ML20135C045

Partially Withheld SECY-93-216, Enforcement Action Incomplete & Inaccurate Plant Records

ML20135C045
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/02/1993
From:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
Shared Package
ML20135B759	List: ML20135B755 ML20135C003 ML20135C045
References
FOIA-96-351 SECY-93-216, SECY-93-216-C, NUDOCS 9703030318
Download: ML20135C045 (24)

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...'% Tc POLICY ISSUE August 2, 1993 SECY-93-216 -

(NEGATIVE CONSENT)

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! From: James M. Taylor I

Executive Director for Operations i

l Subiect: ENFORCEMENT ACTION RE: INCOMPLETE AND INACCURATE PLANT RECORDS l

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POLICY ISSUE -

August 2, 1993 SECY-93-216 (NEGATIVE CONSENT)

Z2E: The Commissioners ZIma: James M. Taylor f Executive Director for Operations Subiect: ENFORCEMENT ACTION RE: INCOMPLETE AND INACCURATE PLANT RECORDS EMIR 919:

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ENCIDSURE 2  ;

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1. b', ug%*g .. UNITED STATES .

[ q .NUCt. EAR RESULATORY COM*.il!SION .l l: .

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! REGION 1 -

4 Q, 475 ALLENDALE ROAD I KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 1MD6-1415 ,

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MEMORANDUM FOR: James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement l ,

FROM

Edward C. Wenzinger, Chief '

Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects  !

i Region I l i t

! John R. White, Chief  ;

Reactor Projects Section 2A  !

Division of Reactor Projects Region I i

l SURIECT: DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEW: j ENFORCEMENT FOR AUXILIARY AND EQUIPMENT

OPERATORS, AND FIREWATCHES RELATIVE TO' i- ' FALSIFICATION OF RECORDS 4

1 i- In response to your memorandum on this subject, dated May 28,1993 (Attachment 1) we have

the following comments

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1. We accept the recommendations of the i%t-panel assigned to review our

! Differing Professional View (DPV) dated April 1,1993 (Attachment 2), as expressed in the memorandum to you from Jack W. Roe, dated May 24,1993 (Attachment 3). In this matter, the panel recommended that enforcement discretion be exercised for all plants, including Salem / Hope Creek. We believe that the panel's recommendations effectively,

(1) stressed the significance of all safety and safeguards related activities without drawing

i. a distinction between routine and compensatory rounds, (2) eliminated the gross

. inconsistency in the application of enforcement action for activities involving similar

misconduct and performance at other plants, and (3) in view of limited NRC resources, l demonstrated a balanced, fair, and effective approach in expressing the agency's concern i and directing licensees' attention to the inadequate management oversight that permitted so many instances of misconduct to occur.

2. We do not agree with your rationale for continuing to pursue enforcement relative to

! Salem / Hope Creek. While the case may have presented the " opportunity to emphasize the role of compensatory measures...in the area of fire pivisciion", we believe that the agency's response in this matter should be based on more than reacting to the perception that "[f] ire protection is a major issue of the day". 'Ihe principal issue is the potential adverse affect on safety that is implied in instances involving lack of integrity on the part j,

i of licensee employees and contractors, and the inadequate management oversight that b

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JUN 0 31993 2

s permitted such conditions to exist and be unnoticed. Pursuing enforcement action for the Salem / Hope Creek fire watch issue could obfuscate the general purpose and focus of the NRC's concern in this area (i.e., the falsification of plant records).

Further, for the same reasons that you identify that enforcement action is not warranted or compelled by the Enforcement Policy for all other instances of falsification of activities by licensed operators or licensee employees, it is evident to us that enforcement acdon is not warranted or compelled in the case of Salem / Hope Creek. Using the same rationale, a stronger case of enforcement discretion could be made for Salein/ Hope Creek.

As our supplement to the DPV (Attachment 4) noted, in the Salem / Hope Creek case, the matter was detected, investigated, analyzed, ==<awi, documented, and eve.cted by the l licensee without any essential input from the NRC. Aggressive disciplinary action was taken, and several causal factors, including elements involving human performance, were identified.

In this case, the licensee demonstrated a high level of professional performance and self-

==<< ment that was fostered and inspired, we believe, by NRC's policy of enforcement i

discretion. However, by doing so, the licensee produced a readily ps.ckaged enforcement case that required very little NRC effort to take advantage of as an enforcement action.

Had PSE&G been less aggressive and effective, it is likely that the licensee could be one of the many others for which relief from enforcement action is granted.

Our understanding of the purposes of enforcement i.e., ensuring safety by effecting

~ compliance with NRC regulatory requirements, obtaining prompt correction of adverse conditions, deterring future occurrences or violations, and encouraging improvement in licensee performance, is already realized in the case of Salem / Hope Creek. l Consequently, the necer.sity of implementing enforcement action in this case is unclear to us, particularly when compared to the numerous other misconduct and performance  !

matters that we are not contemplating pursuing as enforcement cases.

We continue to believe that the performance and veracity of NRC-licensed and non-licensed operators (who are expected to directly observe, monitor, and verify the status and condition of safety-related equipment) is at least as important as that of fire watch personnel (who provide compensatory action to detect fires, that may, if not extinguished or controlled, eventually affect the operability of safety-related equipment). Unlike firewatch personnel, operator surveillance rounds are expected to detect and effect resolution of deficiencies (e.g., inoperable equipment, misaligned valves, and off-normal conditions) that could directly and immediately affect safety-related systems and

. components.

