ML20134L132

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Responds to from Ash Requesting Updated Safeguards Plan in Areas of Erda Responsibility Suggested in 740923 OMB Ltr.Task Force Established by AEC to Determine Resources Needed to Correct Deficiencies in Protection
ML20134L132
Person / Time
Issue date: 04/04/1975
From: Seamans R
NRC
To: Lynn J
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
Shared Package
ML20134L102 List:
References
NUDOCS 9611200168
Download: ML20134L132 (35)
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Text

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..e he w n g capt. bili 1.y f e: noce t itah ..nd n. corne quencit.c n.' tear:ur :r. of nuc)ct.r rate id: in process.:dd in ster:nc es i011 ac to pcevide I C',nr 0 Vr-d t es.ittlo? 0 '

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a* ~ 3 8 i j l Mr. Janes T. Lynn i 6 j 1 s i i l 4. The capability for detecting and locating nuclear materials and for technically evaluating and rerponding to nuclear threats hac l g' been found to be in need of rapid inproven:ent by ERDA management. EPJu management har. cvaluated the identified actions in Items 1. through i

4. above.

The rer.ultn of thin evaluatica are diccunted in the encloced i ( In:hibit 1. Enclosed as Exhibit 2 in a copy of the tach force report { which identifien a total of $56.5 nillion of additional resources needed i i in FY 1976 to cr,rrect the mor.t uracut deficicncies in the current physical protection cafcanarda systema. Estimated additional funding of $2).3 uillion would be necennary to achieve the upgrading of materials control end cccountability; the addi-tionn1 reccarch and developrcat; and iuprovementn in detcetion and recponao 3 i capabilitien, or discunt.ed in Ittms 2., 3., nr.d.4. above. The threat to noc! car materiale nnd f acilitier frca t errorint viol.nca in such th:.t m nuut imprrree the ca f enen rd t. cy: tun. I cen.ider thi n upgrading to La 01' cuch pa ashm import.;nce thz.t additicual Fi 1976 funds rhould be provided fer thin effort. Therefore, 1 cm proponing l thct $7 7.8 nillion be adder! to the IT 1976 bcdget at an raacadrunt. The additional funds vill include $56.5 millica to cuaplete the correctica of the noot urgent physical protection deficiencies; $9.9 million far j cdditionoi research and de'clopment ctfucts; $7.9 million for materid s ! N; j centrol and accountability; and $3.5 million to improve our detectica i / 'and response capabilities. A detailed breakdoun of this a:r.andment is t given in Exhibit 3. .1 i The necend and third phasen in the GIB Ictter of September 23, 1974, require that E!'DA f;enerate a progran nnd define a plan for the safe-l guard:. system. Exhibit 4 presents, the current status of our progreen on thin prograa plannina for safenuards and security of nuc1 car materialn j and facilities. It contains a cchemaric representation en page 3 of the ( parts of this pre:; ram and their interrelationshipc. Establinhing prioritics and ceaducting plant-by-plant ansessments of needed improve-l l 1 ments are longer-term tanks ubich will establich the " firm and ccnprehen-j sive base" f or future safeguards action, including a cicar definition of l the Administration's cafer.uardo policy in terms of its scope, purpose, and rationale. The rapidly changing public attitudes on these matt.crs present a moving target; they will be coasidered, as desired and uccessary chano.e*: cre made in the definition of safeguards policy. Therefore, we devoleped a "r.ocietal rick" approach to safeguards t hat uill permit more systenatic priorities and c1 carer goals. e e d 4

Wr. aJames T. Lynt. .1. - p ~ 11e will hecp you informed of our progress,in defining the pronram, goals, i and prioritics needed for management, Icgislative, and budgetary actions in tiiin area. Sincerely, ($1

h., (L.). 7 M 1

,s o l \\ z}-(; Rober t C. Seamanc, Jr. g Adminintrator V Enclosuren: 1. 1bbibit 1 "Mananca!cnt Acnens-ment 0:!;i Safeguards," dated April 2, 1975 2. Ihhibit 2 "Somery Task Force Report on Phycien1 Protection Safenunrds Deficirncica," dated i.pril 2, 1975 3. Ikhibit 3 "Sa.renuc.rda l'/ 1976 Lice,d:cen t.," d., t.ed April 2, 1975 4. Exhibit 4 " Updated Progrc:m Pir.n i for 1XDA Gafe;;aards Activitics," dated April 2, 1975 ' ?&4 i l l l J 4

1 ~ ' 11.1dbit 1 4/2/75 ~ 1 l'ANAGhPI:NT ASST.SSME!TT SHl! SATEGUARDS I* The l'uergf iteccarch and Developtrent Administration has a statutory obligation to guard age. inst the diversion of specJnl nuclear caterial. In rcceat yearn thin obligation has tchen on nw djuuisionn. In the 1969's it vac a doxestic radical eleuant, but in t.hc 1970's a uorld -wide terrarJct threat. developed. In 1972 when the White Foune anhed uhether the AEC could protect S:C4 cmd } nuclear facilitica f ro:a such terrcric:::, the answer uac qualific.d. The nycteas was adequate for the nature of the progran in the environment of the than current threats but carlously in need of upgrnding for the forescc:.ble future prograta in the new threat environment. A review in 1973 and annin i in 1974 confJrmed thdr. need. i The L:cilit. ice of EPM nrn ope atin<; nade:: phynieni protectica r.ystc:re,.:1::Ich ucre :hil ment ed in the Jato 10 ': O ' < rad Ai.-h Fav i.nd er r.o ne .(- re ett it Ra in the intervuning yNrr. Cuard fcycc.o h " been irduccd in.. <xi a e' j cconomy n'caturen; icncin;; and lient.ing, alt hough given uomi ic.uater.a <cr., have deteriorated with ago. o I 1 Security technolet.:,, which han inde rap 4.d stridec :in reccot year <, h:u .n t l rcen entensive application at nuclear facilitics beenuse of a leck of f cade. g(f? rerfiaater alarm system which would pc.r dt raore ef:fective and economien1 f l, use of nuctdn have not been inctalled. A test.ing progrce has identified catisfactory Ly ster.; but a lack of f unding existo for insta]latj oa, t PHYS _7 C.A.L, PD O..T__EC_.'P_1_.0".. i, Phyof cal pro tecticn uptp:adin", unannres urgently needed at TRIV. facilities .:, identified in the Task Force Report cre described below: ~ Ucaboon racilitics 'ihe Pant e.t Plant is the meat critical EitDA facility beentse of the large concentration of complete nuclear weapons located there. It requiren additional perianter fencing, perit'eter clarni nystems, hardened guard stations, armored escort vehicles and a new security coir.aand center. Additional guards art also needed. The t otal aucunt required for upgrading Pante.x is 04,33,000. s The nerond nm.t crit iral loca t 1.u, W Nevada Test Site, also contains nuclear ucapens or hvican, c' mh nat in t.he cunntities encounterci a t Pr.n t e;:. Uccause o f the irols ten locr tion of a number of its grard stations, the "ev.ula Test. Site has an iradiate requirenent for the F

'h.hibd.t 1

  • hardening of n innber of guard stations.

