIONER MARX 3: Ted, could you just give us t-e
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<- -seb some :. dea about why we are using the thermal reac crs rather o
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5 during it, we got very interested as a nation in developing 8 nuclear submarines. And nuclear submarines, there were fas: reactor designs for nuclear submarines, but there was no 3 need to capitali:e on one property o# fast reac crs I didn' 9 mention, that is tha: they can, under certain conditions, 10 they can produce more #uel than they consume, because these 11 neutrons captured in the uranium 238 -- although they are in~ removed from the chain reaction, eventually produce plu: niu.7 , 13
. which is a good fuel, like uranium 235.
14 We -- there were proposals fer 'ast reactors for 15 submarines, but among other things, there were sc=e severe 16 safety questions about having potentially, a very large 1,,. critical mass, a large number of critical masses, cf highly 18 mixed uranium or plutonium in something under water, which 19 might be in war time or in an accident, subjected :: explcsic ns
.,0 or something that would then mix this very large quantity c#
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212 . 17-6-sch 1- ' submarines, let's put these on land and see how they look. 2 And they didn't look too bad. But it was slightly an accider,: 3 of sort of inertia of previous experience--white water reac:c rs t 4 I think it's fair to say that many pecple, particularly some 5 of the physicists involved in the early days of reactor 8- development, Eugene Wigner, Hans Bethe, Edyard Teller, for example, were strongly in favor of some of them -- I think, F 3 particularly Hans Bethe in the beginning, was strongly in 9 favor of going fairly directly toward fas reactors because 10 they opened up the possibility of using ordinary uranium, 11 much more effectively, because of its breeding possibility. 12 I think all of the people I mentioned, pretty 13 consistently, were -- have always been attracted to using 14 heavy water, which is the course tha: the Canadians followed. 15 So that the simple answer to your question is that we have 16 experience with another type of system which had to be com-17 pact and which spen its life under water 3 that was success-. IS
'ful, and we said, well, let's build on that experience. And ,
18
-that's why we have, I think, we and the Russians, wen:
"O directly toward pressurized water reactors.
,,3 CEAIRMAR KEMENY: Is the fast reactor roughly the same as what's called the breeder . reactor?
.,3 ,
COMMISSIONER TAYlCR: Yes.
.,4 CHAIRMAN 'GMENY:
. Any.c her questions? -Thank you, 25 very much, Ted, for your most enligh;ening lec ure. And may i
l l
- v. .:
7-7-sc) I ask if the representatives of Governer Thcrnburgh are 2 here? 3 MS. JCRGINSON: Yes, they are. 4 CEAIRMAN KIMENY: They are? Yes, thank you, yes. 5 May I invite them :c jcin us please? And we apciagice for 6 running somewhat late. Let's see, perhaps while you're 7 getting ready I might be able 70 make a brief remark jus: Oc S bring you up to date on where the Cc= mission is. The 9 Cc= mission had its organication meeting yesterday acrning, 10 and we are using the remainder of our firs: meeting c ge: 11 as such informal input as possible. In particular, we're 12 very much interested in suggestions as c wha various groups 13 and we certainly are most interested in Governcr Thcrnburgh' s 14 feelings of what issues we should lock a:, what questions we 15 should probe, and any suggestions you have on how we should 16 go at it. l~ May I ask you to star: out, simply sc we have is it on tape, that you in: reduce yourself, name and title, 19 please? 20 MR. WALDKAN: Mr. Chairman, members of the Cc==iss-21 icn, my name is Jay C. Waldman, I'm Governor Thornburgh's execu :ve assistant. 23 MR. WI*.3 URN: I'm Rcber: C. Wilburn, and I'm 24 - w e n , . . , .-,/ . .: o
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.CHA!RMAN KEMEIY: Would you care 50 r.ak e a I
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. l 7-3-sch 1 sta ement? Y0u're most welccme, in any forma; you wish ::
2 proceed.
~3 MR. WALDMAN: Thank ycu. Mr. Chairman, I will 4 read in:0 the record some very brief Opening remarks and 5 be available for any answers that I may be able :: supply 6 that might be of benefit to the members. -
7 "Mr. Chairman and members of the Commissien: 3 "I am Jay C. Waldman, Governer Dick Thornburgh's 9 Executive Assistant. ~ have been privileged c serve with him an s mslar capacities ever the pas 10 _ eight years. ?ur- ' 11 suant to the Chairman's invitation, the Governcr has asked 12 se : represent him at cday's meeting. I was advised by the 13 Chairman that this would be an Organizational meeting rather 14 than a formal testimonial hearing. , He indicated tha: the 15 primary purpose of the meeting was to so,ic;; t sugges :cns on . i 16 the bes: course to puruse and wha: things the Ccamission 17 might focus on in undertaking the vital task assigned :: i: 18 by the President. 19 "I have endeavored Oc structure my remarks 20 accordingly. I do think, however, that a limited review of ~ 21 the crisis frem the vantage point of the Governor's Office 2 may provide a useful framework within which := address this 23 question. l 4 24 "Dr. Uilburn and I were ancng the. half-de:en people 25 ~~
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3 any Governor has ever had : confron:. One of the 4 toughest problems we faced, especially in the initial stage tf 5 u..e crisis, was obtaining adecuate, time _,y, . . consisten: 6 information. This was compounded a: times > by alarmin e 3:ec-.
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1 3 ..w. e s _.. . e . - 9 " Generally, the scurces who were closes :: the 10 site providad far =cre reliable information than these a: 11 a distance. This was particularly true of Mr. Marcld Denton, la
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13 rechnical aspects at the site. His presence provided a 14 .- a g" _ '
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15 advice. 16 "The Governer at all times saw his paramoun cbliga.
- en as doing everytn..ing possicle Oc secrue the .nea_, h and safe-1* .. .
18 ty of the people in the affected area. He continuously scught-19 the best technical advice available. He ordered an 20 accelerated review, under Dr. Wilburn, of emergency pre-U paredness plans. Civil de#ense plans were activiated and M National Guard units placed on an aler; status :: maintain 23 a . a_ _= d v, fe s . " - =. ." c . a n y a. v a... . "m a _' _' . v. W .e .- . . . 4 . " a '__', v
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7-10-seb "The Governer advised pregnan wcmen and pre-schec:. I age children to leave the five mile area around the plan: n a .n . s a v scry as vaca ed on~Apri 9.) He 3 4 crdered a closing of the schocis within that area, as well, 3 Oc facilitate preparedness for a general evacuation if 6 necessary, and in recogni icn of the desire of parents c
., keep all of their children Ocgether.
