ML20135E231
| ML20135E231 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/15/1996 |
| From: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135E228 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-96-077-C, SECY-96-77-C, NUDOCS 9612110107 | |
| Download: ML20135E231 (7) | |
Text
AFFIRMATION VOTE
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RESPONSE SHEET TO:
John C.
Hoyle, Secretary FROM:
CHAIRMAN JACKSON CERTIFICATION OF TWO
SUBJECT:
SECY-96-077 EVOLUTIONARY DESIGNS Subject to attached comments Approved X
Disapproved Abstain Not Participating Request Discussion COMMENTS:
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SIdNATURE Release Vote
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November 15, 1996 DATE Withhold Vote
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4 Entered on "AS" Yes X
No 9612110107 961209 PDR COMMS NRCC
. CORRESPONDENCE PDR
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON'S VOTE ON SECY 96-077 l
I approve the two final rules that amend 10 CFR Part 52 to certify the U.S.
l Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) and System 80+ designs subject to revisions to the final design certification rules and statements of consideration in accordance with the recommendations provided in Mr. Taylor's memorandum to the Commission dated August 13, 1996 and as supplemented by October 21, 1996, subject to the following comment:
I disapprove the inclusion of the new applicable regulations as identified in Section 5(c), and instead approve the inclusion of the attached language in the statement of considerations and certification rules.
I believe inclusion of this language is important to ensure that the level of safety embodied in these designs and that the Commission is certifying is not eroded significantly over time.
Further, I cannot support the extension of the special backfit provisions of 52.63 to technical specifications and other operational requirements as suggested by the industry, because to do so would result in a degree of finality wholly disproportionate to the actual extent of the underlying safety review.
Also, and equally important, we may need flexibility to consider imposition of different operating conditions in the future to maintain the level of safety given the severe restraints on our ability to change the designs.
Therefore, I support the staff's position to create a special category in the design control document (DCD) where technical specifications requirements would be set forth.
In addition, I approve a revised Section 8(c) of the rule that would apply to technical specifications and other approved operational requirements in the DCD, and that would provide for use of 52.63, only to the extent the design is changed, and use of 2.758 and 50.109 to the extent an NRC safety conclusion is being modified or changed but no design change is required.
Further, I agree with both the industry and the staff that after the COL is issued, the technical specifications in the DCD would be subject to the backfit provisions in 50.109.
I also believe the Commission should defer consideration of specific design certification renewal procedures until after the Commission has approved the final design certification rulemakings.
I agree with both the NRC staff and industry that the design certification rulemakings have resulted in a substantial base of information, which will then be augmented by development of design details ("First of a Kind Engineering") as well as construction and operating experience if the design certification is referenced in a combined license application.
Therefore, the renewal review should start with the information base developed in the initial certification rulemaking, and should be directed at determining whether new information (including new operating experience with these and other designs) would materially and substantially affect (per Section 52.59) the Commission's safety determinations in the initial design certification rulemaking with respect to the acceptability of the standard design.
Therefore, I support the inclusion of language for the statements of consideration as provided in Mr. Taylor's memorandum to the Commission dated October 21, 1996.
The staff as a matter of priority should conform the final design certification rules to the changes'as noted above, and forward them to the f
I Federal Register.
I have requested the staff to provide the Commission with a l
the schedule in which this can be completed.
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I ILanguage in Statement of Considerations]
While it is the Commission's intent in 10 CFR Part 52 to promote standardization and design stability of power reactor designs, standardi::ation and design stability are not exclusive goals. The Commission recognized that there may be special circumstances where it would be appropriate for applicants or licensees to depart from the certified designs. However, there is a desire of the Commission to maintain standardization across a group of reactors of a given design. Nevertheless, Part 52 provides for changes to the certified standard designs in carefully defined circumstances, and one of these circumstances is the option provided to applicants and licensees referencing standard designs to request an exemption from one or more elements of the certified design. 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1). The certified design rules reference this provision for Tier 1 and include a similar provision for Tier 2. The criteria for NRC review of requests for exemption from Tier 1 and Tier 2 in the proposed certification rules are the same as those for NRC review of rule exemption requests under 10 CF3 Part 50 directed at non-standard designs, except that Part 52 requires consideration of an additional factor for Tier 1 exemptions - whether special circumstances outweigh any decrease in safety that may result from the reduction in standardization caused by the exemption, it has been the practice of the Commission to require that there be no significant decrease in the level of safety provided by the regulations when exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 are requested. The Commission believes that a similar practice should be followed when exemptions from one or more elements of the standard design are requested, that is, the grant of an exemption under 10 CFR 50.12 or 52.63(b)(1) should not result in any significant decrease in the level of safety provided by the design (Tier 1 and Tier 2). The exemption standards in sections 8(a)(4) and 8(b)(4) of the design certification rules have been modified from the l
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, proposed rules to codify this practice.