Other badly needed inprove-. 1 c:enta are the arroring of escort vehic3 en, a specini encionure for transporting vcapons, night vicion devices and r.pecial guard sup. port 1 cquip:acnt. Total upgradJ ng contn, including those for additional guardc, ] ic $1,090,000. i The Los Alanos Scientific Laboratory csuer:bles complete nuclear weaponc or tent devicen for operatienn at the Nevada n.st Site. Ccmsequently, LASL has c high priority require.nent for the inctal.'ation of perir.eter alcru j vyctens, addi tional fencing, hardened guard uta; / or.n, central station r.onitorin.; equi p:.u rt, the claruing of a no :.bn of n c. ate poj uts, add.itionni ) liW, tin o, space clarran in vaulta, various v;. ult sc.odifica tions, the h cdenlun j of guard hendgrar tern er.d co.wuaicationa cent tro, and the arr.aring of cr. cort and patrol vehiclen. Tot.al coat, including additional guard force pociticas, vould bc $4,124,000. .i platn Plant contnina a hi h concentration of plutonium in venpons 'j The Rocky t part conUguratV.nc. Th r. nrrenrthen by of phy.' 11 prot ection at tha t Jocetien von'd require the i r.s t:110 t i.m o f p. / J e' c ' nra rvst eias: ;he 4 haaben # U. o f p :rd s t c t i..n, v.'r.i or:. r.r..l liira..; te e n e ;; n t J n t 01:, a r.y.t e r, the nn arJng of prcoi - Ja i c ],. a.o the c of nJl.? vin:.a dev'ecc. The tocci coat., :; o cl u.' J a n p e : 1.M o n.~. n _.l c a ro t iren".t hen 1.0 0 gund fo:ce, vould he $5,370,000. In.arovements at t he La.'rence Livczno:x Labora cery ill cost $1,745,000. The ic;uovcmenen vould include Ir.rar.ncd guard st.c cians, ni~h t vision devicce., i portel c.oriitorn, duress a3arna, perir.ter fenci: 3, arp:: red vhiclec, and ' *D. ndditional lightb g. The re.lative3y hidi priority given inprovements at i thJn site is based upon the preence of nuclen: ueapons coa.por.cnts in nufficient que.ntities to tarcrin11y aid in constrrction of a clcudentine explosive. 1 Decarne of its in.portence to the ucarons progrcr, Y--12 i s in a critical statun inno far a:. the upgrading of physical nro cet an r.s.t.cres is concerned, l! ceded corrections include the installation of cy ctrd centrols for b et.ter luternal negreg; tion, - er.ot e reonitorr, por t al.:.anitor c, int reci5n alanac an:. uca ligh tin g. In addition, modification of a grard changehouse would be required. Total coct would be $9,980,000. Cests for more guards are included in this figure. Itequire: cents at other ucapon facilitica would total $2,456,000, brin ging the total for nll ueapons facilitics to $29,14S,000. s Prod uc t ion and.1. Wen.cch W. ei li t Ica x l j Tbc Savannah River Plant has large quantitics of p3 ntonium in venpona-p.rnde forn in storage and in prece:.s; consequently, it is an attrac tive target for thef t or wLot,ge. To bring this r.ite to reasonable physical protection standarda, it reqe.iren the insta3 3atier, ci perireter alarn nystema, perir.te:

'., Exhibit 1 j t l fences, vault-type alarr:n, portal rnonitors.dnd electronic door controls. 'It is also necessary to harden a nu:ther of guard stations. Alto required are night vision devices, new reaponn, and coi=unications equipuent. Total costs, inc]uding thene involved uith t he suppler ent ing of the guard force, are $1,925,000. Oh Tne 3r.portance of the Port n:uuth Plant lien in the presence of Jarge quant.it f or of uranien in ucapons-grade forn. If the physical protection synt en in

t. be adequat.cly upgraded, Por t i.nouth requires t he installa tion of peri: net er a]are nyst em,. s unl] an perinct er fencing and lightin:f.

i A)no requir ed are cert ain bui]dian : nodi fica tions, the const ruction of vaults and the in tallation of key card controh.. Clo.:ed circuit television and part al nanitora are a]no cannidern; e cntial. The total cont for upgradinp Portunouth facilities and hiring additionn1 guards, vould La $J1,66.1 003, in cl udi ng f,,5,13 4,000 for seriously needed vaults and storage 3 facilit iet. for highly enriched uranium. 1 l The production facilition at the it'cho National Pne,ineering Laboratory i have It.r:t.1 enant; t ic. of r.pc e:ial nuclear r aterini in parential urab3 e forn. To upp eh thir, f acilit y t o t he desired ut and :rd, clor.ed circui t t e3 cv; : inn should be innt ailed at a ateriel accem. crea, port al.:nni tm n re ra ';rnd and ni D. v Nion J.iitt, are neede.l. Thi r y;.. ? i n g c oa t s for t his faci];O total $370,U00, not includin, guard conts.thich arc ine] uded c]: where fo.- the t o t:a] E i:L nit c. The Richland progrra, under the Divtcion of Praduction budget rce,uirerents, contajus Jarf,e quantitien of veapana p,rade crecial nuclear u.aterial. At tbin Richlt r.d facili ty H e j ant 111ation of perireter a!arn ayst ea.s ano icncing ,a U as ucll an periuet e: lights are required to 1: prove t he capabili ty of the cite guarda to detect intrudern. liardened guard stations, night visica devicen, guard vehicles, c3esed circuit televinion and portal i.:cnitor, nra n]so bad]y needed. Total cc:;t uculd he $2,M5,000, including.dditiond guarda. Other freilitien not descril ed.Mova include the Argenne Ea tional Lehorntory, ORN L, t b ' h.P.-1) and T W.AT reacturn, the Brenhaven b:.borat cry end Pat telle, b'est Jef ferson, an tell as the Reac tor faiety Research facili ty )cca t ed in Idaho. Yotal funds required to upgcade these locatsoan vould he in the order o f $ 10,9 22,0(1. The r ajor phynical protec tion t,ansures needed nt these faci.11tien inclu !c fencing and alart:s, ligh ts, CCTV, vanitors, and guards. 14AYr,U.1 ALS ACCOET *.MCY 1hamination of the ov< vall role o! natcrials ecocont ancy has led t o j identi fication of ndvers ary actioa nequeneca.iu.:hich accountancy iu necessary for.:feguardn and ccmp3 ret ntary to physir.n] prot ect ica. l!c.?- ever, the enisting account ancy,yntea and t he unterials measurcuent capability it cnplay:. must be n:We ue.c rapid, cc. prehennive, and prccise in detecting changea in n:nount : ef caterial on hand. These needs relate

- '.'.Ev.hib 1 L 1 4-l directly to performance objectiven for the shfcguards nyctc:n; t1e detec-l tion capability of an accountability nycten also addc deterrence against diversion f rc:a uithin. Not only would an upgraded materials accamtancy nycteu strennthen detect ion and det en rence capabilitien, but the data fro.n such a cysten could prove to ha an escential cicuent of any inventi-natory activity. 1 4.k > l Ifajor necda for upgradfun accountancy operations ucre identified at Los Alamon ScientJ fic Laborat ory ($1.2 m1331on); Rochy F1nts P] ant ($1.4 nillion); Savatusah River Plant ($2.4 saillion); and the X-PJant f or processing and st orj un plutonina ne rap and products a t IMchland ($1.0 uillion). Other needs ($1.9 t.'lljon) 1:, rc i denti ff.ed a t nin other niten. All the above siten need ninff to naenure niaterials on hand and in chiprents and to operat e accountability nynt em using the measurematn. Los Alanca ScientJ fic lehoratory har availahJ e rent of the equipn ut needed for measuremnt s and account abili ty but requiren staff, $1.0 m1311on out of 1.bc nhove $1.2 tillion total, to opera te the equipment. for i.mterialn occount abili ty purpcses. Meeds at Rocky Flat:n are primari]y f'or safenuarda inntrumen t s f or nat erJelt. reauureve: nt s and i rput-output cc,u,mter ter;ninals for union t he v s:nured W.ta Jn accennt:mcy operntiona. Tha f avannah Rhar P]not han the larg nt tine 3c need for eceipr. cut i mdo for reanu m ent 'J.24 1.11dcn our of tho ah va G.4 Hl)Jon. 'j h * : i nc ha' eq u i p.c.o n t, addJ t ioxl ) A r. t ory, c'.a d eal, aad noa-dv.tvuc t Ja.e aw..y eq ui p,aeni av.d add iilonal v..e. not enn t equ ipnwnt for n:t cria]n which are in proccan, n l.oi'a rc, or nhlpri'ut.

  • iite Z-PJ nnt, at Rich) ::n i, reeda ; he construction of an annay f acili t y for &hin g non-d? :.t ruc tive t ennuren:mtn. The prcrent rate of r.ahing vaanurmenta in too lov for periodic physica3 inven toric.s.