g "We were continuously pushing the experts :c 9 establish lead times for each possible contingency and 10 insuring tha: they could be reconciled with the time requirec. 13 to execute an evacuation. The Governer constantly weighed 1,, thepotential risks from Three Mile Island agains: the hacard: 13 c:. an evacua . en c:. an unprecedented nature. 14 "At the same time, the Gcvernor sought to preven: 15 the dangerous risk of panic, and to provide the mes: accurate 16 available information to a distraught public. Tc this end, - he p Governor and Mr. Denten held regular press-briefings to 18 apprise the public. A telephone rumcr con:rcl center was 19 established. It averaged several hundred calls an hour a go its peak. 21 "Our experience underscores the need to insure an en adequa e flow of accura e information to the decisionmakers 23 and public in this kind of an emergency. In our view, this 24 requires ceci, capable, credible managemen: cf a crisis a:
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3 a. a . a .- " -. n d e . s ..=...d--# 3..- ^'-.. . " c .' a. .=.~. . owe- . =. . . d 3 radi0 activity may have reduced the potential for panic. 4 The C0mmission may want :c consider appropriate means c# 5 educating the public in that regard. ne.s ---nu.se, a...:
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evaluated in terms of what it may reveal abou: the licensing 10 and review process. 11 "The Governor has prepcsed licensing of utility 1' ccmpany executives, and development c: :ndependen: inspec-13
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ad k - V. 14 to the federal system. The Commission may want to lock a: 15 these and other ways to assure the presence of round-the-16 clock expertise at nuclear power plants. 1.
"Another priority for attention by the Commissi:n 13 would be development of standarc emergency precaredness plans ,
10 with input from the best experts available, Oc insure no maximum preparation to meet any nuclear contingency.
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ir.cident it .c na facility, its findings and recommendati:ns
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.,5 we have begun the task cf assessing and addressing any 1
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u__3 7-12-scb 1 long-term environmental, health and ecencaic consec,uences 2 of the Three Mile Island incident. The Commissicn may wan: 3 Oc. lock at the results of this, as well. 4 "As you undertake the important public responsibil-5 ity entrusted to you, please be assured of the Governcr's 6 support and cccperation. T "Thank you, very =uch, Mr. Chairman." 3 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Thank ycu for ycur extremely 9 brief and very full statement. Ycu touched on a large number 10 of issues that we have been probing all day, and I knew 11 a number of us would wish to pursue them. Withcut prejudging 12 your own investiga:ica, did you feel tha: there was suffic-13 ient and timely technical expertise presen: Oc keep the 14 Governor thoroughly briefed? 15 MR. WALDMAN: I think Mr. Chairman, :har varied 16 from period to period. In the early period, we were largely 1** dependent upon technical advice and reports from the utility 18 and later that day, from regional NRC people from King cf 1 1 19
? russia, Pennsylvania. Neither the Governor, acr any :f the j 1
20 key administration officials involved are nuclear scientists. 21
.so obviously we had to rely to a great deal fer facts and factual evaluations from people who were.
23 And I must say tha: the feeling developed, after 24 1 the first day cr so, that we were no: only getting the bes 1 25 ) or the fulles: cr the acs: ccmplete er the mes accurate l l
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4 statement, not by.-- the Ccesission, but by one of its 5 regional people , tha: the danger was over, the crisis had 6 l passed. Fortunately, we cid not rely 100 percent on that state-i 1
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3 a- . _= .~ ~.. ' . g . '. e' a'f , .. .=. ~. .". .' 0 . .h , .. . was d-ev =_ _oc. ed . . ~. .h _' .'.k . . 9 Chairman, as recall, it was abou 2:30 p.m., that M.r . 10 Denton arrived. '"he Governer and the ?residen spoke about 11 _1 _4 . _' 5 a . r.. . ". k. . a. o.c v a. .- . .o r = s. .k =_ d_ w .". a. ..".a. 2 . a. s _'. d e.. . f ' a__ = a a_ . ...-. l~ semeene to the site who was capable of taking over the tech-13 _ , , , .,, .,_,,
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14 the various collectors, utility a.id other peop'e a: the site., . 15 With respect :: Mr. Denton, and I would say from that period 16 forth, we fel: quite ccafortable and confident, with the 1.,. exten: and quality of technical advice.
- hat was primarily, 13 Mr. Chairman, the area of radicactive readings, what events 19 and what possible contingencies at the site wert, wha: the
.,0 various _,ead times might u.,e in an even: wnen one or t.w.ese - -
.,1 contingencies developed. In the area of emergency preparedness, I must say that a: the end it was seven days
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7-12 sch 1 foot at the site er in the state, for that =arter, were talk-2 ing about 30 mile evacuations, 20 mile evacuations. And 3 indeed, Mr. Wilcox' statement before the Cc==issien talks 4 about evacuations being contempla ed in an area brcader than 3 that for which plans had been developed. The fact is, that 4 the NRC requires.a five mile plan. The state had a five mile I plan and Doctor Wilburn had quickly rightened it up. 3 The state developed a ten sile plan as well, when ir 8 learned tha: the NRC had developed a new propcsed regulation 10 that plans.be extended to 10 miles, although that proposal 11 has ye to be adopted officially. la-I think the confusion is apparently -- may even 18 affect Mr. Wilcox, ccmments to the fac: tha: there was, for 14 a period of about 72 hours, a 10: of people -- some, some of 15 them self-appointed experts who had never been near the site, pe throwing around figures very loosely, like 15, 20, 30 miles, ('
. when the best advice that we were ge :ing free private IS experts and Federal and State Government people a: the site, 19 was that the apprcpriate area to plan for would be five er 1C 20 miles', depending on which mu=her of contingencies might deve:cp.
21 i CFCRMMI K."..ENY : May I ask, in that connection, i
.as we are probing branches of the Executive Branch of the 23 Federal Government, we have requested several of the : de i 24 their bes: to put togeth:r their timetable in that crucial period, say Wednesday to Saturday, Or 'dednesday :: Sunday.