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. 3. Given this disagreement, Management Directive 10.159, " Differing Professional Views or Opinions", requires that we submit this matter as a Differing Professional Opinion i (DPO). In view of the fact that a Commission Memorandum will be developed relative to this enforcement action, we believe that a DPO appears redundant and ina-a=ry.

l However, we request that the Commission Memorandum contain a summary of the DPV 1 issues and the results of the agency's review of the matter and that a copy of the DPV, .

l the DPV panel recommendation, your May 28,1993 response, and this memorandum be attached to the Commission package. If this is accomplished, we will be satisfied with

. the execution of the DPV process. Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

i l 0 l Edward C. enzing J R. White, Chief  !

i Reactor Projects B tor Projects Section 2A Division of Reactor Projects Division of Reactor Projects Region I Region I i

! Attachments As Stated i

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T. Martin, RI

! W. Kane, RI i~ J. Wiggins, RI i J. Roe, NRR T. Johnson, RI l

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. L UNITED STATES

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• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSlCN j g WASHINGTotJ. D.C. 20EE54001 g, -

MAY 2 81993 MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward C. Wenzinger, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Region I j John R. White, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2A .

I Division of Reactor Projects Region I l FROM: James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement -

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SUBJECT:

DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEW:

i ENFORCEMENT FOR AUXILIARY AND EQUIPMENT OPERATORS, AND FIREWATCHES RELATIVE TO FALSIFICATION OF RECORDS I

This is in reference to your April 1, 1993 Differing Professional View (DPV) which has been referred to me for review and decision.

This DPV arises out of the NRC inspection results obtained from l the performance of TI 25*3/115, verification of Plant Records.

t The evaluation of those findings by the Office of Enforcement (OE) identified approximately 30 sites which had found at least one falsified plant record. In considering what enforcement action should be taken, OE noted that each licensee had identified the falsified logs and taken appropriate corrective action, including disciplinary action against the individuals i

involved and broader programmatic changes where appropriate.

[ Therefore, enforcement discretion was originally proposed for l each site with the exception of Salem and Hope Creek.

For the Salem and Hope Creek site, it was noted that the numerous fire watch rounds were falsified by a contractor. Because this case involved a broad failure to adequately implement a required compensatory measure and the NRC had previously issued a $50,000 civil penalty to TU Electric (EA 91-015) for a similar fire protection problem, OE recommended that we not exercise enforcement discretion but rather apply the normal enforcement process.

A draft Generic Letter was subsequently prepared to inform licensees of the results of the NRC inspections and remind licensees and individuals involved in licensed activities that 4 -

the NRC may take direct enforcement action against not only the licensee but also any individual who deliberately causes a licensee to be in violation of NRC requirements. The draft Generic Letter noted that the NRC was concerned not only with l

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i record falsification, but also with management's responsibility to assure that required compensatory measures are fully carried

, out. In addition, a draft memorandum was prepared for the t

commissioners since broad discretion was to be proposed for the logging issues.

On April 1, 1993, you sent a memorandum to Mr. Thomas Marti..,

i Region I Administrator, outlining your DPV on this proposed course of action. In that memorandum, you noted that the Region I staff originally proposed to utilize discretion for the l Sales / Hope Creek case in order to be consistent with the agency's  !

approach to the other falsification issues; the region subsequently modified its proposal to issue without an l enforcement conference a Severity Level III violation without a l civil penalty in deference to the TU Electric case discussed abovet and, the region was subsequently requestad to table its proposal in favor of holding an enforcement conference, which could result in a civil penalty for the Salem / Hope Creek i licensee. An enforcement conference with the Public Service  ;

Electric and Gas Company management was held on April 6, 1993.  !

Based on the application of the Enforcement Policy, a Severity i Level III violation without a civil penalty was proposed. This is the current proposal which has been placed on hold as a result  !

of the DPV. l l

You asserted that this latter action would now be inconsistent l I with established policy and that either enforcement discretion be exercised for all the cases or if enforcement action is taken l against salem and Hope Creek, then enforcement action may be appropriate in some of the other instances of misconduct even though additional NRC resources may'be required to evaluate and l process the cases. Finally, you stated that it appears to be unreasonable to consider a more severe action for a case involving contracted fire watches falsifying their rounds in contrast to NRC-licensed operators or other licensee technical personnel engaged in similar misconduct.

On May 11, 1993, a DPV Panel was held to review the original staff position and to hear your views on the matter. By l memorandum dated May 24, 1993, the DPV Panel presented their recommendation for my consideration. In summary, those recommendations included: (1) issue a modified generic letter that emphasizes the facility licensee's responsibility for stressing personal accountability and the fact that the NRC considers all types of watch standing, whether routine or compensatory, to be significant, (2) exercise enforcement

! discretion for all plants, including those involving compensatory i fire watch issues, and (3) issue separate letters to senior

!. licensee management of each utility which had a plant with i numerous violations to stress the NRC's concern with the apparent

i. extent of the problem at those plants.

