ML20135F892
| ML20135F892 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1985 |
| From: | Grimes B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Alexion T, Cuoco L, Norelius C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| References | |
| 2.206, NUDOCS 8509180006 | |
| Download: ML20135F892 (29) | |
Text
na ase ug#o UNITED STATES
~g 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
,t WASHINGTON. D. C. 20655
~s.,...../
SEP 11 ggg5 Docket No. 50-483 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Charles E. Norelius, Director Division of Reactor Projects Region III Thomas W. Alexion, Project Manager Operating Reactors Assessment Branch Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Lillian N. Cuoco, Attorney Division of Regional Operations and Enforcement Office of the Executive Legal Director FROM:
Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Quality Assurance, Vendor, and Technical Training Center Programs Office of Inspection and Enforcement
SUBJECT:
10 CFR 2.206 PETITION OF MISSOURI COALITION FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND KAY DREY Your review of and input to the enclosed draft of the Director's Decision on the subject petition is requested.
Sections in your individual area which require expansion have been marked.
It is anticipated that information from the SER or other documents or information already gathered as a result of inspections will be used.
After developing your input and/or comments, please talk with the IE Project Manager on this petition, Melinda Malloy, who will coordinate your input in consultation with ELD.
Contact:
Melinda Malloy X24532 8509180006 850911 4y3 DR ADOCK 0
N Multiple Addressees,
Please respond by September 20, 1985 so that we can complete this Decision as soon as possible.
The final draft of the Decision will be provided to you for
~
Concurrence.
/
t ddd Brian K. Grimes, Director
,g, Division of Quality Assurance, Vendor, and Technical Training Center Programs Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
Draft Director's Decision Under 7
l 1
l t
9
- i I
1 4
i t
i i
r I
}
f I
4 l
l i
s pang UNITED STATES
[
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION C
{
p, WASHINGT oN,0. C. 20555 t
\\o...*/
D;ck;t No. 50-483 (10 CFR 2.206)
E Alan S. Nemes, Esq.
7541 Parkdale St. Louis, MO 63105
Dear Mr. Nemes:
f This is in response to your request for action under 10 CFR 2.206 dated March 25,
[
1985, which you submitted on behalf of the Missouri Coalition for the Environment Your petition was referred to the staff for consideration as and Kay Drey.
stateo in my letter of acknowledgement to you on May 10, 1985. The petition has been considered under the 10 CFR 2.206 regulations, and for the reasons stated in the enclosed " Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206," the petition has been denied.
A copy of this decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for its review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations.
As provided by this regulation, the decision will constitute the final action of tha enmmission 25 days after the date of issuance of the cecision unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the decision within that I
time.
t A copy of a notice, which is being filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication, is also enclosed for your information.
Sincerely,
[
James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement C
Enclosures:
1.
Director's Decision Under 10 CFTi 2.206 2.
Federal Reaister notice cc w/ enclosure:
y Union Electric Company Thomas Baxter, Esq., Shaw, e i wiian, Futts, and Trowbridge
A Alan S. Nemes, Esq.
- i Distribution SECY OGC EDO DCS 016 POR LPDR GHCunningham, ELD ESchristenbury, ELD JLieberman, ELD 4
LNCuoco, ELD JGKeppler, RIII CENorelius, RIII BABerson, RIII GWright, RIII JFSuermann, RIII BHLittle, RIII HRDenton, NRR TWAlexion, NRR WJBesaw, ADM JMTaylor, IE RHVollmer, IE JAAxelrad, IE JGPartlow, IE RLSpessard, IE BKGrimes, IE GTAnkrum, IE WDAltman, IE JLMilhoan, IE MMalloy, IE LRWharton, IE IE Word Processing Unit QAB Reading I
DQAVT Reading (EDO #00523)
IE Action 85-165 IE:DQAVT:QAB IE:DQAVT:QAB - IE:DQAVT:QAB:C IE:0QAVT:D ELD MMalloy:hmc WDAltman GTAnkrum BKGrimes JLieberman 08/ /85 08/ /85 08/ /85 08/ /85 08/ /85 NRR:0RAB RIII RIII RIII IE:DD IE:D TWAlexion JFSuermann CENorelius JGKeppler RHVo11mer JMTaylor 08/ /85 08/ /85 08/ /85 08/ /85 08/ /85 08/ /85 y -
[7590-01]
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[ Docket No. 50-483]
UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY (Callaway Plant, Unit 1) 1 4
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, has denied a petition under 10 CFR 2.206 filed by Alan S. Nemes, Esq. on behalf of Missouri Coalition for the Environment and Kay Drey.