7-15 pe 1 because we kept hearing testimony of how late certain Federal 2 departments realiced that this was'a sericus situari:n they 3 were dealing with. Would it be reasonable to recues tha: the 4 Governor's office -- de a similar scr: of thing, because it 5 would be fascinating, I believe, for the Commission Oc ce= pare 6 the timetable frem your perspecti e. who were right on the
~
site and in the middle of it, with how i: Iceked in Washing cm. 8 Remember, we are probing as to where for example, Federal 9 agencies may have fallen down or where the regulations 10 that exist =ay be weak. The discrepancies between those time-11 tables would be extremely useful c us. 12 I think, Mr. Chairman, we will de so, MR. WALOMAN: 13 and I think probably the most graphic thing that it would 14
;cint up -- having tried c tackle this task already scmewhari--
15 is the thing that you can never knew is the thing that ycu 16 don't knew. I
' 1~'
( CEAIRMAN KEMENY: Yes. I 1 13 MR. WALDMAN: The thing you are not being cid. I 1 19 To this day, I a= acaced Ic hear what seme officials si :ing m) . . in Was.n ington er Bethesda were saying to recommend and 21 whether they were justified or not justified, I can tell ycu
- 4. ,
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that =any of these things were never communicated, in any way, a3 shape, er fer=, Oc the Gcverner's office. And I think cha 's
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2n, 7-15 pe 1 CMAIRMAN KEMENY: Thank you, f:r that suggestion. 2 ! just have a couple of things more. You mentioned the 3 question of licensing, which, of course, is part of cur 4 mandate that we mus: Icok at, and is a, quite, key question 1 5 here. And you coupled it fairly closely, I noticed -- a 6 least, soon in your statement came a remark abou around-the-I clock emergency assistance available, a subject we have been a probing earlier cday. , 9 Would you, for example, feel that it would be l 10 important that licensing should be coupled, to the availabili':y 11 of such round-the-clock emergency crews and, if so, is there i 12 any feeling as to whether they should be supplied by the l 13 utility, whether each State should be rsquired to do that, er 14
- whether the Federal Government should play a role in this?
15 MR. WALDMAN: Well, I know that the Governor, 16 Mr. Chairman, feels that something should be done to achieve II that kind of on-site readiness. I think that we would be 18 much less concerned with whether the utility or the State or 19 Federal Governmen have primary responsibility for it, than j
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simply that it be done, that'gcod people be involved, and it
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One thing I don't know is, hcw much are they a fac pr ' a3
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to the technical skill to deal with emergencies. I have very
.33
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li le doubt, frem what I do knew, that the C:mmission t l
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6 ficiently capable technical staff to deal immediate'.y with any conceivable emergency that might arise, when the rez.ctor 3 is not operating normally. O CHAI??.AN KE4Erf: Thar's a =cs important remark, 10 because we had a: least two very clear statements on tha 11 muu .,c.
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a . .= . a. m er.. . . .". a s .ha]' -- 14 as Commissioner McPherson pointed out in his cross e:<amina-15 tion -- that those two statements diametrically contradicted 16 each other. 1., The last area I wanted to probe, c:her than to ask IS a courtesy question, was the public information one. And 10 you do knew the President of the United S ares is very much
.,0 concerned about that whole issue, and charged us te look into
.,1
.w.a I understand what the Gcvernor did, and Mr. Dencen
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-a 7-13pe 1 myself. How effective it is -- I'm cuite sure the Governer i 2 did what he could. How effective is i:? Ecw much can -- in 3
an emergency situatica like this -- the responsible autheri-4 ties control the flow of rumors? I ask it frc= the background 5 of a university president with a much smaller constituency, 6 but I have never succeeded in s:cpping totally outragecus rumors. 3 MR. WALDMAN: Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, tha: 9 your ability := control, although probably never ::: ally 10 eliminate, ru= ors in a panic-type situation, probably turns 11 en a leas two things. One, the credibility of the source,
.12 which is seeking : allay ru=cr, and for tha: reason we 13 thcught it was very important at the Governor's effice who 14
was bes e-. .m. 'a... . a_.. n _ s c . a_ d_i b _' _' _# ./ ..5 . o u ..'.o u' . . "._# . o~ r. =. # o _# 2 . 15 And secondly, en the availability of accurate in-16 formation with which to dispel the rumors. And I think that II if both of those conditions are met, you can calm the situa-18 tien considerably. Not :crally , but considerably. 18 And I think the fact tha: the center we ser up
'.m ended up logging thousands of calls, shows tha: there was
.1
~
need for this kind of thing and that people will seek out 4., accurate information from what they believe is a credible a3
~
source and will accept it once they ge it. If no I dcub l l "f
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l tha: there would have been sc many thousands of phene calls. 25 a __ css _' _=_ . o,7.....#.. _# . _# - e'sv'n =_-- . . " . _ = . , _ ~ . ~ . " _. ' = _ . . . ,
n,:
-19 1 probably never eliminare it. Maybe ancther--I suppose preventien 2 is -- worth a pound of -- an cunce of preventien is worth a 3 pound Of cure, and I think abou: things that we do educate 4 the public through the normal schecling precess.
5 I can remember going to scheci, elementary school, i 6 high school, and learning about how steel was made, le arr ' t.g .
~
about the Bessemer process , and learning about do: ens of I 1 s scientific kinds of precesses. If there were a general publi: 1 9 l awareness of jus: the most basic facts abou; radiation, ! 10 think a lot of the panic could have been allayed. 11 There is ne reason why even a scheci child, through 1 12 the ecs: basic kind of science course, couldn': learn that 13 j readings of 10 or 15 millirems do not constiture an immediate 1 14 and great big danger to life and health, whereas readings of up-15 wards of 10,000 would. ! think if the public merely understood is better the terminology and the forms of measurement that are 1 i used, you might have less panic in the first place. 18 I think the thing that made this crisis so unic.ue 19 And so~ difficult from our point of view, especially in the area you raised, centrolling panic and rumors, is that i Invo,ves an invisible danger, and one that people really don't understand
~~
and really have never been much educated
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did e:cist during that period.
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226 7-20 1 clear myself with my fellow Commissioners, if I may make the A 2 following statement. ! was qucted extensively in a cerisin 3 article by the education editor of a well-known newspaper, 4 where he, of course, refers to me as Chairman of this particu-5 lar Commission. I wanted the Commissicners to know I gave 4 that interview before I had any idea I would become Chairman i of this particular Commission. Su by the time the article 3 was printed, I was ccrrectly so labelled, and I was correctly 9 quoted in it. The subject happens to be the one you referred 10 to, where I tock a fairly strong stand on the necessity of a 11 higher level of science education f:r the populatien. He hap-12 pened to ask me what scr of thing would you need in education 13 for Three Mile Island, and remember at tha: time, I was no: 14 Chairman and didn't know I would be Chairman, and I took a 15 very strong stand on that particular issue. Su I want the 16 Ccamissioners to know I gave that interview before I became 17 ( Chairman. 13 My last question is a courtesy one, and we will more 18 formally approach Governor Thernburgh, but the Commission 20 hopes to have one of its early meetings in the state of penn-
.,3 sylvania ;o take formal testimony. .'tay I assume that you wculd welcome that if we came, and cbviously we would provide 23 the Governor's office er anyone he wished to appear before the
.,- 4 Commission, and we will formally make this reques :: the Governcr?
so o 1 'MR. WALO!iAN: Let me say, Mr. Chairman,that as I indi-2 ca ed in my statement, the Governor is very eager to suppor 3 the work of this Commission and cooperate with it. Hopefully , 4 it will produce the t'/pe of definitive findings and recom-5 mendations which can answer a lo: of the. questions that have 6 plagued all of us. As you know, there are potentially scores a or .,nquaries and committees and commissions :u..a: are preparing 8 l to investigate this, some in our own state, many in Washington. 9 I would have every reason to believe the Governor would wan: 10 to =ake himself available to this Commission, al hough it is 11 possible he cannot make himself available to each and every 12 hearing and committee that is being se up a: this time. Su: 13 we will welcome you when you do arrive. I'm sure tha: the 14 Governor will be delighted to appear. As I scid, Mr. Chairman, 15 I would, I have made available'for each member of this Com-16 mission a copy of the Governor's statement before :he United ( II States Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulations, which was 18 delivered last Monday. 18 CHAIRMAN KIMINY: Thank ycu. Other members of the t 20 Commission? Professor Taylor.
