ML20135F800
| ML20135F800 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 03/07/1997 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135F798 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9703140125 | |
| Download: ML20135F800 (2) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES y
S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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\\, * * * * * [l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 4001
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 221 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR
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AND AMENDMENT NO.197 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-69 BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY j
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT N05. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318 i
1.0 INTRODUCTION
i By letter dated August 1, 1996, the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, the
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licensee for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. I and 2, applied for an amendment to the Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69.
l The proposed amendment would modify the Technical Specification (TS) requirements to allow use of blind flanges during Modes 1-4 in the Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2 Containment Purge System instead of the two outboard 48-inch l
isolation valves. The licensee indicated that the proposed changes provide a more reliable means of containment isolation for the two associated containment penetrations with no significant risk to public health and safety.
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2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION 4
The containment purge system is a part of the containment ventilating systems i
designed to " provide a suitable environment for equipment and personnel with a maximum amount of safety and operating ' convenience" (final, safety analysis report, Section 9.8). The purge system operates only during the plant j
shutdown and refueling modes (Operational Modes 5 and 6).
The current i
configuration contains two air-operated, 48-inch butterfly valves, one inside the containment (inboard) and one outside of the containment (outboard),
located in the supply and exhaust ducts. During power operations (Modes I to j
- 4) the valves are in the " fail closed" position, with power supply disconnected. When entering Modes 5 and 6, the valves power supply is restored and the purge system becomes active.
The modification planned by the licensee will replace the two outboard i
containment isolation valves with testable blind flanges during 31 ant Operational Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The blind flanges will form tle containment pressure boundary for the penetration during these modes of operation. The blind flanges to be installed have a double, concentric, 0-Ring surface with provisions for testing, and are-designed in accordance with the applicable 1
i ASME Code and Standards for the containment purge system. Testing would be performed by pressurizing the annular volume formed between the double O-Rings, the blind flange and the weldneck mating flange attached to the 4
containment penetration sleeve.
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a The only credible leakage path for the affected penetration would be past the 0-Rings into the secondary containment which has a filtered discharge to the plant vent. The flanged penetrations would be tested in accordance with the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J testing requirements for Type B penetrations incorporating resilient seals. The resilient 0-Ring seals in the blind flanges would not be subject to the mechanical forces which degrade the resilient seals of the 48-inch valves. With the blind flanges installed and tested, the isolation valves will no longer be required for containment isolation. Therefore, because the blind flanges are not subject to mechanical forces causing degradation and because the flanges would be tested in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J requirements, the staff finds the change acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Maryland State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 47975). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
A. Drozd Date: March 7, 1997
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1 DATED:
March 7, 1997 AMENDMENT NO.221 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-53-CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 AMENDMENT NO.197 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-69-CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 2 Docket File PUBLIC PDI-1 Reading S. Varga, 14/E/4 S. Bajwa S. Little A. Dromerick OGC G. Hill (2), T-5 C3 C. Grimes, 013/H15 A. Drozd ACRS L. Doerflein, Region I cc:
Plant Service list l
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