This petition related to the Callaway Plant, Unit 1.
In the petition, Missouri Coalition for the Environment and Kay Drey alleged that the Union Electric Company's revoking the certification of quality control inspectors found to have questicnable certifi-cations in early 1985 raised questions as to the adequacy of the inspection i
j process and the safety of the Callaway Plant.
In addition, they allegei. rat the failure of Union Electric Company's management to identify the problem with inspector qualifications for at least four years showed that the utility violated its legal obligation to continually monitor safety inspections at the plant and to provide inspectors with direct access to levels of management sufficient to as,sure prompt reaction to safety violations.
The reasons for the denial of the petition are fully described in the i
" Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206" issued on this date, which is available for public inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room locatedat1717HStreet,N.O., Washington,DC 20555 and in the local public C
i i
i
document room for the Callaway Plant, located at the John M. Olin Library, j
Washington University, Skinker and Lindell Boulevards, St. Louis, MO 63130.
A copy of the decision will be filed with the Secretary for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c).
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this day of August, 1985.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement I
i i
i.
i
DRAFT 00 [ ELD to provide]
m:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT t
m James M. Taylor, Director m
In the Matter of
)
E
)
Docket No. 50-483 UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
(Callaway Plant, Unit 1)
)
DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 I
INTRODUCTION On March 27, 1985, Alan S. Nemes, Esq. on behalf of the Missouri Coalition r
b for the Environment and Kay Drey (" Petitioners") filed with the Director'of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement a petition seeking that the Directors serve upon the Union Electric Company (Licensce) an order to show cause why License No.
NPF-30, issued on October 18, 1984 authorizing full power operation for the Callaway Plant, U, nit 1, should not be suspended or revoked pending a full investigation of the violations of law described in the Petition and why other j
actions requested in the Petition should not be taken. The violations of law described in the Petition are based on the Petitioners' assessment that the l
Licenses has not assured th'at' inspection personnel have been properly qualified
[
during construction and operation of the Callaway Plant, which Petitioners state
(
f raises questions on the adequacy of the inspection process and the safety of the plant. Additionally, Petitioners contend that failure of Licensee management
\\
l w*
to identify the problems with inspector qualifications for at least four years c
shows that the Licensee has violated its legal obligation to continually monitor safety inspections at the Callaway Plant and to provide inspectors with direct access to levels of management sufficient to assure prompt. reaction to l
safety violations.
The facts relied upon by the Petitioners were derived from three copyrighted newspaper articles (a) which reported on the Licensee's investigation into the qualifications of quality control inspectors " prompted by internal complaints," review of completed work orders, and communication problems within the quality control department.
Although the Petition was directed to both the Office of Inspection and Enforcement and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement will respond to the Petition as it deals with matters I
which fall under the programmatic responsibilities of this Office.
t On May 10, 1985, I acknowledged receipt of the Petition and informed the Petitioners that the Petition would be treated under 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations and that a formal decision with respect to it would be issued within a reasonable time.
On July 5, 1985, Mr. Nemes provided the Nuclear Regulatory Commission f
with additional " views subsequent to the filing of the Petition on March 27, 1985.
[
These views conveyed opposition to the Licensee's response of June 6, 1985 to the l
l (a)
"UE Targets Unqualified Plant Inspectors," Columbia Daily Tribune, March 7, 1985, p.1; " Yearlong Workers' Rift Revealed in UE Safety Assurance Problems,"
i Columbia Daily Tribune, litech 8,1985, p.1; "UE Identifies Unqualified In-spectors," St. Louis Post Dispatch, March 26, 1985.
7 i
s
3 show cause Pitition and requested that the Commission conduct a true, independent investigation of the matters raised in the Petition and in their July 5,1985 correspondence.
I have taken Mr. Nemes' additional views into account in reach-ing my final decision with respect to the Petition.
The Licensee has submitted responses to the issues raised in the Petition and to the additional views of the Petitioners.
These responses were submitted on June 6, 1985 and August 2, 1985, respectively, and I have considered them in reaching my decision.
For the reasons set forth in the discussion below, the Petitioners' request for action is denied.
