ML20134K347
| ML20134K347 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 10/25/1996 |
| From: | Myers H AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134F331 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9702130256 | |
| Download: ML20134K347 (4) | |
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i P.O. Box 88 Peaks Island, ME 04108 f
October 25, 1996 i
Hon. ShirleyLJackson Chairwoman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissicn Washington, D.C.
205550-0001
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Dear Madame Chairwonan:
I am. writing in reference to your October 18, 1996 letter that discussed questions I raised in several letters addressed to you, including' letters dated August 10 and August 14.
I respectfully take in my view, issue with specific items in your October 18 letter which, the fact that the j
does not address a critical element of this matter:
i
- NRC staf f appears to have allowed Maine Yankee to operate at 2440 M'ft to operate without having followed. procedures for allowing the plant in this j
when it doec not comply with significant safety regulations, i
case requirements specifijd in TMI Action Plan Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31.
The original question concerned the staff's basis for allowing Maine Yankee to operate notwithstanding noncompliance with Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) requirements and related questions.
in particular, the Commission's position In previous letters I sought, 1996 Order to the regulatory basis for the January 3, with respect that allowed Maine Yankee to operate in circumstances where the plant did not comply with SBLOCA requirements specified in TMI Action Plan Items II.K.30 and II.K.3.31.
"The Commission supports the Your October 18 letter states:
action of the Director of NRR in issuing the Order in accordance with his general delegated authority to issue orders to power reactor lic-the ensees in order to protect public health and safety under including the authority specified provisions of 10 CFR Parts 2 and 5,Since I am awarc of no documents indicating in 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2). "
(or its under-that the Commission has considered the January 3 Order I would appreciate your providing documents lying rationale), indicating the manner in which Commission support of the action of the e.g. documents Director of NRR was discussed and/or expressed:
including memoranda, meeting records, etc.
Please note that a previous request for information with respect sought documents indicating
- to staf f reliance upon 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2)
.the dates.on which. this provision was first brought into the discus-The staff produced no document indicating that the staff sion.
considered use of 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2) prior to late April 1996, nearly The belated ref-four months'after issuance of the January 3 Order.
erence to 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2) leads to the following questions:
When.the Director of NRR explained to you the basis for the 9702130256 970131 9
".d PDR COf9tS MtCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
. October 25, 1996 Hon. Shirley Jackson did he January 3 Order (prior to issuance of that Order),
explain the use of 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2) as a foundation for that Order?
When were the other Commissioners informed of the use of 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2) and its belated invocation?
in noting the use of 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2),
Your October 18 letter, indicate the nature of any analysis demonstrating, pursuant does not to 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2), that the reduced risk resulting from the 90%
restriction compensates for the increased risk resalting from noncom-I have noted previously the pliance with II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31.
seeming misapplication of 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2).
In particular, 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2) contains language that allows the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to impose restrictions on f
reactor operation if it is found that evaluations of Emergency Core cooling performance are not consistent with other provisions of 10 CFR 50.46. In its belated application of 10 CFR Cooling System (ECCS) 50.4 6 (a) (2) to Maine Yankee, the staff has.ited the 2/40 MWL limita-tien as the 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2) restriction.
The staff, however, in its ref erence to 10 CFR 50.4 6 (a) (2), failed to note that ongoing non-f safety
_ compliance with II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31 resulted in a level othat would exist we less than the level provisions.
At this time, as far as I know, there exists no analysis findings (performed under the constraints arising from the post-TMI e.g.
the findings that large-led to II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31, loss-of-coolant accident analyses did not necessarily bound that that demonstrates whether the total break credible design-basis accidents)
(as belatedly interpreted) is or is not a effect of the Order restriction as envisioned by the Commission when it promulgated 10 CFR It has not been established whether the 90% limita-
)
50.4 6 (a) (2) ; i.e.
tion (clearly a restriction) along with the decision to allow operations without have performed analyses required by II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31 (clearly a relaxation) constitute a net restriction or a net relaxation of regulatory requirements.
What analysis undertaken under the constraints Questions remain.
findings that large-break loss-of-coolant arising from the post-TMI accident analyses did not necessarily bound credible design-basis accidents has been conducted to demonstrate that (A) the 90% restric-tion in conjunction with (B) operations being allowed without together j
compliance with the provisions of II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31 And if constitute a net restriction pursuant to 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2) ?
j is indeed relying on the analysis cited in your October 18 j
the staff is the regulatory basis for the NRC staff to use a mode letter, what a mode that assumes the large-break LOCA to be the of analysis (e.g.when the TMI accident showed such reliance provided a bounding event) false sense of security?