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The major issue of the DPV is the apparent distinction drawn between the safety importance of the various positions at a

. nuclear plant. The DPV Panel did not recommend drawing a sharp distinction between the responsibilities of those personnel that i carry out compensatory measures and those personnel that carry

, out other safety and safeguards responsibilities. The panel I

believes that the safety responsibilities of all plant staff and contractors are important to the safe operation of the nuclear

l power plant. Diligence and attention to detail are important for all positions to meet defense-in-depth for the safe operation of 4 the plant. A missed round by an auxiliary operator can be as safety significant as a missed round by a firewatch conside* ring the circumstances. Drawing a distinction with the enforcement i

actions for these cases may be read by the staff and the industry

as drawing a distinction between the safety importance of the i positions. Considering the facts of all the cases of falsified records at the numerous plants, the panel did not see the sharp j safety distinction that has been drawn and believes that this j

distinction will be misunderstood by the staff and industry.

i The DPV was helpful in causing us to rethink this issue. Our j initial review focused only on the Salem / Hope Creek problem due

to the previous TU Electric escalated action. As a result, a j broader review identified the apparent fire protection problem at j j WNP-2 which is also being considered for escalated enforcement I i action. The Perry case also had a fire protection issue, but it f- was clearly an isolated case.

j I understand your concerns and the basis of the DPV Panel's i recommendations. As you are aware, the enforcement process i reflects a balancing of policy issues and judgements. In j developing the OE position, the views of the fivo regional

Division Directors, NRR, and the Region I Administrator as well 2

as the Deputy Executive Director for Operations were considered.

However, the position that this was an opportunity to emphasize the role of compensatory measures, especially in the area of fire protection, was adopted. This was considered important due to the thermo-lag issue and its associated need for compensatory measures. Although the Salem / Hope Creek case did not involve thermo-lag, it did involve a programmatic failure to adequately implement compensatory measures for inoperable fire barriers and degraded fire detection systems.

While the DPV appears to focus on the issue of individual {

misconduct and integrity and distinguishing different positions, i.e., fire watches and operators, the enforcement actions were not intended to focus solely on falsifications. It was not the intent to distinguish the level of integrity needed for different  ;

, positions. Nor did we intend to suggest that logging is not i important or that the role of a licensed operator is less {

_ significant than that of a fire watch. Notwithstanding the special legal relationship NRC has with licensed operators, each

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individual involved in nuclear activities must perform at a high level.of integrity. There is not a graded approach to integrity.

Failures by individuals in different positions can impact safety such that each person involved in a safety function plays an important role in the overall safety performance of a licensee.

If resources were unlimited, we would take enforcement action' against each' licensed operator and each utility that had employees falsifying records. However, such action in my view is not warranted nor compelled by the Enforcement Policy. It is my understanding that the NRC does not have the specific evidence and procedures, etc., to support this action for each licensed operator, nor do we have it for each logging violation. In addition, the data we have for each plant may not be consistent in scope and depth across all licensees. Importantly, the involved licensees have dealt with the integrity issue. The various failures were found not by NRC but by licensees, in many cases demonstrating good initiatives prior to NRC involvement.

In fact, our inspections did not find significant logging failures. Licensees have taken various disciplinary actions against the individuals involved, including in some cases, severe action against the licensed operators. Regional management appears to be satisfied that in each case licensees took appropriate actions to prevent recurrence and provided appropriate messages that falsification will not be tolerated in their licensed activities. Therefore, I continue to be of the view that given the resources needed to complete the actions for these cases, it is not inconsistent with the goals of the Enforcement Policy to exercise discretion in these cases. In my view the exercise of discretion in these cases will not suggest to the industry or its employees that wrongdoing will be tolerated by NRC.

A generic letter, after the required notice to the Commission concerning the exercise of discretion for the integrity issue, should be sufficient to provide licensees with the standard of NRC's expectations for the future. I would also agree with the recommendation of the DPV Panel that a separate letter should be sent to the senior management of each licensee that had a programmatic problem as well as those cases involving licensed operators because of our special relationship with them (see attachment 1).

However, I remain of the view that enforcement action is appropriate for the failure to assure that compensatory action was properly implemented. This is a management issue. While the root cause of the logging falsifications may in part be management of day to day activities, the issue in the two enforcement cases is that management failed to assure that the firewatch rounds compensating for known problems were properly performed.

Better oversight could have identified the issue.

There is a clear distinction between logging activities and

5 operators are lookisig for potential problems while in the other ,

case a fire watch is compensating for a known problem.

Fire protection is a major issue of the day. We have relied on effective firewatch programs to compensate for failures to meet fire protection requirements. Many licensees are relying on fire watches as a justification for continued operation. Recently Salem has had to expand its reliance on firewatches because of questions with insulation. It has always been my view that we should use enforcement to provide regulatory messages consistent with the agency's safety mission. This is an opportunity to provide a regulatory message to emphasize the importance of compensatory measures and firewatches. Therefore, consistent with our safety mission enforcement is appropriate since in the two cases management did not assure that required compensatory measures were taken for known problems with degraded safety ]

s systems. l I recognize that some may argue that the approach may be inconsistent for the two issues. However, I believe that these actions will make it clear that neither falsification of logs or failures to take compensatory actions are acceptable. Both in the future may result in violations of the wrongdoer rule and action against licensees.

In sum, after carefully considering your views, I intend to i continue to process these enforcement actions. The Commission '

memorandum will be modified consistent with this memorandum. If you desire, I will be pleased to attach your DPV, the DPV panel recommendations, and this memorandum. Please let me know your desires by June 4, 1992 so that we can proceed on this matter.