DISCUSSION Petitioners seek the institution of show cause proceedings pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(a) to revoke or suspend License No. NPF-30 for the Callaway Plant pending a full, independent investigation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the Licensee's failure to comply with:
a.
nuality assurance regulations and guidelines regarding proper training of quality assurance personnel; b.
regulations requiring the Licensee to continually verify that its quality assurance program is functioning effectively and in accordance with regulations;
'I c.
regulations requiring the Licensee to institute and maintain a quality assurance program that provides adequate freedom to identify quality
(
assurance problems and to initiate and implement solutions; d.
regulations which require direct access by QA personnel to levels of management necessary to effectively provide quality assurance at the Callaway Plant.
Further, the Petitioners request that pursuant to proceedings instituted under 10 CFR 2.202(a), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
1.
undertake an independent investigation of all quality assurance and quality control personnel during construction and operation of the Callaway Plant to determine whether such personnel have met and continue to meet the prescribed qualifications for their level of responsibility; 2.
conduct an audit of all testing t.nd inspections undertaken by unqualified quality control personnel; 3.
indeperadently inspect all work inspected or reviewed by unqualified personnel; 4.
implement other actions and remedies deemed appropriate.
Prior to discussing the four contentions used as a basis for the Petitioner's request for show cause proceedings, I will cover three broad issues raised by the Petitioners, i.e., the sufficiency of the Licensee's entire operations quality assurance program, 2) the applicability of operations quality assurance program deficiencies to construction, and 3) the many specific points raised by the Petitioners regarding the inspector qualification problem identified at the Callaway Plant ih early 1985.
Sufficiency of the Licensee's Operations Quality Assurance Program The Petitioners argue broadly that the Licensee violated not only regulations and their Final Safety Analysis Report commitments regarding inspector qualifi-cations, but possibly regulations (a) pertaining to:
i' s
I
P
- 1) ensuring conformance of materials and systems to specifications; 2) ensuring accurate inspection of materials and systems; 3) identifying and correcting l
r defective material and equipment; 4) documenting tests and inspections; 5) pro-
-l viding sufficient organizational freedom of persons and organizations performing quality assurance functions or providing direct access of such personnel to levels of management as may be necessary to identify quality problems, initiate, recommend or provide solutions, and to verify implementation of solutions;
- 6) verifying the proper functioning of the quality assurance program by auditing;
- 7) assuring testing of structures, systems, and components important to safety to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety function I
to be performed; and 8) establishing a quality assurance program to provide l
l adequate assurance that structures, systems, and components important to safety
]
will satisfactorily perform their safety functions.
These arguments seek to j
i bring the adequacy of the Licensee's entire operations quality assurance program into question.
I hava relied on an Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Decision on the Callaway Plant (b) in reaching my decision on the Petitioners' broad contentions regarding the sufficiency of the Licensee's operations quality assurance progra'.
Under evaluation of similar contentions, that Decision m
- observed,
[i]n any project even remotely approaching in magnitude and complexity the erection of a nuclear power plant, there inevitably will be some construction defects tied to quality assurance lapses.
It would there-fore be totally unreasonable to hinge the grant of an NRC operating license upon a demonstration of error-free construction.
Nor is such a result mandated by either the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the Commission's implementing regulations.
What they require is simply a finding of reasonable assurance that, as built, the facility can and will be operated without endangering the public health and safety.
42 U.S.C SS 2133(d), 2232(a); 10 C.F.R S 50.57(a) (3) (1).
Thus, in examining claims of quality assurance deficiencies, one must look to the implication of those deficiencies in terms of safe plant operation.
(a) 10 CFR Part 50 Appendices A and B.
(b) Union Electric Company (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-740, 18 NRC 343 (1983).
l i
Obviously, this inquiry necessitates careful consideration of whether all ascertained construction errors have been cured.
Even if this is estab-lished to be the case, however, there may remain a question whether there has been a breakdown in quality assurance procedures of sufficient dimensions to raise legitimate doubt as to the overall integrity of the facility and its safety-related structures and components.
A demonstra-tion of a pervasive failure to carry out the quality assuran mightwellstandinthewayoftherequisitesafetyfinding{g)iprogram Applying those principles in examination of the arguments raised by the Petitioners, I found that although there were some quality assurance program deficiencies,(b) the deficiencies did not amount to a pervasive breakdown in the operations quality assurance program.