1:xint inn int.true.ents vill be moved to a more central location and nhieldinn l. !M uill inolate the Jnatrocents from radia tion bachnround. Additionally, u:ccurrement tinM vi)) be instal]cd at. tha Z-Plant to climinate uncertaintico in plan t t hroughput and therchy reduce dif fercuces batueen book and physi'.:al inve nto ri ca. i l yy,p q. ouy., s m. pw..n < p.....q. v s. i o To ancure the ept Ir.t v.at Jon of nefeguards annerance in return for resources expended, u.anage. cut ha s det e rnined tha t research and develop:..en't of a couprehensive synten denign r:nst be acccupE.nhed for nuclear : capons and traterials an noon as pon rlble. In thin uny, a design balance can ba i achieved ubleb vill ident ify the p.ropen nb: of barrJ ers, air.rns, guards, ucapona, ponitorn, tenc:uremento, accountancy b, lance areas, and nuvveillance. The synt em decinn most alro identify the npecific hm d.eare development ) needs. runding t o accejerat e the ren arch and development ef fort in l $9.9 million. l s a c .g i i K l .i

  • ' Exhibit 1,

a l . y DI7ECTIO:1 Aim RESP 0"sE CAPM;TLITY ~ Tne capability to find stolen nuc3ent laterials by search and detcetion techniqu:*n in not adequa re. Needed capabilitics include pre-de{ined and prc~ positioned equip.cn t for ucc in providing lau enforcetent with technicc1 acsf stance within two hourn; airborne and ground scorch equip-t./; rant adequate for coupleting r.n arca cearch within two or three days; dingaontic services for asnessucnt of a possibic detected device; advisory cervJces on safiny and diz}.ocal of ponnJble nuc] ear e> plosivec; and a tolnir. :1 nrray of detection equip ant for ronitoring vehicles at road-blocho. Needed funding f er 1 ot h equipocat, procurecent, and training of pan.onnel t.o opera t e the equipnent ju $3.5 n1111on. 4 b i i i. 1 s e 4 f 2 4. * ! b 4 9 1 N 4 \\ J 1 f

_____.m._ _m.__ t l r Exhib1_t_2 t,/2/75 1 3

SUMMARY

TAEK FORCE REPORT f } ON PilYSICAL PROTECTION SAFEGUARDS DEFICIENCIES ( i j.,n, Hackrround r On September 25, 1972, the President. issued a memorandum which directed the ectablishment of a Conmittec to Combat Terroricm. As a consequence, l l-the Atomic Energy Commissic.n evaluated the ability of its facilitics to I withstand terrorist attacho and subnequently requested, in a 1ctter dated J May 20, 1974, t o the Director of OSm, cupplemental funding in the amount of $3~/.6 million to correct deficiencier, in the physical protection system. 0313 revieued the request and recommended supplemental funding i of $18 million to upgrade safcguards in transportation of significant quantitics of special nucicar material. Congress reduced the cupplemental funding to hnif of that requested and added $2.5 million for safeguards research and development. Refh eting increnned public and official alarn over the pocribility that SEM vill be diverted, the Chairman of the h tional Security Council, on April 2'/,1974, cent National-Securi ty Decision }'emorandum 2M oa the subject of don.cstic safrgoords to the Chairrrn of the Atcric Energy Connir,e lon.

  • Ihc memorandum indicated that the Prer,ident had directed that a priority cifert he dedicated to ensuring the adequacy of the safe-

- guarda systeu end requested that the AEC " submit an annual report on the aficetivenecn of the safeguards system, progrsm developments and related I !w rc::caneadations for his ccasiduation. "

m.w, National Security Study Men orandum 202, dated June 21, 1974, stated:

" Apart from ihe question of deliberate decisions by governments to mount venpons programs is the possibility of thef t of nuc1 car materials by radical organizations, revolutioncry groups or crimo syndicates and the prospect of deliberate sabotage. As the commercial nuclear pr.:cr industry expands and spreads throughout the world, the oppertunitics for such actions will increase. These scenarios can pose a serious threat.to U.S. security by raising international tensions, endangering Ar.erican citizens or facilities abroad, and possibly leading to military conflict involving nuclear explosivos or radioactive materials." On July 8,1974, the Associate Director of the Offica of Management and Eudget, Frank Zarb, requested that the AEC submit a report in compliance l-with National Security Decision Memorandum 234. The report was forwarded on Aupost 7, 1974, and in a letter dated September 23, 1974, Mr. Zarb recommended that the AEC's " additional safeguards efforts" be divided into three phases which ware: 1 a

i l Exhibit 2-

  • 1 I

"First - Immediate action to correct serious known deficiencies in the l U.S. safeguards system using currently available resources; "Second - Action to improve your present report by better prioritizing i needed actions, reducing the timetable for certain actions, and the inclusion of a plant-by-plant assessment of needed safeguards improve-( monts; and " Third - Action by AEC to prepare an expanded version of your August report to provide a finu and comprehensive base for all future Administra-J tion management, legislation and budgetary actions on this problem." The General Manager of the AEC, on October 9, 1974, appointed a task force consinting of representatives of four divisions and the Office of the Assistant General Menager, Controller. Consistent with the first recom-mendation of the September 23 Zarb letter, the task force was directed to " identify the most serious deficiencies at CM facilitics, and the correc-tive actions which con be taken during FY 197$ and FY 1976 uith available re.cources." The tank force proceeded to evalunte facilitics based upw a proponed revision of Manual Chapter 21:05 which relates to the protection of special nuclear material. The me.nual chapter had been revicued by the task force and its adequacy as a standard had been affirmed. The task force review was limited tc the idcutification of deficiencies in the physical protectiva of trigger quantitics of special nuclear "j j - material. It did not include: 1. Rescatch and development activities or transportation improvements which were included in the FY 1975 supplemental budget. Protec-tive requirements for special nuclear mterial in Icsc than " trigger" quantitics are now being studied. 2. Material control and accountability activitics. These have been the subject oi recent exhaustive studies and adequate information concerning deficiencies in this area is available. Problems connected with the safeguarding of less than trigger quantitics of SNM are currently being studied for the purpose of determining if smaller quantities should be placed under physical protection. 3. Transportation items for which additional funds ucrc' included in the FY 1975 supplemental budget. 4 f 1 ( i as

t Exhir> i t 2' - A. Ohicetives The primary objective of the task force review was to evaluate deficiencies that involved protecting trigger quantitics of Sh'M that could be used to produce a varhead or bomb. Objectives of the task force were as follows: 1. primary obteetive - To protect from an outside threat involving theft ci a nuclear weapon. 2. Second331 0blect_in - To protect from an outside threat involving theft of a nucicar component. 3. T_crtiar_y Obiective - To protect from an outside threat involving theft of SNM. In line ult.h the above objectives and criteria, the task force dividad the AEC sites into four categoriec as noted in Enclocurc 1, with the venpons sites being f.hc primuy objective. In addition, withir, thase nites raticr:le for u;.' grading var eutablished. Thm.c general objec-tives and rcLionale are noted in Enclosure 2. B. Renul ts of Field Of fice Submittain and Task Force llevinu Fic1d office submittals to correct all safeguards ar.d cc:urity 4gg deficiencies totalled 083.3 million. Of this amount, $26.9 million ~' are either (1) being funded or planned for funding in FY 1975 and FY 1976, (2) involving natorials control and accountability of SNM, or (3) deleted as not being of innaediate importance, and not included in the results of the task force review which follows. The remaining field office deficiencies that require corrective action as determined by the task force total $56.6 million* con-i sisting of: Operating Funded Items $ 8.5 Capital Equipment

7. 4 General Plant Projects 9.2 Line Items 31.5

$56.6 The task force identified field office rec,uests for additional guards separately from other items. A summary of the task force recommenda-tions is noted below and further details are provided as Enclosures 5 through 8.

  • Cost summaries by program and location are attached as Enclosure 3.

l l 1

i r 5 3 fxh 11.,i t 2.i 1 Additional l Deficiencies Guards s (in millions) l i Complete Ucapons $ 4.6 $1.7 Nuclear Ucapons SNM 10.0 3.7 Large Quantitics of SNM 20.0 1.5 SNM Requiring Substantial Procenning 13.6 1.3 TOTAL $48.2 $8.2 C. Conclucions and Recommendationn I Although the field office submittals cover many items to upgrade safe-guards and security deficiencies, correction of these items will only I j be a first step in solving the overall AEC safeguards problems. Several areas need to be further resolved, such as the establishment i of uniform criteria for physica] necurity, safeguards of nuclear mate-l riels and reci:.tence against a certcin cize terrorist attack, so that l sites can be evaluated on a consistent basis. l f It is also recommended that an in-depth study be made by SS (on a site-l by-cite basis) to detelaine (1) the effectiveness of cnisting sites, (2) the improvements gained by correcting the field office submitted dericiencies, and (3) reccmmendations for further corrective action necdca. i ltfad In addition, it appears the overall guard force at the AEC sites needs to be substantially upgraded primarily in terms of training, age 1cvel and capability to resist potential terrorist attacks. l It should be recognized that if the plan of action to correct deficicn-cloc for the safeguards program is similar to that followed for the Fire, Safety and Operating Conditions program; i.e., using a set percentage of available GPP, existing capital equipment and uporating funds, serious implementation problems could exist at the field offices. This has been caused by the impact of having to correct OSHA,-EPA, fire safety, etc., deficiencies primarilv vi*hin existing stringent budgets over the past 3-year period. Further restrictions on the limited available GpP and capital equipment budgets in order to cor-rect SNM deficiencies in today's environment of high escalation and i 1 inflation will affect the field offices' ability to meet its l programmatic missions. l D. Field Of fice Co=aenen on Task Force Conclusions and Reco:nmendations / In general, the field offices concurred in the conclusions and reconmendations of the task force, i l w