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James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement

Enclosure:

As stated cc: J. Sniezek,DEDR T. Martin, RI J. Partlow, NRR J. Roe, NRR J. Luehman, OE R. Blough, RI I

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ATTACMMENT 1 PLANTS WITN LICEN8ED OPERATOR 8 OR POTENTIAL PROGRAMMATIC PROBLEMS (MORE THAN 7 FAL8IFIED RECORD 8)

1. Salem and Hope Creek Firs watch rounds falsified by 19 of 35 personnel.

2. Indian Point 3 25 of 30 non-licensed operator-interviewed admitted to falsifying rounds.

3. Millstone 1-3 6 licensed operators and 19 non-licensed operators falsified rounds.

4. Nine Mile 1 & 2 1 licensed operator and 17 non-licensed operators falsified rounds.

5. Seabrook 3 licensed and 14 non-licensed operators falsified rounds.

6. Vermont i licensed operator and 2 non-licensed operators falsified rounds.

7. Maine Yankee 2 non-licensed operators with 9 and 11 record falsifications.

8. Turkey Point 7 non-licensed operavors falsified rounds.

9. Callaway 3 non-licensed operators falsified 14 rounds.

10. Perry 3 non-licensed operators and 2 fire watches falsified 9 records.

11. PVNG8 28 non-licensed operators falsified rounds.

12. KNP-2 20 of 39 non-licensed operators falsified rounds, 6 of which involved readings and the rest were fire watches.

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7"% ATTACHMENT 2 UNITED STATES j , ~/ b't NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION

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REG 80N I I 475 ALLENDALE ROAD i l KING oF PRU$stA, PENNSYLVANIA 1s408-1415

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APR 011993 l

MEMORANDUM POR: 'Ihomas T. Martin, Regional Administrator I il .

Region I I FROM: John R. White, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2A j Division of Reactor Projects j Region I l Edward C. Wenzinger, Chief

] Reactor Projects Branch 2 j Division of Reactor Projects l Region I i

! SUBTECT: DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEW:

! ENFORCEMENT POR AUXHJARY AND EQUIPMENT

] OPERA'IORS, AND FIREWA'ICHES RELATIVE 'ID FALSIFICATION OF RECORDS l

} 'Inc Office of Enforcement (OE) review of the results of TI 2515/115, Verifkation of Plant ,

j Bagnals revealed a number of instances of record falsification have occurred involving many i NRC-licensed reactor facilities. 'Ihe attached enclosure pertains. 'Ihese findings indicate  ;

, apparent serious integrity issues involving NRC-licensed personnel and other licensee employees l 4

, and contra. tors. 'Ibe fact that this problem ranges across all regions and involves so many '

tiranw personnel, supports that this situation is neither recent, isolated, or anomalous. Further,

it is possible that the results of this 'II may be only hinting at the true extent of the problem.

L 'Ihe root cause(s) for such widespread misconduct, among so many personnel (including NRC-j licensed operators) is not obvious. While some licensee's may have performed some root cause

! analysis (e.g., Public Service Electric and Gas Company: Salem and Hope Creek Generating l Stations completed an extensive and comprehensive review to determine causal factors and i

.l weaknesses that led to fire vatch misconduct), other licensees may not have adequately analyzed j the occurrences for causal facwes. It may be that these numerous examples are only symptoms 2

of a more complientad problem, ni may be related to the nature and management oversight of

'! the affected activities. For exam'>le, in the case of the Salem / Hope Creek firewatches, the l licensee discovered many causal factors, including, (1) significant weaknesses in the training and j indoctrination process provided to new employees, (2) poorly communicated performance l Wh that were not clarified or reinforced, and (3) the low-self esteem and image that the

many of the employees had of themselves and their job. .

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j_ Compounding this problem is NRC's inconsistent approach to resolve the enforcement questions j that these findings generate. Currently, a Generic I. meter (GL) has been pW that essentially l

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$- raea-al= the extensive nature of the problem (as revealed by the results of TI 2515/115);

reiterates the .rJ.cMises of 10 CPR 50.5 and 50.9 relative to deliberate misconduct, and the i completeness and accuracy of information; and references prior communication involving j Information Notice 92-30, Palsincation of Plant Records. 'Ihe GL indientas that each instance j was evaluated (case by case) for enforcement action; and that for each case it was found that the j limaaan took appropriate corrective action to adequately address program wa=Lamana= and

- discipline involved personnel. 'Ihe GL indicates that the NRC does not intend to take any j

enforcement action for these matters. Such exercise of discretion may be appropriate if j sufficient bases exist. However, we understand that the .yy!!cd.sc of discretion was likely 4 decided in an effort to conserve the NRC resources that would otherwise have to be expended j to evaluate and process the numerous cases that were involved. Though the conservation of j limited NRC resources has merit, such consideration does not appear to within the botinds of 1 established NRC Enforcement Policy.