Applicability of Operations Quality Assurance Program Deficiencies to Construction The information relied on by the Petitioners in preparing their arguments involved an operations quality assurance program problem which the Licensee was (a) Id. at 346 (footnote omitted).
12,))]i (b) See Inspection Reports 50-483/85012 dated [to be completed by RIII] and 50-483/85002 (DRP) dated April 1, 1985.
8 I
6
\\
investigating.
The Petitioners speculate that violations similar to those contended to have occurred during operation of the Callaway Plant may have possibly occurred during its construction.
It is important to make a distinction between the construction and preoperational testing quality assurance program and the operations quality assurance program.
The quality assurance program for construction of the Callaway Plant was developed and implemented by the Constructor, Daniel Inter-national Corporation, with oversight and audit by the Licensee.
The pre-N operational testing program was managed by Licensee personnel but continued codr,W\\
using the Constructor's program and personnel.
The operations quality assurance program has been developed and is being implemented by the Licensee and has been applied to systems since 1983, as they were turned over to Union Electric Nuclear Operations.
Given these differences between quality assurance program development and implementation during construction and operation of the Callaway Plant, there seems to be no distinct nexus between the inspector qualification problem discovered under the operations quality assurance program and the inspector qualification activities which occurred under the construction and preoperational testing quality assurance program.
Further, the quality assurance program for construction and preoperational testing of the Callaway Plant was inspected a number of times by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
At no time during such inspections did the Commission conclude that the program was implemented other thart in a satisfactory manner.
In particular, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Construction Appraisal Team Inspection report concledes that "the overall QA program at the Callaway Plant is functioning in a satisfactory manner."(a)
(a)
Inspection Report 50-483/82-03 dated June 15, 1982, p. 5, paragraph A.
10 CFR 2.206(a) requires the Petitioners to set forth the facts that constitute the basis for their request.
The Petition provides no facts that support the assertion that there could have been an inspector qualification
~
problem during construction of the Callaway Plant.
Absent such facts, I need not, and will not, pursue action on violations alleged to have occurred during construction of Callaway Plant.
Consequently, the arguments to be set forth in this Decision on the alleged violations by the Licensee will address the operations phase of the Callaway Plant only.
Specific Points Raised by Petitioners Regarding the Inspector Qualification Problem Identified at the Callaway Plant in Early 1985 The Petition raises many specific points regarding the inspector qualification problem which the Licensee identified at the Callaway Plant in early 1985 and as covered in the March 1985 newspaper articles.
During the period January 20 through May 27, 1985, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's resident inspector S
conducted inspections, including follow-up on an allegation he received on February 5, 1985, concerning procedures not being followed in the certification of Level III quality control inspectors.
The inspector's investigation of the allegation included examination of the problem covered in the newspaper articles.
In view of the fact that there are two inspection reports (*) which substantially document the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's findings on the inspector qualifi-cation problem discussed in the articles as well as the allegation, and since the Petitioners raise no new facts which were not already known to the Nuclear Regu-QQ (a) 50-483/85012 (DRP) dated [to be completed by RIII] and 50-483/85002 (DRP) dated April 1, 1985.
.g.
latory Commission as a result of its investigations of the allegation received, I see no benefit in or need to undertake a new investigation which addresses each of the Petition's specific points regarding the inspector qualification problem at the Callaway Plant.
It is important, however, to address the Petitioners' major concerns to determine whether, taken individually or as a whole, they constitute a pervasive breakdown in the Licensee's operations quality assurance program.
A.
Licensee's failure to comply with quality assurance regulations and guidelines regarding proper training of quality assurance personnel The Petitioners argue that NRC regulations and the Licensee's policy man-dated that quality control personnel be certified as meeting specific training, education and technical standards in order to insure [ sic] competent and accu-rate safety inspections and testing.
They further argue that contrary to such, the Licensee has permitted some number of quality control inspectors, including several individuals in supervisory capacities, during both construction and operation of the Callaway Plant, to conduct inspections and testing for which they were not qualified by Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements, Licensee policy, and industry standards.
For operation,of the Callaway Plant, the Licensee is committed to Regula-tory Guide 1.58 Revision 1 (9/80) for Licensee quality control personnel or 7
contracted quality control personnel performing inspection, examination, and testing activities at the plant.