f f .I;xhib i t 2_ 5-l l LOCATIONS DY CLASSES 07 MATPI:IAL Complete Henpens or Devices I,.: l Pantex NV (NTS) LASL 1 !!acicar Weanonn Sm1 { Rocky Flats LLL OR/Y-12 SR RL SA (Area V) Larg _Quantition or Sm1 in rot e.ot.ini 1'encons 11rnble Tor n !!cund Sandia (Remaining Arcas) Idaho Tor tc:nouth Portions of C'l/ANL f.M Portions of ORNL 4 SNM Requfrinn Substentini Procennig ORNL (Remaining Arcos) Cil/AKL (Remaining Arcan) Cll/EliR-11 Cll/ TREAT Cll/Brookhaven Cll/Sattelle - U. Jciferson \\ s J er

c. l Exhibit 2 Enclosure 2 1 CENERAL OBJECTIVES /J:D RATIONALE j i 4 The task force recognizes that, because of varying local situations, it is not possible to establish objectives having universal application.

Ilowever, in general, the following corrective measures should be given the priorities indicated:

1. Ihrjmeter Alarm Systems A perimeter a}crm systent provides early detection of intrusion by inaintaining constant curve 111ance over a fence Ifne. Achieving surveillance of this level could otheruise be achieved only by increasing guard patrols to a frequency which would not be economi-j cally feasible. Thus, where perimeter alarm systems can be used, cuard patrols can he reduced and the guard positions used for l response to alarms, improved access controls, and other essential dutics. Several perimeter intrusion alcrno have been apprnved by the Divi-sion of Saf eguarda cad Security as a consequence of extensiva field I Ichts. I ITuen adequate lighting is provided, cle;:ed circuit telecision systeen may cleo serve as perimeter alarm syste.r.s or be used in conjenetion with them. 2. Cuards Over the years, extensive economy measures have been leveled against AEC and AEC contractor guard forces uith the result that guard force strength at a nuinber of locations is cicarly inadequate. Training has been reduced in frequency and scope because of the costs and i raanpewer involved. At some locations, such as Les Alamos, special training facilities were abandoned and the instructors reassigned. Because of the necessity for adhering to a seniority system, younger, more physically able guards have been terminated during economy drives while older guards have been retained. This has, resulted in - raising the age of the average guard at an AEC facility to 47 years. Labor relations policies have impeded the application oi strict physical standards, thus permitting continued emplovment of physically unfit guards. As a consequence, AEC and AEC contractor guard forces now range in efficiency from " poor" to " mediocre." i

v V ' Ev.h f b i t 2 Enclosure 2 (cont'( Guard forces require inprovement through the application of physical standards, the hiring of younger, more vigorous guards to fill cxisting vacancies, expansion to provide more frequent patrols and to man new posts and by providing for additional and continuous training. 2 :::A 3. Fencing In the early years of the AEC, a concept of " security in depth" per-mit tcd the establistment of large security areas around smaller fenced arcas and buildings, thus providing " buffer zones" betueen the material requirin ; protection and the areas to which the public had access. During the economy drives'of the 1950's and 1960's, the buffer zones were abolished and the smaller fenced areas, and, in some cases, the walls of the buildings containing the material were regarded as the only essential barriers. Alt. hough it was recognized at the time that this arrangement did not constitute a very satis-factory security arrangement, econo.nic pressures and the desire of the Co:r. mission to open areas and buildings to public use prevailed. Under new nLvin'ards publiched in !!cnual Chapter 2405, arca con-taining special nuclear material vill now require feucing. Unicss such fences are erected, the application of perimeter alarm systems and adequate access controls vill not be possibic. h'hile it 2.s recognized that a chain link fence does not constitute a very formidable barrier and that it can be breached in a matter of seconds, fences are essential to the control of traffic and to pro-vide a recognizable linit which, if passed, constitutes an intrusion, i 4. Linhting Perimeter lighting now used at many AEC installations was installed in the late 1940's and early 1950's. Incandescent luminaries, which are now obsolete and provide only minimum illumination, were.used. At that time there was no standard to be met. Since then, standards have been established, lightin!; technology has been improved, and existing luminaries have deteriorated with age. Good lighting is essential to guard patrols from the standpoint of morale and efficiency. 5. Hardened Guard Stations s At the present time, there are no hardened guard stations in use at AEC iaciliLics. With some exceptions, guard stations have tradi-tionally been of temporary construction and designed for protection h-

. = - - 'Erhibft 2. Enclosure 2 (cont'd.) l \\ l l i I from the weather rather than from small arms fire. At some locations, such as'the Nevada Test Site and at Los Alamos, guards are in l isolated positions, many miles from aid. At others, such as Pantex, guards are controlling acecon to oitco containing complete nuclear I weapons. At such locations, as well as at those where large quanti-I M_ tics of special nuclear materials are involved, hardened guard stations should be provided. A hardened guard station is one capabic of resisting small arms fire (.30,.357 magnun) for a period long enough to permit a guard to summon aid. Ordinarily, such guard stations vill make use of bullet-recistant materialc, such as polycarbonate plastics and stcc1 shecting. 6. Duress Alarms A durcsc alarm is a relatively low-cost item intended to permit a guard to num ion aid without une of a radio or telephone. Thus, 11 a guard is being held at gunpoint or is under attack, the eingic action of puching a button or turning a cuitch ic enough to signal a guard I headquarters thr.t the guard needs aid. 7. Finht Vision Devices Hight vision devices are a relatively recent development. These raose lb preferred amplify ambient aght, such as that emanated by stars, dictant lights, and so on, permitting a guard to see into chadov l areas or those which are totally unlighted. These devices are l particularly useful ou night patrole and provide guards with a means of assuring that an intruder is not hiding in darkened arcas. They are much preferred to cearchlights because the guard in ucirq; them l does not reveal his position and so make himself vulnerabic. 8. Communications In general, communications at AEC facilitics are adequate. Tele-phones and radios are ordinarily both availabic at AEC guard ctations. If they were not, however, they would be regarded as a very high priority item. In some instances, portable transceivers (handy-talkies) are not availabic to guards and should be provided. I ~ a l

-- _ ~. _ _ - 3 g . '. Exhibit 2 9- (cont'd.) i '9. 11ardening of Guard Vehicles I In responding to alarms, or in making routine patrols, guards are relatively vulnerable to san 11 arms fire. liardening the vehicles in which they recpond would provide a low-cost method of providing some additional protection. 10. New Constructio_n At some locationn (e.g., Pantex) new construction is required to accommodate expanded guard forces and to provide more secure loca-tio.as for communicationa centers. While there are more pressing i iteta thich should be given higher priority, the task force believes that new construction of this type is also relatively important. I 4 4 i 4 5 l ,

  • E a

i J 5 \\ 4 4 f as

I ExhthRt 2 Encicsure 3 TASK FORCE REPORT Total Costs by Program (In Thousands) "4-Oyerating Cap. Equip. _ CPP Line Total Mll,ITARY APPLTCATION AL 2,273 4,738 3,966 5,107 16,084 NV 500 390 200 1,090 OR ('l-12) 380 360 9,240 9,980 SAN (LLL) 1,007 36 702 1,745 RL 157 157 4,160 5,164 5,385 14,347 29,056 PnopDOT'J ON OR (PORT) 961 10,700 11,661 RL 587 46 1,812 2,445 M SR 921 869 135 1,925 ID 101 205_ 0 306 2,570 1,120 1,947 10,700 16,337 REACTOR RESMARCil Et 11EVELOPr'hX i CH 524 494 1,135 2,153 ID 101 202 83 386 RL 212 22 465 872 837 718 1,683 3,238

0 T.xhibit 2 Enclosure 3 (cont'd.) Operating Cap. Equip. GPP Line Total RESEARCII Cll (B11) 60 70 182 650 962 ...e OR (Om1L) 700 _5,900' _6,600 l 760 70 182 6,550 7,562 RRD ID 102 117 ~219 BIO:EDICAL AND ENVIRODENTS EEARCil RL 59 0 59 _ TOTAL _ Sol DE'JTcTENCIES 8,408 7,189 9,197 31,597 56,471 WA i s l l 5 0 9 l i \\ s l l l i l