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'Ihese cases reveal elements of: (1) breakdown in the control of licensed activities involving numerous related or recurring violations which indicate inattention or carelessness toward

licensed re.f~rsibilities; (2) failure' to conduct adequate oversight of vendors (contractors) l resulting in defective services or indeterminate quality of those services; or (3) incomplete or j inaccurate information pwided to, or required by, the NRC due to inadequate actions on the i part of the licensee. 'Ihese problems have varying Aw of safety significance. Additionally, l there may have been willful personnel misconduct in some of these cases. Any of these 4

elements would normally be sufficient bases to pursue some type of enforcement action,

! particularly since all of these elements are at least a Severity I4 vel III concern (acw. ding to 10 j CFR 2, Appaa* C), and none obviously fit within the parameters established for the exercise j of discretion allowed by the current enforcement policy. 'Ihe policy regarding exercise of j discretion (as specified in 10 CFR 2 Appendix C, Section VII) is ...*to ensure that the resulting

enforcement action appropriately reflects the level of NRC concern regarding the violation at 1 issue and conveys the appropriate rnessage to the licensee." As we understand this, when the 1 i

act is of lesser significance, a lesser penalty may be elected, not withstanding the normal i guidance contained in the policy.

l 1 We question...does such action " appropriately reflect the level of NRC concern," and does it

" convey the appropriate message to the licensee"? The answer is not readily apparent in our

! view. 'Ihe GL, while . acknowledging the fact that serious misconduct has already occurred j indicates the intent to take no enforcement action over a broad spectrum a cases, i.e., from

falsification involving NRC-licensed operators, to falsification involving contracted fire watch j personnel. Is it reasonable for us (NRC) to ignore the apparent willful misconduct and lack of j management oversight hacenae it may involve the additional expenditure of NRC resources?

3 Such reasoning is not easily racaarilahle with a regulatory basis and foundation that relies upon ,

] the integrity of the licensee, its employees and contractors. I i-

, Potential inconsistency in the agency's reasoning is involved in the proposed treatment of Public j Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G): Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations. In j-t this particular case, the misconduct of firewatches is apparently exempted from the " general l

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• granted to all other licensee by the proposed GL. We have indications that enktM l enforcement action is contemplated in the Salem / Hope Creek case.

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The Salem / Hope Creek case was originally proposed by the Region I staff to utilize discretion

(in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy) to be consistent with the agency's chosen

} approach to the other falsification cases, i.e., the misconduct is acknowledged but no enforcement action is planned. Upon later discussion with OE, the region modified the proposal j as a Severity Ievel III-without Civil Penalty, in recognition of PSE&G's inability to successfully

resolve a similar matter that was previously referred to their attention; and in deference to a

! similar situation, previously identified at Comanche Peak, in which a $50,000 civil penalty was

issued. However, since the submittal of this latest proposal, the region has been requested to 1

table that proposal in favor of pursuing an enforcement conference with the possible obtcome 1 of a civil penalty. Such a decision appears inconsistent with the GL's freedom from enforcement allowed to all other licensees that revealed similar deficiencies, particularly when some of those cases involved record falsification by NRC-licensed personnel. Amplification of this concern i is attache .

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! In summary, our view is that:  ;

j (1) 'Ihe agency's actions should be consistent with established policy, and be consistently  !

applied. Since diversions from the implementation of established policy are pe==ahly are l occurrences, such occasions should be sufficiently justified, articulated and explained, {

particularly to those who are required to implement policy.

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(2) Enforcement action may be appropriate in some of these instances of misconduct, even  !

though additional NRC resources may be required to evaluated and process the cases. I Enforcement action should be taken, where required, to obta*cadequate root cause analysis and sufficient corrective actions to prevent recurrence. '

We appreciate the opportunity to express our concerns on this matter. However, we are

! prepared to act in accord with the agency's direction relative to this igue, i

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! ohn R. White, Chief ward C. i er, i Reactor Projects Section 2A Reactor Project Branch 2 i

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- Enclosure As Stated 4 _

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Attachment As Stated f

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I W. Kane, DRA  ;

J. Wiggins, DRP i D. Holody, EO  !

W. Lanning, DRP - '

E. Wenzinger, DRP J. White, DRP T. Johnson, DRP-Salem / Hope Creek

S. Barr, DRP-Salem / Hope Creek S. Pindale, DRP-Salem / Hope Creek -

l K. Lathrop, DRP-Salem / Hope Cmek l.

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t i ATTACHMENT

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i AMPIR1 CATION OF CONCERNr SALEM / HOPE CREEK ENFORCEMENT ACTION VS. AIA p11tER SIMIIAR ISSUES l

The prob lpms of apparently falsified fhe watch rounds has been well documented by the Salem / Hope Creek liemaw, PSPAO, in their October 28,1992 investigation report. PSPAG l' performed a comprehensive investigation of missed / falsified fire watch rounds after one of their contracted fhe watch supervisors personally observed the deliberate misconduct of a round by a contracted firewatch. The NRC has reviewed this report and has found no substantive l deficiencies relative to the licensee's analysis, evaluation, assessment, and corrective actions.

4 This is a positive contrast to the licensee's effort to review an allegation that the NRC referred

! for their review about 2 years ago. In that particular case, the tiemanae concluded that the matter

was unsubstantiated, but failed to develop a sufficient bases for their conclusion.

l l In the most recent investigation, the licensee found that some fire watch rounds were either

! falsified or misconducted by several contracted fire watch personnel who were servicing the l Salem and Hope Creek sites. Deficiencies were found in the performance of about 19 of the l 35 assigned firewatch gw.id. In all these cases, appropriate corrective and dielpli y i actions were taken by the licensee. Nineteen personnel were subsequently terminated frorn i employment. We note that similar instances of fhewatch misconduct were also identified at Pierry and WNP-2.