For other personnel performing inspection, examination, and testing activities, the Licensee is committed to Regulatory Guide 1.8 Proposed Revision 2 (2/79).
The following exceptions to these regu-latory guides were taken by the Licensee, reviewed by the staff, and found to be acceptable:
l l
1.
Where quality control personnel do not meet the education and experience recommendations [ emphasis added] of ANSI N45.2.6-1978 as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.58 Revision 1, the Licensee will demonstrate by documented results of written examination and evaluation of actual work proficiency that such personnel have comparable competence.(a) 2.
Personnel responsible :for directing or supervising safety-related preopera-tional and startup tests and for review and approval of safety-related pre-operational and startup test procedures or results will meet Regulatory Guide 1.8 Proposed Revision 2 and ANSI /ANS-3.1-1978 but will not be certi-fied.(b)
The staff position in Regulatory Guide 1.58 Revision 1 relates that an accept-able way of complying with Commission requirements with regard to the qualifi-cation of inspection, examination, and testing personnel is by implementing, with some additional provisions, the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6-1978 and American Society for Nondestructive Testing Recommended Practice No. SNT-TC-1A (1975), the latter applying to nondestructive testing inspectors.
One additional provision of Regulatory Guide 1.58 Revision 1 which is pertinent to this discus-sion relates to the education and experience recommendations of ANSI N45.2.6-1978.
Position C.6 of the guide indicates, in part, that a commitment to follow Regu-latory Guide 1.58 Revision 1 indicates that the recommendations provided in I
Section 3.5 of ANSI N45.2.6-1978 will be followed unless acceptable alternatives are provided to the Commiss_ ion. Consequently, the Licensee's commitment, includ-l
(
i ing their exception to Regulatory Guide 1.58 Revision 1 described above, would permit deviation from the education and experience recommendations of ANSI N45.2.6-1978.
Such deviations would be expected to be adequately documented per l
(a)
Snupps-C Final Safety Analysis Report, p. 3A-18.
(b)
Ibid, p. 3A-1.
the Licensee's commitment.(a) It should be noted that N45.2.6 contains no re-quirement for qualification and certification of individuals who only supervise inspection, examination, and testing.
An exception to this is that qualification of personnel involved in directing or supervising safety-related preoperational and startup tests and reviewing and approving safety-related preoperational and startup procedures or results should be in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.8.(b) Neither Regulatory Guide 1.8 nor the national standard it endorses however, contains formal certification requirements for these individuals.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's follow-up investigation (c) of the allega-tion received from a Licensee employee on procedures not followed in the certi-fication of Level III quality control inspectors identified two Licensee viola-tions of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B requirements.
One violation involved the Licensee's failure to adhere to a quality control procedure requirement in that the plant manager's signature was obtained on the letters of certification for three assistant quality control supervisors rather than the signature of the certified Level III inspector as prescribed.
This violation was identified and corrected by the Licensee.
In accordance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's policy to encourage licensee initiative in self-identification and correction of problems and since'this violation met all the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, a cita-tion was not issued for this failure to comply with a procedural requirement.
~
(
(a)
Snupps-C Final Safety Analysis Report, p. 3A-18.
(b)
See Position C.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.58 Revision 1 (9/80).
(
2h (C)
See Inspection Reports 50-483/85012 dated [to be completed by RIII] and 50-483/85002 (DRP) dated April 1, 1985.
f
The second violation concerned the failure of the Licensee's quality control program and procedures for operations to provide adequate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria relative to the qualification and certification of quality control inspectors in the following areas:
f 1.
work experience used to satisfy experience and education requirements.
2.
documented evaluation of actual work experience.
3.
guidance for formal training.
4.
determination of initial training.
This lack of appropriate criteria for determining qualifications for the purpose of certifying inspectors resulted in certification of a number of inspectors in areas where their qualifications were questionable.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a Severity Level IV Notice of Violation for the Licensee's violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B requirement that procedures have appro-priate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria.
The Commission's inves-tigation verified that the Licensee has taken prompt and thorough action to cor-rect this violation and to prevent its recurrence.