- '1 COMMISSIONIR TAYLOR: I'd like to try to get a feel-
- 3. . .
ing for what was in the Governor's mind, and of people like
.,3 yourself around him, during the period from abou: Friday after p
the acciden; through that weekend, in terms of what he was 25 really the most worried abou; in considering whether er nc: :o _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ,o . ,~ . . . - - .-,
b 46 3. -
.n.3 r 1 get serious _about evacuation. Wha mean by that is, the 2 ~ question is, whether he was focusing on the extent of radiation <
3 that had already been released, or char might be released scre 4 or less cn1 the scale that it had been occasionally beforehand 5 Or whether he was worried about the conditien of the radio-6 active material inside'the containment, orinsidethecoreit-l 7 self, and whether that might be in scme sense catastrophically a released, and have a much bigger effect On the radiirion levels 9 in the surroundings. Which of these we was he most worried - 10 about? That's the firs question. The second is: de you feel n that he had as much knowledge as, frc= all yeu've been able 12 to determine since then, of wha: the situation really was 13 inside that pressure vessel and inside the containment struc-14 ture at the time when these questions were being made; did 15 he have as much infor=ation, as far as ycu can tell, as any 16 of the experts iccking at the situation did?
'I Well, le MR. WALDMAN: se try to briefly answer
' 18 the second part first. In retrospect, it appears that we had 19 available to us the best available information. I have yet, 20 from reading all the accounts and NRC transcripts and every-21 thing else that . accompanied -- after that, :: see any-thing which would have drastically changed the approach tha:
- 3 the Governor's office ::ok. On the first question , to under-
-34 s and the Governor's frame of mind, or what he was f:cusing on 15 3 ;3, (2,-, I think you have :: understand the Governor is a
4
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was to, partly by asking probing, relevant c,uestiens, :: flush 6 ou. .5e .es. =c-u.=.=.a. '
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3 en that he could. But I do believe that in a very short per-3 ec d c .# ~. .# . e , _s _' ' .~. # u s 5., e c _=...a. " # . . s _= . . . =. .c, e .- . a " cn
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10 that we happily knew nothing abcut only a matter of days be_ 11 fore. I think through this process we did manage to " lush 12 c u . ..k.a ' e s ., a v a .# _' _= . ', _' e # . . . .#.- . ...a . _# ., i~. . - A c a. ' .
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14 c n s - _=.' h- c ~.. .# e a. :c, e . . # . e o . o . a. c,". _# k _' y p .~ v #. ." =. ... . a. =.." - _ 15 are information. But I'm c nvinced the Governor managed to 16 obtain as' accurate a picture as anybcdy had thrcughou: the
". ceriod.
IS We were focusing, cf course, en :.ne escape of rad. a_ 19
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a0 understood it at the time, as I still understand it, there
.3 were at least three ways in which this could cccur. Cne, 30 t
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o e) hydrogen explosion because of the -- and I'm sure that ycu have
.,4 such scre expertise en i than I de, but 1:'s my' understanding, O
and was at ehr time, a hycrogen bubble cevel;ced in the reac r l
i , i l Sa
- 1
,,0 1 because of certain steps'that had been taken, we ran a possible I
.. . . .. . .i.
- ris k c.
- . explosion, because or_ the possici.1:7 . ::. ccmcining w; n 3 oxygen-- That would be.another possible way. Thirdly, simply cy 4 leaking out through normal kinds of pipes er vents or cracks, 5 or what have you. So we were constantly , the C-cverner was 6 constantly, looking at what in fact are the readings. I mean
~
hourly, sometimes two-chree times an hour, you know, what are 8 the readings? What in fact is the a:cun: cf radiatica present 9 in the atmosphere, and tha: means the air, the water, the 10 soil, milk, and tha: meant at the site, and a: a mile from 11 the site, and at five miles from the site, and se forth. 12 Secondly, and simultaneously, he and all of us were obviously 13 also pracccupied with whe: are the other contingencies that 14 could develop that might cr.use mere and dangercus doses of 15 . . radiation to escape the containment into the environment? 16 What is the probability for each and every one, and ecs im-17 portan:17, what are the lead times, and again, can preventive 18 and precautionary and evacuatory actions be executed in time 19 if necessary? These questions were asked endlessly, hourly, "o
~
continuously, from Wednesday scrning until we were pas it. CF. AIRMAN KEMENY: May I ask what kind of answers yc _ a.,
~~
get en lead time, because we have no heard anything abou 43 that yet? I mean, were they like hours er like days?
.i;
~
MR. WALCHAN: : varied, depending On the pericd, I
^5 Mr. Chairman.
~
I think at one pein; we were :cid that we culd l l i
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2 seven hours. By the time that developed, we had an emergency 3 , n _= . . . u. . -..u. -nad u-e,_n .,v ,_wed uy n. .= .# .: _: =_- _ s o-._.,_ a_ . s- . case _=_ . _< 2 , s u, . .u. ,. cov,_.nc.o. .c .: : _:n ,_ , w..u .: c.u. ...s.u- : : e--,- s -
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5 that could be involved, could be evacuated, in the rice c' H pan $c. e C0!*-.TS. S _0NrR . Av. ? C.p... ** an ,-. . u:a a . .u. , . . .. ,..u,.., = _J < r. . 3 s e y,.e. 'no u. s , : cn.. e .a.m n.. , _a s ..u.e 9_ a_ _, A_ . .: ...e .. - __ a 3 ,_ . .u. _, _e 9
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was 3#va_n ^ as a ..u...".e. . .#o*. =. . . ' a_ _=md . 4 ... a. ."..= _
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10 release of material than had been released be# ore? 'Inere did 11 that number come from? 12 M R . "d A C M A N : '"his developed, as did other nu=cers, 13 .,,.s .: , .c .
.e. - n. . co.g.a..
. ques _on.:.. . c_a u.., .
n.,,_n .. ,n . . ._:s ,,.. 14 per s, who would brie # us once, up to twice, a day, and then 15 in between by telephone from the site. .t.nd he would give us is continuing progress reports. And migh say, incidentally, 1*
..u. _t .,g.t . . g u., acy . c . .ye .: .: . s . o g.- . c .: you. :
. . . . s . n.a ,_s ..:n ., :_. _s .
