ML20135E202
| ML20135E202 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1997 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135E182 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9703060352 | |
| Download: ML20135E202 (3) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
WASHINGTON D.C. 3066Ho01
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION d
BfdATED TO AMENDMENT NO.154 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-19.
AMENDMENT NO. 149 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-25.
AMENDMENT NO.173 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-29 4
AND AMENDMENT NO.169 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30 COMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY l
E MIDAMERICAN ENERGY COMPANY DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNITS 2 AND 3. AND OUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-237. 50-249. 50-T:5( AND 50-265
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated December 6,1996, Comonwealth Edison Company (Comed, the licensee) proposed changes to revise the requirements to allow a single control rod to be moved when the plant is in the HOT SHUTDOWN or COLD SHUTDOWN condition provided that the one-rod-out interlock is OPERABLE and the reactor mode switch is in the Refuel position. The requested changes would revise a footnote in Technical Specification (TS) Table 1-2, "0PERATIONAL MODES," and the Applicability statement of TS 3.10.A and its corresponding footnotes.
2.0 EVALUATION The TS currently permits a single control rod in the HOT or COLD SHUTDOWN conditions to be recoupled or withdrawn. This is done by placing the reactor mode switch in the Refuel position, provided the one-rod-out interlock (which limits withdrawal to one rod) is operable.
Permission for recoupling or withdrawal is provided in a footnote to the reactor mode switch MODES 3 and 4 position requirement statements in TS Table 1-2.
The licensee has proposed that the words "recoupled or withdrawn" in this footnote be replaced with
" moved." This change would provide permission for the movement of a single control rod in these operational conditions for purposes other than withdrawal or recoup 14ng, e.g., for venting and scram time testing.
There is currently no TS required surveillance related to the rod withdrawal permitted for OPERATIONAL MODES 3 and 4 in Table 1-2.
The licensee proposes to augment the Applicability statement of TS 3.10.A to include MODES 3 and 4 9703060352 970304 PDR ADOCK 0500 7
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1 with a footnote stating "When the reactor mode switch is in the Refuel position." This change would extend the applicability of the appropriate testing requirements for the one-rod-out interlock to OPERATIONAL MODES 3 and 4 when the mode switch is in the Refuel position.
1 The proposed change to Table 1-2 is similar to existing approved TS Table 1-2 l
specifications in other BWR reactors (e.g., Clinton, Grand Gulf, LaSalle, Perry and River Bend). These were either in the initial TS or the result of apprnved changes similar to those proposed by Comed.
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Since control rod movement is blocked when the mode switch is in either SHUTDOWN position, movement of the switch to Refuel (or to Startup or Run) is necessary to move a rod for recoupling or any other purpose.
When the mode switch is in the Refuel position, the redundant logic of the one-rod-out interlock limitt rod movement to one rod.
Because of the required shutdown margin with one control rod fully withdrawn, there is reasonabin v surance that the reactcr will remain subcritical with the mode switch in th2 Refuel position.
The proposed change to TS Table 1-2 does not change the current permission to withdraw a single control rod in OPERATIONAL MODES 3 and 4, but it does expand the permitted testing and maintenance activities for withdrawal. While this will increase the frequency of single control rod withdrawals in OPERATIONAL MODES 3 and 4, the probability of withdrawal events is not affected since these events would occur in OPERATIONAL MODES 1, 2, or 5.
Maintenance and testing on control rod drives are currently allowed for all BWRs in OPERATIONAL MODES I and 2 (Startup and Power Operation, respectively),
where these activities are not under the control of the one-rod-out interlock, as well as in OPERATIONAL MODE 5 (Refueling).
The proposed change to TS 3.10.A provides appropriate surveillance of the one-rod-out interlock in OPERATIONAL MODES 3 and 4, as it currently does for OPERATIONAL MODE 5.
This change necessitated footnote identification changes.
However, footnote (c) was not marked-up in Sections 4.10.A.2 and 4.10.A.3 on page 3/4.10-1 for Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2, to indicate the footnote identification change from (c) to (d) as shown at the bottom of the page.
This was inadvertently missed on the mark-up, but was appropriately addressed in Attachment A under " Description of the Proposed Change."
The factors discussed above indicate that the proposed change to TS Table 1-2 is consistent with previous Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff approvals and existing TS for other BWR reactors, provides for needed maintenance and testing of control rods, is not significantly different from currently permitted control rod withdrawal operations, and does not increase the probability of a control rod withdrawal event.
The proposed change to TS 3.10.A provides additional and appropriate surveillance requirements for control rod withdrawal in OPERATIONAL MODES 3 and 4 not currently required for permitted withdrawals for control rod recoupling.
Therefore, the staff
' concludes that the proposed changes to the Dresden and Quad Cities TS are acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Comission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no coments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located witnin the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public coment on such finding (62 FR 2187). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Comission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
Robert M. Pulsifer Date: March 4, 1997 s