The Licensee's corrective action has included (a) developing qualitative and quantitative acceptance cri-teria and revising' applicable procedures appropriately; (b) identifying all past i
andpresentoperationsinspectors,re-evaluatingtheirqualificationjtothe newly developed acceptance criteria, and identifying those inspectors having questionable qualifications, i.e., those inspectors whose qualifications did not measure up to the new acceptance criteria; (c) reviewing all operations in-spection and maintenance work orders to identify those involving questionably qualified inspectors; (d) evaluating the inspection activities performed by questionably qualified inspectors to determine the safety significance of those in:pectien: and to verify that the work performed was within the capability of
1
\\
13 -
i i
~
i the inspectors, and reinspecting, by audit, several of the more complex inspections; i
and (e) revoking or limiting the certification of inspectors not qualified accord-ing to the new criteria.(*) This violation of regulation was identified by the Licensee and was given prompt high-level attention.
Timely and adequate action j
has been taken to correct the violation and to prevent recurrence.
The Nuclear Regulatory. Commission's investigation shows that the Licensee's
- corrective action on the identified violations is adequate.
There are no indications that the deficiencies in this single area of the Licensee's quality assurance program demonstrate a pervasive breakdown of the entire program.
Institution of show cause proceedings pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(a) is not warranted.
B.
Licensee's failure to comply with regulations requiring the Licensee to j
continually verify that its quality assurance program is functioning l
effectively and in accordance with regulations I
j The Petitioners argue that 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B requires the Licensee to carry out a comprehensive system of planned, periodic audits to verify i
compliance with all aspects of their quality assurance program and to determine l
the effectiveness of the program on an ongoing basis.
They further argue that the Licensee's failure for at least four years to identify the inspector qualification pr'oblem reflects deficiencies in their verification and auditing programs and a violation of their legal responsibility to verify proper functioning of the quality assurance program.
10 CFR Part 50 Appendix.B does require licensees to institute a comprehen-l sive system of planned and periodic audits land to regularly review the status i
3I
(*) See Inspection Report 50-483/85012 dated [to be completed by RIII].
l I
y
--~se n
w,.,-
w w--
,---,,.-v,--
- -- - =,
.m.,-E,.
,-w_-,,
..m w,,-'v1 w
v, vn.- r w-- w
and adequacy of the quality assurance program.
The Licensee is committed (a) to Regulatory Guide 1.33 Revision 2 (2/78) which endorses with additional pro-visions ANSI N18.7-1976/ANS-3.2.
Section 4.5 of ANSI N18.7-1976 requires audit of all safety-related functions within a period of two years (b) and that, as a minimum, audits verify compliance with and effective implementation of procedures; regulations; license provisions; programs for training, retraining, qualification and performance of operating staffs; as well as other areas.
Further, the Licensee is committed to Regulatory Guide 1.144 Revision 1 (9/80) which endorses ANSI /ASME N45.2.12-1977.
ANSI /ASME N45.2.12-1977 specifies in part(c) that objectives of the audit program are to determine that a quality assurance pro-gram has been developed in accordance with specified requirements and to verify by examination and evaluation that the quality assurance program has been imple-mented.
Section 17.2.18 of the Snupps-C Final Safety Analysis Report states that the Licensee's audit system includes the performance of audits and surveillances (surveillances other than those required by plant technical specifications) by the Quality Assurance Department.
It permits performance of surveillances by other than Quality Assurance Department personnel and requires no unique person-g nel qualificatiohs'and certification except that individuals performing surveil-l (a)
Snupps-C Final Safety Analysis Report, p. 3A-6.
(b)
Section 6 of plant Technical Specifications also requires auditing of activ-ities required by the operations quality assurance program in order to meet 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B requirements at least once per 24 months.
ANSI N18.7-1976 does require auditing of some program areas at an increased frequency,.none of which are pertinent to this discussion.
(c)
See ANSI /ASME N45.2.12-1977, Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
lances be familiar with the area being surveilled and the applicable implementing procedures on surveillances.
Auditors, however, are qualified in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.146 (8/80).(a) Further, the Final Safety Analysis Report in-dicates that through investigation, the audit program will determine the adequacy of and adherence to established procedures, instructions and licensing require-ments and effectiveness of implementation.
The Licensee's commitments to Regulatory Guides 1.33, 1.144, and 1.146 and their description of their audit program to meet the requirements of Criterion XVIII of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B were reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission staff and found to be acceptable.
Although the Licensee began implementing the quality control portions of the operations quality assurance program in 1981, full implementation of the program began on January 1, 1984, 162 days prior to fuel loading.