18 the Governer, ironically, semeene who is no: a nuclear scien-toe .
- .st , who was t.ye . first person to raise :.y.e ,
uest:.on
- . rue-. .
._,0 damage.
.,2
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CHAIRMAN KE EY: Of wha ?
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25 032 1 at least twice. The Governor was the first person 0 say wai-2 a minute, there's something here that bothers me. I haven't 3 3 heard a werd abou: possible fuel damage. 4 COMMISS!0MER TAYLOR: Did semeene explain :: you wh- r 5 the time was six to eight hours, and not half an hour, Or 20 6 minutes, or a much shorter time? I MR. WALDMAN: Not in any kind of scientific detail, 3 but they could probably do so, ycu knew, :: a scientist. Bu: 9 we were asking for what could happen, what could cause it to 10 happen, and heu much time would we have to respond to it if 11 it did happen. 12' COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: And this was ths wors: pc s s ib :.e
, 13 period?
14 MR. WALOMAN: Yes, yes. And incidentally, again, , l 15 let me say we were always asking for the wors: possible cases 16 In other words, if actually we were told it was less than a 17 one percent chance of a mel -down by the time the lead-time was 18 six or seven hours. - ao -- 19 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: And that was from :iRC people,
.,o or __
21 l MR. WALOMAN: Yes. At one ocin , and ! think i
- wc uld 1
have been -- I: =ight have been Friday night. : sight be 23 wrong, thcugh, i might have been over the weekend. I'd have
.i; to check our notes, but it was an NRC man.
25 COMMISSIONER ?!GFORD: Do you happen :: have in hand
0.; e
.. a-1 now a documented description of what did happen?
o MR. WALDMAN: A documented descrip; ion? 3 cws-n wd y_ S c. e 0 w.. _R 3. r.c._ ;. 0 g. D v. ,. s . eecm e ..c ~ . s. 2,sc.:,_
._m.
- in writing of what did happen. Do you happen to have that?
5 MR. WALOMAN: No. We have endless notes. 6 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Do you feel tha: there is adecuate understanding now in the state office of what did S happen? 9 MR. ~4ALDMAN: In scientific terms? 10 COMMISSIONER ?IGFORD: Whatever your fra=a of 11 . . . . . . . re:erence is. You tell me. .'s
. not sure scient;::: is so la~
important. 10 MR. WALDMAN: I'd have to say yes and nc. When 14 there's a current dispute within the NRC about whether the 15 7pe of plant in operation there can be safely operated or 16 not, I can't sit here and say that yes, we're ecnfident we 17 really understand what happened. 18 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Yes, I now understand. Su 19 you have baen =antioning scme things that happened along the 4.0 way that caused you concern, like the hydrogen bubble and so 4.1 forth. Do you new knew, adec.uately feel that you kn:w, wha:
.. m.
happened in tha regard? The pcssibility of a hydrogen 23 explosion.
.,. h MR. WALDMAN: I think we understand wha: tha: neans ,
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23- ,su I were i: to happen again, but I certainly don't think we under-2 stand the process in the sense that I would want any of us Oc 3 be in charge -- cf the Operation of the site. 4 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: Do you feel that you under-5 stand what, say, the probability was, in hindsight, new, of 6 that e:cplosion ' occurring?
~
MR. WALDMAN: I can only go by the estimates we were S given by the NRC experts. I would have nc independent way to 9 assess that. 10 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: Do you happen :: know wha: - 11 These are? Could you tell us? Could you provide them Oc us? 12 MR. WALDMAN: Yes. I could only go by he best of 13 my reccliection. NRC, I'm sure, could give you =cre accurate 14 data. My reccliection is tha: that,_ :oo, was put at a rela-15 rively low percent in terms of reaction. Su: I can' t remember 16 the exact percentage. 17 CEAIRMAN KIMINY: Yes. . We would be very grateful 18 if you would sometimes put these records cgether. You reali: 19 why we are probing this: because part of cur charge is tha 20 in a case like this, the Governor of the state should certain-21 ly have the best possible information available. If it's nc happening, we have : come up with a recc==endation :: make ' a3 Therefore, comparing what you were :cid sure that's the case. l at tha: time with the bes: determination this Ccmmission can 25 make as to what really the situation was, is terribly relevan-9
o g 3 :. .e 1 to our task. 2 COMMISSIOMIR FIGFORD: May I ask one more brief 3 question? e 4 CHAIRMAN- E4E'iY: Oh, please do. 5 COMMISSICMER ?!GFORD: Is the -- We understand that 6 there are some whole body counters in operation in the area. Art these in any way connected with some state operation? S the crate health department? 9 MR. WALDMAN: Are you talking about subsequen to 10 the accident? , 11 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Yes. 12 MR . WALDMAN : We have continued, up to the curren: 13 time, cooperated with -- between state health department and 14 other relevan state agencies, in our state neaning the De-15 part=ent of Environmental Resources, for one, and the various 16 federal agencies and teams that were deployed there during the 17 crisis; so that these readings, as I understand it, are being 18 done federally, unde'r the aegis'cf IPA, by designation of the 18 White Ecuse, but coordinated closely with a: leas: two cf our ao departments, the Department of Health and the Departmen: of al Environ = ental Resources. COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: You're speaking of the cur-43 rent cooperations with those. Yhat I'm interested in is what a4 were.you ger ng cut o: - these measurements,: ,
,n . a: -- and this
#5 erna s w 11 rec.uire a technica_- answer, se mav.be v.eu .. wan:
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- 3. _# . . . = .a. d = A 3 tha these tell you scae:hing about the doses that pecple re-4 c ._ _: ./e s as .,. ._ s u _, .. v .: ..u. e a . ..: a.e n ,.
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6 let me say this. I've been advised by health experts, and
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I'm not one, that it could be years of analy::ing one curren: S da - = s u- .h. a.s yc u ' . e -a_ .# a.-. 4 .. 3- ., - > = v a. .'. ., e, ma_ . . -. a
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9 and c:her developments in the area before they can -- 10 COMMISSICNER ?!GFORD: Yes. I understand the problem , 11 "u.
. .k.a 's . .c. wha. . .
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.v . .h a-14 readings themselves mean? hat's what = asking.
15 MR. '4ALDMAN : ' dell, again -- 16 e. a - m -- v_ a 7 - -. . zu .. 2-.. .. .
,. -o_,
. __ ,, a. .. _ . ,.- .. . u. .