I Fire watch personnel are generally employed to frequently verify the status of WMally

. assigned plant areas (in which there are inoperable fire barriers or fire heian/ suppression j equipment) to assure that the area is free from fire or the potential of fire. The personnel are l instructed to inform approprhte licensee personnel when fire, the potential for fire, or other j problems are detected. Fire watch personnel guarally take no action, except as allowo4 by j basic general employee training, to suppress or extinguish small fhes or smoldering materials.

They are not trained or qualified to operate or affect the operation of any plant equipment. In

most cases, their essential function is to notify NRC liceanari personnel in the control room in the event of a detected fire or other problem. It is the responsibility of trained and qualified liceaaaa personnel to res90nd to the problems that are reported by fire watch personnel.

l Training for fire watch per w .r4 is gene: ally minimal and traditionally consists of General

! Employee Training and some on-the-job training on the performance and documentation of l firewatch rounds. No special educational or experience is required. Usually the personnel are j hired from the local community. Thejob is not very intellectual or demanding, is often tedious,

and can be unrewarding.

I l In comparison, NRC licensed and non-licensed operations, maintenance, and technical personnel 1 are generally responsible for the inspection, surv.in.nc, and verification of operational status i of safety-related equipment and other important to safety components, structures, and equipment.

l- For example, these personnel are trained and qualified to recognize valve and electric circuit j - breaker positions, instrument readings, equipment condition, equipment status, the presence of i~ unusual noises, elevated temperatures, vibrations, etc., and evaluate the as-found conditions l

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' against WAad acceptance criteria. 'Ihey may also be called on to use theirjudgement, based I on training and experience, in identify and sport potential afety problems. such penannel m required to respond to off-normal conditions in Essdess with their training and applicable ,

procedures. 'Ibe selection, qualification, and training of such permannel is speci8ed by NRC l t license conditions, plant technical pr= dons, or ifcensee comsplenwars 'Ihe required l

qualification and training of NRC licensed operators, and consequently the Pdons of their gio.e.ers far exceeds that of 5:e watch personnel. I.icensed operators train as non-licensed j operators, typically for 4-6 years before taking an NRC license examination. Many NRC

' licensed operaton are college graduates; and many have engineering Qis.

J i In view of this comparison, it is not clear why the same action that the Generic Istter proposes j for all other comparable cases involving the falsification of records or misconduct of

! performance, should not be also directed for the Salem / Hope Creek situation. 'Ibe fact that a j more severe action is being considered for a case of contracted firewatches falsifying their rounds vs. NRC-licensed operators or other lkensee technical personnel engaged in similar j ralamaduct appears unreasonable.

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83  %# NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

$ NGION I

' g, 475 ALLENDALE ACAD KING OF PRUS$1A, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 1416 NOTE TO: Charles W. Hehl Director of Reactor Projects ,

Region I

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A. Bill Beach Director of Reactor Projects -

Region IV

l. Kenneth Perkins l Director of Reactor Projects .

Region V L FROM: William Troskoski p Senior Enforcement Specialist l~ office of Enforcement l

SUBJECT:

LOG FALSIFICATION ISSUE

The Office of Enforcement (OE) has reviewed the inspection reports

! documenting the completion of TI 2515/115 and a summary of the l findings is enclosed. This summary was discussed with Jim Sniezek j and it was his view that we should issue Severity Level III l violatiens to the outliers to emphasize the unacceptability of l record falsification. It appears that Indian Point-3, Millstone 1-3, Nine Mile Point 1-2, Seabrook, Wolf Creek, Palo Verde and WNP-2 comprise those outliers.

OE would like to setup a conference call with each of you to discuss this issue. We note that one of our options is to issue a Severity Level III NOV without a civil penalty, provided the licensees identified- the falsified logs and took adequate i corrective action. In such cases, we need not hold an enforcement l conference.

L only Seabrook and WNP-2 have clearly documented technical

! specification violations. Although the inspection reports for the other licensees indicate that there were no technical specification l violations, it is not clear to us that required records were not involved (e.g., Appendix B or Technical Specification 6.8.1 - Reg Guide 1.33 required logs) . This information would be needed to construct a 10 CFR 50.9 citation.

I will be calling you to setup a meeting.

l:

Enclosure:

As Stated

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tJNITEO ST ATES

, NUCLEAR REGULATCRY CO8WIMISSION t i 7' I

• * ' REG 80N 1

• 475 ALLENOAtE COAD KING OF PRUSSIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19e061416

?

Enclosure I

SUMMARY

- TI 2515/115, RECORD FALSIFICATION The following list summarizes each Region's findings with regeM to "

i the TI. There were no findings associated with the sites not listed.

l j REGION I ,

i Beaver Valley i non-licensed operator involved. Suspended;

facing terairation.

l Hope Creek j Salem 5 non-licensed operators suspected (claimed i either card reader problems or someone else performed rounds); 18 contractor fire watches.

l The inspection report details provided did not

reference the number of false logs nor the

! disciplinary action taken by the facilities.