In the Commission's view, full implementation of the program marked the beginning of the two year audit interval during which all safety-related functions must be audited.
During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's investigation of the allega-tion received from a Licensee employee on procedures not followed in the certi-fication of Level III quality control inspectors, however, past and current quality assurance audits and surveillances relating to inspector qualifications and certifications were reviewed to evaluate previously identified deficiencies and to assess the Licensee's corrective action.
This investigation revealed the following:
(a)
See Snupps-C Final Safety Analysis Report, p. 3A-32.
1.
Quality Assurance Audit (a) in April-May 1981 - identified an item rela-tive to the absence of quality control certification ' letters and training records in the quality assurance record files.
This audit did not identify any procedural deficiencies relative to inspector qualification and certification.
Review of the Quality Assurance Department's follow-up of the response to this audit find-ing on records indicated that acceptable action had been taken.
2.
Quality Assurance Surveillance (b) in January 1982 - included a review of the quality control training program and the certification of quality control inspectors. The surveillance did identify some certification records deficiencies, but did not identify any procedural deficiencies.
Review of the corrective action taken by the Licensee revealed that although the records deficiencies were cor-rected, the cause of the deficiencies was not addressed.(c) 3.
Quality Assurance Audit (d) in September 1983 - included an evaluation of the ANSI N45.2.6 capability level of inspectors in the Test Program Surveil-lance Group which provided quality control inspections during preoperational testing.
The audit determined that the inspectors' qualifications were accept-able.
(a)
Quality Assurance Audit Report No. OQA-0009.
(b)
Quality Assurance Surveillance Report No. 8201-02.
(c)
Criterion XVIII of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B requires determination and correction of the cause of @ *ficant conditions adverse to quality to prevent recurrence.
(d)
Quality Assurance Audit Report No. A8309-4.
4.
Quality Assurance Audit (a) in August 1984 - included an evaluation of the qualifications of quality control's nondestructive examination inspectors and identified no discrepancies.
5.
Quality Assurance Surveillance (b) in February and March 1985 - encom-passed a complete review of the qualifications and certification of all past and present operations quality tontrol inspectors prompted by an allegation received by the Quality Assurance Department from a Licensee employee that procedures were not followed in the certification of Level III quality control inspectors.
The Licensee's corrective action is discussed in Section A above.
In the staff's view, the problem with inspector certifications was identi-fied, investigated, and corrected by the Licensee while executing the licensed commitments on quality assurance program audits within the prescribed timeframe, and there is no evidence provided by the Petitioners or otherwise discovered that indicates that the Licensee's audit program has not functioned effectively.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's investigation (c) in this matter shows that institution of show cause proceedings pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206(a) is not warranted.
C.
Licensee's failure to comply with regulations requiring the Licensee to institute and maintain a quality assurance program that provides adequate adequate frbedom to identify quality assurance problems and to initiate and implement solutions kN (a)
Quality Assurance Audit Report No. [to be completed by RIII).
(b)
Quality Assurance Surveillance Report Nos. 8502-09A and 8502-098.
{g (c)
See Inspection Reports 50-483/85012 dated [to be completed by RIII] and 50-483/85002 (DRP) dated April 1, 1985.
t
Contrary to the requirements of Criterion I of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B that persons and organizations performing quality assurance functions have sufficient authority and organizational freedom to identify quality problems, to initiate, recommend, or provide solutions, and to varify implemen'tation of solutions, the Petitioners argue that despite numerous complaints to super-visors by quality control inspectors concerning inadequate training of quality control personnel, Licensee management did not act upon the complaints for an extended period of time and undertook an audit only after a disgruntled inspec-tor took the matter directly to the Quality Assurance Department.
The Licensee has committed (a) to providing sufficient organizational freedom to ensure proper identification and resolution of safety problems.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's review of the Licensee's commitment, organiza-tional structure, and reporting arrangements found no conditions which might prevent or hinder freedom of Licensee employees to identify quality assurance problems and to initiate and implement solutions.
During the allegation follow-up investigation, the inspector held interviews i
with inspectors and quality assurance personnel regarding the issues raised by i
the Petitioners.
This investigation revealed the following:
1.
Licensee inaction for an extended period of time on numerous complaints i
by quality control inspectors concerning inadequate training could not be
{
l substantiated.
The inspector found that all inspectors interviewed indicated
)
i that they had received adequate to very good training.
k f
(a)
Snupps-C Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 17.2.1, p. 17.2-3.