+. ) Exhibit 2' Enclosure 4 I t I NUCLEAR 11ATERIALS SAFEGUARDS ASSESSPENT COST SU124ARY I Cap. Line 8 Oper. Equip. GPP Itam Total t } A. PROJECTS 4 t Complete Weapons $ 280 $2,667 $ 1,700 $ 4,647 Nuclear Weapons SNM 3,288 2,714 3,967 9,969 Large Qty, of SNM 24 2 3,057 2,499 14,227 20,025 g, SN11 Requiring Substan-tial Processing 564 1,317 11,703_ 13.584 TOTAL PROJECTS 242 $7,189 $9,197 $31,5.97 $48,498 i B. CUARDS t Complete Ucaponn $ 1,687 $ 1,687 Nuclear Weapons S'.:M 3,733 3,733 l Large Qty. of SN ! 1,542 1,54' SNM Requiring Substan-I tial Processing 1,284 I 1,284 ,) TOIAT. GUARDS $ 8,246 $ 8,246 C&Y 9 TOIAL $ 8,488 $7,189' $9,197 $31,597 $56,471 1 t i 1 1 ) I s s l

1 '.Er.hib i t 2 Enclosure 5 TASK FORCE REPORT 1111 CLEAR 1%TERIALS SAFf: GUARDS ASSESSMENT +- CO:.iPLETE WEAPONS (in 1,000's) Cap Line Erogr:in incntion Item Oper, guig CPP Item Total i IM Px Singic Connecting Fence $ 596 $ 596 lu Px Perimeter Alarms $1,700 1,700 11A Px Ilarden 4 Cuard Stations 337, 337 IM Px Armor 3 Fncort Vehicles 30 30 1% 1;V Provide Covered Box for Transport 50 50 Truck IIA NV Harden Portable Gronod Zero 200 200 Guard Sta tion tu IN Harden Peinanent cuerd 200 200 Stations liA LASL Perimeter Alarms 410 Area 125 125 1M IASL Harden 410 Area Guard Stations 16 16 1:A LASL Double Fence - Bldg 410 Area 124 1.24 lih RF Install Perimeter Alarms 625 625 1R RF 11arden EEW Perimeter cates 430 430 11A SAN /LLL Install Perimeter Alarms 214 214-TOTAL $ 0- $ 280 $2,667 $1,700 $4,647 Additional Guards Location Additionci Cost Additional Guards (in 1,000's) Pantex' $ 675 51 Nevada 500 20 " LASL 53 2 32 Total $1,637 103 e

. - ~ l. .'.:IL-SA $ ~ T* - Ds c3 c t e+1 <a TAST FORCE Rt.r0RT 4 10Ci'.D.P.1%TERIA1.S SATECUAnDS ASSE3sME::7 l-NUCLEAR WEAPONS S"M (in 1,000's) Cap Linc Pr,orrnm heation Titl e Oncr. Enuh CPP trem Total r }m Px New Security C-ssnd Center $ 907 $ 907 la Px Procurc 2 V-100 Armored Cars $ SO SO }% Px Armor 3 Patrol ".' chic 1cs 30 . 30 i tm };V Armor Escort 6. 7.esponse 50 50 Vehicles 1% IN Purchase 2 V-100 f.rrored Vehicles 60 60 13 LASL 11arden Tour Cutrd Srt. f ons $ 64 64 0 0 P.A Lt.5L Perimeter A1.:re s (5 Areas) 500 500 PA LCL Central St.:tio:? Moniter Equipment 545 545 1% _ IASL Rer.ote A10tn Peints 76 76 6 In.provements 1% IASL TA-3, Specc & Door Alorcis, Fence, 400 170 570 Lights, Porta". Monitors 6 i - L1dg. 1*.od s I la Lt.SL TA-41 Space AL:rms, rence, 130 60 190 . Lights, PertaL Monitors & Eldg. Mods )% IASL TA-21, Space AL:2res. Li. hts, 270 115 385 i Sidg. Mods }% IACL TA-IS, Space A1:rms. Light s, 170 70 240 Bldg. 11ods 1% IASL TA-c, Space Alar .s, Lip. hts, 120 50 170 Bldg. !!ods 11/. 11.SL TA-35. Elds. & 7ault Mode, 90 ,90 ; Lights 1%' IASL TA-16. Fence t.iyhts 65 65 1% 1ASL Std. Quip. f e,r IA-3,8,16,18,21, 307 307 35 ar.4 t.1 1% LASL 11arden Gu..rd 11Q & Cc muni-25 25 cctica:: Center 1% 1ASL Armor Escorr 6 strol Vehicles 20 20 1 18 IASL Purch ve 2 V-1CC Ar.nred Cars 80 00 lu Rr A1:.= Syrte, Mo. s 2,500 2,500 1% RT Ar::or P: tic! Vehicles (3) '30 30 }% RF Por:hase 2 V-100 Arcored Cars 60 SO }m SAf;/LLL itarden Guard Srcrior.s 346 346 in SAN /l.LL Ir.s:211 Addf tion.s1 Lighting 60 60 la Y-12 1.-:reste.. Ale ms 560 500 W N .Y-12 ft;r.:le Li phtin:: 360 36D 11 M , SR Perie:u:r.:. Altrma 6 Fences 259' 40 299 M*! SR Feri; ster Alatr_s & renecs 371 371 1 1 DS SR DrJcn Ct.:r.! liecres 25 25 4 P.N SR 7ar: hose Ar.ored Vehicles 54 54 1_ ris - RL-I:.st:A1 tosie nnec (234-52) 236 236 i im RL Drter Cer. d Station (2M-52) 175 175 !!A RL 3as:all Irarusirn Alaro (231-Z) 81 81 i 1 - );M RL Turch.tr e 2 Orard Vehicles 9 9 ) 1% SA(AreoV) P c;T:. rte r Ala rr,s 147 147 la SA(AreaV) U:. 2cn Gr.te fixre 182 182 ' ~ T0 ! *., o $3,288 $2,714 $3,967 $9,969 i I 4

I l1 ., nyy. ..g. r*'***- i Locatica Mditinnni r.e.t .s.ddi tiet.at Cun rd a (in 1,093':.) Rocky 11nts 775 47 LLL 1,007 05 l Y 12 300 20 793 39 SR B5B 36 RL 0 0 CA $ 3.733 227 7t)TAL ,1,/ Tleld office r siir..: t t nl .a I f ne it c.on ; tanl: force i eco:viendo funited es CIT. 1 4 I l I i f 1 I l l 1 4 l \\ i l l l l i i l l l ( ) l

= l r.1,11,1 t _ 2_ Pnelcher 7 i TASK PORCE REPORT NUCLEAR !!ATERIALS SAPEGlMRDS ASSESSMENT LARGE QUANTITIES OF SN!! (in 1,000's) Cap Iten l ' Prcy,rnm Loca tion Titic Oper Eauip GpP Line Total l Im Px Upgrade guard equip, add'1 equip. $ 28 2; : 1 MA NV Night Vicion Deviccc 20 2( : l }% NV Special Guard Support Equipment 10 1( : In LASL Durecs Alorms, Night Vision Devices & Armored Yests 20 2( ! MA RF Night Vision Devices (12) 95 9.t MA RF Radiometric Scanner Devices, etc. 835 83.' l MA LLL Install Fencing $ 20 2( l!A LLL Purchase irraored Recponce Vehicles 32 37 i 1M LLL Install Riot Gun 11oldcra 1/ 1/ MA LLL Night Vision Devices 4 t-1% LLL Install Panic Alarms 62 6: MA Y-12 Rey Card Controls 13002/ 1300 MA Y-12 Utility Remote Monitors 640_/ 640-2 MA Y-12 SMM Portal Monitors 61002/ 6100 l lu Y-12 Itaterial & Supplies for Guardo $ 80 80i PIB1 SR Radio for Patrol Cates (330-M, etc.) 13 13 PIDI SR Add Roving Gur.rd Patrol 98 6 10!: PIEl SR Hire Training Specialict 30 30, l PIst SR Purchace Law thnpon: 18 16 ; I PliM SR Purchase Armored Vents 4 4 PIDI SR Durcss Alams (Protected Arca Catec) 28 28 j I?DI SR Equip. for Special 1capens Training 7 7 i Pi;si SR Vault-Typt Alrrms 20 20 l PFL: SR Elcetrenic Door Controls 10 10 PMM SR Night Vision Devices 30 30 P101 SR 1;uress Alams (773-A) 7 7 l PP.*1 SR Radios-Patrol Gates (105-C,P,R cte.) 17 17 l PFE! SR lietal Detectors 25 25 PIB1 SR liarden Guard Stationc 70 70 Plni RL intrusion Alarns (235-5Z) 400 400 PIDI RL CCTV-Fence (234-57,) 135 135 RRD RL Intrusion Alam (209-E) 26 26 .8 Pl&1 RL !!ardon Guard Section (200-E) 175 175 Pini RL !!arden Guard Stations (300 Arca) 173 173 RRD RL Harden Guard Stations. (209-E) 44 44 ' RRD RL Install Double Fcace (209-E) 85 85 ! RRD RL Install Intrusion Alar.ns (316) 1 9 9 P?S! RL !! rcen cuard Statien (2JO 'O 175 175 i I