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Indian Point 3 25 of the 30 non-licensed operators interviewed admitted to falsifying rounds at

, one time or another. (Licensee interviewed i NLos after first sample found 72 discrepancies i for 7 NIns.) Facility corrective action

! appears sat. Disciplinary action was limited j' to counseling and remedial training as the

. licensee viewed it.as a management problem.

Limerick 1&2 1 non-licensed operator falsified rounds.

j Counselled ahd given written reprimand.

! ,,,' Maine Yankee . ~ ~~

.2 non-licensed operators falsified round 1

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~~ '"~ records..on '9 and -H occasions;" respectively.

',~~ ' Facility corrective action appears sat;

! , disciplinary action taken.p,. .-

l Millstone 1 "6 licAnsed opera' tor's' and 19 non-licensed j ,

" operators. 2 licenses revoked and other 4 i were suspended for 4 to 6 weeks; 1 NLO was

discharged; all 25 issued letters of reprimand and 11 were suspended for periods of 1 to 30

,, days.

l_ Nine Mile 1&2 1 licensed operator and 17 non-licensed

. operaters involved. The LO and 15 NL0s were l discharged and 2 NLOs resigned.

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9, IJNITED STATES J[L

,, g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2 j CEGION I

. e f l 475 ALLENDALE ROAD '

V

• ...*g KWG of PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 1M081415 l

Enclosure i

I Oyster creek , 5 non-licensed operators involved; suspended for 5 days w/o pay. Other facility corrective l action appears sat. I seabrook 1 3 licensed and 14 non-licensed operators.

Facility corrective action appears sat.

Facility took progressive disciplinary action I depending on how chronic the problem was; rescinded several licenses.

TMI-1 1 non-licensed operator missed 1 round.

Suspended for 1 week without pay.

Vermont 1 licensed and 2 non-licensed operators involved. Each received letters of reprimand, 6 month probation, and 1 to 5 day suspensions.

REGION II l Browns Ferry 2 non-licensed operators with multiple examples, disciplinary action taken.  !

Grand Gulf 2 non-licensed operators falsified fire watch logs. I resigned and I was terminated.

Sequoyah 3 non-licensed operators, 7 instances. l Turkey Point 7 non-licensed operators, 17 discrepancies  :

identified as a result of an exhaustive I search. Appropriate corrective action. j REGION III Braidwood 2 non-licensed operators falsified 2 records.

Byron 2 non-licensed operators falsified 2 records.

I Callaway 3 non-licensed operators falsified 14 round

) records. Facility appears to have taken i

. adequate corrective action, including time of f without pay for the individuals.

Dresden 4 non-licensed operators involved in 5 instances. Facility took correct.ive action, including disciplinary. [ Licensee also found

• [sy cur 'g,

' amtTED STATES 1]

, , . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

$ $ REGION 1 l 475 ALLENDALE ROAD '

EING OF PAUSSIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19406 1415 i I

Enclosure

~

20 instances where 8 operators performed rounds. quicker then expected.- Corrective action addressing.)

Duane Arnold 2 non-licensed operators with numerous discrepancies.

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., y* , NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

$ Y e4EGION I e, f 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19406 1415

• ...*[

. Enclosure t

LaSalle .

6 non-licensed operators falsified 6 records.

Monticello Problem with Rad Protection source checks and licensee response.

Perry 3 non-licensed operators and 2 fire watch techs falsified 9 records. ,

Quad Cities 1 non-licensed operator falsified 1 record.

Zion 1 non-licensed operator with 3 instances. 2 weeks w/o pay.

REGION IV l ANO 3 non-licensed operators missed several rounds. Facility took appropriate corrective action, including giving the operators 3 days off w/o pay. .

Wolf Creek Problem with how operations Department looked at numerous problems. Misleading internal memo R IV to look at.

1 REGION V ,

j i SONGS 1 non-licensed operator, 3 days w/o pay.

PVNGS 28 non-licensed operators (1 with 16 instance!, 2 with 6, rest had 3 or less).

Progressive discipline program used; 9 were given 3 day decision making leave with 1 year probation, 18 received written reprimands.

Diablo Canyon 1 non-licensed operator with 2 instances of going to the wrong unit.

4 WNP-2 20 of 39 non-licensed operators (6 discrepancies involved ' readings, the rest were

' fire . watches) (of the fire watches, 3 operators had 20 - 40 discrepancies, 7 had 4-4 -

8, and 10 had 1-2). All 20 received disciplinary action ranging from unpaid l'

suspensions to formal reprimands.

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% UNIT W N NUCLEAR RE opAMlSS M

• c g p , 1993 i

MEMORANDUM FOR: James Lieberman, Director l Office of Enforcement t

. FRON: Jack W. Roe, Director j Division of Reactor Projects III\lV\V 1

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

RECOMENDATIONS OF DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL l VIEW (DPV) PANEL j On May 11, 1993, a DPY panel, consisting of myself, Jim Luehman of your staff, i

and Randy Blough of Region I, met in the Region I office with the submitters of the April 1,1993, DPV concerning the proposed resolution of the log falsification issue. After a short presentation on the staff's propused

resolution by Bill Troskoski, the submitters expressed their views and were

questioned by the panel members. Following the meeting the panel reconvened separately to discuss the issues and formulate a preliminary recommendation.