1"' doses that people received, and to what exten are they IS
.-,___ ,, an .,
19 MR . '4ALDMAN : ' dell, I'm nc: sure I understand the
~m question. Let me say-- Abcu- the best answer I can give you may el "
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point, all we could do, and I think all we can continue to do ,
.,3
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- .nd .v:.M.ual was , and then Oc rely on c her e:<perts who can l
1 l 31 3..,7 4 4 1 interpre that for us, and tell us what tha =eans, in terms 2 Of health consequences, in terms of environmental censequences, 1 3 and then rake appropriate action. Su: I don't think any cf 4 us have the capacity to independently determine that. '4 hen 5 this crisis started, I d0n't believe that any of us even knew 6 what a milliren was.
~
COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: I understanc. I'm 7.o asking l 3 you uo -- ve . a7' d .' .' .# e - =. n .
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2e, 9 which is new an ongoing thing since the ace ;en:, - suppcse 10 your health department has some attitude as to wha: the infor-11 marion is tha: they're getting from that. I'm interested in 12 their interpretation of it. 13 MR. WALDMAN: I have yet to see any written repor: 14 from them, except that they're working with the federal gover7-15 ment in taking readings, and they're werking on a long-range 16 plan which I understand will cover a period of 20 years. II That's what I'm told. IS CHAI?Jd.AN KEMENY: Other questions? Or. Marks. 19 COMMISSIONER MARKS: Jus to pursue this a li :le
- 'o further. Could you identify the experts who were providing
.,2 you with advice on the health risks?
MR. WALDMAN: Yes. At different times, they in-
.,3 cluded, of course, our own Secretary of Health, Ir. McLeod;
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39- ~~ 233 1 although we approached him en our own, no: through the NRC ; 2 the NRC'itself, which has develcped, obviously seme verki.pg 3 knowledge of health hazards. We talked with Dr. Denten 4 about an ongoing basis. We requested and received a -- ! can-
-5 not remember his name, but he's a doctor -- I can ge this 6 from my notes -- a dec. tor from the Department of Health, Edu-
~; cation and Welfare. He was present for several of the discus.-
3 siens. :: is my understanding that Dr. Wald consulted, al-9 though'he could not personally be there, consulted by rele-10 phone, Dr. Sanger, who is the person who wrote, I'm told, 11 many of the original studies on radiation effects en which 12 the NRC reliad in adopting its regulations as to what dose is 13 required to take affirmative acticn. I may be forgetting some, 14 but -- 15 CCMMISSIOUER. MARKS: I'm not -- Was there someone 16 there as part of the decision-making apparatus, right en the l~ site? You knew, you say that you are probing hour :s hour, 18 and Denton was there. Who was your onsite, if any, expert, 19 so to speak, on the health risks? Who were you turning to to 20 sort of interpret the physical measurements in terms of health 21 risks? MR. WALDMAN: To the extent one person ccordinated, 23 ' I would say it was our health secretary, but the Gcvernor -- COMMISSIONER MAP,KA:. Dr. McLeed? O MR. WALDMAN: Yes. But the Gcverner and others cf 9
,-n--
33
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I us were directly questioning and probing the c her health 2 experts as uell. This is a situation in which, I think, it's ' 3 wise to get a second and third and fourth opinien. 4 COMMISSIONER MARKS: But they were not ensire? 5 re m not getting a clear picture of -- MR . WALDMAN : My understandihg is Dr. Wald did go .cu: side. COMMISSIONER MARXS: Dr. Wald went ensite. 5 MR. WALDMAN: And then was, I am advised, presen: 9 when the situation -- in Colorado. But I canner. say for 10 sure which of them went actually into the plant. 11 COMMISSIONER MARKS: If it's pessible, I think we'd 13 appreciate that information. 13 MR. WALDMAN: To a large excent, what would happen 14 was Mr. Denten would report with the scientific and technical 15 information, and then health people would be asked to evaluat t 16 the health consequences and' precautions that that kind of 17 information might facilitate either for or against. And that 's 18 largely wha:' happened. There would no: -- We were no: 10 looking to send a lot of people into the plant a: the time,
~39 although some of us ended up going in'en Sunday afterncon.
21 COMMISSIONER MARKS: Could I ask one -- A the
~
present time, and the problems are continuing, could ycu give 23 us sc=e idea of what strategy you have for dealing with 24 continuing concerns abcut health risks? 25 MR. WALOMAN: ~~he informatica that I have, l'
34 Tao 1 the mes; current information is, that we would have considera+ 2 bly over a day of notice now for any unreward thing that couli 3 happen. In fact, I'm advised tha: this plant new is in sub-4 stantially safer condition, in terms of risk : health and 5 safety, than any other operating plan in the country, where, 6 in theory, anything could happen on a moment's notice. This 7 plant is close to total shut-dcwn. And se I don't think, froml l 3 the reports I'm ge ing, that i poses any kind of direct or 9 immediate danger. 10 CCMMISSIONER MARKS: Of continuing emissions? 11 MR. WALDMAN: It is my understanding tha: the read-12 ings were either at or very close to sc-called background for 13 the days, with one exception., one day, at one location, as to 14 one thing,'which was radicactive. 15 COMMISS~0NER MARKS: Well, what abou: the concerr.s 16 of those pregnant women or parents of small children, who may 1~ have fel: they might have been in proximity to the site at a 18 time when there was a question raised with regard to levels 19 of exposure above so-called safe levels , a0 MR, WALDMAN : Well, at our request, we met with the 1 l 21 l White House not quire' a week age , as I recall, and we
- 4. .
requested some assistance from them in this area. Our re-22 sources are somewha: limited. We asked them c work with us. either supplying manpower and rescurces er funding, and we 25 will get the medical experts, to conduct engoing studies on
l 5 35' , , , , I this and provide censultation and advice to pecple who may 2 be concerned abou: the physical effects that you allude c, 3 and also the psychological effects, which in a disaster like 4 .this, a fac cr which must be -- 5 COMMISSIONER MARKS: Does the state have a posi- t 6 tion with regard to advice to physicians and their patients
~
with respect to abortion of women who were in the firs Ori - 3 mester? 9 MR. WALDMAN: No. . 10 COMMISSIONER MARKS: You don't have any pcsitien? 11 MR. WALDMAN: I think it's highly unlikely tha: : Te : 12 Governor would-consider'that an area that was apprcpriate f :r 13 the state to comment upon. I think he wculd supper: the 14 integrity of the patient-doctor relationship. 15 COMMISSICMER~ MARKS: What about ne dec cr, the t 16 question of the level of infermation that the doc:crs nigh l have? Is there a state position that information should be l 18 provided to the doc crs , tha: -- 19 MR. WALDMAN: Oh, certainly. I mean, yes. The l 20 health department is continuing the policy that we embarked 21 on earlier of trying to =ake available to the public, not just an individual physician or patient, all of the relevan.:
- '3 . - . . . .
_n:crmat on that we might have. . :n.inx. :ney cou _a ge:
.,4 that. I think, frankly, federal people there new, werking with.curfstate health' people, would aise previde that.