t l 27 27 l l P}Di RL Install Doubic Fence (224-T) 12 12 [.PFH1 .EL . Install Fence Alarms (224-T) 52 52 RRD RL Install Doebic rence (303) 8 8 Pit! RL Might Vision Povices (?00-k') 57 57 IMI RL Install Doorway tienitor (224-T) 8 8 PtD1 RL Night Vinion Davices (235-5Z) 76 76 ITA RL Doorway Moniturc (23 t-7,) 209. 209 PIDI RL Doorway Monitors (23'i-5Z) 38 38 Pt21 RL Doorway :lonitors (2736-Z) - 18 18 PtD1 RL Purchase 2 Cuard Vehicles (200-E) 4 4 RRD ' llL Night Vicion Devicen (209-1:) l I l i r l l l-1 i 1 l l l - l l 4 i l l

} t i I i t 3 Exhibit 2 Enclosure 7 (cont'd.) Cap Item rorgam Location Titic Opci-Equip GPP Line To rr.1 RitD RL Doorway 11onitors (209-E) 38 38 RllD RL Purchusc 2 Vehicles (300) 9 9 RnD RL CCTV (209-E) 21 21 RRD RL Night Vision Devices (300 Area) 15 15 RRD RL CCTV (300 Arca) 106 106 RRD RL Doorway Monitors (318) 19 19 RRD RL CCTV (308) 65 65 MA SA Supplemental Fencing - Area V 42 42 11A SA Secure Conviunications u/ Guard RQ 42 42 IM SA Replace 3 Material Access Doors 70 70 MA SA Portal Monitors 126 126 MA SA CCTV 112 112 MA SA Space Alarms Systems - Arca V 7 7 MA DA Guard Equipment 10 10 1M DA SN/PP Area, Perimeter Alarms, ID 305 305 System, Portal Monitors, Buffer Zones, D1dga 37 6 50, Euffer Zones MA DA T Bldg., Perimeter Alarm, Alarm. 425 425 System, Portal Monitors, Buffer Zone 11A DA R and SW B1dgs., Alarm System, ID System 135 135 i MA DA Upgrade Connunicationc Center 210 210 MA DA Two V-100 Armored Cars from DoD 80 80 RRD ID Install Perimeter Alarms 170 83 253 RED ID Purchase 2 Patrol Vehicles 8 8 KRD ID Purchase Transceiverc 10 10 i Pi M ID Inctall Sp:.cc Alarmo 3 3 aRD/ lum ID CCTV at Material Accerts Arcas 24 24 !1RD/P&1 ID Portal Monitorn 34 299 333 f.RD/P;C1 ID Night vision Devices 10 10. Pifi . PORT Perimeter Alarms 6602/ 6603/l ItDI PORT Purchase 2 Van Trucks 762/ 762/! PID1 PORT Security Pcnces 5974/ 5972/l P;DI PORT t.igh ting 6162/ 6162/ PICI PORT D1dg Mods 1,218 1,218. PID1 PORT Construct Vaults 6302/ 6301/ P;DI PORT Rey Card Controls 70 / 79 / 2 2 PlD1 PORT TV 1:onitors 1,2001/ 1,2001/. Pit! PORT SNM Monitors 1,1202/ 1,17g2/ TOTAL $ 242 $3,057 $2,499 14,227 $20,025

1 l i l i I l .m. 4 -.. u... ADDITIONAL CUARDS L_ccation Additionial Coat Additional Guards i (in 1,000's) Dayton 311 22 i Idaho s 270 Por tcr..ou ti. 15. 061 40 TOTAL $ 1,542 77 i Minor amount - $370.00. n kcn do m so that equipment & CPP t n is c t Id b u d i i i e I

. - ~. - ( E:.h ild ? 2 _f.ncle tre S TASK TORCC RETORT t liUCLEAR ltATERIALS SATECCARDS ASSES::ME!.T SNM REQUIRING SUP,STANTIAL PROCESSING (in 1,000's) (!%yrE s Items Listed Are t;ot in Priority Order) Cap Line Program Location Ite:n Oper. Equin CPP Teen Total jt IIA OR/Y.12 Bldg }!odif - Cuard Changchouse $ 640 $ ~640 { P10{ PORT New Bldg - Storage 4,51? 4,513 R Ord;L Perimeter Alarms 441 441 R ORI:L Tencine. 407 407 R OA! L Lightiv; '140 140 R O';!;L Eldg ::odif - ind. vault storar,c and doortmy monitorH3,069 3,069 R 02:1 TV tioaitors 1,843 1,643 i RED Cli/A!!L Purchanc rcdio '2 2 ERD Q!/A L Cuard Post (331A) 47 47 . PAD CI//.::L Install Tence. Les, Gates (3311.) 36 36 101D QI/A?1 Cuard Shciter (3314) 4 4 12.D Cd/A!C, Key Card Sys te_, (3MA) 2_ 2 ' 2D Cll/A 1

i;ht Vision Devices (3314) 2 2

I ituD CI/A:1 CCTV (33L\\) 19 19 'EdD CI:/A::L Spaee Alart's (3311.) 11 11 IID QI/A;;L Portal Monitors (331A) 29 29 FID 'QI/A:1 Portable. Monitors (331A) 16 16 ~; T.".D ' Q1/A :L Cuard Post (315) 125 125 11D CH/A:;L Fences, Lts, Cates (350) 42 42 P2D' C?./A:s Roadwork (350) 11 11 ERD Cit /A:1 Nir,ht Visica Devices (350) 2 2 ERD CH/A:1 CCTV and Space Ali.rms (316) 24 24 EPJ).cn/A:1 Lock Systen nc.visien (350) i 9 9 II.D O!/A!1. Key Card Control (350) L1 11 RED Cl/A:1 CCTV and Space Ajar:.is (350) 32 32 EP.D Ci/A:2. Install 3r.dio (212) 2 2 U2D Ci/A :L Xey Caril Centrols (212) 4 4 l I 1.RD Ul/A:1 Fences Lts, Cates (212) 29 29 TRD Cli/A!1 Carri Text (212) 37 27 } 'htD ' C /A!1 Crilla, Roci, Fence (212) 12 12 i S EED C!/A iL CCTV and Space Alar =s (212) 71 71 E3D Cll/E2R-II 7acility Alsr:s 39 39 IAD O!/I3n II Fence and Li;;hting 172 172 P.tD Cl/E31-1: Cuard rest 187 187 EtD CH/Cn-II TacI11ty rests 12 12 ,13D C3/;31-!1 Cer.nen Equip 31-31 . ~... -. ..,.... ~... _ j 4 t 4 i .5 a 1 i l l l

~. _. ~.-. i f -l i - f ..,. ~. It l'nD Ct/ELR !! '.*:iliti:s, Site Work. ..- ai 42 42 1;RD Ql/Er't-l'. I:4 cric kiet Syste.a 42 42 l'J.D O!/C57.-11 Sifn: visi;n nevices 17 17 TZD CH/DI-!! CCf7 S.s te= TI.D, Cit /ES.1-1: ror:al'.% niters 83 83 305 .305 LItD QI/E!,2-I!'7ehicle.u.e.itors 52 LED CI/Est..'.I lortahic ::cattors 52, 4 2D i tRD CH/TE ;.7 rence. Ltg, Cates ~ 2R 30 30 RitD O!/13 L*.T