! The major issue of the DPV is the apparent distinction drawn between the i safety importance of different positions at the nuclear power plant. The I panel does not recommend drawing a sharp distinction between the

', responsibilities of those personnel that carry out compensatory actions (e.g.,

. firewatches) anti those personnel that carry out other safety and safeguards i responsibilities (e.g., licensed reactcr operators, non-licensed operators,

security personnel). The panel believes that the safety responsibilities of all plant staff and contractors are important to the safe operation of the nuclear power plant. Diligence and attention to detail are important for all

! positions to meet defense-in-depth for the safe operation of the plant. A l missed round by an auxiliary operator can be as safety significant as a missed round by a firewatch considering the circumstances. Drawing a distinction with the enforcement actions for these cases may be read by the staff and

industry as drawing a distinction between the safety importance of the

positions. Considering the facts of all the cases of falsified records at the

numerous plants, the panel does not see the sharp safety distinction that has d

been drawn and believes that this distinction will be misunderstood by the staff and the industry.

Based on a review of the documents relevant to this issue and the above

meetings, the recommendations of the panel are as follows

4 j 1. The proposed Generic Letter should be issued to all licensees after it is modified to stress not only facility licensee 6

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James Lieberman l l accountability for program oversight, but also facility licensee l l responsibility for stressing personal accountability. The '

l ' Lessons Learned" section of the proposed generic letter touches l on this subject, but does not contain a direct statement about the l l importance of that area to the NRC. The generic letter should l also be modified to further emphasize that the NRC considers the watchstanding duties of all departments at a nuclear power plant to be important as well as all types of rounds, whether they are routine or compensatory to be significant.

2. Enforcement discretion should be exercised for all plants, including the two facilities presently being considered for escalated enforcement because of problems w'.th compensatory j firewatch rounds. This revised approach stresses t'n significance '

of all safety and safeguards related activities of the plant staff and contractors without drawing a distinction betwetn routine and compensatory rounds that may be misunderstood by the industry and the NRC staff.

3. Separate letters should be issued by the appropriate Regional Administrator to licensee senior management'(i.e., the chief nuclear officer) of each utility which had a plant with numerous ,

individuals (by the panel's count that is seven to nine plants and I includes the two plants that were being considered for enforcement i for the firewatch issues) involved in the falsification issues.

The letter should stress the NRC's concern with the apparent extent of the problem at those plants. The panel recognizes that- l there may be a number of reasons why (as discussed in the draft memorandum to the Connission) a few plants indicated a larger l problem than the others. However, the fact remains that based on i the information available to the NRC those plants had a l'arger  ;

problem and that fact needs to be highlighted to their management.

If you have any questions on the above recommendations please contact me.

Oh -

Jack W. Roe, Director Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V cc: Jim Luehman Randy Blough Tim Martin ami

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, ,.* - ATTACHMENT 4

g j SUPPLEMENT

DIPTERING PROFESSIONAL VIEW:

! ENFORCEMENT FOR AUXILIARY AND EQUIPMENT j OPERATORS, AND FIREWATCHES RELATIVE TO j ' FAIAIFICATION OF RECORDS l, AMPLIFICATION CF ASSESSMENT OF CONSEQUENCES l We believe that the following may be consequences if the agency's original position prevails j without adjustment or mitigation:

i j The winns message will be sent to liensees, to the public, and to our own staff. 'Ihe j mcsange will be, regardless of the wording of any NRC communication that conveys

! enforcement discretion, the agency does not currently consider falsification of records or i activities by NRC licensed individuals (or others having safety significant duties) to have  ;

4 sufficient priority to justify expending resources to pursue escalated enforcement. l Further, while excluding enforcement in these matters, the agency will demonstrate grces l l inconsistency as it aggressively pursues ame=1stari enforcement against licenseen for j similar misconduct involving firewatch personnel (i.e., unlicerte:! amployees that are l

L assigned to a task requiring rudimentary skills and elemental respoesibility). Such  !

j regulatory approach is disconcerting, since NRC licensed personnel prtwmably have a l better appreciatia of the significance and consequences of their actons relative to

. potential effect on y.Mc health and safety, and are essentially holder, of the public's

{ trust for the safe operation of the nuclear facility.

l By pr==hg on this course, the agency will be damaging a regulatory process that was based on factors and attributes that promote the recognition of safety significance and demonstrate the exercise of enforcement with comistency, fairness, and equal application.

. If the NRC's approach to regulation or enforcement appears (or is perceived) to be j' arbitrary and capricious by pursuing the easy enforcement cases (as in the case of Salem / Hope Creek) and failing to pursue matters and inues that have potentially greater  ;

j safety significance but require more effort (e.g., the falsification of records and activities l j by NRC licensed g, .a.:), our credibility could be significantly diminished. We will  ;

i have failed our public trust and ourselves as safety professionals.  !

i l In the specific case of the Salem / Hope Creek firewatches, the matter was detected,

investigated, analyzed, aueeeart, documented, and corrteted by the licensee without any  !

i essential input from the NRC. 'Ihe licensee demonstrated a level of professional

! performance and self-assessment that the NRC satially inspired by our policy of i enforcement discretion. However, by doing so, the incensee produced a readily packaged

! enformment case that required very little NRC resource to develop for enforcement l

! action. Had PSE&G been less aggressive and effective, it is likely that the licensee I wouid be one of the many others granted relief from enforcement by the proposed

Generic Letter, t.

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