I in adopting this policy the Commission recognizes that these two standard designs not only meet the Commission's safety goals for internal events, but also offer a substantial i
overall enhancement in safety as compared, generally, with the current generation of operating power reactors. See, e.g. NUREG-1503 at 19.1. The Commission recognizes that the safety enhancement is the result of many elements of the designs, and that much but not all of it is reflected in the results of the PRAs performed and documented for them.
In adopting a rule that the safety enhancement should not be eroded significantly by J
exemption requests, the Commission recognizes and expects that this will require both l
careful analysis and sound judgment, especially considering uncertainties in probabilistic risk assessment and the lack of a precise, quantJied definition of the enhancement which would be used as the standard. Also, in some cases scientific proof that a safety margin a
has or has not been eroded may be difficult or even impossible. For this reason it is appropriate to express the Commission's policy preference regarding the grant of i
exemptions in the form of a qualitative, risk informed standard, in the section of the design certification rules relating to " processes for changes and departures," and inappropriate to express the policy in a quantitative legal standard as part of " additional applicable regulations" in the design certification rules.
There are three other circumstances where the enhanced safety associated with these two designs could be eroded: by design changes introduced by vendors at the certification renewal stage; by operational experience or other new information suggesting that safety margins believed to be achieved are not in fact present; and by applicant or licensee design
. changes under the "50.59 like" processes for changes to Tier 2 only. In the first two cases 10 CFR Part 52 limits NRC's ability to require that the safety enhancement be restored, unless a question of adequate protection or compliance would be presented or, in the case of renewals, unless the restoration offers cost-justified, substantive additional protection. Thus, unlike the case of exemptions where a policy of maintaining enhanced safety can be enforced consistent with the basic structure of Part 52,in the case of renewals and new information, implementation of such a policy over industry objections would requir? changes to the basic structure of the Part. The Commission has been and stillis unwilling to make fundamental changes to Part 52 since this would introduce great uncertainty and defeat industry's reasonable expectation of a stable regulatory framework.
Nevertheless, the Commission on its part also has a reasonable expectation that vendors and utilities will cooperate with the Commission in assuring that the level of enhanced safety believed to be achieved with thase designs will be reasonably maintained for the period they are in effect (including renewtIs).
This expectation that industry will cooperate with NRC in maintaining the safety level of the standard designs applies to design changes suggested by new information, to renewals, and to "50.59 like" changes, if this reasonable expectation is not realized, the Commission would carefully review the underlying reasons and, if the circumstances were sufficiently persuasive, consider the need to reexamine the backfitting and renewal standards in Part 52 and the "50.59 like" criteria for Tier 2 changes in the certified design rules. At this time there is no reason to believe that cooperation will not be forthcoming and therefore no reason to change the regulations. With this belief and stated Commission policy (and the exemption standard discussed above), there is no need for " additional
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1 applicable regulations" to be embedded in the design certification rules since the objective 1
of the " additional applicable regulations" - maintaining the enhanced level of safety -
should be achieved without them.
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[New language for Certification Rules)
Add the following sentence at the end of sections 8(a)(4) and 8(b)(4):
"The Commission will deny a request for an exemption from [ Tier 1] [ Tier 2] if it finds that the design change will result in a significant decrease in the level of safety otherwise provided by the design."
i AFFIRMATION VOTE i
RESPONSE SHEET TO:
John C.
Hoyle, Secretary FROM:
COMMISSIONER ROGERS
SUBJECT:
SECY-96-O'/7 - CERTIFICATION OF TWO EVOLUTIONARY DESIGNS so nic7 r.