  • l r:3

= EED CI/n!.\\T CC I".* 6 6 - R Ot/311 SM: V..utt Ctrr.R) 4 4 .R Cil/E.5 Hr.rden Folice Com:a. Ctr 62 '62 R ct/ tat ccTV 73 75 25 R Q1/B 1 Upda:e free. Equip 25 30 11 G/L". b rabZn.a !!?S2, PA, and Guard Post 30 '45 45 R Q1/153 CCTV (Wul:c - Cuard Post) 15 15 ' R G/Bil Perimeter Fence 1 650 650 wrg

O

, SM 1.317 11,703 13,584 Additions 1 Cuards 4 Location Addit tn;ul Cost Addit innat Guards ,(in 1,000's) ORNL $ 700 40 AHL 300 20 Cri (E!!R 11) 210 15 CII (TCCAT) 14 1 nu t.o Total $1,2114 C0 i i i

j' r y _r.xhib i t 3' 4/2/75 SAFEGUARDS IT 1975 AM!?!!)MTJT ($ Thousands) L. eg Included in S.t.i.fe cu. n t d.o Ff 19 75 'mendrent.. Fi 1976 Capital AMFIGMi';;T Sa fgru ds C. r_e c_a ri e s Com'a jm:! et O'ecntine T.a u J rc.:'nt Con:.truction TOTAT. ne:;earch.:n.' Develop;nent. $ 24,583 $ 9,000 $ 9,900 Co;:xun; ice.t:f o nc 371 Trc.ne por tat i on 21,/:63 t P.h:nt Prot :c.t io n 40,002 8,l SS 7,189 40,794 56,471 i Re t cc J r 1 - Contcol & /.c count: b ; 11ty 18,3S 3,003 3,2'S SLO 7,933 i Detee. tion and ilnapense l Capabilit y 2,115 ?,165 ],370 3, 53.% Selected Resceren,

5. M5 M= *M Totr.1

$121.6O $24,156 11,PO4 $/ L 7"4 7 7, : '. 4 s / a e s

6. 4 , phibit 4 4/2/75 a UPDATED PROGRAM PIAN FOR T.RDA SAFEG!RRDS ACTIVITIES wu I. OBJECTIVES ~ e The general objective of safeguards is to achieve a level of protection arain=t villful cetions involving the possession of nuclear catericls or the sabotage of nuclear facilitics to ensure against a significant incresce in the risk of dca th, injury, or i property dar.anc to the public from other causes beyond the control ) of the individual. 'j{ The general objective can be wet by: (a) reducing the frequency of attempts to produce these sccictal conaccecnces; i (b) reducing the likelihood of adversary success when an attempt ~l ic mada; and (c) reducing the consequences of a succcosful act. i The cdversary nctions leading to societal consequences necessarily take pince in a ecquence,. hich will usually consict of a preparatory j } phe.t e, an accc. nna accuisitica phase, and, in the case of theft, a utilicatlon pb sa. With rer,ard to cdversary cetions involving inter-j cet ion with TPA'. nuclear f r.cilities and oc tivities.. i.e., the accesc and r.cquicition thase, ERDA has the pritury role of estr.blishing j policy, procedurcs, and of assuring adccuate impicmentation. ERDA j has only an ancillary role during the preparatory phase of an adversary oction sequenca and n >upp<....lve role during r esponce g.d)} g and recovery operations oy law enforcement agencies foa. lowing a thef t. He.tever, ERDA can and wi]l take the initiative in such areas as s' is proposing relevant legislation and assuring effective coordination !l artoog governc:ent ap,ancies having safeguards-rela ted func t'icus in d thcoc creas. i, l. l 'ihe fisure on page 3 is a schenatic of six clerents. It shows the li relationship of the four major functional arcac of the safeguards M progra ) (i.e., system evaluation and policy development (III), EPWA safeguards approval and inspection (IV), facility and transport saic-guards implementation (V), and interagency activities (VI)) and the associated research and development program (II). The following five parts of this plan describing the safeguards program' correspond to q these elements. 1, II. _R&D PROC W1 The R&D prop,ran described below has a total FY 1976 Congressional liudget of $24.6 trillion. An Amendnant to the FY 1976 bu3get is being proposed to provide an additional $9.9 million to permit the initiation during FY 1976 of efforts described below. 4 o j ..v

I 4:hibit I.

  • F.

s 4 A. Improve rent of Threat Definition is-directed tcuard an under-standing of the motivation, resources and rethods of the potential adversary and the expected frequency of atterpts at SNM thef t or sabotage. Current and Planned Actions: , n-1. Identify and characterize the nature and resources of j those clerents of society for uham attempts to create j cocietal conocqeences based nuclent events would j nppear to be an advantageote, method of achieving their ends. (FY-39/7) { 2. Provide a basis for ordering or ranking the most like]y targets and modes of attack in terms that vould enhance f cafcguards design and evaluation. (FY 1977-78) L. ,Trgrovement of Systfg Design and Eval uati on procedure 'is dir;cted a t c.n imp rovement in the nathcdology for systematic decign and evalec tion of the nafe; eards systeu. Based on a ctedy enti t]ed "The Societal Rini bproach to Safeguarc.s } Dece.3n and Evalna tica, " a preli:dnary s truc trre for de.cign l ans evalorrion h:2s beca definea. ihe s t ruc tte r e directly rel.ctes the safcauard.? mechaniras to the adversary actions to be countered end perr.its tha level of protzetjon to be gradcd L in terms o f both the IcVel of consequences that might arise from adver scry actions and the likelihood of their occurrence. W, _,} The evaluation or eficctiveness includes the questions of 3] uhether all relevant adversary actions are covered as well as j uhether the level o f protection is adequate. The full develop-nan '.: of this approach is a long-term effort requiring signifi-cant resources. I l Cment rnd Planned A__c.tions: 1. Define the scope of safegtt2rds through the identification of the events of concern and provide a basis for priority of action by ordering the events according to the level of estimated consequences to society. This will include considera tion of all events of concern, including i dispersal o f small quantities of plutonitua and other radiosctive raterials, and may require reconsideration of the trigger quantities no.a used to determine the j requirement for protection (e.g., 2 kgs, plutoniu:u). (FY-1976) i I Ii } \\ li I I

i 2-t SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM SCHEMATIC I. OBJECTIVES SAFEGUARDS OBJECTIVES r II. R&D R&D to Improve R&D to Improve R&D to Improve Economic and PROGRAM Definition of Safeguards Design Safeguards Political Threat and Evaluation Implementation Constraints Capability Capability III. EVALUATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT Evaluation of Policy Safeguards System Decisions. Promulgation of and Recomendation Safeguards of Improvements Requirements IV. ERDA Approval and Inspection SAFEGUARDS of Modt fied ' Approval APPROVAL & Facility and Transport and Inspection INSPECTION Safeguards Modified Procedures l Implementation Procedures i V. FACILITY Facility and Transport AND TRANSPORT Safeguards Modified SAFEGUARDS Implementation Safeguards IMPLEMENTATION Implementation i VI. INTERAGENCY Interagency ACTIVITIES Activities Modified . Interagency Activities l l a -...=-. m m. m s.

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IT. DD A of t and Insrection !M $ATTCUAR.:r3 Facility ced Tran: port l P ree wu ra s li ATT 4.0v/J. f.. tefetu uAe ,1, D5/60TICM Y h fifted I;T eeceta tion l ?<ne 3, e, 1lFactittyaniTranrport { Hedtfled s Y* UCIUU Safeguards (- ,i' $sfeguards

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p I 1 , f xh 4.b 1.t I4 -4" 1 l l I 2. Identify the generic adversary action sequences l i associated uith each event and order them according to the relative difficulty of perpetration as an jndicator of the relative likelihood of attempt. (W-19 76) l i 3. Develop adversary action decision trees in sufficient detail to permit assessment of the effcet of the ~ pretcetive techanier:s on each cetion sequence on a facility-by-facility basis. (W 1976-78) l l 4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the safeguards iTchanisms as applied to each of the adversary action acquences for various combinations of the adversary cttributes which affect the cap:bility to perpetrate the adversary action sequencer,. 'Ihe total set of j g combinations should reficct the credible range of' l poscibilitles for each of the adversary action 7 ccquences. (W 1976-78) C. Im:rcrement of enenbil't.- f or inM r:mnentinn du directed ..t j dnycloping oc seleccing r:ctheda, tuenniques, cnd devicer for: I - facility and transport protection again.sr urauthori: ed access to, or unauthorized renoval of 5"'.i fmm a fixed-site, buildin:;, or crea constituting a heility, cr unauthorized access i W.. to or control over SMI durdng any phase of trans-portation; - internal control and accounting to protect against activities on-site or in connection with transport, i that are directed at cabotage or diversion of SNM; i cnd l - liciting or reducing the consequences of events ~ caused by successful adversary actions. Current and Planned Actions: 1 1. Develop evaluation procedures for assessing periceter and internal control systens. (W 1975-77) 2. Develop, test, prepare specifications and de=anstrate 2 icproved physical protection equipment. (W 1976-78) I 3. Develop, test, and deconstrate improved censuremnt j capabilities. (W 1975-78) l og i .,w my. i