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35 1- COMMISSIONER MARKS: Ycu're providing the informa-2 tion and interpreting it, in terms of risk? 3 MR. WALEMAN: 'Yes, I think they have been doing 4 that. Su again, I think that it is their advice evaluation. 5 They are taking some care not'ro interfere with the 6 patient-doc Or relationship.
'~
COMMISSIONIR MARKS: Well, if anything is available , 3 you know, scr of in written advice or sistements, I think 9 we'd appreciate seeing it, jus: : get some idea cf the cual- , 10 ity of this advice. Because you may have seen tha: there was 11 an ar-icle in : day's New York Times, for extmple, suggesting 12 that there's a gecd deal of apprehension and even sc=e cen-rus:.cn on t.u.e part of pregnant women exposed in this area, 13 14 with regard to these issues. 15 CCMMISSIONIR FIGFORD: Is there someone in the 16 state we :: tight contact to ask about these whole body counters 1~' and the data they're getting and their interpretation of the 18 data? 19 MR. WALDMAN: Yes. I would assume Secretary Jones.
"O COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Jones?
-33 MR. WALDMAN: Clifford Jones.
CHAIRMAN KIMI'TY: Governer Sabbit ?
.,3 COMMISSIONER SA3BITT: Mr. Wald=an, why did the Governor-chcose no: to ask the ?residen for federal disaster declaration?
I l t i ; t
37 2u3 1 MR. WALOMAM: He made that decision largely a: the 2 request of the White House. We had a herline, sc-called ho:- 3 line, installed early in the crisis to provide ready communica-4 tion between the White House and our office, and also Mr. 5 Den:On's group at the site. On Friday that became a very real 6 concern. The White Ecuse indicated that its pr.eference was w e 7 not make a formal request for aid. We did no do so partly c n 3 assurance frem them that we were a: tha: time, and that we 9 would continue to, receive the same typa and level assistanc e 10 as if a formal declaration were made. '." heir concern, and I 11 think the Governor agreed, was : hat in this kind of situatior , 12 that kind of declaration could generate a substantial panic 13 that could be very counter-productive, and that also -- 14 CEAIRMAN KEMENY: A substantial what? A panic? 15 MR. WALDMAN: Panic. That could be counter-produc-16 tive. And that also might convey a felse notion that the 1' . emergency had escalated considerably, and that considerably 18 more radiation levels were present than in fact were. Since 19 the KRC regulations on evacuation recommendations, as I under - 20 stand it, talk in terms, I think, of a: least 10,000
-33 milliress. Obviously at ne time during this period were we even approaching that standard. .,3 COMMISSIONER TRUNK: I'm curious. When the advisory y
for pre-schcol children was given, why did ycu sicp at pre-
.'5 schoci? Why not at six-year-cid or seven-year-cid?
, 1:3'3 h l 2" i 1 MR. WALDMAN: This was based en advice from a number 2 cf health and nuclear experts, including Chairman Hendrie cf 3 the siRC, including Dr. McLeod and Others, that young childrer
-4 and fetuses are particularly sensitive :c, susceptible c, 5- icw levels of radiation, which would not include adults er 8
- older children.
I COMMISSIONER TRUNK: But I mean, a six-year-old -- 3 CHAIRMAN KE'4ENY: Commissioner Trunk. One accent. . t 9 We have te change tape. A one-moment break, I'm sorry. 10 (g,c,33) , 11 ! 12 13 14 15 16 17 l. IS 19 00 21 ese a 24 25 n - n ----
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'3-1 'seb 1 CEAIRMAN KEMENY: So, we're all ser? C:cmissioner 2 Trunk, the tape is all yours. 6 3 COMMISSIONER TRUNK: have a daughter who's six 4 years old, she just turned six. She's been in kindergarten 5 five months, six conths. Why isn' she considered pre-schoc'_
6 age? I mean, she's just a little over school. Started
. schoos. .
5 MR. WALDMAN: I don't know, Mrs. Trunk. Excep: 9 to say that if the advisory had been children 1 through 10 5, somebody would now be asking me abou: their 7 year old 11 daughter, or if it was 1 through 7, they'd be asking abcut 12 their eight year old. We were advised tha: this is the firs: 13 #ive years of life in which the child would be particularly sus-14 ceptible. And that's wha: the decision was based on. 15 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Did anycne in the state 16
=ake its own evaluation of that advice?
1~' MR. WALDMAN: Well certainly by checking and crcss 18 checking with every health, nuclear science exper we can 19 get. Including' Dr. Wald, including Dr. Sangiman, 20 everybody we can get our hands on, on very short notice. 21 COMM SSIONER ?IGFORD: So there wculd be scme one
.w then who would say here is why that age is the cu:cff, and a3 some medical reasons, for example?
44 MR. WALDMAN: I believe that Dr. McCleed 25 ;7 - 37, .Jald, or possibly .any other doc crs -- : mean, we
.I 1
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i 4 4-0 3-2-scb were led to believe tha: this is standard and fcund in g medical tests. It has to do with the size of the thyrrois 3 and ot.5er . kinds of considerations. 4 COMMISSIONER MARKS: The size of what? 5 MR. WALDMAN: The thyrroid, I believe. Again, I'm 6 not a doc ce, I'm just going by my reccliection of the kinds
., Of things that were discussed at the time . But my under-3 standing of the medical situation was that it is fetuses 9
in particular, and small and young children have a seme - 10 what greater sensitivity. 1 i 11 CEAIRMAN KEMENY: Of course, the fascination of 13 your whole restimony is that we, for the firs: ime, ge: 13 the feeling of the extremely shcr: time scale in which the 3 Governer and his associates have to make life and dea:h 15 decisions. 16 MR. WALDMAN: It was a very pressurized situation, 1- Mr. Chairman. F 18 CHAIRMAN KIMENY: I have great sympathy for the 19 Gcvernce, if I may say that for the record. 20 MR. WALDMAN: Let me say this, :co, Mrs. Trunk. el The adviscry on pregnant women and young children was made ec cut of an extreme excess of caution -- 23 COMMISSIONER TRUNK: Oh, I realize that. 24 MR. '4ALOMAN: -- which the Gcvernce fel; was the I ; 25 prudent course. At nc time.did radiarien' levels even approach i
- u7 3-3-scb levels which, under existing health and MRC regula:icas, would have indicated that pecple should have been evacuated.