Rg (b)
Inspection Report 50-483/85012 dated
, p.
[to be completed by RIII).
i
2.
Complaints to quality control management about improper certification of inspectors could not be substantiated.
However, it was substantiated that concerns were raised to the Quality Assurance Department regarding certification of assistant quality control supervisors in late January 1985 which did prompt an investigation of those concerns.
The Nuclear Regulatorp Commission's investigation has found no viola-tions of regulation in this area.
Institution of show cause proceedings pursuant 10 CFR 2.206(a) is not warranted.
D.
Licensee's failure to comply with regulations which require direct access by quality assurance personnel to levels of management necessary to effectively provide quality assurance at the Callaway Plant Contrary to the requirements of Criterion I of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B that irrespective of organizational structure, the individuals assigned the responsibility for assuring effective execution of any portion of the quality assurance program at any location where activities subject to 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B are performed shall have direct access to levels of management as may be necessary to perform this function, the Petitioners argue that a memo-randum issued by the quality control supervisor in March 1984 discourages access to higher levels of management and reveals that the Licensee does not provide sufficle'nt organizational freedom or direct access to ensure proper identification and solution of safety problems.
The Licensee has committed (a) to providing sufficient organizational free-dom to ensure proper identification and resolution of safety problems.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has reviewed the Licensee's commitment, organiza-(
(a)
Snupps-C Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 17.2.1, p. 17.2-3.
t
(
tional structure and reporting arrangements and found no conditions which might prevent or hinder direct access to such levels of management as may be necessary to perform the function of assuring effective execution of any portion of the
~
quality assurance program.
During the allegation follow-up investigation, the inspector held interviews with Licensee inspectors re'garding this issue.
It was not substantiated that the quality control supervisior's March 4, 1984 memorandum on effective communi-cation was viewed by inspectors as a method to discourage access to higher levels of management.
The inspectors interviewed expressed support of the memorandum's subject and related discussions, and did not view the memorandum as a discourage-ment to contact with upper management, the Quality Assurance Department, or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.(a) 1 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's investigation has found no violations of regulation in this area.
Institution of show cause proceedings pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206(a) is not warranted.
f CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, none of the issues identified by the Petitioners in their filing or in their additional views warrant the initiation of cr.:r::(::.uf8.
59%) A.. proceedings.
Further, on the basis of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's inspections to date, I decline to pursue additional independent investigation of the issues.. Accordingly, Petitioners' request for action (a) j[]((
Inspection Report 50-483/85012 dated
, p.
[to be completed by RIII].
21 -
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is denied.
As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary for the Commission's review.
The Petitioners' request for other investigations or actions is also denied.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Dated at Bethesda, Maryland
~
this day of
[ month]
1985.
1 e
l l
i
~ _ _ _
fDhb Multiple Addressees Distribution MM.
DQAVT Reading QAB Reading JMTaylor, IE RHVollmer, IE BKGrimes, IE GTAnkrum, IE WDAltman, IE Malloy, IE LRWharton, IE HRDenton, NRR GHCunningham, ELD ESchristenbury, ELD JLieberman, ELD JGKeppler, RIII BABerson, RIII GWright, RIII JFSuermann, RIII BHLittle, RIII (Ref:
EDO #000523)
IE: QAV: pal l IE: QAVT:QAB IE:DQAVT:QAB:C IE:DQAVT:D Malloy:g WDAltman GTAnkrum BKGrimes 12 / 3 /85
% /85 06/ /85 6(/ /85 Y
1 1
f s
1
?
Multiple Addressees Distribution DCS 016 DQAVT Reading QAB Reading JMTaylor, IE RHVollmer, IE BKGrimes, IE GTAnkrum, IE
'WDAltman, IE MMalloy, IE LRWharton, IE HRDenton, NRR GHCunningham, ELD ESchristenbury, ELD JLieberman, ELD JGKeppler, RIII BABerson, RIII' JFSuermann, RIII BHLittle, RIII
' (Ref:
EDO #000523)
Concurrence
- IE:DQAVT:QAB
- IE: DQAVT:QAB I
AVT:QAB:C.
imes.
I DQAVT:D MMalloy:hmc
- WDAl tman krum 09/ /85 09/ /85 9 0/85 09//3/85
- See' previous concurrences 4
n m -
we