? 22hthlt 4 ~5- ~~ g 4. Davelop, test, and prepare specifications for personnel, Icchage, and vehicle portal conitoring devices. (1Y-1976) s 5. Complete the technical specifications for a decision structure and associated information flows relating to the operation of the safcguards cystem. (1Y 1976-77) ?V,. 6. Develop irtproved inspection procedures and guides which I perdit more ef ficient and effective inspection efforts. (FI 1976-77) I l III. EVM.UATIO'.' CD POLICY DiWELOPMENT A E'litJiRI.n_gnd Davalo,nment of the ERDA policy and procedural l D i p,uidelines in light of the safeguards sub-cbjectives and the j full range of adversary actions identified in the " Societal t Rick Approach to Sa feguards Design and Evaluation". The acheduling will depend on the availability of adequate staff. i Cu c. ent ; nd Plannd Ac tion.: i 1 1. Av.c e n thn coverage of cm rent E20.$ relicy a:d precedurcl d gubialines in effect to count er a.ncary actior" by force, stealth, and guile to gain access to, divert, rahorage, or re:r.a c: nnecici nuclear cate11.1 et facilities or in Lu nsport. ( Fi-1976)

I

,,gge,' 2. h< cess the coverage of the ERDA interagency arrangements j "'~ { relating to the deterrence and detection of adversary action during the preparatorf phas: cf the sequence and i tiw response and recovery activity tLat would follow a ouecessful thef t. (IT-19 76) j i j 3. Devalop and preculgate revised polic-j and procedural guidelinen to correc t any deficiencies and to relate the guidelines to sa feguards sub-objectives. A secondary purposa of the revision will be to segregate guidelines i for npecial nuclear material physicel protection from those concerned with protection of classified information I or valuable property. (IY 19 76-78) 4 B. Develoji a public information policy regarding the disclosure and non-disclosure of information that affects the societal risk nricing froa sabotage or thef t of ESM. i t 4 4 a I i

1 1 ',4 ~ Ifxhibit 4. 4 1 Current and Planned Actions: 1. A National Security Council study on the " National Security Aspects of P.eleasing Safeguards Procedures ? and Data on Nuclear Materials," is scheduled to be complete and fo marded to the President for his consideration by March 28, 1975. 2. A study of Public Information policy to establish the i best vay to enhance public confidence in safeguards and thereby to diminish the lihelihood of attempts. ( F i-19 76) 3 l 3. Establish policy and procedural guidelines to icplement y the approved recon:nndations of the above studies. (n' 19 76-77) t I i IV. ERDA_ SAFEGUARDS APPROVAL AND TNSPECTION .l 1 These operations are mainly conducted by ERDA field offices; however, } c o w.: appraisaln and increcticas are conducted by the U2A Headquartcrr. liivisic>n o f Sa feguards and Security. They are directe? at assuring l tMt donert.ic f acilitj plans and procedurcs are nppecpriate and th.t ,1 they are it.pletanted e ffectively. ERDA facilitics subject to safe-guards and security are int.pected at least annually by ERDA personnel. [ In addition, nine ERDA field of fices and ten area offices are audited. ), app

  • aired, and inspected by the lleadquarters Division of Safcguarh 1

and Security. j The IIcadquarters inspection effort has been limited to conducting inSTections of only select doncstic installations and field offices, ) because of severe shortages of staff and travel funde. One alternative 5 under consideration to provide for core effective inspecticas and broader coveras.e is to establish reglenal inspection activities } under Headquarters direction utilizing the Chld offices survey staffs. This arrangement should of fer ore flexibility of operat"'.tn and reduce the Headquarters inspection staf f. } I

  • Current and Planned Actdons:

s 1 1. Conduct inspections. I 2. Review inspection procedures to assure conformance with revised ,f policy and procedural guidelines. s s j 3. Consider establishtent of regional inspection activitics to j provide more effective and broader coverage of inspeccions. j } .. ~ -

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E . E-d ibit 4 4 -7~ 3 4 V. l'ACILITY AND TRANSPORT SAFECUARDS IMPLEMENTATION i This involves the actual safeguards operations carried out b the various ERDA program divisions and contractors in accordance with ERDA policy and procedural guidelines. When new guidelines or requirenents are itcued, plans or procedures must be developed by the contracter and be submitted to ERDA field offices for cpproval. If the nov requirerents involve significant resources, there vill be an -interval between issuance and implerentation j 'vhile plans and budgets are prepared and approved by the ERDA j ficld offices and progrt_m divisions. This program function ~~ includes both physical protection and internal control and accounting 1 I oubsystems. . I j Ihyrical orotection techniques are directed to the protection ]j against adversary actions (uhether by force, stealth, or guile) involving: (a) unauthorized access to, or rer. oval of designated L materici from a fixed-site, building, ' or area constituting a fccility; or (b) unouthorized accens to or control over designated rntt:rici during any ph=.se of trarsportatien not within a protected fncilitm j } Current and P1:nned Actions: .1. hpand guard forces and improve their capability to respond ,j to c=:rgencies by use of electronic and rechanical guard t supplements and aids, including extensive installations of g'j clectronic intrusion sensors and doorway ronitors for detecting s unauthorized removal of S:0!. (IY-19 76) p I 2. Procure and put into service specially designed vehicles and comunications equipment and c: ploy arred escorts for the trnusport of significant quantities of Covernnent-owned SN)!. (W 1976-77) 7 ~ Internci centrol and accounting subsysters and techniques are directed to generation, reporting, and analysis of information .j ~ 1 concerning the nature, amount, and location of material to be ' protected; to rapid detection, and localization of losses or '[ diversion,' and to credible assurance that control is maintained. i .' s Current and Planned Actions: s 1. Improvement, on a plant-by-plant basis, of systems and components to provide for: (a) ture completely measured, 30-day physical invent.ories; (b) improved measurements between material balanc e l areas; (c) appropriate uce of scals; and (d) limits of crror j analysis for =aterial balances in process arcas. - et u .u el y . ~. u. k

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e I ~ l Fu'iding required for application of physical protection is reflected in E' 6ibit 1. b'ith respect to implementation of internal control I cud accounting techniques, Program Division budgets total $19.3 i teilli.on for this ef fort in the President's Budget for FY 1976. A total. of $7.9 million is proposed as an Amendment to the President's Budget to Congress for incressing 1Y 1976 effort in the foregoing area of internal control and accounting. VI. .II.G. EP. '.U.CICY ACTIV_ITT P.S EBr.A.ectivitics in this area inclule liaison and consultation i uith Inw enforcerent and in telligenc e u;t :.cie:. at the national and local. levels. EilDA vill provide technical assistance in the j dcrcicpment of planc and procedurcs for deterrence, interdiction, cud pursuit and recovery where nuclear caterials are involved. i 9 Also, 12DA technical capabilitics will be established and taintaincd ns required to support in teragency crcr eency preparednesr, plana cgur.' y nuclem ca bo tage, dispercal, c r c::placien and to support an s.:rch and rccovery procedures ce;.uc ted by other ager.cies. 4 i Cu:r: t nnd Tlm. :ed Ac t jor... 1 j 1. Col.3ect free and corre. late with other Federal Agencies and j Interpol information for use in ansensing actual or potential j d.cuestic or foreign adversary capability or cctivity. %L. W.] 2. Initiate interagency efforts to clarify the areas of 4 recponsibili ty of governmant agencies to ensure an integrated 3 rz:.ction to neclear theft or threats prior to the occurrence ) oL' cn international nucicar event. ( 3. IL..rticipate an a working group t.=ber in the develoorant i by the Of fice of Prepareducss, of a Federal Response Plan for Nuclear Energencies (FRINE), which would define the ' } Guvernnent's reaction and areas of renponsibility in the case of an international nuclear event as well as nuclear accident. 4. Erevide to other Federal agencies technical advice, a ss is tanc e, ~ ~ c.cd support with detection equiptent for recovery of SNM l c.nd provide for appropriate training of other Agency's staff I ca new techniques are developed. \\ e 1 I 9 4 y y 4 '= e e t

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