Approved
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Disappro' -d Abstain m
Not Participating Request Discussion i
COMMENTS:
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DATE Withhold Vote
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Entered on "AS" Yes x
No 9612110112 961209 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
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l COMMISSIONER ROGER 8' COMMENTS ON SECY-96-0772 1
l I approve the two final rules that amend 10 CFR Part 52 to certify the U.S. G.E. ABWR and C.E. System 80+ designs subject to revisions a
I to the final design certification rules and statements of consideration in accordance with the recommendations provided in i
i Mr.-Taylor's memorandum to-the Commission dated August 13, 1996, i
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and as supplemented by his memorandum of October 21, 1996, subject l
to the following comments:
1.
I disapprove the inclusion of Section 5(c)
Applicable
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j Regulations.
I concur with the Chairman's comments on this subject and approve the language attached. to her vote for i
inclusion in the statements of consideration and the i
certification rules.
2.
I approve the staff's position with respect to the status of l
operational requirements in the design control document (DCD).
I concur with the Chairman's position approving a revised i
l Section 8(c) of the rule that would apply to technical-specifications and other approved operational requirements in the DCD.
I agree with the staff position that the technical specifications should be treated as a special category of i
information in the DCD that is under 2.758.
After the COL is issued, the technical specifications in the DCD would be l
subject to the backfit provisions in 50.109.
Design changes i
would still be covered by 52.63 backfit provisions. These are all positions approved in the Chairman's vote on this issue with which I concur.
3.
I concur with the Chairman's position that the Commission j'
sho11d defer consideration of specific design certification i
renewal procedures until after the Commission has approved the i
final design certification rulemakings.
I also support the l
inclusion of language covering this matter in the statements of consideration as provided in Mr. Taylor's memorandum to the l
Commission dated October 21, 1996.
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I AFFIRMATION VOTE RESPONSE SHEET d
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John C.
Hoyle Secretary of the Commission l
FROM:
COMMISSIONER DICUS i
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SUBJECT:
SECY-96-077-CERTIFICATION OF TWO EVOLUTIONARY DESIGNS
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Approved X w/ comments Disapproved Abstain j
Not Participating Request Discussion I
COMMENTS: See attached.
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DATE Withhold Vote
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Entered on "AS" Yes X
No
Comm. Dicus comments to SECY-96-077 The staff should be commended for its efforts in bringing these two certification design rulemakings to closure. Their diligence over the years in identifying, addressing and resolving technical, procedural and policy issues with industry representatives will result in what I believe will be a more stable regulatory framework for the licensing of future reactors.
I appiove the certification of the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor and CE System 80+ Evolutionary Designs as described in SECY-96-077 subject to the revisions recommended in memoranda from the EDO to the Commission dated August 13, and October 21,1996, with the exception of " Applicable Regulations" as noted below.
1.
With respect to " Applicable Regulations", I disapprove the inclusion of Section 5(c)" Applicable Regulations." Rather, I favor the inclusion of language in the SOCs and certification rules that would preserve the design features and level of safety of these evolutionary de signs, as expressed in and attached to, the Chairman's comments.
2.
With respect to extending finality to Technical Specifications and other operational requirements in the DCDs, I support the staffs position, and the Chairman's comment on this issue. There are many requirements in the Technical Specifications and the Design Control Documents which may be relevant to both design and operational considerations, but were reviewed in detail only with regard to their relationship to design. Therefore, I agree it is not appropriate to apply the special backfit provisions of @52.63 to the Technical Specifications or to operational requirements that have not received a comprehensive safety review.
3.
With respect to renewal applications, I find it inappropriate to extend finality to the certification renewal proceeding. The renewal proceeding should not be subject to the special backfit provisions of @52.63, it is my belief that the staff does not intend to perform a de-novo review of the entire design in its evaluation of a certification renewal application, but rather, to focus on proposed design changes and new information or insights gained from the time of certification. Therefore, I support the staffs approach to include language in the SOC that addresses this issue as prc /ided in the EDO's October 21,1996 memorandum to the Commission. I also agree that the scope of, and procedures related to renewal reviews be deferred until after the Commission has approved the final certification design rulemaking.