3 In fact, I don't believe tha: to this day anybody who - 4 had documented it, that remained, would have necessarily 5 been imposed to danger. 6 COMMISSIGNER TRUNK: They brough: : hat bcdy
., scanner in, and nine people were told tha: they had larse 3 deses of radiation. How did they ge: the high desage?
l 9 MR. WALDMAN: As opposed c the hundreds who didn'1? 1 1 10 I don't know. On the c:her hand, I've read accounts tha: n cecc.le who lived in areas with -- rich .chesc. hates in the 13 soil, could register even higher readings withou any nuclear 13 occurrence. I just don't have the expertise Oc answer tha 14 question. 15 COMMISSIONZR ?!GTORD: Was the State considering 16 distributing pcrassium iodide? 17 MR. WALDMAN: Yes. 18 COMMISSIONZR FIGFORD: Mcw close did you come? 19 Were you prepared and did you have it ready to gc? 20 MR. WALDMAN: Yes. 21 COMMISSIONER ?!GTORD: Why did ycu decide no ic _ ._, a: se.
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23 MR. WALDMAN: Secause the -- we felt, based on
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l 3 a-sch I COMMISSIONER ?IGFORD: Was that from your State 3 ' people, or from the federal -- 3 MR. WALDMAN: I: was a c0mbination Of people, 4 including Dr. Wald, and also a feeling that it could 5 possibly centribute to a panic armesphere and again, 6 counter-productive. But the basic decision was a scientific . 1 7 health one; ve did obtain -- and I personally read the study 8 submission when the FDA first approved the use of the drug, and l 9 under what situations and conditions.it was recc= mended, and j 10 we were not even approaching them. I believe basically the [ i 11 drug, as'I understand it, was designed for use in -- blocking , I 12 possible exposcie of thyrroids : radio-iccine, in cases 13 where it was either a likelihcod or almes a certainty of 14 exposure to at least 10,000 millirems. And we were not i 15 getting readings even close to that. I 16 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Commissioner Taylor.
'I COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I'd like : get back for a 18
=en: Oc this question about what was known in the Governor's
?
I' affice about the possibilities of a much bigger release i 20 than actually took place. You mentioned two rects to that, 21 one was a core melt and the other was a hydrogen expl:sien. 3., , CHAIRMAN KEMENY: You also =entioned leakage -- ]
.3 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: And leakage Of other types.
24 ... . - A: wha ~;ime do you recas,,, a was the Governor's 0::_ce _n:Orm - 25 ed tha: there'had in fact been a hydrogen-explosion in i I
? u e. - .. I containment?-
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a ... , : :u. .an , I think we would like :: know as accurately as possible, a . .. . . unen that piece or in: rmation came :: the coverner,s 6 office and where it came from. The second question, and I think they're probably in the same category --- nc asking S you fer the timing on this right new, but a: wha: time -- 9 when, was the Governor informed about scme picture of the 10 extent and nature of the core damage, how much of i. had 11 been damaged, wha: the damage mechanism had been, where the 12 damaged fuel was, what problems that might lead : in terms 13 cf them cooling, 0 what exten: were people cencerned abou: , 14 any c-f the damaged fuel blocking the flow cf water :: nake 15 . . . . it more di ::cu,: to cool, and so on? We're trying c ge: 16-established, no -- there are two things : one is, what i. were people's perceptions of the answers :: questions like IS
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4 s-e scc 2 n some tecnnica, detail, and as we piece cur notes back 2 cgether, 'I think it will reflect scre the degree :: which 3 we ccmprehend it. That level of technical details; than 4 the level we attemoted :: address the problem with. 5 COMMISSIONER ?!GTORD: I'm sorry, I don't understand 6 that answer. Could you say it in somewhat different words, or try it again, I'll listen again. 8 MR. WALDMAN: Well I'm suggesting that if we piece 9 Ocgether our notes on this -- 10 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: Oh, tha you will, in the 11 future? 12 MR. WALDMAN: --that what you will find is no: sc ' 13 much the level of technical expertise that Dr. Ienten brough; 14 Oc bear en explaining the problem :: us, as how much we could 15 comprehend. So what I'm suggesting is that you will end up 16 finding out what we thought might happen. That does not neces- , l~ sarily mean that we -- let me say, we're no: the people to ask l 18 as :: the best Technical explanation of what happened -- 19 COMMISSIONER ?!GFORD: I understand cha: -- 20 MR. WALOMAN: -- we're the worst people to ask -- I l
.,1 1
are experts -- 2 COMMISSIONER FIGFORD: I'm no trying : -- l 23 MR. WALCMAN': -- primarily in one thing , and what i: i 24 looked like :: us. New cur actes will tell you, based en 25 Harold Denton's continuous briefings, what we thcugh: the
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3-3 scb i hydrogen bubble meant, what we thought could happen, and c what we thought the op;iens were if i; did happen. 3 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD: Yes. Excuse ne, that's s a really what I do want to get at; what you thought. And I'm 5 asking you this, did you~ hink then tha: the prcblem would 6 be that the hydrogen bubble would explode and then rupture 7 the vessel and rupture the containment, is tha the -- 3 MR. WALOMAN: I was led to believe cha: that would 9 be a possibility. 10 COMMISSIONER ?IGFORD: Yes. And is tha: then, the 11 though: tha: then led to the idea we must evacuate, is that t he 12 next step? 13 MR. WALDMAN: No, no: necessarily. 14 COMMISSIONER ?!GFORD: What was the thing, then, ' 15 tha 1ed to that? 16 MR. WALDMAN: The Governer ultimately, as you know s 17 decided not to order evacuation. 18 COMMISSIONER ?IGFORD: Yes, excuse ne. That was 19 the wrong word to use. Whatever he called it when he sug-20- gested these ;eople leave? 21 MR. WALDMAN: Oh, that? That was based s:rie:17 et : M a
- r --
.o: an excess of caution when he mgetermined tha there were 23- radioactive readings above background that-- within a five 24 mile radius.
25 COMMISSIONER-PIGFORD: I see. That was no connected i e e
. - - _- ~_
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1 I with his perception of the hydrogen bubble? 3-9 scb MR. UALDMAN: That's correct. 3 COMMISSIONIR PIGFORD: Thank veu. 4 CHAIRMAN KIMINY: I den': see any :her Commissi:r.- 3 ers asking for the ficer. May I thank you very much for 6 y ur testimony, which we found fascinating. May I remind
., the Commissioners that we will Ocnclude our first series 3
of meetings temorrow morning. We'll mee: here a: 10:00 00 g hear frem a representative of the Department of Energy 10 who could not come 0 day. And we will then continue asking 11 the questica where de we go frem here in se :ing cur next 1a. few meetings? May I ask staff to stand by to meet and I 13 declare this session adjourned. 14 (Whereupon at 5:.10 P.M. the hearing was adicurned as described 15 above.) 16 17 18 19 20 21
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings befcre the in the matter of: PFESIDENT'S COMMISS:nN ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREZ MILZ ISLAND DOCXIT NUMBER: LCCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C. HEARING DATE: APRIL 29, 1979 were held as herein appears, und that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Department or Commission.
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Reporter i National Reporting Co., Inc. 2009 N. luth Street Arlington, VA 22201 i e l 1 i}}