Simply put, TMI demonstrated that small-break LOCA's could lead to consequences as dire as those resulting from large-breaks, and that prevention of such consequences required, among other things, analyses such as those specified in II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31; it is unfortunate, therefore, that the NRC staff seems
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- dion. Shirley Jackson October 25, 1996 l
ting business as though TMI had not happened and d
. intent upon con uc that the'important lessons learned therefrom did not exist.
4 Again, with respect to the staff's belated invocation of 10 CFR "The staff was satisfied 50.4 6 (a) (2), your October 18 letter states:
that Maine Yankee would be operated safely at the reduced power level, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2), but did not perform an inde-pendent SBLOCA analysis because it was determined to be unnecessaryHow could the s with the restrictions to be imposed."
the reduced power fled that Maine Yankee could be operated safely at level, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2), when all the available evidence indicates the staf f did not even consider 10 CFR 50.46 (a) (2) until nearly four months after issuance of the January 3 Order?
the licensee's approved Your October 18 letter states that large-break loss-of-coolant accident analysis bounded credible design-basis accidents."
It appears that this statement contradicts the NRC rationale for the imposition of the requirements of TMI Action i
Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31.
My understanding is that these
- he lessons of the TMI acci-j requirements were imposed because one of ses did not dent was that large-break loss-of-coolant accident ana.s 4
If this is the necessarily bound credible design-basis accider.tt.
how can it be that the reduction of Maine Yankee's power level to 2440 MWt means that the plant is sufficiently safe at this level?
l
- case, What analysis has the NRC staff done to develop a position regarding the power level at which the large-break analyses bounds credible thereby making the requirements of II.K.3.30 design-basis accidents, and II.K.3.31 superfluous.
I note that neither your October 18 letter nor your
- Overall, Frizzle states that you believe McIne Yankee October 7 letter to Mr.
Instead, you sug-is in substantial compliance with NRC regulations.
2440 in your October 18 letter that operation of Maine Yankee at gest and in your is " consistent with the public health and safety" MWL October 7 letter you stated: "Overall performance at Maine Yankee was considered adequate for operation."
The Commission's inability to state that Maine Yankee is in substantial compliance with regulations seems to contradict the following paragraph from your October 17 statement to NRC staff:
I want to address a few remarks toward our expectations of lic-ensee performance and the emphasis of our own regulatorysee a real dan oversight.
I tinctions between safety and compliance in our regulatory the concepts are bound tightly to each other.
program.
In fact, A licensee's compliance with our regulations and license condi-to our confidence in the safety of licensed l
tions is fundamental i
As I have said any number of times, if there are activities.
requirements on the books that do not have to io with safety, we should remove them through the well-established processes to make such changes.
It is untenable as a reculatory acency to reculatory recuirements can be ianored.
I recognize imolv that as an agency with limited resources and staff, we must
- that,
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, October 25, 1996
-Hon. Shirley Jackson i
t make informed choices in applying our resources to the most safety significant activities or challenges requiring our over-This drives the importance of a risk-informed approach sight.
to regulation.
By focusing our resources on those significant adher-issues and maintaining high expectations for licensees' (until and unless they change),
we ence to existing requirements will strengthen the quality of our oversight and public confi-We will enhance consistency and objectivity in our dence in it.
and thereby help to ensure fairness evaluation and enforcement, to all. [ Emphasis added.)
Also, as I have indicated previously, it is now apparent that the safety issues at Maine Yankee are greater than those arising from the vis-That is, degradation in safety, original RELAP5YA allegations.in full compliance with Commission a-vis the level implicitexceeds the degradation resulting from noncompliance with regulations, Matters brought to light in TMI Action Items II.K.30 and II.K.3.31.
1996 by the Integrated Safety Assessment Team, by the NRC Inspector and by Maine Yankee's review of its working environment
- General, the probability of a severe indicate tha prior tc the 1996 findings, that implicit could well have been substantially in exceve of accident the existence of problems in compliance with regulations.
- Moreover, of the type identified this year (some of which have not been fu1]y corrected) means there is a significant likelihood of there being as-yet undiscovered hardware and procedu ral saf ety deficiencies.
The significance of this year's findings is enhanced by allegations made by one former NRC Maine Yankee Project Manager and the recent placing on administrative leave of another such Project Manager.
l In light of the totality of matters that have surfaced at Maine the Commission address directly the Yankee in 1996, I again urge that question of whether at Maine Yankee the level of compliance with regulatory requirements has diminished to the point where protection of the public safety cannot be assured in the manner required by the Atomic Energy Act.
l Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely, f hlA Hen R. My
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